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825 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 826<br />

Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill<br />

[3RD ALLOCATED DAY]<br />

Further considered in Committee<br />

[DAWN PRIMAROLO in the Chair]<br />

Clause 2<br />

EARLY PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL ELECTIONS<br />

Amendment proposed (24 November): 5, page 2, line 11,<br />

leave out from ‘Government’ to end of line 14.<br />

—(Mr Cash.)<br />

Question again proposed, That the amendment be<br />

made.<br />

The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means<br />

(Dawn Primarolo): With this it will be convenient to<br />

discuss the following:<br />

Amendment 22, page 2, line 12, leave out ‘14’ and<br />

insert ‘ten working’.<br />

Amendment 36, page 2, line 14, at end insert—<br />

‘(2A) In reckoning for the purposes of subsection 2(b), no<br />

account shall be taken of any time during which <strong>Parliament</strong> is<br />

prorogued or during which the House of Commons is adjourned<br />

for more than four days.’.<br />

Amendment 37, page 2, line 14, at end insert—<br />

‘(2B) W<strong>here</strong> the House of Commons passes a motion of no<br />

confidence in Her Majesty’s Government, the Prime Minister<br />

shall tender his resignation to Her Majesty within a period of<br />

seven days of the motion being passed.<br />

(2C) On tendering his resignation under subsection (2B), it<br />

shall be a duty on the Prime Minister to advise Her Majesty to<br />

appoint as his successor the person who appears to him most<br />

likely to command the confidence of the House of Commons.’.<br />

Amendment 25, page 2, line 24, at end add—<br />

‘(6A) In this section a “motion of no confidence in Her<br />

Majesty’s Government” shall be—<br />

(a) in the terms “This House has no confidence in Her<br />

Majesty’s Government” or<br />

(b) in the terms “This House has no confidence in the<br />

Prime Minister”.’.<br />

12.44 pm<br />

The <strong>Parliament</strong>ary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark<br />

Harper): Being in this position almost persuaded me of<br />

the merits of knives, which at least enable us to conclude<br />

debates at approximately the point at which everyone<br />

else has spoken.<br />

I remind the Committee that the amendments deal<br />

with the mechanism providing for an early general<br />

election following a vote of no confidence, as set out in<br />

clause 2(2). Last week, on the second day of this Committee<br />

stage, we engaged in a wide-ranging discussion both of<br />

the merits of the various amendments and of the Bill.<br />

Before I deal with the amendments, let me respond to<br />

some of the questions raised by Members last week.<br />

My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest<br />

(Mrs Laing), who is present and who speaks for the<br />

Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, asked<br />

a number of questions relating to the constitutional<br />

consequences of a vote of no confidence under the Bill.<br />

She was particularly concerned about the possibility of<br />

a Government’s forcing a general election by refusing to<br />

act both in accordance with conventions and in the<br />

spirit of the Act. She gave the example of a Government<br />

who engineered a vote of no confidence in themselves,<br />

or who sought to trigger a series of elections close to<br />

one another by refusing to resign after an election result.<br />

If a Prime Minister who would presumably be seeking<br />

to be re-elected in a subsequent election engaged in such<br />

constitutional shenanigans, he or she would first suffer<br />

a political penalty at that election. If a Prime Minister<br />

behaved in an absolutely unconstitutional fashion, t<strong>here</strong><br />

would always be the ultimate long stop: Her Majesty<br />

the Queen could dismiss the said Prime Minister. That<br />

is the ultimate check and balance in our system. Clearly<br />

it would require an extraordinary set of circumstances,<br />

but it is the position that would obtain if our unwritten<br />

or other conventions were breached in a really appalling<br />

fashion.<br />

Mr Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con):<br />

By what constitutional authority does the Minister cite<br />

the extraordinary proposition that the long stop of the<br />

constitution is that the Queen may dismiss a Prime<br />

Minister?<br />

Mr Harper: Her Majesty the Queen appoints the<br />

Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister were to behave in<br />

an unconstitutional fashion, the Queen would have the<br />

right to dismiss the Prime Minister.<br />

Mr Shepherd: So that is the Minister’s new interpretation<br />

of a constitution, or of defined practice over the years.<br />

Mr Harper: It is not an invention; it is the constitutional<br />

position.<br />

Mr Shepherd: No, it is not.<br />

Mr Harper: Yes, it is.<br />

Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con): I<br />

cannot think of an example of such a position since the<br />

reign of Queen Victoria, who refused to accept Robert<br />

Peel as Prime Minister, and I think it inconceivable that<br />

it would arise in a modern constitution.<br />

Mr Harper: I did say that t<strong>here</strong> would have to be an<br />

extraordinary set of circumstances for the Prime Minister<br />

to behave in such a constitutionally outrageous way.<br />

They would be circumstances in which a Prime Minister<br />

was abusing and stretching the constitution in order to<br />

stay in office and avoid the consequences of losing a<br />

vote of confidence in <strong>Parliament</strong>.<br />

Jacob Rees-Mogg: I think that that is extraordinarily<br />

unlikely. It is theoretically possible that the Queen could<br />

refuse assent to a Bill, but that has not happened since<br />

the reign of Queen Anne. Such constitutional anomalies<br />

remain theoretical, but so theoretical that it is inconceivable<br />

that they would arise whatever the emergency. I really<br />

feel that to rely on that for the passage of the Bill is<br />

most unsatisfactory.<br />

Mr Harper: I am not relying on it for the passage of<br />

the Bill. I was referring to the issue raised by my hon.<br />

Friend the Member for Epping Forest, who last week,<br />

on behalf of the Political and Constitutional Reform<br />

Committee, raised some potential scenarios with which<br />

she was uncomfortable. I believe, and the Government<br />

believe, that those scenarios are indeed, as my hon.

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