Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

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late seventies." ^° Although the WER-1 000/320 reactors have a type of containment
vessel, it is more vulnerable in an emergency than Western-designed containment
vessels. All of these containment vessels have holes to permit various materials
into the reactor area (water, fuels, etc.). For example, the outlets for the piping
system are tunnels through the concrete that extend some distance from the containment
vessel about three meters above ground level, placed on columns. These
are easily damaged in an earthquake or other "event" and practically mean disruj>tion
of the containment's integrity. In general, the containment shells are 1.2
meters thick, made of steel reinforced concrete.^ * Other notable problems are:
• Its pressure vessel diameter presents a special disadvantage: because of its
small size, it provides an inadequate buffer of water between the neutron bombardment
afforded by the fuel and the vessel wall. As a result, embrittlement accelerates.
^^
• A fundamental construction error in the reactor core causes this reactor, like
the RBMK, to exhibit positive reactivity feedback at certain operating levels. "To
date no practicable solution has been found to this problem."''^
• The plant layout results in fire hazards, threatening to the safety of the installation.
3*
C. The Culture of "Acceptable Risk"
The Eastern bloc nuclear industry sprang out of the vast Soviet military-industrial
complex. Therefore, many Russian politicians argue that the industry retains a
utilitarian disregard for human life and well-being. ^^ This attitude manifests itself
in the culture of acceptable risk. Nuclear plant workers and operators simply do not
recognize the need for the level of safety that is taken for granted in the rest of the
international nuclear community. This attitude must be taken into consideration in
evaluating proposed technical backfits, as the mindset of most operators will probably
undervalue safety considerations in the day-to-day operations that will determine
the long-run safety of the plant. This carelessness appears on many levels of
the nuclear community.
Plant workers, especially since the advent of political instability, have been characterized
by a notoriously poor attention to detail and shoddy operating procedure.
In the model 230's, for example, the IAEA found a poor "safety culture". "Safety
culture embodies a top to bottom approach to plant operation from a safety perspective
and needs to be promoted." ^^ However, demoralized plant workers do not
spend the time necessary to maintain a mechanism as sophisticated £is a nuclear
plant. Workers among operators of RBMK reactors suffer from declining morale, according
to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, because the plants,
which do not receive adequate replacement investment, appear to be on the way
out. 3 7
For example, Lithuanian safety inspectors argue that the RBMK plant in Ignalina,
Lithuania, is run in complete violation of national safety standards. As a result
of shoddy workmanship, plant personnel ignored standard operating procedures,
and consequently exposed three wofflers to dangerous doses of radiation. ^^ According
to one Lithuanian safety inspector, this situation has been created, because the
nuclear bureaucracy has ignored the "human questions", and has treated its workers
poorly.
". . . it is not a crazed 'atomic lobby' sitting behind the instrumentation panel in
the various [plants]; they are normal people. . . And if society seriously wants to
have safe [plants] it is essential to resolve urgently not only the technical questions
but also the purely human ones. There should [be] no instance of a reactor operator
who brings home to his family a salary which is less than a tenth of what an average
secondhand dealer earns. . . Is it still not clear that one has to pay for safety?
And pay handsomely for the miser pays twice. .^^
.
A similar, in fact much worse, situation prevails in the Bulgarian plants, none of
which are RBMKs, at Kozloduy. Because Russian technicians have returned home,
and Bulgarian technicians have left their poorly paid jobs and poor living conditions,
the plant has suffered a massive brain drain. In addition, the plant's technology
itself (four model 230's and two model 1 OOO's) lacks adequate safeguards of its
own. Therefore, the loss of trained personnel becomes particularly problematic.
These problems have led nuclear experts to call this plant "one of the most dangerous
nuclear powerplants in the world." *°
A recent study of the plant by the Cousteau Society revealed poor inspection and
a severe lack of spare parts.* ^ The need to operate plants at high capacity, as well
as the lack of domestically manufactured spare parts have hurt efforts to maintain
the plsmt. A member of the Cousteau team. Dr. Robert Pollard concluded: "There is
essentially no dispute that Units 1-4 at the Kozloduy nuclear powerplant do not