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Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives

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I<br />

SECRET<br />

MACV-IVC-2 24 May 1968<br />

SUBJECT:<br />

U MINH FOREST FIRE (U)<br />

9. (C) Naval gunfire, operating off the co<strong>as</strong>t of An Xuyen and Kien Giang provinces fired into the area on a constant<br />

b<strong>as</strong>is (see incl 2). From 27 March to 13 May 1968, Naval gunfire expended 8,331 rounds of 5 inch min stabilized<br />

rockets. 1.878 rounds of 5 inch/38, 455 rounds of 5 inch/54 and 1,097 rounds of 40mm ammunition. The spin stabilized<br />

rockets were all high explosive ordnance, while many of the 5 inch/38 rounds included both high explosive white<br />

phosphorous ammunition. Together they accounted for hundreds of structures destroyed and numerous secondary explosions.<br />

This constant shelling also hampered VC attempts to transfer ammunition and supplies out of the area and<br />

1.prohibited this concentration of laborers who were attempting to stop the fire from spreading to new are<strong>as</strong>.<br />

10. (C) USAF flew 10 missions with 29 sorties over the U Minh area from the period 27 March to 26 April 1968. (see<br />

incl 3) 5 of these missions were flown with the purpose of starting new fires, while the remainder were flown to<br />

<strong>as</strong>sist the burning process in are<strong>as</strong> where the fire w<strong>as</strong> already in progress. Their ordnance consisted primarily of napalm<br />

although white phosphorous and anti-material fragmentation bombs were also used.<br />

I II. (C) As a result of the fire, enemy activity incre<strong>as</strong>ed throughout the U Minh area. The S2 of glen Giang Province reported<br />

that the VC during much of April were frantically seeking new storage are<strong>as</strong> for their supplies and ammunition. It<br />

is estimated that a large portion of the goods removed were taken back up normal routes of resupply where they were<br />

then exfiltrated by sea to the three sisters area (XS 885 165) or stored in are<strong>as</strong> lying to the north-northe<strong>as</strong>t of the<br />

forest. By the same token, the S2 of An Xuyen providence reported a similar incre<strong>as</strong>e in activity in the extreme south-<br />

3 western portion of the forest, (vic VR 85 15). This area h<strong>as</strong> long been used <strong>as</strong> a storage area and it is estimated that<br />

the number of caches in this area h<strong>as</strong> incre<strong>as</strong>ed <strong>as</strong> a result of the fire.<br />

Swere<br />

12. (C) Within the forest proper there is very little cover and concealment remaining. Trails and canals which were formerly<br />

covered by several layers of jungle canopy are now clearly visible by aerial observation. In essence, enemy activity in<br />

this area h<strong>as</strong> ce<strong>as</strong>ed.<br />

13. (C) A final analysis of the U Minh fire indicates that its success came from several contributing factors. First, the<br />

area experienced an exceptionally long dry se<strong>as</strong>on. Second, the constant shift in winds along the co<strong>as</strong>tal area literally<br />

fanned the fire causing it to burn rapidly and over a v<strong>as</strong>t area. Third, the peat-like substance of the forest floor caused<br />

the fire to continue burning with only a minimal amount of combustible material and very little wind. Fourth, fires<br />

started in several are<strong>as</strong> at about the same time which prohibited a concentration of laborers in any one area.<br />

Furthermore, personnel who were attempting to put out the blaze were constantly in danger of friendly firepower and<br />

therefore could not make large and open attempts at stopping the fires' progress. Finally, me<strong>as</strong>ures were taken by<br />

friendly personnel to <strong>as</strong>sist the overall burning process.<br />

14. (C) As a result of the above factors, the following estimate of final damage is submitted:<br />

a. 75 to 85 percent of the true forest w<strong>as</strong> destroyed.<br />

b. 50 percent of various outlying swamps were destroyed (vic VR 920 300; VR 830 300; VR 960 610; WR 100 530;<br />

WR 120 370; WR 070 290).<br />

c. Hundreds of tons of ammunition, rice and petroleum products were destroyed.<br />

SECRET A-7<br />

4i

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