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831 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 832 [Mr Harper] general election was unclear, we could end up having a succession of general elections. Amendment 5 would force such elections to be held. In countries that have fixed-term Parliaments it is very common for there to be a period of Government formation after a vote of no confidence before an election is triggered. That is what happens in Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Sweden, so we are proposing an approach that has much precedent, which we think is sensible. We cannot ask my hon. Friend the Member for Stone to withdraw his amendment, because he is not here and thus unable to do so. However, we urge Members who are here not to insist on it being pressed to a Division. Mr Jenkin: I have been in touch with my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who makes things complicated because he does not text people. He is in Budapest representing the European Scrutiny Committee, but he has suggested that it would be in the interests of the scrutiny of this Bill to press the amendment to a Division, and one or two of us will attempt to do so. Mr Harper: As I said, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone is away on parliamentary business and, as he has perhaps not reached 21st century methods of communication, my words are unlikely to reach him in a timely way. So I can only urge him not to press his amendment to a vote, but I suspect that the decision on that will be for others, not for him. Chris Bryant: As it happens, I agree with the Minister on this amendment. However, the one area that it will be worth considering on Report is whether it would be sensible to have a motion of confidence on the forming of a new Government after a general election, which should be treated in a slightly different way. Such an approach would address the 1924 situation that he suggests. Mr Harper: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, which has been raised by others. I believe I am right in saying that the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, has said he is keen on the idea of installing Prime Ministers with an explicit vote in the House—he was speaking for himself there, not for the Committee. That would be a further change to our system and, as I said in answer to the hon. Member for Leicester South (Sir Peter Soulsby), we have made the necessary changes in the law to take away the Prime Minister’s right to call an early general election, but we have not gone further. I shall think about what the hon. Member for Rhondda said and see whether we think it has merit. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment 22 seeks to replace the 14 days that we set out in the Bill for that Government formation period with a period of 10 working days. He is supportive of a Government formation period, because he would not be attempting to keep one through this amendment were he not. I think he was wanting to understand why we chose the period that we did, using calendar days rather than working days. The reason why we did so was because the calendar day period is fixed and certain, whereas working days are not, as they are dependent on things such as bank holidays. Two legitimate concerns are involved here, and they were touched on last week. There is a concern that the number of business days in the 14-day period would be curtailed or that the date of the no confidence vote could mean that the date for the Government formation vote fell on a non-working day. Our view—I am interested to hear the hon. Gentleman’s—is that discussions on Government formation would not stop on weekends and bank holidays; I suspect that they would continue, given that having a Government is probably the most important thing for the country. There are two ways around a scenario where the vital 14th day when the vote of confidence is due falls on a day when the House would conventionally not be sitting. The first is to arrange that the no confidence motion be taken on a day that means that the House will be sitting 14 days later. The alternative is for the House simply to sit on what would traditionally have been a non-sitting day. There is nothing to prevent the House from sitting, if it chooses to do so, on a bank holiday, a Saturday or a Sunday. Non-working days are not days when the House cannot sit, even though it does not do so. There are precedents for the House sitting on such days when emergencies have happened. I believe I am right in saying that the House was recalled to sit on a Saturday when the Falkland Islands were invaded by the Argentines. Holding a vote on whether a new Government did or did not have the confidence of the House would be sufficiently important that it would be in order for the House to sit that day, even if it was not a conventional day. Chris Bryant: The Minister is right in relation to the Falkland Islands, and I believe that the House has also sat on a Sunday on the demise of the monarch. That is precisely why we did not specify “sitting days” in this amendment; we used the term “working days” because that is the language used throughout the rest of the Bill. We sought to provide a degree of flexibility; otherwise, over Easter, when there are bank holidays on the Friday and the following Monday, there might be a sustained period when the House would find it inconceivable to sit but the Government might, none the less, want to be able to do their business. Mr Harper: For the purposes of this particular set of motions, the only business that we would be talking about the House undertaking would be holding a vote on whether or not a new Government who had been formed had the confidence of the House. Given the things that the Government are responsible for, it would be important to have a clear Government in place for the financial markets and at difficult times. We know from experience and we can see it from what happens in other countries. Therefore, the Government formation negotiations would want to be concluded and it would benefit the country, the Government and the House for the House to vote on that without inordinate delay. If there were a number of bank holidays or other holidays in the way, that could be dealt with. [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman asks about Good Friday. As I have said, the alternative is that we could arrange things by moving the no confidence vote so that it was 14 days before a sitting day. Conventionally, no confidence motions are given time in the House very soon after they are tabled, but as long as the Government were prepared to table such a motion

