Download transcript of talk given by John D Coles, CB FREng

The Royal Academy
of Engineering
The Future Aircraft Carrier
- the engineering and technical challenges
of designing and building
the largest ever warships for the Royal Navy
Tuesday, 20 March 2007
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
1 Victoria Street
LONDON SW1
Speaker:
Chairman:
John D Coles, CB FREng, Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF)
Integrated Project Team Leader, Ministry of Defence
Sir John Parker, FREng, Chairman, National Grid plc

THE FUTURE AIRCRAFT CARRIER
The engineering and technical challenges of designing and building
the largest ever warships for the Royal Navy
Tuesday, 20 March 2007
Speaker: John D Coles, CB, FREng
Sir John Parker FREng (Chairman): Distinguished guests, ladies and
gentlemen, may I bid you all a warm welcome to this Royal Academy of Engineering lecture.
The fact that we have some 240 participants assembled here at 4.30pm on a Tuesday shows
that this lecture concerns a topic of great interest.
Perhaps I am biased but, as a naval architect and mechanical engineer, I have yet to
come across a major project which demands such a unique combination and range of
engineering disciplines, than is required for the design of a nuclear submarine or a major
complex surface ship such as the proposed aircraft carriers. Retaining this specialist
engineering and naval architectural skill base in the UK, plus continuing to recruit a raft of
new graduates, will be vital to the success of this and other current naval projects, including
the Astute nuclear submarines and the new deterrent submarines over the next 25 years.
The Royal Academy of Engineering, working with other engineering institutions, is increasing
its outreach efforts to double the number of young people in our schools to be introduced to
the excitement and challenge of an engineering career.
Our speaker this afternoon, John Coles, is a true engineering professional, for whom I
and many others in this room have enormous respect. John Coles was awarded a Royal
Corps of Naval constructors Cadetship to study at University College London. Following
appointments associated with the design and acquisition of ships and submarines, he joined
the staff of Flag Officer Submarines at Northwood in 1978. In February 1982, he headed the
British Admiralty Office in Connecticut, United States, overseeing the design and integration
of the centre section of the Vanguard class submarines.
On return to the United Kingdom, he was Assistant Director for Future Naval Projects,
based in London. Reassigned to Bath in 1988, he was the Design and Acquisition Project
Manager for the Vanguard class submarines and, later, the Project Manager for Batch 2
Trafalgar class submarines. In 1992, he was appointed as the Director of Works to manage
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the completion of the large civil works programmes at the Faslane Naval Base and nearby
armament depot at Coulport in Scotland. He attended the RCDS in 1994 and, on
completion, was appointed Superintendent of Ships at Devonport.
John took over as the Chief Executive of the Ships Support Agency in September
1997 and became Head of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors in April 1998. In 2001, he
became the first Chief Executive of the newly formed Warship Support Agency, now part of
the DLO (Defence Logistics Organisation). In 2004, he became Director General Nuclear, a
role in which he is accountable to the Chief of Defence Procurement and Chief of Defence
Logistics for the coherent delivery of the MOD’s nuclear programme.
In December 2001, John was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Engineering
from Bath University. In 2004 he was elected as a Fellow of the Royal Academy of
Engineering and was awarded the CB in January 2005.
John took up the post of Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) Integrated Project Team
Leader in January 2005. The project is at the forefront of SMART Acquisition, and is using
an innovative alliancing approach that is bringing together the MoD and Industry to deliver
the two new carriers to time and cost. John represents the client in the Alliance and is
Chairman of the Aircraft Alliance Management Board.
It now gives me very great pleasure to invite John to present his lecture. [Applause]
THE FUTURE AIRCRAFT CARRIER
- The Engineering and Technical Challenges of
Designing and Building the Largest Ever Warships for the Royal Navy
John D Coles CB, FREng
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. Thank you, Sir John,
for that introduction, and to the Academy for giving me the opportunity to talk about some of
the work undertaken by the Ministry of Defence and industry over the last seven years or so
on this fascinating project. Conducting public procurement on such a project brings with it at
times unwelcome but ultimately unavoidable interest from the public, the media and
parliamentarians.
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Media attention
A sample of recent headlines is shown here, and most of these occurred last week.
Questions from parliamentarians, select committees, members of the public and the media –
particularly following the Freedom of Information Act – add enormously to the task of
managing such a complex project.
[Photo]
Since I assumed responsibility for this project two years ago, there have been 35
freedom of information requests; 87 full ministerial responses and 83 parliamentary
questions, covering subjects ranging from the procurement of valves, to the date when the
first ship steel will be cut. That is reflected in the public interest and attention that this project
attracts. Therefore, when I was approached by Sir John to give this lecture, I decided that
sharing information about the project with such a body might help to reduce the burden on
myself and the team – although somehow I doubt that.
Before we delve into the current project, I would like to recall briefly the first use of air
power from sea in support of the UK’s armed forces, which is approaching its centenary.
History of carrier design
Early experiments were often very dangerous, as this footage shows. [Video shown]
These are sea planes being lifted onto some earlier carriers, as they were called, launched
off a gun barrel, and railway lines. Very tricky – keep the nose up. At least they rescued the
pilot! Note the hesitation amongst the crew – this is not quite the health and safety of the
nineties. [Laughter]
This is a very busy flight deck, and there are lots of planes in the sky.
The first operational use of air power from sea occurred on Christmas Day, 1914, with
planes attacking the Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven by nine sea planes flying from three ships.
The ships themselves were actually converted cross-channel ferries. The results were not
spectacular in military terms. It required the deployment of some 150 ships in a variety of
supporting roles – 150 ships for nine sea planes. Regardless of the lack of success of this
mission, sea-based aviation has developed rapidly, with very ships deploying large numbers
of fast jets either in support of naval operations or of a land battle. They are being deployed
for long periods of time, without shore-side support.
[Photo]
The US navy carrier Nimitz class, shown here, is an exemplar of delivering air power
from the sea.
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Requirement – policy background
The requirement for the UK’s future carriers, or CVF as they are known, stems
directly from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, set in motion by the incoming
administration. This policy was re-endorsed in the New Chapter work published in 2002 and
then by the Defence White Paper in December 2003, and summarised in this slide in the
2005 Defence Strategic Guidance.
The CVF, with its embarked air group, provides the means to put up excursionary
warfare in support of the land campaign from the sea, avoiding the need for concrete
runways and permission for overflights. In short, the UK can intervene at a posed threat at a
time of its choice.
Invincible class plus Harriers
This national capability for ships with embarked aircraft and support equipment is
known collectively as ‘carrier strike’, and offers a considerable increase in capability than that
currently available in the Invincible class, equipped with Harrier GR 9s.
CVF – tasking spectrum
Of course, while the ships’ early design is for this primary task, history teaches us that
they are more likely to be deployed on a much wider range of tasks, captured in this slide.
The range of tasks extend from preventing conflict to full scale war fighting. The majority of
their time, however, is engaged on preventing conflict.
The delivery of carrier strike capability requires even more than the carriers
themselves. First, there are the Joint Combat Aircraft, the offensive elements, also known as
the Joint Strike Fighter, or the F35 or, in the US, Lightning 2, which is replacing the GR 9
Harriers operating in Joint Force Harrier. The aircraft have been developed by Lockheed
Martin in three variants: in CTOL (Conventional Take-Off and Landing); STOVL (Short Take-
Off and Vertical Landing), and CV (Carrier Variant), equipped with the capability to be
catapulted from and arrested on a ship.
There is considerable equipment and component commonality between these
variants with all aircraft are capable of operating in all weathers, day and night, flying strike
missions and conducting offensive off-ground operations when forces are ashore. Aircraft
such as the Joint Strike Fighter, equipped with precision guided weapons, are much more
effective than aircraft were a few years ago. Each JSF can successfully engage several
targets where, historically, several aircraft would be required to neutralise just one target.
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JCA (CTOL)
A pre-production CTOL first flew in December last year. The corresponding STOVL
version, the UK’s chosen variant, is scheduled to take its maiden flight in the spring of next
year.
Sea King Mark 7
The Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control Capability (MASC), the role currently
provided by the Sea King Mark 7, is also required for the carrier strike. Studies are
underway to consider updating or replacing this capability for the CVF.
Afloat support will enable each carrier to remain on station for a long time, provided
by new ships under the Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability programme. All of these
projects are yet to enter service and in fact each of these programmes – JSF, MASC and
MARS – is at a different stage of the procurement cycle, which adds enormously to the
complexity of designing and building a CVF.
Beyond these headline programmes, there are a many more labours that will be
required to deliver carrier strike. To ensure coherence across defence Rear Admiral Guild,
sitting in the front row here, acts as the Senior Responsible Owner, with specific
responsibility and accountability for the coherence of carrier strike across defence.
So far, I have outlined the background to the requirements in general terms, and the
key elements that would make that carrier strike capability. The process to turn these
concepts into military hardware is captured in the phrase ‘Smart Acquisition’, introduced into
the Ministry of Defence as part of the Strategic Defence Review that proposed to the carriers.
As a result, the project was one of the first to embrace this new doctrine.
It would take a full lecture on this alone to do justice to it, but suffice it to say that the
key ingredients are in place to enable delivery of the project. These include a clearly defined
customer, setting and funding the capability – and he is here today, too; to empower the
integrated project team to deliver the capability – that is me and my team; the early
engagement of the supply base – and there are lots of those here today; understanding and
allowing for the cost of ownership importantly, when spending considerable resources, of up
to 15 per cent of the total project costs, before final commitment to manufacture.
CADMID cycle – against time
And then there is a structured approach to acquisition, the so-called CADMID cycle.
This has six phases: concept; assessment; demonstration; manufacture; in-service, and
disposal – all of different lengths, of course, with a two-stage approach to the formal
approvals at the initial and remaining dates. CVF is currently in the third phase of the
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CADMID cycle, the demonstration phase, to ensure the design, build maturity, strategy,
industrial capacity, costs and, importantly, the risks, are fully understood and accepted
before the substantive manufacture and therefore costs are incurred.
Equally important, as we move through the CADMID cycle, is to consider whether
what we plan to acquire is what the customer wants – that is, the defence staff and the Royal
Navy. Defining the need, with a programme such as this, begins with identifying a capability
gap which, in this case, was fully explained in the Defence Review itself. The solution to fill
this need begins by identifying key requirements – which mean the mission to be achieved.
Key User Requirements
With the CVF, there are nine key user requirements (KURs), which define the
capability required. Each of these is supported in more detail by a series of so-called user
requirements documents (URDs), and there are typically 10 of these per KUR. A solution is
developed, which meets each of these URDs but, almost invariably, the result is too
expensive or too difficult to achieve. It is the responsibility of the IPT, in conjunction with the
customer and the supply chain, to examine these capability requirements and seek a solution
that would measure trade-offs, and meets the available budget. This is necessarily an
iterative and, I have to say, lengthy process, requiring both analysis and synthesis of a
complex set of variables.
It we mentally walk around this slide, I will outline a representative number of KURs,
with the security constraints of this unclassified presentation, in the time available, to look at
the cost of capability trade-offs.
The first one is inter-operability. This capability is essentially the degree to which
information can be generated, gathered, supplied, and distributed through a variety of
national and multinational systems. Such a capability may require an enhanced
communication fit, radars, antennae, as well as complex distribution systems and the ability
to integrate complex messages that the embarked staff can comprehend and issue the
necessary commands. The capabilities for trading are very wide including, for example,
intensive manpower that might be required to operate and maintain the systems.
KUR3: availability. The CVF shall provide one platform at high readiness for its
principal roles at all times. This one almost speaks for itself – but the trade-off
considerations include the life of the vessel, on-shore maintenance requirements, hit
reliability, system redundancy and readiness. It also, of course, drove the need for two
ships. The carriers have an availability which is very similar to that of cruise ships – of about
300 days per year.
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KUR6: aircraft operations. The physical size of the air wing, the volume of the hangar
and the sortie generation rate – that is, the total number of aircraft flights per day – are major
influences on the capability. Perhaps less well understood are the demands of high sortie
generation rates on weapon handling and spaces for weapon preparation, prior to their
delivery to the aircraft. Considerable modelling has been undertaken to optimise the ability
to handle a large number of aircraft on the flight deck and in the hangar, and deliver weapons
to them. Such modelling has inputs, for example, on the number and size of the aircraft lifts;
the arming and refuelling positions, as well as related matters of provision of aircraft
maintenance spaces, reading rooms, mission planning and so on. The trade space is
extensive.
And finally, KUR8: flexibility. This capability is virtually guaranteed with a ship of this
size, with its flexibility to be reconfigured to operate different aircraft and to operate, for
example, a landing platform helicopter role, similar to HMS Ocean, for humanitarian support.
Consideration was also given to fitting catapults and arresters, demanding space and
power throughout the ship, to fit future systems, representing a huge area of potential tradeoff.
The synthesis of these ‘ilities’, from inter-operability to versatility, together with our
expanded user requirements documents and subsequent analyses, produced a solution to
the required capability that is judged affordable and therefore build-able. Adjustments were
necessarily made to the URDs, although most of the major decisions were taken by 2004/5.
There are a number of solutions, all of which meet the KURs with their advocates.
What is needed …. A Treasury view?
This is what the Treasury thought we should have. [Laughter]
extremely low through-life costs.
Not much use, but
What is needed …. A Royal Air Force view?
This is what the Royal Air Force thought we might need – expensive, and useless for
military operations, but it has lower life costs.
What is needed …. A Royal Navy view?
And then the Royal Navy – which meets all the requirements but is hopelessly
expensive and unaffordable.
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… but this is the preferred solution
But the preferred solution is this one, since it meets all the KURs, all the URDs, and it
is affordable. Of course, we have gradually reached this one, after a number of iterations of
designs.
As well as meeting the capability requirement, the design was influenced by the drive
to use more commercial standards for certain equipment and structures, while pulling
through equipment from other naval programmes, to avoid development risks and
manufacturing constraints – of which more later.
The final design is known as Design Delta. In my view, it is elegant and innovative,
with many features reduced to cost of production and whole life costs, as well as a carefully
researched arrangement for the integral layout for competing spaces.
Much of the credit for this should go to BMT, for the fundamental concept design,
while under contract to Thales. Other companies, including BAE Systems at Govan and
