Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives

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detailed and timely intelligence, or upon the use of weapons and tactics capable of affecting very large areas almost
simultaneously.
Forest fires have the potential both to remove concealing vegetation, thus assisting in intelligence
operations, and to destroy stores and facilities over a wid& area within a short time.
In late March, 1965, the 315th Air Commando Group initiated a fire bombing raid, code-named Operation
SHERWOOD FOREST, against the Boi Loi Forest, 25 miles west of Saigon. Although the raid was zonducted in the rain
and did not result in any appreciable destruction of forest cover, the concept evoked considerable interest.
In September 1965, CINCPAC requested that the Joint Chiefsof Staff take action to expedite the development of a
device capable of destroying large areas of jungle or forest growth by fire.
In December 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by JCSM-862-65, requested that the Secretary of Defense initiate
programs to determine the feasibility of dehydrating jungle growth to the point where such material would sugfrort
combustion, and to initiate development of operational means for determining the specific conditions under which there
is the greatest probability of destroying jungle or forest growth by fire.
On December 20, 1965, the Advanced Research Projects Agency initiated ARPA Order 818 with the Division of Fire
and Atmospheric Sciences Research of the Forest Service to conduct a research program of environmental modification
techniques (Project EMOTE). The program was concerned with basic flammability problemsof the major vegetation types
of the world: although specific emphasis was given to humid forests, particularly the jungles of Southeast Asia. The major
objectives were to develop the knowledge and technology needed to:
I. Describe, measure, and express quantitatively the flammability characteristics of forests and associated vegetation.
2. Modify flammability of vegetation types so that the fuel masses will readily support combustion.
3. Achieve rapid mass ignition and burning as required to remove each kind of canopy.
The initial Forest Service effort was devoted to assisting the Commander in Chief, Pacific with a second operational
test of forest burning, code-named Operation HOT TIP. This raid w~s conducted in March 1966 against Chu Pong Mountain
in Pleiku Province. The results were sufficiently successful that an expanded program of research to develop
operational criteria was pursued. Guidelined for future inccndiary operations were published in June 1966.5- At the
same time laboratory studies were undertaken to develop.flammability criteria for Southeast Asian fuels similar to those
.-ready developed for forest fuel types in the United States, and climatic analyses of Southeast Asia were initiated in order
to define the weather conditions most likely to contribute to successful incendiary operations.
In January through April, 1967, a series of three full scale operational tests, code-named Operation PINK ROSE,
were conducted by the 7th Air Force against targets in War Zones C and D. The results were no better than those of
Operation HOT TIP, and the Forest Service advised against further operational testing in Vietnam. §J
Further research was conducted in 1968 and 1969 to determine the specific limiting factors for forest fire initiation
in humid tropical forests.
Both test fires and naturally occurring forest fires were observed and analyzed in Malaysia,
Vietpam, Thailand. Bougainville, Australia, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the southeastern United States.
At Breit, L. M., et al, op. cit.
§_ Bentley, J. I. and others, Forest Fire Research, Vols. I and 11. USDA-Forest Service. 279 pp., illus. SECRET.
6/ Mutch, R. W. and others. Operation PINK ROSE. USDA-Forest Service. 121 pp., illus. SECRET.
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