Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
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I<br />
SECRET<br />
MACV-IVC-2 24 May 1968<br />
SUBJECT:<br />
U MINH FOREST FIRE (U)<br />
9. (C) Naval gunfire, operating off the co<strong>as</strong>t of An Xuyen and Kien Giang provinces fired into the area on a constant<br />
b<strong>as</strong>is (see incl 2). From 27 March to 13 May 1968, Naval gunfire expended 8,331 rounds of 5 inch min stabilized<br />
rockets. 1.878 rounds of 5 inch/38, 455 rounds of 5 inch/54 and 1,097 rounds of 40mm ammunition. The spin stabilized<br />
rockets were all high explosive ordnance, while many of the 5 inch/38 rounds included both high explosive white<br />
phosphorous ammunition. Together they accounted for hundreds of structures destroyed and numerous secondary explosions.<br />
This constant shelling also hampered VC attempts to transfer ammunition and supplies out of the area and<br />
1.prohibited this concentration of laborers who were attempting to stop the fire from spreading to new are<strong>as</strong>.<br />
10. (C) USAF flew 10 missions with 29 sorties over the U Minh area from the period 27 March to 26 April 1968. (see<br />
incl 3) 5 of these missions were flown with the purpose of starting new fires, while the remainder were flown to<br />
<strong>as</strong>sist the burning process in are<strong>as</strong> where the fire w<strong>as</strong> already in progress. Their ordnance consisted primarily of napalm<br />
although white phosphorous and anti-material fragmentation bombs were also used.<br />
I II. (C) As a result of the fire, enemy activity incre<strong>as</strong>ed throughout the U Minh area. The S2 of glen Giang Province reported<br />
that the VC during much of April were frantically seeking new storage are<strong>as</strong> for their supplies and ammunition. It<br />
is estimated that a large portion of the goods removed were taken back up normal routes of resupply where they were<br />
then exfiltrated by sea to the three sisters area (XS 885 165) or stored in are<strong>as</strong> lying to the north-northe<strong>as</strong>t of the<br />
forest. By the same token, the S2 of An Xuyen providence reported a similar incre<strong>as</strong>e in activity in the extreme south-<br />
3 western portion of the forest, (vic VR 85 15). This area h<strong>as</strong> long been used <strong>as</strong> a storage area and it is estimated that<br />
the number of caches in this area h<strong>as</strong> incre<strong>as</strong>ed <strong>as</strong> a result of the fire.<br />
Swere<br />
12. (C) Within the forest proper there is very little cover and concealment remaining. Trails and canals which were formerly<br />
covered by several layers of jungle canopy are now clearly visible by aerial observation. In essence, enemy activity in<br />
this area h<strong>as</strong> ce<strong>as</strong>ed.<br />
13. (C) A final analysis of the U Minh fire indicates that its success came from several contributing factors. First, the<br />
area experienced an exceptionally long dry se<strong>as</strong>on. Second, the constant shift in winds along the co<strong>as</strong>tal area literally<br />
fanned the fire causing it to burn rapidly and over a v<strong>as</strong>t area. Third, the peat-like substance of the forest floor caused<br />
the fire to continue burning with only a minimal amount of combustible material and very little wind. Fourth, fires<br />
started in several are<strong>as</strong> at about the same time which prohibited a concentration of laborers in any one area.<br />
Furthermore, personnel who were attempting to put out the blaze were constantly in danger of friendly firepower and<br />
therefore could not make large and open attempts at stopping the fires' progress. Finally, me<strong>as</strong>ures were taken by<br />
friendly personnel to <strong>as</strong>sist the overall burning process.<br />
14. (C) As a result of the above factors, the following estimate of final damage is submitted:<br />
a. 75 to 85 percent of the true forest w<strong>as</strong> destroyed.<br />
b. 50 percent of various outlying swamps were destroyed (vic VR 920 300; VR 830 300; VR 960 610; WR 100 530;<br />
WR 120 370; WR 070 290).<br />
c. Hundreds of tons of ammunition, rice and petroleum products were destroyed.<br />
SECRET A-7<br />
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