Multiple benefits of renovation in buildings - PU Europe
Multiple benefits of renovation in buildings - PU Europe
Multiple benefits of renovation in buildings - PU Europe
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<strong>Multiple</strong> <strong>benefits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> energy<br />
efficient <strong>renovation</strong> <strong>of</strong> build<strong>in</strong>gs<br />
regulated level. The strictness <strong>of</strong> the rent control def<strong>in</strong>es e.g. whether or not landlords<br />
may pass on cost <strong>in</strong>creases to the tenant, and <strong>in</strong> which cases what types <strong>of</strong> costs may be<br />
passed on.<br />
The fact that owners/landlords <strong>of</strong> build<strong>in</strong>gs are the ones to undertake the <strong>renovation</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment,<br />
and users/tenants are the ones to benefit from reduced energy sav<strong>in</strong>gs, gives<br />
rise to a so called split-<strong>in</strong>centive problem. In the literature this is sometimes known as a<br />
pr<strong>in</strong>cipal/agent problem. Basically, the landlords will not have the proper <strong>in</strong>centive to<br />
undertake such <strong>in</strong>vestments, unless they have the possibility to pass on (some <strong>of</strong>) the<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment costs to the tenants. The tighter control there is over the rent sett<strong>in</strong>g, the less<br />
<strong>in</strong>centive landlords will have to <strong>in</strong>vest. One example <strong>in</strong> the UK shows that wall cavities<br />
where filled at a much higher rate <strong>in</strong> the owner-occupied sector than <strong>in</strong> the private rented<br />
sector (49 per cent versus 32 per cent <strong>in</strong> 2008). 31 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to OECD, the EU Member<br />
States with the tightest rent control <strong>in</strong> the private rental market is Sweden, Netherlands,<br />
Germany, Czech Republic and Denmark, cf. Figure 19. Rent control for social hous<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
especially strict <strong>in</strong> Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy and Hungary.<br />
Figure 19 Rent control regulation<br />
Degree <strong>of</strong> rent<br />
control<br />
6<br />
5<br />
4<br />
3<br />
2<br />
1<br />
0<br />
Private rental market<br />
Social hous<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Note:<br />
The degree <strong>of</strong> rent control is a constructed <strong>in</strong>dicator determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g how <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> rent are determ<strong>in</strong>ed,<br />
and the permitted cost pass-through onto rents.<br />
Source: OECD (2011a)<br />
The rent regulation problem may have a significant impact, as 26 per cent <strong>of</strong> the EU<br />
build<strong>in</strong>g stock is rentals, cf. Figure 20. This <strong>in</strong>cludes both residential and non-residential<br />
build<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />
31 UK government Energy Bill, Green Deal Impact Assessment (2010), referr<strong>in</strong>g to English Hous<strong>in</strong>g Condition Survey (2007)<br />
and (2008).<br />
29