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Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

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12<br />

U. S. Senator Howard M.<br />

METZENBAUM<br />

CommnuMt:<br />

Budgei<br />

Energv and Notural Ratoufces<br />

Human Resoufces<br />

Judiciarv<br />

of Ohio 202 224 2315<br />

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOWARD M. METZENBAOH<br />

SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE<br />

JONE 19, 1986<br />

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding these<br />

hearings today.<br />

There is a lot to be learned about the <strong>Chernobyl</strong> accident,<br />

and a lot to be learned from it.<br />

One immediate lesson is quite clear: a severe accident<br />

resulting in massive releases of radiation, widespread<br />

evacuations and numerous civilian deaths can indeed occur.<br />

Americans living near nuclear facilities are rightfully<br />

concerned that a tragedy like <strong>Chernobyl</strong> could happen to them.<br />

They expect that everything possible will be done to prevent a<br />

severe nuclear accident, and that effective emergency plans are<br />

in place in case one does occur.<br />

All of this should result in more emphasis on safety and<br />

emergency planning in this nation, and a re-evaluation of the<br />

current approach to risk assessment, which serves as the basis<br />

for estimating the effectiveness of safety measures at nuclear<br />

facil ities.<br />

Yet, incredibly, industry and the government have responded<br />

to the accident with a fortress-like mentality.<br />

They tell us that the probability of a severe accident is<br />

already so low that there is no undue level of risk and nothing<br />

more needs to be done to make plants safe.<br />

The Executive Director for Operations of the NRC said: "W'<br />

see nothing coming out of this accident to suggest we need to<br />

change."<br />

This manifests an air of dangerous complacency.<br />

Yet, the record does not justify this complacency.<br />

<strong>Accident</strong>s which the NRC deems to be "incredible" - that is,<br />

of such low probability that plants do not have to be designed<br />

for them - keep occurring. Time after time, we have an accident<br />

or a near miss caused or complicated by unquanti f iable factors<br />

such as poor management, human error, regulatory violations and<br />

poor design or construction.<br />

These experiences argue for more aggressive, rather than more<br />

relaxed, efforts to improve safety.<br />

Yet, the NRC, at the urging of the nuclear industry, has<br />

engaged in de-facto deregulation, and effectively halted all<br />

efforts to improve safety.

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