Barrow, as well as BAE Systems Insyte, Converteam, Rolls Royce, MacTagger Scott, L3,
VT, Babcock and KBR, among others, have made significant contributions. The concept of
the design itself, the design development, procurement or manufacturing process – it is a
truly, national programme.
Initially, there were competing design proposals from BAE Systems and Thales UK,
which sought to address many of the issues I have highlighted. The conclusion reached was
that both companies offered largely complementary skills and that, by choosing only one, we
would lose some of the expertise and knowledge to deliver the programme. The Ministry of
Defence decided that utilising the skillsets of both teams to mature the design was the best
way forward. The alliance approach which was finally adopted initially between MoD, BAE
Systems and Thales was announced in January 2003.
Aircraft carrier alliance
The size and shape of the alliance continued to develop as the project moved through
development, to incorporate other players, as shown on this slide; KBR joined, and then the
shipyards – Babcock and VT.
Key principles are having a single, integrated team, with collective ownership of the
programme, including the risks, to deliver a project by minimising cost and therefore
increasing profitability. There is incentivisation to achieve outstanding performance.
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Alliance charter
Each of the chief executives of those companies signed up to a charter for the
conduct of business and, without top cover from the CEOs, alliances would always struggle
to deliver. An alliance must be based on innovation and support, as well as on a culture of
trust – typified, for example, by open-book accounting and the acceptance of a higher rate of
return and not simply chasing turnover. This reflects the experiences of successful alliances
in the oil and gas industry, as well as our experience in the demonstration phase, which has
had some considerable success in driving out cost.
Flight deck – STOVL and CV configurations
Turning to the design itself, we need to recognise that carrier design is an
exceptionally complex three-dimensional puzzle. This is the first adapted design that was
fitted with a ski-jump to operate the STOVL aircraft. This is a view of the flight deck. This
can be altered in service, if you wish, to accommodate catapults and arrester gear to fly CV
aircraft – so you would have two catapults here, one here and one there, an angled flight
deck, and you can obviously take off and have arrester wires here, to arrest the aircraft.
We had to accommodate both designs right through the whole process, which means
that you have a lot of space reservations as you go through the design.
A supply chain with over 30 major suppliers has helped to create a solution which
matches the capability required for the available budget.
Principal particulars (all approx)
The principal features are outlined on this slide. It is about 270m long on the
waterline, which is just under 900 ft. It is 40m on the beam (130ft), and at the start of life it
displaces about 65,000 tonnes, with a 10 per cent growth to grow over the life. There are
nine decks below the flight deck, with a minimum deck height of three metres – about 10ft –
to ease manufacturer and the running of systems.
These are, therefore, very large ships, in terms of volume, width and length. Indeed,
they are volume-driven, rather like cruise ships. The payload is not very dense – and that is
not, of course, a reflection on the passengers.
Design Delta
A comparison with current carriers of other nations is shown here. This is the current
Invincible Class; the Charles de Gaulle; the Nimitz class, and the CVF. So it is quite a large
ship, although not as large as the largest of course – but considerably bigger than the current
Invincible class.
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CVF-T45 Midship section comparison
This is the carrier in section. This is a Type 45 destroyer. You can see that the
sponsons on the side of the ship are equal to half a Type 45, by volume of course, so it is
quite large.
The other way of looking at this is by the size of the flight deck, which is four acres –
or two Invincible class, plus nine tennis courts. This always gives rise to the phrase that we
have widely used, which is that this is “four acres of British sovereignty”, able to be deployed
worldwide. It is an enormous capability to develop.
CVF size comparison
There is a danger in over-concentrating on the size and volume of these ships and, in
any case, size it not directly related to costs. There are, therefore, four principle size drivers.
First, the sortie generation is clearly influenced by the number of aircraft and therefore the
size of the hangar, emissions, and aviation support. Second, there is the provision of the
four a ‘for but not with’ capability, for fitting catapults and arrester gears, and that determines
the length. Third, there is the overall complement required to be put in the ship, particularly
given the more generous spaces for sleeping and recreation now required for all rates and
ranks. Finally, there is the tankage volume necessary for unrefuelled range at the cruising
speed. There are others, but those are the most important points.
CVF design standards and key technical issues
Let me say something about a few of the standards and general principles before
talking about the ships themselves.
General design standards and policies
We have used, as much as we can, Lloyds’ rules for structures and systems, and
also for commercial equipment – very much like the cruise liner industry – and, where we
need to, defence standards for military features. The transversals, across the ship, noise,
environmental – these, again, are based upon commercial standards. We have tried to put a
lot of the work from the cruise liner industry into these ships as well, where we have specific
standards, for magazines, ability to withstand shock and noise signatures. Although it
sounds like a commercial ship, it is still a warship, because it has all these features in it and,
where we need military features, it has those too. In any case, it is also painted grey!
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CVF principal features (1)
Let me talk about a few of the features. It is not very clear here, but there are two
islands as you can see, on many of these things. This is rather a novel feature, since most
carriers have a single island – at least, if they are conventionally powered – and they usually
have a long, thin island for taking the uptakes and downtakes. However, with integrated
electropropulsion and a long ship, you can actually move the engines, wider separated, and
have the exhaust going just up these two, because the gas turbines are sited high up in the
sponsons. The islands themselves are either for ship control or for flying operations, and
also they are the only places where you could really put antennas and that sort of thing.
I have talked about the 3m deck-to-deck height. This has a bulbous bow, probably a
French one, and you will hear more about that in a moment. It has trim flaps, which are
small things on the back of the ship to produce its good fuel efficiency. There is set use of
sponsons for all sorts of things around the side of the ship here, and you will see that later
on.
We have also built this in three zones because, since it is so big, commissioning will
be difficult. If you actually build it such that you can commission those zones separately, you
can reduce your construction time considerably.
The complement is only 1,500, which is with the air crew embarked. That compares
with probably about 4,000 for an American carrier. The size of these crews is very similar to
that of the Invincible class. Cabins are a mixture of one, two and six-berth, all with the same
features, or the same shape – and more of that later – and we have an integrated galley
complex, with provisions rooms below.
CVF principal features (2)
Some of the other principle features include - I have mentioned already, the business
about weapon preparation and handling. We have a fully automated weapon handling
system, which is probably the most innovative part of the design – and I will talk about that
later. It has a fully integrated electropropulsion system, which means that you can generate
either for speed, or just for the ships system – and it is fully integrated in the way that it is put
together.
Propulsion is two shafts, and the motors are very similar to the Type 45 motors
currently that they put on the Type 45 up at Govan.
The power generation is two MT30 gas turbines, sited high up on the sponsons, and
four diesels, in pairs, in two main chimney spaces. This is the gas turbine – and it is actually
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already in use in the American programme. This is part of the induction motor, which is very
similar for the Type 45.
General arrangement
I will talk through this slowly, to give you some idea of the overall general
arrangement. We have the two islands and of course, here are the zones for building these.
Most of the aerials are up here, and I will come to that in a moment.
The first space is the hangar and the workshop for the aircraft, which is 7.5 metres in
height, to work on the aircraft in the workshops and the hangar. These two spaces are for
the lifts, and there are sponsons for the gas turbines.
The ops complex is sited, as you might imagine, underneath the main island carrying
some of the more critical antenna.
The main auxiliary machinery spaces – each of the main machineries is actually sited
under an island for the exhaust, and the gas turbines are sited on the sponsons, high up,
considerably reducing the complexity or trunking, which traditionally in carriers went across
the ship and occupied huge amounts of space. In each space, there is a main and auxiliary
machinery space, for the distribution of the equipment power and so on, that needs to be
delivered in those spaces.
Aircraft operations: the whole of the back end of the ship underneath the flight deck is
devoted to what I would call briefing rooms, where the air crew keep their kit, and where they
do their pre-flight training, briefing and planning. This has been carefully thought out so that,
when the pilot leaves this area to go to his aeroplane, he just needs the key to put in the slot
and fly off. This has been very carefully researched.
Accommodation is shown in yellow. Vast areas of the ship are devoted to
accommodation, not unlike a cruise ship. That is three decks-worth of accommodation for
the 1600 people who we can actually put in cabins or bunks.
Propulsion machinery is back down here, because of course you do not have any
long shaft-lengths. You have a fully electrically integrated drive and propulsion motors can
be sited down at the back end of the ship, reducing enormously the complexity of your
transmission system and shafting.
We looked at pods on the outside, in the cruise line industry, but concluded, after four
looks at it, that it was too risky.
Aviation stores – we will pass over that.
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Galley and dining are here, as you will see shortly, above the accommodation
spaces, together with the spaces here and here [on slide]
Switchboards are above the main machinery spaces, both HV and LV. We have a
big medical centre for 1600 people and, of course, with no interim relief, you want a good
medical centre. This goes the full width of the ship, like a small cottage hospital, I would say.
There are lots of ships stores to put the kits in down here, and back there. There are
tanks for the Avcat to support the sorties required, and for diesel for the ship. Finally, there is
the mooring equipment to make sure that we can come alongside safely. It has a bulbous
bow and, although you cannot see it on this slide, it has twin flaps at the back, that are
covered from the rudders, aft of the screw. This is a large ship.
Mission system
I did not know whether to include this here, but I have done it deliberately – it is the
mission system. People talk about mission systems but what I wanted to show here is that
what we have done in this ship is to pull through technology from existing programmes, to
reduce both the development risk and to reduce the overall risk of integration.
Air traffic control is from the current naval air stations. The command system is from
a Type 45, adapted for those pieces. Long-range radar, Type 45. Shorter-range radar for
aircraft control are from the Type 23. The optical systems are from the Type 45 and Type 23
class frigates.
The precision approach radar is from the current CVSs. Phones are COTS
(Commercial Off The Shelf). There is a fibre optic network running around the ship, which
takes all the information systems in a single system, though there is a cross mix for
duplication.
All the communications systems – Skynet, VHF, conventional HF and VHF, are all
from existing platforms or from the CVS. The equipment is taken out of the CVS, that is
Invincible staff. It is refurbished, re-fitted, or re-cycled. It is to reduce the development risk
and put the money where we actually wish to spend it.
Flight deck ops
Finally, some of the engineering challenges. I have talked about sortie generation
rate a good deal. We have a model which looks a bit Mickey Mouse, but you could run
enormous numbers of serials of aircraft lining up and taking off. This is about 10-times
speed, and all the little things running across the deck are either pallets or weapons or carts,
to make sure that we get the modelling right, and that we have the right combination and
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space to do all these evolutions. Even on four acres, with a large number of aircraft, this
becomes pretty congested if you do not get your layout right.
This is what we use – it is called ‘SAILOR’. You can play with it endlessly, to achieve
the optimised layout of the flight deck and the spaces below. Sortie generation rate has a
huge impact upon the whole of the design.
Highly mechanised weapons handling system
The second one I wanted to talk about is the weapon handling system. There are a
couple of large magazines in the ship, with lifts to bring the weapons up into weapon preps
areas, and they can be joined together. It is the preparation of the weapons which is often
the long pole of the tent, for sortie generation rate. We have gone for a highly mechanised
weapons handling system – that is code for a system in which there are no people actually
involved in the movement of weapons, until they get up onto this area here. Even there, they
are moved around on pallets.
HMWHS – compartment arrangement
There is a series of rails and the weapons sit on these pallets, which are moved
across automatically into the lifts, up through the flight deck and then prepared. You have to
bring the pins or the fuses or whatever it may be, together in the same piece.
Pallet, mole and …
This is what one looks like. It was developed by Alstec and it is a very clever system.
It has been fully trialled, as I hope the next slide will show you.
Demonstration – Boscombe Down
We took this down to Boscombe Down. [Video clip not working] We will try to show
you that at the end of the presentation. It is a full-scale mock up of it, moving around on a
platform to show that it actually works at sea, to de-risk it before manufacture.
Cabin module system
Finally, let me turn to accommodation. We decided on another innovation, which is
also very similar to what has been done with the Type 45. The cabins come in flat-packs,
manufactured and selected. They are assembled ashore and dropped in, with everything
inside the cabin that you would want – whether it is six-berth or two-berth or on-berth. We
have about 500 units, which means that you can outfit the whole of the accommodation very
quickly, and they just hook up with air conditioning or extra power for the whole ship. It is a
very clever system, used widely in the cruise-line industry, and employed on the Type 45 as
well. There is extensive use here, and the manufacturer has clearly been selected already.
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Junior rates’ accommodation
Here is the final cabin – it looks like that and it is dropped into the ship. We have
mock-ups already, fully outfitted with everything in them from lockers to bunks and so on.
We hope that this will save a huge amount of money in outfitting, with joiners and fitters.
UK industrial base
If designing it was quite difficult, we still have to build it. There is certainly no single
facility in the UK that has the resources, capacity or capability to undertake its construction.
We have to match the demands of the CVF programme to the capabilities and facilities
available when considering the most cost-effective solution.
Block allocation
It is for these reasons that we have selected the programme today. If you go back to
that block diagram, which block here – lower block 4 – will be assembled at BAE Systems
facility at Govan. Lower block 3 is currently scheduled to go to Barrow, and the final one will
be at VT. Babcock in Rosyth are responsible for the Bow section. They will all be shipped
round and outfitted and taken to Rosyth for final assembly, while the upper blocks and the
islands will be subject to competition.
CVF assembly
When the blocks arrive, where this Invincible class is, they will come through here,
across the basin and into this dock at Rosyth.
Rosyth – looking North
They will finally be assembled in this dock here. It is quite a big logistics problem to
build in three or four places, finally transport it all and do the final testing and commissioning
in Rosyth for two ships.
Support. Much of my recent experience is drawn from my time, as Sir John
mentioned, in equipment and ship support during the last 10 years. With this in mind, and
with the imminent launch of the new Defence Equipment and Support organisation, in which
CVF will sit, it would be remiss of me not to talk about the long-term issues of support. This
is particularly important, given that the through-life costs are nearly three times the cost of
the actual initial purchase for a ship such as this.
At the outset, we need to make a major technical change to substantially reduce the
cost of ownership. Given that these ships are not intrinsically different, from an engineering
dimension, overall costs are unlikely to be significantly different from existing classes.
15

