Evaluation of the Australian Wage Subsidy Special Youth ...

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10 The labour market for low-skill labour is shown in Figure 1.1. Labour demand is LD, while Labour supply is LS, which in a competitive market might give the wage and employment outcome at A (w*, L*). The minimum wage is set to w + , which gives a market outcome for the demand for labour at B, with employment at L + . The effective labour supply corresponds to D, with unemployment the difference (L # -L + ). By offering a wage subsidy to employers of the amount, (w + -w*), the firms raise their labour demand to LD2. The outcome is then drawn to point E with the wage w + equivalent to the minimum wage and employment L*. Unemployment is reduced and employment is raised. Dreze and Sneessens (1997) elaborate the model by describing a ‘ladder effect’ linking the skilled and unskilled labour markets, whereby if higher skilled wages lead to lower employment at the next higher skill level then the unemployed from the skilled market can become part of the labour supply in the low-skilled market. The labour demand then has skill-substitution effects, where unskilled wages are relative to other wages. Wage subsidy programs can then raise the employment of the person, simply by reducing the costs to an employer of hiring that particular person. Katz (1996) p7 also discusses the partial equilibrium dynamics of wage subsidies in this type of model shown in Figure 1.1. In the Katz model, the labour market is for low wage rather than low skill workers. This is also true for the Phelps (1994, 1997) subsidy. Katz additionally considers an infinitely elastic effective supply of labour, such as when there is structural unemployment, which would make the LS curve in Figure 1.1 horizontal. In this case, the wage subsidy does not affect wages but expands employment in proportion to the elasticity of labour demand for the low-skill (or low wage) workers. The effective wage elasticities of both labour demand and supply are key to the effects of the subsidy. However Katz (1996) also points out that in practice, design issues, administration, employer take-up, can all affect the practical effect of the subsidy.
11 Real Wage Employment Figure 1.1: Labour market equilibrium with wage subsidy Dreze and Sneessens (1997) Figure 8.5 p268. Layard (1991, 1997) links the wage subsidy to the concept of employability within a model of the wage-price spiral. This is often considered a useful general model as it links the concepts of the NAIRU (Natural rate, or Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) and the Phillips Curve linking inflation and unemployment, to policy for reducing unemployment. This gives a basic macroeconomic framework for the analysis of the effects of the subsidy on economic variables and processes that influence aggregate employment and unemployment rates. In defining the notion of employability, there is a mixture of job search and skills, and employability is linked to the capacity of a person to fill a vacancy: “Near one end is A: a skilled worker who is willing to take any job and searches every day. Near the other end is B: unskilled worker with an excessive reservation wage who only samples the job market once a month. If there are vacancies, A will probably be hired soon and B after a longer spell of unemployment.” (Layard (1997): 340)
Page 1: i Evaluation of the Australian Wage
Page 5 and 6: v Declaration I hereby declare that
Page 7 and 8: in method and assumptions. The orth
Page 9 and 10: 3.3 Data and variables used for est
Page 11 and 12: List of Tables and Figures Figure 1
Page 13 and 14: Table A2.0b Univariate Probit of pa
Page 15 and 16: xv Abstract The job subsidy Special
Page 17 and 18: 1 1: Wage subsidy theory and evalua
Page 19 and 20: 3 programs of providing benefits an
Page 21 and 22: 5 The empirical methods used for th
Page 23 and 24: 7 how the outcomes from these metho
Page 25: 9 employment effect could be mainly
Page 29 and 30: 13 are two types of unemployment, s
Page 31 and 32: 15 Real wages are predetermined whe
Page 33 and 34: 17 Vella (1998), Heckman, Lalonde a
Page 35 and 36: 19 Each individual has two potentia
Page 37 and 38: 21 this case, if there was no data
Page 39 and 40: 23 correlation for the error of the
Page 41 and 42: 25 Table 1.3 collects together some
Page 43 and 44: 27 Table 1.3 Brief overview of rece
Page 45 and 46: 29 necessarily brief. Then, the evi
Page 47 and 48: 31 limited applications, such as fo
Page 49 and 50: 33 who participated. It was conclud
Page 51 and 52: 35 term unemployed for over 12 of t
Page 53 and 54: 37 importance of the subsidy second
Page 55 and 56: 39 differences in characteristics t
Page 57 and 58: 41 Matching methods are theoretical
Page 59 and 60: 43 2.2 SYETP implementation As SYET
Page 61 and 62: 45 In July1978, the subsidy was cal
Page 63 and 64: 47 In January 1979, variations were
Page 65 and 66: 49 benefits were paid at a slightly
Page 67 and 68: 51 2.2.3 SYETP operation Earlier re
Page 69 and 70: 53 ceiling constraints’ applied t
Page 71 and 72: 55 Award Conditions for employment
Page 73 and 74: 57 Harris (2001) claims that during
Page 75 and 76: 59 display boards listed details of
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61 restriction was used. If there w
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63 to the end of the 1980’s. An o
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65 for teens overall had risen, emp
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67 for Australia using data from th
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69 training, can provide a form of
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71 employer survey estimates were t
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73 provisions for SYETP and extende
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75 withdrawals occurred at similar
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77 Table 2.17 State usage of progra
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79 2.3.1 Stretton (1982, 1984) 53 S
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81 Stretton attributed the success
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83 included in the employment model
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85 completers. Their argument was t
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87 was an issue for the data. Unlik
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89 Table 2.21 Richardson (1998) Est
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91 2.3.5 General discussion Some ge
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93 Controlling for differences in i
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95 taken by a previous researcher a
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97 If employability is assumed to b
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99 suitability of the underlying as
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101 Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (199
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103 effect on employment relative t
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105 Table 3.1, Part A Employment eq
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107 (-1.80) (-1.80) Tradesperson -0
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109 duration of Pre-June 1984 unemp
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111 4: Study 2 Propensity score mat
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113 Propensity score matching provi
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115 4.2 Propensity score matching m
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117 covariates that influence the a
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119 (7) E(Y c | D=1) = E P(X) {E[Y
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121 For CIA to be plausible, a ‘r