833 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 834 very soon and agreed that with the Opposition, it would not necessarily have to be tabled the next day. I do not think that it is an inordinate problem. We think that it is sensible for there to be a fixed timetable for a Government to be formed so that everyone has some certainty. That is why we picked the time period that we have. My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest spoke in support of amendments 36 and 37, which are also tabled in the names of other members of the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform. Amendment 36 would make the 14 days in a period following a Government defeat a period that would not include periods of Prorogation or Adjournment for more than four days. Although I do not think that this is the intention behind the amendment, its effect would be to permit the 14-day period for Government formation to be prolonged potentially indefinitely if the House was prorogued or adjourned. The Government do not think that that is appropriate. We think that the 14-day period strikes the right balance between giving parties in this House time to discuss and see whether a Government can be formed and not allowing things to go on for so long that the country is plunged into a period of uncertainty. We do not think that amendment 36 is acceptable. Amendment 37 provides that a Prime Minister must resign within seven calendar days of losing a vote of no confidence and recommend to the monarch a successor who appears to them to be the person most likely to be able to command the confidence of the House. I think I am right to say—my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest will correct me if I am wrong—that the purpose of the amendment is to avoid a situation in which a Prime Minister who has lost a no confidence vote wishes to remain in power and asks the monarch to prorogue Parliament to avoid an alternative Government receiving a vote of confidence, thereby forcing a general election. Mrs Laing: Yes. Mr Harper: My hon. Friend says that that is indeed the purpose of the amendment. However, I think amendment 37 is defective, because it rules out the possibility of what happened in 1979 occurring again. As I have said, Prime Minister Callaghan did not resign as a result of the no confidence motion. He remained in office, asked Her Majesty the Queen to dissolve Parliament and resigned when he lost the subsequent general election. That outcome remains a possibility under the Bill. My hon. Friend’s amendment would have meant that he would have been forced to resign before the result of the election was known. I do not think that that would have been a sensible outcome. Mrs Laing: I fully appreciate the Minister’s point. Amendments 36 and 37 might well be technically defective—in any case, I have no intention of pressing them to a vote, as I said—but the Select Committee’s purpose was to ensure that this issue was properly discussed and scrutinised on the Floor of the House. Will the Minister reassure the House that he and his colleagues are satisfied that it would not be possible under the Bill’s provisions for the Government to seek indefinite prorogation in order to avoid a vote of confidence and a general election? Mr Harper: I think I have set out why I do not think that that is likely. As we have heard, there are lots of theoretical possibilities that are very outlandish—I do not propose to rehash the conversations that we had at the beginning of this debate—but the Government do not think that they are realistic risks and that is why we do not think that amendments 36 and 37 are acceptable. Let me turn now to the last amendment in this group, amendment 25, which was also tabled by the Opposition. It specifies the wording of motions of no confidence for the purposes of clause 2(2). It aims to remove the discretion of the House over its wording and that of the Speaker in his certifying of a motion of no confidence. The Government recognise that no confidence motions might take different forms, as they do now, but we do not want to remove the flexibility entirely. That raises an issue, which we will come to in the next group of amendments, to do with the House’s exclusive cognisance. If we try to set out in statute the precise form of a no confidence motion, that could raise the risks to which the Clerk of the House has alluded. We think it is better for the Speaker’s certificate to be conclusive and for the Speaker to determine the nature of that certification. As I said when we touched on this matter in debating a previous group of amendments, if there were doubt—I think it unlikely that there would be—about whether what the House was discussing was a motion of no confidence, it would seem to be sensible for the Government, the Opposition and the Speaker to ensure that Members were clear on that point when they were debating it. I cannot believe that there could ever be a debate in this House about a motion of no confidence in the Government in which Members were sitting there completely unaware that they were debating the future of the Government of our country. 1.15 pm Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP): Of course, the Minister is right about the reality and the politics of the situation. He should remember, however, that we are talking about a situation in which legislation has been introduced and that legislation is always challengeable in the courts. Once things get into the courts, who knows what will happen regarding the interpretation of the provisions? For the sake of clarity and certainty, what is wrong with setting out the precise terms that must be used so that there can be no doubt? That goes to the issue in amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), which sets out provisions for the avoidance of doubt. Surely there is merit in making it absolutely clear and plain. Mr Harper: I shall not attempt to rush forward to the certification procedure, because we will debate it when we discuss the next group of amendments. Let me turn to the specific amendment before the Committee. I do not think amendment 25 achieves the certainty that the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) suggests would be desirable. It states that a motion of no confidence “shall be”, not “must include”, so it is not clear whether the motion would have to consist exclusively of the specified text or whether that text could be part of a motion, such as if it were added to a Government motion by amendment.