However, attention to detail and the introduction of the infrastructure, can and will make the
cost of ownership measurably lower.
A number of specific measures have been introduced to reduce the cost of
ownership. I have already highlighted the emphasis on keeping the crew down – it has been
huge.
We talked about fuel consumption, with trim tabs and the bulbous bow, to reduce the
cost of the cruising at that speed. At equipment level, considerable emphasis has been
placed on a selection to maximise equipment in use elsewhere. That has been a tenet of the
design process. As outlined already, virtually all the combat set equipment are in service or
will shortly be, reducing not only the development costs but crucially the support costs of
spares, manuals and, importantly, training as well as the repair loops themselves. Where
that has not been possible, we have used derivatives of equipment in service – for example,
the propulsion motors for diesel engines.
We have of course also looked at all the usual things that one would expect to look at
– removal routes, manuals, need for spares, cap of spares, use of condition monitoring, of
which underwater engineering is a feature. It is all much in line with initiatives over the last
few years.
Finally, adding to the complexity of this project and enriching it and strengthening it in
other ways, there is our relationship with France. To meet its own requirements for a second
carrier, France has joined the UK in a fully collaborative programme, adopting UK design as
the basis for its national programme. In return, we have incorporated a number of features
into our design which are important and necessary for the French navy.
Porte–Avians 2 (PA2)
The resulting French ship is shown here, it is as near identical as possible, within the
constraints of nationally differing operational doctrines. It has different combat aircraft – they
do not fly the Joint Strike Fighter – and of course national combat systems. The main visible
difference is that the French ship is fitted to allow aircraft operating conventional take-off and
landing, i.e, aircraft will be catapulted and arrested.
The commonality of design offers the potential for a huge amount of saving and the
procurement of equipment, engineering and other non-recurring costs. Beyond manufacture
support cost savings can be huge.
The detailed arrangements were captured in a joint MOU signed by the respective
Secretaries of State earlier last year. At a political level, the creation and the ownership of
16

