Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
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SECRET<br />
This report contains the findings and conclusions of Project EMOTE and is presented in final fulfillment of ARPA<br />
Order 818.<br />
FOREST FIRE EFFECTS<br />
When considering forest fires <strong>as</strong> a potential weapon. certain advantages and limitations must be kept clearly in mind.<br />
The greatest single superiority factor of fire <strong>as</strong> opposed to other damage-causing agents, is that under the proper circumstances<br />
fire is self-propagating. A relatively large area can be covered with a minimum expenditure of ordnance. The<br />
burning of the U Minh <strong>Forest</strong> in March and April 1968 resulted in a burned-over area of more than 1000 square miles<br />
from an expenditure of 20 aircraft sorties and 36 naval gunfire support missions (see Appendix A). The damage caused by<br />
this fire w<strong>as</strong> equivalent to that of a 20 megaton nuclear device. On the other hand, the greatest single disadvantage to the<br />
use of forest fires <strong>as</strong> military weapons is that they are totally weather dependent. Thus their use against troops (in the<br />
move must be opportunistic rather than planned, and successful forest incendiary operations are most likely when<br />
directed at fixed b<strong>as</strong>es, or at le<strong>as</strong>t semi-permanent targets such <strong>as</strong> potential ambush sites.<br />
The overwhelmingly important result of forest fires from a military point of view is visibility enhancement and<br />
cover denial. Despite the use of an array of sophisticated sensors for improving aerial intelligence capability, an analysis of<br />
tactical air strikes in South <strong>Vietnam</strong> during fall of 1966 showed that there were 35 strikes on "suspected" troop locations<br />
for every strike on a "known" troop location. 7 - 1 Equally revealing is an analysis of Australian/UK ground engagements in<br />
Borneo. Malaya. and <strong>Vietnam</strong> which showed that over 75 percent of all enemy targets were encountered in forest cover<br />
regardless of whether the attack w<strong>as</strong> initiated by enemy or friendly forces. N<br />
In addition to removing vegetative cover, all forest fires can be expected to destroy some supplies. Intense fires will<br />
also produce some c<strong>as</strong>ualties. The extent of damage will depend on th• type of forest fire. There are four generally<br />
recognized forest fire types:<br />
1. Creeping ground fire. The creeping ground fire is the le<strong>as</strong>t intense and le<strong>as</strong>t damaging of the four fire types.<br />
As the name implies, ground fires burn in the leaves and litter of the forest floor without consuming standing trees of<br />
shrubs. Ground fires spread at rates varying from a few inches per minute to a maximum of about 4 feet per minute with<br />
flames less than 2-3 feet high. Although these fires do not consume trees or bushes, they do heat their stems at the<br />
groundline and can kill the smaller and thinner barked species. Within a day or two the leaves wilt on affected plants.<br />
Thus horizontal visibility is enhanced at eye level by a factor of 2-3 in situations where brush or vines normally limit<br />
visibility. Since the larger trees that make up the top layer of cover generally have larger, more fire-resistant stems, they<br />
are relatively unaffected by ground fires. Consequently, vertical visibility is not changed after ground fires.<br />
Even the lightest ground fires will cause some damage, particularly to munitions, unless precautions have been taken<br />
to piotect loose stores by raking the area around them clean of all leaves and debris. Three of the six <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese forest<br />
fire raids studied by Project EMOTE resulted in initiation of light ground fires (Sherwood <strong>Forest</strong>, Pink Rose I, Pink Rose<br />
Ill). Despite the fact that none of these fires burned any appreciable amount of foliage, and that the initial incendiary<br />
7_ Zwemer, H. A. Tactical Air Strikes in South <strong>Vietnam</strong> - Fall 1966. CIRADS I1 Proc. Vol 1i, Part I pp. 109-119.<br />
June 1967. CONFIDENTIAL.<br />
N_ The ABA <strong>Fire</strong>power Study Group. Some statistics 'f counterinsurgency operations. CIRADA 11 Proc. Vol. II, Part 2,<br />
pp. 3-31. June 1967. SECRET.<br />
SECRET 4