833 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 834<br />

very soon and agreed that with the Opposition, it would<br />

not necessarily have to be tabled the next day. I do not<br />

think that it is an inordinate problem. We think that it is<br />

sensible for t<strong>here</strong> to be a fixed timetable for a Government<br />

to be formed so that everyone has some certainty. That<br />

is why we picked the time period that we have.<br />

My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest spoke<br />

in support of amendments 36 and 37, which are also<br />

tabled in the names of other members of the Select<br />

Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform.<br />

Amendment 36 would make the 14 days in a period<br />

following a Government defeat a period that would not<br />

include periods of Prorogation or Adjournment for<br />

more than four days. Although I do not think that this<br />

is the intention behind the amendment, its effect would<br />

be to permit the 14-day period for Government formation<br />

to be prolonged potentially indefinitely if the House<br />

was prorogued or adjourned. The Government do not<br />

think that that is appropriate. We think that the 14-day<br />

period strikes the right balance between giving parties<br />

in this House time to discuss and see whether a Government<br />

can be formed and not allowing things to go on for so<br />

long that the country is plunged into a period of uncertainty.<br />

We do not think that amendment 36 is acceptable.<br />

Amendment 37 provides that a Prime Minister must<br />

resign within seven calendar days of losing a vote of no<br />

confidence and recommend to the monarch a successor<br />

who appears to them to be the person most likely to be<br />

able to command the confidence of the House. I think I<br />

am right to say—my hon. Friend the Member for<br />

Epping Forest will correct me if I am wrong—that the<br />

purpose of the amendment is to avoid a situation in<br />

which a Prime Minister who has lost a no confidence<br />

vote wishes to remain in power and asks the monarch to<br />

prorogue <strong>Parliament</strong> to avoid an alternative Government<br />

receiving a vote of confidence, t<strong>here</strong>by forcing a general<br />

election.<br />

Mrs Laing: Yes.<br />

Mr Harper: My hon. Friend says that that is indeed<br />

the purpose of the amendment. However, I think<br />

amendment 37 is defective, because it rules out the<br />

possibility of what happened in 1979 occurring again.<br />

As I have said, Prime Minister Callaghan did not resign<br />

as a result of the no confidence motion. He remained in<br />

office, asked Her Majesty the Queen to dissolve <strong>Parliament</strong><br />