such vessels gives a new opportunity for the conduct of military and diplomatic initiatives
within a European setting.
I started my working career as assistant constructor in a three-deck cruiser section,
known as the Invincible class. My task then – apart from undertaking the mundane, classical
design calculations for structures and dynamics – was to be the understudy for the
constructor dealing with aviation requirements. At that time, the Sea Harrier was hardly
capable of being airborne for more than a few minutes with any significant payload. Little did
I know that I would play some part in its successor programme some 30 years later.
Last Friday, I handed over responsibility for the project, to my relief, Rear Admiral
Bob Love, who needs to think, ‘I’ve started, so I will finish.’
The carrier strike capability is at the heart of the UK’s defence policy and represents a
quantum step in military capability for the UK’s armed forces. In my judgment, the project is
very nearly ready to enter the manufacturing phase – and that is my opinion, by the way.
When these two great ships, HMS Queen Elizabeth and The Prince of Wales, enter
service with the Joint Strike Fighter embarked, operated by the Royal Air Force, the
capability will provide a remarkable uplift for the armed forces. The ship is quite an
extraordinary product.
Thank you. [Applause]
[Video shown – had failed to function during presentation]
This is the platform built for the Harrier testing: a rig was put on it, fully operating, so
that we could show it operating in a sea way. If you look at it for too long, it makes you feel
seasick. That was one of the pieces of equipment that is not in use, for which we undertook
quite a comprehensive development programme, and we have done that with one or two
other smaller pieces.
Question & Answer Session
Sir John Parker: Thank you very much indeed, John. I should underline that
John has agreed to take questions but under Chatham House rules – as, indeed, the whole
lecture should be, even though it is John’s last day in the role. We must safeguard him until
the end.
17

