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825 1 DECEMBER 2010 Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill 826<br />
Fixed-term <strong>Parliament</strong>s Bill<br />
[3RD ALLOCATED DAY]<br />
Further considered in Committee<br />
[DAWN PRIMAROLO in the Chair]<br />
Clause 2<br />
EARLY PARLIAMENTARY GENERAL ELECTIONS<br />
Amendment proposed (24 November): 5, page 2, line 11,<br />
leave out from ‘Government’ to end of line 14.<br />
—(Mr Cash.)<br />
Question again proposed, That the amendment be<br />
made.<br />
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means<br />
(Dawn Primarolo): With this it will be convenient to<br />
discuss the following:<br />
Amendment 22, page 2, line 12, leave out ‘14’ and<br />
insert ‘ten working’.<br />
Amendment 36, page 2, line 14, at end insert—<br />
‘(2A) In reckoning for the purposes of subsection 2(b), no<br />
account shall be taken of any time during which <strong>Parliament</strong> is<br />
prorogued or during which the House of Commons is adjourned<br />
for more than four days.’.<br />
Amendment 37, page 2, line 14, at end insert—<br />
‘(2B) W<strong>here</strong> the House of Commons passes a motion of no<br />
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government, the Prime Minister<br />
shall tender his resignation to Her Majesty within a period of<br />
seven days of the motion being passed.<br />
(2C) On tendering his resignation under subsection (2B), it<br />
shall be a duty on the Prime Minister to advise Her Majesty to<br />
appoint as his successor the person who appears to him most<br />
likely to command the confidence of the House of Commons.’.<br />
Amendment 25, page 2, line 24, at end add—<br />
‘(6A) In this section a “motion of no confidence in Her<br />
Majesty’s Government” shall be—<br />
(a) in the terms “This House has no confidence in Her<br />
Majesty’s Government” or<br />
(b) in the terms “This House has no confidence in the<br />
Prime Minister”.’.<br />
12.44 pm<br />
The <strong>Parliament</strong>ary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark<br />
Harper): Being in this position almost persuaded me of<br />
the merits of knives, which at least enable us to conclude<br />
debates at approximately the point at which everyone<br />
else has spoken.<br />
I remind the Committee that the amendments deal<br />
with the mechanism providing for an early general<br />
election following a vote of no confidence, as set out in<br />
clause 2(2). Last week, on the second day of this Committee<br />
stage, we engaged in a wide-ranging discussion both of<br />
the merits of the various amendments and of the Bill.<br />
Before I deal with the amendments, let me respond to<br />
some of the questions raised by Members last week.<br />
My hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest<br />
(Mrs Laing), who is present and who speaks for the<br />
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, asked<br />
a number of questions relating to the constitutional<br />
consequences of a vote of no confidence under the Bill.<br />
She was particularly concerned about the possibility of<br />
a Government’s forcing a general election by refusing to<br />
act both in accordance with conventions and in the<br />
spirit of the Act. She gave the example of a Government<br />
who engineered a vote of no confidence in themselves,<br />
or who sought to trigger a series of elections close to<br />
one another by refusing to resign after an election result.<br />
If a Prime Minister who would presumably be seeking<br />
to be re-elected in a subsequent election engaged in such<br />
constitutional shenanigans, he or she would first suffer<br />
a political penalty at that election. If a Prime Minister<br />
behaved in an absolutely unconstitutional fashion, t<strong>here</strong><br />
would always be the ultimate long stop: Her Majesty<br />
the Queen could dismiss the said Prime Minister. That<br />
is the ultimate check and balance in our system. Clearly<br />
it would require an extraordinary set of circumstances,<br />
but it is the position that would obtain if our unwritten<br />
or other conventions were breached in a really appalling<br />
fashion.<br />
Mr Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con):<br />
By what constitutional authority does the Minister cite<br />
the extraordinary proposition that the long stop of the<br />
constitution is that the Queen may dismiss a Prime<br />
Minister?<br />
Mr Harper: Her Majesty the Queen appoints the<br />
Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister were to behave in<br />
an unconstitutional fashion, the Queen would have the<br />
right to dismiss the Prime Minister.<br />
Mr Shepherd: So that is the Minister’s new interpretation<br />
of a constitution, or of defined practice over the years.<br />
Mr Harper: It is not an invention; it is the constitutional<br />
position.<br />
Mr Shepherd: No, it is not.<br />
Mr Harper: Yes, it is.<br />
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con): I<br />
cannot think of an example of such a position since the<br />
reign of Queen Victoria, who refused to accept Robert<br />
Peel as Prime Minister, and I think it inconceivable that<br />
it would arise in a modern constitution.<br />
Mr Harper: I did say that t<strong>here</strong> would have to be an<br />
extraordinary set of circumstances for the Prime Minister<br />
to behave in such a constitutionally outrageous way.<br />
They would be circumstances in which a Prime Minister<br />
was abusing and stretching the constitution in order to<br />
stay in office and avoid the consequences of losing a<br />
vote of confidence in <strong>Parliament</strong>.<br />
Jacob Rees-Mogg: I think that that is extraordinarily<br />
unlikely. It is theoretically possible that the Queen could<br />
refuse assent to a Bill, but that has not happened since<br />
the reign of Queen Anne. Such constitutional anomalies<br />
remain theoretical, but so theoretical that it is inconceivable<br />
that they would arise whatever the emergency. I really<br />
feel that to rely on that for the passage of the Bill is<br />
most unsatisfactory.<br />
Mr Harper: I am not relying on it for the passage of<br />
the Bill. I was referring to the issue raised by my hon.<br />
Friend the Member for Epping Forest, who last week,<br />
on behalf of the Political and Constitutional Reform<br />
Committee, raised some potential scenarios with which<br />
she was uncomfortable. I believe, and the Government<br />
believe, that those scenarios are indeed, as my hon.