Chomsky on Anarchism.pdf - Zine Library

CHOMSKY ON ANARCHISM
So it seems that I have (wo choices: to keep (Q the general issues offreedom
and common sense (as dictated by a sense of duty); or to discuss specific questions
of power, justice, and human rights. 1fT were to take the latter course, I'd
have to keep to questions to which I've given some thought and study. Thus in
the case of national self-determination, I would feel able to discuss the question
of Israel-Palestine, but not that of Northern Ireland. In the fo rmer case,
what I have to say might be right or wrong, smart or stupid, but at least it
would be based on inquiry and thought.
At a conference like this one, the second course seems to me the appropriate
one for group sessions or for the general discussion that will follow. For the
introductory comment such as these, the general issues seem a more proper
choice. So, I'll follow the sense of duty and keep to some general remarks about
these-but limited ones, so that we can turn the discussion of more concrete
and urgent matters without undue delay.
On the matter of common sense and freedom, there is a rich tradition that
develops the idea that people have intrinsic rights. Accordingly, any authority
that infringes upon these rights is illegitimate. These are natural rights, rooted
in human nature, which is part of the natural world, so that we should be able
to learn about it by rational inquiry. But social theory and action cannOt be
held in abeyance while science takes its halting steps towards establishing
truths about human nature, and philosophy seeks to explain the connection,
which we all sense exists, between human nature and rights deriving from it.
We therefore are compelled to take an intuitive leap, to make a posit as to what
is essential to human nature, and on this basis to derive, however inadequately,
a conception of a legitimate social order. Any judgment about social action
(or inaction) relies upon reasoning of this sort. A person of any integrity will
select a course of action on grounds that the likely consequences will accord
with human rights and needs, and will explore the validity of these grounds as
well as one can.
According to one traditional idea, it is a fundamental human need-and
hence a fundamental human right-to inquire and to create, free of external
compulsion. This is a basic doctrine of classical liberalism in its original 18th
century version, for example, in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who
inspired Mill. Obvious consequences were immediately drawn. One is that
whatever does not spring from free choice, bur only from compulsion or
instruction or guidance, remains alien to our true nature. If a worker labors
under the threat of force or of need, or a student produces on demand, we may
admire what they do, but we despise what they are. Institutional structures are
legitimate insofar as they enhance the opportunity to freely inquire and create,
Out of inner need; otherwise, they are not.
For people with any faith in the worth and dignity of human beings, this
is an attractive vision. We can proceed to draw from it a whole range of conclusions
about legitimate institutions and social action.
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