Dr Mike Steeden (Defence Science & Technology Lab): John, you began
by remarking on press and political attention. First, perhaps I could comment on that. When
inspirational engineering programmes of this type attract more invitations from the likes of
Desert Island Discs than they do parliamentary questions querying cost and programme
management, I suspect then that engineering in the UK will be making real progress.
As far as my question is concerned, the Chair began by highlighting the issue of
engineering skills. How would you characterise the specialist technical skills needed within
your IPT, as opposed to those available in industry? What challenges have you faced in
finding those with the requisite skills to staff the IPT?
John Coles: That is a very interesting question, which is not easily
answered. Fundamentally, the IPT has to be sufficiently knowledgeable – sufficiently
knowledgeable – to be able to exercise some form of control over the project. It therefore
needs very good commercial skills and very good financial skills, but it also needs a degree
of technical awareness of the project and also of the components that make it up. The
Ministry of Defence simply does not have enough of those people to do it on its own and it is
partly for that reason that we have formed an alliance in which we have brought the skillsets
in industry to work alongside the Ministry of Defence, so that they are complementary.
This is the only way in which we can run a major project like this and, although I did
not have time to talk about it today, the alliance programme is delivered on a day-to-day
basis by Peter McIntosh, who was the former managing director of VT Shipbuilding. He was
seconded into the Ministry of Defence to bring that team together, and the requisite skills –
both from industry and from the Ministry of Defence. However, it is essential that we have
sufficient skill knowledge for all those domains inside the Ministry of Defence.
If you ask me – and this is a personal opinion, although it is shared by many others in
the Ministry of Defence – we are getting quite close to not having sufficient of those skills
inside the Ministry of Defence, at least at the more junior levels to grow them for the future.
We probably have enough to do that today, but only just – but we are running out of those
skilled resources. That is well understood in the MoD, and some steps are being taken to
correct that.
John Wilson (Grenville Wilson & Partners): What steps have you taken to
ensure the survivability of these vessels against outside attack?
John Coles: I think I have to say, sufficient. [Laughter]
18

Peter Hearne (Formerly of Marconi): I have three very brief questions. In
this country, we are not very good at large programmes, and this is the largest one that we
have tried for some time so it seems that there will be a fair amount of risk in it. Three of the
areas of risk are, first, that we are told that it will last for 40 years – but I find it difficult to
believe, in these days of asymmetric warfare that we can actually choose today the main
weapon of our country for that period.
The second of risk is that it seems to be critically dependent on the US defence
budget funding of the J35 aircraft, which we know is not entirely stable. The last question
relates to the issue of reliability and availability. Reliability engineering is a developing
science and it is one which we have not been as good at as the Americans. Are we really
happy that we can provide one carrier availability at any time – even when, as the previous
suggested, one of them may have been damaged by enemy action?
John Coles: On the question of the Joint Strike Fighter, I do not propose to
answer that. There are others who are responsible for that, so I will leave that to one side. I
have no doubt that it will go ahead myself, but that is for others to decide.
On your questions about projects over-running and so on, yes there has been a
history, but I would suggest that part of the reason is that you do not commit to your whole
manufacturing cost until you really understand the risks. Part of the time taken between
initial concept or assessment demonstration has been to de-risk it – to take out those risks by
selective decisions, some of which have been referred to. Until those risks are actually
bounded and accepted by the client, who is the Ministry of Defence, and the industry, and
they jointly own the risk register and then to the final cost, you would not proceed.
We obviously have a contingency for risks, and it is not insignificant for a ship of this
size, for building this long.
Your last question was about reliability. In my experience, certainly over the last 10
years, the reliability of equipment is very much greater than you might think. We have
recently contracted, in my experience, for ships not as large as this, which have availabilities
in excess of 300 days a year – more like 320 days a year – where contractors are willing to
take the risk of paying for ships that are not available. Modern equipment, carefully selected,
can give you an enormous availability. As to the layout of the ship - remember the weapons
system in this ship is the aircraft, and those can be changed. That is why the ship is flexible.
Commander Arthur Burnett (Offshore and Marine International Services):
You have not mentioned whether the flight deck is bomb-proof. That is my first question.
19

Secondly, you have not said anything about damage control arrangements. Some of
these may be confidential, while some may be significant for this audience.
Thirdly, the ships are vulnerable, as we said, to damage, and you have not said
where they can be dry-docked around the world. Are they available to go through the
Panama Canal – how do they get from the Atlantic to the Pacific, other than the long way
round?
John Coles: I will avoid the question about survivability and damage control,
because I would be straying into areas that are not in the public domain. I said ‘sufficient’
and ‘necessary’, and I will leave it at that.
There are sufficient dry docks around the world. There are in fact three in this
country that could actually take it, and of course we could also use France too. Large ships
will necessarily have restricted docking facilities and we just have to make the ones we have
in the UK available when we need them.
Commander Burnett: In the offshore industry, in which I have had long
experience now since leaving the navy, there has been considerable advancement in the use
of composites, to great advantage for weight, corrosion and usage. Does your design
incorporate the latest – latest – techniques in composite engineering? This is very important
where you want to save weight and to decrease maintenance and corrosion.
John Coles: There are two points here. I said this was a volume-driven ship,
so saving weight is not actually a primary driver of this particular vessel. It is not a primary
driver.
As to the use of composites, we use them in some places, but not an extensive
amount.
Commander Burnett: The offshore industry has shown that there are vast
areas of usage which are very un-thought-of at the present time, but which are very reliable
for various purposes. Weight is one, of course, but there is also corrosion maintenance,
which is a very important item too.
John Coles: The answer is that I know we have it in some areas, but if you
have extensive knowledge that we are avoiding or not taking advantage of, then certainly let
me know and I will put it to my team, to make sure that we take note of it. When you say
‘composites’, much of the pipework, for example, is made of composite materials. So, yes,
we do. If you are talking about insulation, yes it is. A great deal of stuff is being used, but
the term ‘composites’ is very wide ranging.
20

