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Evaluation of the Australian Wage Subsidy Special Youth ...

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10<br />

The labour market for low-skill labour is shown in Figure 1.1. Labour demand is LD,<br />

while Labour supply is LS, which in a competitive market might give <strong>the</strong> wage and<br />

employment outcome at A (w*, L*). The minimum wage is set to w + , which gives a<br />

market outcome for <strong>the</strong> demand for labour at B, with employment at L + . The effective<br />

labour supply corresponds to D, with unemployment <strong>the</strong> difference (L # -L + ). By <strong>of</strong>fering a<br />

wage subsidy to employers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> amount, (w + -w*), <strong>the</strong> firms raise <strong>the</strong>ir labour demand<br />

to LD2. The outcome is <strong>the</strong>n drawn to point E with <strong>the</strong> wage w + equivalent to <strong>the</strong><br />

minimum wage and employment L*. Unemployment is reduced and employment is<br />

raised.<br />

Dreze and Sneessens (1997) elaborate <strong>the</strong> model by describing a ‘ladder effect’ linking<br />

<strong>the</strong> skilled and unskilled labour markets, whereby if higher skilled wages lead to lower<br />

employment at <strong>the</strong> next higher skill level <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> unemployed from <strong>the</strong> skilled market<br />

can become part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> labour supply in <strong>the</strong> low-skilled market. The labour demand <strong>the</strong>n<br />

has skill-substitution effects, where unskilled wages are relative to o<strong>the</strong>r wages. <strong>Wage</strong><br />

subsidy programs can <strong>the</strong>n raise <strong>the</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> person, simply by reducing <strong>the</strong><br />

costs to an employer <strong>of</strong> hiring that particular person.<br />

Katz (1996) p7 also discusses <strong>the</strong> partial equilibrium dynamics <strong>of</strong> wage subsidies in this<br />

type <strong>of</strong> model shown in Figure 1.1. In <strong>the</strong> Katz model, <strong>the</strong> labour market is for low wage<br />

ra<strong>the</strong>r than low skill workers. This is also true for <strong>the</strong> Phelps (1994, 1997) subsidy. Katz<br />

additionally considers an infinitely elastic effective supply <strong>of</strong> labour, such as when <strong>the</strong>re<br />

is structural unemployment, which would make <strong>the</strong> LS curve in Figure 1.1 horizontal. In<br />

this case, <strong>the</strong> wage subsidy does not affect wages but expands employment in proportion<br />

to <strong>the</strong> elasticity <strong>of</strong> labour demand for <strong>the</strong> low-skill (or low wage) workers. The effective<br />

wage elasticities <strong>of</strong> both labour demand and supply are key to <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subsidy.<br />

However Katz (1996) also points out that in practice, design issues, administration,<br />

employer take-up, can all affect <strong>the</strong> practical effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subsidy.

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