Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

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Thus, while the recent events at B&W plants have reinforced our
concerns regarding the sensitivity of the B&W plants to
operational transients, we have concluded that continued operation
of the B&W plants during the assessment does not pose a undue risk
to the public health and safety.
Commissioner Asselstine adds:
The Commission's response indicates that a reassessment of B&W
plants has been initiated. However, I have misgivings about the
scope of the reassessment and the decision to give the B&W owners
the lead in that reassessment.
Following the TMI accident in 1979, the NRC required the industry
to reexamine many aspects of the B&W design, including the
integrated control system and the auxiliary feedwater systems.
The Davis-Besse and Rancho Seco events of 1985 illustrate that
that industry reexamination did not lead to the necessary
improvements to the B&W plants. The Commission, in essence, has
said that the best approach to resolving the known design
weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the B&W plants is to ask the
industry once again to reexamine the plants. I do not agree.
Although B&W and the utilities which operate B&W plants should be
involved in the reassessment program, I do not believe that they
should be given the leadership role in conducting the
reassessment.