Commander Burnett: There are many areas in the offshore industry which
are very new and interesting, of which I am sure the navy could take advantage.
John Coles: We would be delighted to hear from you.
Speaker: I have two quick questions, but I doubt whether you will be able to
answer the second. On turnaround time, on converting the carriers from through-deck to
angle-deck – how long would that take? Secondly, has Phase IV been decided yet?
John Coles: On your first question, it would depend when you decided to do
the conversion. The lead time for the equipment is very long – several years – because
there is of course only one supplier, and they build ships fairly infrequently. The lead time for
procuring the equipment would take some time.
Even when you have procured it, the fitting time would probably take longer than a
year, to do the conversion. It would depend on how you chose to do it. You have to fit the
cats and traps, the boilers, the additional accommodation and everything that goes with it. It
is an extensive period of outage to do it, but of course you could do one while the other ship
was still running around. This is an expensive operation.
Speaker: The procurement – is it JSF? Is it just STOVL, or is it CV as well?
John Coles: As I mentioned in the lecture, the STOVL version has been
selected for the UK.
Speaker: And the Phase IV question?
the time.
John Coles: It has been decided, but all decisions are actually reversible at
Dr Peter Broughton (Peter Fraenkel & Partners): I have spent my time in
the oil business.
You are to be congratulated on this project because it is the sort of stuff which we, as
young boys, used to read about in the Eagle weekly newspaper. It was the centrefold, and it
would all be pulled out and explain how it would work
My question really concerns the process, and controlling the schedule and costs.
You put a little chart up there which is quite familiar to people in the oil business, and
probably other sectors of industry, where you have different gates and stages of approval.
My understanding was that you are approaching this main gate, where this is the final
estimate before you go for the full execution of the project. Am I right or wrong to say that
21

the cost at that stage is £3.6 billion per ship, plus a contingency of 15 per cent? Are these
figures correct, or is there something else?
John Coles: They are hopelessly misplaced, but this is the wrong forum,
wrong speaker, wrong time. It would be remiss of me, for all sorts of reasons – not least of
which being that you do not declare your hand until you have actually seen the contract.
Peter Broughton: Fair enough, but will they be published at some point soon
after these contracts are awarded?
John Coles: I am sure that our ministers will make the necessary
announcements, and they will put all the information in the public domain that they need to.
If they do not, the House of Commons Defence Committee will.
Imran Akram (General Atlantic): I have a question on a related point there.
You have mentioned a number of different bodies that you have involved here – obviously,
the Air Force, the Navy and the governments of two different countries. At the design stage
it is clearly easier to get everyone to agree, because it is all still up in the air and not yet
finalised. As you come to this point exactly, where you have to say, ‘Here is what we are
doing and here is the thing that is going to be built’, what steps have you taken to make sure
that you have properly aired this idea across all those different bodies and made sure that
they have agreement, so that you do not need to use up that contingency, and you do not
need to make costly changes after this date?
John Coles: Probably not explained in the lecture is the fact that we have
produced for industry what I would call ‘a solution to build to’. It will be a solution-based
contract and that is captured in a fully comprehensive specification which defines the ship.
That is signed up to a client, the defence staff, the industry alliance partners and –
importantly – the Royal Navy. If you want to change the specification, you go to my
colleague in the defence staff and ask him to provide some more money to do it. That is the
only discipline that we can apply and that is what we have done for this programme.
It is a solution-based spec, which you change only by asking for more resources from
the customer. If he has it, you might make the change. That is how it is done. The alliance
approach means that the risks of not delivering it are within the alliance and so you cannot
escape inside the alliance by saying it is someone else’s problem. It is the alliance’s to
solve, within the budget. That is why the risk provision is there, and it is jointly shared.
22

Sir Kenneth Warren: I rose to the surface immediately you referred to the
problems posed to you by parliamentarians and select committee chairman, of which I have
been one and both. The problem you face, Sir, is one of confidence. Parliamentarians and
select committee chairmen want to know what you are about and, too often, the MoD hides
behind the veil of secrecy when it really ought to be telling everybody what is being done with
its money. I have in mind in fact, if you go back to the Polaris programme, that Admiral
Rickover led that programme by new management technology. I noticed your statement this
afternoon is about the engineering and technical challenges but have you risen to the need
for extra qualities of management technology? If you can then describe those, in public, I
see no need for secrecy.
John Coles: Thank you for the reprimand – I did not mean to say that we
would not welcome it, but it is just an added burden.
I have not gone through the project management challenge because this lecture was
not about that. A great deal has been done about the project management of this particular
programme, which is a rainbow team with three levels of reporting – firstly into the
stakeholders, which includes the five principle companies plus the MoD, and finally into the
chief executives of those companies themselves. Much of this stuff – and I am very familiar
with the Rickover and the Polaris programme, and the Trident programme – is built into this.
In fact, if you saw the degree of planning that has gone on, you would probably be surprised
that we have a schedule that shows such detail. Like all plans, it has to stand the first whiff
of combat. I can assure you that a great deal of effort has gone into that – you are absolutely
right.
Professor Rudi Klein (Specialist Engineering Contractors Group): My
question relates to your reference to 30 major suppliers. In your alliance – as I counted on
your slide – you have five partners. How did the 30 major suppliers buy into the risk and cost
decisions? Or have they still to do that?
John Coles: Only the five alliance partners and the Ministry of Defence buy
into the risk pot. The other suppliers, of which there are many, have been selected mainly
for their equipment lead, or their specialist knowledge, and most of those are already
selected by competitive process. It is also possible that some of those will be formed into
sub-alliances, subject to final agreement, such that some of those risks can be cascaded
down the supply chain.
The essence of being a supplier to this programme is that you buy into the totality of
it, right from day one – and that includes overseas suppliers as well. Most suppliers actually
23

know about the programme, and most will be involved in the design process – in some cases
for several years. Most of their equipments are actually already specified. Perhaps that is
another thing I should say here – the maturity of this particular product, as you might have
seen from some of the slides that I have shown you today, is very high indeed, for prior to
actually placing a contract, with the involvement of many suppliers.
Simon Wallis (Collins Stewart): I am representing myself today, but I
started my career as a systems engineer with Lockheed Martin. I am now a more significant
tax payer as a stockbroker.
First, let me congratulate you generally about the programme because there is much
to be very enthusiastic about – and in particular, some of the labour productivity savings you
have made for the crew and the automation.
I have three related questions regarding mission capability. First of all, could you
contrast the payload of the French Rafale compared with the short take-off and landing Joint
Strike Fighter?
John Coles: The answer to that is no.
Simon Wallis: Secondly, but related – and these are obviously drawing the
same conclusion – can you tell me what the French catapult solution is?
John Coles: No, ask the French.
Simon Wallis: Thirdly, could you tell me what the Royal Navy catapult
capability will be and if there is an upgrade, perhaps relying on electromagnetic or what are
the options there, please?
John Coles: The ship has been designed to have a long catapult – and I will
not give you the length of it – based on US technology of both and steam and for
electromagnetic. When we take the decision to fit the catapults, we will choose the variety at
that time.
Simon Wallis: How do you generate the steam?
John Coles: We use a boiler. How do you do it? [Laughter]
Simon Wallis: Fair play! Thank you.
Sir John Parker: You should not have gone into stockbroking!
24

