Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Congressional Hearings Transcript

CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENTS
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS TRANSCRIPTS
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Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident CIA, Department
of Defense, Department of Energy, Congressional, GAO,
and Foreign Press Monitoring Files
4,010 pages of CIA, Department of Defense, Department of Energy,
Congressional, GAO, and foreign press monitoring files related to the
Chernobyl Nuclear Accident.
On Sunday April 26, 1986, at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant near
Pripyat, Ukraine, reactor #4 exploded. For the 25 years from 1986 to
2011, this incident has been referred to as the world's worst nuclear
power plant accident.
THE ACCIDENT
According to reports filed with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
on April 25, 1986, technicians at the Chernobyl plant launched a poorly
executed experiment to test the emergency electricity supply to one of
its Soviet RBMK type design reactors. The test was meant to measure a
turbogenerator's ability to provide in-house emergency power after
shutting off its steam supply. During the experiment the technicians
violated several rules in place for operating the reactor.
During the experiment, the emergency shutdown system was turned off. The
reactor was being operated with too many control rods withdrawn. These
human errors, coupled with a design flaw that allowed reactor power to
surge when uncontrolled steam generation began in the core, set up the
conditions for the accident.
A chain of events lasting 40 seconds occurred at 1:23 AM on April 26.
The technicians operating the reactor put the reactor in an unstable
condition, so reactor power increased rapidly when the experiment began.
Subsequent analysis of the Soviet data by U.S. experts at the Department
of Energy, suggests the power surge may have accelerated when the
operators tried an emergency shutdown of the reactor. According to Soviet
data, the energy released was, for a fraction of a second, 350 times the
rated capacity of the reactor. This burst of energy resulted in an
instantaneous and violent surge of heat and pressure, rupturing fuel
channels and releasing steam that disrupted large portions of the core.
The surge destroyed the core of reactor unit four, containing
approximately 200 tons of nuclear fuel. Some of the shattered core
material was propelled through the roof of the reactor building. The hot
core material of reactor 4 started about 30 separate fires in the unit 4
reactor hall and turbine building, as well as on the roof of the
adjoining unit 3. All but the main fire in the graphite moderator
material still inside unit 4 were extinguished in a few hours.
It was a day and a half before the people living in Pripyat were ordered
to evacuate. The residents were told they would only be gone for several

days, so they left nearly everything behind. They never returned. Soviet
authorities made the decision not to cancel May 1, May Day, outdoor
parades in the region four days later.
The graphite fire continued to burn for nearly two weeks carrying
radioactivity high into the atmosphere, until it was smothered by sand,
lead, dolomite, and boron dropped from helicopters. Despite the wide
spread of radiation, Soviet officials at first said very little publicly
about what happened at Chernobyl. It was not until alarms from radiation
detectors in other countries, many hundreds of miles away, forced the
Soviets to admit to the Chernobyl accident.
Radioactive material was dispersed over 60,000 square miles of Ukraine,
Belarus, and Russia. Smaller amounts of radioactive material were
detected over Eastern and Western Europe, Scandinavia and even the United
States. The accident has left some nearby towns uninhabitable to this
day.
Radioactivity forced Soviet officials to create a 30-kilometer-wide nohabitation
zone around Chernobyl, sealing off Pripyat. Still, the power
plant continued to generate electricity until it was finally shut down in
December, 2000.
During the first year after the accident, about 25,000 people, mainly
Soviet Army troops, were dispatched to the site to clean up the accident.
Thousands of workers, called liquidators, were employed during the
following years of the cleanup.
Around October, 1986 the construction of a 21 story high metal and
concrete shelter was completed, enclosing the reactor and the radioactive
material that remained. Almost 200 tonnes of melted nuclear fuel rods
remain within the damaged reactor. This containment shelter was not
intended to be a permanent solution for containing the radioactive
material. Over time, the shelter has weakened; rain entering through
holes and cracks has caused corroding.
By 2006 the plans for a new shelter was about 7 years behind schedule,
with a completion target date of no sooner than 2012. In February of 2011
it was reported that construction of the shelter may have to be halted,
due to a $1 billion dollar short fall in the funds needed to complete the
structure.
A United Nations report released in February 2011 estimates the disaster
caused thyroid cancer in 7,000 children in the affected area. The report
said despite the high rate of cancer, only 15 fatalities in these 7,000
cases have occurred.
THE DOCUMENTS
CIA FILES

215 pages of CIA files dating from 1971 to 1991.The files cover the
Soviet Union's atomic energy program; The effect of the Chernobyl
accident on the Soviet nuclear power program; and the social and
political ramifications of the accident in the Soviet Union.
A 1981 report covers the less publicized Soviet nuclear "accident" near
Kyshtym in 1957-58.
Media reporting of a nuclear accident near Kyshtym first appeared in
1958. It was not until 1976, when the writings of Soviet dissent Dr.
Zhores Medvedev began to appear, that wider attention was given to this
subject. Medvedev, an exiled Soviet geneticist, claimed in several
articles and books that a "disaster" occurred near Kyshtym in 1957/58. He
alleged that thousands of casualties and widespread, long-term
radioactive contamination occurred as the result of an explosion
involving nuclear waste stored in underground shelters.
The general consensus today is that a combination of events, rather than
a single isolated incident at Kyshtym nuclear energy complex caused the
radioactive contamination in the area. A study of the claims by Medvedev
can be found in the Department of Energy section, in the 1982 report "An
Analysis of the Alleged Kyshtym Disaster"
U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN PRESS MONITORING
900 pages of foreign media monitoring reports from 1986 to 1992, produced
by the U.S. government's National Technical Information Service's U.S.
Joint Publication Research Service. They contain information primarily
from Russian and Eastern Block news agency transmissions and broadcasts,
newspapers, periodicals, television, radio and books. Materials from non-
English language sources are translated into English.
The reporting includes firsthand accounts of experiences during all
points of the Chernobyl disaster. Topics covering the accident and its
aftermath including domestic and international politics, sociological
affairs, nuclear plant fire, evacuations, sealing the reactor,
cleanup mobilization, health implications, and people returning to
region.
DEPARTMENT OF ENGERY REPORTS
1,244 pages of reports dating from 1982 to 2009 produced or commissioned
by the Department of Energy.
The agencies and institutions contributing to these reports include Los
Alamos National Laboratory, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Argonne
National Laboratory, and the Pacific Northwest Laboratory.
Highlights include:

The 1986 Report of the U.S. Department of Energy's Team Analyses of the
Chernobyl-4 Atomic Energy Station Accident Sequence DOE/NE-0076.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) formed a team of experts from Argonne
National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest Laboratory. The DOE team provided the
analytical support to the U.S. delegation for the August, 1986 meeting of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to subsequent
international meetings. The DOE team analyzed the accident in detail,
assessed the plausibility and completeness of the information provided by
the Soviets, and performed studies relevant to understanding the
accident.
The 1987 report Radioactive Fallout from the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor
Accident
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory performed a variety of
measurements to determine the level of the radioactive fallout on the
western United States. The laboratory used gamma-spectroscopy to analyze
air filters from the areas around Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
in California. Filters were also analyzed from Barrow and Fairbanks,
Alaska. Milk from California and imported vegetables were also analyzed
for radioactivity.
Other report titles include: An Analysis of the Alleged Kyshtym Disaster;
Workshop on Short-term Health Effects of Reactor Accidents; Preliminary
Dose Assessment of the Chernobyl Accident; Internally Deposited Fallout
from the Chernobyl Reactor Accident; Report on the Accident at the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station; Radioactive Fallout from the Chernobyl
Nuclear Reactor Accident; Radioactivity in Persons Exposed to Fallout
from the Chernobyl Reactor Accident' Radioactive Fallout in Livermore, CA
and Central Northern Alaska from the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Accident;
Projected Global Health Impacts from Severe Nuclear Accidents -
Conversion of Projected Doses to Risks on a Global Scale - Experience
From Chernobyl Releases; The Chernobyl Accident - Causes and
Consequences; Chernobyl Lessons Learned Review of N Reactor;
Reconstruction of Thyroid Doses for the Population of Belarus Following
the Chernobyl Accident; The characterization and risk assessment of the
Red Forest radioactive waste burial site at Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant; Estimated Long Term Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident; and
Environmental Problems Associated With Decommissioning the Chernobyl
Nuclear Power Plant Cooling Pond.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORTS
816 pages of reports dating from 1990 to 2010 produced or commissioned by
the Department of Defense.
The reports include: Chernobyl Accident Fatalities and Causes; Biomedical
Lessons from the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident; Nuclear

Accidents in the Former Soviet Union Kyshtym, Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl;
Retrospective Reconstruction of Radiation Doses of Chernobyl Liquidators
by Electron Paramagnetic Resonance; Neurocognitive and Physical Abilities
Assessments Twelve Years After the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident; Simulating
Wet Deposition of Radiocesium from the Chernobyl Accident; and Radiation
Injuries After the Chernobyl Accident Management, Outcome, and Lessons
Learned.
GAO REPORTS
184 pages of reports from the United States General Accounting Office,
whose name was later changed to the Government Accountability Office. The
four reports are Comparison of DOE's Hanford N-Reactor with the Chernobyl
Reactor (1986); Nuclear Power Safety International Measures in Response
to Chernobyl Accident (1988); Nuclear Power Safety Chernobyl Accident
Prompted Worldwide Actions but Further Efforts Needed (1991); and
Construction of the Protective Shelter for the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor
Faces Schedule Delays, Potential Cost Increases, and Technical
Uncertainties (2007).
UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
634 pages of transcripts from three Congressional hearings: The Chernobyl
Accident Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Ninety-ninth Congress, 2nd session on the Chernobyl accident and
implications for the domestic nuclear industry, June 19, 1986; The
Effects of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant hearing
before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, United States Senate, One
Hundred Second Congress, second session, July 22, 1992; and The legacy of
Chernobyl, 1986 to 1996 and beyond hearing before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second
session, April 23, 1996.

S. Hrg. 99-869
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATTJEAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON THE
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
JUNE 19, 1986
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
U.S.
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-756 O WASHINGTON : 1986
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Saks Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

S. Hrg. 99-869
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
'^
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON THE
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
JUNE 19, 1986
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
U.S.
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-756 O WASHINGTON : 1986
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
JAMES A. McCLURE, Idaho, Chairman
MARK O. HATFIELD, Oregon J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
JOHN MELCHER, Montana
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BILL BRADLEY, New Jersey
DON NICKLES, OUahoma
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
CHIC HECHT, Nevada JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
DANIEL J.
EVANS, Washington
Frank M. Cushing, Staff Director
Gary G. Ellsworth, Chief Counsel
D. Michael Harvey, Chief Counsel for the Minority
(II)

CONTENTS
STATEMENTS
Beyea, Dr. Jan, senior staff scientist, National Audubon Society 210
Bumpers, Hon. Dale, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arkansas
Ill
Bunch, Dr. Delbert F., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Reactor Deployment,
Department of Energy 78
Dean, Dr. Richard A., senior vice president, GA Technologies, Inc 200
Denton, Harold R., Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 28
Evans, Hon. Daniel J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington 8
Johnston, Hon. J. Bennett, a U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana 3
McClure, Hon. James A., a U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho 1
Metzenbaum, Hon. Howard M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 9
Meyers, Sheldon, Acting Director, Office of Radiation Programs, Environmental
Protection Agency 16
Murkowski, Hon. Frank H., a U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska 116
Pate, Dr. Zack T., president. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 170
Schulten, Dr. Rudolf, Nuclear Research Center, Julich, Germany 140
Taylor, John J., vice president, Nuclear Power, Electric Power Research
Institute 150
Wade, Troy E., II, manager, Idaho Operations Office, Department of Energy.... 67
Walker, Mary L., Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety, and Health, Department
of Energy, accompanied by Don Ofte, principle deputy assistant
secretary, Defense Programs; Mel Sires; assistant manager. Savannah River
Operations Office; and John Hunter, director of Nuclear Energy and Surplus
Facility Management, Richland Operations Office 57
Wallop, Hon. Malcolm, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming 98
APPENDIX
Responses to additional committee questions 237
Page
(III)

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 1986
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room SD-
366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James A. McClure
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McClure, Domenici, Wallop, Warner, Murkowski,
Nickles, Hecht, Bumpers, Metzenbaum, and Melcher.
Also present: K.P. Lau and Marilyn Meigs, professional staff
members; and Benjamin S. Cooper, professional staff member for
the minority.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. McCLURE, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The April 26 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in the
Soviet Union has stimulated a lot of interest in a myriad of issues
related to the continued use of nuclear powerplants in this country
and abroad.
From members of this committee, we have had expressions of
concern about the immediate and long-term health effects of the
Chernobyl accident, the safety of our U.S. commercial and defense
reactors, the need for licensing reform, and the accident's overall
impact on the world energy supplies.
From an international perspective, we have already seen an increased
interest in expanding the role of the International Atomic
Energy Agency with respect to nuclear safety issues, including the
negotiation of international agreements for early notification about
nuclear incidents, and coordinating emergency response and assistance
in the event of a nuclear accident that releases radioactivity
into neighboring countries.
I wish to commend the IAEA for the responsiveness it has already
shown in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, and its actions
have reinforced my conviction that the IAEA is an invaluable body
for the promotion of responsible use of nuclear power throughout
the world.
From the perspective of our domestic use of nuclear power, I am
not surprised that the accident at Chernobyl has caused us to once
again assess the adequacy of the designs, safety features, and regulations
of all our operating nuclear reactors. The Department of
Energy has already responded by summoning numerous in-house
and independent reviews of the safety of its operating production
(1)

eactors to determine if any safety improvements are needed in
light of the Chernobyl accident.
In the commercial reactor sector, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
is closely monitoring and evaluating the causes and consequences
of the Chernobyl accident, to determine if there are any
lessons to be learned with respect to the regulation of our own
commercial nuclear industry.
I, for one, am confident that the soul searching and self-evaluation
that we are now undertaking as a result of the Chernobyl accident
is healthy and will eventually lead us to a renewed confidence
in our own nuclear industry. For, given the obvious differences in
the technologies, safety systems, and regulations between our two
countries, we will inevitably come to the conclusion that our technology
is one of the finest in the world.
One need only to point to such things as the accident at Three
Mile Island, where 70 percent of the core melted down, releasing
millions of curies of radiation into the containment building, and
yet no public health consequences resulted from that truly severe
accident. And, to the fact that numerous States and counties have
borrowed and used successfully the emergency response measures
originally established for nuclear powerplants, in responding to
nonnuclear disasters that have occurred in locations nearby to a
nuclear plant.
Our technology does, in fact, work. Our regulations do serve to
protect the public health and safety. We have learned from TMI
and other plant events how to make our technology even better.
We, in Congress, have been striving to make public liability coverage,
if a severe accident were ever to occur, the most comprehensive
we possibly can. More importantly, we are finally taking to
task the one big area that is still broken, that of the nuclear licensing
process, so that this Nation can enjoy a continued growth in
the use of nuclear power that has served this country so well in the
past.
Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to submit
on behalf of Senator Johnston, a statement of his, as well as his
letter to you.
The Chairman. His statement and the letter will be made a part
of the record, as well as Senator Evans' statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Johnston, his letter to the
chairman, and the prepared statement of Senator Evans follow:]

statement of Senator J. Bennett Johnston
June 19 Hearing on
the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on your decision to hold
this hearing. As we said in our letter to you of May 7
requesting the hearing, the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources should be playing a lead role in informing the public
about the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
The Committee can greatly assist the public in analyzing the
implications and lessons of this accident by creating a forum
where the best and most informed comment can be heard. We ought
to hear all sides, including the responsible people from the
Administration, so that the marketplace of ideas can operate to
inform us and the public.
What ever we find as a result of this hearing or later on as
more information becomes available from the Soviet Union, some
things are already clear.
First, this is a human tragedy of the first magnitude. Over
20 have died by the official Soviet count, and many more may live
with a real threat to their lives. Our sympathy must be with
these people.

Second, the severity of this accident and the halting,
indecisive actions of Soviet officialdom in acknowledging what
was going on just underscore the importance of openness in the
management of nuclear power. We in the United States benefit
from the give and take of open criticism of the way this
technology is managed in our country. This is not to say that
our management system is perfect of even adequate to the task it
faces and will face in the future. I am often a critic of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and I expect I will continue to
be. But however we reform our licensing process we will want to
retain the opportunity for criticism of management to be heard.
Third, while this event is without doubt a tragedy, it should
not be taken as a sign that there is something so forbidding
about the technology of nuclear power as to turn us away from it
as a source of electricity. We need nuclear power now and we
will need it much more in the future.
Chernobyl shows us that if we do not do the job of managing
the technology right, there could be some very bad consequences.
But nothing I have seen suggests in any way that we cannot do the
job right. I remain an optimist where this technology is
concerned. We are now using nuclear power in the United States
to generate 16 percent of our electricity. Its safety record is
exemplary.

We will contiue to work to make nuclear power a servant of
economic growth and well being. Our job in the Committee is to
determine how to use what has happened at Chernobyl to assist us
in this very important work.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that a copy of our letter of May 7 be
inserted in the record of this hearing.

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Bnited States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY *ND NATURAL RESOURCES
WASHtNGTON. DC 30510
May 7, 1986
Honorable James A. McClure
Chairman
Comniittee on Energy and Natural Resources
U. S. Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear
Jim:
The accident at the Soviet nuclear power station at Chernobyl
has captured the attention of the American public and has
received unprecedented media coverage. In fact, the media has
been the major source of information on the accident and its
implications for the 0. S. nuclear power and nuclear weapons
programs. Comment and analysis from official U. S. sources has
been fragmented and often overshadowed by media reports.
We believe that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
should be playing a lead role in informing the public about this
accident and in analyzing its lessons by bringing together the
best and most informed comment, including the official views of
Accordingly, we ask that you convene a series of hearings at
the earliest possible date, hopefully before the coming recess,
to thoroughly analyze the implications of the Chernobyl accident
for
- public health and safety in the U, S., in the Soviet
Union and in Eastern Europe;
- management and regulation of domestic nuclear
reactors, especially those most like the ones at Chernobyl;
the Plutonium production reactors operated by the Department
of Energy;
- plans in the U. S. to reform the nuclear reactor
licensing process and to extend and revise the Price-Anderson
Act;

.
- the foreign reactor market that U. S. vendors have
been seeking to reestablish; and
- future energy supplies, including effects on the world
market for fossil fuels, as a result of possible Soviet
decisions or decisions in other countries to lessen reliance
on nuclear power in the short and long term.
We look forward to working with you on this most important
matter
With kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
J. Bennett Johnston
Ranking Minority Member
Wendell H. Fore
United States Senator
1d^A-
Dale Bumpers
United States Senator
Howard M. Metzenbaum
United States Senator
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United States Senator
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8
STATEMENT BY SENATOR DANIEL J. EVANS
OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
JUNE 19, 1986
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
As the Senator from the state that has the only graphitemoderated
reactor in the country, I have a keen interest in the
subject. The N-Reactor at Hanford began operation in 1964, and
has had a good operating record over the past 20-plus years. It
has also created a huge amount of inexpensive electricity for the
ratepayers of the Pacific Northwest through the utilization of
steam byproduct, besides producing weapons materials for our
defense needs. I don't think that such a record justifies the
immediate shut-down of the reactor. Until there is strong and
ample evidence to the contrary, I believe the plant should
continue to operate.
I am concerned, however, about the implications of the
Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union, as I think anyone
familiar with the nuclear power industry should be. But it is
difficult to make rational decisions until the Soviets provide us
with an adequate scientific explanation of the causes and nature
of the accident. I understand that the Soviets will not make
such a presentation to the IAEA until mid or late August.
It is very important to conduct studies of the N-Reactor 's
safety and operating record in order to present the objective
facts to the uneasy citizens in my state. At last count, there
are six studies being carried out today. The first study on the
fire prevention and safety systems, which was released several
weeks ago, called for some modest improvements in some of the
monitoring systems. The next study on the basic design of the
reactor, and modifications made to it since 1964, is due out at
the end of this month. I believe that the DOE, and the Congress,
should follow up quickly to provide the funding to implement any
recommendations coming from these studies.
We also must address through these studies the more
fundamental problem of the life extension of the N-Reactor. We
must ask ourselves when examining the results of these studies if
it is in the public health and safety interest to prolong the
life of this reactor, or whether we should proceed to consider
authorizing a new production reactor? I understand the budget
difficulties that our Government faces today, which led to a
decision to extend the life of the present graphite core. But
safety should be paramount to the budgetary questions in this
matter, in my view. And, in this instance, you can't measure
public health and safety in dollars and cents.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you
for holding these hearings. I wrote to you urging that you do so,
and I think a number of other Senators did, as well.
I must make a prefatory statement, however, in connection with
your own statement, and that is, Mr. Chairman, I do not think we
can be sanguine. I do not think we can be so confident that our
own agencies are doing the job that they should be doing, or that
the international agencies are doing the job that they should be
doing.
It is comforting to recite the words, and we look back at Three
Mile Island and feel a great sense of gratification that nothing
worse happened. But, the fact is that it was so close to being something
worse, maybe we just skidded by or got by.
There is a lot to be learned from the Chernobyl accident, and a
lot to be learned about that accident. One immediate lesson is quite
clear: a severe accident resulting in massive releases of radiation,
widespread evacuations, and numerous civilian deaths can indeed
occur.
I will be interested in hearing today what our agencies did in
connection with this, how promptly they moved and whether or not
they were able to find out how much radiation had reached some of
the other nations of the European sector, or whether or not they
just sat back and waited for others to supply the information.
I cannot overlook the fact that there are well over 300,000 American
servicemen, plus their families, living in the European theater,
and there was a certain amount of exposure. Should some of
those wives have come home, particularly the pregnant ones;
should some of the children have come home? I don't know.
Americans living near nuclear facilities, however, are rightfully
concerned that a tragedy like Chernobyl could happen to them.
They expect that everything possible will be done to prevent a
severe nuclear accident and that effective emergency plans are in
place in case one does occur.
My research in the history of the nuclear industry is not reassuring.
Because in the first instance we started off with the Atomic
Energy Commission, which had a twofold responsibility. One part
of that responsibility was to sell and encourage the use of atomic
energy, and the second part of the responsibility was to concern
itself with the safety cf Americans.
But the fact is, very little was done with respect to the second
part, and much more was done with promoting the use of nuclear
energy. And then as time went on, it caught up with us and some
of the plants in this country have had to be closed down because
they were not safe enough.
I remember so vividly a headline across the top of the Plain
Dealer in Cleveland, some years ago, which recited the fact, "Davis-
Besse Nuclear Facility has 1,400 Defects."
I remember just recently, I went down to one of the plants down
near Cincinnati, and found that there had been a leakage there.
Fortunately, they were able to catch it.

10
But all of this causes me concern; makes me believe that it
should result in more emphasis on safety and emergency planning
in this Nation and a reevaluation of the current approach of risk
assessment which serves as the basis for estimating the effectiveness
of safety measures at nuclear facilities.
I am frank to say that I am not confident that those who have a
responsibility in this area are not more concerned about stepping
on the toes of the nuclear energy, or in somehow affecting the nuclear
energy industry than they are concerned about the health
and safety of American people.
Incredibly, industry and Government have responded to the
Chernobyl accident with a fortresslike mentality.
They tell us that the probability of a severe accident is already
so low that there is no undue level of risk and nothing more needs
to be done to make plants safe.
The Chief of Staff of the NRC said, "We see nothing coming out
of this accident to suggest we need to change." To that I just respond—I
cannot believe you said it.
This manifests an air of unbelievable, dangerous complacency.
The record does not justify this complacency.
Accidents which the NRC deems to be incredible, that is of such
low probability that plants do not have to be designed for them,
keep occurring. Time after time after time, we have an accident or
a near miss caused or complicated by unquantifiable factors such
as poor management, human error, regulatory violations and poor
design or construction.
These experiences argue for more aggressive, rather than more
relaxed, efforts to improve safety. Yet, the NRC, at the urging of
the nuclear industry, has engaged in defacto regulation, and effectively
halted all efforts to improve safety.
The residents of the State of Ohio have a justified concern about
the NRC's effectiveness. Ohio has hosted the Zimmer Plant, the
Davis-Besse Plant, and the Perry Nuclear Plant. One facility has
been abandoned due to poor construction, another suffered the
most serious accident in the United States since Three Mile Island,
and the third is involved in a controversy relating to its location
near an earthquake fault.
Many Ohio residents feel poor regulation by the NRC is responsible
for many of the problems which have occurred.
All of this leads me to conclude that the public is not receiving
the kind of protection it deserves.
In human terms, the Chernobyl accident was a tragedy. Estimates
of cancers and fatal cancers resulting from the accident
range from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of thousands.
Out in the West, there is a man by the name of Dr. John Goffman.
Dr. John Goffman was one of the atomic scientists involved
at Los Alamos. Dr. John Goffman was one of those involved at the
Livermore Laboratory and had a high-ranking position. Today, he
is professor emeritus of medical physics at the University of California
at Berkeley.
I remember when Dr. Goffman lost his subvention from the U.S.
Government because he was asked to do an investigation of the
safety and usage of nuclear energy in this country. He came up

11
with the wrong report. He came up with a report that his superiors
did not Uke and his subvention was immediately cut off.
Now Dr. Goffman has estimated that Chernobyl will result in
320,000 fatal, and 320,000 nonfatal cancers. I do not think there is
anybody in the country that would question the experience, the
reputation of Dr. Goffman.
I am concerned today that we will be told there is no problem
and that this accident has little relevance to our Nation and its nuclear
program. Such a response will not be adequate.
We do not have to point to the problems we experienced with the
space shuttle. We have a very serious problem of technology right
before this committee. Unless agency and industry officials are
doing all that they should be doing to prevent a repeat of this tragedy,
it will be up to this committee and Congress to step in and
take action.
We can turn our eyes away from the fact, we can close our ears,
but the truth is, a problem exists unless those who are charged
with the responsibility by our Government do all that they should
be doing.
This committee has a responsibility to ensure that public health
and safety is protected. We cannot afford to shirk our duty in this
instance.
I am looking forward to learning about the Chernobyl accident,
and I also hope the Government and industry officials will learn
the lessons of Chernobyl and quickly undertake new initiatives to
improve safety, openness and emergency planning at commercial
and Federal facilities.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Metzenbaum follows:]

12
U. S. Senator Howard M.
METZENBAUM
CommnuMt:
Budgei
Energv and Notural Ratoufces
Human Resoufces
Judiciarv
of Ohio 202 224 2315
STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOWARD M. METZENBAOH
SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE
JONE 19, 1986
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding these
hearings today.
There is a lot to be learned about the Chernobyl accident,
and a lot to be learned from it.
One immediate lesson is quite clear: a severe accident
resulting in massive releases of radiation, widespread
evacuations and numerous civilian deaths can indeed occur.
Americans living near nuclear facilities are rightfully
concerned that a tragedy like Chernobyl could happen to them.
They expect that everything possible will be done to prevent a
severe nuclear accident, and that effective emergency plans are
in place in case one does occur.
All of this should result in more emphasis on safety and
emergency planning in this nation, and a re-evaluation of the
current approach to risk assessment, which serves as the basis
for estimating the effectiveness of safety measures at nuclear
facil ities.
Yet, incredibly, industry and the government have responded
to the accident with a fortress-like mentality.
They tell us that the probability of a severe accident is
already so low that there is no undue level of risk and nothing
more needs to be done to make plants safe.
The Executive Director for Operations of the NRC said: "W'
see nothing coming out of this accident to suggest we need to
change."
This manifests an air of dangerous complacency.
Yet, the record does not justify this complacency.
Accidents which the NRC deems to be "incredible" - that is,
of such low probability that plants do not have to be designed
for them - keep occurring. Time after time, we have an accident
or a near miss caused or complicated by unquanti f iable factors
such as poor management, human error, regulatory violations and
poor design or construction.
These experiences argue for more aggressive, rather than more
relaxed, efforts to improve safety.
Yet, the NRC, at the urging of the nuclear industry, has
engaged in de-facto deregulation, and effectively halted all
efforts to improve safety.

13
The residents of the state of Ohio have a justified concern
about the NRC's effectiveness. Ohio has hosted the Zimmer plant,
the Davis-Besse plant, and the Perry nuclear plant. One facility
has been abandoned due to poor construction, another suffered the
most serious accident in the O.S. since Three Mile Island, and
the third is involved in a controversy relating to its location
near an earthquake fault. Many Ohio residents feel poor
regulation by the NRC is responsible for many of the problems
which have occurred.
All of this leads me to conclude that the public is not
receiving the kind of protection it deserves.
In human terms, the Chernobyl accident was a tragedy.
Estimates of cancers and fatal cancers resulting from the
accident range from the tens of thousands to the hundreds of
thousands.
Dr. John Gofman, Professor Emeritus of Medical Physics at the
University of California at Berkeley has estimated that Chernobyl
will result in 320,000 fatal and 320,000 non-fatal cancers.
Yet, I am concerned that today we will be told there is no
problem and that this accident has little relevance to our nation
and its nuclear program.
Such a response will not be adequate.
We don't have to point to the problems we experienced with
the space shuttle.
We have a very serious problem of technology right before
this Committee, and unless agency and industry officials are
doing all that they should be doing to prevent a repeat of this
tragedy, it will be up to this Committee and Congress to step in
and take action.
This Committee has a responsibility to ensure that public
health and safety is protected. We cannot afford to shirk our
duty in this instance.
I am looking forward to learning more about the Chernobyl
accident.
I also hope that both government and industry officials will
learn the lessons of Chernobyl and quickly undertake new
initiatives to improve safety, openess and emergency planning at
commercial and federal facilities.

14
The Chairman. You have started on a range of opinion. I understand
that that is part of the public dialog that is going on. I have
likened the situation in the nuclear industry today by saying, yes,
there is indeed a risk as there is to all of life. But it is not perfect
in its record, as indeed nothing in life is perfect.
Often times, we, in our political debates, use the old illustration
of a half of glass of water and say, "Is the glass half full or half
empty?" This is a glass of water that is better than 99 percent full
and less than 1 percent empty, and are we going to look at the
glass and say, "That is not completely full," and throw it
while we are thirsty.
away
Let's do with the Salk vaccine for polio. It is not perfect; there
are a few people who get polio. There is substantial risk to public
health and human condition because of a whole variety of situations
in our society.
We debate the 55 mile per hour speed limit, knowing that raising
it to 70 will cause more deaths on the highway, and cutting it to 35
would save some. We make some trade-offs in our society measuring
the greater risks, or the greater costs to society.
There is a cost to not having safe energy and there is a cost to
not having sufficient energy. There are costs in any of the decisions
that we made. It is a lot easier to play the negative than it is to
play the positive.
It is a lot easier to sell fear than it is to sell confidence. I notice
that some people recently, a very prominent scientist has written
an article that has received wide publicity, saying American technology
has failed and he points to the failures that are obvious.
But, American technology has succeeded dramatically in a whole
host of things that make our life safer, more comfortable, rich and
more rewarding.
Is the glass 99 percent full, or 1 percent empty? I do not know
what the appropriate proportions are and I certainly am not complacent
about safety in the nuclear power field any more than I am
complacent about safety in dam design.
We have just observed the 10th anniversary of the failure of the
Teton Dam in Idaho that caused the loss of 11 lives and $0.5 billion
worth of damage, but we have not drained every dam in the country.
We do not live in fear, below every dam. We know that there
are earthquakes that cause problems and earthquake scientists predict
that there will be severe earthquakes in California, but we
have not evacuated California.
Although some suggest it.
I am confident that with the help of the Senator from Ohio and
others, that we are not going to see anything brushed under the
rug in the investigation of the procedures we use with the nuclear
industry, nor am I suggesting that it should be.
I think I have been as insistent as anyone has been or should be
with respect to examining the safety features of our industry; doing
what we reasonably can do to make certain that we take the actions
that are necessary, appropriate the money that we have to
appropriate, create the programs that are necessary to give the
people of this country assurance that we are doing what can reasonably
be done with respect to safety in this industry.

15
Yes, I am not satisfied with everything we have done, nor should
we be, and I am not complacent about it. But, I do believe we need
to put it into some kind of perspective and this hearing today is an
effort to allow the American public to hear from people who know
what the facts are so that we can put it into the appropriate perspective
and take the appropriate actions that are necessary with
respect to our own industry.
But, above all, I believe the American public should understand
what Chernobyl is, what it means and what it is not, and what it
does not mean.
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the issue is
whether we close down all of our nuclear facilities, or do not close
them down.
I do not think anybody advocates closing them all down.
The Chairman. Some do.
Senator Metzenbaum. Well, let me say that I believe the issue is:
Are we doing everything that is humanly possible to see to it that
those facilities that are operating
The Chairman. We are not doing everything that is humanly
possible to make certain that Salk vaccine does not infect somebody.
We are not doing everything that is humanly possible to keep
people from dying—the largest cause of death, violent death in the
United States is on our highways and we are not doing everything
that is human possible to stop death on the highways.
We are making measured, reasoned responses to risk.
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman, I think that comparisons
sometimes do not work. I do not believe that you appreciate—no, I
will withdraw that.
I
know that you appreciate the distinction between some risks
and the kinds of risks that are involved in connection with nuclear
accidents. You mentioned the problem at the Teton Dam, 11
deaths. We are not talking about 11 deaths if there is an accident
or problem at one of our nuclear facilities. We are talking about
thousands and thousands of deaths. We are talking about longrange
suffering. We are talking about evacuating entire communities,
and I will conclude by saying, using your own analogy to that
half a glass of water—whether it is half full or half empty—I think
the reS issue is—and it is not a question of whether it is 99 percent
full. The real issue is, what kind of water is in there? Is the
water tainted? Have we done everything we can to see to it that
the water that we drink is as pure as it possibly can be?
I am not sure, by your examining that particular glass that you
can always be able to tell just by looking at the nuclear facility,
nor at the water, whether it is as safe as it should be.
The Chairman. I would say to my friend from Ohio, that if we
applied the same test to that water that we now apply to the nuclear
industry, I would chuck it out. It could not possibly pass the
test. And we have the Clean Drinking Water Act, too. You and I
helped write that, and we are enhancing the safety of the water
supplies to the people of this country.
But we have no way the same level of confidence, the purity of
that water, than we have in the safety of nuclear industry.
Senator Metzenbaum. As the ringmaster of the show, maybe we
ought to say, "On with the show."

16
The Chairman. I do look forward to hearing from the witnesses,
but that is one of the things that I think is essentially from my
own standpoint; that we understand what the hearings are trying
to do, and that is get facts and not hype emotions.
With that, we will call our first panel. The first panel consists of
Mr. Sheldon Meyers, Acting Director, Office of Radiation Programs,
the Environmental Protection Agency; Mr. Harold Denton,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, of the NRC; and
from the Department of Energy, Ms. Mary Walker, Assistant Secretary,
Environment, Safety and Health; Dr. Delbert Bunch,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Reactor Deployment; Mr. Troy Wade,
Manager, DOE-Idaho Operations Office, U.S. Department of
Energy.
If you ladies and gentlemen will take your place at the witness
table, please.
I would note that there are several people who have accompanied
these witnesses who may be called upon to supply answers or
information. They are seated in the front row and available for
consultation, if that is necessary.
The prepared statements of each of you will be placed in the
record in full, and if you can summarize, hit the high points, make
the points that you think are essential, we would appreciate it.
We will start with Mr. Meyers.
STATEMENT OF SHELDON MEYERS, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
Mr. Meyers. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. I am going to describe for you this morning the activities
of the President's Interagency Task Force on the Soviet Nuclear
Accident, and also describe for you EPA's environmental radiation
monitoring system, otherwise known as ERAMS, which was
instrumental in collecting data in this country as a result of the
accident in the U.S.S.R.
As you have already stated, the accident occurred at approximately
1:30 a.m., Saturday, April 26. On Monday, April 28, the first
reports were received from Sweden, indicating that a significant increase
in levels of radioactivity were detected and they suspected a
major nuclear accident had occurred in a powerplant in the Soviet
Union.
President Reagan established the Interagency Task Force on the
accident on Tuesday, April 29. Lee Thomas, Administrator of EPA
was named to head the task force. The task force included representatives
from 15 departments and agencies.
Meetings were held daily from April 30 through May 14, with
the exception of May 10, 11, and 13: and on May 14, it was decided
that further meetings were not warranted unless something unforeseen
took place.
The work of the task force was to assess the accident and the situation
in Europe, to monitor environmental radioactivity levels in
this country, to determine the potential for health and environ-
and to provide the best and most current informa-
mental effects,
tion to public officials, the press, and to the U.S. citizenry.

17
We accomplished our work by collecting available foreign and domestic
information, evaluating and interpreting the data, and then
coordinating the Federal response and the dissemination of the information
to the public.
Key agency contacts were designated to respond to specific types
of public inquiries, and a daily task force report on the Soviet nuclear
accident was issued by EPA from April 29 through May 23.
The response effort at EPA was organized into three groups; data
receipt, evaluation, and interpretation: data reporting and operations
support. This was essentially staffed through Mr. Thomas in
his capacity as chairman.
EPA was the centralized collection point for data on the international
levels of radiation, for monitoring data obtained from DOE's
national laboratories, from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration on atmospheric air levels, from EPA's own
ERAMS system, and also from State monitoring, from U.S. Embassies
or diplomatic posts via the State Department, and U.S. scientific
monitoring teams abroad.
A Health Working Group, under the leadership of the Health
and Human Services Department was formed and tasked to examine
potential long- and short-term health effects, to identify symptoms
and effects, and to distribute information to health officials
around the country.
The assessment of agricultural and food effects was also a resp)onsibility
of this work group.
A work group of the task force headed by NRC was given the responsibility
to describe and evaluate possible reactor accident scenarios.
NOAA was responsible for providing the meteorological information
that was also included in the daily task force report.
EPA was responsible for public information, issuing the daily
task force report, and providing information to the public as it
became available.
Also, EPA headed the Dose Assessment Working Group, which
consisted of representatives from several agencies.
On May 1, the State Department issued a travel advisory recommending
against travel to Kiev and adjacent areas in the Soviet
Union and urging the public to monitor press reports for any updated
information.
The following day, the State Department upgraded its travel advisory
to recommend against travel by women of childbearing age
and children to Poland until the situation there was clarified, and
also advised travelers in Eastern Europe to avoid consumption of
milk and dairy products.
The task force decided that contact should be made with counterpart
agencies in affected countries to obtain radiological data.
NRC placed calls to 18 countries between May 2 and May 5 and
the best available information was included in the daily task force
report.
On May 3, the State Department sent cables to diplomatic posts
to request available radiological data be sent to the United States.
The United States dispatched scientists to make environmental
measurements in United States Embassies and consulates in selected
sities in the U.S.S.R, Poland, and Hungary on May 3. EPA sci-

18
entist Richard Hopper went to Warsaw and Krakow, Poland, Budapest,
Hungary, and Sofia, Bulgaria.
A military team was dispatched to the Soviet Union to take
measurements in the Moscow Embassy and in Leningrad. I bring
this up because we were getting essentially no information from
Russia, itself, while on the other hand, we were getting information
from the Western countries.
Sampling frequency in the United States for radioactive airborne
particulates was increased from twice weekly to daily in EPA's
ERAMS on April 29. The Canadian air monitoring network also increased
their sampling to daily.
On April 30, collection of rainwater samples was increased to
daily and collection of milk samples was increased from monthly to
twice weekly.
At this time, let me expand on the ERAMS System, itself. The
ERAMS has been in place since 1973, when several separate but
related radiation monitoring networks were combined. The
ERAMS collection and analyses of environmental samples constitutes
the Nation's single major continuous source of environmental
radiation data acquisition and analyses. It operates all the time.
For the Chernobyl incident, we merely speeded it up.
It is a cooperative program between the States and local governments
which collect the samples, and the EPA, which performs the
analysis using verified, anal5^ical quality assured techniques.
ERAMS consists of 268 sampling locations, which routinely collect
environmental data on air particulates, precipitation, milk,
drinking water, and surface water. The air particulate and drinking
water stations take samples representative of about 30 percent
of the American population, while the milk sampling stations cover
over 40 percent of the milk consumed in the United States today.
We have sampling stations in all 50 States, Puerto Rico, and the
Canal Zone.
Radiation analyses are performed on ERAMS samples and include
gross alpha and gross beta levels, gamma analyses for fission
products, and specific analyses for uranium, plutonium, strontium,
iodine, radium, krypton, and tritium.
Special consideration is given to certain radionuclides, such as
iodine, cesium, and strontium because one would expect to find
these radionuclides in fallout of fresh fission products such as those
emitted from the Soviet nuclear reactor accident, and gross beta in
air particulates for screening or early warning procedures.
Each of these radionuclides also have biological significance;
iodine concentrates in the th5n'oid, cesium in lean flesh, and strontium
in bone. These radionuclides are also readily passed into the
milk supply.
Typical ambient levels of radioactive iodine in air and milk are
normally near zero due to its short half-life and resulting decay.
Cesium and strontium persist in the environment for longer periods
of time due to their longer half-lives.
The first reports of elevated radiation in the United States from
the accident
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Excuse me, Mr. Meyers. Senator Metzenbaum.

19
Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman, I thought you had asked
the witnesses—I am afraid if we wait for each of the witnesses to
read their entire statements, as Mr. Meyers is doing, there will be
no opportunity for questioning. I thought they were asked by you
to summarize their statements.
The Chairman. Mr. Meyers, is it possible to give us some high
points and summarize briefly? I think all the press have copies of
the statements; statements are available from all witnesses.
Mr. Meyers. Yes, sir. Let me just quickly give you some readings
that we did get. The daily precipitation samples showed a number
of cities with detectable levels of iodine-131 resulting from the nuclear
reactor accident. The highest deposition level reported was
12,300 picocuries per square meter, in Montpelier, VT.
As a frame of reference, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's
protective action recommendations for ground water depositions
of iodine-131 is 130,000 picocuries per square meter. This is a
level that FDA recommends for local public health officials to take
protective action to avoid domestic food contaminationn. Thus, the
12,300 level represented less than 10 percent of the FDA level and
was not considered to pose any threat to the public health or welfare.
While we will continue to collect samples routinely, we did make
arrangements for the World Health Organization to serve as the
international data repository for all radiation related to the Chernobyl
nuclear reactor accident, and EPA will continue to supply
WHO with domestic data, but they will assume the responsibility
from EPA for collecting the international data.
In closing out the work of the task force, it was decided that the
involved agencies will continue to cooperate and collaborate in
areas where continued activity is necessary, such as the dose assessment
group, health and agricultural working group, and finally,
a summary health and dose assessment report will be prepared.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Meyers follows:]

20
STATEMENT OF
MR. SHELDON MEYERS
ACTING DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECflON AGENCY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENAFE
June 19, 1986
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.
My name is Sheldon Meyers; I am Acting Director of EPA's Office
of Radiation Programs. I will discuss the activities of the
President's Interagency Task Force on the Soviet Nuclear
Accident and also describe for you EPA's environmental radiation
ambient monitoring system, otherwise known as ERAMS.
The accident occurred at approximately 1:30 AM, Saturday,
April 26, 1986. On Monday, April 28 the first reports were
received from Sweden indicating that a major nuclear accident
had occurred at a power plant in the U.S.S.R.
President Reagan established the Interagency Task Force on
the Soviet Nuclear Accident on Tuesday, April 29th. Lee Thomas,
Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
was named to head the Task Force. The Task Force included
representatives from fifteen Departments and Agencies. Meetings
were held daily from April 30 through May 16 (with the exception
of May 10, 11, and 13) at which time it was decided further
meetings were not warranted.

21
The work of the Task Force was to assess the accident and
the situation in Europe, to monitor environmental radioactivity
levels in this country, to determine the potential for health and
environmental effects here and abroad, and to provide the best
and most current information to public officials, the press, and
U.S.
citizens.
We accomplished our work by collecting available foreign
and domestic information, evaluating and interpreting the data,
and then coordinating the Federal response and the dissemination
of the information to the public. Key agency contacts were
designated to respond to specific types of public inquiries and
a daily Task Force Report on the Soviet Nuclear Accident was
issued by EPA from April 29 through May 23.
The response effort at EPA was organized into three groups:
data receipt, evaluation and interpretation; data reporting; and
operations
support.
EPA was the centralized collection point for data on
international levels of radiation, from monitoring data obtained
from DOE'S National Laboratories, from NOAA on atmospheric air
levels, from EPA's ERAMS , from State monitoring, and from U.S.
embassies or diplomatic posts via the State Department and the
U.S. scientific monitoring teams.
A Health Working Group under the leadership of HHS was formed
and tasked to examine potential long and short-term health effects,
identify symptoms and effects, and distribute information to

.
.
22
health ofticials. The assessment of agricultural and food effects
was also a responsibility of this working group.
A work group of the Task Force headed by NRC was given the
responsibility to describe and evaluate possible reactor accident
scenarios
NOAA was responsible for providing the meteorological
information that was also included in the daily Task Force Report.
EPA was responsible for public information: issuing the daily
Task Force Report and providing information to the public as it
became available. Also EPA headed the Dose Assessment Working
Group which consisted of representatives from several Federal
agencies
On May 1 the State Department issued a travel advisory
recommending against travel to Kiev and adjacent areas in the
Soviet Union and urging the public to monitor press reports for
any updated information. The following day the State Department
upgraded its travel advisory to recommend against travel by
women of child-bearing age and children to Poland until the
situation there was clarified and also advised travelers in
Eastern Europe to avoid consumption of milk and dairy products.
The Task Force decided that contacts should be made with
counterpart agencies in affected countries to obtain radiological
data. NRC placed calls to eighteen countries between
May 2 and May 5. The best available information was included
in the daily Task Force Report.

