Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

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in part through the stimulation of sophisticated, less energy wasting branches of the
Hungari£in economy.
Several studies have confirmed the various opportunities for energy savings. An
assessment of the district heating network in Budapest suggest network energy
losses between 30 percent and 40 percent. Such losses could be offset by upgrading
heat distribution networks and developing small-scale cogeneration units in powerplants.'''
A 1990 study by Thomas Jaszay for Pacific Northwest Laboratory demonstrates
that Hungary can develop 700 MW of cogeneration capacity in the near
term, with 600 additional MW available by 2005. Since the Paks stations have an
effective capacity of 1425 MW,'^ over the long-term,''^ this represents a replacement
of 49 percent in the short-term, and 91.2 percent in the long-term. A 1988 EEC
study corroborates Jaszay's analysis, by arguing that "efficiency could provide the
same net increase in energy as a new nuclear power reactor, but do so far more
quickly and at about one-fifth the cost." *° Considering that new nuclear power reactors
produce 2 to 3 times more power than Hungary's older, smaller capacity stations,
this claim seems particularly dramatic.
Jaszay's study further argues that final energy demand in Hungary will actually
decrease in the coming years, from 1355 PJ in 1990, to 1269 PJ in 2005, and finally
to 1117 PJ in 2030. Therefore, after the installation of cogeneration through 2005,
the remaining 125 MW (3.94 PJ)®^ would be solved for by a decrease in energy
demand, which will total 152 PJ, fully 148 PJ more than necessary. In fact, since
Hungary's nuclear output in a year comes to just under 41 PJ, conservation alone
could solve for the energy crunch well before 2005. To further bolster the case for
efficiency, Jaszay now believes his estimates to be too conservative.*^
b. Trends in Supply
Although demand will continue to fall, supply likely will follow suit. Production
throughout Hungary's energy industries has been falling over the past few years, as
Hungary has become increasingly dependent on energy imports.®'' Although nuclear
power would seem then to be an effective solution, it turns out to lack economic
viability.
Since Hungary is prepared to integrate itself into the international economy, in
order to preserve a reasonable balance of trade, it must maximize the efficient utilization
of goods which it imports, while maximizing domestic production. A strategy
of energy conservation matches the first objective, and will minimize the outflow of
hard currency for energy imports. Nuclear power, however, does not match the
second objective. First, much capital must be imported in general to maintain the
Paks nuclear pleint, and much more will obviously have to be imported to upgrade it
to acceptable safety standards. Any capital expenditure associated with these loans
is capital which cannot be spent as part of a larger national conservation strategy.®*
Second, since Hungary is a net energy importer, it is unlikely to be able to export
nuclear-generated electricity for foreign exchange. Therefore, if it costs more to
produce nuclear energy than it costs to import energy, then economic resources,
which could be spent upgrading Hungary's ancient and wasteful energy infrastructure,
are being wasted.
Because investments in efficiency have been found to be one-fifth to one-seventh
the cost of nuclear electricity in Hungary,®^ both precious hard currency and scarce
domestic capital could be far better spent on efficiency than on nuclear power, particularly
in the next decade, when efficiency improvements are likely to be easiest
and have the highest payback (when energy efficiency approaches international
norms, investment will have a lower return). For the long-run, as efficiency improves
over time, so does conservation technology. For example, in the long-term,
Hungary may increase its cogeneration capacity even more;®® in addition, its economy
will certainly become less energy intensive, as it switches away from heavy industry,
which will necessarily become less profitable if Hungary needs to import
energy by using valuable foreign exchange. Finally, in the long-term, Hungary's existing
nuclear reactors (the already outdated WER 440/21 3s) will also cease to be
able to function. Therefore, it will not be difficult to fill in the short- to mediumterm
void left by the closure of these reactors.
4. Particular Opportunities in Bulgaria
In 1991, nuclear plants in Bulgaria accounted for 34 percent of electricity produced.®'
This figure includes the 2025 MW of effective generating capacity (out of
2722 MW of net generating capacity).®® However, Bulgaria poses a more extreme
form of Hungary's problem, because Bulgaria is "the most energy import-dependent
country in Eastern Europe. . . It imports almost 60 percent of its energy needs, including
virtually all of its oil and natural gas. Most of the country's domestic energy