Professor John McDermid (University of York): In your talk, you did not
say much about the safety process and safety engineering, which is really quite complex for
a product like this. There are two particular factors, one being the flexibility and configuration
– in fact, you have a range of aircraft that fly from it, flotillas of support ships, and also the
flexibility that you talked about, such as changing to fit the catapult. Can you give me an idea
of how you would deal with some of those challenges in such a programme?
John Coles: Again, in a lecture like this, it is not possible to cover everything.
We have quite an extensive acceptance and safety regime built into the specification. So, for
example, we have to meet standards laid down by an external regulator, who is not involved
in the project, to meet – for example – stability, fire-fighting, and all the usual things, including
the evacuation of the crew. There is quite a complex process of external assessors, to make
sure that all of those issues have been addressed progressively through the design, and
certainly through the manufacturing phase, as part of the acquisition process.
It is no different from any other RN ship at all, and this is quite a well-trodden path.
Here, however, we have tried to lay it down from day one, so that people do not try to
increase the standards halfway through the build process, because that is when you run into
difficulties. So it is captured in the specification that I referred to – both the acceptance and
safety regime required, and the documentation that will be necessary to demonstrate to
external authorities. And there are trials as well, of course.
Tim MacDonald (UCL): This is another payload question, I am afraid. The
US navy is currently investing lots of money and research into unmanned aerial vehicles of
various sorts, and I was wondering how you see UAVs fitting in with the carrier, for its long
life?
John Coles: I could give you my opinion about that, and of course UAVs do
form a part of the wider naval programme. At the moment, however, I am just concentrating
on building the CVF.
Basil Butler: I am formerly of BP, and Devonport Royal Dockyard at a later
stage. I am very interested in your alliance contract system. I would be interested to know
what arrangements there are for incentives for the partners in this alliance, having had a
good deal of experience in North Sea operations, where the partners benefited greatly if a
project came in under budget. Is there any system like that for the benefit of the partners in
this project?
25

John Coles: Absolutely – both in the demonstration phase, which has proved
to be extremely successful both for the suppliers and for the Ministry of Defence, and of
course the risk and reward mechanism that we have in place. Obviously, I cannot go into
detail about it, but it incentivises very heavily the reduction in cost. Then there is of course
the risk provision which is partly there to be not used by the alliance as they go through.
It is in capturing innovation and the cost reductions in manufacture and design
development, where the risk and reward can be substantial. That is what we have tried to
incentivise, building very much on some of the North Sea oil work and indeed on some of the
principles adopted in the Terminal 5 work by BAA. Much effort has gone into that. Of
course, we can talk about great alliances and how wonderful they are, but I always tell
people that we have not yet actually got an out-turn. But yes, it is all there – all of it – and it
is quite well researched. There is huge debate about who gets which share of the pot.
Peter Blair (Smallpeice Trust): I am a director of the Smallpeice Trust which
encourages young people to become the cadre of the future engineering staff who will build
the successors, and refit and so on.
This is rather a detailed question. I was amazed to see TACAN listed on the
equipments that you had there because I am pretty sure that the US has closed down all its
TACAN and I cannot believe that JSF will carry it. GPS does the job. Is there a specific
reason, or is this another thing that you cannot tell us about?
John Coles: I can tell you the answer, which is that of course not all systems
are for the Joint Strike Fighter. Our current Harriers use the system that they would want to
employ on the ship, so yes, we do use it – it is a piece of kit taken to the CVFs when the
Harriers are engaged. I have to say that that is from my memory.
Peter Blair: So the ship will take Harriers as well?
John Coles: In the KURs, I talked about flexibility. A whole range of aircraft
are being considered for operation from this vessel, both in the short-term and in the longterm,
and helicopters as well. It covers a whole range of things.
Peter Blair: Thank you. I understand.
Captain Stuart Ellins (Young Engineers): I am fascinated about the
technical challenge about designing and the fact that you have talked very little about the
26

human element of actually delivering capability. Can you explain how you optimise the
manpower element against the equipment element, to achieve the best balance?
John Coles: It is quite difficult to do that in a lecture. You would have to go
through it equipment by equipment, and from operational space to operational space to do
that. All I can say is that if you take something like the weapon handling as a good example,
if we went to a conventional way of doing it, we would have to have 90 additional crew on the
ship. That is a good example.
If you look at the integrated electropropulsion system, and how many manned spaces
you have, that would also tell you things. What I probably did not and could not say is that a
great many of the spaces are unmanned, using optical systems for giving the state of those
spaces. A great deal of attention has been given to that interface between a man and a
machine – as indeed in many other areas in the Royal Navy – because it is of course the
manpower costs. In fact, I think I am right in saying that about half the through-life costs will
be in manpower and so taking people out of the loop, sensibly, is part of the game of
reducing costs.
Captain Stuart Ellins: The question is really, how do you get the balance
right between hardware and software?
John Coles: As ever, that will only come through when you have actually put
the piece of kit in service. However, a good deal of effort has been put in to get that trade-off
right, upfront. That is all I can say, without going through every single piece of equipment.
Much of it was done, and it is done for most projects.
Tom Watt (PA Consulting Group): The CVF in itself has quite a complex
capability and it is supported by a vast range of subsystems. On day one in service, some of
those are legacy and some are brand new and innovative. Can you say anything about the
ongoing relationship between industry, the IPT and the MoD, on when and how decisions are
made to replace some of those systems with their own CADMID cycles to support capability?
John Coles: There is a process in place for equipment obsolescence, and
upgrading or changing capability. My friends in the Defence staff, the capability managers if
you like, or the owners, are responsible for deciding when that is. Our job is to find
equipment to maintain current capability and, when they have the resources, then we will
change it or, if it is obsolete, we would decide to change it because of obsolescence. That is
the normal process and it is no different from any other ship. When my friend over the road
says that he wants a greater capability, we put the kit in when he brings the money. It is
27