23
On May 3 the State Department sent cables to diplomatic
posts to request available radiological data be sent to the
United
States.
The U.S. dispatched scientists to make environmental
measurements in U.S. embassies and consulates in selected cities
in the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Hungary on May 3. EPA scientist
Richard Hopper went to Warsaw and Krakow, Poland, Budapest,
Hungary, and Sophia, Bulgaria. A military team was dispatched
to the Soviet Union, (Levels at several times background were
reported at each location visited.)
Sampling frequency in the U.S. for radioactive airborne
particulates was increased from twice weekly to daily in EPA's
ERAMS on April 29. The Canadian air monitoring network also
increased their sampling to daily. On April 30 collection of
rain water samples was increased to daily; collection of milk
samples was increased from monthly to twice weekly.
I would like to expand on the ERAMS system. The ERAMS has
been in place since 1973 when several separate, but related
radiation monitoring networks were combined. The ERAMS collection
and analyses of environmental samples constitutes the Nation's
single major continuous source of environmental radiation data
acquisition and analyses. It is a cooperative program between
the States and local governments which collect the samples, and
the EPA which performs the analyses using verified analytical and
quality assurance procedures.

.
24
ERAMS consists of 268 sampling locations which routinely
collect environmental data on air particulates, precipitation,
milk, drinking water, and surface water. The air particulate and
drinking water stations take samples representative of about
30 percent of the American population, while the milk sampling
stations cover over 40 percent of the milk consumed by U.S.
citizens
Radiation analyses are performed on ERAMS samples and include
gross alpha and gross beta levels, gamma analyses for fission
products and specific analyses for uranium, plutonium, strontium,
iodine, radium, krypton, and tritium. Special consideration is
given to certain radionuclides, such as gross beta in air
particulates for screening or early warning procedures, and
iodine, cesium, and strontium because one would expect to find
these radionuclides in fallout of fresh fission products such
as those emitted from the Soviet nuclear reactor accident.
Each of these radionuclides also has biological significance;
iodine concentrates in the thyroid, cesium in lean flesh, and
strontium in bone. These radionuclides are also readily passed
into the milk supply.
Typical ambient levels of radioactive iodine in air and milk
are near zero due to its short half life and resulting decay.
Cesium and strontium persist in the environment for a longer
period of time, due to their longer half lives.

25
The first elevated levels of radiation in the U.S. from the
accident were received from the Pacific Northwest Laboratory
in Richland, Washington, on May 5. ERAMS detected the first
elevated levels of radioactivity in air at ground level in
the U.S . on May 7.
The daily precipitation (rainwater) samples showed a number
of cities with detectable levels of iodine-131 resulting from the
nuclear reactor accident. The highest deposition level reported
was 12,300 picocuries per square meter (pCi/m2) in Montpelier,
Vermont.
As a frame of reference, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration's protective action recommendations for
ground water deposits of iodine-131 is 130,000 pCi/m2. This
is the level that FDA recommends for local public health
officials to take protective action to avoid domestic food
contamination. Thus, the 12,300 level represented less than
ten percent of the FDA level and was not considered to pose
any threat to public health or welfare.
The Governor of the State of Oregon issued an advisory May 7
for people who used rainwater as their sole source of drinking
water to refrain from drinking rainwater at that time. The first
positive milk samples were reported by ERAMS on May 13.
The Task Force Report iater concluded that the U.S. radiation
monitoring network had recorded sporadic and detectable levels
of radiation from the Soviet accident in most areas of the
country but these levels posed no health or environmental threat.

26
other activities of the Task Force include the following:
EPA acted as the clearinghouse for offers of assistance and
coordinated this activity with the State Department.
FAA requested and received measurement assistance from DOE.
The CDC/FDA medical network was used to provide information to
State health officers. DOE had primary responsibility for
Congressional liaison on the Soviet accident.
In addition, a Dose Assessment Working Group consisting of
representatives from several Federal agencies was formed.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and
Inspection Service and the FDA had in place routine procedures
to monitor imported products. Increased monitoring and analysis
of tresh fruit and vegetables, fish and selected dairy products
were conducted at points of entry into the U.S. and countries who
export meat and poultry products to the U.S. were notified of
special monitoring procedures to undertake prior to shipment
to the U.S. Working with U.S. Customs officials, particular
attention was given to products from Austria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Norway, Poland, the
Soviet Union, Sweden, and West Germany.
FDA measurements have shown low amounts of iodine-131 and
other radionuclides in imported shipments of fresh vegetable
and dairy products from Europe. Two shipments of cheese exceeded
the level of concern for iodine-131 for imported foods and were
refused entry. Collectively, all of FDA's results would present
no public health hazard to U.S. citizens.

27
8
Foreign data received suggested external radiation levels
were decreasing in Western Europe beginning May 10.
The analyses tor air and water were conducted on an expedited
basis through the first two weeks of June. The collection and
analyses of milk samples will continue on an expedited basis
until samples wind down to normal radiation levels, at which
time routine monitoring will be resumed through the ERAMS system.
EPA made arrangements with the World Health Organization
(WHO) to serve as the international data repository for all
radiation data related to the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident.
EPA will continue to provide WHO with domestic data from our
ERAMS monitoring program and other sources of data until domestic
data return to background levels. WHO will provide the global
data base to all interested parties.
In closing out the work of the Task Force, it was decided
that the involved agencies will continue to cooperate and
collaborate in areas where continued activity is necessary, such
as the Dose Assessment, Health, and Agriculture Working Groups.
Finally, a summary health and dose assessment report will be
prepared.
This concludes my formal statement.

28
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Meyers.
Mr. Denton.
STATEMENT OF HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NU-
CLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM-
MISSION
Mr. Denton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to summarize
my testimony briefly.
Following the formation of the task force, we created within the
NRC a Chernobyl incident tracking team, using our response
center, which we created after the TMI accident. That provided a
way that we could serve as the clearing house for the entire
world's interest in this area. We had daily contact with most of the
regulators in the European countries and Japan. We supplied all
the background information that we could gather to the task force
with regard to the possible causes of the accident and its consequences.
As you know, we have identified significant design differences between
that plant and the U.S. plants. That plant is not exported
outside of Russia. It is a graphite plant, a boiling water plant, vertical
pressure tubes; very different than U.S. light water plants. I
could go into those differences if you so desire.
We intend to issue a report to the Commission by about the
middle of July which summarizes all the information we have
gathered to date. We now have access to a great deal of information
that we have gathered which is in the public record, regarding
the design of that plant. We are trying to look at the entire plant;
what are the general design criteria in the Soviet Union, what are
their approaches to QA, operating training, the licensing, what is
their safety philosophy.
We hope ultimately to provide the Commission with a report on
that plant and on the accident that the Commission can use in deciding
whether or not design changes may be necessary.
We will be participating in the forthcoming IAEA meetings. I
met with two of the Soviet designers of this plant in Vienna several
weeks ago. They have promised to be fully forthcoming and
cover all the details from the initiating event through the biomedical
aspects.
Chairman Palladino has asked that the senior staff recommend
by the end of the year whatever changes we think are necessary in
our program. Based on all that we can gather, we have identified
three areas which we think need a detailed look.
we want to look at accident prevention, to see if there is
First,
anything in the initiating event, the relationship of the Chernobyl
design to U.S. design and accidents that might occur here. We
intend to
compare accident prevention aspects with what we require
in this country.
The second area we want to look at in detail involves emergency
response planning. We want to be sure we understand what happened
there, how severe the accident was and what implications it
might have to the United States.

29
By way of comparison, you might recall that TMI released 15
curies of iodine into the atmosphere; this plant released approximately
60 million curies of iodine-131 into the atmosphere.
Senator Metzenbaum. Would you give us the figures again?
Mr. Denton. At TMI there were 15 curies of iodine-131 released
into the atmosphere over the course of the accident. At Chernobyl,
there were approximately 60 million curies of iodine released very
early in the accident.
There is a stark difference between the consequences of that accident
and the TMI accident.
I might mention, Senator, you had asked about complacency
within the NRC. I don't think we are complacent. It might be
worth a moment to just highlight some of things we have done
since TMI, to set the stage for things we think were important.
If you recall, we did establish the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, so we do now have around all U.S. plants preplanned
emergency planning, involving State and local officials. I think in
retrospect, if we had not done that at TMI time, that would be one
of the first lessons to learn from Chernobyl. I am very glad we
have that sort of preplanned FEMA agency in place today.
The second thing we did following TMI was emphasize plant operations.
We made the requirements for the selection of plant operators
and management more stringent; there is an accreditation
program for operators; we have changed procedures, strengthened
all the instrumentation in the control room and made a lot of
changes with regard to that area. Third, we made hardware
changes; a lot of instrumentation, pumps, valves and these sort of
things, to try to reduce the probability of an accident.
Overall, I think TMI cost plant operators in direct costs about
$50 million per plant. That is probably $5 billion that TMI cost in
terms of safety and improvement. Probably an equal amount was
spent on indirect improvements following TMI, so that I would
guess the total impact of TMI on improving safety in this country
was probably on the order of $10 billion, everything considered.
It is not clear what Chernobyl will lead to, but we do have a task
force appointed. We have people who will follow each of the various
areas and we intend to supply the Commission as quickly as we
can following these IAEA meetings, a complete report on what
happened and what the implications are to the United States.
We think this sort of approach will provide a comprehensive, systematic
assessment of the impact of the Chernobyl accident on our
regulatory policies, and provide a technical basis for what changes,
if any, need to be made.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Denton follows:]
63-756 0-86

30
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Testimony of Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
June 19, 1986
Mr. Chairman, at your request, I am appearing before the Committee
today on behalf of the NRC staff to present testimony on the
Chernobyl Reactor Accident and our plans for evaluating its
implications on regulatory practices in the United States.
At approximately 1:23 a.m. on April 26, 1986, a serious accident
occurred at Unit Number 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Station near
the city of Kiev in the U.S.S.R.
The accident involved severe damage to the reactor and the
structure that housed it. As you know, only a few details have
been forthcoming from the Soviet Union regarding the nature and
causes of the accident. However, we do know that significant
radiological releases occurred as a consequence of the accident
which were ultimately detected in a large number of countries

31
- 2 -
around the world. In the immediate aftermath of the accident, the
Government established an interagency task force to assess and
monitor the accident in order to determine its potential
environmental impact on the United States. This interagency task
force effort was completed on May 14, 1986.
To support the interagency task force, the NRC established the
Chernobyl Incident Tracking Team. This team is now winding down
its efforts and completing preparation of a draft report of its
efforts.
Based on the information available to us now, we have concluded no
immediate cha-nges in our regulatory practices and policies are
necessary. Information will be forthcoming from the Soviet Union
this summer regarding details of the Chernobyl Unit 4 design as
well as the accident scenario.
There are substantial design differences between commercial
reactors in the United States and the Chernobyl reactor. These
differences include a reactor enclosure philosophy that appears
significantly different from the containment philosophy embodied
in western-style plant designs. The reactor itself is a graphite
moderated, pressure tube, boiling water design, which is considerably
different from the design of light water reactors in use
in the U. S. The significance of these fundamental design
differences is that the nature of accident initiating events, and
the way they could evolve in a plant like Chernobyl, as well as

32
- 3 -
the likely magnitude of the consequences, are very different from
U. S. designs .
I would now like to discuss the program the NRC is currently
implementing to ensure that the full ramifications of the
Chernobyl accident are completely and thoroughly assessed.
First, let me say that the need to understand the impact of the
Chernobyl accident on regulatory policies and practices is not
unique to the United States. All 26 countries in which nuclear
power plays a role in their electrical generation are undoubtedly
faced with the same questions.
Already there is an international effort underway by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, with which the NRC's efforts
will be closely coordinated.
Specifically, NRC will participate in several upcoming IAEA
meetings over the next several months. The first will be a
meeting, expected in July, during which the Soviet Union will
report on the causes of the Chernobyl accident. There will also
be meetings in which binding international early warning and
coordination agreements will be drafted. There will be a meeting
of worldwide experts that will develop and propose ways to improve
safety. The final meeting will be a conference of governments
convened to consider the recommendations of the experts meeting.

33
4 -
In addition to these meetings, there is also underway a general
movement to strengthen the role of the IAEA n* i respondi ng to
accidents such as Chernobyl. For example, the role of the
Operational Safety Assessment Review Teams will be strengthened
through mechanisms such as increasing the inspection frequency.
The Incident Reporting System will likewise be improved.
We have been informed that the International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group, which advises the IAEA Inspector General, will
also be strengthened. Finally, other U. N. -sponsored
organizations, such as the U. N. Scientific Committee on Effects
of Atomic Radiation, and the World Health Organization will become
more actively involved in responding to nuclear accidents.
In addition, the NRC actively participates in activities of the
Committee for the Safety of Nuclear Installations, which operates
under the auspices of the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency. This
Committee is beginning to become actively involved in the
assessment of the Chernobyl accident.
Chairman Palladino has asked the NRC's Executive Director for
Operations to appoint a group of senior NRC scientists and
engineers to continue the study of the accident and recommend to
the Commission any action that might be needed for the U.S.
nuclear regulatory program.

34
Although we are still lacking information regarding the causes of
the accident, it is possible to identify issues in which increased
regulatory attention will likely be focused in the future. These
issues can, in general, be codified into three areas. The first
area deals with those issues involving accident prevention. We
will be looking to identify the initiating event, the relationship
of the Chernobyl plant design to the accidents and transients that
could occur in plants of that design, and to assess the likelihood
of such events. This relationship will be compared to U. S.
plants to systematically identify any similarities and
differences. We will also be examining the USSR approach to
safety features that can potentially reduce radiological
consequences, such as containments, and at severe accident
management and accident recovery procedures.
The second area we will investigate deals with the issues
involving emergency response planning. This includes
international cooperation and early warning programs as well as
reassessing the adequacy of current U. S. programs in light of any
lessons learned from Chernobyl. We will be involved with wide
range planning efforts regarding radiation assessment, food chain
impacts, and other environmental impacts. Close coordination with
other U. S. agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Food and Drug Administration, will be required.
The third and last major area is source term and accident
consequences. A major effort will be to examine how the

35
- 6
radiological release mechanisms that occurred at Chernobyl apply
to U. S. reactors, and whether our current models to predict
radiological source terms remain valid. The validity of current
meteorological models for transport of radionuclides in the
atmosphere will also be investigated.
This effort may take at least six months to a year, and will
involve considerable staff effort within NRC, as well as
patticipation by scientists in our national laboratories.
I believe that this plan will provide a comprehensive, systematic
assessment of the impact of the Chernobyl accident on U. S.
regulatory policies and practices, and provide a sound technical
basis for what, if any, changes need to be made. It will also be
integrated with international efforts, so that the maximum benefit
from programs can be realized.
Appended to my testimony are a description of the Chernobyl site
and plant and a summary of the accident.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before the
Committee today. At this time both I and my staff are available
to answer any questions you might have.

36
ATTACHMENT TO TESTIMONY OF HAROLD DENTON BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
JUNE 19, 1986
SITE AND PLANT DESCRIPTION
THE ACCIDENT
EVENT DESCRIPTION SUMMARY AND STATUS
RADIOLOGICAL
DATA
FUTURE PLANS

37
DESCRIPTION OF THE CHERNOBYL SITE
THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR SITE IS A 4 UNIT SITE LOCATED ON THE PRIPYAT
RIVER APPROXIMATELY 10 MILES NORTHWEST OF CHERNOBYL
CHERNOBYL IS A SMALL TOWN LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 60 MILES NORTH OF
KIEV
POPULATIONS
- KIEV - 2i MILLION
- PRIPYAT + 3 OTHER NEARBY TOWNS - 49,000
WITHIN 18 MILE RADIUS - 150,000 TO 180,000
- WITHIN A 100 MILE RADIUS - 7 MILLION
TERRAIN APPEARS TO BE ROLLING HILLS
ALL FOUR UNITS ARE RBMK-1000 CLASS PLANTS. UNIT 1 OPERATIONAL AROUND
1981, UNIT 4 OPERATIONAL IN 1983. TWO MORE RBMK-1000 CLASS UNITS
CURRENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT SITE.
APPROXIMATELY 1 DOZEN RBMK-IOOO CLASS UNITS CURRENTLY IN
OPERATION IN SOVIET UNION

39
. 3
CHERNOBYL PLANT CHARACTERISTICS^
RBMK-1000 PLANT DESIGN IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM
COMMERCIAL U.S. REACTORS
THE CHERNOBYL UNITS (RUSSIAN NAME RBMK-IOOO) ARE DIRECT
CYCLE BOILING-WATER PRESSURE-TUBE REACTORS
EACH UNIT IS RATED AT ABOUT 3200 MWT
THE REACTOR FUEL IS CONTAINED IN A LARGE NUMBER (---1660) OF
INDIVIDUAL ZIRCALOY PRESSURE TUBES IMBEDDED IN A MATRIX OF
GRAPHITE
BLOCKS.
EACH PRESSURE TUBE CONTAINS 18 ZIRCALOY CLAD UO2 FUEL PINS
ENRICHED TO ABOUT 1.8% U-235. THE PRESSURE TUBES ARE
8.8 CM (3.5 INCH) IN DIAMETER.
THE REACTOR IS ABOUT 12M (-^40 FT) IN DIAMETER AND 8M (~26FT)
HIGH INCLUDING SIDE AND TOP GRAPHITE REFLECTORS
THE GRAPHITE MATRIX IS ENCLOSED WITHIN AN INERTED ATMOSHPERE
*ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AVAILABLE LITERATURE

40
SIX OPERATING PUMPS (8 PUMPS TOTAL, TWO PUMPS ARE ON STANDBY)
CIRCULATE COOLING WATER TO THE INLET OF EACH INDIVIDUAL PRESSURE
TUBE (FUEL ASSEMBLY) THROUGH INDIVIDUAL LINES FOR EACH ASSEMBLY
STEAM IS PRODUCED WITHIN THE ASSEMBLY AND IS EXTRACTED FROM THE TOP
OF EACH PRESSURE TUBE AND COLLECTED IN A HEADER COMMON TO ONE OF
FOUR STEAM
DRUMS
CONTROL IS ACCOMPLISHED WITH 211 BORON CARBIDE CONTROL RODS
THE CONTROL ROD CHANNELS ARE COOLED SEPARATELY
ON LINE REFUELING (ESSENTIALLY CONTINUOUS)
EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEMS ARE DESIGNED FOR MAIN COOLANT PIPE
BREAK
3 DIESEL GENERATORS FOR 2 UNITS

41
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42
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46
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47
11
DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY SYSTEM ENCLOSURE
RBMK-1000
ENCLOSURE
PHILSOPHY
DEDUCED FROM LITERATURE
PRIMARY SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE HOUSING EQUIVALENT TO A WESTERN
STYLE CONTAINMENT
ENCLOSES REACTOR AND MAJOR PIPING WITHIN MULTIPLE DRY WELLS
PROVIDES A WETWELL BENEATH THE DRYWELL STRUCTURES
ENCLOSES REMAINING PRIMARY SYSTEM WITH A CONFINEMENT STRUCTURE
METAL LINED
RECTANGULAR VOLUMES
CURRENT CONCLUSIONS :
WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO DRAW ANY DEFINITE
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE PRIMARY SYSTEM
ENCLOSURE
IT APPEARS THAT THE
SOVIET PHILOSOPHY OF CONTAINMENT/
CONFINEMENT IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM U.S. /EUROPE

48
12
H

49
13
UJ
s
ec
I-
3
CM
B
a
s
o
i
1

50
14
SUPPRESSION POOL
ARRANGEMENT
REACTOR
VAULT
MAJOR PIPING
ROOM
WETWELL
AIR
SPACE
VENT PtPES
OVERROH TUBE
SPRINKLERS

51
EVENT DESCRIPTION SUMMARY AND STATUS
15
ON APRIL 26, 1986, AT APPROXIMATELY 1:23 AM, EXPLOSION(S) OCCURRED
AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN U.S.S.R.
REACTOR HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY OPERATING AT 7% POWER
PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY FAILURE PROBABLY CAUSED BY OVERPRESSURIZATION
DUE TO SUDDEN POWER INCREASE
SUBSEQUENT HYDROGEN EXPLOSION(S) AND GRAPHITE FIRE
DECAY HEAT PLUS HEAT FROM GRAPHITE FIRE PRODUCED TEMPERATURES
SUFFICIENT TO MELT FUEL
GRAPHITE FIRE HAS BURNED DOWN, SOME OR ALL OF MOLTEN CORE MATERIAL
IS PROBABLY ON REACTOR CAVITY FLOOR
CONCERN FOR MOLTEN CORE PENETRATION THRU SUPPRESSION POOL BASEMATS
SOVIETS HAVE STATED THAT REACTOR IS STABILIZED AND ARE REPORTED
FILLING SUPPRESSION POOL CAVITY WITH CONCRETE (WITH INTERNAL COOLING)
AND INJECTING NITROGEN INTO CORE REGION
THERE ARE MANY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR CHERNOBYL THAT CAN LEAD TO THE
DAMAGED CORE (BUT STILL DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF
EVENTS WAS)

52
16
SOURCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DATA
ELEVATED LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY DETECTED IN MORE THAN 10 COUNTRIES
SWEDEN AND FINLAND PROVIDED ACTIVITY MEASUREMENTS AS A
FUNCTION OF TIME BEGINNING SHORTLY AFTER THE ACCIDENT

53
17
SOURCE
TERM
SOURCE TERM ESTIMATED BY EXTRAPOLATION OF ESTIMATED DOSE FROM
CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENTS IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN BACK TO
CHERNOBYL SITE
ENERGETIC ATMOSPHERIC
RELEASE
AVAILABLE DATA INDICATE PROLONGED RELEASE

54
18
EXTRAPOLATION
FACTORS
(BACK TO CHERNOBYL SITE)
ACCOUNT FOR:
DISPERSAL IN AIR
RADIOACTIVE
DECAY
CLOUD
DEPLETION
VALUES
FOR:
EXPOSURE TO NOBLE GASES (1 E+5)
INHALATION OF IODINES (1 E+6)

NO
55
19
ESTIMATED DOSES
DOSE,*
REM
LOCATION WHOLE BODY THYROID
BASED ON MEASUREMENTS STOCKHOLM 0.002 0.01
(750 MI)
BASED ON MEASUREMENTS HELSINKI 0.005
'
(700 MI)
DATA
BASED ON MODELS CHERNOBYL y 100 4000
(1 MI)
*BASED ON 1-DAY EXPOSURE IN U.S.S.R.; 2-DAYS FOR SWEDEN AND FINLAND

56
20
FUTURE
PLANS
PREPARE
REPORT
ISSUES
NEED FOR EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (IAEA)
" NEED FOR SYSTEM FOR RAPID INTERNATIONAL DATA COLLECTION
AND EXCHANGE (IAEA)
SEVERE ACCIDENT LESSONS
ACCIDENT RELATED
ISSUES
SOURCE TERM TECHNOLOGY
NO PROGRAMMATIC CHANGES BASED ON OUR PRESENT KNOWLEDGE AND
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HAPPENED

57
The Chairman. Thank you, very much.
Ms. Mary Walker.
STATEMENT OF MARY L. WALKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EN-
VIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY DON OFTE, PRINCIPLE DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEFENSE PROGRAMS; MEL SIRES, AS-
SISTANT MANAGER, SAVANNAH RIVER OPERATIONS OFFICE;
AND JOHN HUNTER, DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND
SURPLUS FACILITY MANAGEMENT, RICHLAND OPERATIONS
OFFICE
Ms. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
I appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss the
safety program at the Department of Energy.
As already indicated, Troy Wade, the manager of the Idaho Operations
Office, and Del Bunch, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Reactor Deployment of the Office of Nuclear Energy are
also offering testimony.
Accompanying the three of us are Donald Ofte, Principle Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Defense Programs; John Hunter, director of
nuclear energy and surplus facility management at Richland; and
Mel Sires, the assistant manager of operations for Savannah River.
The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl understandably generates
questions and a comparison of U.S. reactors, including those owned
by the Department of Energy. This is particularly true since one of
our reactors, the N-reactor at Richland, WA, is a graphite moderated
system.
Before proceeding into more detailed issues, I would like to put
in perspective the issue of safety, somewhat as the chairman has
already reflected. Safety does not mean the absence of danger.
There are no absolutes in complex systems. Safety and safe operations
really mean the management of risk so that its existence is
reduced to an acceptable level.
Though I would admit that the assessment of risk is not easy,
and the comparison of risks are difficult, I would like to discuss
today how the Department manages risks that are inherent in its
operations, and in particular, its nuclear operations.
The Department is committed to operate its facilities so that the
assumed risks are small, so that members of this committee and
the public at large can have full confidence in our protection of the
safety of our workers, the public and our environment. We are convinced
that management is the fundamental aspect to ensuring the
safe operation of our facilities.
Accordingly, DOE reactors are operated under a strong and effective
safety program, which provides a multitiered approach to
safety. This means a quality product, multiple layers of safety systems,
actions to correct any anomalies that surface, continued
safety upgrades, a widespread reporting of lessons learned so that
others can profit from them, and an effective oversight in my
ofBce, and other places in the Department, to hold management accountable.

58
The Department's Nuclear Safety Program starts with the clear
assignment of responsibility for safety, to DOE and contractor line
managers, in both headquarters and in our field offices.
Independent safety oversight organizations at these levels assure
that managers and employees fully adhere to safe practices. DOE
has in effect a rapid, effective communications and emergency response
capability to respond to emergencies at all nuclear facilities,
and this clearly involves the public.
In September 1985, Secretary Herrington ordered a series of further
initiatives to strengthen both the Environment, Safety and
Health Organization within the Department, and assure an excellent
safety record will be continued at the Department. These, of
course, included a new assistant secretary, responsible solely for
environment, safety and health and reporting to the Secretary,
with no programmatic responsibility.
It also included technical safety appraisals that are in depth and
multidisciplined appraisals of all of our high and moderate hazard
nuclear facilities. These have already begun and have in fact been
conducted at several of our facilities, including the N-reactor.
The technical safety appraisals cover organization and administration,
operations, maintenance, training and certification, auxiliary
systems, emergency readiness, technical support, security and
safety interface, experimental activities, facilities safety review, nuclear
criticality safety, radiological protection, personnel protection,
and fire protection.
These actions, I might add, by Secretary Herrington, are in addition
to the existing strong safety program at the Department.
For example, my office conducts about 100 safety appraisals per
year at all levels; that is, management, contractor, and direct-facility
appraisals.
The combination of good safety practices, a sharing of experience,
effective independent review by environment, safety and
health people, provides a basis for strength and confidence in the
Department's system and the results, I believe, can be seen in our
safety record, which has been excellent.
In response to the incident in the Soviet Union at Chernobyl,
Secretary Herrington has taken additional steps. He has, in fact,
accelerated the schedule for the technical safety appraisals of our
major production reactors, including the N-reactor, and that, in
fact, has been performed, and he asked my office to conduct two
additional reviews of its reactor.
The first, a special safety review of the fire protection system
and the graphite moderator, and the safety of the reactor's confinement
system has been accomplished. The design review, which is I
think fourth or fifth in a series of design reviews of the N-reactor,
and is designed, itself, to be very comprehensive, is ongoing at this
time and is expected to be completed in early July.
In addition to the reviews of my office, Secretary Herrington has
asked certain independent experts to conduct an analysis and a
review of the issues raised by the Soviet incident, in particular,
with respect to the N-reactor and to provide him with their views.
This review has begun and is ongoing. He has also asked the National
Academy of Science and the National Academy of Engineer-

59
ing to make an independent assessment of DOE's 11 major production
and research reactors, again, including N-reactor.
We are confident that our ongoing safety program and these special
reviews, conducted in light of the Soviet accident, will provide
and do provide a strong foundation upon which we can with confidence
reduce any inherent risks to a minimum, acceptable level,
thus assuring our facilities are continued to be operated safely.
Obviously, further reviews must await more detailed information
from the Soviet Government, but as that information is available,
we will be analyzing it for lessons learned that can be applied to
our safety program.
We believe at the Department that nuclear energy is a vital contributor
to our security needs and our quality of life. It is an
energy option that the Department believes can and should be preserved.
Based upon our own safety reviews, and the program in the
Office of Environment, Safety and Health, I believe this can and is
being accomplished in a safe manner, and we look forward to working
with you in this effort.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Walker follows:]

60
STATEMENT
OF
MARY L. WALKEK
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE
THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S.
SENATE
JUNE 19. 1986

61
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this Comnittee
and the American public on the safety of the Department of Energy's research
and production reactors. Accompanylny me today are Troy Made, Hanager, Idaho
Operations Office; Donald Ofte, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
Defense Programs; Del Bunch, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reactor
Deployment, Office of Nuclear Energy; John Hunter, Director, Nuclear Energy and
Surplus Facility Management, Richland Operations Office; and Mel Sires,
Assistant Kbnager for Operations, Savannah River Operations Office.
The nuclear disaster in Chernobyl understandably generates Iceen interest,
questions, and comparisons of U.S. nuclear reactors, particularly those owned
by DOE, with those in the Soviet Union. The reactors operated by DOE are
critical to our national security and to our leadership in scientific and
technical research. Therefore, I appreciate your invitation to testify to
help in assuring you that the Department has and will continue to address
nuclear safety as a matter of the highest priority.
Emphasis on Safety
Before proceeding to more detailed issues, I would like to put the issue of
safety in perspective.
Safety does not mean the absence of danger. Scientists and engineers will
argue that there are no absolutes in dealing with complex systems. In
1903, Wilbur Wright wrote: "Carelessness and overconfidence are usually
more dangerous than deliberately accepted risks." Therefore, it's appropriate
for ne to discuss with the Committee how the Department manages the
risks that are inherent in all of its operations, and in particular, its
nuclear operations. The Department is committed to operate our facilities
63-756 0-86-3

62
to minimize and manage risks so that the public can have full confidence In
our stewardship of the responsibilities we have to protect the safety of
our workers, the public, and the environment.
The Kemeny Commission report to the President on the accident at Three Mile
Island
said:
"After many years of operation of nuclear power plants, with no evidence
that any member of the general public has been hurt, the belief
that nuclear power plants are sufficiently safe grew into a conviction.
One must recognize this to understand why many key steps
that could have prevented the accident at Three Mile Island were not
taken. The Commission is convinced that this attitude must be changed
to one that says nuclear power is by its very nature potentially
dangerous, and, therefore, one must continually question whether the
safeguards already in place are sufficient to prevent major accidents."
One of Secretary Herrington's first actions over a year ago was to review
the Department's health, safety and environmental programs and activities.
This action was not the result of a crisis or a response to any perceived
problems. The review conducted last year noted DOE's outstanding safety
record. At the same time, the review indicated that authority for health,
safety and environmental performance was dispersed. In response, the
Secretary established the position of Assistant Secretary for Environment,
Safety and Health reporting directly to him. Secretary Herrlngton recognizes
that our mission to meet national security and scientific objectives
carries with it a fundamental responsibility to assure worker and public
health and safety and he has made It clear, throughout the Department, that
discharging this responsibility Is and will remain a top priority.
We are convinced that management Is the fundamental aspect to Insuring the
safe operation of our facilities. The Department's nuclear safety program

63
Includes the clear assignment of responsibility and accountability for
safety to DOE and contractor line managers In Headquarters and the field.
In addition. Independent safety oversight organizations at these levels
assure that managers fully adhere to safety practices.
DOE reactors are operated under a multi-tiered approach to safety. This
means: a quality product, multiple layers of safety systems, actions to
correct any anomalies that do surface, and widespread reporting of lessons
learned so that others can profit from them.
First, stringent requirements for safety pervade every aspect of the
design, construction and operation of a nuclear reactor to assure quality.
Second, multiple lines of defense—defense in-depth—are provided to assure
that potential equipment malfunctions or operator errors will not progress
to an accident which endangers the public. These Include:
Redundant safety systems to prevent failures from causing harm to the
reactor
core.
Redundant safety systems to prevent the release of dangerous quantities
of radioactivity even If core damage should somehow occur.
Independent oversight to assure that good safety practices are fully
Implemented.
Effective emergency preparedness so that the public can be alerted and
protected even in the unlikely event of a large accident.

64
Third, the United States nuclear community, of which the Department Is a major
member, has an unparalleled system for reporting, analyzing, and acting on
equipment failures or operator errors. This is one reason why the Department
is conducting a careful review of Implications from the accident at the
Chernobyl
power plant.
One of the Initiatives taken by the Secretary in 198b was the establishment
of Technical Safety Appraisals of all high and moderate hazard nuclear
facilities. The Technical Safety Appraisals will review all aspects of
safety, including organization and administration, operations, maintenance,
training and certification, auxiliary systems, emergency readiness, technical
support, security/safety Interface, experimental activities, facility safety
review, nuclear criticality safety, radiological protection, personnel protection,
and fire protection. These DOE ES&H independent review teams are
made up of technical experts from the Department, the Department's national
laboratories, and private Industry. Prior to the Chernobyl incident, we had
scheduled Technical Safety Appraisals of our major production reactors
including the N Reactor in Hanford, Washington, and four reactors at the
Savannah River site in Aiken, South Carolina. In response to the Chernobyl
accident, the Secretary directed that these schedules be accelerated. In
addition, he requested that several special reviews be made of the N Reactor
because It Is the only one of the five that uses a graphite moderating
system.
The status of the reviews by my office Is as follows: A Special Safety
Team has reviewed fire protection safety of the N Reactor's graphite
moderator and the safety of the reactor's confinement system that is

65
designed to ensure against an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. The
Special Safety Team concluded that the graphite of N Reactor was unprotected
from the damaging effects of postulated fires or explosions and
that the confinement system meets federal requirements for protecting the
public. Second, the Technical Safety Appraisal, one of Secretary
Harrington's ES«H initiatives, has been completed. Their report Is now
being prepared. Third, a separate Design Review Team is now performing a
detailed review of the N Reactor. We are confident that these reviews
will fully assess the adequacy of the N Reactor design, management, and
operating procedures. It 1s this combination of good safety practices,
sharing of experience and meticulous review by independent experts that has
been in the past and continues to be the strength of the Department's
system.
At the Department's Savannah River Plant, we have recently completed a
Nuclear Safety Program Appraisal and Management Appraisal. This review
included safety management, reactor safety, radiation protection, emergency
preparedness, and quality assurance. The Savannah River Operations Office
and the operating contractor were judged to have effective safety, health,
and quality assurance programs. The Technical Safety Appraisal of the
Savannah River reactors will be started in July.
In addition to the Internal series of safety reviews noted above. Secretary
Herrington has also asked for several outside experts to review the safety
of the N Reactor, In light of the Chernobyl Incident. He has also asked
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering to
make an independent assessment DOE's 11 major production and research
reactors, including N Reactor.

66
The priority the Department places on Its safety and health program is
demonstrated by the positive results realized from that program and by the
Department's excellent safety record. Without exception, for each year
since Its creation, the Department has parried out Its operational missions
with a safety and health record that Is at least two-to-three times better
with respect to fatalities, injuries, and illnesses than that of the private
sector. DOE has safely operated its reactors for over 40 years. The
quality of U.S. nuclear technology and its record are in no way diminished
by the accident at Chernobyl. While we remain open to learning the lessons
from this unfortunate incident, we believe the system we have in place is
consistent with the Kemeny Commission's recommended attitude of "continually
questioning" the significance of the safeguards we have In place.
Conclusion
The Department of Energy research and production reactors and the civilian
U.S. nuclear power industry have an excellent history of safety. While we
clearly must learn all we can about the Chernobyl accident and apply any
appropriate lessons, this process must be deliberate and reasoned and any
appropriate actions must be taken judiciously. The quality of U.S. nuclear
technology and its safety record are in no way diminished by the accident
at Chernobyl. The Department, in Its commitment to continuously improve
the safety of its facilities, will, as information becomes available on the
Chernobyl incioenx, examine its facilities for possible improvements.
This concludes my prepared statement. We would be pleased to answer any
questions you may have.

67
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wade.
Senator Hecht. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one thing before
Mr. Wade begins?
The Chairman. Surely.
Senator Hecht. He is a Nevada man who I have known for
many, many years. We have only loaned him to you in Idaho, but
he epitomizes so much of dedicated, brilliant, hardworking Department
of Energy officials, and he has devoted his entire life to this. I
think when people have such dedication, that they should be acknowledged,
and I just want to bring that out for the record.
The Chairman. Very good. I appreciate your willingness to loan
him to us.
Senator Hecht. It is only short term; we need him back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wade, with that preamble.
STATEMENT OF TROY E. WADE II, MANAGER, IDAHO
OPERATIONS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Wade. Mr. Chairman, members, and Senator Hecht, thank
you, very much. It is my pleasure to be here today representing the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, which has long been the
location for much of this Nation's research in light water reactor
safety, and also has been the location for the development and testing
of many other reactors, some 52 reactors have been built and
tested at the Idaho Lab over the years of its existence.
I will speak very briefly about past and current safety research
and then my views on the likely influence of the Chernobyl accident
on future research and development priorities.
I would like to begin by commenting on the outstanding safety
record of the U.S. nuclear power industry, largely made possible by
research into reactor and reactor materials behavior. Much of that
research has been done at the INEL in reactors there, such as the
materials test reactor, the engineering test reactor and the advance
test reactor.
Those early experiments were followed by extensive safety research
into severe accidents in both water cooled and liquid metal
reactors. The activities at our laboratory encompass by experimental
research and the development of a wide range of safety analysis
tools and capabilities.
The three focal points for the INEL water reactor work, were reactor
called Semiscale, the loss-of-fluid test facility and the power
burst facility.
Semiscale is an electrically heated reactor in which thermal-hydraulic
phenonema is investigated. The LOFT reactor is a liquid
water reactor in which we have conducted some 40 nuclear tests to
investigate reactor system behavior and the capabilities of the
emergency core cooling system. In the power burst facility, we have
taken various kinds of fuel, taken them to meltdown, measured the
fission product release, and then measured those results against
such things as the Three Mile Island accident.
The DOE and the INEL have been involved since the first day of
the accident at the accident at TMI-2. Substantial release of fission
products occurred there. We believe that a very significant portion

68
of the reactor core melted. Unlike, however, the Chernobyl incident,
the amount of fission products released from the TMI-2 reactor
to the environment posed no significant threat to the public.
The scenario for the progression of the TMI accident would indicate
that the relocation of the core into a reactor lower plenum
that remains full of water will probably result in coolable debris
which will arrest the accident. The reactor primary vessel integrity
was maintained there. We believe it would be maintained in a similar
accident, and as I mentioned, that information from TMI correlated
very well with the experimental work done on the reactors
LOFT and PBF.
Each of the facilities and test programs have contributed to the
safety and to the information base from which the adequacy of
commercial reactor designs and their safety and regulatory criteria
are confirmed.
Many of the reactor codes that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
uses for licensing commercial power reactors are based on experimental
data and analysis done by the Department of Energy.
The eventual impact of Chernobyl on existing light water reactors
is difficult to assess. I believe that as was the case with TMI-2,
as more information is available from the Chernobyl accident, we
will begin to refocus the U.S. program. I do not see significant refocusing.
I believe that we will continue the work on the program,
such as severe accident phenomena, particularly as it might relate
to containment response; we will continue to work on the resolution
of the fission product release and source-term issue; and we
will continue to minimize the human factor in reactor operations
and control room designs.
I believe the Chernobyl accident will ultimately confirm the
quality of U.S. safety technology. I am confident that the vast experience
and expertise available at the DOE National Laboratories
will contribute to the understanding and resolution of concerns
raised by the accident at the Chernobyl plant.
We are continuing to work on advanced reactor safety at the
INEL. We recently did a test on the liquid metal reactor called
EBR-2 in which a loss of coolant, without reactor scram, provided
for the automatic shutdown of the reactor. We continue to work
with the Gas-Cool Reactor Association on their inherently safe designs.
I therefore see that many of these inherently safe reactor designs
will receive a high priority. It is imperative that the safety of these
next generation reactors be supported by tests and we have a program
to do that.
Internationally, I believe it is important that the United States
continue its
involvement in IAEA and other international efforts
so that we may fully understand the effects of the Chernobyl accident
and that can indeed be inputed into the U.S. designs and research
and development.
That concludes my summary, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wade follows:]

69
STATEMENT OF
TROY E. WADE, II
IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE MANAGER
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
JUNE 19, 1986

70
Introduction
As a member of the senior management of the Department of Energy (DOE) and
Director of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), I appreciate the
opportunity to address the Conuiittee today. As you know, the INEL has long
been preeminent in the field of Light Water Reactor (LWR) research and analysis;
in addition, INEL has been the location for the development and testing
of many other reactor types. Breeder reactor technology was pioneered at INEL
under the guidance of the Argonne National Laboratory, (ANL).
It is this extensive INEL technical background I bring to bear on today's
concern. I have been asked to present the position of the DOE regarding the
effect the Chernobyl accident may have on the research and development
activities of both light water reactors and other advanced reactor types. I
will begin by addressing the importance of past and current safety research
activities in ensuring safe designs and the safe operation of U.S. reactors.
Then I will speak to the likely influence of the Chernobyl accident on future
DOE reactor research and development priorities.
Importance of Past Safety Research
The generally smooth day-to-day operations and the outstanding safety record
of the U.S. nuclear power industry is made possible by research into reactor
and reactor materials behavior. The behavior of reactor materials and fuels
in the high radiation environment in a nuclear reactor has been wellresearched
In DOE test reactors, such as INEL's Materials Testing Reactor
(MTR), Engineering Test Reactor (ETR), and Advanced Test Reactor (ATR).
-2-

71
The transient kinetic behavior of light water reactors was studied at the
SPERT-I through -IV reactors and liquid metal cooled reactor behavior was
researched at EBR-I. At the INEL, liquid metal cooled reactor behavior and
materials research continues at the EBR-II, and TREAT facilities.
The early experiments in basic reactor behavior and materials "research were
followed by extensive safety research at the INEL for severe accident in both
water cooled liquid metal cooled reactors. INEL activities encompassed both
experimental research and the development of a wide range of safety analysis
tools and capabilities. The three focal points for INEL water reactor accident
experimental research were the Semiscale Facility, the Loss-of-Fluid Test
(LOFT) Facility and the Power Burst Facility (PBF).
Since it began operation in 1965, the Semiscale Facility has conducted
hundreds of non-nuclear experiments to investigate thermal -hydraulic phenomena
that occur in pressurized water reactors under abnormal conditions. The LOFT
reactor began operation in 1976, and has conducted 40 nuclear tests to
investigate reactor system behavior and the capabilities of emergency core
cooling systems to prevent core damage during various reactor plant accidents
including complete loss-of-coolant accidents. The LOFT test program culminated
in two experiments in which the reactor fuel was allowed to reach
temperatures sufficient to cause fuel failure and the release and transport of
fission produces in the reactor system. Finally, since its beginning in 1972,
the Power Burst Facility has provided detailed information on a variety of
fuel types to better understand the behavior of fuel and the release of
fission products during severe accident conditions. Experiments in the Sodium
Loop Safety Facility installed in the ETR, answered many of the "what-if"

72
questions concerning fuel behavior during severe accidents in a liquid metal
cooled
reactor.
The DOE and INEL are involved in the assessment of the severely damaged core
in the TMI-2 reactor. This assessment has determined that the TMI-2 accident
resulted in a significant amount of fuel melting; approximately 50 percent of
the core was molten at some time during the course of the accident. Therefore,
a substantial release of fission products occurred. But, unlike the
Chernobyl accident, the amount of fission products released from the TMI-2
reactor to the environment posed no significant threat to the public. The
scenario for the progression of the accident would indicate that the
relocation of a molten core into a reactor lower plenum that remains full of
water will probably result in coolable debris which will arrest the accident
progression. Thus, the reactor primary vessel integrity is maintained. The
understanding of severe accidents and source term phenomena from this work
correlates with the results of small-scale tests such as those conducted at
PBF.
Each of the facilities and test programs I have just described has contributed
to an information base from which the adequacy of comnercial reactor designs
and their safety and regulatory criteria are confirmed. This data base is
also instrumental in the development and verification of computer codes used
to predict reactor plant response during reactor accidents. Thus, DOE
supported reactor materials, behavior, and safety research have built and
continue to build the foundations for safe and reliable nuclear power plant
design and operation.