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123 employment and programme partic
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Highest qualification in 1984 (1.56
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127 4.6 Distribution of the propens
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129 Figure 4.3 Histograms of estima
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131 Table 4.5 Summary statistics fo
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133 Table 4.5, that the variance of
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135 Table 4.6 Matching results, Sin
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137 Table 6.3 using Swedish data wi
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139 matching is the ability to weed
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141 Table 4.7 Matching results, All
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143 the unobserved component. If th
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145 5: Study 3 Attrition and non-re
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147 occur by design, because the mi
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149 (1990) extended and improved th
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151 (10) A* = δ 0 + δ 1 x +δ 2 z
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153 again from September to Novembe
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155 5.5.2 Univariate examination of
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157 lower, the job lengths are only
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159 Work limited by health 1984 0.1
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161 The characteristics of the SYET
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163 para-professional Mother not em
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165 comparison group where the shar
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167 5.5.4 Attrition: natural attrit
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169 both sources that impose change
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171 para-professional Father not em
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173 work in later sections, this su
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175 Table 5.6: Effect of selection/
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177 appropriate to discard these fr
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179 Australia/Tasmania. Amongst tho
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181 Table 5.5a Summary statistics b
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183 5.6.1.2 Effects of the non-resp
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185 3 years + -0.35 -0.47 -0.34 -0.
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187 5.7 Multivariate analysis of ef
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189 proportion of time spent unempl
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191 post-school qualification, and
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193 Generally, those variables foun
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195 longj0 Longest job by 1984 < 1
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197 adopted in order to maintain co
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199 6: Study 4 Weighting to counter
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201 Table 6.1, part A Employment eq
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203 Methodist 0.133 0.261 (0.77) (1
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205 CEP referrals 1984 0.143* 0.128
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207 6.2 Results of weighting the PS
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209 The distribution of the propens
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211 Table 6.3 Weighted probit used
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213 (0.76) Tradesperson mtrad 0.20
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215 Table 6.5 Summary statistics fo
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217 Table 6.7 Matching results, sin
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219 6.3 Discussion The comparison o
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221 the selection into SYETP and th
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223 Heteroskedasticity is a violati
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225 Table 7.1, Part A Employment eq
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227 (1.26) (1.28) (1.16) Mothers oc
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229 Other Post-School qualification
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231 7.1.2 Exclusion restriction in
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233 Finally, the third panel of new
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235 Table 7.2 summary of changes to
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237 schooling that was statisticall
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239 (0.25) (0.21) 3 years + -0.50 -
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241 Table 7.4 Summary of distributi
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243 7.2.2 Propensity score matching
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245 original model, but with the pe
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247 maintained, then the Heckman bi
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249 Table 7.6 Weighted Probit used
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251 Table 7.7 Summary of distributi
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253 8: Summary and Conclusions The
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255 over which it ran, the review m
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257 the Heckman and PSM methods wer
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259 posited that that such sensitiv
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261 Description Derivation and deta
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Appendix 2 Tables 263
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2 years 0.28 0.07 (1.70) (1.70) 3 y
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267 Table A2.0b Univariate Probit o
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269 Religion brought up in (1.52) (
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271 hq9_84 Year 9 of school or less
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273 Table A2.1 Continued Means and
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275 mtrad Tradesperson 0.04 0.04 0.
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277 Year 9 of school or less -0.19
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279 Table A2.3 Probit of SYETP part
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281 (0.22) (0.44) (0.67) (0.89) Tra
Page 299 and 300:
283 Table A2.5a Univariate probit f
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285 Manager/professional/para-profe
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3 years + -0.04 (2.13)* CEP referra
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289 Table A2.6 Part A Employment eq
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291 Table A2.6 Part B Selection/par
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Page 311 and 312:
Page 313 and 314:
Page 315 and 316:
Page 317 and 318:
301
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BLMR Bureau of Labour Market Resear
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Fay, R.G. (1996) "Enhancing the eff
Page 323 and 324:
Heckman J.J. and Smith, J. A. (1998
Page 325 and 326:
Lewis, H.G. (1963) "Unionism and re
Page 327 and 328:
Quandt, R. (1972) "A new approach t
Page 329 and 330:
Stromback, M. and Dockery, A. (2000
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