REGINE Regularisations in Europe Final Report - European ...
REGINE Regularisations in Europe Final Report - European ... REGINE Regularisations in Europe Final Report - European ...
‘Nationality’ and ‘Ethnic ties’ are definitely not relevant for benefiting from regularisation mechanisms, as they are mentioned most often as ‘not relevant’ and hardly at all as ‘desired’ or ‘essential’. In general, ‘length of residence’ and ‘presence in the territory before a certain time point’ are essential only for five mechanisms, but are seen as not relevant in 10 and 14 mechanisms respectively. Figure 6, below, shows the criteria or conditions seen as ‘essential’ by frequency of occurrence in the 21 mechanisms for which information has been provided. Figure 6 Conditions considered as essential 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Presence in the territory before a certain date Length of residence Family ties Ethnic ties Nationality Evidence of integration efforts Lack of a criminal record Employment Health condition Other 36
Box 3: Regularisation policy in Switzerland From 1945, Switzerland followed a temporary worker immigration programme to fill its economic demand for unskilled labour, with rotation of workers to avoid settlement of migrant groups. Until very recently, Switzerland denied the existence of long-term immigrant residents – even though the phenomenon had started to appear in the 1970s. Immigration practice was changed in 1991 and again in 1998 to conform to EEA (European Economic Area) rules, such that persons from countries outside the EU or EFTA (European Free Trade Area) could not be given work permits, unless they were highly qualified. A 2005 immigration law, replacing the previous one of 1931, strengthened the restrictions on immigration from outside EFTA (by setting quotas) and increased the maximum detention term for illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers from one to two years, while also introducing criminal and other sanctions for human smuggling, irregular employment, and marriages of convenience. At the same time, draconian rules on asylum were introduced (effective from 2007) along with reduced benefits for asylum-seekers – making it the harshest asylum law in Europe, according to UNHCR. The 2000 Census recorded 22.4% of the population as foreign-born and 20.5% with a foreign nationality; the principal immigrant group is now citizens of the former Yugoslavia (24% of foreigners) followed by Italians, at 22%. Illegal residents (the term used is sans papiers) are thought to number between 50—300,000 according to government estimates, which averages 2.4% of total population. (This makes Switzerland, according to our classification in Table 5, a country with a very high (VH) stock of irregular migrants.) According to expert opinion, these irregular migrants are mostly from Latin America, former Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe, and Turkey; they tend to be of prime working age (20-40), with unequal distribution across the country of genders and family status. Some entered Switzerland on tourist visas; others lost or failed to renew their legal residence status. However, the term sans papiers is most frequently used to denote temporary workers who have lost their legal status, family members of these, and rejected asylum-seekers who have remained and work informally. It was not until a particular situation occurred in the latter half of the 1990s – involving nationals of the former Yugoslavia – that regularisation became a matter of political contention and public interest. Since 1991, seasonal workers from countries outside of the EEA had been denied work permits: the Yugoslav seasonal workers were threatened with deportation as they could not complete the four years required for a one year residence permit. In 1998, the government rejected a proposal made by the National Council for a mass amnesty; instead, they opted for individual regularisation on the basis of ‘hardship’. In 2001, a circular was issued (the ‘Metzler’ Circular) outlining the criteria used for case-by-case regularisations. Since the cantons are responsible for case-by-case regularisations (subject to approval by the Confederation) and also execute federal deportation orders, the position adopted by each canton is crucial. Over the period 1996—2000, the Frenchspeaking canton of Vaud supported regularisation of Bosnian migrants on the basis of hardship, although the federal government refused to do so. In 1997 the canton refused to implement deportation orders; eventually, in 2000, 220 families were granted permits by the federal government. A second political mobilisation also involved the canton of Vaud, and concerned Kosovar migrants; they were former seasonal workers who had applied for asylum at the outbreak of the Kosovo war and were now threatened with deportation. Again, the political mobilisation – which involved trade unions and publicity campaigns – was successful and the Swiss Federal Council regularised 6,000 Kosovars who had spent more than eight years in the canton. Although these regularisations are ostensibly case-by-case, in reality they are collective programmes. Since 2001, there have been 14 parliamentary inquiries into the matter of sans papiers. Left