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133 Territorial Army<br />
26 OCTOBER 2009<br />
Territorial Army<br />
134<br />
in six months. Once we lose the culture of attending a<br />
drill night on a Tuesday or Wednesday, pretty soon that<br />
slot will be filled with something else. People will start<br />
going to the cinema with their wives, and it will be<br />
almost impossible to get them back in on a Tuesday<br />
night. We should not forget that a TA soldier will be<br />
paid just one quarter of a day’s pay for a drill night.<br />
They may receive two or two-and-a-half days’ pay for a<br />
weekend, so they can do three months of training on<br />
drill nights for the equivalent. That is why the concession<br />
is so minor. I believe that the Minister said today that<br />
giving one drill night back would cost £2.5 million, but<br />
that is relatively small beer in the MOD budget. That is<br />
why this is such a penny-pinching move, why it will<br />
ultimately be so damaging to the Territorial Army and<br />
why I call on him to think again, give greater concessions<br />
and allow more drill nights.<br />
Much of the debate has focused on training, and the<br />
Minister has made it clear that he is convinced that all<br />
soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan will receive the<br />
appropriate pre-deployment training. Let us be clear<br />
that regular units—formed units—may undergo some<br />
18 months of pre-deployment training before they are<br />
deployed on operations. At best, a TA soldier can<br />
currently expect to be mobilised some three months<br />
before being deployed to Afghanistan, the process<br />
culminating in two weeks’ testing at the reserve training<br />
and mobilisation centre at Chilwell. That is not always<br />
the case; colleagues of mine have been mobilised at just<br />
three days’ notice and have gone straight to the RTMC<br />
to be tested.<br />
The proposal is to have a system where the RTMC<br />
will no longer be testing soldiers—it will be training<br />
them. Already soldiers are being deployed to Afghanistan<br />
at risk. The Minister said in the statement that no TA<br />
soldier will be deployed at risk, but that was wrong.<br />
This is a technical point, but I am concerned that if we<br />
are no longer simply testing at RTMC, but training<br />
there too, we will be deploying even more soldiers at<br />
greater risk. That is fundamentally unacceptable.<br />
The TA contains specialists—I am a bomb disposal<br />
officer, although I am not currently in that role. Is the<br />
Minister really expecting specialists such as me—a bomb<br />
disposal officer—to be able to maintain their skills and<br />
potentially be deployed to Afghanistan having had no<br />
training for six months? That is ridiculous. I heard what<br />
was said by my colleagues at the meeting that the<br />
Minister attended this afternoon, so I know that he is<br />
beginning to realise the strength of the feeling in all<br />
parts of the House—it is being shown in this debate<br />
tonight—that this is a fundamentally flawed decision.<br />
Mr. Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con): My hon. Friend<br />
has referred persuasively to specialists’ training, but<br />
does he agree that this is also about the training of<br />
junior leaders and officers in the TA? If they do not<br />
have interaction or training over a period of months<br />
leading up to deployment, they have no capacity to do<br />
their job and lead men in the field.<br />
Mr. Lancaster: My hon. Friend makes a very important<br />
point, on a subject that I was going to discuss, the<br />
officer training corps at universities. One of the key<br />
shortages in the TA at the moment is of junior officers—<br />
there are simply not enough of them in units. One of<br />
the key sources of junior officers used to be the officer<br />
training corps, but they are now not going to receive<br />
any training at all. We are cutting off that inflow of<br />
junior officers, so I would be fascinated to know how<br />
the Minister intends to replace it.<br />
I hope that the Minister will take this opportunity<br />
also to explain to the House exactly how the bounty<br />
system will work for the end of this financial year. As<br />
many hon. Members realise, not only do TA soldiers get<br />
paid a daily rate but, providing they meet their minimum<br />
requirements in days and in their military training tests,<br />
they receive a bounty. That is a tax-free amount and,<br />
depending on how long one has served, it can be up to<br />
£2,000—or just under that sum. Having had their training<br />
cut off, how are members of the TA going to achieve<br />
their bounty requirements? It appears that commanding<br />
officers might have the ability simply to wipe off days<br />
and say, “There is no need to fulfil your man training<br />
days for the year,” and that soldiers will only have to<br />
pass their basic military annual training tests. Those<br />
tests have already been reduced this year simply to<br />
passing a first aid test, doing one’s personal fitness<br />
assessment, which consists of doing a mile-and-a-half<br />
run, press ups and sit ups, and a weapon handling test.<br />
Is that really going to be the minimum requirement for<br />
a TA soldier to get their bounty? Are we going to have<br />
TA soldiers who pass a weapon handling test, yet the<br />
first time they will get an opportunity to fire a weapon<br />
is when they finally go to the RTMC, perhaps days<br />
before they get deployed to Afghanistan? Is the Minister<br />
really suggesting that that is adequate pre-deployment<br />
training? I cannot believe for one second that he is.<br />
I want to focus on the one Army concept, too. We<br />
have made major advances in recent years in bringing<br />
the two parts of the Army—the TA and the regular<br />
Army—together. Now, when one goes on operations, as<br />
I am sure that the Minister has seen for himself, one<br />
cannot tell who is in the regular Army and who is in the<br />
TA. That is a fabulous achievement for the TA over a<br />
number of years. We run the risk of pulling the two<br />
sides of the Army apart as a result of this decision.<br />
After the reserve review, we formed some hybrid<br />
regiments. For example, my former regiment, 101 Engineer<br />
Regiment, will now have a regular headquarters, two<br />
TA squadrons and two regular squadrons. With this<br />
decision, the Ministry is basically saying to the commanding<br />
officer, “We realise that you have one regiment, but you<br />
now have two very different halves to it. You can train<br />
this half, but you cannot train that half. This half can<br />
go adventurous training, but that half cannot.” How<br />
does that underpin the one Army concept? What will it<br />
do to morale in the Territorial Army when they see their<br />
regular counterparts able to train when they cannot?<br />
Does the Minister not even begin to understand what<br />
this decision is doing to separate the one Army concept?<br />
Let me say a couple of words on the cadets. They play<br />
a vital role in supporting future recruitment to the<br />
regular Army and Territorial Army. Only last year, the<br />
Prime Minister wrote to the Secretary of State for<br />
Defence to ask him to increase the size of the cadet<br />
force. How does this decision to reduce all funding for<br />
the cadet force underline the Prime Minister’s request?<br />
I want to end on the most important point, which is<br />
the programme review for 2010. At the moment, TA<br />
soldiers face a six-month cut in their training. All they<br />
ask is for some reassurance that this cut will not continue<br />
into the next financial year. We are asking TA soldiers