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133 Territorial Army<br />

26 OCTOBER 2009<br />

Territorial Army<br />

134<br />

in six months. Once we lose the culture of attending a<br />

drill night on a Tuesday or Wednesday, pretty soon that<br />

slot will be filled with something else. People will start<br />

going to the cinema with their wives, and it will be<br />

almost impossible to get them back in on a Tuesday<br />

night. We should not forget that a TA soldier will be<br />

paid just one quarter of a day’s pay for a drill night.<br />

They may receive two or two-and-a-half days’ pay for a<br />

weekend, so they can do three months of training on<br />

drill nights for the equivalent. That is why the concession<br />

is so minor. I believe that the Minister said today that<br />

giving one drill night back would cost £2.5 million, but<br />

that is relatively small beer in the MOD budget. That is<br />

why this is such a penny-pinching move, why it will<br />

ultimately be so damaging to the Territorial Army and<br />

why I call on him to think again, give greater concessions<br />

and allow more drill nights.<br />

Much of the debate has focused on training, and the<br />

Minister has made it clear that he is convinced that all<br />

soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan will receive the<br />

appropriate pre-deployment training. Let us be clear<br />

that regular units—formed units—may undergo some<br />

18 months of pre-deployment training before they are<br />

deployed on operations. At best, a TA soldier can<br />

currently expect to be mobilised some three months<br />

before being deployed to Afghanistan, the process<br />

culminating in two weeks’ testing at the reserve training<br />

and mobilisation centre at Chilwell. That is not always<br />

the case; colleagues of mine have been mobilised at just<br />

three days’ notice and have gone straight to the RTMC<br />

to be tested.<br />

The proposal is to have a system where the RTMC<br />

will no longer be testing soldiers—it will be training<br />

them. Already soldiers are being deployed to Afghanistan<br />

at risk. The Minister said in the statement that no TA<br />

soldier will be deployed at risk, but that was wrong.<br />

This is a technical point, but I am concerned that if we<br />

are no longer simply testing at RTMC, but training<br />

there too, we will be deploying even more soldiers at<br />

greater risk. That is fundamentally unacceptable.<br />

The TA contains specialists—I am a bomb disposal<br />

officer, although I am not currently in that role. Is the<br />

Minister really expecting specialists such as me—a bomb<br />

disposal officer—to be able to maintain their skills and<br />

potentially be deployed to Afghanistan having had no<br />

training for six months? That is ridiculous. I heard what<br />

was said by my colleagues at the meeting that the<br />

Minister attended this afternoon, so I know that he is<br />

beginning to realise the strength of the feeling in all<br />

parts of the House—it is being shown in this debate<br />

tonight—that this is a fundamentally flawed decision.<br />

Mr. Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con): My hon. Friend<br />

has referred persuasively to specialists’ training, but<br />

does he agree that this is also about the training of<br />

junior leaders and officers in the TA? If they do not<br />

have interaction or training over a period of months<br />

leading up to deployment, they have no capacity to do<br />

their job and lead men in the field.<br />

Mr. Lancaster: My hon. Friend makes a very important<br />

point, on a subject that I was going to discuss, the<br />

officer training corps at universities. One of the key<br />

shortages in the TA at the moment is of junior officers—<br />

there are simply not enough of them in units. One of<br />

the key sources of junior officers used to be the officer<br />

training corps, but they are now not going to receive<br />

any training at all. We are cutting off that inflow of<br />

junior officers, so I would be fascinated to know how<br />

the Minister intends to replace it.<br />

I hope that the Minister will take this opportunity<br />

also to explain to the House exactly how the bounty<br />

system will work for the end of this financial year. As<br />

many hon. Members realise, not only do TA soldiers get<br />

paid a daily rate but, providing they meet their minimum<br />

requirements in days and in their military training tests,<br />

they receive a bounty. That is a tax-free amount and,<br />

depending on how long one has served, it can be up to<br />

£2,000—or just under that sum. Having had their training<br />

cut off, how are members of the TA going to achieve<br />

their bounty requirements? It appears that commanding<br />

officers might have the ability simply to wipe off days<br />

and say, “There is no need to fulfil your man training<br />

days for the year,” and that soldiers will only have to<br />

pass their basic military annual training tests. Those<br />

tests have already been reduced this year simply to<br />

passing a first aid test, doing one’s personal fitness<br />

assessment, which consists of doing a mile-and-a-half<br />

run, press ups and sit ups, and a weapon handling test.<br />

Is that really going to be the minimum requirement for<br />

a TA soldier to get their bounty? Are we going to have<br />

TA soldiers who pass a weapon handling test, yet the<br />

first time they will get an opportunity to fire a weapon<br />

is when they finally go to the RTMC, perhaps days<br />

before they get deployed to Afghanistan? Is the Minister<br />

really suggesting that that is adequate pre-deployment<br />

training? I cannot believe for one second that he is.<br />

I want to focus on the one Army concept, too. We<br />

have made major advances in recent years in bringing<br />

the two parts of the Army—the TA and the regular<br />

Army—together. Now, when one goes on operations, as<br />

I am sure that the Minister has seen for himself, one<br />

cannot tell who is in the regular Army and who is in the<br />

TA. That is a fabulous achievement for the TA over a<br />

number of years. We run the risk of pulling the two<br />

sides of the Army apart as a result of this decision.<br />

After the reserve review, we formed some hybrid<br />

regiments. For example, my former regiment, 101 Engineer<br />

Regiment, will now have a regular headquarters, two<br />

TA squadrons and two regular squadrons. With this<br />

decision, the Ministry is basically saying to the commanding<br />

officer, “We realise that you have one regiment, but you<br />

now have two very different halves to it. You can train<br />

this half, but you cannot train that half. This half can<br />

go adventurous training, but that half cannot.” How<br />

does that underpin the one Army concept? What will it<br />

do to morale in the Territorial Army when they see their<br />

regular counterparts able to train when they cannot?<br />

Does the Minister not even begin to understand what<br />

this decision is doing to separate the one Army concept?<br />

Let me say a couple of words on the cadets. They play<br />

a vital role in supporting future recruitment to the<br />

regular Army and Territorial Army. Only last year, the<br />

Prime Minister wrote to the Secretary of State for<br />

Defence to ask him to increase the size of the cadet<br />

force. How does this decision to reduce all funding for<br />

the cadet force underline the Prime Minister’s request?<br />

I want to end on the most important point, which is<br />

the programme review for 2010. At the moment, TA<br />

soldiers face a six-month cut in their training. All they<br />

ask is for some reassurance that this cut will not continue<br />

into the next financial year. We are asking TA soldiers

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