Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
Vietnam War: Forest Fire as a Military Weapon - Paperless Archives
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SECRET<br />
FOREST FIRE AS A MILITARY WEAPON<br />
The battle w<strong>as</strong> fought<br />
in the forest of E'phraim;<br />
and the forest devoured<br />
more people that day<br />
than the sword.<br />
II Samuel 18: 6,8<br />
<strong>Forest</strong>s were a haven and refuge for bandits, insurgents, and rebel bands long before Absalom took up arms against<br />
King David in the forest of E'phrain. Leaders <strong>as</strong> diverse <strong>as</strong> Robin Hood., Marshall Tito, Chief Croatan of the Seminoles.<br />
and Fidel C<strong>as</strong>tro. learned to conduct successful military operations from forest havens. The <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese insurgency h<strong>as</strong><br />
placed heavy reliance on forest b<strong>as</strong>es since the first stirrings of rebellion during the Japanese occupation. The Viet Cong<br />
is not really Chairman Mao's -fish who swims in the sea of pe<strong>as</strong>ants'. he more closely resembles a jungle cat who lives<br />
hidden in the forest but preys on the surrounding villages. Large forest havens along the border, such <strong>as</strong> Dong Thapmutdi.<br />
U Minh and <strong>War</strong> Zone C. serve <strong>as</strong> training and supply b<strong>as</strong>es for the VC and North <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese Main Force, <strong>as</strong> well <strong>as</strong> secure<br />
infiltration and escape routes (Fig. I). <strong>Forest</strong>s in the interior such <strong>as</strong> <strong>War</strong> Zone D, Do Xa. and Chu Pong contain major<br />
supply depots and operational b<strong>as</strong>e complexes. Innumerable small forest, like Boi Loi <strong>Forest</strong>, the Iton Traingle, and Ho<br />
Bo Woods, all lying between Tay Ninh City and Saigon, are used <strong>as</strong> temporary staging are<strong>as</strong>.-<br />
Although considerations cf communications, food supply, strategic location and availability of support all enter into<br />
the selection of a particular area <strong>as</strong> an insurgent b<strong>as</strong>e or safe haven, the major requirement is dictated by the need for concealment<br />
from above. Dense forest growth offers the best possible overhead concealment for b<strong>as</strong>e operations of company<br />
size or larger.<br />
A recent study of VC b<strong>as</strong>es showed that 83 percent were located in dense forest and only I percent were further<br />
than one-half kilometer from dense forest (Cambodian R and R are<strong>as</strong> excluded). It An Australian study of changes inVC<br />
installations over a 9-year period showed that when selecting a new b<strong>as</strong>e site, the VC chose are<strong>as</strong> in which vegetative cover<br />
offered the most effective concealment at that time. 3/<br />
One additional characteristic of a forest haven is so obvious that it h<strong>as</strong> gone unmentioned in most studies of the<br />
problem. The forested area must be large enough that it cannot be surrounded'nor effectively swept by conventional<br />
forces. Consequently, any successful counterinsurgency effort against such b<strong>as</strong>es must depend on extremely accurate.<br />
j/ Breit, J. M. and others. Neutralization of Viet Cong Safe Havens. Research Analysis Corp. Technical Paper RAC-<br />
TP-191. September 1965, 74 pp., illus. SECRET.<br />
_1 Narten, P. F. and E. E. Kraus. Area analysis techniques in insurgent b<strong>as</strong>e location. CIRADS III Proc. Vol. 2, pp. 1-59.<br />
December 1968. CONFIDENTIAL<br />
3J Holt, E. S. Prediction of the location of insurgent installations. CIRADS III Proc. Vol. 2, pp. 59-76. December 1968.<br />
CONFIDENTIAL<br />
SECRET