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Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

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68<br />

of the reactor core melted. Unlike, however, the <strong>Chernobyl</strong> incident,<br />

the amount of fission products released from the TMI-2 reactor<br />

to the environment posed no significant threat to the public.<br />

The scenario for the progression of the TMI accident would indicate<br />

that the relocation of the core into a reactor lower plenum<br />

that remains full of water will probably result in coolable debris<br />

which will arrest the accident. The reactor primary vessel integrity<br />

was maintained there. We believe it would be maintained in a similar<br />

accident, and as I mentioned, that information from TMI correlated<br />

very well with the experimental work done on the reactors<br />

LOFT and PBF.<br />

Each of the facilities and test programs have contributed to the<br />

safety and to the information base from which the adequacy of<br />

commercial reactor designs and their safety and regulatory criteria<br />

are confirmed.<br />

Many of the reactor codes that the <strong>Nuclear</strong> Regulatory Commission<br />

uses for licensing commercial power reactors are based on experimental<br />

data and analysis done by the Department of Energy.<br />

The eventual impact of <strong>Chernobyl</strong> on existing light water reactors<br />

is difficult to assess. I believe that as was the case with TMI-2,<br />

as more information is available from the <strong>Chernobyl</strong> accident, we<br />

will begin to refocus the U.S. program. I do not see significant refocusing.<br />

I believe that we will continue the work on the program,<br />

such as severe accident phenomena, particularly as it might relate<br />

to containment response; we will continue to work on the resolution<br />

of the fission product release and source-term issue; and we<br />

will continue to minimize the human factor in reactor operations<br />

and control room designs.<br />

I believe the <strong>Chernobyl</strong> accident will ultimately confirm the<br />

quality of U.S. safety technology. I am confident that the vast experience<br />

and expertise available at the DOE National Laboratories<br />

will contribute to the understanding and resolution of concerns<br />

raised by the accident at the <strong>Chernobyl</strong> plant.<br />

We are continuing to work on advanced reactor safety at the<br />

INEL. We recently did a test on the liquid metal reactor called<br />

EBR-2 in which a loss of coolant, without reactor scram, provided<br />

for the automatic shutdown of the reactor. We continue to work<br />

with the Gas-Cool Reactor Association on their inherently safe designs.<br />

I therefore see that many of these inherently safe reactor designs<br />

will receive a high priority. It is imperative that the safety of these<br />

next generation reactors be supported by tests and we have a program<br />

to do that.<br />

Internationally, I believe it is important that the United States<br />

continue its<br />

involvement in IAEA and other international efforts<br />

so that we may fully understand the effects of the <strong>Chernobyl</strong> accident<br />

and that can indeed be inputed into the U.S. designs and research<br />

and development.<br />

That concludes my summary, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the<br />

opportunity.<br />

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wade follows:]

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