Evaluation of the Australian Wage Subsidy Special Youth ...
Evaluation of the Australian Wage Subsidy Special Youth ... Evaluation of the Australian Wage Subsidy Special Youth ...
40 working, looking for work and absence from the labour market. The survey data was linked to administrative records for programme participation, and the PPM survey outcomes. Only consenting persons could be linked, and not all linked cases had full administrative data or PPM survey outcomes, and all incomplete records were dropped for analysis. The matched data showed that raw outcomes for employment 3 months after the Jobstart programme were substantially different in the matched PPM outcome and the SEUP Labour market history, as shown in Table 2.2. The difference in the employment outcomes measured could be partly due to the differing data sources, collection times, response rates, recall biases, the shares of incomplete/missing data (as all incomplete cases were dropped), and also the share of cases where there was an inability to link data. Table 2.2 Stromback and Dockery (2000) Raw employment outcomes after Jobstart Matched PPM SEUP % in Employment 38.4% 51.0% after Jobstart Known outcomes 318 787 Source: Stromback and Dockery (2000) p32 Table 8.3 Only includes episodes for which PPM outcomes are known. Reported labour market activity is known for all episodes. SEUP calculated as per cent of labour market spells, Matched PPM calculated as per cent of spells with known outcomes. Exact matching analysis on gender, four age groups and 8 categories of unemployment spell durations was used to estimate the net employment impact using the SEUP data. A comparison group was constructed of those registered unemployed in the administrative data, who were not in the programme at the point the Jobstart participants left the programme (note this means they could have entered the programme after this point). The employment outcomes 3 months after the programme participation reference period were then compared. For Jobstart, the net impact on employment 3 months after the programme in 1995 was found to be 11.8 per cent, with 19.3 per cent of Jobstart participants in employment and 7.5 per cent of the comparison group. During the later survey periods there was a change to the programme rules, which meant that employers were required to retain employees at least 3 months after the subsidy period, and because this corresponds to the post-programme evaluation period chosen for analysis these later periods cannot be usefully considered (OECD (2001): 217).
41 Matching methods are theoretically based upon the consideration of characteristics prior to programme entry, and the definition of the comparison group used here flouts this fundamental premise and would bias and generally invalidate these estimates. This is because Stromback and Dockery (2000) argue that their comparison group definition excludes the ‘lock-in’ period, where placements must be in subsidised employment until the end of the subsidy, which the comparison group does not face. They also point out that defining the comparison group at programme entry as matching methods require would give the comparison group an employment rate nearly 3 times higher, and so Jobstart would end up with a negative employment impact. However, this alludes to choices made to achieve a desired positive employment impact rather than providing a satisfactory reason for choosing this econometric strategy. In June 1996 the new coalition government announced reductions for labour market programme expenditures, and abolition of several programmes. However there was some political confusion and substantial ambiguity about Jobstart expenditures and continuity, with various conflicting announcements (OECD (2001): 201 –202). It eventuated that Jobstart continued into 1997-98 but as a programme for the disabled, and was then abolished in 1998/99. There is no wage subsidy programme that operates in Australia in the current period. 2.1.4 Discussion Australian evaluation evidence for wage subsidies is scant. The AWSS was not evaluated. The GTA-OTJ was only evaluated alongside SYETP. 16 It could in any case be argued, that the relevance of these subsidies is more limited than that of SYETP or Jobstart. Both AWSS and GTA-OTJ were very small in scale, with very little expenditure and few placements being made to these programmes. GTA-OTJ is very difficult to define clearly, as it was so discretionary. However, as GTA-OTJ was only for ‘jobs-in-demand’ it was not a general wage subsidy available to all employers. The later Jobstart evaluations mostly took place after Jobstart had been changed from a general wage subsidy tiered by age to a subsidy programme only for long-term unemployed and disadvantaged or 16 A critical review of these evaluations is given in the later section 2.3 of this chapter
- Page 5 and 6: v Declaration I hereby declare that
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- Page 15 and 16: xv Abstract The job subsidy Special
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- Page 43 and 44: 27 Table 1.3 Brief overview of rece
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40<br />
working, looking for work and absence from <strong>the</strong> labour market. The survey data was<br />
linked to administrative records for programme participation, and <strong>the</strong> PPM survey<br />
outcomes. Only consenting persons could be linked, and not all linked cases had full<br />
administrative data or PPM survey outcomes, and all incomplete records were dropped<br />
for analysis. The matched data showed that raw outcomes for employment 3 months after<br />
<strong>the</strong> Jobstart programme were substantially different in <strong>the</strong> matched PPM outcome and <strong>the</strong><br />
SEUP Labour market history, as shown in Table 2.2. The difference in <strong>the</strong> employment<br />
outcomes measured could be partly due to <strong>the</strong> differing data sources, collection times,<br />
response rates, recall biases, <strong>the</strong> shares <strong>of</strong> incomplete/missing data (as all incomplete<br />
cases were dropped), and also <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> cases where <strong>the</strong>re was an inability to link data.<br />
Table 2.2 Stromback and Dockery (2000) Raw employment outcomes after Jobstart<br />
Matched PPM<br />
SEUP<br />
% in Employment 38.4% 51.0%<br />
after Jobstart<br />
Known outcomes 318 787<br />
Source: Stromback and Dockery (2000) p32 Table 8.3 Only includes episodes for which PPM outcomes are<br />
known. Reported labour market activity is known for all episodes. SEUP calculated as per cent <strong>of</strong> labour<br />
market spells, Matched PPM calculated as per cent <strong>of</strong> spells with known outcomes.<br />
Exact matching analysis on gender, four age groups and 8 categories <strong>of</strong> unemployment<br />
spell durations was used to estimate <strong>the</strong> net employment impact using <strong>the</strong> SEUP data. A<br />
comparison group was constructed <strong>of</strong> those registered unemployed in <strong>the</strong> administrative<br />
data, who were not in <strong>the</strong> programme at <strong>the</strong> point <strong>the</strong> Jobstart participants left <strong>the</strong><br />
programme (note this means <strong>the</strong>y could have entered <strong>the</strong> programme after this point). The<br />
employment outcomes 3 months after <strong>the</strong> programme participation reference period were<br />
<strong>the</strong>n compared. For Jobstart, <strong>the</strong> net impact on employment 3 months after <strong>the</strong><br />
programme in 1995 was found to be 11.8 per cent, with 19.3 per cent <strong>of</strong> Jobstart<br />
participants in employment and 7.5 per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> comparison group. During <strong>the</strong> later<br />
survey periods <strong>the</strong>re was a change to <strong>the</strong> programme rules, which meant that employers<br />
were required to retain employees at least 3 months after <strong>the</strong> subsidy period, and because<br />
this corresponds to <strong>the</strong> post-programme evaluation period chosen for analysis <strong>the</strong>se later<br />
periods cannot be usefully considered (OECD (2001): 217).