73
Impact on Current Reactors
Although there is little similarity between Chernobyl Unit 4 and existing U.S.
commercial reactors, and little is known about the Chernobyl accident, the
accident has understandably generated considerable interest and concern in
this
country and world-wide.
The eventual impact of Chernobyl on existing light water reactors is difficult
to assess. However, I expect that, as was the case with the TMI-2 accident,
we will begin to collect all available information on the accident and factor
the applicable lesson learned into the licensing and safety assessment of
current U.S. reactors. Because of significant differences in the design and
operation of U.S. reactors and the Chernobyl reactor, I believe that the
Chernobyl accident will not cause significant refocusing of the U.S. reactor
research programs. Research topics likely to be re-evaluated or to receive
greater emphasis are those concerning:
1. Severe accident phenomena, particularly as it might
relate to containment response.
2. Resolution of the fission product release source-term
issue,
and
3. Minimizing the human factor in reactor operations and
control room designs.

74
While each of these areas are part of the ongoing U.S. reactor research
program, lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident may lead to refocusing
certain activities to expedite resolution of key issues. For example, the
Chernobyl accident may provide insight into one of the most severe, low
probability, core melt scenarios in which molten core material breaches the
pressure vessel and contacts the concrete base in an already failed containment
building. Some U.S. researchers feel that this scenario could release
more of the low volatility rare earth, refactory, and transuranic activity
than has been considered in any of our risk assessments. Availability of data
concerning this scenario and its consequences will fill in the data set for
source term research.
I believe the Chernobyl accident will ultimately confirm the quality of U.S
nuclear safety technology. I am confident that the vast experience and
expertise available at the DOE national laboratories will contribute to the
understanding and resolution of concerns raised by the accident at the
Chernobyl
Nuclear Plant.
Impact on Future U.S. Reactor R&D
The next item I would like to discuss involves the possible impact of the
Chernobyl accident on the future direction of the DOE reactor research and
development program. I would emphasize that, since definitive technical
information regarding this accident is sparse, my opinions cannot be considered
as final and complete at this time.

75
In making the following remarks, I am starting from the unaltered position
that nuclear power will continue as an important energy source for the U.S. in
the future. It is also a basic premise that public perception regarding the
safety of nuclear reactors is an important factor in the continued and
increasing utilization of this technology. The Chernobyl accident reinforces
the need for continued priority emphasis on nuclear reactor safety in order
that nuclear power will be significant and publicly supported source of
electrical
energy generation.
The primary effect of the Chernobyl accident on future DOE nuclear power R&D
will likely be a reinforcement of the directions already being taken to
explore the feasibility of "self-protecting" or "walk-away" safe designs for
the future reactors. The operating history of current U.S. nuclear power
plants shows that these plants can and do operate reliably and safely; but
future design power plants should incorporate features to permit reduction in
the multiplicity of safety systems and operating concerns
required for such
operation can be significantly reduced. Such simplification has the potential
for further reducing accident probabilities and may tend to lower construction
and operating
costs.
A recent experiment for a loss-of-coolant flow without reactor scram or
automatic shutdown at the EBR-II at INEL demonstrated the self-protecting
nature of the pool-type of liquid metal cooled reactors, one of the reactor
types now being supported by DOE for "next generation" nuclear power plants.
The Modular High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (MHTGR) design supported by
DOE and advocated by Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates (GCRA), a utility group.

76
promises to be able to demonstrate a self-protecting nature. The Electric
Power Research Institute and the DOE, including the Advanced Reactor Severe
Accident Technology Program at the INEL, are supporting the development of
design requirements and licensing criteria for "next generation" light water
cooled reactors with an emphasis on simplified design and self-protecting
characteristics.
"Next generation" reactor conceptual design studies for liquid metal and gas
cooled reactors are including containment requirements that are less demanding
than the requirements for current water cooled power reactors because of the
self-protecting characteristics of these concepts and the significantly
reduced probabilities for fission product releases. The Chernobyl accident
should motivate a careful reexamination of containment requirements for "next
generation"
reactor designs.
I therefore foresee that these more inherently safe reactor designs will
receive a higher priority in the future. It will be imperative that the
safety of these next generation reactors be supported by tests. Therefore, a
program will evolve to select a preferred reactor concept based on the
criteria of economics, safety, reliability, and licensability.
International
Safety Research
Increased international coordination of nuclear reactor safety issues should
be an important effect of the Chernobyl accident. This unfortunate accident
could provide a wealth of real data relative to worst-case accident radiological
release, transport, environmental contamination and decontamination.

77
accident recovery, emergency actions, and health effects that will never be
available form our safety research programs. Therefore, it is important that
the U.S. be involved in IAEA and other international efforts to fully understand
and evaluate the Chernobyl accident.
Thank you for this opportunity to address this Committee.

78
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Bunch.
STATEMENT OF DR. DELBERT F. BUNCH, ACTING DEPUTY AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY, REACTOR DEPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY
Dr. Bunch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three points I
would hke to make and I will briefly describe each of them.
First, the reactor at Chernobyl had what I consider to be inherently
undesirable safety characteristics. We are now 2 months into
that accident; as Mr. Denton has described we have gone to a great
deal of trouble to understand what the Soviets have said about that
plant, and what the technical literature says. We continue to work
with the international community to obtain a better understanding
of that plant, but it is important to recognize at this point what we
believe to be the situation about that plant.
Second, a point I will also discuss in a little more detail, I think
there has been a situation in which too many people are rushing to
judgment about the implications of Chernobyl on the safety of the
U.S. plants.
The third point is not one of safety, but, as you have discussed
this morning in the colloquy, one of restoring or achieving public
confidence in the safety that we do have. I think your committee's
efforts to secure legislative reform of a new licensing process would
be a great step toward that direction.
Back to the first point. I think the reactor at Chernobyl has undesirable
safety characteristics. First, the nuclear properties of the
plant, as were alluded to by Mr. Denton, were what I would call
unstable. Disturbances in the plant would cause unwanted changes
in power which placed stress both on the operators and on the
safety system.
The engineering details of the plant, how the plant was actually
put together, have little of what we have come to expect in the
U.S. approach toward defense indepth.
I think it is fair to say that the Soviets in the last decade or so
have put a great deal of attention on instituting a new safety
regime in their practices for the engineering of nuclear power
plants in the Soviet Union. In my own view, it seems to be, at least
with respect to Chernobyl, too little, too late.
What has been done was simply not enough to overcome those
intrinsic safety features in the plant.
Second, it is my view that too many have rushed to judgment
about the implications of Chernobyl.
I think my own view, as a member of the task force, was that we
saw a certain measure of instinctive reaction on the part of the
technical community immediately following the accident. There
were those who are strong opponents of nuclear power who seem to
say—see, I told you so. Those who were strongly in support of nuclear
power very quickly moved to say Chernobyl would never
happen here.
I think the arguments that Mr. Denton has just given about the
steps that we are taking to try to understand, apply, and learn

79
whatever we can and do so in a disciplined way, is the proper
course of action.
I think that probably we could have done better if we had informed
the public about the strengths and the weaknesses of the
Chernobyl reactor so that they could make their own informed
judgment on that.
Having said that, I think it is still necessary to say after a couple
of months of reviewing that plant, that what we see in terms of the
inherent characteristics of the plant are not the kind of characteristics
that we expect to see and that we in fact see, in the U.S.
plaints.
In part, I believe, this is due to the fact that in the 1960's, when
the introduction of nuclear power in this country was just getting
underway, what is now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, spent
a great deal of effort trying to develop general design criteria that
would assure that the basic configuration of powerplants in this
country was fundamentally sound and not fundamentally flawed.
I think that the measures that have been alluded to by Mr.
Denton show in good measure the efforts subsequent to developing
general design criteria, to augment the inherent safety characteristics
and overcome any weaknesses have been massive and I believe
a successful ones.
Finally, on that same point, I think that the severity of the accident
at Chernobyl, seems to have been caused by the way that the
Chernobyl plant was neutronicaily created, that is, its inherent and
engineered safety features, and not really due to any physical phenomenon
that you would expect to find in each and every powerplant
that uses nuclear technology.
That leaves me again to reiterate the third point: namely, I
think the issue is, one, primarily of restoring confidence and finding
ways to restore confidence, and finding yet more ways to show
that we have a program that emphasizes safety. I think we are all
concerned about finding ways to improve safety in a disciplined
way, where it makes sense to do so.
But I think none of these programs, to improve protection
against core meltdown accidents in this country, should be taken as
an indictment against safety. Our plants are simply not like Chernobyl.
I would put in a point of concern, raised by Senator Metzenbaum,
I think a legitimate concern. I think in order for us to
rightfully claim that the licensing process puts safety first. Federal
regulators must act, and more importantly they must be seen as
acting by the public as requiring that the industry get on with the
job of resolving safety issues. There simply, in my view, is no
excuse for tolerating delays in obtaining industry proposals on how
they would respond to safety issues and, then moving ahead, quickly,
with action and rulings on those proposals.
A comment on what we seem to be learning about Chernobyl at
this point: I think as probably was evident by my first two points,
that the answer does not lie in placing yet more emphasis on emergency
planning or on the source term. I think emergency planning
is not an answer for safety. At best, it is a coherent system for responding
to a situation where attempts to prevent accidents have
simply failed.

80
The most important actions we can take are the ones that were
highlighted by Harold Denton, to protect the public by preventing
accidents, and do so by looking at all aspects of design, construction,
operation, and management.
As Mr. Wade was pointing out, I think that the call for increased
simplicity, improved reliability, and enhanced safety in advance reactors
is timely. I think it is a goal of national importance.
These goals, however, for product improvement are no different
than the design goals considered when the U.S. civilian reactor industry
was getting underway.
What has changed, I think, is we have a clearer idea on how to
accomplish these goals in economically attractive ways.
The last point is that we do need a regulatory process that will
pave the way for the introduction of better reactors for the future.
That process should give first priority to the proper functioning of
the powerplant. It should be a process that is structured to assure
safety issues are promptly and effectively resolved.
A modernized licensing process will provide the framework for
maintaining the strong focus on safety that is needed to protect the
interests of the investors, the ratepayers and the public at large.
Finally, a full and open process for ensuring that safety issues
are resolved before construction is allowed to proceed awaits only
legislative mandate. We urge your committee to take action on
Senate bill 2073.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Bunch follows:]

81
STATEMENT OF
DELBERT F. BUNCH
ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR REACTOR DEPLOYMENT
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. SENATE
JUNE 19, 1986
.
Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to appear before you today to discuss the
accident at Chernobyl and its implications for the civilian nuclear power
industry.
Chernobyl is a global issue. U.S. scientists and engineers are working
with many groups and international agencies to better understand what
happened, how it happened, and how we all can learn from the consequences
of that accident. Soviet officials have stated that they will provide
an analysis of the causes and consequences of the accident to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Soviet officials are
scheduled to provide their analysis to the IAEA in late August and U.S.
representatives will attend that presentation.
It has been nearly 2 months since the accident at the Chernobyl powerplant.
In that time, we have all sought to find the implications of this accident
and the impact it may have on the safe use of nuclear power here and
abroad. The absence of detailed analytical data has not helped our
judgments.

82
Nonetheless, I will try to recount some basic facts and provide preliminary
observations. This is based on a review of Soviet literature and the
statements made to date by Soviet scientists and government officials.
We know that the Soviet engineers and scientists have nearly two dozen of
the large RBMK reactors like Chernobyl in operation or under construction.
These machines are light water cooled, graphite moderated, pressure tube,
boiling water reactors. They utilize on-line refueling while the reactor
is
operating.
We know that the RBMK design has inherently undesirable operating
characteristics. Special computer control of the reactor is required to
maintain safe
operation.
We know that most of the new construction in the Soviet Union Is what are
called VVER-lOOOs—pressurized water reactors with containments, and
not
the RBMK reactors like Chernobyl.
We know that the Canadians built and dismantled a pressure tube
reactor—Gentilly-1— that had design and safety features that were similar
to Chernobyl, but used heavy water as a moderator. Problems were
encountered in safely controlling the Gentilly reactor and it was taken out
of service.
We know that the United Kingdom considered use of the Soviet reactor
concept, but abandoned that notion, largely because of safety concerns.

83
What we know about the Chernobyl accident
We know that the accident that caused damage to the reactor also breached
whatever pressure suppression or "containment" might have been present.
We know that an initial non-nuclear explosion knocked down the walls and
opened the industrial -style building over the reactor cover. This
explosion and the subsequent fire in the graphite caused a massive release
of radioactive gases and particles into the environment. We suspect that
the severity of the accident is directly attributable to the truly unique
features of the Soviet design.
It should be recognized that the Soviet Union has made efforts to upgrade
the safety of their new reactors. The Soviet Union has actively
participated in the IAEA nuclear safety standards program and now maintains
that these safety standards are the basis of its nuclear regulation. In
1983, a new State Committee for supervision of the operation of the Soviet
nuclear power industry—effectively an independent regulatory body—was
established. This has come too late to have influenced the basic design
and safety philosophy of the Chernobyl reactors.
The Soviet claims about the safety of their products, before the accident
at Chernobyl, are bound to have an impact on the credibility of claims
about the safety of U.S. plants. Some will argue that nuclear power is not
being safely controlled and perhaps can never be made safe enough.
The lack of full public confidence in our claims of safety is the most
serious problem facing the nuclear industry today.

84
I doubt If I can today convert everyone to my views on this subject.
Rather, I Intend to retrace the path from past to present and, in so doing.
Identify some guidelines for reestablishing confidence in the nuclear
option for the United States.
The 1954 licensing legislation Included a mandate to assure safety
The American Government showed great vision in 1954 when it enacted the
"Atoms for Peace" legislation, the Atomic Energy Act. The landmark
legislation of 1954 allowed and encouraged the use of nuclear technology
here and abroad. It had two main goals— to help strengthen America's
energy security and to help maintain U.S. technical leadership. A
legislative framework was established that allowed these goals to be
achieved.
The protection of public health and safety was an integral part of the
Atomic Energy Act. Whatever was done in the name of securing economic and
strategic values for the public was not to be at the cost of new perils and
was not to create a great risk to life.
Under that legislation, the Industry is responsible for assuring that their
use of nuclear power is safe. Federal regulators are responsible for
setting basic safety standards used by the industry. Having set the rules
of the road, the role of regulation is to make sure that no segment of the
Industry cuts corners on safety in order to save money.

85
Basic structure of the licensing process determines how the Act Is implemented
The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act have been carried oat through a
"deslgn-as-you-go", "regulate-as-you-go" licensing process. The real test
of whether a plant Is "safe" Is faced after the plant is constructed.
Moreover, with the regulator's willingness to put off Issues for another
day by naming things "unresolved" safety Issues, operating licenses have
been granted with many loose ends. This process was probably essential
during the Infancy of the nuclear era when the technology was imnature, yet
rapidly developing. It did facilitate the comnercial introduction of an
important new technology consistent with the primary goals of the Act to
help strengthen America's energy security and to help maintain
U.S. technical leadership.
However, one of the issues of the last decade has been whether the
licensing process which allowed the public to secure the benefits of
nuclear power did so in ways that adequately assured the public's
confidence in nuclear powerplant safety. It is that issue which deserves
thoughtful reassessment as your Conmittee considers the Administration's
legislative framework for licensing new reactors.
Two problems must be kept in mind: first, a continued dissatisfaction with
the regulator's ability to adequately deal with severe accident issues; the
second, a seeming Inability to resolve any safety issue quickly.

86
All of our eggs are In the basket of core-melt prevention
The legislation granted broad safety powers to the Federal regulators.
Very fundamental policy decisions had to be and were made.
The safety approach of Federal regulators has Its origins In a policy
adopted In the early 1960's. The policy allowing civilian reactors to be
located relatively close to cities was called "engineering out the distance
factor." The key to this safety approach was increased emphasis on
assuring that equipment failures and operator errors would not turn into
core meltdown accidents.
Plants did not have to show that systems were able to prevent a major
release to the public even if a core meltdown were to occur. The pressures
and temperatures associated with water escaping from a large pipe break set
the basis for containment design. A core meltdown was called "incredible"
and neither the regulators nor the industry was required to answer the
question of "what happens if ? core meltdown occurs."
General design criteria were subsequently Issued that encouraged use of
inherent characteristics in the reactor that would tend to maximize the
ability of the powerplant to be self-correcting and minimize the
consequences of equipment malfunction. The regulators also called for
diversity and redundancy in the engineering of the plant to promote safety.
These criteria have helped to assure that the inherent nuclear
characteristics and the engineering of U.S. powerplants are fundamentally
sound from a safety standpoint.

87
The core meltdown prevention policy adopted In the 1960's began to unravel
at the edges In the 1970's. The 1975 Reactor Safety Study by the NRC
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (WASH-1400/NUREG-75/014) and
subsequent analyses Included estimates of probabilities of core meltdown
accidents far higher than the rules of thumb of one In a million or one In
a hundred thousand used by the regulatory staff. On the other hand,
technical analyses Indicated that a core meltdown did not In^ltably lead
to Imnedlate failure of containment and disastrous off-site consequences.
The March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) showed, among
other things, that the containment systems did provide an important measure
of protection to the public, even with a core-melt accident. It also
showed that some of the basic design features—such as small pressurizers—
greatly complicated efforts to assure that core meltdown accidents would
not
happen again.
After TMI-2, actions were taken on a broad front to ensure that the
probability of another TMI-2 was very, very small. This has been a costly
but necessary outgrowth of our determination to correct weaknesses In
design and
operation.
Looking back with the hindsight of 20 years' experience, it is easy to see
that the research and development community, designers, utilities, and
regulators could have given greater emphasis to optimizing the inherent
safety characteristics of proposed reactor design. Passing through the
hurdles of a very burdensome regulatory process and dealing with repeated
backfits would probably have been easier with a plant that had bigger

88
8
safety margins and more fall -safe features. However, this Is a lesson
learned for new plants. The early application of general criteria helped
to assure that the characteristics of today's reactors are fundamentally
sound and not fundamentally flawed. The actions taken since TMI-2 should
be viewed as an expression of the continuing commitment of the U.S. nuclear
Industry to prevent core-melt accidents through Inherently safe nuclear
characteristics and through the defense-In-depth engineering of the plant.
The record of the civilian nuclear power Industry amply demonstrates that
positive steps have been taken to ensure that nuclear power remains a safe
and reliable energy supply option for the United States.
Vhy does It take so long to get anything done ?
Unfortunately, It is difficult to convince the public that measures to
assure safety have been totally effective. In part, this difficulty Is due
to the snail's pace with which technical issues are finally resolved. The
credibility of events Involving transients and failure of shutdown systems
was debated some 20 years; plant changes are still not fully Implemented.
When compliance is delayed, there Is concern that some accidents In some
plants could turn out just like Chernobyl. In a licensing regime dependent
on showing that accidents will not result in core meltdown, delays In
resolving safety issues are intolerable—they allow design or operational
weaknesses to continue and erode public confidence.
In order for us to rightfully claim that the licensing process puts safety
first. Federal regulators must act and be perceived by the public as acting

89
to require that the Industry get on with the Job of resolving outstanding
safety issues. There is no excuse for tolerating delays in obtaining
industry proposals for resolving generic issues and then ruling on those
proposals. Anything less will further erode public trust and weaken the
foundation for continued improvements in safety.
If regulators cannot assure the public that their strategy of core meltdown
prevention works and is being effectively implemented, then it is time to
revisit the licensing process and the regulatory management structure. We
need a regulatory process that will assure that safety issues are promptly
resolved.
Emergency planning can be
improved
Those who look to Chernobyl to find insights about emergency planning or
source term issues are missing the point. It should be apparent to all
that an accident that results in major core damage and early failure of
containment will have disastrous off-site consequences. Chernobyl will
teach us nothing new regarding that basic conclusion.
Emergency planning is not an answer for safety. It is at best a coherent
system for responding to a situation where attempts to prevent accidents
have failed. The most important actions we can take to protect the public
are those calculated to assure the
proper functioning of the powerplant,
determined by design, construction, operation, and management.

90
10
The existing emergency planning requirements were developed as another
add-on safety requirement that had little to do with the underlying safety
of the technology. Evacuations are a response to a disastrous release of
radioactivity. The public need not fear a disastrous release of
radioactivity if the Industry builds reactors whose inherent features
assure a low probability of a core meltdown accident and there is a
guarantee that unsafe levels of radioactivity will not be released into the
environment even in the remote event where such quantities of radioactivity
were to be released from the reactor itself.
Current requirements for emergency planning are detailed, prescriptive, and
comprehensive. They require an unprecedented degree of coordination among
diverse groups. We do not set priorities for assuring public safety nor do
we clearly distinguish actions according to their ability to resolve
important issues or to definitively assign responsibilities.
It is no wonder that we have nuclear powerplants hostage to situations and
organizations outside their control—everyone's authority seems tied to
someone else's action. We should not argue about who does what, but simply
evaluate if what we are requiring adds significantly to the safety of the
people we are all committed to protect.
The nature of radiological releases, not unreasonably, is that those nearer
to the release are at the most risk. Priority should be placed on
protecting the public most at risk. It would be most reasonable then to
focus immediate decision-making, warning, and protective actions at the
site and its immediate environs. This is what the NRC should concentrate

91
11
on for licensing purposes and this Is what the utility should focus on for
crisis management purposes. State and local governments then would focus
on sound strategies to minimize the threat to the public beyond the site
area. A two-pronged crisis management strategy should emphasize
(1) thoughtful decision-making on accident recovery measures within the
plant and (2) focused or graded action to protect those most at risk. This
two-pronged strategy would be far superior to the present system.
The case for licensing reform
The pressing need to assure the public of the safety of our current plants
fits squarely with reform proposals to resolve safety and design Issues in
advance of design and site approval for future plants. These key concepts
now become more urgent after Chernobyl.
Further, with adequate
information, the public would have a full opportunity to be heard on any
questions about a decision on approving a design for use In building a
nuclear plant. Why should the public continue to feel safety issues are
not being resolved when a process for doing so in advance and in a
systematic way needs only legislative mandate?
We agree with Ellyn Weiss' statement last July before a House subcoimittee
on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists that:
"...(E)llminatlon of the current 'design as you go' system
would do more to enhance safety and predictability than all the
provisions combined which regularly come to Congress each year
(on nuclear licensing reform;."

92
12
Further, If we want to ensure technical Integrity and public confidence In
our nuclear Industry, we must have a well -defined management system to
Inspect and verify the quality and validity of plant construction. If the
major safety Issues are completely resolved In the design and siting, then
the construction/operation license public hearing should focus on the
specific application of the design to the site and the construction
approval to the utility. At this point, the participants should have a
clear Idea of what benefits and risks that powerplant poses to society and
what benefits and risks It doesn't. On that basis, a decision to buHd and
operate a plant can be made conscientiously and responsibly. If an
"approve-before-you-bulld" system Is put Into effect, we should have the
confidence to allow operation without further litigation.
Finally, as new Information leads to the need for modification(s), the
Administration's licensing reform proposal reemphasizes that the point of
regulation Is Increased plant safety. That is the standard against which
we should measure our actions. It Is the rationale for regulation in the
first place. Anything less than achieving assured plant safety should be
discarded.
As we look to the future, one key action is to show continued success In
the operation of existing powerplants. In part, this will require that we
confirm that the fission product control systems in our operating reactors
are adequate for the task of protecting the health and safety of the
public. If containment systems have to be upgraded to deal with core

93
13
meltdown accidents, then let's get on with It. It Is essential that we
take those steps necessary to restore public confidence In plant safety.
As for new plants, our engineers and scientists are well on the way toward
developing advanced power reactors—using water, helium, and sodium as
coolants. We know how to build simpler, safer reactors, and the concepts
on the drawing boards will provide the American public with reliable,
economic, and safe power to meet our future needs. This hope for the
future requires two actions. If the promise of enhanced safety in future
reactors Is to be realized, we must have a licensing process which will
bring advanced reactors
into use.
Senator McClure has introduced the Administration's legislative proposal
that would modify the licensing process. We urge the Committee to take
action on S. 2073. This legislation would require that the success of the
core meltdown prevention strategy be fully considered and decided (with
respect to a standardized design at a preapproved site) before construction
is allowed to begin. We ought to be able to understand the safety
strengths and eliminate the weakness of any future design before it is
approved for widespread use as a standardized design.
A licensing process which puts a premium on resolving safety questions
before construction begins should have a valuable side benefit. Concepts
which have relatively greater Inherent or passive safety should fare well
under a restructured licensing process. All concepts would have to show
that any major safety concern were resolved before construction of a
powerplant based on that concept could begin. A plant like Chernobyl would
63-756 0-86

94
14
never survive the kind of process contemplated In our proposed leolslatlon;
a reactor that exploits the best that the technology had to offer In
preventing core melt accidents might well prove to be the only easily
llcensable concept.
There Is no reason why safety and economics have to be sworn enemies.
Chernobyl shows the danger of focusing on safety after the Inherent
features of the plant are already fixed. General design criteria, such as
those Issued In the 1960's, did much to assure that U.S. reactors were
fundamentally sound--not fundamentally flawed. We can do better still.
Work now underway on Improved design criteria and advanced reactors holds
great promise for the nuclear option. A modernized licensing process will
provide the framework for maintaining the strong focus on safety that 1s
needed to protect the Interests of Investors, the ratepayers, and the
public at
large.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions you or members of the Committee may have at this time.

95
The Chairman. Thank you. We will proceed on the first round of
questions among the Senators. My first question is to Mr. Meyers.
Are there any Federal plans in place that would activate an interagency
task force, similar to the one that was convened after the
Chernobyl incident, responding to any future nuclear plant accidents
that might have national or transboundary consequences to
the public?
Mr. Meyers. Do you mean a domestic accident, Senator?
The Chairman. Domestic or international.
Mr. Meyers. There is FEMA, that would take care of any accident
that would happen domestically. We are trying to reconstruct—you
may recall that the initial impetus for this task force
being put together was a group that was to respond to an international
nuclear detonation, and the people in the Executive Office of
the President felt that the same kinds of services would be required
to respond to the accident at Chernobyl.
it
We are looking at that memorandum of understanding to see if
can be broadened to accomplish the purposes that you are suggesting.
The Chairman. You are looking at it, but it is not yet in place?
Mr. Meyers. That is right.
The Chairman. Mr. Denton, could you explain to laymen, what
is the difference between containment and confinement, in nuclear
terms.
Mr. Denton. All U.S. plants have had since day 1 what we call a
containment building. That goes all the way back to plants like
Yankee and Dresden. Yankee was put in operation some 25 years
ago. What they were intended to be was a strong enclosure which
would contain the radioactive fission products that might be released
in the event of reactor accident, with very minimsd leak^e.
A confinement building, in my use of the term, has been a building
which didn't have these pressure retaining features, but would
slow down the release and would perhaps result in a controlled release.
The confinement building would permit the release of perhaps
the noble gasses, but filters would be in place to filter iodides
and particulate matter. In plants which might be so large that containments
would be impractical, confinement buildings have been
occasionally proposed.
But for the commercial plants—all plants, I would say, except for
Fort St. Vrain in Colorado, have what I call a containment building.
Fort St. Vrain is a gas-cooled graphite moderated plant. After
Chernobyl, I did ask staff for a special study of the safety of that
plant. We did look at it and concluded that it could continue operating.
It has a number of different features. It has inert coolants,
so it does not have water in it. It doesn't have zirconium because
the fuel is interspersed in the graphite. There is £in 8-foot thick reactor
pressure vessel, prestressed, and it is surrounded by a confinement
building. That is the only plant that does not have a containment
building in commercial use.
The Chairman. If I recall, one of the problems that surfaced, one
of the concerns that surfaced at TMI, there was a problem to the
people who were trying to understand and manage that accident
was the build-up of hydrogen. And if I recall reading the news reports
with respect to Chernobyl, it is suspected, at least, if not con-

96
firmed, but at least suspected that the thing that breached the confinement,
the suprastructure of the industrial building in which it
was located was a hydrogen explosion. Is that correct?
Mr. Denton. Let me answer the first question first. There was a
hydrogen explosion in the TMI containment. Those containments
were so big and so strong it did not threaten the integrity of the
building.
Our present view on the Chernobyl accident is that probably the
power surge which occurred ruptured some of those 1,700 pressure
tubes—one or more of those tubes—and exposed a very thin wall
enclosure of the core to direct reactor system pressure— 1,000
pounds per square inside pressure. It was probably the steam pressure
that caused the initial physical disruption of the core.
After that occurred, we think that the fuel overheated, the metal
water reaction produced hydrogen and hydrogen probably did seep
into several areas of the plant. It is thought that there was one or
more explosions of hydrogen. Then, that caused further core disruption
and that led to the graphite fire, and in effect, disrupted
the industrial type enclosure that was around this reactor.
I don't consider that plant as having the type of containment
building that we have in licensed plants in the United States.
The Chairman. Have we taken corrective action since TMI, dealing
with the potential for a hydrogen build-up?
Mr. Denton. Yes, sir. We have a rule that we adopted since TMI
requiring that plants be able to cope with the generation of hydrogen.
A great deal of research has been done at Idaho and other
places in that area, and some of it is still going on. But we have
provided all our plants a capability to withstand hydrogen, depending
on the circumstances.
We think our plants can all stand accidents beyond the design
basis, and some have the capability to withstand accidents that
would be greater, beyond the design.
The Chairman. When TMI occurred, we immediately turned to
research facilities in the United States to try to understand what
was happening, to interpret data that we were getting at TMI. We
turned to things like LOFT and PBF. Is that not correct?
Mr. Denton. Yes, sir; that is correct. We also, you recall, took
action to shut down similar, or plants of identical design following
TMI. I suspended the operation of the other B&W plants for some
time. I understand that in the Soviet Union, the other 15 or so
plants that are identical to this design are continuing to operate.
The Chairman. How were LOFT and PBF used at the time of
the TMI accident?
Mr. Denton. They were used two ways. We attempted to have
some conditions simulated right during the event. While I was at
TMI, we were in communication with the reactor laboratory, attempting
to use them to calculate what might happen next in the
TMI core. So there was some immediate use made of their capabilities.
Then after that, we had a large program to be sure we understood
the core, and Mr. Wade has mentioned a number of the tests
that were done.
I was at TMI just yesterday observing the preparations for loading
the first canister out of the core into the cast to be shipped to

97
Idaho, and that will give us further information on what actually
happened during the accident and what isotopes do come out in the
event of a severe accident.
Maybe Mr. Wade would like to elaborate on the types of tests
that were done. But we have made substantial use of the Laboratory's
capabilities since TMI.
I think our understanding now of what happens in a water reactor
is much increased as a result of those efforts.
The Chairman. Mr. Wade, in terms of safety research facilities
at DOE labs, do we have the same capability today that we had at
the time of TMI in 1979?
Mr. Wade. No, we do not, Mr. Chairman. Some of the facilities
that were available in 1979 have been shut down or put on standby.
They reached the end of what had been their projected experimental
programs. So, in fact, the LOFT reactor to which Mr.
Denton referred, and the PBF reactor are at the present time not
operating. They were at the time of the TMI accident.
The Chairman. Are those the only safety research facilities that
have been put on standby or deactivated since 1979?
Mr. Wade. No, sir. There have been others. There are thermal
hydraulic safety facilities that are jointly operated by the NRC and
industry which are still operating. There is a facility that I referred
to in my statement in Idaho called Semiscale, which is currently
planned to shut down at the end of this fiscal year. There is
a research reactor at Sandia in Albuquerque which continues to operate.
The Chairman. Of these that have been shut down, how many
could be reactivated, if they were necessary in the future?
I assume that the ones that are on standby could be started up,
again. If I am in error in that assumption, I wish you would state
that, too.
Mr. Wade. Well, in Idaho, Mr. Chairman, of the three major test
facilities, the PBF reactor could be restarted. The Semiscale facility
could be continued. The LOFT reactor has been dismantled. It
could not be restarted, but I believe that the data we got from the
LOFT tests correlates very well with our understanding of what
happened at TMI and we would not need to repeat those kind of
tests, again, anyway.
Mr. Denton. Mr. Chairman, I might like to add one further amplification.
I realize this is not a budget meeting, but it bears on
the topic. I think our expenditures on safety research have dropped
dramatically over the past decade. In real dollars, we are probably
spending one-fourth or one-fifth as much as we were spending at
the time of TMI.
I do observe, worldwide, much of the leadership in safety research
and development is moving outside the United States now
because those countries seem to be developing new programs and
building more plants. But, for whatever reason, we are increasingly
have to go to other sources for our data. We do work through agencies
like the Nuclear Energy Agency and the IAEA to try to determine
what is being done worldwide so we can maximize the dollars
that we do spend to be sure that we are not duplicating anything
spent anjrwhere else in the world.

The Chairman. If we were to
98
have another accident Uke TMI,
would we go offshore for some of the research capabiUty that we
use to have inside this country?
Mr. Denton. The way the NRC works since we don't have any
national laboratories, is that we develop a need for the information
and we go to to the Department of Energy and say—can you provide
this? If they don't have it, we would hope they would look offshore.
But we tend to identify what our needs are and depend upon
them to provide it.
The Chairman. Troy?
Mr. Wade. I think the fact is, Mr. Chairman, that we would have
to go offshore. If we had a TMI kind of accident in the next week
or so and had resources enough to restart some of our domestic test
reactors, we could not do it in time to be of any help.
The Chairman. My time has expired.
Senator Wallop.
STATEMENT OF HON. MALCOLM WALLOP, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF WYOMING
Senator Wallop. Thank you. I have an opening statement for
the record which I would ask unanimous consent that it be inserted
in its entirety.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Wallop follows:]

99
STATEMENT BY SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP FOR THE HEARING RECORD FOR
THE HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES ON THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT, JUNE 19, 1986, 9:30 A-M-
MR. CHAIRMAN, THERE IS A MYTH CIRCULATING IN OUR COUNTRY AND
ABROAD THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO WRITTEN OBLIGATION TO INFORM
THE WORLD IMMEDIATELY OF THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT.
THIS COMMITTEE HAS HEARD THAT MYTH REPEATED BY A STATE DEPARTMENT
WITNESS WHO APPEARED BEFORE US IN A BRIEFING FOLLOWING THE
ACCIDENT, BY FOREIGN EXPERTS AND BY THE NEWS MEDIA. WE HAVE
HEARD THIS FACTOID REPEATED BY MANY RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN THE COURSE OF THEIR
INTERVIEWS AND BRIEFINGS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC AND THE WORLD
COMMUNITY ON THE DETAILS OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER.

100
2
THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT THE SOVIET UNION
DID HAVE A WRITTEN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION TO INFORM THE WESTERN
WORLD IMMEDIATELY OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT! THAT OBLIGATION IS
ENSHRINED IN THE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI OF THE CONFERENCE ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, SIGNED BY 35 NATIONS AT
HELSINKI, FINLAND IN 1975-

101
IN THAT AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO A SERIES OF
MEASURES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS- THERE
ARE NO LESS THAN THREE ENTIRE PAGES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
SETTING FORTH WHAT THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DO ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS SUCH AS THIS NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT- I WILL ASK, MR.
CHAIRMAN, THAT THE TEXTS OF THOSE PAGES BE INSERTED IN THE RECORD
AS PART OF MY STATEMENT BUT I WANT TO HIGHLIGHT FOR YOU THE MOST
IMPORTANT POINTS. THE SOVIET UNION AGREED, INTER ALIA , THAT IT
WOULD
"CONSULT ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
ESPECIALLY IN CONNECTION WITH PROBLEMS WHICH COULD HAVE
INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES-"

102
THE SOVIET UNION ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD DEVELOP FURTHER SUCH
COOPERATION
BY
"PROMOTING THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT, CODIFICATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS ONE MEANS OF PRESERVING
AND ENHANCING THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES RELATING TO POLLUTION AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
CAUSED BY ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OR CONTROL OF THEIR
STATE AFFECTING OTHER COUNTRIES AND REGIONS."

103
I THINK THE ENGLISH HERE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND COMMON SENSE TELLS
ME THAT I DO NOT NEED A BEVY OF FANCY INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS TO
INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT THE
SOVIET UNION AGREED, WITH 35 OTHER NATIONS WAY BACK IN 1975, TO
PROVIDE TIMELY INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION OF AN EVENT SUCH AS THE
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT- THE FACT THAT THEY DIDN'T DO IT IS ONE MORE
EXAMPLE, MR. CHAIRMAN, OF THE CYNICAL AND IMMORAL WAY THE SOVIET
EMPIRE HANDLES ITS WRITTEN AGREEMENTS WITH THE WEST, FROM HUMAN
RIGHTS TO ARMS CONTROL TO THE ENVIRONMENT-

104
6
MR. CHAIRMAN, IT WILL DO US LITTLE GOOD TO PURSUE MORE WRITTEN
AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS AFTER CHERNOBYL UNLESS WE THINK THEY
INTEND TO FULFILL THEM- THEIR RECORD THUS FAR IS ABYSMAL AND I
FOR ONE AM SCEPTICAL THAT EVEN THE BEST, MOST TECHNICAL AND MOST
PERFECT NUCLEAR SAFETY AGREEMENT THE WEST MIGHT EXTRACT FROM
GORBACHEV NOW WOULD BE WORTH MUCH, GIVEN THE SOVIET DISREGARD FOR
AND DISTAIN FOR THE PROMISES IT MADE ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
HELSINKI
ACCORDS.
I ASK UNANIMOUS CONSENT THAT THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE HELSINKI
ACCORDS BE INSERTED IN THE HEARING RECORD AS PART OF MY
STATEMENT.

105
The Department
ofState
Bulletin Reprint
Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN EUROPE: HNAL ACT, HELSINKI, 1975
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, which opened at Helsinki on 3 July 1973
and continued at Geneva from 18 September 1973
to 21 July 1975, was concluded at Helsinki on 1
August 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,
the United States of America and Yugoslavia.
During the opening and closing stages of the Conference
the participants were addressed by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations as their
guest of honour. The Director-General of UNESCO
and the Executive Secretary of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe addressed the Conference
during its second stage.
During the meetings of the second stage of the
Conference, contributions were received, and statements
heard, from the following non-participating
Mediterranean States on various agenda items: the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the
Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of
Morocco, the Syiian Arab Republic, Tunisia.
Motivated by the political will, in the interest of
peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and
to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice
and co-operation as well as to rapprochement among
themselves and with the other States of the world.
Determined, in consequence, to give full effect to
the results of the Conference and to assure, among
their States and throughout Europe, the benefits
deriving from those results and thus to broaden,
deepen and make continuing and lasting the process
of detent*.
The High Representatives of the participating
States have solemnly adopted the following:
QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE
The States participating in the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe,
Reaffirming their objective of promoting better
relations among themselves and ensuring conditions
in which their people can live in true and lasting
peace free from any threat to or attempt against
their security;
Convinced of the need to exert efforts to make
detente both a continuing and an increasingly viable
and comprehensive process, universal in scope, and
that the implementation of the results of the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe will
be a major contribution to this process;
Considering that solidarity among peoples, as well
as the common purpose of the participating States
in achieving the aims as set forth by the Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe, should lead
to the development of better and closer relations
among them in all fields and thus to overcoming the
confrontation stemming from the character of their
past relations, and to better mutual understanding;
Mindful of their common history and recognizing
that the existence of elements common to their
traditions and values can assist them in developing
their relations, and desiring to search, fully taking
into account the individuality and diversity of their
positions and views, for possibilities of joining their
efforts with a view to overcoming distrust and increasing
confidence, solving the problems that separate
them and co-operating in the interest of mankind;
Recognizing the indivisibility of security in Europe
as well as their common interest in the development
of co-operation throughout Europe and among
themselves and expressing their intention to pursue
efforts accordingly;
Recognizing the close link between peace and security
in Europe and in the world as a whole and
conscious of the need for each of them to make its
contribution to the strengthening of world peace and
security and to the promotion of fundamental rights,
economic and social progress and well-being for all
peoples;
Have adopted the following:
1.
(a) Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations
between Participating States
The participating States.
Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security

106
12
tific developments. includinB the conclusion of mutually
beneficial co-operation arrancemcnta between
firms and enterprises in fields agreed upon between
them and for carrying out. where appropriate, jomt
research and development programmes and projects;
consider it desirable that periodic exchanges of
views and information take place on scientific policy,
in particular on general problems of orientation and
administration of research and the question of a
better use of large-scale scientific and experimental
equipment on a co-operative basis;
recommend that, in developing co-operation in the
field of science and technology, full use be made of
existing practices of bilateral and multilateral cooperation,
including that of a regional or sub-regional
character, together with the forms and methods of
co-operation described in this document;
recommend further that more effective utilization
be made of the possibilities and capabilities of existing
international organizations, intergovernmental
and nongovernmental, concerned with science and
technology, for improving exchanges of information
and experience, as well as for developing other forms
of co-operation in fields of common interest, for example:
—in the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, study of possibilities for expanding multilateral
co-operation, taking into account models for
projects and research used in various international
organizations; and for sponsoring conferences, symposia,
and study and working groups such as those
which would bring together younger scientists and
technologists with eminent specialists in their field;
—through their participation in particular international
scientific and technological co-operation programmes,
including those of UNESCO and other
international organizations, pursuit of continuing
progress towards the objectives of such programmes,
notably those of UNISIST [World Science Information
System] with particular respect to information
policy guidance, technical advice, information contributions
and data processing.
5. Environment
The participating States,
Affirming that the protection and improvement of
the environment, as well as the protection of nature
and the rational utilization of its resources in the interests
of present and future generations, is one of
the tasks of major importance to the well-being of
peoples and the economic development of all countries
and that many environmental problems, particularly
in Europe, can be solved effectively only
through close international co-operation,
Acknowledging that each of the participating
States, in accordance with the principles of international
law, ought to ensure, in a spirit of co-operation,
that activities carried out on its territory do not
cause degradation of the environment in another
State or in areas lying beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
Considering that the success of any environmental
policy presupposes that all population groups and
social forces, aware of their responsibilities, help to
protect and improve the environment, which necessitates
continued and thorough educative action, particularly
with regard to youth.
Affirming that experience has shown that economic
development and technological progress must be compatible
with the protection of the environment and
the preservation of historical and" cultural values;
that damage to the environment is best avoided by
preventive measures; and that the ecological balance
must be preserved in the exploitation and management
of natural resources,
/tints of co-operation
Agree to the following aims of co-operation, in
particular:
to study, with a view to their solution, those environmental
problems which, by their nature, are of a
multilateral, bilateral, regional or sub-regional dimension;
as well as to encourage the development of
an interdisciplinary approach to environmental problems;
— to increase the effectiveness of national and international
measures for the protection of the environment,
by the comparison and, if appropriate, the
harmonization of methods of gathering and analyzing
facts, by improving the knowledge of pollution phenomena
and rational utilization of natural resources,
by the exchange of information, by the harmonization
of definitions and the adoption, as far as possible, of
a common terminology in the field of the environment;
— to take the necessary measures to bring environmental
policies closer together and, where appropriate
and possible, to harmonize them;
to encourage, where possible and appropriate,
national and international efforts by their interested
organizations, enterprises and firms in the development,
productioh and improvement of equipment designed
for monitoring, protecting and enhancing the
environment.
Fields of co-operation
To attain these aims, the participating States will
make use of every suitable opportunity to co-operate
in the field of environment and, in particular, within
the areas described below as examples:
Control of air pollution
Desulphurization of fossil fuels and exhaust gases;
pollution control of heavy metals, particles, aerosols,
nitrogen oxides, in particular those emitted by transport,
power stations, and other industrial plants;
systems and methods of observation and control of
air pollution and its effects, including long-range
transport of air pollutants;
Water pollution control and fresh water utilization
Prevention and control of water pollution, in particular
of transboundary rivers and international
lakes; techniques for the improvement of the quality
of water and further development of ways and means
for industrial and municipal sewage effluent purification;
methods of assessment of fresh water resources
and the improvement of their utilization, in particular
by developing methods of production which
are less polluting and lead to less consumption of
fresh water;
Protection of the marine environment
Protection of the marine environment of participating
States, and especially the Mediterranean Sea,

107
13
from pollutants emanating froni land-based sources
and those from shins and other vessels, notably the
harmful substances listed in Annexes I and II to the
London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters;
problems of maintaining marine ecological balances
and food chains, in particular such problems as may
arise from the exploration and exploitation of biological
and mineral resources of the seas and the
sea-bed;
Land utilization and Boils
Problems associated with more effective use of
lands, including land amelioration, reclamation and
recultivation; control of soil pollution, water and air
erosion, as well as ether forms of soil degradation;
maintaining and increasing the productivity of soils
with due regard for the possible negative effects of
the application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides;
Nature conservation and nature reserves
Protection of nature and nature reserves; conservation
and maintenance of existing genetic resources,
especially rare animal and plant species; conservation
of natural ecological systems; establishment of
nature reserves and other protected landscapes and
areas, including their use for research, tourism, recreation
and other purposes;
Improvement of environmental conditions in areas
of human settlement
Environmental conditions associated with transport,
housing, working areas, urban development
and planning, water supply and sewage disposal
systems; assessment of harmful effects of noise,
and noise control methods; collection, treatment and
utilization of wastes, including the recovery and
recycling of materials; research on substitutes for
non-biodegradable substances;
Fundamental research, monitoring, forecasting and
assessment of environmental changes
Study of changes in climate, landscapes and ecological
balances under the impact of both natural
factors and human activities; forecasting of possible
genetic changes in flora and fauna as a result of
environmental pollution; harmonization of statistical
data, development of scientific concepts and systems
of monitoring networks, standardized methods of
observation, measurement and assessment of
changes in the biosphere; assessment of the effects
of environmental pollution levels and degradation
of the environment upon human health; study and
development of criteria and standards for various
environmental pollutants and regulation regarding
production and use of various products;
Legal and adininistrative measures
Legal and administrative measures for the protection
of the environment including procedures for
establishing environmental impact assessments.
Forms and methods of co-operation
The participating States declare that problems
relating to the protection and improvement of the
environment will be solved on both a bilateral and
a multilateral, including regional and sub-regional,
basis, making full use of existing patterns and forms
of co-operation. They will develop co-operation in
the field of the environment in particular by taking
into consideration the Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment, relevant resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly and the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe Prague
symposium on environmental problems.
The participating States are resolved that cooperation
in the field of the environment will be
implemented in particular through:
exchanges of scientific and technical information,
documentation and research results, including
information on the means of determining the possible
effects on the environment of technical and
economic activities;
—organization of conferences, symposia and meetings
of experts;
—exchanges of scientists, specialists and trainees;
—joint preparation and implementation of programmes
and projects for the study and solution of
various problems of environmental protection;
—harmonization, where appropriate and necessary,
of environmental protection standards and
norms, in particular with the object of avoiding
possible difficulties in trade which may arise from
.gfforts to resolve ecological problems of production
processes and which relate to the achievement of
certain environmental qualities in manufactured
products;
—consultations on various aspects of environmental
protection, as agreed upon among countries
concerned, especially in connexion with problems
which could have international consequences.
The participating States will further develop
such co-operation by:
—promoting the progressive development, codification
and implementation of international law as
one means of preserving and enhancing the human
environment, including principles and practices, as
accepted by them, relating to pollution and other
en\nronmental damage caused by activities within
the jurisdiction or control of their States affecting
other countries and regions;
—supporting and promoting the implementation
of relevant international Conventions to which they
are parties, in particular those designed to prevent
and combat marine and fresh water pollution, recommending
States to ratify Conventions which have
already been signed, as well as considering possibilities
of accepting other appropriate Conventions
to which they are not parties at present;
—advocating the inclusion, where appropriate and
possible, of the various areas of co-operation into
the programmes of work of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, supporting such
co-operation within the framework of the Commission
and of the United Nations Environment Programme,
and taking into account the work of other
competent international organizations of which they
are members;
—making wider use, in all types of co-operation,
of information already available from national and
international sources, including internationally
agreed criteria, and utilizing the possibilities and
capabilities of various competent international
organizations.

