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BPIE: Europe's buildings under the microscope - PU Europe

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IV. Separation of expenditure and benefit<br />

This is probably <strong>the</strong> most complex and long-standing barrier relating to existing <strong>buildings</strong>, particularly in<br />

countries where <strong>the</strong>re is a high share of rental accommodation in <strong>the</strong> residential sector, but also because<br />

of <strong>the</strong> structure of occupancy in <strong>the</strong> non-residential sector. This barrier has been known <strong>under</strong> various<br />

names throughout <strong>the</strong> years. Most recently it is known as <strong>the</strong> ‘split incentives barrier’ or <strong>the</strong> ‘landlord/<br />

tenant barrier’, <strong>the</strong> ‘investor/user barrier’ and <strong>the</strong> ‘principal/agent barrier’, to name <strong>the</strong> main ones.<br />

This barrier was identified as <strong>the</strong> fourth most important barrier in <strong>the</strong> <strong>BPIE</strong> survey, although <strong>the</strong>re were no<br />

first place positions amongst <strong>the</strong> countries. This barrier is sometimes considered a financial barrier and,<br />

<strong>under</strong>standably, <strong>the</strong>re are financial implications. It is also sometimes considered to be an institutional<br />

barrier. This is presented separately herein due to its importance in retrofit strategies.<br />

The problem originates from <strong>the</strong> fact that one person or organisation owns a building and someone else<br />

uses it. For <strong>the</strong> owner, any investment has to bring a benefit which is not necessarily through energy<br />

savings, unless it is a situation where <strong>the</strong> landlord pays <strong>the</strong> energy bills (this may sometimes be <strong>the</strong> case).<br />

Since <strong>the</strong> tenant does not own <strong>the</strong> facility, any investment in lowering energy bills has to be seen as<br />

financially advantageous for both actors. This often leads to a stalemate with nothing happening.<br />

There are many examples where <strong>the</strong> party investing in a building may not be <strong>the</strong> party reaping <strong>the</strong><br />

financial returns (in full or in part). Examples include:<br />

• Landlords investing in a property where tenants pay <strong>the</strong> energy bill;<br />

• Landlords’ inability (through legislative restrictions or o<strong>the</strong>r reasons) to raise rents after a building<br />

renovation; and<br />

• Developers constructing a new building or renovating an existing one, where market prices do not<br />

reflect <strong>the</strong> energy performance of <strong>the</strong> building.<br />

As evidence from Germany 26 has shown, this is one of <strong>the</strong> most relevant barriers needing increased<br />

attention, particularly since many leases include heating charges and so <strong>the</strong> actual consumer has a lack of<br />

<strong>under</strong>standing of actual energy consumption. A comprehensive analysis on split incentives <strong>under</strong>taken<br />

by <strong>the</strong> International Energy Agency in 2007 showed that this barrier accounts for about 30% of sectorial<br />

energy use, which is highly significant. It stated, however, that no single policy instrument can address<br />

it. The IEA stated 27 :<br />

“Nei<strong>the</strong>r regulatory mechanisms, (e.g. minimum energy performance standards, or regulated contract<br />

design), nor information-based instruments (i.e. awareness campaigns) alone will resolve <strong>the</strong>m. Instead,<br />

governments should help design well-targeted policy packages to address PA problems in <strong>the</strong>ir specific<br />

national contexts, and within <strong>the</strong> particular constraints of a given sector. These packages should include<br />

measures to: a) address contract design to ensure end-users face energy prices, b) regulate <strong>the</strong> level of<br />

energy efficiency in appliances and <strong>buildings</strong>, c) improve access to information about energy efficiency<br />

performance.”<br />

This is an important point to remember in designing renovation policy pages, as will be seen in Part 3.<br />

26<br />

<strong>BPIE</strong> database<br />

27<br />

IEA, Mind <strong>the</strong> Gap, IEA/OECD, Paris, 2007, p. 12.<br />

60 | <strong>Europe</strong>’s <strong>buildings</strong> <strong>under</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>microscope</strong>

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