Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

177
' Because closing costs will involve mainly technical assistance and a scant amount of technology,
fmancial aid will not be an extremely significant part of this somewhat inexpensive step.
Decommissioning costs would appear in the long-term, and would be more significant.
* These reactors should be shut down at a lower priority than the RBMKs, and should be
given a phase-out period of 6 months to a year, in order not to shock the grid too heavily.
* This figure includes Kozloduy 1 and 2, both temporarily shut down. Kozloduy units 1-4, according
to the Cousteau study, among other sources, represent the most immediate risk, because
they am WER 440/230 types. Reactors Sand 6 are third generation 1000 MW plants, and are in
slightly better condition. Those plants should be closed within five yearn, to allow energy efficiency
and grid improvement to absorb the impact of the decreased energy supply.
* According to the study by SEVEn, the Prague, CSFR, center for the study of energy efficiency,
industrial retrofitting could substitute for these reactors in the immediate term.
' To close down all four reactors at once would shock the electricity supply too heavily, as
Hungary probably could not implement compensatory measures quickly enough. As Thomas
Jaszays study of efficiency in Hungary indicates, however, 700 MW of cogeneration capacity
could be developed in the immediate term; this would compensate for the loss of the first two
reactors. Although there is no significant difference in risk between the first pair and the
second pair, reactors 3 and 4 may have to be kept open in order to avert a catastrophic power
shortage. The remaining two reactors can be shut down within 2 years. This will require a concerted
effort to reduce demand through the funding of conservation, as documented by Jaszay,
and the longer-term expemsion of cogeneration capability. The declining Hungarian energy
demand, fostered by restructuring, will buffer the shock of decreased supply.
* Andrew Fisher. "Gaping Holes in the Safety Net." Financial Times: 1 April 1992.
* Juliet Sychrava. "Closure of Soviet Reactors Urged." Financial Times: 25 March 1992.
'"Nicholas Lenssen. Worldwatch Institute. Phone Interview. 25 June 1992. Simon Rippon.
"After Five Years, Uncertainties Remain at Chernobyl." Nuclear News. June 1991. p.49.
'
' Greenpeace document on Soviet-designed nuclear plants. Fax from Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace
U.K., dated 26 June 1992.
>2 Fisher.
* ^ Nicholas Lenssen. Worldwatch Institute. Fax dated 30 June 1992.
'* Fisher.
' * Sychrava.
»6 Mark Hibbs. "Siemens Reckons up to $12-Billion Needed from G-7 for Eastern PWRs." Nucleonics
Week: 14 May 1992, p.3.
" Hibbs, 2.
"The Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in Central emd Eastern Europe: An Overview and
Major Findings of the IAEA Project on the Safety of WWER 440 Model 230 Nuclear Power
Plants. Undated, p.2.
*9 Unless otherwise noted, all data are from IAEA report.
2° John Willis. Risk Finance: Backfit vs. Shutdown of WER Nuclear Reactors. Greenpeace
International: Amsterdam, 1991.
2
' Greenpeace document on safety of Soviet-designed reactors. In fax from Antony Froggatt,
Greenpeace UK, dated 26 June 1992.
" Willis, 13.
23 WUlis, 7.
2* Round Table 1990—seven person working group of the Greifswald reactor. Drawn up on
behalf of the Central Round Table in Berlin, May 1990. Paraphrased in Greenpeace document
on safety of Soviet-designed reactors. In fax from Antony Froggatt dated 26 June 1992.
^^ Environmental Issues. 11 October 1991.
26 Willis, 9-14.
2^ It is important to note that Western standards also suffer from many inadequacies and
pose their sham of danger to human health and the environment. Nothing in this Report should
be construed to support nuclear power as managed and promoted in Western countries.
2 8 As quoted in: Christopher Flavin, et al. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report: 1992.
May 1992. Worldwatch Institute, Greenpeace Intemationzd, WISE-Paris. p. 10.
2 9 According to Emil Bedi, energy expert at SZOPK, this reactor does have a containment
vessel, which represents the most significant improvement over the 213. According to Bert van
Pinxteren, of the FOE International Secretariat, modifications to the containment system am
being proposed to enable it to withstand higher pressures.
'^° Permanent Monitoring Group on Plant Safety. Control Report No. 13. November 1988. aqi
Greenpeace document on Soviet reactor safety, in fax from Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace UK,
dated 26 June 1992.
3' The interior skin of the vessel is 8 mm, and made of steel. Including vessel shielding, the
design has 120 mm of steel. Data from Gefahrenpotential des Atomkomplexes Temelin, June
1988, sterreichisches kologie-Institut fr angewandte Umweltvorshung.
32 Willis, 11.
33 Permanent Monitoring Group on Plant Safety: Control Report No. 13. November 1988. As
quoted in Greenpeace document on Soviet-designed reactor safety. In fax from Antony Froggatt,
Greenpeace UK, dated 26 June 1992.
3'»
Permanent Monitoring Group on Plant 35 Safety.
Strengthening Nuclear Regulation in Russia: A Report on the First Workshop on Nuclear
Waste and Safety with the committee on Ecology of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.
December 15-20,1991; February 36 3-7, 1992.
IAEA,31.
3' Matthew Wald. "Ex-Soviets Still Lag in Nuclear Safety, U.S. Finds." New York Times: 23
April 1992.
^^ Environmental Issues. 11 October, 1991.