108
14
The participating States a^^ree on the following
recommendations on specific measures:
—to develop through international co-operation
an extensive programme for the monitoring and
evaluation of the lonp-range transport of air pollutants,
starting with sulphur dioxide and with possible
extension to other pollutants, and to this end
to take into account basic elements of a co-operation
programme which were identified by the experts
who met in Oslo in December 1974 at the invitation
of the Norwegian Institute of Air Research;
— to advocate that within the framework of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe a
study be carried out of procedures and relevant
experience relating to the activities of Governments
in developing the capabilities of their countries to
predict adequately environmental consequences of
economic activities and technological development.
6. Co-operalion in other areas
Development of transport
The participating States,
Considering that the improvement of the conditions
of transport constitutes one of the factors
essential to the development of co-operation among
them,
Contidering that it is necessary to encourage the
development of transport and the solution of existing
problems by employing appropriate national and
international means,
Taking into account the work being carried out on
these subjects by existing international organizations,
especially by the Inland Transport Committee
of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe,
note that the speed of technical progress in the
various fields of transport makes desirable a development
of co-operation and an increase in exchanges
of information among them;
declare themselves in favour of a simplification
and a harmonization of administrative formalities in
the field of international transport, in particular at
frontiers:
consider it desirable to promote, while allowing
for their particular national circumstances in this
sector, the harmonization of administrative and
technical provisions concerning safety in road, rail,
river, air and sea transport;
express their intention to encourage the development
of international inland transport of passengers
and goods as well as the possibilities of adequate
participation in such transport on the basis of
reciprocal advantage;
declare themselves in favour, with due respect for
their rights and international commitments, of the
elimination of disparities arising from the legal
provisions applied to traffic on inland waterways
which are subject to international conventions and,
in particular, of the disparity in the application of
those rrovisions; and to this end invite the member
States of the Central Commission for the Navigation
of the Rhine, of the Danube Commission and of
other bodies to develop the work and studies now
being carried out, in particular within the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe;
express their willingness, with a view to improving
international rail transport and with due resjiect
for their rights and international commitments, to
work towards the elimination of difrii;ulties arising
from disparities in existing international legal provisions
governing the reciprocal railway transport
of passengers and goods between their territories;
express the desire for intensification of the work
being carried out by existing international organizations
in the field of transport, especially that of the
Inland Transport Committee of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, and express their
intention to contribute thereto by their efforts;
consider that examination by the participating
States of the possibility of their accession to the
different conventions or to membership of international
organizations specializing in transport matters,
as well as their efforts to implement conventions
when ratified, could contribute to the
strengthening of their co-operation in this field.
Promotion of tourism
The participating States,
Aware of the contribution made by international
tourism to the development of mutual understanding
among peoples, to increased knowledge of other
countries' achievements in various fields, as well as
to economic, social and cultural progress.
Recognizing the interrelationship between the development
of tourism and measures taken in other
areas of economic activity,
express their intention to encourage increased
tourism on both an individual and group basis in
particular by:
—encouraging the improvement of the tourist
infrastructure and co-operation in this field;
—encouraging the carrying out of joint tourist
projects including technical co-operation, particularly
where this is suggested by territorial proximity
and the convergence of tourist interests;
—encouraging the exchange of information, including
relevant laws and regulations, studies, data
and documentation relating to tourism, and by improving
statistics with a view to facilitating their
comparability;
—dealing in a positive spirit with questions connected
with the allocation of financial means for
tourist travel abroad, having regard to their economic
possibilities, as weU as with those connected
with the formalities required for such travel, taking
into account other provisions on tourism adopted
by the Conference;
—facilitating the activities of foreign travel agencies
and passenger transport companies in the promotion
of international tourism;
—encouraging tourism outside the high season;
—examining the possibilities of exchanging specialists
and students in the field of tourism, with a
view to improving their qualifications;
—promoting conferences and symposia on the
planning and development of tourism;
consider it desirable to carry out in the appropriate
international framework, and with the cooperation
of the relevant national bodies, detailed
studies on tourism, in particular:
—a comparative study on the status and activities
of travel agencies as well as on ways and means
of achieving better co-operation among them;

109
Senator Wallop. I would like to make the first point that is in it
because I think it is important. There is a myth circulating both
here in this country and abroad that the Soviet Union had no writ-
inform the world immediately of the Chernobyl
ten obligation to
nuclear reactor accident.
This committee heard that myth repeated by a State Department
witness who appeared before us in a briefing following the accident,
by foreign experts and by the news media. We have heard
this factoid repeated by many responsible officials of the International
Atomic Energy Agency in the course of their interviews and
briefings to inform the public and the world on the details of the
Chernobyl disaster.
The fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Union
did and does have a written international obligation to inform the
world immediately of the Chernobyl accident. That obligation is enshrined
in the final act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, signed by 35 nations, including the Soviet
Union in Helsinki, Finland, 1975. It is contained specifically in
there.
I just wanted the committee to know that, for whatever reasons,
we continue to make apologies for behavior that is
the world's scene. I think much of the health problem and much of
intolerable on
the dimension of the accident is related specifically to the Soviet
Union's inability to come to grips with failure, even with their own
people.
Their failure to inform them is even more intolerable than their
failure to inform the public. But I think the dimensions of the accident
is clearly related to the unwillingness to react immediately to
the Soviet people.
In light of that, and I know, Mr. Myers, you cannot answer this
question, but I wish you would take it back and have it answered
for us; we have been contacted in our office by a number of Americans
of Ukrainian descent.
I
received a letter from the White House, basically passing the
buck to Mr. Thomas at EPA on the issue of how these Americans
with family members in the Ukraine would be able to communicate
with them as a result of the accident. My question to be answered
for the record is. What will EPA, as coordinator of the
Chernobyl task force do to promote such family communications?
Mr. Meyers. I think we did get that request, and as the task
force has essentially broken up, that would be a normal responsibility
of the State Department, and the response will essentially
say the State Department will take care of that for you.
The Chairman. The buck goes back.
Senator Wallop. The buck goes round and round. It never stops.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I wish the committee would write the State
Department and see if it stops somewhere along the line. These
people are rightfully concerned; family members whom they may
never see again.
The Chairman. That will be submitted to the State Department
for response for the record for this hearing.
Senator Wallop. I thank the chairman. Mr. Denton, Mr. Wade,
the Soviets are building nuclear reactors in Cuba. There is some

no
speculation in the press that it was the same type reactor that was
at Chernobyl, other speculation that it is not.
The question is, Do we know what types of reactors are being
built and are we faced with the same casual attitude toward safety
that apparently triggered the Chernobyl accident?
Dr. Bunch. It is my understanding that the reactors in Cuba are
what are called VVER-400; namely, 400 megawatt class, pressurized
water reactors. It is also my understanding that the particular
designs are the Soviet export models, with containments, somewhat
analogous to U.S. PWR's of that size.
I am finally given to understand that the particular concept
chosen is one similar to that already being operated in Hungary.
The Soviets claim that it has substantial safety features not found
in the RBMK, the Chernobyl type of design. Whether or not its
construction quality and the details of the safety systems are what
we would expect in this country I think is doubtful, but I don't
have the details of the Cuban design at this point.
Senator Wallop. Have we ever had any access to the Soviet reactors
and their buildings and design so we have some confidence in
how
Dr. Bunch. There have been a number of United States citizens
who have been granted tours of Soviet reactors in the past. There
have been extensive discussions, for example, with the Fins, who
have a Soviet style machine. The Fins, and the Germans have had
full access to many of the design documents of some of these systems
and have been asked to evaluate them.
One of the benefits of a multinational, international nuclear society
is that we do in fact, have broad access to information about
these systems.
Senator Wallop. Do we have broad access yet to the information
of all the details of the Chernobyl accident?
Dr. Bunch. As Mr. Denton and I both were trying to convey, we
have exhaustively examined the Soviet literature that has been
published. There is much that we don't have.
Senator Wallop. That is not precisely mv question.
Dr. Bunch. I was giving you a long "no,' sir.
Senator Wallop. That is what I was afraid you were giving me.
Mr. Denton. Senator, we have attempted to carry on a dialog on
safety with all countries, but when they invaded Afghanistan, as a
matter of national policy, we terminated that discussion with the
Soviets. We have not had a safety discussion with them since that
time.
Senator Wallop. Has anyone?
Mr. Denton. I can only speak for the NEC. We were in the process
of trying to reestablish that communication link when Chernobyl
occurred.
Senator Wallop. Mr. Meyers, can you add anything to that? Presumably
if they are not talking to us—not presumably at all, but
maybe me if they are not talking to us they are talking to somebody
else and presumably we could have access to that information.
Mr. Meyers. Well, they clearly have spoken to the IAEA management
who, as you know, have been there. They apparently have
made certain agreements with them to release information. We

Ill
have not seen any of it yet. I understand there is an international
conference to be taking place in several months that everybody is
looking forward to that is being advertised as getting more information
on Chernobyl. But, as of today, we have very sparse information
on what happened at the site itself in terms of actual measurements.
Ms. Walker. If I might. Senator Wallop. It is my understanding
that that briefing is tentatively scheduled to take place near the
end of August, I believe 23 or 24, and at that time there will be a
briefing by the Soviets on the accident, and information will be
presented at that time and I believe this is being done under the
IAEA and will occur in Vienna.
Senator Wallop. Do we have any reason to feel confident that
we will have the basic information necessary to make judgments
about it, or will we have a tailored set of facts?
Ms. Walker. It is expected that all of our questions will not be
answered, but that we will have more information than we have
now and perhaps enough information so that we will understand
the implications for our own industry.
Mr. Denton. Senator, I think they do intend to provide a lot of
information. I spoke to the head of the delegation; mentioned the
type of investigation we did after TMI. I don't expect that sort of
report to come out, but they do indicate that they intend to spend
several days telling us what happened and that they will be taking
questions from experts in the various technical areas. So I am very
hopeful this will be the first opportunity to get to
Senator Wallop. Four months is time to make up a good story
and rehearse it well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wallop.
Senator Bumpers.
STATEMENT OF HON. DALE BUMPERS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
Senator Bumpers. Thank you. Mr. Denton, and to all the members
of the panel, let me say, first of all, in light of the ominous
warnings of the greenhouse theory and what is going to happen if
we continue to burn coal, this hearing is very important because
we may find ourselves having to rely almost exclusively on nuclear
power in the short term. This may be necessary because it is a
cleaner fuel and does not cause the air pollution problems that coal
and oil do.
So I think it is incumbent upon us, No. 1, not to be defensive
about nuclear power and the safety of it, or make comparisons with
the Soviet Union's safety record, but to look at this very realistically
and recognize that we must on a continuing basis continue to
consider the safety of our reactors, and how they might be improved.
Now, what was the Soviet safety record prior to Chernobyl?
Mr. Denton. I don't think I can shed much light on that.
Senator Bumpers. Anybody on the panel who can?
Mr. Denton. We exchange, with most of the countries of the free
world, information on unusual operating events, abnormal occurrences,
and I could do a much better job with most countries, other

112
than the Soviet Union. They haven't provided much data to the
IAEA up to now and therefore we have very little hard facts. Perhaps
someone else could
Senator Bumpers. Well, so far as we know then, up until Chernobyl,
they had a better record than we did? After all, we had TMI in
1979.
Ms. Walker. Senator Bumpers, I would like to ask Mr. Ofte,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Defense Programs, who may have a
comment.
Senator Bumpers. Fine.
Mr. Ofte. I think that there is a pattern when we look back
over—perhaps not the reactor program because we don't have
but when we look back at Kyshtym, where
much insight into it,
the Russians engaged, as near as we can analyze by the data we
have gotten, in some very poor practices in handling their radioactive
wastes, they despoiled a very large region of their country
with those practices in the 1950's.
Likewise, I think there is a little insight that we can get on their
practices when we recall the reactor satellite that crashed into
Canada and what their response was to that. Then, I guess finally,
we have a limited Test Ban Treaty that we have entered into with
the Russians that requires release of any radionuclides from underground
nulear testing, do not go beyond the borders of the country.
We have evidence that says they repeatedly violated that treaty
and don't respond by changing their practices.
Senator Bumpers. My question really goes directly to the safety
of their civilian reactors.
Mr. Ofte. Yes, sir. These are analogies I can't talk to Soviet reactor
safety because I am not knowledgeable in that area, sir.
Senator Bumpers. Our job here is not to determine the comparative
safety of ours with theirs; our job here is to make certain that
ours are as safe as we can possibly make them and reassure the
people of this country. And that is the reason that Senator Johnston
and some of us have requested the chairman call this hearing
today, and to make sure that there is not some kind of accommodation
of the industry here in the operation of these plants.
For example, I am looking at an article here from the Washington
Post, May 6 of this year. It says,
Last year, even as the industry compiled its worse safety record since TMI, experiencing
significant mishaps with 10 percent of the U.S. plants, experiencing significant
mishaps, or management lapses, Commission rulings set up procedural hurdles
for imposing safety modifications on plants and gave utilities the right to regulate
themselves in important areas of employee training and fitness for work standards.
What do you have to say to that, Mr. Denton?
Mr. Denton. Let m,e give a long answer. I think we are a lot
tougher now than we were pre-TMI. I think pre-TMI, the Agency
felt that severe accidents were just precluded by design and therefore
would not happen.
Since that time, we have started giving utilities scorecards or
grades and there are some well operating utilities in the United
States, plants like Kewaunee and Point Beach just consistently operate
without any upsets. They are reliable plants, low occupational
exposures, and I think our goal today is to bring all plants up to
that level of performance.

113
We are also trying to be tougher on the poor performers and you
have seen a lot of activity with regard to plants like Rancho Seco,
Diablo Canyon, and TVA, where the performance is not up to par.
I think it turns out that with 50 or 60 utilities to regulate, the biggest
factor today in terms of safety, is the commitment and dedication
of utility management. It has been a big effort to upgrade it.
Problems do continue to occur, but I think our threshold to problems
is a lot lower than it was at TMI, and we are trying to act on
glimmers, precursors that we might have just not even dealt with
before TMI. In some areas, like accreditation, I think it is true that
the industry proposed a process to accredit operators and after
much debate, the Commissioners, themselves voted that they would
give the utilities a chance to demonstrate that that program could
work.
I have been asked, as a member of the staff, to monitor that program
and give the Commission a report back, as I do periodically.
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Denton, I don't understand your answer.
What I am asking is, in light of TMI, 1979, and the task force that
studied that and the recommendations that were made, here is a
statement that I would like you to either admit or deny.
Six years after TMI, this industry experienced its worse accident
record in history, with 10 percent of the U.S. plants experiencing
significant mishaps.
How can you account for that 6 years after TMI—the worse
record—this article calls it.
Mr. Denton. I guess I would deny that that is the worse year.
We have had problems every year somewhere in the United States.
We had the Salem issue several years ago. Each year we have several
events that occur that demand a lot of our attention.
I looked back several months ago as to whether I could really see
a trend and I think overall, the trend in general, is improving, although
I must admit there are some occasional bad performers
that got into that list. I don't think it is the worse year ever.
I think, by and large, if you count all 102 plants which are in
operation today, the total trend is upward, although there are still
plants which deserve a lot more regulatory attention. That is what
we are trying to get them.
Senator Domenici. Would the Senator yield for a clarification
question?
Senator Bumpers. Yes.
Senator Domenici. I don't understand what he means, and
maybe it does have something to do with the answer. You said,
"We have changed the threshold level." I think I know what that
means. Could you tell us? I am not sure that everybody understood
what that means. I am not sure at this point. Could you tell us
what that means?
Mr. Denton. I think that means we have gotten tougher, or pay
a lot more attention to all occurrences than before TMI. We put
resident inspectors, you recall, at all sites. Many sites now have
three or four NRC employees there.
We go to around-the-clock inspections, as we did up in Boston,
when we suspect a problem. The scrutiny that we give plants has
increased considerably. When there is a breakdown, we try to use

114
We find
that as a glimmer that there is a problem and jump on it.
them, we take enforcement action.
So I think these issues get a lot more attention now than they
did pre-TMI. It does not mean that the safety record was worse; I
would like to think it means that we are getting on problems
before they turn into real problems.
Senator Domenici. I thank the Senator.
Senator Bumpers. Thank you, Senator. In the same article, Mr.
Denton, it says that two declarations by the five-member panel,
last year, sum up what critics consider to be a laissez faire regulatory
philosophy. Four months after the Commission projected a 45
percent probability of a severe reactor core meltdown within the
next 20 years—45, that is almost a 50 percent probability—the
Commission concluded that today's plants pose no undue level of
risk to the public.
That seems to me a contradiction, is it not?
Mr. Denton. That I think is the issue which has bedeviled the
Commission with regard to how safe is safe enough? We have, as
the staff of the Commission, estimates on what the probability is of
TMI-type accidents occurring again in this country, or worse accidents
occurring in this country.
We can give them probability and consequences. They make the
judgments on what is safe enough in terms of the level of safety. I
think safety in some sense can be judged by the individual who
asks "safe compared to what?" They made the statement and I
would prefer that they give you their basis for having said that.
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Denton, I am going to introduce a bill
today calling for the President and others, and I won't go into
detail on the legislation, to appoint a 12-person commission to get
deeply involved in the study of nuclear safety issues.
you feel about that?
How would
The reason I did this is because I remember when the shuttle exploded
and people were calling and saying, if the appoint a blue
ribbon panel to study this, I would certainly like to be on it. I was
saying, listen, nobody has the integrity that NASA has. I am sure
there will be an in-house study here that will be great, and clarify
this whole thing. I know they have done everything they can possibly
do.
It never occurred to me what was going to come out of the blue
ribbon panel's investigation of the shuttle accident. I
am not suggesting
the NRC is in the same boat, but I think just for my own
feelings about it, and the feelings of the American people, who
have a right to be assured that we are doing all we can—and I am
not just suggesting a one-shot deal. Independent safety reviews
ought to be done periodically.
Do you have any objection to that?
Mr. Denton. Senator, my own personal opinion, having worked
in this agency for 20 years, is I would stay with the single administrator
approach that is pending before Congress. I think by having
five commissioners we have not clearly selected a course of action
all of the time. I would prefer a single administrator that you could
hold accountable, that would give the staff marching orders and it
would be clear that we are carrying out the mandate of Congress.

115
Senator Bumpers. I must confess, Mr. Denton, I don't feel comfortable
with that at all. I know that Commissioner Asselstine is
not everybody's favorite Commissioner over there, but I think you
need a maverick on every commission; somebody just to stir up the
water. He may even be irresponsible at times, but he will at least
get your attention and cause you to focus on something.
He says, "The memory of Three Mile Island has faded and complacency
about safety has set in." Now obviously, you would disagree
with that.
Mr. Denton. My experience has been—and not dealing in personalities
at all—but every person
Senator Bumpers. It is unfair of me to ask you.
Mr. Denton. But I would like to qualify it. The Commission form
of government seems to polarize individuals and we spend — just
speaking as a staff member, we are very ineffective because of the
lack of a single leader on the Commission. Strictly speaking in
terms of the effectiveness of the Commission. I think the bills
before Congress which strengthen the leadership are ones that
would produce a more effective Commission regardless of what
your attitude toward whether safety should be increased or not.
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Denton. I don't know whether you are the
proper person to ask this last question or not, my time is up, and I
will be back and we will cover more of this. But I did want to talk
about evacuations.
It is a policy in this country by the NRC, to evacuate, plant evacuations
within 10 miles. How many people live within 10 miles of
Indian Point, and No. 2, in light of Chernobyl, do you think that
policy ought to be reevaluated since they had to evacuate almost 20
miles out?
Mr. Denton. In developing the 10-mile policy, we looked at a
spectrum of accidents. We didn't just assume that containment
would work as it did at TMI. However, we do intend to take another
look at the 10 mile policy. Prior to Chernobyl, there was a
move toward reducing the emergency planning zone because all the
research that has been done shows that if the containment works
properly, most of the activity stays inside.
I had gotten a petition from Calvert Cliffs, which is not too far
from Washington, down on the bay, to reduce their emergency
planning zone from 10 miles to 2 miles. I denied that petition as
premature, until we had completed all the scientific research that
needed to go on.
I do intend to look at that matter again, in light of Chernobyl.
How many people live within 10 miles of Indian Point?
Senator Bumpers. How many people lived within 10 miles of
Chernobyl?
Mr. Denton. I think roughly 100,000 people were evacuated.
Senator Bumpers. That was about a 16 or 17 mile area, was it
not?
Mr. Denton. Yes, sir. And the evacuation radius kept expanding
as time went by.
Senator Bumpers. Well, you did not answer my question: How
many people live within 10 miles of Indian Point?

116
Mr. Denton. I don't have that answer, Senator, but I would be
happy to supply it. Perhaps someone here from FEMA might have
a feel for it.
Senator Bumpers. Well, Senator Metzenbaum came well prepared.
Give them the figures.
Senator Metzenbaum. 218,398, and I think there were a couple
of births since that figure.
Senator Bumpers. It may be like my hometown; we never could
grow because every time a baby was born, somebody had to leave
town.
The Chairman. Senator Murkowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. I have a statement which I would ask
unanimous consent be entered in the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
Statement of Hon. Frank H. Murkowski, a U.S. Senator From the State of
Alaska
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I commend
you for holding this very important hearing. There are many lessons we can learn
from the Chernobyl accident and this hearing is the necessary first step to that
process.
I recognize that the primary purpose of this hearing is to explore the impacts of
the Chernobyl accident on our domestic nuclear power industry. I trust that the witnesses
will cover that matter thoroughly in their presentations. However, I would
like to focus for a moment on another aspect of the accident. An aspect which is
more i>eople related than the central theme of this hearing.
Reports continue to reach us that the Soviet nuclear disaster a Chernobyl may be
more extensive than was previously indicated.
Chernobyl is located in the heart of the Soviet Union's breadbasket—the "black
earth" region of the Ukraine which has traditionally provided the vast majority of
Russia's food. It now appears that a significant part of that area has been contaminated
by radioactive fallout from the accident. Dairy and meat herds have also been
affected. At this time of year, many Russian fields lie plowed and open, making it
easier for contamination to sink deeper into the soil.
If these reports are true, the Russians could be facing an enormous human tragedy.
They already have difficulty raising enough food to feed their population. Fallout
from this accident could make that problem worse, perhaps much worse for
years to come.
I have been a frequent critic of the Soviet Union. I have condemned its repression
of freedom at home, its actions in Afghanistan and Poland, its continued military
buildup. But there are times when we have to set our differences aside and respond
as human beings to a human tragedy.
This accident is not a political issue, it is a humanitarian one. I strongly support
the President's offer to the Soviets of all possible assistance—not only to cope with
the immediate problem of the reactor meltdown, but to deal with the long-term
problems, including health and food supply.
This is not just altruism: it involves our own security and safety. The cloud of
radioactive dust from Chernobyl is being carried around the world. This accident
reminds us that, in the nuclear age, the fortunes of our two countries—indeed, of
the entire world—are ultimately bound together.
This could prove an historic opportunity for us to work together with our Soviet
adversaries on a problem which threatens us both. What is needed is an international
effort to pool our knowledge about how we can deal with this unprecedented,
international problem.
The world is ready to help the Russian people in this time of national disaster.
But the secrecy with which the Soviets surround such tragedies makes it difficult to
do so. Whether it is pride, a misplaced sensitivity about security, a reluctance to
admit mistakes—whatever it is—this approach is unnecessary and tragic. The secre-

117
cy makes it extremely difficult for nations of the world to know the seriousness of
the tragedy and the degree of help needed.
Mikhail Gorbachev has spoken of a new openness and frankness he would like to
call on him
see in Soviet society. Now is the time for him to put that into practice. I
not to retreat into defensive attitudes concerning this disaster, but to accept our
offer of aid in the sincere and genuine spirit in which it is made. The Soviet people
need to know that America taies no joy in this tragedy. Instead, we are ready to
help—with technical and medical assistance, food, or whatever is needed—as generously
as possible.
Senator Murkowski. My first question is relative to the uniqueness
of the opportunity to attempt to work with the Soviets for the
benefit of both our own research and potential contribution toward
ensuring that such an accident does not reoccur.
I am curious, Mr. Chairman, to have a forecast, if you will, of the
likelihood of the Soviets being agreeable to working in concert to in
detail evaluate the shortcomings of the Soviet safeguard system, so
that we can both learn and share this knowledge with those other
countries that use nuclear power generation or are contemplating
it.
In your opinion, is there a likelihood that the atmosphere of
mutual concern and sharing might realistically come out of this for
the advancement of nuclear technology? Or, do you have reservations?
Dr. Bunch. Senator, I think it is a little too soon to tell. Shortly
after the accident, as you may recall, Mr. Gorbachev came on the
air and he issued to the United Nations a written statement about
his intent to cooperate on improving the safety practices in the
international community which I presume means he is willing to
do more in his own country.
I think we will have a better understanding when the Soviets sit
down with us and other member nations of the International
Atomic Energy Agency in July, to talk about possible conventions
for mutual emergency assistance, and reporting. I think that before
Chernobyl, there was work going on with the IAEA to secure
agreement with the Soviets, to allow inspection of these teams on
how effective were the operational practices.
If that is extended, I think the answer will be yes, but it is too
soon to tell to see how much actual improvement we are going to
see in the willingness.
Senator Murkowski. You are just waiting out there and saying
that it is probably too soon to tell.
Mr. Denton. I am saying that the Soviets have said they want to
try to do better. What that means, I think we have to wait and see.
Senator Murkowski. I am concerned, if you will, over the ability
to analyze the traditional Soviet patterns, where they have been
criticized by basically the entire free world for the manner in
which they have handled this. Yet, I am heightened by their willingness
to take some of our specialists in bone marrow transplants
and so forth, and bring over for the rehabilitation of those who can
be helped.
I guess I am a little disappointed that we are not a little further
along on a clear signal as to what the Soviets may determine. I am
also concerned with their traditional track record of cloistering in
when they do have a difficulty.

118
My next question is what is the significance of the degree of inaccuracy,
misinformation, that came out of our own media in the
first information flow that came out of the Soviet Union? We obviously
were unable, even within reasonable limits, to pinpoint the
significance of those that were allegedly killed or those that were
exposed to such an extent that there would be mass annihilation,
up to a few hundred thousand, or maybe more, much greater anticipated
devastation than actually occurred.
Was this just a situation where the press was over-exuberant, or
was there some other reason?
Mr. Denton. Speaking as a member of the task force, we didn't
rely on ham radios out of Kiev, and those sort of sources that I
think some media relied on in the first few days. We tried to rely
only on facts that we could verify or calculate. I think the absence
of information from the Soviet Union during this first few days led
to that sort of speculation.
Senator Murkowski. The Soviets were denying that it was that
bad and we kept sa5dng it was that bad, or inferred that it was. I
can recall headlines in New York papers that would really scare
the devil out of you.
Mr. Denton. But I can remember the same sort of headlines
during TMI, and it seemed to vary with distance. The further way
from the accident, the more erroneous the report. But I think as
members of the task force, we tried to report information that we
really knew to be essentially correct.
Senator Murkowski. You do not feel at all responsible for the
misinformation that was carried by the media?
Mr. Denton. I think we felt responsible to try to tell the media
what we knew. I don't feel responsible, that is correct, for what the
media prints.
Senator Murkowski. My last question, Mr. Chairman is, there
was reference in the statement of Mr. Delbert Bunch, toward increased
simplicity. I am wondering, Mr. Bunch, if you could elaborate
on why we can't more or less have a customized nuclear powerplant,
one that has met all the requirements—the licensing, not
for the first time, but for the 10, 11 and 12 times, so that we are
not almost customizing each time we do a new reactor.
I recognize if you are going to have technological changes, you
are going to have to have some newness, but it seems like it is an
extraordinary burdening process each time, and why can we not
say—here is a principle that has been operational for x-number of
years. It has passed all the inspections and licenses, it is proven.
The next one and the next one are going to be just like this one.
That is why your word "simplicity" caught my thought process. I
wanted to follow up on why don't we do this? Why don't we direct
that if we are going to have nuclear power generation in this country,
that it have that simplicity, that it have that proven core of
technological design?
Dr. Bunch. Senator, I couldn't agree more with you. It seems to
me that one of the ways to make sure that happens is to secure
enactment of the legislative proposal of the administration. A new
licensing process that would encourage the use of that kind of concept
would be a major step toward realizing the benefits of advanced
nuclear plants.

—
119
Part of the problem has been that there are not new orders at
this point in time. We have seen that particular step be very successfully
applied in both Japan and Europe. I would expect that at
such time as we see a resurgence in demand in this country that
you will see continued efforts to bring that kind of plant into being.
Senator Murkowski. Well, there is legislation now, and I gather
it is not going anywhere, and I think that is too bad.
Mr. Denton. I did want to respond to that. Senator. There are a
few standard plants in this country which look alike and they tend
to operate very well. Wolf Creek and Calloway were a group of
four; two plsuits were canceled but two were finished. Both of those
plants are running very well. That was an attempt by the industry
at standardization.
Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 are all cookie-cutter copies of each other
and they are operating very well. But what we have is a very competitive
industry with four vendors, each trying to market its product.
So we try to have requirements for simple, ee-sy to build, reliable,
safe plants, and each comes up with a design and so far, while
everyone agrees standardization is desirable, industry forces have
tended to prevent it from actually occurring.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator Metzenbaum Mr. Meyers, what are the estimates of the
number of fatal and nonfatal cancers which will develop over the
long term as a result of the Chernobyl accident?
Mr. Meyers. As a task force, we did not make those kinds of estimates
in large measure because we had very limited data on the
actual deposition of radioactivity, or its release in the exclusion
zone around the plant.
Senator Metzenbaum. Did you send anyone over immediately
after the accident to do your own monitoring of Poland, Sweden,
the other nation's of Europe, or did you just rely upon whatever
information might be available in those countries?
Mr. Meyers. We actually sent an EPA representative to Poland
and Hungary, where he essentially had access to the Embassy and
the Embassy grounds only.
Senator Metzenbaum. The Embassy did not actually do a day-byday
count as would be necessary in order to determine the impact,
did they?
Mr. Meyers. We had some there, relatively quickly, within I
think, 3 days.
Senator Metzenbaum. You say you had someone there, but there
were a number of countries involved, and all they did was to monitor.
Mr. Meyers. That is right.
Senator Metzenbaum. So that actually, EPA did not send over
you can buy a radiation monitor for about $150, can you not?
Mr. Meyers. We left the instruments there, so that the Embassy
personnel, the scientific representatives could operate them. The
initial concern that the State Department had was the health and
safety of their employees.
Senator Metzenbaum. What about the 300,000 servicemen in
Europe?

120
Mr. Meyers. These are the Eastern bloc countries. We were getting
very good data from the Western countries, and the levels that
we recorded there were essentially not harmful to human health.
Senator Metzenbaum. Have you made no official estimates as to
what the potential loss of life will be in Europe as a result of this
accident?
Mr. Meyers. We have not; not as a task force.
Senator Metzenbaum. With respect to your monitoring and the
information available, let me read you a statement from the Los
Angeles Times. "Some scientists may have further muddied the
data by the manner in which they have worked with it. In computing
cumulative exposures to radiation in European cities, for example,
EPA ignored some of the data because the agency thought the
readings were too high. Reports for May 1 in Warsaw, for example,
showed readings of both 60 milirems of radiation exposure per
hour, and 1.5 million milirems per hour, but EPA discarded the
higher figure, a spokesman said, 'Because it didn't fit in with the
rest of the data and we think they might have made a mistake.' "
What do you know about that? Did the EPA discard the report of
1.5 milirems per hour and use only the 60 milirems per hour?
Mr. Meyers. Senator, I don't recall seeing myself the 1.5 milirems.
Based upon the other information I have seen, it seems that it
would not have been correct, and what you have suggested may
indeed have happened. I will have to check on it. I don't have personal
knowledge of it.
[Subsequent to the hearing Senator Metzenbaum and Mr. Meyers
submitted the following:]

.
121
Additional Statement By Senator Howar Metzenbaum
For clarification, I wish to include in the record a
copy of the Los Angeles Times article I cited while
questioning Mr. Myers of the EPA.
I would like to point out that the radiation levels I
quoted to Mr. Myers (60 milirems per hour and 1.5 million
milireras per hour) were incorrect. The correct levels were
1.5 milirems per hour and 60 milirems per hour.
However, the thrust of my question to Mr. Myers did not
relate to the particular radiation levels cited. Rather, my
concern was whether the Times article was correct in
reporting that the EPA disregared some data because readings
appeared to be too high, and whether such an action would be
proper
*

122
Los Anpeles Times, 5/22/86
Radiation Reporting
Needs Improvement,
28 Pan l/Thurvlay. May 22. l^f..
U.S. Scientists Say-
By THOMAS H. MAUGH II. Tima letSeiptetrWriitr
One clear lesson of the Chemo/^ have havi been on the way to Europe the lilgheat levels of radiation
byl disaster is that current systems the day after the accident was
of moniioriiig atmospheric m
reported, and we would have had a
woulc^have been released dunnc
the firtt two days foUowuif the
lion in much of the world are( far much better Idea of what happened,"
ezploobn.
he said.
Dafa for many other countries
from adequate and perhaps areVol
capable of providing sufficient e; Some inconsistency In reported ^^^linng that same two-day penod,
ly warning to the public, scientutj
G< Germany,
e«ullj__aro«e from difference»-(n^'^ such as East and West
•ly.
equipment RaaiSTOgQCs lii Finland Austria, and Romania, are also
mlasing. Prance has releaaed almoat
The main problem is that there noted earlier this week that their
•re no standard procedures or system is best because Its equipment
uses activated charcoal to
iMtruments for measuring radiatiotion
no Information about radia-
levels.
and no formal reporting system.
trap gaseous that compounds may Some adentiata, such as Gofman.
As the Soviet accident has demonstrated,
individual
and aome anti-nuclear organiza-
countries do
their own airborne radiation measurements.
And more often than
not. they use different types of
equipment, monitor for different
penods of lime, and report results
in different units. Sweden, for
example, reports readings in "bequerels
per cubic meter," Prance in
"microGreys." Britain in "mlcrosieverts
per hour" and the United
Slates in "picocunes per cubic
meter."
For all these reasons, then, scientists
now concede that ihe actual
human exposure to radiation released
during the Chernobyl accident
may never be known.
"We've been trying to get Information
about the radiation release
and exposures. But it just isn't
available," said Roger Ney. executive
director of the National Council
on Radiation Protection and
Measurement.
lOMpenitvrDeHelsn*
^This situation could have been
largely avoided, according to medical
physicist John Cofman of UC
Berkeley. "Good radiation detec-
,Jon are available for as
»KO._A planeload of the
contain radioactive iodine. These
compounds are not trapped in conventional
filters used by most
countries. Including the United
States. As a result, the Finns
estimated, other countries actually
detected as littJe as 15% of the total
amount of radioactive iodine present
The U.S. Environmental Protection_Agency
acknowledged earlier
this week that Ita radiation monitors
do not trap such gaaeoi _
compounds. EPA officials conceded
that actual radiation levels In the
United States were 2Vi to 3 times as
high as EPA had been reporting.
But even the Increased levels were
well within safety guidelinea. the
agency said.
Since the Chernobyl accident.
Individual countries have been reporting
their results to the World
Health Qr«aiu2aUon_fqr_cpmEUatjon-and
dissemination, but aom*^
'Countries have been criticized for
apparently being selective In that
eporting.
^HO has no data, for example,
/from Poland for Apnl 27, 28 and 29.
' the days immediately followlnf the
acetdenL Moat adentiau agree that
tiona. such as the Union of Concerned
Sdenllsta, think that the
countries cloaetl to Chernobyl may
have M^Lhheld informalion about
exposures during those first two
days to prevent hysteria among
their dtitfnrv.
Some scientlata may have fiu--
Iher muddied the data by the
manner In which they have worked
with IL In computing cumulauve
exposures to radiation In European
citiea, for example, EPA Ignored
some of the data because the
agency thought the readinfi were
too high.
Reports for May 1 In Warsaw, for
example, showed readings of both
60 milllrema of radiation expoaure
per hour and 1.5 mlllirems per
hour. But EPA discarded the higher
figure, a spokeanun said, "becauae
It didn't fit In with tha rtat of
the dau and we think they might
Juve made a mistake."
'I'hal WJ WUUIU. nuuiiw. mve
marked the period of highest expoaure.
and the levels would have
been expected to drop sharply
later.
Timas staff writar Tylar Marshall
in London contributad to
this etory.

123
Juue 19, 1986 Committee oti Energy arid Natural Resources
On page 85 in the hearing transcript, Senator Metzenbaum,
in a quote Erom the London Times , stated EPA ignored some of
the data because the Agency thought the readings were too
high. He asked Mr. Meyers to respond.
EPA's response follows:
As part of the Federal Task. Force's response to the
Chernobyl accident, EPA's Office of Radiation Programs made
extensive efforts to obtain credible radiation data from
foreign countries and to make that data available to all
interested parties. EPA and other Federal agencies requested
and obtained data through contacts in the international
scientific community, the World Health Organization, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and through formal requests
of governments via the State Department.
The following quality assurance and reporting rationale
were applied to all data:
o Data must have originated from a reputable health
organization.
o Data would be reported as received if there were no
obvious errors.
o All values would be checked for errors in data entry.
o Extreme or conflicting values would be reviewed and
corrected, if identified as erroneous.
This "real time" reporting rationale allowed EPA to make
the data available for timely dose and risk calculations while
still assuring reasonable quality. However, a few situations
were encountered which required delays in reporting data and/or
revisions of reported values: ^
o Telex reports identified direct exposure values in
excess of 100 Rads per hour (R/H), The telex printed in upper
case only and there was a space just before the R/H. A second
telex identified the values as MICRO R/H (uR/H). The
( u= 10"^) had not printed in the first telex.
o Values of 1,000 mR/H (extremely elevated but possible)
were reported by EPA, but later corrected to 1,000 w R/H when
that same country identified normal background levels as
10 mR/H. A background or ambient level of 10 u R/H is what
would be normally expected for that country. The country was

124
us trig au m ifistead of a u to iridicate micro.
o Values oE 1.5 arid 60 mR/H were reported by orie couritry
for the same date arid locatiori. A spread of 1.5 arid 60 mR/H is
urilikely; however, this situatiori could exist due to ari
extremely localized rairiout of radioactive materials. The
couritry later retracted these values due to large errors iri
measuremerit techriiques arid reported the highest value ever
reached for that locatiori was 60 R/H. The values were removed
from the EPA report.
We have discussed our reportirig ratioriale with a riumber of
radiatiori prof essiorials (iricludirig persoris iri the NRC, DOE, arid
Dr. Johri Gof mari) . Dr. Hofmari has iridicated that he fully
uriders tarids our ratioriale iri approachir«g the data reportirig
problem. Both DOE arid NRC also support EPA's approach..