politicians demanded large-scale amnesties, while most centre parties insisted on case-by-case regularisation on the grounds of ‘hardship’. The latter is seen as the only solution to the problem, although there have been criticisms of the lack of transparency of the process. Since 2001, 3,694 persons from various countries of the world applied, with an acceptance rate of 57%. A regularisation campaign aimed at non-deportable rejected asylumseekers in 2000, with onerous criteria for applications, benefited 6,500 Sri Lankans: each case was reviewed individually by the Federal Office for Refugees (FOR). Rejected asylum-seekers from other countries were not eligible, and had to ask their canton to request the FOR to re-examine their cases. In 2006, the Federal Commission for Foreigners called for harmonisation across the cantons of treatment of cases of hardship; whilst in December 2007, a new call for mass regularisation of irregular migrants has been made by socialist politicians in Zurich. The official position on regularisation taken by the Federal Council is unstintingly one of opposition to largescale amnesties, on the grounds that they promote future illegal migrations, encourage illegal employment, reward illegality, and might increase recorded unemployment (inter alia). Thus, they insist on case-by-case evaluations on the humanitarian basis of ‘hardship’. Many cantons, Swiss trade unions and other sectors of civil society take a different view, tending to emphasise the important economic role of undocumented workers and their integration in society. Thus, there is no consensus on policy, except at the federal political level. SOURCE: REGINE country study on Switzerland 37
- Page 1 and 2: REGINE Regularisations in Europe St
- Page 3 and 4: CONTRIBUTORS Principal authors Mart
- Page 5 and 6: Preface In December 2007, the Europ
- Page 7 and 8: 1 Terms, definitions and scope 1.1
- Page 9 and 10: Table 1: Types of illegal or irregu
- Page 11 and 12: 1.3 Freedom of movement rights and
- Page 13 and 14: 1.4 The meaning of ‘regularisatio
- Page 15 and 16: Regularisation Mechanism A regulari
- Page 17 and 18: 2 Previous comparative studies on r
- Page 19 and 20: Generally, the focus of SOPEMI repo
- Page 21 and 22: enefiting from regularisation has s
- Page 23 and 24: amnesty and moreover involved (limi
- Page 25 and 26: 2. 3 The Odysseus study on regulari
- Page 27 and 28: etween expediency and obligations c
- Page 29 and 30: Sunderhaus identifies several ratio
- Page 31 and 32: whether it can be attributed to pul
- Page 33 and 34: Box 2: 3-tier earned regularisation
- Page 35 and 36: measures; it does address questions
- Page 37 and 38: 3.1.1 Regularisation Programmes Ove
- Page 39 and 40: Nine Member States provided details
- Page 41: Figure 3 Grants of regularised stat
- Page 45 and 46: 3.2 Regularisation as a policy resp
- Page 47 and 48: Table 5: Comparative table of regul
- Page 49 and 50: case in Europe, alongside the more
- Page 51 and 52: that a year after regularisation so
- Page 53 and 54: treatment according to nationality,
- Page 55 and 56: iii. issues of advance planning iv.
- Page 57 and 58: iv. the requirement to appear in pe
- Page 59 and 60: denying residence permits to existi
- Page 61 and 62: efugees under the provisions of the
- Page 63 and 64: 4 Government positions on policy 15
- Page 65 and 66: 5 Positions of social actors 5.1 In
- Page 67 and 68: Since the 1990s - and in some count
- Page 69 and 70: live their lives without fear.” 1
- Page 71 and 72: admission policies. 181 The Danish
- Page 73 and 74: and useful, if planned and implemen
- Page 75 and 76: depend on (unskilled) immigrant lab
- Page 77 and 78: migration”. 209 In the opinion of
- Page 79 and 80: stresses that “economic immigrati
- Page 81 and 82: undocumented migrants by the Brusse
- Page 83 and 84: NGO/Country Main activities in rega
- Page 85 and 86: NGO/Country Assessment of own role/
- Page 87 and 88: known that this makes them vulnerab
- Page 89 and 90: eaching reforms of the overall fram
- Page 91 and 92: Accord of March 2008 have not yet b
‘Nationality’ and ‘Ethnic ties’ are def<strong>in</strong>itely not relevant for benefit<strong>in</strong>g from regularisation<br />
mechanisms, as they are mentioned most often as ‘not relevant’ and hardly at all as ‘desired’ or<br />
‘essential’. In general, ‘length of residence’ and ‘presence <strong>in</strong> the territory before a certa<strong>in</strong> time po<strong>in</strong>t’<br />
are essential only for five mechanisms, but are seen as not relevant <strong>in</strong> 10 and 14 mechanisms<br />
respectively.<br />
Figure 6, below, shows the criteria or conditions seen as ‘essential’ by frequency of occurrence <strong>in</strong> the<br />
21 mechanisms for which <strong>in</strong>formation has been provided.<br />
Figure 6<br />
Conditions considered as essential<br />
14<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
Presence <strong>in</strong> the territory<br />
before a certa<strong>in</strong> date<br />
Length of residence<br />
Family ties<br />
Ethnic ties<br />
Nationality<br />
Evidence of <strong>in</strong>tegration<br />
efforts<br />
Lack of a crim<strong>in</strong>al record<br />
Employment<br />
Health condition<br />
Other<br />
36