REGINE Regularisations in Europe Final Report - European ...
REGINE Regularisations in Europe Final Report - European ... REGINE Regularisations in Europe Final Report - European ...
The ‘reluctant regularisers’ (France, the UK) These ‘old immigration countries’ with colonial histories and, in the case of France, large post-war labour recruitment programmes, have struggled to manage immigration over many decades, occasionally resorting to regularisation programmes as a policy instrument (but with fairly small numbers, although overall numbers in France are higher). They have developed extensive and sophisticated regularisation mechanisms, which are used to a significant degree although (particularly in the case of France) with a serious lack of transparency. 105 In both countries, the asylum process is caught up in the issue of illegal immigrant stocks, although a considerable proportion of irregular migration takes place outside of the asylum nexus . Policy responses include more aggressive deportation of failed asylum-seekers, toleration, and regularisation of some on humanitarian grounds. The extent to which medium-level stocks of illegal migrants are actually managed is open to debate – especially in the UK, which we classify as having high irregular TCN stocks. The ideological opponents of regularisation (Austria, Germany) These are distinguished by their political opposition to regularisation as a policy instrument, even though Germany uses mechanisms that amount to regularisation (awarding ‘tolerated’ status) and in addition several small-scale programmes for specific target groups; generally, both Germany and Austria extensively utilise regularisation mechanisms. 106 In both countries, the asylum system is thought to be linked to the creation of illegal immigrant stocks, although the number of asylum applications in both countries has sharply decreased recently: this is particularly true in Germany, where asylum applications have constantly decreased since the early 1990s. In both countries, stocks of irregular migrants have significantly decreased as a result of EU enlargement . Despite this, the stock of irregular migrants in Germany is considered to be relatively high, resulting in significant social exclusion and labour market segmentation. The non-regularising ‘new’ Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Rep., Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia) To some extent, the principal characteristic shared by these countries is transition from state-driven to market-based economies, with the implicit larger role for the informal economy. With the major exceptions of Cyprus and the Czech Rep., all have low stocks of illegal migrants, with little policy to manage these. The situation is acute with Cyprus, which has high immigrant stocks on temporary permits: there is an interaction with the asylum system, going in the opposite direction from the usual 105 The data for France (see Fig. 3) show this; the UK is unable to provide data, but we believe that the figures are very high. 106 Germany is the foremost country in awarding legal status through mechanisms – see Fig. 3 42
case in Europe, alongside the more normal immigration—asylum input. Malta also has an asylum system problem, but one stemming from illegal immigration feeding directly into the asylum process and applicants forbidden to work. None has had any regularisation programme, and none has a functioning regularisation mechanism: 107 there is, therefore, no policy for the management of irregular migrant stocks in these countries. 3.2.2 Intervening variables that might explain policy differences This is necessarily speculative, but we do need some sort of theoretical explanation of why some countries respond to irregular migration with a particular policy instrument, or indeed do not respond. Proceeding from the Member State responses to the ICMPD questionnaire (see also §4), the following observations can be made: (1) The ideological opponents of regularisation (Germany and Austria) believe that it constitutes a ‘pull factor’ for future illegal migration flows. This view is also shared by France and Belgium (and possibly the UK) (2) The Nordic countries, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands emphasise humanitarian reasons as a primary issue for regularisation policy (3) The southern countries emphasise managing the labour market (including labour recruitment problems), combating the large informal economy, and trying to maintain the legality of residence of TCNs (4) The regularising new MS put forward a variety of reasons for regularisation, including humanitarian reasons, managing illegal residence, bringing immigrant workers within the tax and social security regime, and securing long-term integration (5) The non-regularising new MS appear not to have formulated policy positions, and some (at least) might be described as agnostic on the issue. (6) Family reasons constitute an important reason for regularisation, especially in France; family reasons (often converging with the notion of ‘strong ties’) have also been important grounds for regularising migrants in an irregular situation in various other countries, including Belgium and Sweden. On the basis of the above observations, we can posit the following as possible intervening variables that can explain policy differences: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Differing labour market structures – particularly concerning informal employment The role of ideology and sanctity of law in policy formulation The degree of pragmatism in policy formulation (contradicts point (b)) The extent and phase of migration – i.e. recentness and lack of state infrastructure The role of asylum policy, i.e. managing rejected asylum-seekers after extended processes 107 To be accurate, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta and Romania have regularisation mechanisms that amount to temporary ‘toleration’; it is not known if these have been utilised. See Appendix B country profiles, for more information. 43
- Page 1 and 2: REGINE Regularisations in Europe St
- Page 3 and 4: CONTRIBUTORS Principal authors Mart
- Page 5 and 6: Preface In December 2007, the Europ
- Page 7 and 8: 1 Terms, definitions and scope 1.1
- Page 9 and 10: Table 1: Types of illegal or irregu
- Page 11 and 12: 1.3 Freedom of movement rights and
- Page 13 and 14: 1.4 The meaning of ‘regularisatio
- Page 15 and 16: Regularisation Mechanism A regulari
- Page 17 and 18: 2 Previous comparative studies on r
- Page 19 and 20: Generally, the focus of SOPEMI repo
- Page 21 and 22: enefiting from regularisation has s
- Page 23 and 24: amnesty and moreover involved (limi
- Page 25 and 26: 2. 3 The Odysseus study on regulari
- Page 27 and 28: etween expediency and obligations c
- Page 29 and 30: Sunderhaus identifies several ratio
- Page 31 and 32: whether it can be attributed to pul
- Page 33 and 34: Box 2: 3-tier earned regularisation
- Page 35 and 36: measures; it does address questions
- Page 37 and 38: 3.1.1 Regularisation Programmes Ove
- Page 39 and 40: Nine Member States provided details
- Page 41 and 42: Figure 3 Grants of regularised stat
- Page 43 and 44: Box 3: Regularisation policy in Swi
- Page 45 and 46: 3.2 Regularisation as a policy resp
- Page 47: Table 5: Comparative table of regul
- Page 51 and 52: that a year after regularisation so
- Page 53 and 54: treatment according to nationality,
- Page 55 and 56: iii. issues of advance planning iv.
