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851 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 852<br />
Mr Shepherd: I am a little puzzled as to why the hon.<br />
Gentleman comes to the conclusion that this needs to<br />
be codified in any way. Our history demonstrates quite<br />
openly that this House comes to such a resolution by<br />
the processes of the House. When Mr Chamberlain<br />
won the famous Norway debate, he recognised that<br />
t<strong>here</strong> was no confidence in him personally. These matters<br />
are eventually decided by the House and by the judgment<br />
of individuals. Surely that is the better way of doing it.<br />
Chris Bryant: In a sense, that is an argument against<br />
the whole Bill which I understand. I know that the hon.<br />
Gentleman is not saying that this is a conspiracy, but I<br />
think that the hon. Member for Harwich and North<br />
Essex feels that a bit of a cosy consensus has developed<br />
around the fact that t<strong>here</strong> should be a codification of<br />
fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s. We agree with that codification.<br />
However, once one starts to codify one element, one has<br />
to codify rather a lot of them. That is why I have wanted<br />
to codify what counts as a motion of no confidence and<br />
what should be a motion of confidence. Perhaps we<br />
should have tried to codify it in a slightly different way<br />
so that, for instance, a motion to amend the Loyal<br />
Address could also be considered as such, as in 1924.<br />
Mr Jenkin: What the hon. Gentleman is suggesting<br />
might well be sensible in one respect, but I fear that it<br />
will not prevent the courts from having a go at this.<br />
Indeed, if what constitutes a motion of confidence is<br />
codified in our Standing Orders, the courts will then be<br />
interpreting whether our Standing Orders reflect what<br />
could be regarded as such. If he wants clarity and is<br />
seeking to provide a better definition, this has to be put<br />
into the legislation. Of course, that reflects the point<br />
that we are tempting the courts to interfere in the<br />
proceedings of this House.<br />
Chris Bryant: That is an interesting point. The Bill of<br />
Rights refers, I think in section 9, to the fact that<br />
proceedings in <strong>Parliament</strong> shall not be touched by any<br />
other court. The moot point then is what constitutes a<br />
proceeding in <strong>Parliament</strong>. T<strong>here</strong> have been many discussions<br />
about this over the past couple of years, not least in<br />
relation to the arrest of the hon. Member for Ashford<br />
(Damian Green). The hon. Member for Harwich and<br />
North Essex is right in one sense. However, I have<br />
presumed—this is the advice that I had when I sat on<br />
the Government Benches as Deputy Leader of the<br />
House—that parliamentary privilege covers proceedings<br />
in <strong>Parliament</strong> and the whole of the Standing Orders of<br />
this House, because that how this House chooses to<br />
proceed. I think that t<strong>here</strong> is greater security in the<br />
Standing Orders of the House.<br />
Another issue is how we ensure that the Speaker is<br />
not dragged into a partisan contest, particularly at a<br />
moment of great political drama. As I said in an earlier<br />
debate, my concern is that if it is left for the Speaker to<br />
have to determine all these elements, the Speaker’s<br />
impartiality is compromised.<br />
Another strange element of the Bill is the provision<br />
that says that before the Speaker issues his certificate, he<br />
shall consult the Deputy Speakers. That mirrors the<br />
provision in the 1911 Act w<strong>here</strong>by the Speaker, before<br />
issuing his certificate on a money Bill, has to consult<br />
two members of the Panel of Chairs. What happens if<br />
all the Deputy Speakers disagree with issuing the certificate?<br />
Why should the Speaker have to consult? One presumes<br />
that it is simply a matter of fact, although I suppose we<br />
all know that facts are rarely clearly delineated and are<br />
rather more subjective than most people would want to<br />
admit. The point is, however, that this puts the Speaker<br />
and potentially the House in peril, because people may<br />
want to contest any one of the various elements of the<br />
Speaker’s decision. One of the matters that would almost<br />
certainly arise if t<strong>here</strong> were any contest as to whether<br />
the certificate was being rightly issued is what the Deputy<br />
Speakers had said. That is an unfortunate direction for<br />
us to take.<br />
We have tabled an amendment, on which I hope to<br />
divide the Committee, on the timing of when the Speaker<br />
issues the certificate. At the moment, the Bill makes no<br />
provision whatsoever on when the Speaker’s certificate<br />
should be issued. One t<strong>here</strong>fore presumes that it could<br />
be a month, two months or several months after the<br />
passage of two weeks. Let us say, for instance, that after<br />
a motion of no confidence has been carried, the<br />
Government try to reform themselves with a different<br />
concatenation of political parties and do not manage to<br />
secure a new motion of confidence, but t<strong>here</strong> are still<br />
patently ongoing negotiations that are nearing their<br />
closing phase. Would it then be all right for the Speaker<br />
not to issue a certificate at that point but to wait until<br />
such time that another Government had been formed?<br />
The difficulty is that if the Speaker chose not to do so,<br />
who is to gainsay the Speaker? T<strong>here</strong> is no provision in<br />
the Bill for what would happen if the Speaker has not<br />
done what the Bill requires.<br />
For all those reasons, I believe that this element of<br />
the Bill is flawed. I also believe that certain elements<br />
should not be in statute but should be in Standing<br />
Orders in order to provide greater certainty for the<br />
House by taking them within the concept of proceedings<br />
of this House. Above all, I want to ensure that t<strong>here</strong> is<br />
no uncertainty about the specific provision as to when<br />
the Speaker has to act and when the Speaker may act.<br />
Jesse Norman: I wish to speak in favour of the<br />
amendment. First, may I congratulate my hon. Friend<br />
and neighbour the Minister on the very calm and effective<br />
way in which he has steered this legislation through the<br />
House?<br />
None the less, it seems to me that a basic issue with<br />
the legislation remains unresolved. It has been described<br />
in this House as a matter of parliamentary privilege,<br />
but in fact it concerns the fundamental principle of<br />
parliamentary sovereignty. One thinks of the magisterial<br />
words of A.V. Dicey:<br />
“The principle of <strong>Parliament</strong>ary sovereignty means neither<br />
more nor less than this, namely that <strong>Parliament</strong> thus defined”—<br />
by which he means the King or Queen in <strong>Parliament</strong>,<br />
rather than just <strong>Parliament</strong> itself—<br />
“has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake<br />
any law whatever: and, further, that no person or body is recognised<br />
by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the<br />
legislation of <strong>Parliament</strong>.”<br />
That is the cardinal principle at issue today. It is worth<br />
saying that our parliamentary sovereignty remains intact<br />
in principle. It remains open to this House to repeal, if<br />
it so wished, the Act of Settlement 1701 by simple<br />
majority. The sovereignty of <strong>Parliament</strong> can thus be<br />
deliberately limited in its effects by this House—for