REGINE Regularisations in Europe Final Report - European ...

In terms of the impact of regularisation on fiscal revenues and state expenditures Abella highlights
that the overall balance of regularisation is difficult to establish. Although it can be reasonably
expected that regularisation does contribute to higher state revenues (tax revenues and social security
contributions), evidence from the US quoted by Abella indicates that two thirds of undocumented
workers had already paid social security contributions prior to regularisation to avoid detection. 69
Indeed, a study on the impact of regularisation programmes commissioned by DG Employment
quotes evidence from a survey among Mexican migrants showing that 66% of all unauthorised
migrants were paying taxes, while 87% among those legalised under IRCA’s provisions for
agricultural workers and 97% of those regularised under the law’s general provisions had already paid
taxes prior to regularisation. 70 This also suggests that the possible fiscal gains from regularisation
measures depend not insignificantly on the legislative framework in the country in question and in
particular on the extent to which illegal residence is associated with irregular work. As the data cited
by Papademetriou show, a majority of illegal migrants in the US seem to work in the formal economy.
In Southern Europe, by contrast, illegality is closely associated with irregular employment, although
irregular employment is at the same time a much broader phenomenon. In many other European
countries, by contrast, the proportion of legal immigrants and EU citizens (in particular from new
Member States) who are engaged in irregular work seems to be relatively large and more important
than illegally staying third country nationals.
Abella further argues that the gains through increased social security and tax payments may be – to
some extent – offset by additional expenditures following from an increased use of public services,
including welfare entitlements, education, health services etc. 71 Finally, Abella emphasises the need to
distinguish between different types of irregularity and to design regularisation programmes
accordingly. Quoting Böhning’s review of early ILO studies of regularisation programmes, 72 he
distinguishes three types of irregularity: (1) institutional irregularity, “where aliens become irregular
because there is [a] lack of explicit policies in the country they enter, or the laws are ambiguous, or
because of administrative inefficiency”; (2) statutory irregularity, which “arises where non-nationals
violate restrictions imposed on them that contravene customary international law”; and (3) proper
irregularity “where non-nationals violate national laws and regulations that are compatible with basic
human rights”. Each of the different types of regularisation requires a different design because
different target populations are being addressed. In our terminology (see introduction), measures
targeting institutional irregularity would generally be subsumed under what we call ‘normalisation’,
whereas we would not regard relaxation of restrictions (statutory irregularity) as constituting
regularisation. Finally, it is ‘proper irregularity’ which is the actual target of regularisations in the
narrow sense.
impact of citizenship and there is relatively little research on the impact of different legal statuses (or the lack
thereof) on earnings, occupational status and occupational mobility.
69 Abella, M.I.: op. cit, p.207f
70 Papademetriou et al.: op. cit. p.18. Papademetriou explains the higher tax paying rate among regularised
migrants by their longer residence in the US and possible positive self-selection.
71 Abella M.I.: op. cit. p.208
72 Böhning, W.R.(1983): ‘Regularizing the Irregular’, International Migration, 21, 2.
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