- Page 57 and 58: iv. the requirement to appear in pe
- Page 59 and 60: denying residence permits to existi
- Page 61 and 62: efugees under the provisions of the
- Page 63 and 64: 4 Government positions on policy 15
- Page 65 and 66: 5 Positions of social actors 5.1 In
- Page 67 and 68: Since the 1990s - and in some count
- Page 69 and 70: live their lives without fear.” 1
- Page 71 and 72: admission policies. 181 The Danish
- Page 73 and 74: and useful, if planned and implemen
- Page 75 and 76: depend on (unskilled) immigrant lab
- Page 77 and 78: migration”. 209 In the opinion of
- Page 79 and 80: stresses that “economic immigrati
- Page 81 and 82: undocumented migrants by the Brusse
- Page 83 and 84: NGO/Country Main activities in rega
- Page 85 and 86: NGO/Country Assessment of own role/
- Page 87 and 88: known that this makes them vulnerab
- Page 89 and 90: eaching reforms of the overall fram
- Page 91 and 92: Accord of March 2008 have not yet b
- Page 93 and 94: Table 8: Suggested target groups fo
- Page 95 and 96: policy measures that could be adopt
- Page 97 and 98: followed by the granting of any sta
case <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, alongside the more normal immigration—asylum <strong>in</strong>put. Malta also has an asylum<br />
system problem, but one stemm<strong>in</strong>g from illegal immigration feed<strong>in</strong>g directly <strong>in</strong>to the asylum process<br />
and applicants forbidden to work. None has had any regularisation programme, and none has a<br />
function<strong>in</strong>g regularisation mechanism: 107 there is, therefore, no policy for the management of irregular<br />
migrant stocks <strong>in</strong> these countries.<br />
3.2.2 Interven<strong>in</strong>g variables that might expla<strong>in</strong> policy differences<br />
This is necessarily speculative, but we do need some sort of theoretical explanation of why some<br />
countries respond to irregular migration with a particular policy <strong>in</strong>strument, or <strong>in</strong>deed do not respond.<br />
Proceed<strong>in</strong>g from the Member State responses to the ICMPD questionnaire (see also §4), the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
observations can be made:<br />
(1) The ideological opponents of regularisation (Germany and Austria) believe that it constitutes<br />
a ‘pull factor’ for future illegal migration flows. This view is also shared by France and<br />
Belgium (and possibly the UK)<br />
(2) The Nordic countries, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands emphasise humanitarian<br />
reasons as a primary issue for regularisation policy<br />
(3) The southern countries emphasise manag<strong>in</strong>g the labour market (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g labour recruitment<br />
problems), combat<strong>in</strong>g the large <strong>in</strong>formal economy, and try<strong>in</strong>g to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the legality of<br />
residence of TCNs<br />
(4) The regularis<strong>in</strong>g new MS put forward a variety of reasons for regularisation, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
humanitarian reasons, manag<strong>in</strong>g illegal residence, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g immigrant workers with<strong>in</strong> the tax<br />
and social security regime, and secur<strong>in</strong>g long-term <strong>in</strong>tegration<br />
(5) The non-regularis<strong>in</strong>g new MS appear not to have formulated policy positions, and some (at<br />
least) might be described as agnostic on the issue.<br />
(6) Family reasons constitute an important reason for regularisation, especially <strong>in</strong> France; family<br />
reasons (often converg<strong>in</strong>g with the notion of ‘strong ties’) have also been important grounds<br />
for regularis<strong>in</strong>g migrants <strong>in</strong> an irregular situation <strong>in</strong> various other countries, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Belgium and Sweden.<br />
On the basis of the above observations, we can posit the follow<strong>in</strong>g as possible <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g variables<br />
that can expla<strong>in</strong> policy differences:<br />
(a)<br />
(b)<br />
(c)<br />
(d)<br />
(e)<br />
Differ<strong>in</strong>g labour market structures – particularly concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formal employment<br />
The role of ideology and sanctity of law <strong>in</strong> policy formulation<br />
The degree of pragmatism <strong>in</strong> policy formulation (contradicts po<strong>in</strong>t (b))<br />
The extent and phase of migration – i.e. recentness and lack of state <strong>in</strong>frastructure<br />
The role of asylum policy, i.e. manag<strong>in</strong>g rejected asylum-seekers after extended processes<br />
107 To be accurate, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta and Romania have regularisation mechanisms that amount to<br />
temporary ‘toleration’; it is not known if these have been utilised. See Appendix B country profiles, for more<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation.<br />
43