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827 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 828
[Mr Harper]
Friend says, theoretical, and extremely unlikely to happen.
My point is that if a Prime Minister behaved
unconstitutionally in such a theoretical and extremely
unlikely way, a mechanism that already exists would be
invoked. However, the Government contend—and I
agree with my hon. Friend on this—that both sets of
circumstances are highly unlikely. It is our contention
that the eventuality to which my hon. Friend has referred
would not be necessary, because a Prime Minister would
not behave in a way that stretched constitutional convention
to breaking point.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab): I must say that this is
the second very worrying route the Minister has gone
down. He is saying that if the Prime Minister were to
behave unconstitutionally, the monarch would act. How
would the monarch know whether the Prime Minister
had acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally?
Mr Harper: I am not setting out anything that is
groundbreaking; this is the position that exists now. I
agree with my hon. Friend the Member for North East
Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) that there would have to
be an extraordinary set of circumstances; indeed, I said
as much. I did so because I was referring to a point my
hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest made last
week in raising some concerns of the Select Committee’s
concerns. My view is that those concerns are not well
founded because the events they address are extremely
unlikely to happen and are only really theoretical in
nature, but there is a response to them if they were to
happen.
Mrs Eleanor Laing (Epping Forest) (Con): Will my
hon. Friend reassure the Committee that it is the
Government’s intention to fulfil their duty and that of
Parliament to protect the Crown from being put in a
position where the monarch would ever have to make
such an important constitutional decision?
Mr Harper: Absolutely. I can certainly say on behalf
of this Government that this Government and this
Prime Minister would never wish to put Her Majesty
the Queen in such a position. Clearly, I cannot speak for
Governments of the future, however.
Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con):
I think it would help the Committee if the Minister
could cite an academic paper, some judicial text or
something else that bears out this notion that Her
Majesty the Queen would interfere in politics in the way
he is suggesting she would. Can he quote anything?
Mr Harper: The position is that Her Majesty the
Queen appoints Prime Ministers and the ultimate
constitutional long-stop is that if a Prime Minister
behaves in a way that is outwith the constitutional
position, the monarch can dismiss the Prime Minister—but
that is the long-stop constitutional safeguard in our
system.
Mr Jenkin: Her Majesty would have to take advice on
such occasions. From whom would she take advice?
Mr Harper: Her Majesty would, indeed, take advice
from, for example her Privy Council and her other legal
advisers.
Chris Bryant: Let us be absolutely clear: as I understand
it, the Minister is saying that if the Prime Minister were
“unconstitutionally”—to borrow the Minister’s word—to
engineer a motion of no confidence in himself, for
instance by tabling a motion of confidence in himself
and urging his supporters to abstain, the monarch
would sack him.
Mr Harper: I am not setting out particular scenarios.
I was making the point that we can set out some
theoretical propositions that have not happened and
that we think are extremely unlikely to happen. I was
simply setting out that if such a theoretical and unlikely
event, to use the words of my hon. Friend the Member
for North East Somerset, were to happen there is a
constitutional long-stop. That was all I was saying, and
I think the hon. Gentleman is making rather too much
of it as it is not a new point.
Sir Peter Soulsby (Leicester South) (Lab): Although
we may well accept that the scenarios we are talking
about are unlikely, they are none the less possible, and
while they remain possible would it not be desirable for
the Government either to accept the Select Committee’s
amendments or, indeed, to bring forward some of their
own to make sure that should such unlikely events
occur, there is a clear road map for the sovereign to
follow?
Mr Harper: The fact is that some of these things can
happen under our existing constitutional position; they
are not triggered by anything we are providing for in
this Bill. Our flexible constitution has worked rather
well over the years in dealing with events that have not
been thought of in advance, and I see no reason to
undertake a rather more significant constitutional rewrite.
This Bill is intended to do one specific thing, which is
remove from the Prime Minister the power to seek a
Dissolution of Parliament. It makes the necessary changes
to do that, but it does not seek to make changes that are
not necessary to do that; it does not seek to go wider
than achieving that particular change, and I think that
is very sensible.
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest also
asked last week how the Bill strengthened the power of
the House to throw out a Government. Giving statutory
effect to the vote that could bring about a general
election, rather than simply relying on the conventions,
strengthens the power of the House. The Bill transfers
from the Prime Minister to this House the power to
decide whether there will be an early general election. If
I remember rightly, my hon. Friend did, however, say
that she is broadly supportive of the measures in the
Bill, as, I think, is the Select Committee.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) asked
a number of questions last week. He asked whether the
Bill should contain a provision to ensure that a motion
of no confidence is given precedence so it is debated
without delay. He is aware—he mentioned this last
week—that there is a convention that the Government
find time to debate a motion of no confidence tabled by
the official Opposition. That is a long-standing convention,
which has been followed by Governments. Also of