125
Senator Metzenbaum. Would that disturb you if somebody made
a decision just to disregard the higher figure, particularly in view
of the fact that that is the day when it was the highest level of
exposure and obviously it would have been expected to fall after
that, shortly after the accident when the winds were blowing in
that direction, you would expect it to be at the highest level—for
an EPA official to just say "we just discarded it."
Mr. Meyers. Not necessarily. You may recall several weeks after
the accident there was a report of an elevated reading in Finland,
and it later turned out that the instrument was faulty.
Senator Metzenbaum. That is not what I am asking. Certainly
there are times when you get information and the information is
faulty. This isn't what was said. "Because it didn't fit in with the
rest of the data, and we think they might have made a mistake."
Now the scientists with whom I have spoken since the accident
have indicated that scientists never disregard any particular element
and they attempt to explain why it is there, or if indeed it is
a mistake, they try to find out whether the equipment was faulty
or what. But they just don't throw it out the window, as has been
suggested by the EPA spokesperson.
Mr. Meyers. Again, I am not familiar with that. I will have to
look into it when I get back, and I will get back to you for the
record.
Senator Metzenbaum. Does the Government expect to have an
official estimate as to what the number of deaths that may be anticipated,
as well as the number of cancers that may be anticipated?
Mr. Meyers. As I said earlier, the task force itself did not do that
kind of analyses and since the task force has disbanded, unless
there is a specific request made to, for example, the Health and
Human Services Agency, I suspect it will not be done.
Senator Metzenbaum. Is the EPA in a position to make that determination?
Mr. Meyers. We would have difficulty without getting more accurate
data from the Soviet Union to know explicitly how to make
the calculations in the Eastern bloc countries, for example.
We do have data in the Western countries, and I suppose that
one could postulate certain scenarios and make those csdculations.
One of the aims of the task force was not to conjecture and postulate
and put together different kinds of scenarios because we felt it
might be false and alarming.
Those calculations clearly can be made; what their validity is, is
not clear.
Senator Metzenbaum. Well, Dr. Goffman is in touch with the
EPA, and I would assume many other scientists are in touch with
EPA. He has made an estimate of 320,000 deaths, as well as
320,000 additional cancers. I would guess that other scientists
would have their own evaluation.
Is it not a responsibility of Government to indicate to the American
people what the estimate is and what the evaluation is as to
the impact of the Chernobyl accident?
Mr. Meyers. Senator, I have not seen Dr. Goffman's analysis, nor
the others. If we had them, we could certainly review them and
63-756 0-86-5

126
have it go through a peer review process to determine the validity
of the analysis.
As of this time, again, it is not at all clear to me what obligation
the United States has to do an analysis of the number of deaths in
the Soviet Union?
Senator Metzenbaum. Is it that maybe the Government does not
want to find out?
Mr. Myers. No, not at all.
Senator Metzenbaum. Maybe there is a concern that toes might
be stepped on? Even if his figures are wrong—assume they are
high—but it would be very disturbing to the American people if
they knew that the Chernobyl accident will probably result in x
number of deaths and cancers. Are we not entitled to that information?
Mr. Denton. Senator, perhaps I can help a little on that. In the
forthcoming IAEA meeting with the Soviets, it is my understanding
that there will be coverage of the consequences of the accident,
and I understand the World Health Organization will be involved,
and another U.N. organization which specializes in radio effects
will be involved. I would expect those two medically oriented
groups would be the ones who would, with Soviet cooperation, document
what the consequences of that accident were on the Soviet
people.
Other countries, such as Sweden, are actively doing the kind of
thing that you are talking about now; the countries who are most
effected are doing it, and I would suspect that somewhere down the
road the World Health Organization will probably issue a report
that brings together all the biomedical information on what the
consequences were.
Senator Metzenbaum. When do you think that might be?
Mr. Denton. I think it will be at the earliest, late this year, after
the Soviets have provided the necessary information.
Senator Metzenbaum. I think you are both touching upon the
concerns that I have. Ms. Walker has a comment, but one of the
concerns I have is that, as that article that Senator Bumpers was
reading indicated. Three Mile Island fades off into the distance and
people forget about it, and don't concern themselves, and they are
not nearly as alarmed now. Chernobyl is on the front pages for a
while, and it fades. In 3, 6 or 9 months from now, it will be but a
vague memory.
I think that what bothers some of us is the fact that there is
going to be a task force and there is going to be a meeting of the
World Health Organization and a meeting of the IAEA, and there
is going to be this and that, but the fact is, some things can be determined
on a much more expedited basis, and although there
might be an inability to give the exactitude that is wanted, the fact
is that there ought to be some knowledge as to how many lives
were endangered, how many cancers will result from Chernobyl,
and I believe that what we get from the people at the NRC, EPA,
and the other Energy Departments is just sort of a laid-back attitude.
We put things in the Embassy and we are checking into it; no
sense of urgency, no sense of real concern. I know I, as one individual,
am concerned about the safety of my grandchildren. I am con-

127
cerned when they are living around nuclear reactors, and I
feel a sense of urgency.
do not
I think the article that Senator Bumpers was reading had another
phrase in it. There is a willingness to accommodate industry
wishes and a reluctance to take a strong and aggressive role
through regulation. There is a misplaced sense of optimism, even to
the point of ignoring the messages we are getting from the operating
experiences of the plant.
I think these are the things that concern us. Ms. Walker, did you
have something you wanted to say?
Ms. Walker. Yes, if I could. I might be able to answer some of
your earlier inquiries. Picking up your last point, we were very
concerned; as soon as a day or two after the accident was made
known to us, we were part of the offer of assistance that was made
to the Soviet Union.
My office personally assisted in drafting the cable that went
over, offering both monitoring and health assistance because we
had the expertise and the ability to be a part of it in a meaningful
way. As you know, that offer was rejected. We have made other
offers since, and I believe even as we meet here currently, we have
experts from our national laboratories that are over at the Embassies,
providing assistance to members of the U.S. Embassy there in
the Soviet Union in terms of monitoring and in terms of explaining
to them what we know, and what the dangers are and that sort of
thing.
In addition to offers of health and environmental research, the
Department of Energy, has established a task group of scientists
that are charged with addressing the assessments of the health
consequences in exposed populations, and validating the predictive
models.
Of course, the health assessment which is designed to produce
exactly the kind of information you are interested in is necessarily
reliant upon information of the characteristics of the radioactivity
that was released, as well as the amount of the doses received. We
do not have an independent way of gathering this information,
short of what the panel has expressed to you.
Obviously, we are relying on the Soviets to give us information
we can't get from neighboring countries or from our own monitoring
at the Embassies. We are hopeful to get this information, but
we have scientists already committed to this effort. I am not saying
they are waiting. They are taking what is known and they are beginning
their review.
It will of course be more accurate as more accurate information
is made available to them.
Senator Metzenbaum. I would like to ask each of the panel
members to submit to the committee for the record their estimate
of the number of fatal and nonfatal cancers that will result from
Chernobyl. I am certain that there must be some evaluation being
made on that subject and I would like to ask each of them to
submit that.
The Chairman. The question has been submitted to each of the
witnesses for their response in writing. We will appreciate whatever
response you will be able to make.

128
Mr. Meyers. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion? One of
the things the task force tried to do was present a uniform Federal
Government position on the Chernobyl incident. We had various
groups set up to do certain things. I think this was within the
realm of the Health and Safety Group that we did set up. It does
have representatives on it from all of the Federal agencies, and
rather than get several different responses, I think it might be
more useful if those agencies worked together and provided you a
single response if that is acceptable to you.
[EPA's response follows:]
It is premature to begin an assessment of the health impacts of the Chernobyl
accident until more complete data are available, particularly from the U.S.S.R.
When more data are available, it is expected that an international group of scientists,
perhaps under the auspicies of the United Nations, will perform such an assessment.
Senator Metzenbaum. I would be satisfied with that if I got a
specific response. If not, I would like each of the agencies to respond.
Ms. Walker. I think, too, Senator, if what we are able to provide
you with—and I don't know this for certain—now is an indication
of the on-going assessments that are hopefully going to lead to
more specific information, it might be helpful to you to have the
individual agencies respond.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, on that point?
The Chairman. I think the Senator's time has expired.
Senator Metzenbaum. As I understand, you would rather have
individual responses?
Ms. Walker. I don't want to preclude the EPA's suggestion; that
might be helpful. All I am saying is that I don't know if we can
give you specific answers at this time, and if we can't, we will certainly
provide you with an assessment of what we are doing.
Senator Metzenbaum. That is fine.
[DOE's response follows:]

129
Material for Health Consequences Questions: Hearing before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
In early May, the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Research
established an Interlaboratory Task Group on Health and Environmental Aspects
of the Soviet Nuclear Accident. One charge undertaken by the Task Group was
to carry out an assessment of the health consequences in exposed
populations. The health assessment subgroup has proceeded to collect data
and develop information required for the assessment. This includes
information on: the source term, i.e., the total amount and type of
radionuclides released as a function of time; atmospheric and terrestrial
transport of material, and uptake into plants, animals, and the human
population. Calculation of whole body and organ radiation doses then
provides the basis for an assessment of health consequences.
The subgroup is completing an initial estimate of population dose
resulting from the Chernobyl accident. At this time, the uncertainty
associated with the dose estimates is very substantial. This derives from
uncertainties in the pattern of radionuclide deposition over the earth's
surface, which is highly influenced by rain fall, uncertainties in
the actual uptake of radionuclides by the exposed population, and
uncertainties in the source term for which no definitive information
is available. Nevertheless, preliminary dose estimates indicate that
exposures in Europe were sufficiently low that no demonstrable health
effects are likely to be expected there. A report by the
Department's health assessment subgroup is expected within the next
two months. We will be happy to provide a copy of the report to the
Committee when it is available.

130
-2-
The health assessment subgroup has also established a close working
relationship with international organizations such as the Commission of
European Communities, and the World Health Organization (WHO). This
will enable intercomparison of parallel efforts to obtain dose
estimates and will assure a comprehensive and unified assessment of
human health consequences. The WHO recently held an international
meeting and expects to have a report by late summer on the consequences
in Europe of the accident. A global assessment is planned by the
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
which we understand will be included as a specific annex in their 1988
report.

131
The Chairman. Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. On that last question, so that our distinguished
friend from Ohio is not back here in 3 weeks when they
submit their answers, to make sure we understand—we don't want
a bunch of guesses. If they don't know, because there is not enough
information—are they not permitted to tell us that? We do not
want somebody to guess, and tell Senator Metzenbaum 100,000 to
150,000, or so.
The Chairman. I would suggest to the Senator from New Mexico
that if indeed the witnesses feel they are incapable of answering
the question, that is what their answer will have to be.
Senator Domenici. I thank the chairman. I would appreciate the
opportunity to ask a few questions.
I was listening here and two things come to my mind. Would the
Senator from Ohio stay.
Senator Metzenbaum. There was a Judiciary Committee hearing
I was trying to get to, but for you, I will wait.
Senator Domenici. I greatly appreciate it. I am not sure you will
when I am finished.
But let me say, the first thing that came to my mind as I listened
when humankind first rubbed some sticks together and started a
fire, I am grateful that we did not have either this committee or
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission around, because I guarantee
you, if they had a slight bit of clairvoyance and a little bit of computer
capability, we would be frozen to death, but we would not
have had the fires we have had.
Having said that, let me say, I really do not appreciate at all the
insinuation from my good friend from Ohio that our Government,
represented here by these people, are trjdng to hide environmental
facts about Chernobyl.
Senator Metzenbaum. I was only quoting from one of the members
of the Commission.
Senator Domenici. I just do not believe it. Not only do I not believe
it, but let me tell you, I believe they are just as interested in
the information about Chernobyl, and TMI, as they are about the
effects of coal-burning plants in the United States on the health
and welfare of our people.
I believe that they are just as interested and doing just as good a
job, or just as poor a job, evaluating the health effects on American
people from the pollutants coming out of the smokestacks that are
burning coal as they are about nuclear. I believe your people in
Ohio are just as interested, and if they are not, they ought to be.
If we are going to insist on a new study, I am going to ask that
they do a study about the effect of the failure of the coal-burning
plants in the State of Ohio to yet today meet the ambient health
standards of the United States.
Senator Metzenbaum. I have no problem with your request.
Senator Domenici. I think we ought to do that.
think that whatever the Senator from
Senator Metzenbaum. I
New Mexico thinks we should do, he ought to do. That is the Senator
from New Mexico's decision.
I am much more concerned about the potential problem
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the Senator
from Ohio, as I did for him, be permitted to make my statements

—
132
and ask my questions. If he would like me to yield, he has been
around here a long time, and I would be very pleased to do that.
The Chairman. The Senator from New Mexico has the floor.
Senator Domenici. Now, having said that, I would also suggest
that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas arrived just at the
right time, because I remember he and I served
thought this was on nuclear energy, not
Senator Metzenbaum. I
on the Senators from Arkansas and Ohio.
Senator Domenici. I wanted to say how he and I first got interested
in the greenhouse effect. We were kind of young Senators
here and they gave us a great job, if you recall. We were on a subcommittee
of one of the committees that had charge of NASA.
That committee was going to be abolished, so they gave us this
little job.
It turned out we were studying the effect of those sprays on the
possibility of cutting the sunlight and it would cause perhaps
greenhouse, and all these other things. From that has come a genuine
interest on his part. I am only raising this question because it
appears to me that we ought to make sure that the American
people understand that while there are risks, and great risks in nuclear
energy, and the Senator from New Mexico is not trying to
minimize them, and certainly Chernobyl is a good lesson—and let
me suggest in a moment I will talk about what I think the lesson
is—that anything in the area of producing energy for the American
people in electricity has risks.
If we want to talk about zero risk accident in nuclear, we ought
to talk about zero risk in coal burning. I submit that the evidence
would indicate today that more of the American people have died,
been injured, got black lung from those aspects related to coalburning
powerplants—because you cannot burn it without digging
it, you cannot dig it without getting black lung—and we have not
had one death we have proved yet from nuclear energy in this
country, and we are here talking about zero risk, some kind of
America is negligent, we do not care, we are doing all these things
wrong—and I just do not believe that.
Now let me ask all of you; if the Soviet Union wanted to export
one of those plants like the one that had the accident to the United
States of America, as inefficient or efficient as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is, and I do not know which one you want to buy,
and since, even though they cannot talk to each other because if
they do they violate the law—they have to hold a public meeting
given all those, could that powerplant be built in the United States
today?
Mr. Denton. I would like to answer that. Senator. We came
across a study that was done 10 years ago by a British company,
and at that time, they concluded the plant could not be licensed in
the United Kingdom I think it is important to realize that study
was done pre-Chernobyl, therefore it was not biased by the accident.
But just reading the contents of that study, I would come to
the same conclusion; that plant could not be licensed in the United
States.
Senator Domenici. Now, I want to ask you one other question
comparing, just for purposes of whether we are doing a pretty good
job—that is all I just want to try to establish here. Both these, TMI

133
and Chernobyl, had a very serious accident. It was core-related; is
that correct?
We assumed there was a core meltdown at TMI, and we assumed
there was a similar one at Chernobyl, do we not? Let me ask you:
One mile from TMI, what was the curie count, if you recall?
Mr. Denton. The numbers I do recall were, on iodine-131, there
were 15 curies released from TMI over the course of the accident,
and 50 to 60 million curies of iodine-131 released at Chernobyl.
Some of the same comparisons would work for the noble gasses,
also.
Senator Domenici. Let us have the numbers one more time. At
the same distance, we are measuring for the potential radioactive
effects that might occur on living things, and one of the ways we
do is to measure what?
Mr. Denton. The total amount of iodine-131 that was released.
Iodine is one of the most hazardous isotopes in the reactor. At TMI,
15 curies were released; at Chernobyl, 50 to 60 million curies of the
same isotope.
Senator Domenici. Now, let me ask you, what is the principle
reason that they had 15 and they had the millions that you just
described?
Mr. Denton. I think the principle difference would have to be attributed
to the reactor pressure vessel and the reactor containment
that worked at TMI, and whatever enclosure the Soviets had provided
was ineffective and permitted the release of essentially all
that isotope.
Senator Domenici. All right. Now we use this word containment,
and sometimes words that have very, very explicit meaning seem
out there to take on some scientific meaning. Containment is the
right word, is it not? We have a light water reactor that could
work all by itself with what it has, only we put a container around
it so that if anything gets out it gets hooked up in the container. Is
that a valid description of what containment is?
Mr. Denton. Yes, sir. Containment are those large, strong buildings
that are typically shown as housing the reactor. We have required
them in this country since the earliest reactors were licensed.
Senator Domenici. And they do not have one of those on these
plants? They do not have that kind of containment on the plant
that had the accident, or on almost of their civilian reactors?
Mr. Denton. From the best we can tell, they had paid little attention
to accident mitigating features of any kind; containment,
emergency safety features, all the safety features, up until fairly
recently. It does appear that when they began to export reactors,
they attempted to upgrade their standards to Western style standards.
But this reactor, obviously, did not have a Western style containment
building around the reactor core.
Senator Domenici. As a matter of inquiry, other than their satellite
nations, which I do not assume buy voluntarily, how many
countries have bought nuclear reactors from the Soviet Union for
civilian use of the kind that are at Chernobyl? Freely and open in
the market.

134
Mr. Denton. I do not think they have sold any of the Chernobyl
type outside the U.S.S.R. They have sold a different type of reactor,
one that looks more like a United States light water reactor,
but the first country that bought one, Finland, insisted on Western
style containment. They bought that containment from Westinghouse.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, very much.
One last question: Civilian nuclear reactors in the United States,
owned and operated, produced by civilian companies, operated by
powerplant companies, whether they are privately owned or cooperatives,
do they produce as a byproduct of the activity plutonium
that can be used for military purposes? U.S.A. I am talking about.
Civilian-run light water reactors. Do we have any that are there to
produce plutonium for the military of the United States?
Mr. Denton. None are designed to produce plutonium. As a byproduct
of operating, they do produce plutonium isotopes in the
fuel, and that plutonium then undergoes fission just as the uranium
atoms undergo fission. So at the end of life on a commercial
reactor core, there is plutonium actually in the fuel.
Now, whether its concentrations are such that the Department of
Energy would consider it useful in a weapons program or not, I
will have to defer to them. But the plants are not designed to
produce weapons from plutonium. But any time you put uranium-
238 in a reactor core, it does produce plutonium.
Senator Domenici. Now flip that over; what about theirs?
Mr. Denton. It is fairly clear this reactor had its origin as a
weapons production reactor. I think that is why it is designed the
way it is. They apparently adopted it to try to turn it into a power
producing reactor.
They did have problems with reactivity coefficients and its dynamic
behavior. We do have information showing that they
changed the fuel concentration recently in an attempt to make the
reactor more stable. I don't really know how to answer the question
for all of their type of reactors, but looking at the isotopes that
we did detect from the accident, it does not appear that it was operating
in a weapons producing mode.
Senator Domenici. My last question, is not the model and make
up, behavior of the Soviet reactor that we are talking about here,
such that the higher the capacity the more you try to pump out of
it by way of heat, the more plutonium it produces. Is that not correct?
So if you want plutonium and you are interested in it, that
means you maximize it because it produces more when you maximize
it. Is that correct?
Dr. Bunch. I don't believe that is correct. Senator. I believe in
fact what has been done in the last couple of years with that particular
design at Chernobyl is to maximize it for power production.
Senator Domenici. I understand that that is what they have
done. But I am asking, in its design, without modification, without
attempt to make it do otherwise, does it not produce more plutonium
the higher efficiency you try to pump into it? I could be wrong.
I just read that someplace.
Dr. Bunch. I believe that you are mistaken. Senator. At the
power level given, what you wind up doing is burning the fuel

135
longer, as in U.S. light water reactors, and that decreases the quality
of the plutonium that is in the plant.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Domenici.
Senator Melcher.
Senator Melcher. Mr. Denton, the staff of the Commission has
estimated that out of the 100 nuclear plants in this country, there
is a 45-percent chance of a core meltdown. Just so we understand
what that likelihood is, does that 45 percent mean that you flip a
coin 100 times, and 50 times it is going to come up heads? What
does it mean?
Mr. Denton. I don't think the number itself is too meginingful.
Senator Melcher. What does it mean?
Mr. Denton. It is assuming that all the plants have about the
same management capabilities and maintain their plant at about
the same level, and have, good drug abuse programs in place, and
that therefore, you could treat all the class of reactors as cookiecutter
imitations of each other. That you truly have a random statistical
type basis.
What that number was based on were the 15 or 16 probablistic
risk studies that have been done since TMI, taking sort of the average
number and assuming that the same number applies to all the
plants, and that we are not effective in trying to reduce the probability
through our regulatory systems and other pressures that we
bring on the utilities.
It is my goal to try to reduce it at individual plants as low as we
can.
The real secret at preventing, accidents, I think
Senator Melcher. What does the 45-percent chance mean? My
next question will get into how safe people feel about nuclear
plants. But this is one item and if it means 50-50, that is what I
am asking. Does it or does it not?
Mr. Denton. Let me tell you what it does mean and how we got
it. We originated an average number for the probability of a TMItype
event based on analytical studies. That number turned out to
be about 1 chance in 10,000, roughly.
If you assume that we have 100 plants, and you run 20 years,
and you run through the math, you can come up that somewhere
in the U.S. population of reactors, in the next 20 years, there would
be a 45-percent change of another accident such as TMI occurring.
Senator Melcher. Did the staff suggest that it was a core meltdown,
or the chance of one occuring? Were they not looking at a
chance of a core meltdown?
Mr. Denton. No, we were looking at a TMI-type occurrence.
Senator Melcher. But not a core meltdown.
Mr. Denton. That number does not assume that containment
would fail.
The Chairman. Would the Senator yield?
Senator Melcher. Yes, I would be glad to.
The Chairman. There was a core meltdown at TMI, was there
not?
Mr. Denton. Yes, partial.
The Chairman. Partial. All right.

136
Senator Melcher. To clarify your answer, so that I understand
it, it was that this 45-percent chance or probabiUty did not include
a core meltdown any worse than what was at TMI.
Mr. Denton. It included a complete release of fission products to
the containment, but it did not include a containment failure. Our
plants are designed with containments so that the chances of a
core meltdown in the reactor vessel leading to a Chernobyl-type release
is low. That is the function of containment.
Senator Melcher. How long is it?
Mr. Denton. It varies. All our containments have substantial
margins, but some are
Senator Melcher. No, I mean, what were the chances?
Mr. Denton. At TMI the containment did not fail. So that is one
statistical data point there, and the studies done afterwards show
that that containment was designed as such that there was very
little chance of it failing under a lot of circumstances.
We litigated this question at Indian Point, and the answer for
that containment, which was the most populated site in the United
States was a few percent chance that the containment will fail,
given you have a core meltdown.
Senator Melcher. A few percent, like 5 percent?
Mr. Denton. I would say less than that; 2 or 3 percent.
Senator Melcher. Dr. Bunch, regarding the question of the
public confidence in safety, has not the design of the plants been
sort of regulate as you go?
Dr. Bunch. I think it is fair to characterize the emergence of the
plants in the 1960's as design as you go. The technology was developing,
and the powerplants went in in a fairly short period of time.
Power ratings went from several hundred megawatts to above
1,000 megawatts.
There was a period of development, and I think the regulatory
process was in a very major period of growth in that period of time,
so there was, in response to this developing commercial industry, a
regulate as you go activity.
Senator Melcher. Is that not part of the reason for the public
alarm, that the plants are being designed as you go, and then regulate
as you go? What percentage of the 100 plants that are in operation
would be affected by that design as you go and regulate as
you go feature?
Dr. Bunch. I think that the message I would convey out of that
is, first, we saw the introduction of technologies which I believe to
be fundamentally sound.
Senator Melcher. How many of the plants are design as you go
and regulate as you go?
Dr. Bunch. The point I was going to get to, as Mr. Denton described,
for most of the early period of the introduction of these
commercial plants, they were customized units and not standardized.
So there was little opportunity to look at units that were
going to be fully subjected to resolving all the safety problems
before they actually proceeded to construction.
For the last several, we heard a comment about Palo Verde, the
SNUPPS units, there was much more a degree of standardization
and there was a greater backlog on the part of the regulatory staff

137
and the designers about what was involved in those particular
products.
So, the short answer is, most of the plants that we presently
have today are in the design-as-you-go/regulate-as-you-go kind of
mode.
Senator Melcher. That would be like 90 out of 100?
Dr. Bunch. I don't think that is an unreasonable estimate, sir.
Senator Melcher. 90 out of 100. The Commission staff says that
there is practically a 50-50 chance of another TMI accident occurring.
Is this not interrelated with the same concern that the public
has, or the apprehension they have, with these plants, over the
design as you go aspect, as they are being constructed, and after
the design was figured out, what to regulate them—as you go—to
prevent any failure. Does not this therefore cause for alarm?
Dr. Bunch. My view is that the design of the plants on the part
of the designers, and the review of those plants on the part of the
regulators, did pay a good fair measure of attention to the fundamental
criteria under which those designs would be developed. A
fair measure of attention was given to making sure that the way
the plant was going to be laid out and engineered, was going to be
sound. The regulate-as-you-go part of it came when operating experience
came up, such as on water hammer, or materials failures, or
equipment wasn't behaving exactly the way that people had hoped
and intended, there needed to be accommodations and new ways of
dealing with those in design, and new ways of satisfying regulatory
solutions.
That particular way of dealing with after-the-fact experience has,
I think, caused some concern on the part of the public. It is on that
ground, I think, that what Mr. Denton was talking about, to get
past that and show that we have resolved those problems is going
to be very helpful.
Mr. Denton. Senator, I need to be sure I clarify one point. As a
result of those 18 or so probabilistic risk studies that were done,
many changes were made in the plants because they did identify
think the most
vulnerabilities and areas that contributed to risks I
recent commission tabulation, where they go back and look at the
plants as they exist today, and are being operated, the same calculation
gives an industry average severe core damage frequency of
about 6 chances in 100,000.
So, I think today if you ask the Commission about the 45 percent,
the answer you will get is 12 percent. It sounds like it is pencil
sharpening, but what it really is is that the vulnerabilities identified
in the earlier studies have been corrected, and therefore, as
those improvements are made in the plants, the probability of an
accident gets lower and lower.
The Commission is in favor of standard plants. There is an effort
going on with EPRI, the Electric Power Research Institute, in
which we would get the complete design before we issued any license.
The plant would be designed with a safety goal in mind, so
that that would be a part of the design. That has not been required
as part of our system up to now.
Senator Melcher. Mr. Denton, you mentioned drug and alcohol
programs for the people in the plants. What is the percentage of

^
138
human error then, leading to the risk of a Three Mile accident or
some other similar accident?
Mr. Denton. I don't have an exact number, but you find in every
event we looked at, human error plays a significant role in it.
It is
not just a piece of equipment failing and then
Senator Melcher. So then it is 100 percent.
Mr. Denton. I would say human errors have been involved in
every significant accident in the United States.
Senator Melcher. That is right, so it is 100 percent.
Mr. Denton. And that whole area has taken a lot of our attention
to try to upgrade the qualifications for people who operate the
plant, and programs like drug abuse, to be sure they can perform
in an emergency.
Senator Melcher. For those people who design and engineer the
plants, I suspect that the answers we have received, a 45 percent
likelihood of a TMI accident, has diminished because you have
taken some actions that improve it. Therefore, the 45 percent
found by the staff studies earlier is lower.
I point out that since human error is involved in 100 percent of
those cases, it is no wonder the public has some concern.
Mr. Denton. One area that I think has made a big difference is
the use of simulators. Pre-TMI there were very few simulators used
in the nuclear business. Today there are about 70 or 80 simulators,
which is a reconstruction of the reactor control room, and you can
put the people through their paces with the worse imaginable types
of things going on and make sure they know how to respond.
In a normal reactor, if operated properly, you get very few challenges,
so the operators tend to go stale, and I think the introduction
of simulators is ultimately going to really pay off as an improvement.
Senator Melcher. Thank you, very much, Mr. Denton. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Senator Bumpers, I think you indicated you had
one or two more questions. We can probably crowd those in before
we have to recess for the vote.
It will be my plan to entertain those questions, then release this
panel, recess the committee for the vote, and return to hear the
five witnesses on the second panel.
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for
your indulgence. I just want to say that I would like also to submit
some questions for the record to this panel.
The Chairman. All Members will have that privilege.
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Denton, on June 9, 1986, you are reported
in a publication called Inside NRC, in an interview, you said regarding
General Electric's Mark I containment:
I don't have the same warm feelings about GE containment as I do about the
larger dry containments.
Harold Denton, director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation told utilities
officials, "There has been a lot of work done on those containments, but Mark I
containments, especially being smaller with lower design pressure—and in spite of
the suppression pool—if you look at the WASH 1400 reg safety study, you will find
something like a 90 percent probability of that containment failing."
Now, the GE officials there pooh-poohed that and took strong exception
to what you said. The independent information I have is

139
that you are dead right about that. Have you changed you mind for
any reason?
Mr. Denton. No. I have called in the owners of the Mark I containments.
Senator Bumpers. There are 25 of those in this country, as I understand
it; boiling water reactors, with that containment.
Mr. Denton. As I mentioned earlier, the containments have—
they are all designed for the design-basis event, but they vary with
regard to their capability to withstand the core meltdown. The case
I mentioned, Indian Point, is a strong, big containment which is
probably the most likely to perform well.
The Mark I is the smallest of the containments that exist. I have
met with all the owners. The owners insist that the new research
results that are available indicate that their containment is no
more likely to fail than the big ones. I said it is time to prove it;
that our old studies showed that it was very vulnerable to failure.
There are ways in which that containment can be improved and
brought up to high standards so that the probability of early failure
is low.
They have accepted that challenge and I look forward to closing
that issue with those owners.
Senator Bumpers. I want to thank you. You go on to say:
There is a wide spectrum of ability to cope with severe core accidents in GE
plants, and I urge you to think serious about your ability to cope with such an event
if it were to occur at your plant.
And, then:
containment would withstand a severe
Questions concerning whether the Mark I
accident have taken on new importance following the Chernobyl accident, Denton
said. And in response to the political climate following the accident, industry and
the NRC should focus on the integrity of Mark I containment rather than continuing
to debate the probability of severe accidents.
I applaud you for saying that, and I will certainly applaud you if
you will continue to pursue that in a very vigorous way.
Mr. Denton. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Bumpers. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask unanimous consent
that this entire report be inserted in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The report referred to follows:]
Denton Urges Industry to Settle Doubts About Mark I Containment
NRC's top safety official has urged the U.S. nuclear industry to give top priority
to settling lingering uncertainties about the ability of General Electric's Mark I containment
to withstand a severe core melt accident.
"I don't have the same warm feeling about GE containment that I do about the
larger dry containments," Harold Denton, director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) told utility officials. "There has been a lot of work done on
those containments, but Mark I containments, especially being smaller with lower
design pressure—and in spite of the suppression pool—if you look (at the) WASH
(1400) reg safety study, you'll find something like a 90% probability of that containment
failing."
Denton also told industry leaders gathered last week at an Electrical Power Research
Institute conference at Brookhaven National Laboratory that some plants
with Mark I containments may not be prepared to deal with a severe accident that
might lead to containment failure. "There is a wide spectrum of ability to cope with
severe core accidents in GE plants, and I urge you to think seriously about your
ability to cope with such an event if it were to occur at your plant," he said. There

140
are 25 BWR units with Mark I containments in operation in the U.S., according to a
1984 study done for NRC.
Questions concerning whether the Mark I containment would withstand a severe
accident have taken on new importance following the Chernobyl disaster, Denton
said. And in response to the political climate following the accident, industry and
the NRC should focus on the integrity of Mark I containment rather than continuing
to debate the probability of severe accidents.
"We can argue about the probability of severe core damage for a long time,"
Denton said. "I think the political climate is such that p)eople are willing to concede
that maybe they (severe accidents) vvrill happen now and then at U.S. plants, despite
the best efforts of everyone. But they want to know it won't turn into the Chernobyl-type
event."
For that reason, Denton said, NRC will give "a lot of attention" to industry efforts
concerning the integrity of Mark I containment. He said Idcor (Industry Degraded
Core Rulemaking Program) studies on ways to "be sure these containments
don't fail early due to overpressurization ... should really be top priority." To protect
containments from the overpressurization "would require positive ways to
Mark I
vent and filter before you get a high pressure buildup," Denton added.
Denton said in an interview following his address that the message he was trying
to convey to industry was: "If you want to find something to go look at that has a
high payoff, that (Mark I containments) is not so bad."
The notion that a Mark I containment might fail in the event of a severe accident
wEis strongly disputed in an earlier address to the conference by an official from
Philadelphia Electric Co., who said that that perception has resulted from computer
models "driven by silly little assumptions."
"The perception of the Mark I problem is totally unwarranted," said Richard Diederich,
who is in charge of probabilistic risk assessments for Philadelphia Electric.
Inaccurate assumptions used for the sake of conveninece by both the NRC and Idcor
in modeling accident sequences and the risk of containment failure led to the perception,
Diederich said. But '
it's not true."
GE, in a statement released after questions were raised concerning its containments
following the Chernobyl accident, said: "Attacks on the safety of the containment
system used with GE reactors represent a rehash and exploitation of items
that were raised and then resolved eight years ago ... GE reactors are safe." -Brian
Jordan, Brookhaven National Library.
The Chairman. If there would be no further questions for this
panel, I wish to thank each of you, and I wish to thank the members
of the second panel for their patience. The committee will
stand in recess and will return in just a few minutes.
[The committee was recessed.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Our second panel in the hearing today. Dr. Schulten, director. Institute
for Reactor Development, Nuclear Research Center, Julich,
Germany; Mr. John Taylor, vice president, nuclear power division,
EPRI; Mr. Zack Pate, president. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations;
Dr. Richard Dean, senior vice president, GA Technologies,
Inc.; and Mr. Jan Beyea, senior staff scientist. National Audubon
Society.
We will start with Dr. Schulten, and as I said to the other panel,
your entire prepared statements will be placed in the record. You
are invited to summarize the statements in whatever manner you
wish. Dr. Schulten? We do thank you very much for your willingness
to appear here.
STATEMENT OF DR. RUDOLF SCHULTEN, NUCLEAR RESEARCH
CENTER, JULICH, GERMANY
Dr. Schulten. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce
myself. My name is Schulten. I work in the Nuclear Research
Center, Julich, which is located near Cologne, in Germany, and
which is one of the two big nuclear centers in my country.

141
I
am working there as a leader of the HTR development since
am also
more than 20 years. At the same time, in the last years, I
the vice president of the Technical University in Aachen.
I was in charge of the construction of the AVR, the first hightemperature
reactor in Germany, and I was also the project leader
for the planning and development of the second high-temperature
reactor, a plant of 300 megawatts electrical.
The Grerman HTR Program now is going on since more than 20
years. The main goal of this development is "Reactors with Passive
Safety."
Since about 20 years, we have the first reactor, the AVR, with 15
megawatts electric, and 950 degrees C in operation, quite successfully.
Since several months, the second reactor has been in startup
operations.
In the 20 years development program, a large number of experiments
have been made. The most important are fuel element tests,
safety exp)eriments, tests for corrosion, earthquakes, and concrete
vessels.
A large number of physical calculations and safety analysis of
this reactor type have been made. The safety analyses have been
proved and agreed by licensing authorities. Also, a lot of experiments
and studies have been made for the application of nuclear
process heat for the chemical industry, oil
recovery and coal refinery;
up to now about 5 billion deutsche marks, including the construction
of reactors, have been spent in our country.
Two supplier companies are bidding for small HTR reactors, and
a 500-megawatt electric plant is in the planning stage.
Now, to the accident at Chernobyl. It is a big quantity of zirconium
of more than 100 tons and it is moderated by graphite. About
1,700 vertical channels are in the reactor. This is a system of a
large number of almost independent elements which must be controlled
each by engineering safeguards. The facts which we know
are not clear enough to say the exact reasons for the accident, but
it is sure that the accident started with a chemical explosion of hydrogen
which was created by the very fast reaction of zirconium
with seam. Our own physical calculations of the nuclear core show
in agreement with data from the literature that the core is rather
unstable, because the reactivity and power increases when water is
lost and when the temperature of the moderator is going up.
The so-called xenon oscillations depending from power and temperature
distribution makes controlling of this reactor even more
complicated. Therefore, it is not surprising that there has happened
a nuclear excursion.
The zirconium-steam reaction was a consequence of one or many
of the channels. The hydrogen explosion destroyed the upper part
of the reactor. The central reason has been: Burning of large
amounts of zirconium by steam at elevated temperatures and hydrogen
production. Here it has to be mentioned that this reaction
is strong, self-sustaining because it produces large amounts of heat.
As a final consequence, there has been fuel melting in the channels.
As I mentioned before, the reactor consists of 1,700 channels like
independent small reactors. Additionally to the physics control,
these small reactors made by one channel must be controlled by

142
engineering safeguards for thermodynamic reasons. So far as we
know, this is very difficult and the probabiHty of malfunction of
this system is rather high.
The reaction of graphite with steam or air is much slower. The
reaction of zirconium with steam is faster and in the first stage of
this accident, graphite was a sink which has moderated the influence
to delay of the reaction.
There are important differences to Western reactor types: The
reactor did not have a containment for the core, and also not an
emergency cooling system in the sense of our safety philosophy.
I
should mention that in principle, the Magnox reactor types in
Great Britain and in France are similar systems. Instead of combination
of zirconium and seam, these reactors have a similar combination
of magnesium and carbon dioxide. But in any case, the
en-
Magnox type reactors have much lower power density and is
closed in a big concrete containment. For these reactors, there are
good experience over 30 years.
The HTR working with low enrichment has also a graphite moderator.
Core melting in this reactor type is excluded. In a case of
loss of coolant, graphite is a rather large heat sink and the temperature
in this system will increase in the case of a loss of cooling, by
600 to 700 C in average after a time of 8 to 10 hours.
At this time, the heat is transported by heat conductivity of the
system to the outside, and the maximum temperature in a small
part of the reactor will not be higher than 1,600 C. Many of our
experiments show that under these conditions, there is not a release
of radioactive material from the fuel elements.
The heating up of the reactor by the loss of cooling has been
demonstrated several times in safety experiments in our power
plant AVR in Julich. It is so rare that the reactor did not get damaged,
and continued operation again without any repeat work and
without any influence on the fuel elements. For this reason, even
for the worse case, the small HTR does not need an emergency
cooling system. The reactor is stabilizing itself without release of
radioactive materials.
It is a completely passive, safe system.
Air ingress, which could corrode and burn the graphite, is excluded
by vessels combined with a concrete containment, which can
be constructed underground. The vessels and the vented containments
have only small penetrations. Depressurization of the coolant
helium is possible, but the contamination is so low that there is
no harm to the environment.
In all cases, air ingress is negligible; for instance, in the THTR of
300 megawatts, the reactor has only holes with the diameter of 6
centimeters. In the worse case, this means during several weeks, a
maximum corrosion of graphite less than 100 kilograms on the 100
tons of fuel elements—that means less than one per mil, and there
is no release of radioactivity.
Experiments of air ingress have been made in large extent by
mockups.
For all accidents, the influence to the environment is so small
that evacuation of people is not necessary. This behavior of the
HTR reactor is not dependent on human error.

143
In addition to the development work of the United States and in
Grermany, there is going on development work parallel in the
Soviet Union, in the Kurchatov-Institute and other institutes.
For my last visit to the Kurchatov-Institute, I know that the staff
consists of more than 1,000 scientists and engineers working on the
pebble bed concept, similar to the German design. There may be a
feasibility to get agreement, that an agreement can be established
with the East Block countries for the application of passive, safe
reactor systems.
Senator Domenici [presiding]. Dr. Schulten, would you mind just
letting me ask you a question, please. We have a very serious time
problem, and we had asked witnesses
Dr. Schulten. A half-minute^ust in 1 minute.
Senator Domenici. That is fine. I was going to ask you what you
thought it would take.
Dr. Schulten. The bigger market of nuclear energy in the next
decades are the small reactors. This is demonstrated by studies of
international organizations. The most people in the world are
living in regions with small networks of transportation lines so
that only small units can be used.
Also, the heat application for cogeneration of nuclear steam and
oil recovery need only small units. Therefore, I guess in the next
decade, a large number of passive, safe reactors are necessary, especially
for countries that have not the technology to make active,
safe systems which are used in the reactors today.
Thank you, very much.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, very much. Doctor. We greatly
appreciate the time and effort that you have taken to come and
share your information with us.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schulten follows:]

144
STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES SENATE
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
JUNE 19, 1986
PROFESSOR DR. RUDOLF SCHULTEN
NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER
JULICH, GERMANY

145
Prof. DR. Rudolf Schulten
Nuclear Research Centre Julich
May I INTRODUCE myself. My name is Schulten. 1 work In the
Nuclear Research Centre Julich which is located near Cologne
IN Germany and which is one of the two big nuclear centers
in my country. I AM WORKING THERE AS THE LEADER OF THE HTR
Development since more than 20 years. At the same time in the
last years, i am also the vice president of the technical uni-
VERSITY IN Aachen. I was in charge of the construction of the
AVR, the first High Temperature reactor in Germany, and I was
also the project leader for the planning and development of the
second high temperature reactor - the thtr, a plant of 300 mw(e).
The German HTR-Program now is going on since more than 20 years.
The main goal of the development is: "reactors with passive safety".
Since about 20 years we have the AVR reactor with 15 MW(e) and
950 °C IN operation quite successfully, since several months
the THTR has been in startup operations.
In the 20 years development program a large number of experiments
have been made. The most important are fuel element tests, safety
experiments, tests for corrosion, earthquakes, and concrete vessels.
A LARGE number OF PHYSICAL CALCULATIONS AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF
THIS reactor type HAVE BEEN MADE. THE SAFETY ANALYSIS HAVE BEEN
PROVED AND AGREED BY LICENSING AUTHORITIES. ALSO, A LOT OF EXPERI-
MENTS AND STUDIES HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THE APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR

146
2 -
Process Heat for the chemical industry, oil recovery, and coal
REFINERY, UP TO NOW ABOUT 5 BILLION DEUTSCH MARKS, INCLUDING
the construction of reactors, have been spent in our country.
two supplier companies are bidding for small htr reactors, and
a 500 mw(e) plant is in the planning stage.
now to the accident at chernobyl. it is a boiling water reactor
with a big quantity of zirconium of more than 100 tons and is
moderated by graphite. 1700 vertical channels are in the reactor.
This is a system of a large number of almost independent elements
WHICH must be controlled EACH BY ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS. THE FACTS
which WE KNOW ARE NOT CLEAR ENOUGH TO SAY THE EXACT REASONS FOR
THE ACCIDENT. BUT IT IS SURE THAT THE ACCIDENT STARTED WITH A
CHEMICAL EXPLOSION OF HYDROGEN WHICH WAS CREATED BY THE VERY FAST
REACTION OF ZIRCONIUM WITH STEAM. OUR OWN PHYSICAL CALCULATIONS
OF THE NUCLEAR CORE SHOW IN AGREEMENT WITH DATA FROM THE LITERA-
TURE THAT THE CORE IS RATHER INSTABLE, BECAUSE THE REACTIVITY
AND POWER INCREASES WHEN WATER IS LOST AND WHEN THE TEMPERATURE
OF THE MODERATOR IS GOING UP. THE SO-CALLED XENON OSCILLATIONS
DEPENDING FROM POWER AND TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION MAKE THE CON-
TROLLING OF THIS REACTOR EVEN MORE COMPLICATED. THEREFORE IT
IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THERE HAS HAPPEND A NUCLEAR EXCURSION.
The ZIRCONIUM-STEAM REACTION WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF A DRYOUT OF ONE
OR MANY OF THE CHANNELS. THE HYDROGEN EXPLOSION DESTROYED THE UPPER
PART OF THE REACTOR. THE CENTRAL REASON HAS BEEN: BURNING OF
LARGE AMOUNTS OF ZIRCONIUM BY STEAM AT ELEVATED TEMPERATURE AND
HYDROGEN PRODUCTION. HERE IT HAS TO BE MENTIONED THAT THIS REACTION
IS STRONG SELFSUSTAINING BECAUSE IT PRODUCES LARGE AMOUNTS OF HEAT.
As A FINAL CONSEQUENCE THERE HAS BEEN FUEL MELTING IN THE CHANNELS.

147
3 -
As I MENTIONED BEFORE, THE REACTOR CONSISTS OF 1700 CHANNELS
LIKE INDEPENDENT SMALL REACTORS. ADDITIONALLY TO THE PHYSICS
CONTROL THESE SMALL REACTORS MADE BY ONE CHANNEL MUST BE CON-
TROLLED BY ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS FOR THERMODYNAMIC REASONS,
So FAR AS WE KNOW, THIS IS VERY DIFFICULT AND THE PROBABILITY
OF MALFUNCTION OF THIS SYSTEM IS RATHER HIGH.
The REACTION OF GRAPHITE WITH STEAM OR AIR IS MUCH SLOWER. THE
REACTION OF ZIRCONIUM WITH STEAM IS FASTER AND IN THE FIRST STATE
OF THIS ACCIDENT, GRAPHITE WAS A HEAT SINK WHICH HAS A MODERATING
INFLUENCE TO DELAY THE REACTION. THERE ARE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES
TO WESTERN REACTOR TYPES: THE REACTOR DID NOT HAVE A CONTAINMENT
FOR THE CORE AND ALSO NOT AN EMERGENCY COOLING SYSTEM IN THE
SENCE OF OUR SAFETY PHILOSOPHY.
I SHOULD MENTION THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE MAGNOX REACTOR TYPES IN
Great Britain and in France are similar systems. Instead of a
combination of zirconium and steam, these reactors have a similar
combination OF MAGNESIUM AND CARBON DIOXIDE. BUT IN ANY CASE,
THE MAGNOX Type reactors have a much lower power density AND
IS enclosed in a BIG CONCRETE CONTAINMENT. FOR THESE REACTORS
THERE ARE GOOD EXPERIENCE OVER 30 YEARS.
The HTR WORKING with low enrichment HAS ALSO A GRAPHITE MODERATOR.
Core melting in this reactor type is excluded. In a case of loss
OF coolant, graphite is a rather large heat sink and the temperature
in this system will increase in the case of a loss of cooling
BY 600 to 700 °C IN AVERAGE AFTER 8 TO 10 HOURS. AT THIS TIME

.
148
- ^
THE HEAT IS TRANSPORTED BY HEAT CONDUCTIVITY OF THE SYSTEM TO
THE OUTSIDE, AND THE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE IN A SMALL PART OF THE
REACTOR WILL NOT BE HIGHER THAN 1600 °C. MANY OF OUR EXPERIMENTS
SHOW THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THERE IS NOT A RELEASE OF RADIO-
ACTIVE MATERIAL FROM THE FUEL ELEMENTS. THIS HEATING UP OF THE
REACTOR BY THE LOSS OF COOLING HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED SEVERAL
TIMES IN SAFETY EXPERIMENTS IN OUR POWER PLANT AVR IN JiJLICH.
The RESULTS WERE THAT THE REACTOR DiD NOT GET DAMAGED AND CON-
TINUED OPERATION AGAIN WITHOUT ANY REPAIR WORK AND WITHOUT ANY
INFLUENCE ON THE FUEL ELEMENTS. FOR THIS REASON EVEN FOR THE
WORST CASE THE SMALL HTR DOES NOT NEED AN EMERGENCY COOLING
SYSTEM. The REACTOR IS STABILIZING ITSELF WITHOUT RELEASE OF
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS. IT IS A COMPLETELY PASSIVE, SAFE SYSTEM.
Air INGRESS WHICH COULD CORRODE AND BURN THE GRAPHITE IS EXCLUDED
BY VESSELS COMBINED WITH A CONCRETE CONTAINMENT, WHICH CAN BE
CONSTRUCTED UNDERGROUND. THE VESSELS AND THE VENTED CONTAINMENTS
HAVE ONLY SMALL PENETRATIONS. DEPRESSURIZI ATION OF THE COOLANT
HELIUM IS POSSIBLE, BUT THE CONTAINMENT IS SO LOW THAT THERE
IS NO HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT. In ALL CASES AIR INGRESS IS
NEGLIGIBLE, FOR INSTANCE, THE THTR HAS ONLY HOLES WITH THE DIA-
METER OF 6 CENTIMETERS. IN THE WORST CASE, THIS MEANS DURING
SEVERAL WEEKS A MAXIMUM CORROSION OF GRAPHITE LESS THAN 100 KILO-
GRAMS ON THE 100 TONS OF FUEL ELEMENTS, AND THERE IS NO RELEASE
OF RADIOACTIVITY. EXPERIMENTS OF THIS AIR INGRESS HAVE BEEN MADE
IN LARGE EXTENT BY MOCK-UPS

149
5 -
For all accidents the influence to the environment is so small
THAT evacuation OF PEOPLE IS NOT NECESSARY. THIS BEHAVIOUR OF
THE HTR REACTOR IS NOT DEPENDENT ON HUMAN ERROR.
In addition to the development work in THE US AND IN GERMANY
THERE IS GOING ON DEVELOPMENT WORK IN THE SOWJET-UNION IN THE
KURCHATOV-lNSTITUTE AND OTHER INSTITUTES. FROM MY VISITS TO THE
KURCHATOV-lNSTITUTE I KNOW THAT THE STAFF CONSISTS OF MORE THAN
1000 SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS WORKING ON THE PEBBLE BED CONCEPT,
SIMILAR TO THE GERMAN DESIGN. THEREFORE IT IS FEASIBLE THAT AN
AGREEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH THE EAST BLOC COUNTRIES FOR
THE APPLICATION OF PASSIVE, SAFE REACTOR SYSTEMS.
The BIGGER MARKET OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE NEXT DECADES ARE THE
SMALL REACTORS. THIS IS DEMONSTRATED BY STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS. THE MOST PEOPLE IN THE WORLD ARE LIVING IN REGIONS
WITH SMALL NETWORKS OF TRANSPORTATION LINES, SO THAT ONLY SMALL
UNITS CAN BE USED. ALSO, THE HEAT APPLICATION FOR COGENERATION
AND NUCLEAR STEAM FOR OIL RECOVERY NEED ONLY SMALL UNITS. THERE-
FORE, I GUESS IN THE NEXT DECADES A LARGE NUMBER OF PASSIVE,
SAFE REACTORS ARE NECESSARY.
CONCLUSIONS:
The HTR is characterised by the following items:
1) It has a PASSIVE, safety system.
2) Human errors are not dangerous
3) Evacuation of people in the worst case is not necessary.
This means a new era of reactor safety philosophy.