and resigned when he lost the subsequent general election.<br />

That outcome remains a possibility under the Bill. My<br />

hon. Friend’s amendment would have meant that he<br />

would have been forced to resign before the result of the<br />

election was known. I do not think that that would have<br />

been a sensible outcome.<br />

Mrs Laing: I fully appreciate the Minister’s point.<br />

Amendments 36 and 37 might well be technically<br />

defective—in any case, I have no intention of pressing<br />

them to a vote, as I said—but the Select Committee’s<br />

purpose was to ensure that this issue was properly<br />

discussed and scrutinised on the Floor of the House.<br />

Will the Minister reassure the House that he and his<br />

colleagues are satisfied that it would not be possible<br />

under the Bill’s provisions for the Government to seek<br />

indefinite prorogation in order to avoid a vote of confidence<br />

and a general election?<br />

Mr Harper: I think I have set out why I do not think<br />

that that is likely. As we have heard, t<strong>here</strong> are lots of<br />

theoretical possibilities that are very outlandish—I do<br />

not propose to rehash the conversations that we had<br />

at the beginning of this debate—but the Government<br />

do not think that they are realistic risks and that is why<br />

we do not think that amendments 36 and 37 are acceptable.<br />

Let me turn now to the last amendment in this group,<br />

amendment 25, which was also tabled by the Opposition.<br />

It specifies the wording of motions of no confidence for<br />

the purposes of clause 2(2). It aims to remove the<br />

discretion of the House over its wording and that of<br />

the Speaker in his certifying of a motion of no<br />

confidence. The Government recognise that no<br />

confidence motions might take different forms, as they<br />

do now, but we do not want to remove the flexibility<br />

entirely. That raises an issue, which we will come to in<br />

the next group of amendments, to do with the House’s<br />

exclusive cognisance.<br />

If we try to set out in statute the precise form of a no<br />

confidence motion, that could raise the risks to which<br />

the Clerk of the House has alluded. We think it is better<br />

for the Speaker’s certificate to be conclusive and for the<br />

Speaker to determine the nature of that certification.<br />

As I said when we touched on this matter in debating a<br />

previous group of amendments, if t<strong>here</strong> were doubt—I<br />

think it unlikely that t<strong>here</strong> would be—about whether<br />

what the House was discussing was a motion of no<br />

confidence, it would seem to be sensible for the Government,<br />

the Opposition and the Speaker to ensure that Members<br />

were clear on that point when they were debating it. I<br />

cannot believe that t<strong>here</strong> could ever be a debate in this<br />

House about a motion of no confidence in the Government<br />

in which Members were sitting t<strong>here</strong> completely unaware<br />

that they were debating the future of the Government<br />

of our country.<br />

1.15 pm<br />

Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP): Of course,<br />

the Minister is right about the reality and the politics of<br />

the situation. He should remember, however, that we<br />

are talking about a situation in which legislation has<br />

been introduced and that legislation is always challengeable<br />

in the courts. Once things get into the courts, who<br />

knows what will happen regarding the interpretation of<br />

the provisions? For the sake of clarity and certainty,<br />

what is wrong with setting out the precise terms that<br />

must be used so that t<strong>here</strong> can be no doubt? That goes<br />

to the issue in amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Member<br />

for Stone (Mr Cash), which sets out provisions for the<br />

avoidance of doubt. Surely t<strong>here</strong> is merit in making it<br />

absolutely clear and plain.<br />

Mr Harper: I shall not attempt to rush forward to the<br />

certification procedure, because we will debate it when<br />

we discuss the next group of amendments.<br />

Let me turn to the specific amendment before the<br />

Committee. I do not think amendment 25 achieves the<br />

certainty that the right hon. Member for Belfast North<br />

(Mr Dodds) suggests would be desirable. It states that a<br />

motion of no confidence “shall be”, not “must include”,<br />

so it is not clear whether the motion would have to<br />

consist exclusively of the specified text or whether that<br />

text could be part of a motion, such as if it were added<br />

to a Government motion by amendment.

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