normal process, and no different for this ship than any other one, except that this ship is
rather large, and you can do it more easily, I would say.
Lieutenant Ron Goodenough (UCL): With how much detail did we
investigate nuclear power in the early stages? Do you regret that we cannot afford it, if that
is why we did not go down that route?
John Coles: I was not around when that decision was made, so I do not
really know. I would imagine that the cost of developing propulsion plants of the scale and
size to power this ship would be outwith the national budget of the UK armed forces.
Dr Hywel Davies: You made one or two references to French elements – for
the catapult and other things. This could lead us to think that there is very little connection
between the French activities, except for some common outlines of the ship. Could you tell
us more about how French interests, French management and French industry are
connected to integrate with your activity?
John Coles: I will try. If you are going to have a collaborative programme,
and you want to have the maximum amount of resource, then you have to have as much in
common as possible. The agreement with France at a technical level is that, if both nations
want to save resource, then we need to have as much in common as possible, and that is
what has been achieved, except where they have different aircraft, different weapons
systems - mission systems really – for their different national systems, and where they have
different operational doctrines.
If you actually look below the flight deck and the hangar deck, the design is very
common – in fact, it is identical, except where there are very specific French changes, which
we may not fit because of our own national requirements. It is very surprisingly, in my view
and quite a coup for both nations to have that degree of co-operation without the same
requirements.
There are the through-life savings, if you actually save on the things that you jointly
do together – such as spares - it would be quite enormous. They would dwarf the acquisition
costs, in my view.
John Thornhill (Wartsila Propulsion): I have a propulsion question. You
said earlier that you made the decision fairly early on to go for conventional propulsion as
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proposed to podded propulsion, and you said it would reduce risk. Could you expand on
that, and on your decision making process to decide to go that way?
John Coles: Like all these things, going into the detail is always difficult
because I cannot always recall it all. We have looked at fitting pods, because that gets rid of
the rudders and all the shafting, four times, to see whether that would give us a reliable
solution, and an enduring one. We are looking at what has happened, and at the power
required as well. We are looking at what has happened in the cruise-liner industry. We
concluded each time that the risk of that being unsuccessful was too great for us, and we
therefore decided not to proceed. We would have loved to in many ways, because it would
have saved a great deal of resource in terms of the rudders, shaft lines and how to
manufacture. However, as I have tried to say in this lecture, we have gone for a pragmatic
solution for this particular vessel, with lots of pull through from existing technology wherever
we can. We only take risks where that is really necessary.
John Thornhill: So you did not consider that there was any difference in the
vulnerability from a combat point of view?
John Coles: I do not really think so. You could argue that, actually, four
pods – depending on where they were sited – might be rather better, but you could argue
that either way. Common load take was the other consideration.
Professor David Andrews (UCL): I am now at University College, London,
but at one time I was at the MoD.
I just wanted to congratulate John and the team, because back in the early 1990s I
was responsible for the early work on the concept. It is really heartening to see that it has
come to this level of fruition already and – fingers crossed – I hope we will actually see the
ships.
One of the messages from your presentation is that one of the fears in only designing
a carrier – or any other major ship like this – almost every other generation, is that there is an
old design adage (I think by a famous naval constructor) which says that one should not
include more than 25 per cent novelty in a new design, otherwise the risk would turn round
and hit you in the end. From what I have seen, you are to be congratulated on the degree to
which you have actually tried to avoid novelty.
Perhaps the last question on the podded propulsors is an example of where you
perhaps might have been tempted, although it would actually have been highly risky. Do you
think you actually have the 25 per cent?
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John Coles: I suspect it is rather higher in novelty in some sense, although
we have used a great deal of pull-through to reduce the risk. It is very difficult to make that
judgment call, and we still have an integration risk which of course, even though they are the
same equipments. I would say it is a little higher, but it is much less than it used to be. That
is all I can say.
Dr Peter Hughes (Scottish Engineering): We represent the manufacturing
engineering sector in Scotland. I have more of a comment rather than a question.
First, I would like to congratulate John on an excellent lecture – it was first class, and
really explained the situation very well. It also gives us an opportunity to tackle some
sections of the media, who seem to delight in suggesting that manufacturing and engineering
in the United Kingdom is either dead or dying. I see this carrier as an opportunity to show
not only that we are proud to be British, but that we are proud to be engineers. We can use
this – if you excuse the pun – as the real flagship for engineering, going forward. More
power to your elbow.
John Coles: Of course, I agree with you. [Laughter]
Mark Oliver (Laing O’Rourke): Laing O’Rourke is a company that is
involved in design and construction of buildings but, in comment with your project, John,
each time we put a building together, it is a prototype and we do not have a chance, as in
other industries, to create and perfect it.
In our industry recently – and I suspect that we are not leading edge here – we have
begun digitally modelling and creating a virtual model of the building, so that we have built it
once in virtual reality, before we build it on the ground. That involves collaborative efforts
between different disciplines of engineers and alliance partners.
My interest is, to what extent, or how far have you gone, in terms of creating a single
object model on which all of your alliance members are working together? Does it go down
to the last rivet and therefore can you then model the implications of a change and the
impact of the cost, because all of this information is in a single database?
John Coles: You can of course model, if you put sufficient resources in, for
huge areas of the ship, and we have done that on some recent programmes. If you look at
the cruise-liner industry, they do not model anything like to the same extent because
controlling that model and making changes to it institutionalises a huge support role.
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Actually, it does not save you as much as you think, unless you are getting large numbers of
production runs.
We have therefore selected a degree of modelling that is appropriate to the size and
scale of the ship. We model extensively, for example, machinery spaces which are tight, but
those where we have accommodation, we can leave an awful lot – I will not say to the
imagination, but the detailing does not have to be extensive. Some of our programmes have
perhaps suffered because we have over-modelled and caused a huge product development
bill and even more to maintain it. Changing it becomes almost a fear. We have to get the
balance right and I like to think that what we propose to do across the alliance, with common
systems where appropriate, is to maintain that balance. It means that the Ministry also has
to change as well, and might want to model everything before we build. And then there is the
cultural change, which is quite difficult to achieve – and cultural changes are quite important.
Captain David Smith (Corporation of Trinity House): I am a retired naval
officer and a carrier man. May I ask why, from a purely practical point of view, we do not
incorporate arrester gear and catapults from the beginning? It would surely be cheaper in
the long-run and provide intra-operability with the French.
John Coles: Well, of course, it would – but we would have to buy them for
aircraft we do not operate and so, from a cost-effective point of view, the JSF and the STOVL
version is sufficient for our national needs, so why invest in equipments you do not need
today?
Captain Smith: The fact is that, if you have arrest gear and catapults, you
can get a better range or weapon load in your aeroplane. In the longer-term, surely we see
such an aircraft coming into being.
John Coles: This goes back to the Key User Requirements: what do you
want to do with this capability and, if the aircraft you have chosen can actually conduct a
mission successfully, then why invest in a larger amount of material and the aircraft when
you do not need it today? We should bear in mind that there are other parts of the defence
budget which actually might need kit, which are more pressing and fitting, for but not with, in
this case, with [sic]. It is a question of economics.
We would all like to have full, capable kit but, in the end, you have to pay for it. We
have a limited resource budget.
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Roger Dobson: I am really asking this question on behalf of my daughter,
who is serving in the Fleet Air Arm. She has a very keen interest in knowing the sort of
accommodation that might be provided. [Laughter] It was interesting to hear that you are
using so much of the cruise ship technology. In the offshore industry in which I used to work,
we also built living accommodation in modules. Are these modules interchangeable, or will
you be able to accommodate the different standards that seem to be required by the different
forces?
John Coles: I am sure you can tell your daughter that the modules are
standard size. They are reconfigurable but whether they are one-berth, two-berth or sixberth
– and, as for the French navy, eight-berth – you can have any number of people inside
them. Once you have actually built them, of course, it is more difficult because they go in as
a single piece and it is not easy to take them out. So, hopefully, you have one, two and six in
the right sort of ratios from the start. So, with that constraint, yes – but, as long as we are
carrying 1500 people around, we will need roughly 1500 bunks, and one, two and six gives
you the right combination.
Stephen Payne (Carnival Corporate Shipbuilding): I am from Carnival
Corporation and designer of Queen Mary 2. Can you tell me, when the ships are finally
ordered, will the design be frozen, or will there be continuous updates and changes that
ultimately must increase the cost of the project?
John Coles: As one designer to another, you all know that, if you freeze the
design and do not allow changes, you can probably have a schedule of cost. I probably
indicated to someone earlier that we have produced a specification which is signed up to by
the customer, by the Royal Navy – that is the operators, and the industry, such that build
what it says on the tin. If we want to change it, you had better bring some more money. It is
absolutely crucial to controlling the design process and also the manufacturing process. If
we have not learned that lesson, then we have not learned very much.
I have tried to make everybody sign in blood on the specification so that they cannot
change it. That does not mean to say that they will not, but they will have to bring the money
for it.
Sir John Parker: I will close the meeting there. We have heard a splendid
lecture tonight and I am sure you would all like to express your gratitude to John for a great
lecture, which has demonstrated the breadth of his tremendous experience.
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Thank you, John. Judging by the number of questions, you or your successors will
be able to come back and present many papers on a number of topics that you were not able
to deal with tonight.
John has decided that he would like to stay out of jail, so could you please have a
great deal of respect for the fact that we have conducted tonight’s proceedings under
Chatham House rules. Let us show our appreciation to John. [Applause]
- End of Briefing -
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