150
Senator Domenici. Mr. Taylor, we will be delighted to hear your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN J. TAYLOR, VICE PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR
POWER, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Senator. I have submitted my statement
and I
am going to simply make the major points that are covered
there, and address a couple of other questions that were raised at
the first panel discussion.
The primary objective of the EPRI Nuclear Power Program is to
provide technology to improve the safety and reliability of the nuclear
powerplants. In keeping with that objective, EPRI continues
to review and study the many aspects of safety in the U.S. nuclear
powerplants.
After the accident at TMI, EPRI took a series of initiatives following
the accident, to further our understanding of this accident
and strengthen utility systems to assure the safety of nuclear
power.
The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center was formed to do indepth reviews
of the accident, to pinpoint the causes, to find corrective actions.
Also, on a continuing basis, to examine carefully incidents in
the field, identify accident precursors, and communicate them to
the United States.
More recently, INPO has taken on the daily task of doing that,
using systems set up at the time.
An important issue was to launch a major research program to
better understand severe accidents and the potential for release of
radioactivity to the atmosphere. That work had a heavy element of
developing methodology for probabilistic risk assessment, and the
comments made earlier today about the 45-percent change of an accident,
a severe accident in this country, I would like to dwell on
for a moment in light of our experience.
That evaluation was done for a subset of plants and represents in
fact a somewhat higher estimate of probability than we have seen
from some more recent estimates for plants. To multiply that
number by the entire number of plants in the United States, I
think is an error in the first place, giving a very much higher estimate
of the probability of difficulty.
Further, for the most part, those evaluations were made to identify
the occurrence of the beginning of trouble; the onset of loss of
core cooling. Our experience at TMI-2 and many other evaluations
have shown when you reach that point, there are many other
events, signals that occur which would provide some substantial
time for operator action.
So the probability of moving from the onset of core cooling to a
severely damaged core is substantially lower.
Furthermore, even if that happens, the source term work we
have done indicates that containment does perform its function to
protect the public from further dissemination of fission products.
So the picture that one is faced with serious public risk, with one
chance in two, in the rest of this century, in my opinion, is an
alarmist statement.

151
One other feature which is extremely important in these evaluations
is operator action. For the most part these methods assumes
the operator does not take effective action in responding to the
emergency condition.
We know that is in effect in doing these risk assessments and
have launched a program which now is being done cooperatively
with the major national utility in France, to measure the response
time of operators under full-scale simulation of accident condition.
We are not finished with that, but what we have so far is an indication
that if we apply the data, we will find that the probabilities
of getting into a truly severe core melt condition are 10 times lower
than our present methods would indicate.
I would like now to discuss— my paper points out the many other
areas of work we have undertaken and reliability, particularly to
address the lessons from TMI-2, and I will not repeat those.
Many of these actions that we took were done at the request of
the Utility Nuclear Power Oversight Committee of the utility. A
steering group of chief executive officers of the nuclear utility.
Shortly after Chernobyl, this group supported an industry technical
review group, functioning with AIF staff support, to evaluate
the causes, postaccident response, and recovery experience of the
Chernobyl accident, identify whatever lessons there may be for
U.S. commercial nuclear powerplants and responding to the legitimate
questions raised by the accident.
That group met on May 29, and finalized the industry efforts on
Chernobyl, and EPRI has been asked by UNPOC to provide technical
support for that evaluation. So our staff has been working to
understand the events of Chernobyl and to develop an understanding
of what lessons from that event can be applied to our U.S. commercigd
nuclear power industry.
A thorough understanding of the sequence of events and a thorough
understanding of the performance of all the safety systems
and operator actions during the event is crucial to developing
sound conclusions and recommendations.
We are concerned that pressures on the NRC and on our industry
to produce quick answers and quick fixes in response to Chernobyl
may preclude doing the thorough job of analysis that is so
importgmt to rational decision-making. We must avoid the temptation
to shoot from the hip.
I would like to make a comment on some discussions earlier
today which I believe are of the nature of shooting from the hip.
EPA was challenged on why it did not consider seriously a report
of a measurement in Europe of 1.5 millirem per hour, or 1,500
roentgens; 1,500 roentgens will kill a person in 1 to 2 hours, so on
the very face of it that information is inappropriate.
There is also great discussion of the possibility of several hundred
thousand people getting cancer as a result of the Chernobyl
accident. Now, I agree with the statement made by EPA that they
do not want to make guesses without the information on what the
exposure of those people would be.
But we do have information from the tragedy of the bombings in
Japan. There were 285,000 survivors of that bombing, which as you
well know killed tens of thousands of people, who had excess radiation
dose.

152
Of that, over the many, many years, because of the sincere support
and interest of the United States and this Congress, the Commission
was set up to study the health of those people for the rest
of their lives.
At this juncture, 30-plus years later, 70,000 people have died;
14,000 of those from cancer and 415 of those cancers have been concluded
have come from the excess radiation exposure.
I find it very hard to accept the comments of 300,000 cancer
deaths in the Chernobyl accident, where tens of people—not tens of
thousands of people—were killed.
We would love to know enough about exposure so we could make
our estimates and respond to legitimate questions which the Senator
has raised. I agree totally with his remark; we must know. We
must understand those issues and we would like to see the Soviet
Union, perhaps in combination with the World Health Organization,
do the same thing the United States did with the Japan survivors;
study their health through the rest of their lives, and develop
a base through which we can understand better the consequences
of excess radiation exposure.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Taylor, let me ask you—I don't intend to
inquire of each witness, but you mentioned the cancer deaths as a
result of the bomb. Then you said there is a small number that are
directly related to—provable £is related to the excess radioactivity
to which they were exposed.
Is the remaining number of cancer deaths an inordinately high
number of cancer deaths?
Mr. Taylor. No. That is on a statistical basis what one would
expect from that population not associated with overexposure of radiation.
Senator Domenici. All right.
Mr. Taylor. Incidentally, without that carefully study, it would
have been near impossible to even recognize the difference; to be
able to single 400 out of the 14,000 is a difficult task.
Well, to get on then, following our time work, there were long
lists of new requirements and an attempt to require that everything
be done at once. In retrospect, many of the new requirements
were excellent but the effort to implement them without prioritization
led to unforeseen complications.
We believe the industry and NRC both learned much from that
experience and as a minimum, we believe it would be premature to
make proposals for additional changes to U.S. approaches to safety
prior to receiving and analyzing the full report on the accident
from the Soviet Union.
The content of this paper then gets into the discussion of the differences
between these systems, and I don't intend to repeat what
has been said by many capable people on the panel, and hope perhaps
that the record itself will provide some amplification.
The emphasis on the differences is not intended to suggest that
there are no lessons from Chernobyl, but to help us focus on the
facts and to ensure that correct lessons are identified.
One comment, we have divided the differences into reactor
design differences, which have been discussed; containment differences,
which have been discussed; and safety system differences
which have been discussed.

153
In just a summary statement on safety system differences:
concluded that the Soviet designs don't address the full scope of
design basis accidents that we do in the United States, nor do they
treat low probability, high consequent scenarios, accident mitigation,
and emergency response in the detail that we have had, particularly,
since TMI.
Many of the accidents they do consider, such as individual channel
blockage, are unique to their designs, and many of the accidents
they don't appear to consider are within the U.S. design
basis.
Finally, we think that U.S. technical specifications for reactor
operation, limiting conditions of operation, emergency procedures,
realistic operator training and m£iny other operations related features
that are important to reactor safety in the United States may
not each receive the same level of attention in the Soviet Union.
In summary, I think the United States might well be proud, in
retrospect of the Chernobyl accident, and particularly, the Congress,
for two fundamental policy decisions at the outset of the program.
When the first shippingport plant it was decided to put containment
on it. For the next 30 years, we have been honing, improving,
evaluating the capability of containment and the consequences
of potential release of radiation.
This has been backed up by a massive safety research and development
program, through your generosity, so we are literally decades
ahead of the Soviet Union because a policy was established
quite distinct from theirs which chose not to have containment.
Those of us who implement policies are subject to a substantial
amount of error, difficulty in being perfect in implementing it. But
you should be proud that you set the right policy, which makes it a
heck of a lot easier for us.
The second one, you separated civilian nuclear power development
from weapons production, and the Soviet channel reactor is a
dual purpose reactor. They chose not to separate it.
As an engineer, I am glad I was not given the job designing an
optimum power producer in the same machine as an optimum plutonium
producer. That is what they have tried to do.
I think the industry, too, can be proud of its overall record of improvement
since the 'TMI accident. I think Zack Pate is going to
give you some very specific data on those improvements.
Safety has been improved as a result of both regulatory effort
and the industry initiatives. If we give appropriate credit to the improvements
of the last 7 years, as we intensify our efforts to make
these more uniformly excellent throughout our industry and
search through the lessons of Chernobyl for opportunities for further
improvement, we probably will find that the important lessons
of reactor safety have been learned already and applied in the
United States.
We look forward to a new level of international cooperation on
reactor safety and will continue to work with Government and industry
organizations to ensure safety in the design, construction,
and operation of nuclear powerplants.
Thank you, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor follows:]
We

154
statement
to
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
of
the
Dnited
States Senate
John J. Taylor
Vice President, Nuclear Power
Electric Power Research Institute
June 19, 1986

155
statement of John J. Taylor
Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
June 19, 1986
I am John Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Power, Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI), I want to thank the
Chairman and the other members of this Committee for the
opportunity to express our views on this very important
subject.
A primary objective of the EPRI nuclear power program is to
provide technology to improve the safety and reliability of
nuclear power plants. In keeping with that objective, EPRI
continues to review and study the many aspects of safety in
U.S. nuclear power plants. After the accident at TMI, EPRI
took a series of initiatives following the TMI-2 accident to
further our understanding of nuclear accidents and strengthen
utility systems for assuring the safety of nuclear
power:
(1) The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) was formed,
and an in-depth review of the TMI-2 accident was carried
out to pinpoint the causes, define corrective actions,
and publish a detailed analysis of the accident.
(2) NSAC was assigned to evaluate operating reactor incidents
so as to identify generic accident precursors and
root causes and communicate them to all U.S. nuclear
utilities. The SEE-IN (the evaluation phase) and
NETWORK (the communication phase) systems, initially
developed by NSAC, have now been turned over to INPO and
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156
have become vital and continuing processes in the
industry .
(3) A major research program was launched to better understand
severe accidents and the potential for release of
radioactive materials to the atmosphere (the "source
term")
(4) The entire EPRI nuclear power R&D program in safety and
reliability was re-oriented on the basis of the "lessons
learned" from TMI-2 and the recommendations of the
Kemeny Commission and other investigations of the TMI-2
accident. A major safety relief valve test program was
implemented. Improved devices for valve position indication
were developed. A large-scale hydrogen control
test program was implemented. Major attention was given
to improvement of human factors in operation and maintenance,
including diagnostic aids and system-oriented
procedures for improved emergency response, signal validation
techniques, and simulator qualification standards.
Development and application of probabilistic
risk assessment methodology was intensified, particularly
in the treatment of human error inputs and common
mode failure. Extensive testing of emergency core cooling
systems and small break loss of coolant accident
transients was implemented. Major effort was devoted to
develop improved in-service inspection techniques and to
establish inspector training qualification programs.
Time does not permit a full summary of these activities.
Many of the actions taken by EPRI after the Three Mile
Island accident were undertaken at the request of the
Utility Nuclear Power Oversight Committee (UNPOC), a steering
group of chief executive officers of nuclear utilities.
Shortly after Chernobyl, UNPOC supported an industry
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157
technical review group, endorsed by the AIF Board, to
evaluate the causes, post-accident response, and recovery
experience of the Chernobyl accident, identify whatever
lessons there may be for U.S. commercial nuclear power
plants, and respond to the legitimate questions raised by
the accident. That group met on May 29th and formalized the
industry efforts on Chernobyl. EPRI has been asked by UNPOC
to provide technical support for these industry efforts.
Our staff has been working to understand the events of the
Chernobyl accident and to develop an understanding of what
lessons from that event can be applied to our U.S. commercial
nuclear power industry. We have found, as others have,
that detailed technical information on Soviet plant designs
and operation is difficult to obtain. We have also found
that the lack of detailed accident information at this time
has made it virtually impossible to develop a thorough analysis
of the event, as we did for the Three Mile Island accident.
EPRI has responsibility to the electric utilities to
do what we can to develop the best possible technical explanation
of the accident and its consequences. Industry
groups such as EPRI, INPO, and AIF are working together with
NRC, DOE, the IAEA, and hopefully with the Soviets, to
obtain adequate information to create a detailed sequence of
events and thorough understanding of root causes and consequences
of the Chernobyl accident.
One of the most important lessons we learned from our
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center analyses of the Three Mile
Island accident, and other significant events which NSAC
analyzed and reported, is that a thorough understanding of
the sequence of events and a thorough understanding of the
performance of all the safety system and operator actions
during the event, is crucial to developing sound conclusions
and recommendations. We are concerned that pressures on the
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158
NRC and our industry to produce quick answers and quick
fixes in response to the Chernobyl accident may preclude
doing the thorough job qf analysis that is so important to
rational decision making. We must avoid the temptation to
'shoot from the hip.' Following TMI, there were long lists
of new requirements, and an attempt to require that everything
be done at once. In retrospect, many of the new
requirements were excellent, but the effort to implement
them without prioritization led to unforeseen
complications. We believe the industry and the NRC both
learned much from that experience. As a minimum, we believe
it would be premature to make proposals for additional
changes to U.S. approaches to safety prior to receiving and
analyzing the full report on the accident from the Soviet
Union.
One of the major reasons which mandates that we analyze this
event carefully prior to formulating recommendations for
U.S. light water reactors (LWRs) is that the Soviet designs
are significantly different from ours. Fundamental design
and operational differences exist that make side-by-side
comparisons extremely difficult. These fundamental differences
lead us to draw two immediate conclusions:
1. First, the differences will make it difficult to draw
easy applications to the U.S. situation. Many of the
lessons from Chernobyl will not apply to U.S. plants.
Some lessons will apply, and must be analyzed. Initial
challenges or event initiators can be very similar
between U.S. and Soviet plants. Also, we believe the
consequences of the Chernobyl accident, in terms of
accident source terms, radioactive transport, health
effects, and cleanup efforts are all important areas
that U.S. scientists must study and apply as appropriate
to our own safety programs and analysis efforts.
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159
2. Second, we must not fail to recognize the most obvious
fact about U.S. -Soviet nuclear power program comparisons:
Chernobyl was vastly different from our 1979
accident at Three Mile Island. Despite the fact that
each experienced major core damage, the public health
effects from the Three Mile Island accident and the
Chernobyl accident are dramatically different. No
deaths or radiation injuries resulted from the Three
Mile Island accident. The exhaustive Pennsylvania
Department of Health study completed last September
found no evidence of increased cancer among area residents
due to the 1979 accident at TMI . No damage to
crops or livestock occurred, and no cleanup of land
outside the plant boundaries was required. Our basic
design and safety philosophy - namely, defense in-depth
with multiple safety barriers - and the implementation
of this approach in the U.S. designs and operations
account for that difference. The analysis of Chernobyl
will no doubt reveal some opportunities for further
improvements in the design and operation of U.S.
reactors, but we must not lose sight of the fact that
TMI-Chernobyl comparisons indicate that our program is
fundamentally sound. This is a credit not only to our
industry, but to the NRC and to the Congress, all of
whose efforts have been open to public scrutiny within
our democratic process. They all have worked together
to achieve high standards of safety.
I would like to take a few minutes to explain in more detail
some of these important differences between U.S. and Soviet
reactor designs. I must again emphasize that our information
on Soviet designs is incomplete. My emphasis on the
following differences is not intended to suggest that there
are no lessons to learn from Chernobyl, but to help us focus
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160
on the facts and to ensure that correct lessons are identified.
My summary of fundamental design differences will be
divided into three areas: reactor differences, containment
differences, and safety system differences. My point of
comparison will be the U.S. light water reactor.
REACTOR DIFFERENCES
The Chernobyl reactors are light-water cooled, graphite
moderated, vertical pressure tube, boiling water reactors.
These 1000 MWe plants are called "RBMK-1000 '
by the
Soviets. The RBMK reactors are the dominant standard Soviet
design. RBMK-type designs comprise over one-half of all
operating Soviet power reactors and about 65% of their
nuclear capacity.
The first difference between Soviet RBMKs and U.S. LWRs is
the use of graphite as a neutron moderator. The RBMK design
evolved in the Soviet program from earlier weapons production
reactors that used graphite and low enrichment
uranium. U.S. designers selected the light water coolant as
moderator over graphite for power reactor applications for a
number of reasons:
• First, the concerns associated with a potentially
flammable material inside the reactor core are avoided,
along with all the complex support systems that go with
it (moderator heat removal, cover gas, fire protection,
etc. ) .
• Second, the unique physical problems of graphite under
irradiation, requiring annealing of the Wigner energy
effects, are avoided.
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161
• Third, the Soviet graphite reactors are very large in
physical size. We have had favorable experience with
the more compact LWR systems.
• Fourth, they are very complex when compared to U.S.
LWRs. About 1700 individual pressure tubes are embedded
in the 1800 tons of graphite, each with its individual
inlet and outlet piping.
• Fifth, the advantages of graphite moderation in a watercooled
reactor are associated with production of
material for weapons: use of very low enrichment or
natural uranium and on-line refueling. Co-production of
commercial power and weapons materials was not supported
by our government or scientific experts; and graphite
moderation was not attractive to U.S. utilities, who had
no interest in providing materials for the U.S. weapons
program.
My discussion of the significant differences between
graphite and water moderation is not meant to say that
graphite is dangerous inherently. The U.S. technical community
has made important improvements in graphite safety,
and defense-in-depth can be designed into graphite reactors.
The next major difference between U.S. and Soviet reactor
designs is in the defense-in-depth barriers. These are
provided to ensure that nuclear fuel and fission products
cannot escape the core. Both Soviet RBMK reactors and U.S.
LWRs use UO2 fuel pellets surrounded by a zirconium cladding
or 'can' of about 0.02 inches to 0.03 inches wall thickness.
These fuel elements are similar, but the next barrier
of defense against release is radically different. The
Soviets use about 1700 individual zirconium alloy pressure
tubes, 23 feet high, and 3 1/2 inches in diameter to contain
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162
the fuel elements and light water coolant flowing past the
fuel elements. The pressure tube walls are about 0.16
inches thick and are located within 1/4 inch of the fuel
cladding; whereas the pressure vessel walls on U.S. LWRs are
about 6 1/2 to 8 1/2 inches thick, and are separated from
fuel and fuel cladding by about two feet of water and steel
thermal shielding. This means that during an accident,
overheated and damaged fuel elements on a Soviet RBMK reactor
have a much greater chance of penetrating this second
barrier of defense (the pressure tubes) than on a U.S. LWR
(a single large pressure vessel).
These first two Soviet differences, use of graphite as the
moderator and thin-walled pressure tubes, combine to form a
third distinction, the possibility of creating dangerously
hot-graphite/hot-steam reactions from a breach in the pressure
tube wall. This reaction releases carbon monoxide and
hydrogen gas, which can burn or explode in the presence of
oxygen.
As at TMI, when the core overheated, hydrogen was generated
from the chemical reaction between the hot zircalloy
cladding and the water or steam. However, two important
differences between U.S. and Soviet RBMK reactor designs
impacted the consequences of hydrogen production from zirconium-water
reactions. First, the Soviet design includes
two to seven times more zirconium inventory than U.S. LWRs,
and thus the potential for much more hydrogen production.
Second, the likelihood that oxygen can come in contact with
this chemically produced hydrogen in an accident is much
greater in the Soviet RBMK design. At the time of the TMI
accident, there was never any danger from explosion of the
hydrogen bubble in the pressure vessel. Oxygen gas was not
present in the reactor coolant system, so no explosion was
possible
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163
Although both the RBMK and LWR designs use light water as
coolant, the different reactor designs create some unique
cooling and stability problems for the Soviets. First, with
a relatively small water inventory in the reactors, little
time is available to respond to challenges such as losses of
inventory, before coolant boiloff and fuel overheating
begins. Individual fuel channels may boil dry if there are
channel-to-channel instabilities between pressure tubes.
Even more important, loss of coolant does not appear to
result in the fail-safe negative reactivity that exists in
U.S. designs. Soviet reactors have exhibited positive steam
void reactivity coefficients which required iesign changes
including control rod changes, increased reactor control
computerization, and increases in fuel enrichment. By contrast,
both the UK and Canada carefully considered pressure
tube designs with reactivity coefficients similar to the
RBMK type design as an alternative for power reactors, and
this inherent instability problem was stated as a key reason
for rejecting this boiling water, vertical pressure tube
design.
CONTAINMENT DIFFERENCES
I have summarized the major differences in Soviet RBMK vs.
U.S. LWR reactor designs, and will now say a few words about
reactor containment. The subject of Soviet containments has
generated a great deal of discussion. On this subject, we
find that technical information on RBMK containment capability
is much less available than technical information on
RBMK reactor designs. We believe this to be a result of
relatively slow development of containment technology in the
Soviet program. Early Soviet reactors had no containment
whatsoever. Incremental steps have been taken on subsequent
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164
generations of RBMK designs to improve on this situation,
but to this date we are unaware of any operating or underconstruction
Soviet RBMK with a full primary containment in
the sense we in the West define full containment.
To us, full containment means complete enclosure of all
reactor and primary support systems for the reactor such
that any design basis accident is contained inside. Full
primary containment is achieved typically in the U.S. by
building a strong, thick steel and concrete containment
vessel around all primary reactor systems. The containment
is either large enough to contain the peak pressure anticipated
for the worst design basis accidents, or has sufficient
"pressure suppression" or steam condensing capacity to
contain that worst case peak pressure. Most U.S. LWRs have
containments with design pressures of about 60 psi with
ultimate yield strengths as high as 3 times that figure.
For some U.S. containments with lower design pressures, such
as BWR MK-3 and ice condensers, sufficient pressure suppression
capacity is installed to limit the worst case accident
peak pressure to a much lower value that is well within the
containment design. Needless to say, the capability of a
containment to perform its design purpose successfully is
not merely a function of its design pressure, but also its
size and pressure suppression capacity. Finally, "full
containment" as defined by the U.S. implies the ability to
isolate completely and rapidly all containment penetrations,
such as main steam and main feedwater piping under accident
conditions.
We have heard of reports based on Soviet technical literature
that credit the Chernobyl Unit 4 with containment. We
have studied the Soviet literature and believe such claims
probably are not correct in the sense that we define "full
containment." This lack of containment seems to be sub-
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165
stantiated by a recent Associated Press report that Ivan
Emel'yanov, Deputy Director of the RBMK design organization,
"confirmed speculation that the reactor did not have a conventional
containment vessel used in the West to prevent
radiation leaks in case of a breakdown." The evidence does
appear to point toward newer RBMKs like Chernobyl-4 being
equipped with some compartmentalization and a pressure suppression
system called a 'bubbler pond'. Earlier RBMKs
appear to have no such pressure suppression capability.
But, as previously stated, even the more modern Soviet RBMK
structural designs would not qualify in the U.S. as "containment."
A more appropriate term would be "limited
pressure suppression capability."
We base this conclusion of lack of full containment on four
observations
• First, it appears that only part of the primary system
is enclosed within a boundary intended to be pressure
tight. Reactor inlet piping is enclosed, but Soviet
literature implies that reactor outlet piping and the
four large steam drums or steam separators are outside
the pressure suppression boundary enclosure. We doubt
that the reactor core itself is protected by a strong
pressure boundary. There is a sealed barrier around the
core that encloses the mixture of helium and nitrogen
that cools and protects the graphite from oxygen, but
the pressure and explosion-handling capability of this
region is doubtful.
• Second, the numerous piping penetrations of the various
pressure boundaries and biological shields do not appear
to be equipped with isolation capability (e.g., pressure
tube exit isolation valves, main steam isolation valves,
main feedwater isolation valves).
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• Third, the design appears to be limited to the pressure
suppression of certain specific break sizes and locations,
and does not appear to envelope the full range of
possible accident sequences for which U.S. containments
are analyzed.
• Fourth, the structure does not appear to be designed to
withstand burning or explosion of combustible gases from
zirconium-water reactions or graphite-steam reactions.
The inventory of potential chemical energy in the
RBMK-1000 type reactor is very much greater than in an
equivalent 1000 MWe light water reactor. As previously
stated, the amount of zirconium is between two and seven
times larger than comparable U.S. LWRs . Also, the
RMBK's graphite combustion energy has no equivalent in
light water reactors.
In general, Soviet compar tmentalization appears directed at
limiting the pressures from pipe breaks, not containing
chemical energy or the activity that could be released in an
accident. Again, the comparison of what happened at TMI and
at Chernobyl helps explain the importance of these design
differences. At TMI, very little activity escaped containment.
Most of the small amount of activity that was
released was in the form of gaseous fission products that
present relatively small health risks in comparison to the
particulate fission products that were contained effectively.
As previously discussed, the hydrogen produced at TMI
from the high temperature chemical reaction between zirconium
and water did not result in combustion inside the
reactor coolant system. However, some of the hydrogen did
escape the reactor coolant system via a power operated
relief valve and surge tank relief system. This hydrogen
accumulation eventually resulted in a hydrogen burn and
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pressure buildup inside the TMI containment, but without any
adverse consequences. The TMI containment building design
was strong enough to contain overpressures from both escaping
steam, and from hydrogen release and burn. In comparison,
the Chernobyl accident appears to us to indicate a
weakness in the Soviet RBMK design with respect to containing
fission products and chemical energy.
SAFETY SYSTEM DIFFERENCES
The final area of U.S. and Soviet designs that I wish to
address is safety systems. This topic is perhaps the most
difficult area of comparison, but also is an area that may
yield the most useful applications to our industry. Soviet
nuclear power plant safety criteria and systems will be
difficult to analyze, not only because of the limited number
of Soviet papers on the subject, but because we believe that
the description of a safety system in Soviet literature does
not necessarily mean the system described is in fact
installed, tested, and available to perform its design function
on each Soviet reactor. This makes it hard to do the
kind of safety analysis and risk assessment that we do on
U.S. LWRs. We understand that a Soviet design may call for
three emergency diesels, where in fact the plant may operate
before the third diesel is delivered to the site. We read a
translation of a Soviet paper that describes the safety
value of adding a turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
It may be describing a desired feature that is not yet
installed, despite the implication that it is part of the
design. It is our understanding that such a feature was
not installed at Chernobyl. We also question whether tests
and computer analyses of various modes of degraded heat
transfer inside pressure tubes were part of the design
process, or were conducted later to study the effects of
accidents not considered originally, or to study the details
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and ramifications of flow and heat transfer instabilities
observed during actual operations. I bring up the above
points not as a criticism of Soviet safety systems, but as a
caution against conclusions that can be drawn from Soviet
literature that may later prove to be unwarranted
extrapolation.
We have studied the available literature on RBMK safety
systems. Soviet ECCS systems in modern RBMK designs appear
to be similar to Western approaches, but appear to lack the
degree of redundancy and diversity we have provided in our
modern LWRs. For example, we believe that Soviet RBMKs may
lack the capability for continuous injection of makeup water
for post-scram decay heat removal in the event of a station
blackout. This capability typically is provided on U.S.
PWRs by a turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater AFW Pump, and
on U.S. BWRs by a turbine driven High Pressure Coolant
Injection (HPCI) pump, or High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)
pump, as well as a smaller turbine driven Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling (RCIC) pump.
We have concluded that Soviet designs do not address the
full scope of design basis accidents that we do in the U.S.,
nor do they treat low probability, high consequence scenarios,
accident mitigation and emergency response in the
detail that we have since TMI . Many of the accidents they
do consider, such as individual channel blockage, are unique
to Soviet designs; and many of the accidents they don't
appear to consider are within the U.S. design basis, such as
earthquake and missiles. Finally, we think that U.S. technical
specifications for reactor operation, limiting conditions
of operation, emergency procedures, realistic operator
training, and many other operations-related features that
are important to reactor safety in the U.S. may not each
receive the same level of attention in the Soviet Union.
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SUMMARY
The U.S. has reason to be proud of its overall record of
improvement since the TMI accident. We have made major
design, operational, and institutional improvements since
TMI. Safety has been improved as a result of both regulatory
actions and industry initiatives. If we give appropriate
credit to the improvements of the last seven years as we
intensify our efforts to make these more uniformly excellent
throughout our industry and search through the lessons of
Chernobyl for opportunities for further improvement, we
probably will find that the important lessons of reactor
safety have been learned already and applied in the U.S. We
look forward to a new level of international cooperation on
reactor safety, and will continue to work with government
and industry oganizations to ensure safety in the design,
construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

—
170
Senator Domenici. Thank you. Let me tell the panel, we do
intend to listen and be here. What I must do for about 3 minutes is
to temporarily adjourn. I have to return a long distance call. I will
do that in this room, and return and then take the balance of the
testimony.
So you are in recess for a few moments.
[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]
Senator Domenici. Our next witness will be Zack Pate, president
of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Atlanta, GA.
STATEMENT OF DR. ZACK T. PATE, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE OF
NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
Dr. Pate. Senator, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Institute
of Nuclear Power Operations and our work in promoting reactor
safety.
The institute, or INPO, as we are usually called, was formed in
1979, in response to the Three Mile Island accident. We are a nonprofit
corporation, incorporated in the State of Delaware. We are
funded by the U.S. industry, plus 13 international participants. All
55 U.S. utilities that operate or are constructing nuclear plants are
members of the institute.
As I indicated, we v/ere created in response to Three Mile Island,
but our work will be surely applicable to any lessons learned from
Chernobyl.
INPO was established as an independent safety organization for
the sole purpose of promoting excellence in the way nuclear plants
in the United States are operated. We are not an advocate.
We are dependent on the industry, as a whole, but we have
ample independence from any one member. We are also independent
from the Government in the sense that none of our programs
are funded by the Government.
Our key technical activities can be categorized into four cornerstone
programs, and I will cover those very briefly; the evaluations
of all the operating plants in the country, analysis of operating experience
and feedback of the lessons learned to the industry, training
and accreditation programs, and various forms of assistance,
primarily aimed at sharing best practices among the utilities
something that simply was not done prior to Three Mile Island.
As just one example, we have conducted 227 evaluations at the
operating plants since we were formed.
After Three Mile Island, the President appointed a commission
to investigate the accident, the Kemeny Commission. I arn pleased
the Kemeny Commission recommendations that
to report that all
were under our jurisdiction have been implemented.
INPO's strength is in its people. We have 405 full-time professionals
now. Dennis Wilkinson was the first president of INPO. Mr.
Wilkinson was the first commanding officer of the Nation's first
nuclear submarine, the U.S.S. Nautilus and later the first commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Long Beach, the first nuclear powered
surface ship.
Mr. Wilkinson retired as a vice admiral. At the time of his retirement,
he headed the submarine warfare division for the Chief of
Naval Operations. My background is not as distinguished, but not

171
dissimilar. I had assignments as chief engineer and commanding
officer of nuclear submarines. My last job in the Navy was working
directly for Admiral Rickover, at his headquarters in Washington,
and my responsibilities included overseeing the inspection program
that Admiral Rickover ran, for ensuring safety in the nuclear powerplants
in Navy ships.
In fact, all of my career, some 20 years in the Navy's nuclear
propulsion program, focused on the safe operations of the plants, as
did my work at graduate school at MIT, including a doctoral thesis
on reactor safety.
Many other personnel at INPO have nuclear Navy experience.
As you know, Admiral Rickover picked the best, and we have
picked the best from among those. We have 71 people who were officers
at one time or another in the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.
Shifting to experienced people from the commercial industry, we
have 56 on our staff who have held certification as senior reactor
operators in nuclear powerplants in the industry. That means that
these people have hands-on control room experience and detailed
knowledge of how the plant should be operated.
We have a total of 136 people with utility experience, and most
of that is plant experience. The most senior member of that group
is sitting right behind me, Mr. Bill Conway, who joined our staff
just a few months ago. Mr. Conway was the plant manager at the
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station a few years ago, and was
promoted through the successive positions to become the chief executive
officer. He took early retirement from that position just a few
months ago, and we are pleased to report that he has joined our
staff.
We are seeing progress in many areas, but much of our work in
the first 6 years has been in laying a foundation for excellence. To
give you some examples, as mentioned briefly by Mr. Denton earlier,
at the time of Three Mile Island, there were 10 full-scale, controlroom
simulators in operation in the country. Today there are
52, and in a few more years there will be 75.
These simulators are as large as this end of the room we are in
and cost $5 to $12 million. They are excellent training tools for the
safe operations of plants.
Senator Domenici. What does the simulator contribute?
Dr. Pate. The simulator allows the operators to practice off
normal and casualty, events that simply can't be practiced with the
plant. They are very much like the simulators that the airlines
now use to qualify their pilots.
Simulators are sophisticated enough that airlines can get their
pilots certified without actually using the aircraft. You can take
the simulator through off normal/and severe accident conditions
which you can't do with the actual plant or the actual aircraft.
As a second example of putting the foundation in place, there
were less than 1,000 full-time people dedicated to training in 1979.
Today, there are just over 4,400, more than a fourfold increase.
Similarly, floor space or office space dedicated to training was just
under 500,000 square feet in 1979, and it exceeds 2 million square
feet today, and there are 800,000 square feet under construction.

172
Soon we will have seen a fivefold increase in the amount of space
that this industry has dedicated to the training of its people.
Early after its formation, INPO developed an accreditation program
to help ensure that the 10 key functional positions in nuclear
plants receive training that meets high standards. We formed an
independent accrediting board of distinguished Americans to make
an independent judgment as to whether those training programs
deserve to be accredited.
To give you an idea of the scope of the work we were talking
about, in 1984 and 1985, just over 12,000 people attended courses in
the industry that are covered by the accreditation program.
In September of last year, we formed the National Academy for
Nuclear Training to integrate these extensive training activities—
the activities at each nuclear plant or at each training site, the activities
of the accrediting board and the activities of the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations.
As of this month, our members report 453 training programs,
and remember there are 10 at each station, so there are many
throughout the country. But 453 training programs have been reported
as ready for accreditation, and are awaiting a team visit by
INPO personnel, and 193 of these programs have been accredited
to date.
I could talk at length about accreditation and the National Academy,
and I would be pleased to do so, but it is covered in my written
testimony. I will shift now and talk about performance indicators,
the measures of plant performance and the measures of
progress that John Taylor of EPRI brought up a moment ago.
Let me first read a statement that has appeared in our annual
report and many other places, and I think the statement is well accepted.
"It is widely recognized that nuclear plants with high
equivalent availability, small numbers of forced outages, few unplanned
scrams, few significant events, low personnel radiation exposures
are generally well managed overall. Such plants are more
reliable and can be expected to have higher margins of safety."
It is that higher margin of safety that we are concentrating on.
Over the past couple of years, we have developed a set of indicators
that are shown in this folder, and I will show some examples in
just a moment. A copy of the folder is provided in my testimony.
These indicators should tell us how individual plants are doing
and how the industry is progressing overall.
You have 10 of these in the folders, but I will cover just 5.
Unplanned automatic scrams We have seen a reduction in
the average number per unit, 7.4 in 1980, to 4.3 in 1985. To save
time, I will cover long-range goals as I go through the performance
trends. We have worked with the industry to get every utility to
set goals for 1990, to project, plan for and do the work that is necessary
to achieve improved performance in each of these indicators,
looking out 5 years to the future.
I must emphasize that these are goals set by the individual utilities,
but the program is monitored by INPO. So where we have
seen improvement in the first 5 years, the industry has set tough
challenging goals for 1990.
Lost time accident rate is considered a good indicator of the attitude
of the people at the plant and how much they respect the

173
rules regarding safety. Lost time accident rate means accidents
where someone cuts their hand, or breaks their leg, or that kind of
thing. You can see the improving trend between 1980 and 1985,
and again, the tough goal the industry has set for 1990.
Incidentally, the DuPont Corp. has the best record in the industry,
if not in the world, with this kind of thing.
Collective radiation exposure per nuclear unit at boiling water
reactors was 1,230 manrems in 1980. As an industry, we had that
down to 800 by 1985, and again, set a tough goal for 1990.
Personnel exceeding 5 rems in a year
Federal regulations require
that personnel be kept below 12 rems. We established 5 rems
as a standard of excellence. We set that goal in 1980, and you can
see the industry's progress in getting down to zero in 1984, and
maintaining the zero level in 1985.
Low-level solid radioactive waste per pressurized water reactor
unit. This is the pasteboard and the clothing and the paper and so
South
on that has to be compacted and shipped off for burial in
Carolina, or one of the other low-level radioactive waste burial
sites. Again, good progress between 1980 and 1985, and again a
tough goal.
This goal, by the way, would have the industry doing better than
the legislation passed late last year would require.
The last one of these I will show is equivalent availability, which
is probably the best overall measure of plant reliability. Progress
has been slow in this indicator. We did see some improvement in
1985, despite the fact that the TVA's units were shutdown and
other units were shutdown. The industry has set a tough goal in
1990.
I personally am optimistic that we will see this also begin an improving
trend, as we have for the other indicators, in the years to
come.
In closing, the U.S. nuclear industry took the initiative to establish
an organization that promotes excellence in all phases of plant
operation. We have put that organization in place, and in the first
6 years have implemented the Kemeny Commission recommendations
for lessons learned from TMI, that are under our jurisdiction,
and we will surely apply the lessons learned from Chernobyl.
Progress has been achieved on many fronts and yet much remains
to be done. We believe the foundation is in place for further
progress. The National Academy for Nuclear Training is a vital
part of that foundation. The payback from improved training is
now being seen.
We are and will remain unrelenting in our quest for excellence
and we appreciate your interest and support.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pate follows, attachments have
been retained in committee files:]

174
Testimony
to
the
Energy and Natural Resources Conunittee
by
Dr. Zack T. Pate
President
and CEO
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
on
June 19, 1986
Good morning, my name is Zack T. Pate, President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
(INPO) in Atlanta, Georgia.
This testimony includes information on the formation of the
Institute, its organization and mission, and three key areas
germane to recent events that affect the U.S. nuclear power
industry. These three areas include nuclear plant performance
measures in the U.S. utility industry, the National Academy for
Nuclear Training, and the Institute's International Program.

175
BRIEF HISTORY OF
INPO
INPO was formed by the U.S. nuclear utility industry in late 1979
to promote high standards of safety and reliability in the operation
of the nation's nuclear electric generating plants. The
function of the Institute is to assist utilities in the technical
aspects of nuclear power plant operation. The Institute is not
to be an advocate of nuclear energy.
Since 1979, INPO has grown from a small cadre of loaned nuclear
utility professionals to an established work force of more than
400 permanent and on-loan employees.
Every utility in the U.S. that has a nuclear plant in operation
or under construction is a member. INPO has had support from 100
percent of the nuclear utilities since its formation.
Utility organizations representing 13 non-U. S. countries make up
the International Participant Program, which I will describe in
more detail later in this testimony. Additionally, major
supplier organizations from the United States and abroad
participate through a separate Supplier Participant Program.
In forming INPO, the industry responded positively and decisively
to the accident at Three Mile Island. The President's
investigatory commission on that accident, the Kemeny Commission,
in issuing its recommendations in October 1979, made it clear
that the nuclear utility industry must be in charge of its own
destiny. The commission suggested that the industry establish
its own safety standards and an organization to conduct
independent evaluations. INPO, formed and supported by the U.S.
nuclear power industry, fills this role. A number of other
Kemeny Commission recommendations that became a part of INPO's
jurisdiction have been implemented. Several are referenced later
in this testimony.
The accidents at Three Mile Island seven years ago and more
recently in the Soviet Union make it quite clear that we must
work together not only in the U.S., but as an international
community to ensure the safe stewardship of nuclear energy
worldwide.
We respectfully request that the four items attached to this
testimony be included in the Committee record. For your reference,
these include the following:
o Institutional Plan for the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations , a 1985 document describing INPO's organization,
mission, and activities in depth
o INPO's 1985 Annual Report, Focus on Performance , which
describes improvements in the nuclear industry as measured
by selected indicators of plant performance

176
o The June 1986 folder entitled Performance Indicators for the
D.S. Nuclear Utility Industry , updating the above reference
o The brochure and charter of the National Academy for Nuclear
Training, which was established in late 1985 as the framework
unifying the nuclear training efforts of the industry,
the National Nuclear Accrediting Board, and INPO
INPO ORGANIZATION
The Institute's organization is similar to that of many U.S.
corporations. The Board of Directors is made up of 11 utility
executives and senior managers who are elected by the members to
oversee INPO's operations and activities. As a part of the
Institute's charter, two of the 11 Board members must have had
recent and direct responsibility in nuclear plant operation.
An Advisory Council of professionals from outside the industry
reviews Institute activities and provides advice on broad objectives
and methods to the Board of Directors. The Advisory
Council is comprised of 18 distinguished professionals in areas
related to the Institute's activities and includes prominent
educators, scientists, industrialists, and health specialists.
An Industry Review Group (IRG), made up of senior professionals
and managers from member utilities, is established for each
technical group. These IRGs provide advice and feedback to the
head of the respective INPO group. The IRGs may also be
requested to conduct specific review or audit functions by the
president or the Board of Directors.
The President of INPO reports to the Board of Directors and is
fully and solely responsible to the Board for the operation of
the Institute.
The professionals working at INPO have brought with them many
years of nuclear power experience from the utility industry, the
nuclear Navy, and related industries. INPO is a high standard
organization, dedicated to assisting member utilities in striving
for excellence in nuclear power plant operation.
FOUR CORNERSTONE ACTIVITIES
The Institute's major technical programs can be divided into four
areas, as follows:
o the evaluation of operating nuclear plants
o the analysis of nuclear plant events and the
dissemination of operating experience (lessons learned)
among nuclear utilities
o training and accreditation
o assistance to members and participants
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EVALDATIONS
In-depth evaluations are conducted at operating U.S. nuclear
plants. On-site evaluations of plants and of corporate support
activities focus on safety and reliability. The evaluations are
performance-based, focusing on observations of station personnel
at work. Identification of the root cause of any problem area is
stressed.
Plants are placed in the evaluation schedule after reaching
commercial operation; plant evaluations are scheduled in
approximately 15-month intervals, while corporate evaluations are
scheduled for alternate plant evaluatipns. INPO is now in its
fifth round of evaluations for most nuclear plants. As of
June 1, 1986, the Institute had completed 227 plant evaluations
and 62 corporate evaluations.
Evaluations are conducted by teams of experienced professionals,
augmented with industry personnel. Industry observers often
accompany teams to see methodologies in place at other plants.
These evaluations also often serve as a mechanism to check on the
progress of other INPO programs, such as the implementation of
operating experience recommendations, data reporting, and success
in the implementation of training programs.
In all cases, written commitments for recommended improvements
are obtained from the utility before the evaluation process is
considered complete and a formal report is issued to the utility.
Plant Evaluations
Plant evaluations include in-depth reviews of the following
areas:
o organization and administration
o operations
o maintenance
o technical support
o training
o radiological protection
o chemistry
o operating experience
Plants are evaluated against a set of performance objectives and
criteria developed and refined with industry input. Performance
objectives reflect excellence in each operating area. In addition,
INPO evaluates the effectiveness of simulator training,
including operator performance during simulated emergencies and
off-normal events.

