Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

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The Chairman. Thank you. We will proceed on the first round of
questions among the Senators. My first question is to Mr. Meyers.
Are there any Federal plans in place that would activate an interagency
task force, similar to the one that was convened after the
Chernobyl incident, responding to any future nuclear plant accidents
that might have national or transboundary consequences to
the public?
Mr. Meyers. Do you mean a domestic accident, Senator?
The Chairman. Domestic or international.
Mr. Meyers. There is FEMA, that would take care of any accident
that would happen domestically. We are trying to reconstruct—you
may recall that the initial impetus for this task force
being put together was a group that was to respond to an international
nuclear detonation, and the people in the Executive Office of
the President felt that the same kinds of services would be required
to respond to the accident at Chernobyl.
it
We are looking at that memorandum of understanding to see if
can be broadened to accomplish the purposes that you are suggesting.
The Chairman. You are looking at it, but it is not yet in place?
Mr. Meyers. That is right.
The Chairman. Mr. Denton, could you explain to laymen, what
is the difference between containment and confinement, in nuclear
terms.
Mr. Denton. All U.S. plants have had since day 1 what we call a
containment building. That goes all the way back to plants like
Yankee and Dresden. Yankee was put in operation some 25 years
ago. What they were intended to be was a strong enclosure which
would contain the radioactive fission products that might be released
in the event of reactor accident, with very minimsd leak^e.
A confinement building, in my use of the term, has been a building
which didn't have these pressure retaining features, but would
slow down the release and would perhaps result in a controlled release.
The confinement building would permit the release of perhaps
the noble gasses, but filters would be in place to filter iodides
and particulate matter. In plants which might be so large that containments
would be impractical, confinement buildings have been
occasionally proposed.
But for the commercial plants—all plants, I would say, except for
Fort St. Vrain in Colorado, have what I call a containment building.
Fort St. Vrain is a gas-cooled graphite moderated plant. After
Chernobyl, I did ask staff for a special study of the safety of that
plant. We did look at it and concluded that it could continue operating.
It has a number of different features. It has inert coolants,
so it does not have water in it. It doesn't have zirconium because
the fuel is interspersed in the graphite. There is £in 8-foot thick reactor
pressure vessel, prestressed, and it is surrounded by a confinement
building. That is the only plant that does not have a containment
building in commercial use.
The Chairman. If I recall, one of the problems that surfaced, one
of the concerns that surfaced at TMI, there was a problem to the
people who were trying to understand and manage that accident
was the build-up of hydrogen. And if I recall reading the news reports
with respect to Chernobyl, it is suspected, at least, if not con-