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829 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 830
course, it would always be open to the Opposition to
table an amendment to a Government motion, changing
it to one of no confidence to ensure that that was debated.
The hon. Gentleman also raised a number of related
points about whether particular votes could be considered
motions of no confidence and whether it was appropriate
for the Speaker to rule on such matters. I think I am
right in saying that he was concerned that the Bill would
give too much discretion to the Speaker. The Government
do not consider that to be the case. We would expect the
Speaker by and large to take a fairly literal approach to
clause 2(2). We do not think the Speaker would be left
with appreciably more discretion in dealing with this
sort of question than he already has, for example under
the Parliament Act 1911 when he has to certify whether
a Bill is a money Bill. That is a decision he makes; it is
for him. It seems to me that that is a sensible amount of
discretion for the Speaker to have, although I accept it is
on a different issue.
Chris Bryant: The Minister is right, of course. In fact,
at present Members of the House of Lords are fiercely
contesting the Speaker’s decision on whether certain
Bills are money Bills. My point, however, is that all that
that determines is whether or not it can be debated in
another Chamber, whereas under this measure it would
determine whether or not we had a general election and
the Government had fallen. That is a very big decision
to be placing in the hands of the Speaker, which heretofore
has never been in the hands of the Speaker.
Mr Harper: There are two issues there. I will not
dwell on the money Bill issue to any great extent,
because if I were to do so you would rule me out of
order, Ms Primarolo, but I have read the account of the
debate in the other place to which the hon. Gentleman
refers and the other place is not challenging the Speaker’s
ability to rule on whether a Bill is a money Bill. It is
simply disagreeing with the consequences of that, and
arguing that if something is a money Bill it is perfectly
appropriate for the upper House to debate it in Committee
and pass amendments to it, recognising that legally
those amendments will have no effect if the House of
Commons chooses not to take them into account. The
upper House is therefore not challenging the Speaker’s
right to make that decision.
The hon. Gentleman is also not right to say that this
is about the Speaker deciding, effectively, whether to
bring down the Government. That would be a decision
for the House. The Speaker would have to make a
decision about certifying something as a vote of confidence.
As we debated last week, it would be extraordinary if
the House were debating a motion of confidence—which
the Speaker would certify as such—with everybody
remaining in ignorance of the fact that it was a motion
of no confidence in the Government. I simply do not
think that would happen. Everyone would be very well
aware of the fact that it was a motion of confidence—that
it had that import to it. It would be for the House to
vote on the matter, and the Speaker would then certify
in a way that means the decision is outside the ambit of
the courts.
Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP): As the Minister just
appeared to touch on, under the Bill the Speaker issues
the certificate only after the vote has taken place, not
before. Therefore, would not the Labour amendment
that specifies what is and what is not a vote of confidence
be much better in everybody’s terms?
1pm
Mr Harper: I shall deal with the specific amendments
shortly, when I set out why the Government think that
they are unnecessary and that their drafting makes
them flawed. If the hon. Gentleman does not think I
have adequately dealt with his point, he will be able to
intervene on me and I will happily take such an intervention.
We have debated the fact that there is also a purpose in
the Bill’s not specifying the exact words in legislation,
because such an approach gives the House some necessary
flexibility. I will return to that in a moment.
Let us consider the amendments in order. Amendment 5
was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone
(Mr Cash), who is not able to be here today because he
is away on other parliamentary business. He explained
that his amendment would remove the 14-day period
before an early election was called in the event of the
Speaker certifying that the House had passed a vote of
no confidence. It is right to say that there would be
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to move
to an early election when the House determined that we
should do so, and the Bill provides for that in clause 2(1).
But it is perfectly possible that there may be circumstances
within a fixed term in which a legitimate Government
could be formed from the composition of the House as
it then stood, so it would not be appropriate to insist on
an election. Members will have been elected for five
years, and they are able to give their approval to a
Government formed from within their ranks without
the need necessarily to go to the country. The House
can decide to do so, because under our proposals if a
vote of confidence is lost and no Government can be
formed within 14 days who subsequently receive a vote
of confidence, a general election would take place. It
seems sensible to give the House the opportunity to test
whether a Government can be formed.
My hon. Friend’s amendment contained a fundamental
misunderstanding about what a Prime Minister should
do in the event of a Government losing the confidence
of the House. Two things can happen. One possibility,
under our current system, is that a Prime Minister
remains in office but invites Her Majesty to dissolve the
House and call a general election. Thus the Prime
Minister does not resign immediately, and that is what
happened when the House expressed its lack of confidence
in the Government in 1979. Mr Callaghan did not
resign when he lost the vote of confidence; he resigned
only when he lost the subsequent election. Alternatively,
the Prime Minister could resign almost straightaway
after losing a vote of confidence, as happened in
January 1924 when the Government’s motion for the
Loyal Address after the Queen’s Speech was amended:
Prime Minister Baldwin resigned and the Labour
Opposition formed a Government. This Bill seeks to
encapsulate that double-sided convention.
At the moment, if a general election has an unclear
outcome, the Prime Minister is able to test his support
in the House of Commons. If the House then signalled
that it did not have confidence in that Government, that
Prime Minister would go and a new one could be
appointed. Amendment 5 would insist that another
general election took place, and if the result of that