Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

78
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Bunch.
STATEMENT OF DR. DELBERT F. BUNCH, ACTING DEPUTY AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY, REACTOR DEPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY
Dr. Bunch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three points I
would hke to make and I will briefly describe each of them.
First, the reactor at Chernobyl had what I consider to be inherently
undesirable safety characteristics. We are now 2 months into
that accident; as Mr. Denton has described we have gone to a great
deal of trouble to understand what the Soviets have said about that
plant, and what the technical literature says. We continue to work
with the international community to obtain a better understanding
of that plant, but it is important to recognize at this point what we
believe to be the situation about that plant.
Second, a point I will also discuss in a little more detail, I think
there has been a situation in which too many people are rushing to
judgment about the implications of Chernobyl on the safety of the
U.S. plants.
The third point is not one of safety, but, as you have discussed
this morning in the colloquy, one of restoring or achieving public
confidence in the safety that we do have. I think your committee's
efforts to secure legislative reform of a new licensing process would
be a great step toward that direction.
Back to the first point. I think the reactor at Chernobyl has undesirable
safety characteristics. First, the nuclear properties of the
plant, as were alluded to by Mr. Denton, were what I would call
unstable. Disturbances in the plant would cause unwanted changes
in power which placed stress both on the operators and on the
safety system.
The engineering details of the plant, how the plant was actually
put together, have little of what we have come to expect in the
U.S. approach toward defense indepth.
I think it is fair to say that the Soviets in the last decade or so
have put a great deal of attention on instituting a new safety
regime in their practices for the engineering of nuclear power
plants in the Soviet Union. In my own view, it seems to be, at least
with respect to Chernobyl, too little, too late.
What has been done was simply not enough to overcome those
intrinsic safety features in the plant.
Second, it is my view that too many have rushed to judgment
about the implications of Chernobyl.
I think my own view, as a member of the task force, was that we
saw a certain measure of instinctive reaction on the part of the
technical community immediately following the accident. There
were those who are strong opponents of nuclear power who seem to
say—see, I told you so. Those who were strongly in support of nuclear
power very quickly moved to say Chernobyl would never
happen here.
I think the arguments that Mr. Denton has just given about the
steps that we are taking to try to understand, apply, and learn