178
Corporate Evaluations
Evaluations of corporate support activities cover the following
areas:
o organization and administration, including management
involvement
o materials and outside services
o technical services
o licensing and regulatory matters
o design engineering
o document control
o human resources
o nuclear safety assessment
o quality programs
o industrial safety
o training and qualification
o radiological protection
o chemistry
o emergency preparedness
These areas are evaluated against performance objectives and
criteria for corporate support that are designed to promote
excellence in plant operations.
INPO determines whether the responsibilities of a utility's
organizational structure are clearly defined and if all aspects
of nuclear support are covered. An assessment of corporate
monitoring of station performance is included, as is the degree
of management involvement and commitment in supporting safe and
reliable station operations. The INPO corporate evaluation teams
are augmented by senior executives from other utilities.
Construction Project
Evaluations
INPO recently concluded its evaluation program for nuclear construction
projects. These evaluations covered organization and
administration, design control, construction control, project
support, training, quality, and test control. The staff completed
21 evaluations, with each construction project being
visited at least once. The Institute is now completing
development of construction project guideline documents to
capture the experience gained through this program.
Evaluation
Process
The evaluation process itself includes the following aspects:
o Two weeks are spent at the plant and one week at the
company's corporate offices so that the results can be
coordinated and the corporate evaluations can follow up on
concerns found at the plant.

179
o Observations are made of ongoing activities at the plant in
all performance areas. The teams look for the root cause of
each performance problemo
Interviews are conducted with all levels of plant personnel
and senior- and middle-level corporate management.
o Rigorous follow-up is conducted on evaluation findings from
earlier visits to ensure that corrective actions remain
effective.
o A formal exit meeting between senior utility (typically the
CEO and senior nuclear line management) and INPO management
is conducted to review evaluation findings. In these meetings,
key areas requiring attention are clearly called out
in the candid discussions.
o Next, a written report is prepared and provided to the
utility that includes findings, recommendations, and the
utility responses.
o A six-month progress report is submitted by the utility for
INPO's review.
Since its inception, INPO's evaluation program has been upgraded
in several ways. For example, senior reactor operators from
other plants now accompany each INPO team to provide current
hands-on operational experience. Also, senior utility executives
now accompany each corporate evaluation team as observers and
advisors.
Emergency Preparedness
INPO promotes a high degree of readiness throughout the industry
so utilities are able to respond rapidly in the event of a plant
emergency. Assistance is provided to member utilities in
developing and maintaining effective emergency preparedness
programs.
INPO's assistance to the industry in this important area has
undergone considerable refinement. Initially, programmatic
reviews of emergency preparedness were conducted as utilities
upgraded their programs following Three Mile Island.
In 1984, the emphasis shifted from programmatic reviews to the
actual observation of utility emergency preparedness drills and
exercises. During these drills and exercises, a utility's
procedures and resources for responding to emergencies are tested
during a simulated emergency. This helps ensure that emergency
equipment and facilities will function when they are needed and
that emergency response personnel will work as a team in the
event of an actual emergency.
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EVENT ANALYSIS AND
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
Analysis of
Events
The Kemeny Commission stressed the need for a systematic
gathering, review, and analysis of nuclear power plant
operational experience. INPO has been engaged in this important
activity since its inception. Presently, between 7,000 and
10,000 operational reports are screened each year. For example,
in 1985, 8,162 operational reports were reviewed. From this
extensive information, lessons are distilled that allow the
personnel at individual plants to learn from the operating
experience of the entire industry.
Events are screened for significance, and those with generic
applicability are disseminated to the industry in one or more of
the following forms:
o Significant Operating Experience Reports
o Significant Event Reports
o Operations and Maintenance Reminders
o Industry Safety Reports
o INPO special reports
o Workshops and seminar presentations
Of the number reports screened, some are identified as
significant in terms of nuclear safety or operational
reliability. The criteria for selecting these significant events
have remained essentially the same since 1981. There were 1.64
of these events per operating domestic reactor in 1981. This
level has declined steadily. In 1985, 0.53 significant events
per operating domestic reactor occurred. This threefold
reduction in the number of undesirable significant events is an
example of the effectiveness of the improvements put in place
since the accident at Three Mile Island.
When an operating event has significant safety implications for
the entire industry, INPO will comprehensively investigate and
analyze the event. The results incorporate recommendations, in
the form of Significant Operating Experience Reports, which
assist utilities in preventing such events from occurring
again. Since first issuing these reports in 1980, a total of 61
have been developed and distributed to INPO members and
participants. These reports are color-coded to aid in setting
priorities for the associated recommendations. The following
color-coding system is used:
o Red-tab operating experience reports are for immediate
attention. These reports cover events that may result
directly in the loss of means to effectively remove reactor
heat, inability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in
a shutdown condition, or extensive release of fission
products to the environment.
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181
o Yellow-tab operating experience reports are for prompt
attention.
o Green-tab operating experience reports are for normal
attention.
Each Significant Operating Experience Report has several
recommendations, and action on these recommendations is formally
tracked by each utility. During plant evaluations, the INPO team
checks to determine how the utility has responded to and
implemented each specific recommendation. The current status of
industrywide response to completing actions on significant
analysis recommendations is as follows:
o Red operating experience reports
90 percent of required actions have been completed
industrywide
o Yellow and green operating experience reports
— 84 percent of required actions have been completed
industrywide
The implementation status of each recommendation is tracked until
appropriately dispositioned.
Information Exchange
The Kemeny Commission also identified the need for coupling the
analysis of operating experience with an industrywide
international communications network. NUCLEAR NETWORK is an
international electronic messaging system that fulfills this
need. About 1,200 messages are routinely sent among INPO members
and participants each month, covering many categories of
information. Operating experience information is one important
category that is promptly disseminated on NUCLEAR NETWORK.
Nuclear Plant Information Data Bases
INPO catalogs other types of plant information and scans this
information to spot any undesirable trends before they lead to
serious incidents. One of the more important of these data bases
is the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) . NPRDS now
contains engineering information for more than 4,000 components
per commercial operating unit in the United States. With more
than 100 such reactors in service, this data base has on file
detailed engineering information for more than 400,000 of the
most important hardware components in U.S. operating plants.
When one of these components malfunctions, a report is sent to
INPO electronically by the plant where the malfunction
occurred. This report identifies the type of failure and its
cause. Currently, about 44,000 such equipment malfunction
reports are on file in INPO's computers. The resulting data are

182
accessible from remote terminals at each nuclear plant and at
each corporate headquarters by INPO members and participants.
This massive data base is now beginning to be used for the
improvement of component and system reliability and enhancement
of nuclear plant performance.
Two examples of using NPRDS information to improve component
performance are as follows:
o Two plants operated by a utility experienced several
essential electrical system inverter failures over a nine
year period, some of which caused plant scrams and
challenged safety systems. After searching the NPRDS data
base and reviewing inverter failure information, the
following key items were identified:
— Many other plants had inverter failures but most did not
result in a plant scram, pointing to a potential design
problem.
— The inverter failures due to heat-related component
degradation were significantly higher than at other
plants, pointing to a potential environmental or
application problem.
The utility initiated immediate and long-term corrective
actions related to the design and environmental issues. No
plant scrams from inverter failures have occurred in the
year after these corrective actions were initiated.
o A plant experienced frequent failures of the isolation
valves for the pressurizer power -opera ted relief valves,
resulting in unscheduled repair outages and the increased
potential for adverse impacts on plant operation. A search ,
of the NPRDS data revealed the following key items:
The isolation valves had a unique design for body to
bonnet closure, pointing to a potential design
problem.
Other plants were not experiencing similar failure modes
for the isolation valves.
The utility initiated several corrective actions covering
valve modifications, maintenance procedures, and training of
personnel involved in valve maintenance. The valves have
exhibited a significant improvement in reliability since
implementation of these actions, resulting in an estimated
annual increase of 0.3 percent in plant availability (cost
benefit of approximately $900,000).
Human Performance
In recent years, the utilities and INPO have begun the
development and expansion of another important operational event
data base and corrective action system. This system, called the
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Human Performance Evaluation System is, in one sense, the human
counterpart of NPRDS. While NPRDS catalogs the types of failures
that machines can experience, utilities can use the Human
Performance Evaluation System to identify, analyze, and correct
human error. Virtually every comprehensive reactor safety study
has highlighted the critical importance of the performance of
people in the safety and reliability of our nuclear
installations. The Human Performance Evaluation System is a
major step forward in a process called for by the Kemeny
Commission.
TRAINING AND ACCREDITATION
The Kemeny Commission recognized that training plays a key role
in nuclear power plant safety and reliability. The Commission
recommended the "establishment of agency-accredited training
institutions for operators and immediate supervisors of
operators." The Commission also stressed that "comprehensive,
ongoing training must be given on a regular basis to maintain
operator's level of knowledge."
After Three Mile Island, the industry launched aggressive
programs to upgrade the training for nuclear power plant
personnel. In keeping with INPO's mission to promote the highest
levels of safety and reliability, the industry assigned the
Institute the task of assisting utilities in developing,
implementing, and maintaining high quality, performance-based
training.
The following are specific examples of activities aimed at
assisting the industry in the area of training:
o INPO has developed 17 training and qualification guidelines
based on the results of a systematic analysis of job
content. These guidelines outline the course content needed
for the training and qualification of personnel in key
nuclear power plant positions.
o Using industry expertise and experience, a detailed job
analysis, followed by a detailed task analysis, has been
conducted for key nuclear plant positions. Job and task
analysis is a proven, systematic method of determining
training requirements for a specific position. It is a key
step in developing comprehensive, performance-based training
programs. Job analysis determines the tasks performed by
each position, .and an analysis of these tasks determines the
knowledge and skills needed for each position.
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o INPO has also developed good practice documents to assist
utilities in conducting more effective training. These
documents cover the following:
development and implementation of on-the-job training
programs
incorporation of operating experiences into training
programs
development of teamwork and diagnostic skills
o The Institute sponsors workshops and special seminars for
utility training personnel to assist them in developing
their own training systems. Training and accreditation is
often a major subject at other workshops such as those for
utility chief executive officers, nuclear plant managers,
and the other technical disciplines.
o During regular plant evaluations, the effectiveness of
training programs are evaluated by assessing the performance
of plant personnel. INPO observes and evaluates the actual
application of the knowledge and skills taught in the
classroom and in simulator training. INPO/industry teams
assess how simulator training programs teach operators to
respond under different plant conditions.
o During 1985, INPO conducted 49 special training assistance
visits to help utilities improve training. Through May
1986, there have been 42 such visits. Our efforts during
these visits range from identifying problems to assisting in
the actual development of training programs.
As a condition of membership, each of INPO's 55 member utilities
has committed to achieving and maintaining accreditation of
training programs for 10 key positions involved in nuclear power
operations. These training programs are as follows:
o non-licensed operator
o reactor operator
o senior reactor operator/shift supervisor
o shift technical advisor
o instrument and control technician
o electrical maintenance personnel
o mechanical maintenance personnel
o chemistry technician
o radiological protection technician
o technical training for technical staff and managers
The accreditation process has three steps:
o First, using the INPO-developed accreditation objectives and
criteria, the utility performs a self-evaluation to identify
and correct weaknesses in its training programs. The
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utility writes a comprehensive report, which is provided to
INPO, that describes how the accreditation criteria are
being met.
o Second, an accreditation team, composed of training experts
from INPO and other utilities, visits the plant and
evaluates the training programs. After the utility corrects
identified weaknesses, the team's recommendations, along
with the utility's responses and corrective actions, are
presented to the National Nuclear Accrediting Board in a
written report.
o Third, the decision to award or defer accreditation is made
by the National Nuclear Accrediting Board.
The National Nuclear Accrediting Board is the independent
decision-making body that awards or defers accreditation of
utility training programs. The Board operates under the auspices
of INPO, but it is totally independent in its deliberations and
decision-making process.
When training programs are presented to the Board, members
examine the report of the accreditation team and the utility's
responses, as well as the utility self-evaluation report. The
Board's final decision comes only after its meeting with
representatives from the plant and training staffs. This is a
meeting that involves page-by-page review of the written report,
and it is followed by private deliberations by the Board to
determine whether the training programs meet the accreditation
objectives and criteria.
To maintain accreditation, INPO requires a status report two
years after training programs are accredited. Further, each
program must be fully reaccredited every four years.
The National Nuclear Accrediting Board includes four categories
of membership: senior utility representatives, non-nuclear
training experts, representatives from the post-secondary
educational community, and individuals nominated by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
A working board of five individuals meets to consider
accreditation for each nuclear plant's training programs. This
working board includes one or more individuals from each of the
classifications listed above and must have a majority of
representatives from outside the nuclear utility industry.
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Members of the full Board are listed below:
NATIONAL NUCLEAR ACCREDITING BOARD
Non-nuclear
Industrial Training Category
John E. Carroll
Vice President, Flight Standards and Training (retired)
United Airlines
Edward R. Jones, Ph.D.
Chief Human Factors Engineer
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
George E. Moore
Director, Education Department (retired)
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Charles J. Sener
Assistant Vice President (retired)
Bell Communications Research, Inc.
William R. Kimel, Ph.D.
Dean, College of Engineering
University of Missouri-Columbia
Post-secondary Education Category
Russell R. O'Neill, Ph.D.
Dean Emeritus, Engineering and Applied Science
University of California, Los Angeles
John M. Palms, Ph.D.
Vice President for Academic Affairs
Emory University
Robert L. Seale, Ph.D.
Head, Department of Nuclear and Energy Engineering
University of Arizona
Utility Category
Dennis E. Gilberts
Senior Vice President, Power Supply
Northern States Power Company
John M. Griffin
Senior Vice President, Energy Supply
Arkansas Power & Light Company
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Wayne H. Jens, Ph.D.
Vice President, Nuclear Operations (retired)
The Detroit Edison Company
A. Lee Oxsen
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Boston Edison Company
Harold B. Ray
Vice President and Site Manager
Southern California Edison Company
Cordell Reed
Vice President
Commonwealth Edison Company
Donald F. Schnell
Vice President, Nuclear
Onion Electric Company
C. 0. Woody
Vice President, Nuclear Energy
Florida Power & Light Company
NRC Nominee Category
Lincoln Clark, Jr.
Associate Director of Nuclear Reactor Laboratory and
Director of Reactor Operations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Frank C. Fogarty
Associate General Manager, Experimental Programs
EG&G Idaho, Incorporated
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Forrest J. Remick, Ph.D.
Associate Vice President for Research
Pennsylvania State University
Gordon E. Robinson, Ph.D.
Professor, Nuclear Engineering
Pennsylvania State University
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NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR NUCLEAR TRAINING
Since the Three Mile Island accident, there have been extensive
improvements in training initiated by utilities and encouraged
and facilitated by INPO and the accreditation process. As a
logical next step, the National Academy for Nuclear Training was
established to strengthen and unify industry efforts to pursue
excellence in training. The Academy provides a framework to
integrate the training-related activities of nuclear utilities,
INPO, and the National Nuclear Accrediting Board. It serves also
to enhance the pride and professionalism of plant personnel and
to aid utilities in obtaining recognition for their training
accomplishments.
Since all nuclear utilities have made a commitment to achieve
accreditation of their training programs, all are, therefore,
provisional members of the Academy. When its first programs are
accredited, a plant becomes a branch of the Academy and is
authorized to award Academy certificates to graduates of its
accredited programs.
As of June 15, 1986, there were 40 Academy branches, with 186
programs accredited at those branches. A utility becomes a
member when all of the 10 programs at its operating plants are
accredited. As of June 15, 1986, there were three members of the
Academy. All of INPO's member utilities have designated senior
management personnel to serve as their Academy representatives.
INPO's Group Vice President for Training and Education serves as
the Academy's Executive Director. He is advised by the Academy
Council, which consists of 10 utility executives and managers.
INPO provides administrative support for the Academy.
Chronology of Training-related Events Leading up to the Formation
of the National Academy for Nuclear Training
o A formal institution for the accreditation of nuclear plant
training programs was first suggested by the President's
Commission on Three Mile Island— the Kemeny Commission— in
1979.
o On December 7, 1979, the President of the United States, in
his response to the Kemeny Commission recommendations,
encouraged INPO, with assistance from the Department of
Energy (DOE), to develop a program for upgrading and
accrediting training.
o In March 1980, the President appointed the Nuclear Safety
Oversight Committee, chaired by Governor Bruce Babbit of
Arizona. The Committee recognized INPO's programs as a
suitable approach to implementing the Kemeny Commission
recommendations
o In September 1980, INPO formed a task force to review the
question of whether training centers should be located at
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each utility or established on a regional or national basis.
The purpose of the study was to help INPO determine how to
structure its accreditation program. The task force recommended
(in March 1981) in favor of local, utility-based
training centers. There were three reasons for this
recommendation, as follows:
Every plant's operators need to train on a plantspecific
(or plant-referenced) simulator.
— Recurrent or requalif ication training is best
conducted at the trainee's plant, since virtually
every plant in the United States is unique.
— On-the-job training can be integrated with classroom
studies more effectively.
o Congress enacted the "Nuclear Safety Research, Development
and Demonstration Act of 1980." The act directed the
Secretary of Energy to consider the establishment of a
national academy to train nuclear professionals. The DOE
report (in December 1981) concluded that existing efforts at
INPO and in the nuclear utility industry could meet the
goals for enhanced operator training.
o In May 1982, INPO published and implemented procedures and
criteria for accreditation that reflected the following
approach:
— Training is controlled and conducted locally by utilities.
— Training activities are evaluated by INPO.
— Training programs are accredited by an independent
accrediting board.
o Section 306 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of December 1982
directed the NRC to promulgate regulations or regulatory
guidance for the training and qualification of nuclear power
plant personnel. After considerable review, the NRC issued
a Policy Statement on Training and Qualification of Nuclear
Plant Personnel that endorsed the INPO-managed accreditation
program and gave the industry a two-year period to show
progress. The policy statement was dated March 1985.
o Early in 1985, Senator Moynihan (D-NY) introduced Senate
Bill 16, "The National Nuclear Power Plant Personnel
Training Act of 1985," which would have established a
National Academy for Nuclear Power Safety.
o In early 1985, INPO began developing the concept of an
industrywide academy that would integrate the following
three elements:
— extensive utility training facilities and staffs
the independent National Nuclear Accrediting Board
the training-related activities of INPO
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o In May and June of 1985, the INPO Board of Directors discussed
the formation and structure of this National Academy
for Nuclear Training.
o In September 1985, the INPO Board of Directors approved and
established the National Academy for Nuclear Training.
Certificates of achievement are now being awarded to individuals
who successfully complete accredited training programs; further,
plants receive recognition when they are designated as Academy
branches, and utilities are recognized when they are designated
as Academy members.
Although the Academy is less than a year old, it has received
recognition from public officials as having significant potential
for industry improvement.
In a November 6, 1985, letter to Senator Moynihan, NRC Chairman
Palladino stated (in part):
". . .the INPO proposal for a National Academy for Nuclear
Training. . .is a natural extension of the industry
initiatives in the training area. If the Academy is able to
carry out its stated objectives of focusing and unifying the
industry's training efforts, it should have a beneficial
effect on overall reactor plant safety."
At the Atomic Industrial Forum/American Nuclear Society meeting
on November 13, 1985, Secretary of Energy Herrington noted:
"The decision by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
to establish a National Academy for Nuclear Training. . .is
an outstanding example of. . .industry action showing
. . .that we're serious about safety by doing everything
possible to ensure safe and reliable operation of nuclear
plants.
Former White House Science Advisor George Keyworth, in an address
to the Atomic Industrial Forum in December 1985, stated that:
"INPO has been aggressive in developing training programs to
make sure the personnel—who are the heart of any operating
reactor—are well-trained. . .and certified as to their
qualifications. It's an impressive array of programs,
including the new National Academy for Nuclear Training. .
."
These statements indicate that the Academy has been recognized as
a positive industry initiative by the NRC, the Department of
Energy, and a key member of the Administration.
Further information on Academy organization and operation is
provided in the charter and the brochure that are attached to
this testimony.
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ASSISTANCE
The industry recognized that a fundamental element in striving
for operational excellence was to promote the exchange of
information and good practices among members and participants and
to assist member utilities in implementing their own
improvements. INPO conducts special assistance visits to member
utilities and international participants as requested and agreed
to by the Institute. These are independent of INPO's evaluation
and accreditation programs (though a request for such visits
frequently stems from an evaluation) and are intended solely to
assist the membership in improving operational safety and
reliability.
The Institute provides other direct assistance through many forms
of written and computerized information. This program is
important in helping utilities learn not only from each other's
experiences, but also from the best elements of programs in the
industry.
INPO's assistance to members includes the following specific
activities:
o On-site visits: Assistance visits requested by the utility
to cover specific areas. This area has seen the expanded
use of industry "subject matter experts" to increase the
technical expertise of the assistance teams, with assistance
based on sharing best practices. INPO's activities in this
area have increased steadily, with teams conducting 102
special assistance visits to 39 utilities in 1985.
o Requests for information: INPO is responsive to many
requests for information regarding successful programs. The
Institute acts as a clearing house for sharing documents,
procedures, methods, etc.
o Guidelines: These documents are publications that establish
the basis for sound programs in selected areas of nuclear
plant management, operation, and training. They are
provided to member utilities to aid them in developing or
improving the management and operation of their plants, and
most are designed to assist member utilities in meeting INPO
performance objectives and criteria. It is expected that
utilities may use different approaches or methods than those
defined in the guidelines, but members are expected to meet
the intent of the guidelines.
o Good Practices: A good practice is one effective method for
enhancing nuclear power plant management and operation.
Good practices are written to address many areas of plant
operation. INPO has developed good practices based on
elements of the better industry programs and procedures
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identified during INPO evaluations, assistance visits, and
workshops. They are periodically reviewed and updated to
ensure continued applicability. To date, 88 good practices
have been developed and furnished to members and
participants.
o Workshops/Working Group Meetings: These information
seminars are held periodically for each of the utility key
managers, including the plant managers and chief executive
officers. The use of workshops and meetings contribute
substantially to INPO's mission. They are widely attended
by members as well as supplier and international
participants. The attendees not only benefit from the
information presented but also from the exchange of
information through discussions with their counterparts from
other utilities. Since INPO's founding, over 60 workshops
have been conducted, with nine scheduled for 1985 and 10
planned for 1987.
INPO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
In carrying out its mission to promote the highest levels of
safety and reliability in the operation of nuclear electric
generating plants, INPO depends on the support of its members and
participants and on the coordination of its activities with other
industry organizations and groups, as well as with various
federal agencies.
The principal industry organizations and groups with which INPO
maintains liaison include the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF),
American Nuclear Energy Council (ANEC), American Nuclear Society
(ANS), American Public Power Association (APPA), U.S. Committee
for Energy Awareness (USCEA), Edison Electric Institute (EEI),
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association (NRECA), and Utility Nuclear Power
Oversight Committee (UNPOC) . Additionally, to minimize
duplication of effort and to support its members, INPO maintains
liaison with insurer groups such as American Nuclear Insurers,
Nuclear Mutual Limited, Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited, and
Mutual Atomic Reinsurance Pool.
To ensure credibility, INPO maintains its independence with
respect to any individual member and with respect to federal
agencies, while being responsive to the collective needs of the
nuclear utility industry. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is the principal federal agency with which INPO coordinates
its programs. The Institute needs to coordinate its activities
and cooperate with the NRC while at the same time neither
becoming nor appearing to become either an extension of the NRC
or an advocate for the utilities. As a result, INPO and NRC
activities must be largely independent, yet complementary.
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INPO expects that the NRC will review INPO programs and provide
appropriate regulatory credit. A Memorandum of Agreement has
been established with the NRC that covers key areas in which NRC
and INPO have mutual interests. This agreement establishes the
framework for cooperation and coordination, including the sharing
of information. For example, INPO provides the NRC information
on INPO programs and activities, including the following:
o copies of selected generic documents
o access to other pertinent information as described in
specific coordination plans
o periodic briefings
o observation of INPO field activities by NRC employees (with
agreement of the member)
INPO also coordinates its activities with the Department of
Energy (DOE) and has a Participation Agreement in place. In
addition, certain aspects of the Institute's International
Program are coordinated with the Department of State.
Additional details on INPO's interactions with outside
organizations and groups are provided in the attached
Institutional Plan.
INDUSTRY PROGRESS
The success of the Institute's programs can best be measured by
the progress of the industry. The programs explained previously
support the industry's efforts to improve performance in nuclear
plant safety and reliability. As the needs of the industry have
evolved, activities in each of the four cornerstone areas have
undergone refinement in scope and philosophy. As utilities
focused their attention on nuclear plant performance, the
Institute's goal was to make sure its programs and activities
provided the best possible support for these efforts.
Training
The importance of training in the nuclear industry cannot be
overemphasized. Training of all personnel employed in nuclear
plants has improved over the past several years; however, the
extent to which improved plant performance can be attributed to
upgraded training may not be fully evident for another few
years. The trainees in the training programs accredited today
will not be impacting plant performance until they graduate and
begin performing independently.
However, the results of increased training emphasis are already
beginning to be felt in the plants. Plant managers have stated
that they are seeing better performance in the plant as a result
of upgraded training, and there have been several instances of
undesirable plant events that were prevented as a direct result
of specific training that was provided. There is also an
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increased awareness at all levels of management regarding training
and the benefits to be gained from improved training.
Among the training advancements INPO has seen are the following:
o In 1979, there were 10 training simulators in the
industry. Currently, 52 are in operation, and when those
planned or under construction are completed, 75 will be in
operation.
o The number of operating shifts in the industry has
increased, with 42 plants having six shifts (55 percent of
the industry) and 34 plants having five shifts. This
compares with four shifts at many plants in 1979 and allows
for one shift to be dedicated to training and
requalif ication at all times.
o Floor space dedicated to training has quadrupled since
1979. Utilities now have more than 2.2 million square feet
of training space dedicated to nuclear plant personnel
training and some 813,354 square feet of additional training
space is under construction.
o Ten years ago, a typical nuclear plant training staff
consisted of one coordinator and a handful of instructors.
Today, an average of 24 instructors and five additional
training professionals are at work at each nuclear plant in
the country— four times as many as in 1980.
Plant Performance Indicators
In early 1981, INPO initiated development of a performance
indicator program in order to strengthen and support utility
efforts in attaining high levels of performance.
It is widely recognized that nuclear plants with high equivalent
availability, small numbers of forced outages, few unplanned
scrams, few significant events, and low personnel radiation
exposures are generally well-managed overall. Such plants are
more reliable and can be expected to have higher margins of
safety. Therefore, the performance indicator program and its use
by utilities in establishing long-term goals directly support
improvements in plant safety as well as reliability. In 1985, in
recognition of this, INPO, in conjunction with three external ad
hoc review groups, looked closely at how performance indicators
could be best utilized to enhance long-term improvement.
Ten overall indicators were ultimately identified as the good
measures of nuclear power plant performance. INPO's member
utilities are now tracking their performance in these areas and
establishing long-term goals in most of them. All began
reporting data to the Institute during 1985. INPO analyzes this
data and provides periodic reports to members and participants.
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In April 1986, INPO issued its initial periodic Industrywide
Nuclear Power Plant Performance Indicator Report representing
data reported by member utilities. The report reflects industry
results through calendar year 1985 and presents those results in
a manner that allows comparison of a specific utility's
performance with that of the industry as a whole. Among the
indicators in the report are the following:
o equivalent availability factor
o safety system unavailability
o unplanned automatic scrams while critical
o unplanned safety system actuations
o forced outage rate
o thermal performance
o fuel reliability
o collective radiation exposure
o volume of low-level solid radioactive waste
o industrial safety lost-time accident rate
The remaining indicators in the report reflect performance in
specific areas such as maintenance, chemistry, and radiation
protection. Data on these indicators are provided to utilities
as management tools for assessing performance.
Attached to this testimony is a folder entitled Performance
Indicators for the U.S. Nuclear Utility Industry , dated June
1986. This shows utility industry performance results for the
overall indicators for the years 1980-1985. As can be seen from
a review of the graphs, improving trends are evident in a number
of areas including the following:
o The number of unplanned automatic reactor scrams while the
reactor was critical has declined by more than 41 percent
since 1980, from an estimated 7.4 per unit down to 4.3 per
unit in 1985.
o The number of significant events per unit (identified
through the INPO Events Analysis Program) at U.S. operating
nuclear plants has declined over 67 percent since 1981, from
1.64 to 0.53 in 1985.
o Forced outage rates reflect the percentage of time units are
off-line on short notice because of equipment failures or
other conditions. This outage rate has dropped more than 26
percent since 1982, down from 16.1 percent per unit to 11.9
percent per unit in 1985.
o Equivalent availability is the ratio of the total power a
unit could have produced, considering actual equipment and
regulatory limits, to its rated capacity expressed as a
percentage. Equivalent availability has risen from 59.8
percent in 1980 to 63.5 percent in 1985.
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o Collective radiation exposure for pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) has dropped by nearly 40 percent since 1981 when it
reached a high of 707 raan-rems per unit-year. It was only
425 man-rem per unit-year in 1985. For boiling water
reactors (BWRs) it has decreased almost 35 percent since
1980 from 1,230 man-rem per unit-year to 800 to 1985.
o Low-level, solid radioactive waste shipped per PWR unit has
been reduced more than 43 percent, from 586 cubic meters per
unit-year in 1980 to 334 in 1985. For BWRs, it declined
more than 28 percent, from 1,113 cubic meters per unit-year
in 1980 to 797 in 1985.
o Industrial safety initiatives have reduced lost-time
accident rates for worker injuries at nuclear plants by
almost 53 percent since 1980 (1.36 per 200,000 man-hours
worked in 1980 to 0.64 in 1985). This fact alone makes the
U.S. nuclear power plant one of the safest industrial work
places.
LONG-TERM GOALS
In conjunction with ongoing efforts to monitor performance, INPO
has been working in concert with the industry to encourage each
utility to use the overall performance indicators to establish
long-term goals for each of its nuclear units.
Throughout 1985, INPO interacted with members and participants to
refine the overall performance indicators and to develop background
information that would assist in establishing long-term
goals for each unit. This effort culminated in discussions at
the November 1985 CEO Workshop where each utility was asked to
establish 1990 goals for as many of the overall indicators as
feasible and provide those goals to INPO during the spring of
1986.
By April 1986, each utility with operating nuclear plants had
developed 1990 goals for most of the overall indicators. The
following is a table that reflects these goals and that shows how
they compare with 1980 and 1985 results.
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1990 AVERAGE GOALS
OVERALL
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Equivalent Availability
Factor (percent)

198
Establishment of these long-term goals has helped define an
industry vision of desired achievement by 1990 and provides a
framework for action. The response of the utilities to date in
regard to this effort is indicative of the strong commitment to
long-term improvement.
We consider these results to be very encouraging.
INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANT PROGRAM
As INPO developed and expanded its activities during 1981, an
International Program was formed to exchange operating experience
and technical information with participating international
nuclear utilities or utility organizations in other countries.
Participation is open to non-U. S. utility organizations involved
with the operation of nuclear power plants. International participants
contribute to the funding of INPO so that the International
Program is financially self-supporting.
The first organization to join was Electricite de France in
1981. The most recent participant is Korea Electric Power
Corporation, which joined in 1983. The INPO International
Participant Program has grown to include 13 countries on four
continents, representing 44 utilities with 175 operating nuclear
reactors. This represents 82.5 percent of the operating reactors
in the free world. The 13 international participants represent
the following countries:
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
England
France
Italy
Japan
Mexico
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Taiwan
West Germany
Each participant assigns liaison engineers to INPO to facilitate
information exchange between the organizations as well as to
participate directly in Institute programs.
With the exceptions of actual plant evaluations and training
accreditation support, international participants are eligible
for the same benefits as INPO's domestic members.
The international .participants provide operating experience
analysis and data to the Institute's event analysis activity.
They also are active participants in various workshops and other
information exchange programs. NUCLEAR NETWORK, INPO's computerbased
messaging system, is used widely by the International
Participants. For example, the 13 participants originated more
than 1,557 messages in 1985.
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Technical exchange and assistance visits by INPO teams to plants
operated by the international participants are now commonplace.
In 1985, INPO teams made 12 such visits, including a comprehensive
review of Japan's approach to nuclear plant operation by a
team of 22. The visit to Japan was headed by Mr. E. P. (Dennis)
Wilkinson, INPO's President Emeritus, and included team members
from INPO, seven U.S. utilities, Westinghouse, General Electric,
the Electric Power Research Institute and the National Nuclear
Accrediting Board.
International Program activities are coordinated closely with the
U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In 1983, a Memorandum of
Understanding was established with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria, which also provides for
coordination and information exchange. Currently a senior INPO
technical manager is filling an assignment in the Division of
Nuclear Safety at the IAEA.
Further, the Institute conducts periodic discussions with the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear
Energy Agency in Paris, France, and with the Pacific Basin
Coordinating Committee. These forms of information exchange,
although limited, support our more extensive interactions with
the INPO international participants.
CONCLnSION
The U.S. nuclear utility industry took the initiative to
establish an organization that evaluates the performance of
nuclear electric plants, and one that promotes excellence in all
phases of plant operation. We have put that organization in
place, and in our first six years, have implemented the Kemeny
Commission recommendations— the lessons learned from TMI— that
are under our jurisdiction.
Progress has been achieved on many fronts, yet much remains to be
done.
We believe the foundation is in place for further progress. The
National Academy for Nuclear Training is a vital part of that
foundation, and the payback from improved training is now being
seen.
We are and will remain unrelenting in our quest for excellence.
We appreciate your interest and your support.

200
Senator Domenici. Thank you, very much. We will now hear
from Dr. Richard Dean, senior vice president, GA Technologies,
San Diego, CA.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD A. DEAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Dr. Dean. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the implication of the Chernobyl accident on the domestic
nuclear industry. As accurate information becomes available, I am
sure technical lessons will be learned that will be applied to our
light-water reactor industry, which is already very safe, to make it
even safer.
Furthermore, misconceptions and misinformation, which has
been generated regarding the utilization of graphite will be corrected,
and I have addressed these issues in my written statement.
Now, I would like to focus on just ways that the accident may
affect the nuclear industry in the United States.
The first is a direct near-term impact, and that will be on public
acceptance of nuclear power. Following Three Mile Island, when
public support for nuclear power reached a low, the industry made
efforts to restore the public's confidence in nuclear power, and now
only to see it erode again following Chernobyl.
I do not believe we will be able to revitalize our domestic industry
without strong public support, and therefore, we must take immediate
action to start restoring their confidence in nuclear power.
This will be a multifaceted task. One essential ingredient in my
opinion is that we rapidly develop an inherently safe reactor.
Dr. Hans Blis, the Director General of the IAEA, who you probably
saw on TV following the incident at Chernobyl; he voiced a
sinular opinion in the opening session of the European Nuclear
Conference in Geneva earlier this month when he was discussing
the events and consequences of Chernobyl, and their impact on the
worldwide nuclear industry.
His point was that the next generation of reactors require greater
intrinsic safety, to be more forgiving, and the sooner we obtain
such designs, the better.
Now while the focus on inherently safe plants for domestic use
may be the near-term issue, there may be an even greater implication,
although it is more indirect and of a longer term. When we
look into the early part of the next century
Senator Domenici. Dr. Dean, I again, apologize. The call I made
did not find anybody on the other end, but they found me now, so I
have to go take a call.
[A short recess was taken.]
Senator Domenici. Let's go.
Dr. Dean. Looking into the next century, the only realistic supplies
of energy is coal and fission, nuclear power. The economic expansion
of the Third World and the developing countries will be dependent
on an adequate source of energy, and it is unrealistic to
expect that this can be met by coal.
Lord Marshall of Goring, who is the Chairman of the CEGB in
the United Kingdom, recently stated that we in the West intend to

201
either attain a disproportionate share of the world's energy, or else
we must introduce a major, new energy source.
He rejected the first option as unethical, and since without this
new energy source, the Third World would be kept in poverty.
Therefore, the development and deployment of nuclear power in
these nations are essential.
Now is the current generation of nuclear plants the proper product
to export to the Third World? Even from a very nationalistic
point of view, I think not. Those countries simply don't have the
technical infrastructure required to operate the current generation
of reactors in a safe and efficient manner, nor can they afford to
direct their future technical capabilities out of proportion to such a
task.
It is vital that this capability be utilized for design and construction
of dams and irrigation systems and transportation systems, to
feed their populations. They should be insisting on systems that
have improved, inherent safety and investment protection features.
But I ask, what if a serious accident in a developing country
were to occur? You discussed the type of reactor going into Cuba
this morning. Pressured water reactor with containment. What
would be the impact of a serious accident due to solely operator
error if they failed to have the technical infrastructure such as has
been described by INPO hearing this morning?
I believe there would be a demand from the public and the
United States to shut similar reactor types down. My message is
that we can provide an inherently safe reactor for export to the developing
countries not just for our own good, but to protect our
ability to generate nuclear energy in the United States with the
current generation of reactors.
Thus, the accident at Chernobyl calls for an acceleration of the
program to develop these inherently safe reactors, such as the modular
high-temperature reactor that is being restricted by its current
funding level.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and present
our views on some of the implications that can be expected from
the Chernobyl incident. Thank you, very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dean follows:]

202
STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
SENATE ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES SENATE
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
June 19. 1986
DR. RICHARD A. DEAN
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

203
Mr . Chai rman :
I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning on
the implication of the tragic Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl
on our domestic nuclear industry. Although we may never be
told the exact cause of the sequence of events at Chernobyl, I
believe we are in a position to put to rest some of the misconceptions
and misinformation which have been generated regarding
the accident; we can identify the basic differences in the safety
features of Chernobyl with those of other nuclear systems; and we
can Identify compelling arguments for the development of Inherently
safe advanced nuclear power in the United States.
In the first few days and weeks following the Chernobyl
accident, the media appeared to characterize the presence of a
graphite moderator in the core of the Soviet reactor as a major
contributor to the 1 oss-of-cool ant accident. From what has come
to light about the accident, I believe you will find now that the
technical concensus Is that the presence of graphite did not
Initiate the 1 oss-of-cool ant accident, contribute to the explosion,
or to the initial dispersion of radioactivity which occured
at Chernobyl .
The early identification of graphite as a trigger for
the accident was very surprising, since the use of graphite in
nuclear reactor designs has long been viewed as an additional
safety feature when coupled with appropriate coolant and fuel
design. In fact, the use of graphite as a fuel moderator is a
primary safety feature in both the U.S. and German design of what
Is arguably the most publicly acceptable of the inherently safe
advanced reactor designs, the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled
Reactor .
Graphite, which has excellent nuclear properties, and Is
stable to very high temperatures, provides a large heat storage

.
204
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capacity, and has long been considered a means for Improving
reactor performance and safety. Currently, as part of the U.S.
Department of Energy program, a Modular High Temperature Gas-
Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) is being designed which takes advantage of
these graphite properties to attain a passively safe system,
i.e., the safety of the public is assured under all conditions
without requiring any operator action or the operation of powered
systems (such as pumps, valves, motors, etc.). In supporting
this concept, the Congress has recognized that a system of this
type is essential to overcome the technical and institutional
barriers which have prevented the deployment of nuclear systems
in the U.S., for the past decade. The need for a passively safe
system, such as the Modular HTGR, is even more essential after
Chernobyl
The Chernobyl nuclear disaster has raised questions regarding
the design similarities and differences between the RBMK
(Chernobyl type) boiling water graphite moderated reactor and the
MHTGR. In particular, the reported graphite fire has drawn attention
to the MHTGR which also uses graphite as a moderator. In
this testimony, I will identify the numerous fundamental differences
in the safety of the two systems.
The CHernobyl RBMK reactor is a pressure-tube type of
reactor using zirconium alloy clad uranium oxide pellets as fuel,
boiling light water as the coolant, and graphite as the moderator
(Figure 1). The fuel assemblies consist of a cluster of 18 clad
fuel pins located in vertical zirconium alloy pressure tubes
through which the cooling water is circulated. The reactor is
designed to perform on-line refueling. The reactor coolant inlet
and outlet temperatures and pressures are consistent with boiling
water reactor technology. The approximately 1700 pressure tubes
which serve as the pressure boundary for the system pass through
stacked graphite moderator blocks. The graphite blocks are enclosed
in a thin stainless steel enclosure and blanketed with a
helium and nitrogen gas mixture. The safety system incorporates
an emergency core cooling system and a pressure suppression

205
-3-
system. The reactor is surrounded by concrete and steel shielding
and support structures.
The MHTGR uses ceramic coated particle fuel, helium gas
as a coolant, and graphite as the moderator and core structural
material. The fuel particles consist of microspheres of uranium
oxy carbide clad with pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide, which
form a barrier and pressure vessel to retain fission products.
These ceramic coatings are stable to very high temperatures. The
coated particles are bonded together with a graphitic binder and
inserted into large graphite fuel element blocks. The helium gas
passes through coolant holes In the fuel element blocks. Although
the coolant pressure is lower than that of the RBMK concept,
the use of the inert helium as a coolant allows operation
of the reactor at a higher temperature. The pressure boundary
for the Modular HTGR system is a steel reactor vessel which is
contained in a below-ground silo which serves as a biological
shield and vented confinement structure. As indicated above, the
RBMK and MHTGR are significantly different types of reactors.
These differences are also reflected In their susceptibility and
response to accident conditions which could lead to the release
of radioactivity from the plant.
system
Key factors in the accident responses to the reactor
Include:
Heatup Rate With Loss of Cool ant
The heatup rate of the fuel in the MHTGR is very slow
since the fuel and moderator are integral and the heatup
rate is determined by the heat capacity of the massive
graphite moderator.
The RBMK heatup rate of the fuel and cladding is rapid
since the heat capacity of the fuel assemblies is small
and the fuel assemblies are thermally Isolated from the
massive graphite moderator.

206
• 4-
Temperature
Stability
The ceramic pyrocarbon and silicon carbide fuel particle
coatings (i.e., cladding) in the HTGR are stable and
retain fission products to temperatures of over 3200°F.
The graphite core structure gains in strength to 4500°F
and is structurally sound to over 5400 F.
The zirconium alloy fuel cladding of the RBMK loses
strength and starts release of fission products at
approximately 1300°F during a loss of coolant accident.
Chemical Reactions Between Coolant and Fuel
In the HTGR, the helium coolant is inert and does not
react with the grahite, fuel coatings, or other system
components .
In the RBMK, an exothermic (heat producing) chemical
reaction between water (or steam) and the zirconium
alloy fuel cladding is initiated at about 1800°F.
Wigner Energy Release
The buildup of Wigner energy in graphite, which can lead
to a rapid buildup in temperature upon release, is not a
consideration in the HTGR or in the RBMK reactor. Both
reactors normally operate at temperatures at which the
energy is annealed out of the graphite continuously.
Graphi te
Burni ng
It is difficult to induce a self-sustaining burning of
the dense, massive graphite shapes used in either the

207
•5-
HTGR or RBMK type reactors. Studies of the graphite
combustion process have shown that under ideal controlled
conditions in which an ample supply of oxygen or
air is available, graphite temperatures in excess of
1300*'f are required. These conditions do not exist in
normal operation of the systems and would be expected to
result only as a consequence of a major accident(s)
which could cause multiple breaches of the barrier(s)
preventing air/graphite contact. To get a self-supporting
reaction, a continuous flow of air must come in
contact with the hottest graphite. (A double breach of
the steel pressure vessel, one in the upper portion and
the other in the lower portion, would be required in the
MHTGR.) Further, unless a large fraction of the graphite
is exposed, the amount of heat that would be generated
woud be small compared to the decay heat of the
core .
The accidents which would result in major releases of
fission products are those which could result in a failure of the
fuel cladding (or particle coatings) and the failure of the pressure
boundary (pressure vessel or pressure tube). The accidents
of major concern are those involving a loss or blockage of coolant
for water-cooled systems and the depressuri zat i on accidents
for gas-cooled reactors.
In the case of the RBMK, coolant system blockages or
breaks are the most likely conditions which would lead to a loss
of coolant accident. The limited heat capacity of the RBMK fuel
rods (and the thermal isolation from the graphite mass) can lead
to failure of the zirconium alloy clad and the release of fission
products into the system in a matter of seconds. Further damage
to the cooling system and/or exothermic chemical reactions (such
as the zirconium water reaction) could occur which could lead to
a breach of the primary pressure boundary, to radiation release
from the plant, to an increase in graphite temperatures, to air
ingress, and ultimately, if the geometry allows a continuous
supply of air, to graphite burning.

208
In addition. It also appears that the RBMK reactors are
susceptible to reactivity accidents (a rapid increase in power
with loss of water) which could lead to rapid steam formation and
the overpressurizatlon of the system.
The 1 oss-of-cool ant accidents of concern for the MHTGR
involve the depressuri zat i on of the core, along with the loss of
all active means of circulating the coolant or of removing heat
from the core. Since in the HTGR the fuel particles are physically
and thermally coupled with the massive core and reflector
graphite, the fuel temperature increases •^ery slowly. Because of
the slow heatup of the reactor and its low power density, sufficient
heat can be removed from the core by passive radiation
and conduction to the surroundings that the modular HTGR core
temperatures never reach temperatures at which the ceramic cladding
will fail or release fission products within the system.
A large sustained air-graphite reaction is also precluded
since the modular HTGR is designed to be contained within
a below ground silo. This type of installation limits the
quantity of air that would be available to sustain an air- graphite
reaction, even should a double rupture of the vessel occur
and the graphite becomes exposed. Further, studies of the combustion
of HTGR fuels have shown that the fuel particles retain
their capability to retain fission products even if the graphite
and outer pyrocarbon layer has been burned away.
Chemical reactions which could lead to an explosion are
essentially precluded in the HTGR since the system remains blanketed
with the inert helium coolant and the core components do
not chemically react with each other. The introduction of water
into the system could lead to the formation of hydrogen and
carbon monoxide. The rate at which this reaction takes place is
insignificant below about 2000°F (well above the temperatures
normally present in the MHTGR core). Further, the reaction is
endothermic (absorbs heat) and is sel f-1 imi 1 1 nq .

209
-7-
Another important safety feature of the MHTGR is the
large negative temperature coefficient. Loss of cooling tests
were performed at the AVR Arbei tsgemei nschaf t (
Verbuchsreaktor
GMBH) HTGR reactor In Germany. The reactor was at 100% power and
the circulators were stopped and the control rods were locked
out. The increase of temperature of the fuel was sufficient to
take the reactor subcritical and there was no damage to the fuel
or p1 ant .
Thus, the nature of the fuel system, coolant, and plant
arrangement for the HTGR, which are dramatically different from
the RBMK type system, essentially preclude the possibility of an
accident such as occured at Chernobyl, and more importantly,
prevent by passive means accident consequences which would result
in significant release of radioactivity.
It is essential that the developing countries be provided
with some form of nuclear power in the next century if they
are to improve their economic condition. Is the current generation
of nuclear plants the proper product for this export? I
think not, because those countries cannot support the technical
infrastructure required to operate these plants in a safe and
efficient manner. That is not just their problem, but a problem
for our domestic industry. If there is a serious accident anywhere
in the world all similar operating reactors in the U.S.
would come under close scrutiny and In all likelihood there would
be a demand from the public to shut them down. Therefore, for
our own good, we must provide an inherently safe accident-proof
reactor for export to these developing countries.
The Chernobyl accident again highlights the position of
this Committee that nuclear safety remains a major Issue and it
is of vital importance for this nation to take the lead in aggressively
developing a reactor in which the safety of the public
is not dependent upon active systems or human response,
but rather systems In which safety Is assured by passive mechanisms
Inherent in the concept.
Vie thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today and look forward to your continued support of the modular
HTGR program.

210
Senator Domenici. Thank you. Dr. Beyea, senior staff scientist,
National Audubon Society.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAN BEYEA, SENIOR STAFF SCIENTIST,
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY
Dr. Beyea. Thank you. Senator. As a nuclear physicist who has
many studies of reactor accidents, I appreciate this opportunity to
comment on behalf of the National Audubon Society in connection
with the Chernobyl accident. I will summarize my statement.
The accident, I think, has many lessons to teach us, and the first
of which is that accidents are indeed serious business. I think even
a conservative estimate indicates that at Chernobyl, thousands of
cancers will likely result over the next 30 years, and that is using
the Japanese bomb data to estimate cancer risk coefficients.
I am somewhat surprised by Mr. Taylor's comparison of the Japanese
bomb with the Chernobyl release; it is comparing apples and
oranges; for instance, the long-term radioactivity that dominates
the reactor accident consequences, you probably have 100 times as
much radiocesium at Chernobyl than at Hiroshima or Nagasaki. It
is a question of sitting down with the source terms and doing the
calculations.
I might add that the NRC certainly has access to computer codes
that will do those kinds of calculations relatively easily if they
have a rough estimate of the source term. They do that calculation
when they estimate risks at domestic plants; they can do it at
Chernobyl.
The second lesson I think is that strong containments are valuable
safety features, and we are very fortunate in the United States,
I believe, that we have many reactors with strong containments.
But a significant fraction of U.S. reactors, as we have heard this
morning, do not have strong containments.
Senator Domenici. I did not get the last remark.
Dr. Beyea. There is a large number of U.S. reactors that do not
have strong containments. In particular, the 25 older, small volume
containments made by General Electric will quickly burst in a core
melt situation.
I would like to add a paper. Senator, to the record that a colleague
and I did that documents that statement.
In addition, even the large volume containments are not guaranteed
to survive a loss of coolant accident, so I think that the Chernobyl
accident is indeed relevant to the U.S. nuclear program.
The third lesson is that radioactivity from reactor accidents can
travel enormous distances. Computer models have been predicting
this for years, as I document in my written statement. Yet no attempts
to coordinate emergency planning between countries has
taken place.
In particular, the United States does not have agreement with
either Mexico or Canada to deal with transborder radioactivity.
A fourth lesson is that the enthusiasm of nuclear engineers
needs to be tempered by a strong regulatory process, one in which
the voices of independent scientists and the public can be heard.
In light of this issue, it is distressing to me that the nuclear industry
is still promoting legislation to restrict public involvement

211
in the licensing process. What such legislation will really do is
bring us closer to the regulatory system used by the Russians.
How do we respond to the accident? The National Audubon Society,
like many other organizations, is trying to decide what recommendations
to make in light of Chernobyl. Right now it is far too
early for us to take a formal position on the implications of the accident.
I thought it would be useful to share with you some of the
recommendations that we are contemplating.
The first possible recommendation is to shut down those reactors
with weak containments until the implications of the Chernobyl accident
are thoroughly studied. That is what was done with the
B&W reactors after the TMI accident, and we think maybe that is
what should be done with the old General Electric reactors.
500,000 members,
Now, the National Audubon Society, with its
will not recommend that all reactors be closed. To shut down all
plants immediately would be to guarantee a large increase in the
consumption of coal, which itself carries a drastic public health and
environmental penalty. The National Audubon Society favors a
gradual phase-out of nuclear power.
Nevertheless, we are very concerned about the possible implications
of the Chernobyl accident for small volume containments,
why we are considering supporting a moratorium on
and that is
these types of reactors; small volume reactors.
And fortunately, it will not be very expensive to do that, to keep
those reactors shut down for a few months. Right now, we have
excess generating capacity in most parts of the country, while oil
and natural gas prices are low.
The second and third recommendations are discussed in my text
and require very little explanation.
Senator Domenici. Shut them down for a few months? What
would we do during the few months?
Dr. Beyea. We would evaluate the Chernobyl accident for its implications
to the domestic industry.
Senator Domenici. I thought we were going to fix them; that is
not going to be done in 2 or 3 months.
Dr. Beyea. I don't think we can do that in a few months. I think
it takes several months to understand the full implications of the
Chernobyl accident.
The second and third recommendations we are considering are,
emergency plans should be revised to include dose reducing measures
beyond 10 miles, and in particular, arrangements should be
made with Canada and Mexico to handling the difficult planning
tasks associated with radioactivity crossing national boundaries.
The next recommendation we are considering is that all attempts
to weaken public involvement in reactor licensing should be halted
and that public participation should be made more meaningful by
funding intervenors.
A final recommendation we are considering does require some
explanation. This is a recommendation to impose a 1-cent-per-kilowatt-hour
tax on existing nuclear powerplants, a tax that would be
dedicated to the development of solar electricity, particularly photovoltaics,
and also to the development of a new generation of reactors
that would be meltdown free. We have heard some discussion
on this panel of reactors that may have those capabilities.

212
The billions of dollars per year that would be generated by such
a tax would represent to us the most exciting commitment ever
made by this country to a rational energy future. It would salvage
something positive out of the Chernobyl disaster.
I believe that a joint program aimed at developing both cost-effective
solar electricity and meltdown free reactors offers the best
hope for both the solar and the nuclear industry.
Now why should the nuclear industry favor such a tax? Because
the handwriting for them is on the wall. The only long-term hope
for the industry, as some speakers have said today, is in meltdown
free designs. I think the industry needs new critical allies and a
new source of development funds.
Why should environmentalists and solar electricity advocates
support a tax whose revenues would be shared with nuclear researchers?
Because there is no way to develop a political concensus
that will give solar electricity the edge it needs to comj)ete with
electricity from coal.
If current trends continue, the nuclear option will certainly die,
but the victorious survivor will not be solar cells or solar collectors;
it will be polluting coal plants, plants that cause respiratory illness,
acid rain, and increased global temperatures.
Global warming from fossil fuel is such a serious environmental
problem that environmentalists cannot afford to turn their backs
on any possible option that might prove preferable.
If nuclear researchers can develop meltdown free designs, and if
solar electricity fails to live up to its promise, I believe the environmentalists
of the next century will change their opinion of nuclear
power.
Now in conclusion, I hope that these remarks will spark discussion
of positive responses that can be made to the Chernobyl accident,
and the National Audubon Society is ready to work cooperatively
with a wide range of groups to find concensus on energy
policy.
Thank you. Senator.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Beyea follows:]

213
National Audubon Society
-^^
950TH1RD AVENUE. NEW YORK. N.Y. 10022 (212) 832-3200 CABLE; NATAUDb'BON ^
Responses to
the Chernobyl Accident
Statement by
Dr.
Jan Beyea
Senior Staff Scientist
National Audubon Society
950 Third Avenue
New York., New York, 10022
(212) 546-9300
before the
Senate Connnittee
on
Energy and Natural Resources
June 19,1986
AMERICANS COMMITTED TO CONSERVATION

214
As a nuclear physicist who has prepared many theoretical studies on
reactor accidents, I appreciate this opportunity to comment for the
National Audubon Society on the relevance of the Chernobyl accident to the
U.S.
nuclear program.
The Chernobyl accident has many lessons to teach us:
Lesson 1: Reactor accidents, as predicted by theoretical computer models, are
serious business.
At Chernobyl, millions of curies of radioiodine and radiocesium were
released into the environment. Thousands of cancers will likely
3 4
result from the accident over the next 30 years. ' The nightmarish
vision, long feared by environmentalists, of a landscape contaminated by
radioactivity has become a reality in the Ukraine. Russians in the
Ukraine find themselves having to fear the very environment itself, the
soil, fields, crops, gardens, even the beaches.
Lesson 2: Strong containments are valuable safety features.
We are fortunate in the United States that many of our reactors have
large-volume containments that can hold enormous quantities of steam
during an accident. Unfortunately, a significant fraction of U.S.
reactors do not have strong containments. Reactors with ice-condenser
safety systems will fail at very low pressures, and all 25 of the older,
small-volume containments made by General
Electric will quickly burst
when assaulted by the copious amounts of steam and other gases that are
likely to be produced in a core-melt situation.

215
Furthermore, even large-volume U.S. containments are not guaranteed
to survive a loss-of-coolant accident. There is considerable debate as
to how hign the internal pressures irill rise during the course of an
accident. And human error, such as failure to close bypass valves,
could render containments
ineffective.
Consec[uently, it is incorrect for the nuclear industry to claim that
the Chernobyl accident is irrelevant to the U.S. nuclear program.
It is worth noting that, prior to Chernobyl, the nuclear industry
never made the charge that Russian reactors were unsafe. In fact, the
trade association of the industry, the Atomic Industrial Forum, has
always taken credit for tJie safety of Russian reactors in its world
safety
statistics.
. . 6
Lesson 5: Radioactivity from reactor accidents can travel enormous distances;
Computer models have been predicting for years that radioactivity in
a bad accident will be carried across national boundaries. Yet, no
attempts to coordinate emergency planning between countries has taken
place. The United States, for example, does not have agreements with
either Mexico or Canada to deal with transborder radioactivity.
This lack of preparation for a real emergency is a perfect example
of the decade-long paralysis that has gripped agencies responsible for
protecting the public against accidents. When extensive planning
measures have been the subject of public debate, regulating agencies have
consistently folded in the face of fierce opposition from the nuclear

216
industry and strong reaction from a public that often takes planning for
a nuclear accident as
an admission of guilt.
Consider the fact that before the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident,
emergency planning zones in the United States did not extend beyond a few
miles. And even TMI would not have brought us ten-mile zones without
Congressional pressure.
Is ten miles enough? Chernobyl provides a resounding, "So." The
Soviets evacuated out to eighteen miles. Chernobyl confirms the fact
that the choice of a ten-mile emergency planning zone in the United
States was based on politics, not public health considerations.
Lesson 4: The enthusiasm of nuclear engineers needs to be tempered by a
strong regulatory process, one in which the voices of independent scientists
and the
public can be heard.
The Russian nuclear program demonstrates the dangers of a regulatory
system in which believers in a technology are given free rein. In light
of this lesson, it is distressing that the Chernobyl accident has not
dampened tne enthusiasm of the nuclear industry for restricting public
involvement in the licensing process. Apparently, the industry is still
promoting its restrictive version of licensing "reform," What such
restrictive legislation will do is bring us closer to the regiolatory
system used by the Russians.

217
POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE ACCIDENT
The National Audubon Society, like many other organizations, is trying
to decide what recommendations to make in light of the Chernobyl accident.
Although it is far too early for us to take a formal position on the implications
of tne accident for the U.S. nuclear program, I thought it would be
useful to share wiUi you some of the recommendations we are contemplating.
Note that some of the ideas put forward below are consistent with past
g
positions taken in the Audubon Energy Plan ; some go beyond them.
Response # 1: Until the implications of the Chernobyl accident for the U.S.
program can be thoroughly studied, reactors with weak containments should be
turned off and put in cold shutdown.
The National Audubon Society will not recommend that all reactors be
closed. To take such action on an an immediate basis would be to guarantee
a large increase in the consumption of coal, which itself carries a
drastic public healUi and environmental penalty.
The National Audubon
Society favors a gradual phase-out of nuclear power--one that will occur
naturally as units in existence today are decommissioned after the turn
of the century. Under such a policy, there will be time to gradually
replace both coal and nuclear power with alternative sources of electricity
and with conservation.

218
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Nevertheless, despite our opposition to an iramediate shutdown for
all reactors, we are very concerned about the possible implications of
the Chernobyl accident for small-volume containments. That is why we are
considering supporting a moratorium on the operation of these types of
reactors.
Fortunately, the United States today has an excess of electricity
generating capacity in most parts of the country. Oil and natural gas
prices are low. It will be a relatively inexpensive proposition to shut
down small-volume containment reactors for a
few months while the
Chernobyl accident is being evaluated.
Should evaluations of the Chernobyl accident now under way indicate
that the
safety features of small-volume containments are indeed helpless
in core-damage accidents, these reactors should be kept closed permanently.
In such a situation, it may be necessary for the federal government
to compensate the affected owners for the loss of their investment.
After all, it was the federal government that licensed the designs. And
without such compensation, it may be politically impossible to obtain the
legislation or administrative action necessary to keep them shut permanently.
Response # 2: Emergency plans should be revised to include dose-reducing
measures
beyond ten miles.
Certainly, priority in planning should be given to evacuating people
within ten miles of reactors, but that does not mean that everyone else
should be treated, as is now the case, on an ad hoc basis. A staged
evacuation is appropriate, with people within ten miles evacuating first.

219
There are other litigation measures in addition to delayed evacuation
that are appropriate for tne population beyond ten .iiiles. For
instance, plans for distribution of potassium iodide medicine to the
post -ten-mile population could be implemented. Such medicine, if made
available early enough, could significantly reduce the number of thyroid
'
cancers that would occur in the population exposed to radioiodine.
In addition to the steps suggested so far, arrangements should be
made with Canada £ind Mexico to initiate and complete the difficult planning
tasks that are associated with transborder transport of radioactivity.
A consistent set of guidelines should be worked out for setting
thresholds for food and
land contamination.
Response # 5: All attempts to weaken public involvement in reactor licensing
should be halted. Public participation should be made more meaningful by
funding
intervenors.
If there is any consensus lesson from the Chernobyl accident, it is
that the nuclear industry needs criticism from a concerned puDlic.
Although the nuclear industry criticizes groups like the Union of
Concerned Scientists (UCS), reactors are safer in the United States
because UCS has been active over the years. But UCS gets involved with
only a small number of interventions. Most interventions are started by
local groups vnth little prior experience with nuclear power. The best
way to ensure that these groups participate in an effective and meaningful
way in the licensing process is to provide them with funds to pay
technical witnesses.

220
Citizen groups are going to intervene regardless of whether or not
there is WRC funding for them. But without adequate technical help to
direct criticisms toward the real weaknesses of license applications,
interveners are going to continue to object to everything that seems the
slightest bit suspicious, out of fear that someone is trying to pull the
wool over their eyes. It is this fear by interveners of being tricked,
in my opinion, that has slowed down the regulatory process unnecessarily
in the past.
Certainly, arming interveners with technical experts is going to
lead to discoveries that will halt license applications in some cases.
But that's as it should be. On average, I believe intervener funding
will speed up the licensing process.
Response # 4: Impose a 1-cent per kilowatt -hour tax en existing nuclear power
plants, one that will be dedicated to the development of solar electricity
(particularly pnotovoltaics) and development of a new generation of reactors
12
that will be "meltdown free."
The billions of dollars per year generated by such a tax would
represent the most exciting commitment ever made by this country to a
rational energy future. It would salvage something positive out of the
Chernobyl disaster.
A joint program, aimed at developing both cost-effective solar electricity
axvd meltdown-free reactors, offers the best hope, in my view, for
both the solar and the nuclear industry.
Why should the nuclear industry favor such a tax? Because the
handwriting is on the wall. There are not going to be any new orders for

221
nuclear plants of the current generation, no matter how many nuclear
licensing bills are passed. The only long-term hope for the industry is
in raeltdown-free designs. But the industry no longer has the political
muscle to gain the federal funds that will be needed to develop such
designs. The industry needs new political allies and a new source of
funds.
Why should environmentalists and solar electricity advocates support
a tax whose revenues would be shared with nuclear researchers? Because
there is no other way to develop a political consensus that will give
solar electricity the edge it needs to compete with electricity from
coal. If current trends continue, the nuclear option will certainly die,
but the victorious survivor will not be solar cells or solar collectors.
It will be polluting coal plants that cause respiratpry illness, acid
rain, and increased global
-5
temperatures.
Global warming from fossil fuel carbon dioxide is such a serious
environmental problem that environmentalists cannot afford to turn their
backs on any possible option that might prove preferable. If nuclear
researchers can develop the raeltdown-free designs that many scientists
believe are possible, and if solar electricity fails to live up to its
promise, then environmentalists of the next century will no doubt change
their opinion of
nuclear power.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Hopefully, the preceding remarks will spark discussion of positive responses
that can be made to the Chernobyl accident. The National Audubon Society is
ready to work cooperatively with a wide range of groups to help our country
break out of the dead end in energy policy in which we now seem to be
trapped. It is time to find consensus on energy policy.
63-756 0-86-8

]
222
-9-
Footnotes and References
1) Most of these studies on reactor accidents were prepared while I was a
member of the researcii staff at the Center for Energy and Environmental
studies at Princeton University.
2) Although estimates made by western experts are higher than numbers quoted
by the Soviets [ New York Times , June 12, 1986], all estimates imply that
millions of curies were released during the accident.
3) A preliminary (and conservative J estimate of the number of Chernobylrelated
cancers that will eventually result in Europe from radioactive
Ce5ium-137 deposited on the ground has been made by Frank von Hippel of
Princeton University and Thomas B. Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense
Council. ["Chernobyl—The Long-Term Health Consequences," June 11, 1986,
Draft. Ihe final version of this article is to be published in the September
1986 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Starting from meteorological dispersion maps prepared by Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory (Ref. 4), von Hippel and Cochran obtained a range of 3200
to 9600 cancers. Of course, all estimates of this type are preliminary and
Jill no doubt change as more information about fall-out patterns is published
and analyzed.
4) Joseph B. Knox and Marvin B. Dickerson ("technical contacts"), "AKAC
Preliminary Dose Estimates for Chernobyl Reactor Accident," Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, May 7, 1986..
5) Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, "Containment of a Reactor Meltdown,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 38, August/September 1982, p. 52.
6) See past issues of Nuclear LSFO , 7101 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD
20814-4891.
7) That radioactivity from reactor accidents can travel across national
boundaries has been recognized ever since a 1957 accident in Windscale England
released 20,000 curies of radioiodine, remnants of which were tracked far over
Europe. [N.G. Stewart, R.N. Crooks, "Long-Range Travel of the Radioactive
Cloud from the Accident at Windscale," Nature , 4636 . p. 627 (1958).]
Since 1957, the notion has appeared in numerous technical and
policy- related papers. For instance, the puff trajectory model, MESOS, was
initiated in 1976 to simulate the atmospheric transport and dispersal of
radionuclides over distances of several hundred kilometers or more. [H.M.
ApSimon, A.J.ri. Goddard, J. Wrigley, "Long-Range Atmospheric Dispersion of
Radioisotopes- I. The MESOS Model," Atmospheric Environment 19, pp. 99-111
(1983).] The authors state that such calculations are relevant to planning
for the possible transfrontier consequences of a nuclear accident in a
neighboring country."

223
•loin
a 1978 study prepared for the Swedish Energy Commission, I pointed out
that long-term health consequences from an accident in Sweden would appear in
other countries. ["A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypothetical
Reactor Accidents at Barseback," Swedish Energy Commission, Stockholm, DS I
1978:3, 1978. J Similarly, in a 1980 report to the U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality, I stated that "emergency planning may require
cooperation between different states and, in some cases, cooperation with
Canada or Mexico."
8) The Audubon Energy Plan , National Audubon Society, 1984.
9} 50,000 respiratory- related deaths per year have been correlated with
sulphur air pollution, much of which comes from coal-burning electricity
plants. Even when coal plants are equipped with scrubbers, some sulphur
escapes. [For references to sulphur air pollution and mortality, see, Jan
Beyea, G. Steve Jordan, "Implications for Mortality of Weakening the Clean Air
Act," National Audubon Society, EPAD Report 18, May 1982.]
As is well known, coal-buming plants are major contributors to acid
rain. Less appreciated is the fact that use of coal adds significant amounts
of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, threatening to change the climate of the
entire planet.
10) Jan Beyea, "Emergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists , 56, December 1980, p. 40.
11) Frank von Hippel, "The NRC and Thyroid Protect ion- -One Excuse After
Another," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , October 1980, p. 44.
12) See for instance, A.M. Weinberg, I Spiewak, "Inherently Safe Reactors and
a Second Nuclear Era," Science, 224, 1598-1402 (1984). See also, J. L.
Dooley, R. Philip Hammond, "Build Nuclear Plants that Don't Need Evacuation
Plans," Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1986.

224
THE BULLETIN
OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
uIji
Containment of a
Reactor Meltdown
Jan Beyea and Frank vonHippel

225
Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel
Containment of a reactor meltdown
Any good scientist or engineer believes
implicitly in Murphy's law: "If
something can go wrong, sooner or
later it will go wrong." The U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, which
until 1975 had the responsibility for
ensuring the safety of U.S. civilian
power reactors, had many good scientists
and engineers involved in its
work. And during its history it repeatedly
considered the consequences
of all
the safety systems in a nuclear
reactor failing, the fuel melting and
the volatile radioactive isotopes in the
fuel being released to the atmosphere.
The answer which came back from
major studies in 1957 [1], 1965 [2] and
1975 [3] was always that the consequences
could be very serious indeed.
This finding underlined the importance
of preventing nuclear reactor
meltdown accidents. As a result, the
Atomic Energy Commission and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), its successor in the area of
nuclear safety regulation since 1975,
required so many redundant safety
systems on nuclear power plants that
both nuclear regulators and the
nuclear industry became convinced
that the likelihood of a reactor
meltdown accident had been reduced
to a negligible level.
The massive failure of safety systems
and the associated confusion
which has occurred repeatedly at nu-
Figure 1
LARGE VOLUME PRESSURIZED WATER CONTAINMENT
Figure 2
SMALL VOLUME BOILING WATER CONTAINMENT
CONTAINMENT
HEAT REMOVAL
IfiE COOLANT
SAFETY INJECTION
Because of its large volume {about 60,000 cubic meters), this containment
can hold all of the steam released in the first minutes of a
loss of coolant accident. Subsequently steam pressure should be reduced
by the containment water sprays.
The combined volume of the drj' well and the connected free space
over the pressure suppression pool is only one eiglh that of the containment
shown in Figure I. Steam from the dry well bubbles through
the water in the pressure suppression chamber and is condensed. This
could prevent overpressurization by steam but not by other noncondensable
gases such as hydrogen and carbon dioxide.
Source: T.J. Thompson and J.G. Beckerly. The Technology of Nuclear Reactor Safety, vol. 2, chap. 21 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973).
52

226
clear power plants since 1975 — with
serious damage resulting at Brown's
Ferry in 1975 [4] and Three Mile Island
in 1979 (51 -have, however,
thrown this confidence into question.
Our purpose here, therefore, is lo
draw wider attention to the possibilities
for increased public protection
offered by the last barrier between the
radioactivity released from a molten
core and the outside world: the reactor
containment building.
The containmeni. Reactor containment
buildings are both massive and
well-equipped (Figures 1 and 2). Most
are designed to withstand internal
pressures of three to four atmospheres
and may maintain their integrity at
more than six atmospheres internal
pressure. They also have water sprays,
water pools or compartments full of
ice — whose purpose is to reduce pressures
by removing steam from the
containment atmosphere.
Reactor containment buildings today
are not designed to contain a reactor
core meltdown accident, however.
Their "design basis accident" is a lossof-coolant
accident in which large
amounts of volatile radioisotopes are
released from a temporarily overheated
core, but in which the uncontrolled
release of energy from the core
into the containment atmosphere is
terminated by a flood of emergency
core cooling water before an actual
meltdown occurs. This is essentially
what happened during the accident at
Three Mile Island although, due to
various errors, the core remained only
partially cooled for a period of hours.
The threat of overpressurization. If
for any reason the emergency core
cooling system were not effective and
a core meltdown occurred, the buildup
of internal pressure in a sealed reactor
containment building could rupture
it within a matter of hours. The
So many tens of billions of dollars fiad been invested in plants
which were already operating or in an advanced stage of construction
that nuclear safety authorities were unwilling to question
the basic safety design features of nuclear power plants.
threat would come from steam, hydrogen
and other gases.
For an extended period of time after
a reactor shutdown, the radioactive
fission products in a reactor core
generate heat at a rale great enough to
turn hundreds of metric tons of water
into steam per day (Figure 3). It would
take only about 300 metric tons of
steam to increase the pressure inside
even a large (60,000 cubic meter volume)
Three Mile Island type of containment
building by about ten atmospheres.
It is apparent, therefore, thai
unless the containment cooling system
operates reliably and effectively to
keep this steam pressure from building
up, the containment will quickly
be overpressured by steam alone (6).
Hydrogen is another potential contributor
to the pressurization of the
containment. It is produced when
water or steam comes into contact
with a metal which binds oxygen so
strongly that the metal can take oxygen
away from water molecules. Because
it absorbs relatively few neutrons,
one such metal, zirconium, is
the structural material of choice used
in the cores of water cooled reactors.
Zirconium starts reacting rapidly with
steam at temperatures above UKWC.
About one half the zirconium in the
core of Three Mile Island Unit No. 1
was oxidized during the accident there
m.
For a small volume (boiling water
reactor type) containment, the mere
pressure developed by the amount of
hydrogen generated at Three Mile
Island .would have been enough to
raise the containment pressure by one
to three atmospheres.
For a large volume containment,
the principal hazard associated with
the hydrogen would be fire or explosion,
and in fact the hydrogen did
burn at Three Mile Island. Fortunately,
however, the initial pressure in the
containment building was such that
the containment was able to withstand
the resulting pressure increase of
about two atmospheres. Some existing
reactor containments would not
have withstood the pressure rise asso-
cialed with the burning of this much
hydrogen — even given an initially low
pressure.
In small boiling water reactor containments
the probability of a hydrogen
fire is eliminated by "inerting" the
containment with an atmosphere of
pure nitrogen. This is not done, however,
in ice condenser containments
which are designed to withstand much
lower internal pressures than most
other containments. On September 8,
1980, during a final review of the
design of Sequoyah Nuclear Power
Plants, Units 1 and 2 (which are
equipped with ice condenser containments)
the SRC's watchdog, the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
pointed out in a letter to the
Commission that: "For events involving
more than 30 percent oxidation of
the zirconium, hydrogen control
measures may be necessary to avoid
containment failure."
The remaining threat to containment
integrity from overpressurization
during a core meltdown accident
would arise from the carbon dioxide
and carbon monoxide liberated as the
molten core melted its way down
through the concrete basemat of the
reactor building (8; 9).
This listing is sufficient to suggest
why one of today's small volume reactor
containment buildings would
probably rupture during a core meltdown
accident and why there is a significant,
although less certain, probability
of failure for a large volume
pressurized water reactor type containment
(3].
The regulatory response.
The situation
we have just described was first
explored by an Atomic Energy Commission
advisory committee in 1966
when the AEC was just beginning to
license the construction of today's
large commercial power reactors. The
advisory committee recommended in
its report, however, that the Commission
should undertake only "a
small-scale,
tempered effort on (the)
August/September 1982 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53

.
227
Frank von Hippel. a physicist, is in the Program on Nuclear
Policy Alternatives of the Center for Environmental Studies
at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544.
problems . . . associated with systems
whose objective is to cope with the
consequences of core meltdown. ."
.
The committee did not recommend a
crash program on the development of
better containments because it felt
that "to produce effective designs,
indeed feasible, might require both
considerable fundamental research
and practical engineering application."
Instead, the committee advised
the Commission that "for the
time being, assurance can be placed
on existing types of reactor safeguards,
principally emergency corecooling"
[10].
The Commission accepted this advice
and went ahead with the licensing
of containment buildings whose integrity
depended upon the successful
functioning of emergency core cooling
systems. A small amount of
research was conducted for a time into
3000
1000
if
Figure 3
the possibility of improved containment
concepts. As the Commission
certified time after time that existing
containment designs were adequately
safe, however, this research
was phased out.
Periodically, the issue of improved
containment designs was brought up
by outsiders. For example, in 1975 the
American Physical Society Study
Group on Light Water Reactor Safety
recommended that "more emphasis
should be placed on seeking improvement
in containment methods and
technology" (11). By that time,
however, so many tens of billions of
dollars had been invested in nuclear
power plants which were already
operating or in an advanced stage of
construction, that the nuclear safety
authorities were unwilling to question
the basic safety design features of
nuclear power plants.
This attitude was expressed in a
memorandum written on September
POTENTIAL STtAM PRODUCTION BY RADIOACTIVE AFTER-HEAT
( 1000 MEGAWATT REACTOR)
2 4
DAYS AFTER SHUT-DOWN
The figure shows the cumulative amount of water which would be evaporated by the
radioactive afier-heat generated after shut-down by the core of a typical modern
1 ,(XX)-megawatt light water reactor. In the absence of heat removal from the containment,
the steam pressure so generated would threaten the containment integrity within hours.
25, 1972 by Joseph Hendrie, then
Deputy Director for Technical Review
of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Hendrie was responding to the suggestion
by a senior member of the
Commission staff, Steven Hanauer,
that because of the safely disadvantages
of small volume containment
buildings such as the General Electric
boiling water reactor pressure suppression
containment shown in Figure
2 and the ice condensor pressure suppression
containment design being
proposed at the time by Westinghouse,
"I recommend that the aec
[Atomic Energy Commission] adopt a
policy of discouraging further use of
pressure suppression containments."
Hendrie's response is reproduced in
full below:
"With regard to the attached, Steve's
idea to ban pressure suppression
containment schemes is an attractive
one in some ways. Dry containments
have the notable advantage of brute
simplicity in dealing with a primary
blowdown, and are thereby free of
the perils of bypass leakage.
However, the acceptance of pressure
suppression containment concepts
by all elements of the nuclear
field, including Regulatory and the
ACRS (Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards], is firmly imbedded
in the conventional wisdom.
Reversal of this hallowed policy,
particularly at this lime, could well
be the end of nuclear power. It
would throw into question the operation
of licensed plants, would make
unlicensable the GE and Westinghouse
ice condensor plants now in
review, and would generally create
more turmoil than I can stand."
This memorandum became public as a
result of a Freedom of Information
Act suit by the Union of Concerned
Scientists reinforced by Congressional
pressure following Hendrie's appoint-
54

228
Jan Beyea, a physicist, is
a senior energy scientist at the National
Audubon Society in New York 10022.
ment to the chairmanship of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in 1977.
tillered vents. As more and more
nuclear power plants went into operation,
the attention of those who wished
to improve reactor containment designs
turned to safely systems which
could be "retrofitted" onto existing
plants and to one specific idea in particular.
This was a "filtered vent"
system which could relieve the pressures
inside a dangerously pressurized
containment building by releasing
some of its radioactive gases to the atmosphere
through a large filter system.
There the most dangerous radioactive
species would be trapped before
the filtered containment gases were
allowed to escape. It would be
relatively easy to add such a system
onto an already completed containment
building because the filter
system could be installed in a separate
building outside the existing containment
building and connected to it
through a large valve and underground
pipe (Figure 4 [12]).
The installed cost of one of these
systems has been estimated to be between
$1 million and $20 million per
reactor, an amount which is small in
comparison with the more than $1 billion
total cost of a modern nuclear
power plant (13).
Despite these attractive aspects of
the vented containment concept, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceeded
to investigate it extremely
slowly and cautiously. While the
Commission's slowness can only be
deplored, its caution is appropriate:
prescriptions for nuclear safety, like
those for drugs, should be both safe
and effective and the staff has concerns
in both areas.
In the area of effectiveness the
staffs concerns focus on the possibility
that in certain accident sequences
the pressure buildup inside the containment
might be so rapid that no exhaust
system of realistic size could release
gas fast enough to save it. The
pressure rise associated with a hydrogen
fire could, for example, be very
rapid. Rapid increases in steam pressure
could also occur within the containment
of a pressurized water reactor
as a result of sudden contacts between
large' amounts of molten core
and large amounts of water.
According to current ideas, a melting
reactor core would not drip away.
Instead, it is believed more likely that
a large fraction of the core would suddenly
collapse and fall into the water
remaining at the bottom of the reactor
pressure vessel. In the past there has
been concern in the reactor safety
community about such an event resulting
in a "steam explosion" violent
enough to propel the top of the reactor
vessel through the shell of a containment
building. This concern has
been downgraded in most recent studies
but inside even a large containment
building a rapid increase in pressure
of about one atmosphere could occur.
In some scenarios, where the primary
pressure system around the reactor
core and its attached piping remain intact
until the core actually melts
Figure 4'^
through the pressure vessel, the meltthrough
would relieve the steam pressure
in the primary system, with the
result that certain water in the system
would be mobilized and pour into the
pressure vessel on lop of the molten
core. This could cause a rapid pressure
rise of one to three atmospheres.
And finally, after melting through the
pressure vessel, the molten core could,
once again, fall into a pool of water
collected in the cavity below the vessel.
Another rapid increase in pressure
could then result (9, I).
There appear to be strategies that
can reduce the threat of containment
failures resulting from such pressure
increases if in fact further analysis
should establish this threat as a serious
one: Indeed, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is already beginning
to require hydrogen "igniters"
capable of burning any accumulating
hydrogen in stages before concentrations
can build to levels where a single
fire will be intense enough to endanger
the containment. The magnitude of
some of the steam pressure rises associated
with core meltdowns in pressurized
water reactors could also be
reduced by relieving the pressure in
the primary system and fiooding the
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF A PWR FILTERED VENT SYSTEM
PWH REACTOR
^CONTAINMENT
BUILDING
'^fe^jT-^^^ ^'"""-
^\ Tjmf^P^'
UNDERGROUND
CHARCOAL FtLTERS
If the pressure inside the containmeni climbed to dangerous levels,
EXHAUST STACK
.
FOR
FILTERED GASES
the isolation valves
could be opened and some of the containment gas released through sand and activated charcoat
niters.
August/September 1982 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scienlisls 55

229
As more and more nuclear power plants went Into operation,
attention turned to safety systems
which could be retrofitted onto existing plants
containment building with water to a
level which covers the pressure vessel
when a meltdown appears inevitable.
And, as we have seen, a filtered vent
would make possible still another
strategy: early venting so as to reduce
the pressure base on which any subsequent
sudden pressure increases
would build.
The possibility of early venting is
two-edged, however, because it requires
a judgment that nothing else
can be done to prevent a major release
of radioactivity. That judgment might
be wrong or the filtered venting system
might even operate accidentally.
The resulting releases would be dominated
by the non-filterable radioactive
noble gases which would contribute
about one-thousandth of the
cumulative radiation dose from an
uncontained meltdown accident. The
Commission's safety concern about
filtered venting, therefore, focuses on
the fact that a filtered vent system,
while offering some protection
againsx large releases of radioactivity
to the atmosphere would also increase
by an uncertain amount the frequency
of public exposure to very much
smaller releases.
This concern is akin to the one
about automobile seat belts — that by
slowing a passenger's escape from a
vehicle in some accident situations, a
seat belt could contribute to rather
than prevent a death. But seat belts, as
we know from statistics, save vastly
more lives than they endanger. In the
case of reactor core meltdown accidents
we (fortunately) have no statistics
yet. The Commission will, therefore,
have to make a careful judgment.
It seems likely that the final
conclusion will be that, for a welldesigned
system, the reduction in the
risks of large releases will greatly exceed
the increased risk of small
releases. At the current level of effort,
however, it will take many years before
thorough safety analyses have
been concluded on each major type of
reactor containment; and then more
years may be taken up in conducting
specific safety analyses on each plant
chosen as a candidate for retrofit.
The industry response. In response
to the Three Mile Island accident, the
U.S. nuclear industry could have put
An area the size of Connecticut
Among nuclear power opponents one of the most widely
used characterizations of the hazard from reactor accidents
is based on a quote from the files of the long-suppressed
1965 Atomic Energy Commission study on reactor
accident consequences: "The possible size of such a
disaster might be equal to that of the state of Pennsylvania"[2].
approximately three times higher than the average wholebody
dose from natural background radiation over the
same period and might cause on the order of one extra
cancer death among every 1,000 people exposed at that
level [22].
In the case of thyroid irradiation we have chosen a
100.000 fTTT-TT
Figure 5
What exactly would happen over this area?
The study found -as have many studies since [3, 11,20)
-that the most widespread danger from a reactor accident
would be thyroid damage from the ingestion of radioactive
iodine. I^ilk might be contaminated with radioiodine
above the protective action limits specified by the
Federal Radiation Council over "areas which would range
from 10,000 to 100,000 square kilometers" [2]. The area of
Pennsylvania is 115,000 square kilometers: hence the
comparison.
The problem of milk contamination by radioiodines appears
to us to be a relatively manageable one [21], so we
focus instead on two potential consequences of reactor
core meltdown accidents which are less manageable
than milk contamination and could also affect huge
areas. These are the hazards of long-term contamination
of land and property by radioactive cesium; and thyroid
damage resulting from the inhalation of radioactive iodine-131.
COWCCTICUT_
10.000
UPVeR •OUNOARC*
^ —^^ TrnuL »tk
For land contamination we have set the threshold at a
standard level corresponding, in the absence of decontamination,
to a cumulative whole-body dose from penetrating
external gamma radiation of 10 rem to any resident
population over the first 30 years following the accident.
(The duration of land contamination will be dominated by
30-year half-life cesium-137.) This 10-rem dose would be
10»**i
100
10 1
PERCENT RAOIOCESIUM RELEASED
\
56

230
... a filtered vent system could relieve the pressures
inside a dangerously pressurized containment building by releasing
some of its radioactive gases thirough a large filter system.
ils own resources into invesligaling
the possibilities
for the reduction of
radioactive releases following coremelt
accidents. Unfortunately, it did
not. Instead, the industry mounted a
concerted campaign to convince both
the public and government that, even
in case of containment failure, the resulting
release of radioactivity to the
atmosphere would be much less than
has always been thought. In particular,
the electrical utilities' Electric
Power Research Institute published a
study which concluded, in effect, that
improved containments were not necessary
(I4|.
The Institute report claimed that,
even in the event of a core meltdown
accident and a containment failure,
"due to the solubility of the volatile
fission product compounds and the
aerosol behavior mechanisms, the offsite
dispersion of radioactive materials
(other than gases) following a
major l wr [light water reactor) accident
will
be small." The electric utilities'
public relations departments and
the nuclear industry press sprang into
pressed no public reservations concerning
the significance of these
claims, which tended to give them further
credibility.
The Commission did, however, authorize
an effort to examine the Institute's
claims as a collaborative enterprise
between Commission staff
members and technical experts at
three major national laboratories. In
March 1981 this team stated in a draft
report:
action and advertised these claims
with great fanfare, noting that "If
"The results of this study do not
support the contention that the predicted
consequences of the risk do-
findings like these are verified ... it
would go far toward deflating the
minant accidents have been overpredicled
by orders of magnitude in
doomsday predictions of anti-nuclear
groups" 115). The Nuclear Regulatory
past studies. For example, the analysis
Commission, aside from a few staff
comments in the trade press, ex-
. . .
10% to 50% of the core inventory of
in this report indicates
that
iodine could be released to the environment"
116).
Under pressure from the industry, the
threshold dose from inhalation of 30 rem for adults. The
Environmental Protection Agency's guideline threshold
dose to the thyroid for mandatory evacuation is 25 rem
[23]. The dose to the thyroids of exposed children in the
same area might exceed 1 50 rem (24). For an Xray dose of
Mill
Figure 6
C0M«CT1CUT-.
10,000
100 r—

231
The industry is concerned that accident mitigation techniques,
such as off-site preparations for emergencies and retrofitting
with filtered venting systems, could be interpreted as
tacit admissions that serious accidents can happen.
Commission subsequently rewrote the
summary language so that it no longer
appeared to be a rebuttal to the Electrical
Power Research Institute report.
Nevertheless, the technical conclusions
remained the same.
The role of public pressure. There
are by now many e.xamples of public
pressure being required to offset the
paralyzing effect of industry opposition
to nuclear safety initiatives — especially
when the purpose of the initiatives
is
to mitigate the consequences
of nuclear reactor accidents. The industry
is apparently concerned that
the adoption of accident mitigation
techniques, such as off-site preparations
for emergencies and retrofitting
containment buildings with filtered
venting systems, could be interpreted
by the public as tacit admissions that
serious accidents can happen.
It was only after Congressional
pressure developed for improved
emergency planning in the aftermath
of Three Mile Island, for example,
that the Commission converted the
recommendations of a Nuclear Regulatory
Commission/Environmental
Protection Agency task force report
into Commission policy and extended
the emergency planning zone for accidents
out to 16 kilometers from reactors.
In Sweden, it appears that the political
pressure of that country's debate
over nuclear power may have already
forced a decision in the case of filtered
venting. Prior to that country's March
after the Three Mile Island accident.
Filtered venting was one measure recommended
by this committee. After
the referendum, the Swedish government,
noting that subsequent studies
had failed to uncover any basis for a
reconsideration of this decision, indicated
in a parliamentary bill that it
would move forward to implement filtered
venting starting with the Barseback
reactor located just 20 kilometers
across the sound from Copenhagen
[17].
Without the pressure of a political
referendum, it is doubtful that progress
on filtered venting would have
been any faster in Sweden than it has
been in the United States.
Unfortunately, there are no comparable
political events on the horizon
in the United States. It is possible,
therefore, that it will take an accident
more serious than Three Mile Island
to overcome the inertia that is holding
back further development of containment
improvements in this country. If
a large release of radioactivity occurs
in such an accident, the U.S. nuclear
industry may well follow the example
of its Swedish counterpart and endorse
containment improvements in
an attempt to salvage a future for
nuclear power in the United States.
The prognosis for our society will
be bleak, however, if we protect ourselves
only after experiencing every
variety of disaster. It is,
therefore, to
be hoped that the Commission and its
watchdogs will press ahead with work
on accident consequence mitigation
strategies from the "study" stage to
the decision stage.
The Commission received exactly
this recommendation from its Three
Mile Island "Lessons Learned Task
Force" in October 1979:
1980 referendum on the future of nuclear
power the pro-nuclear side was
eager to support every safety measure "The Task Force recommends . . .
proposed by a special Swedish government
committee of enquiry, created rulemaking be issued to solicit com-
that a notice of intent to conduct
ments on the issues and specific facts
relating to the consideration of controlled,
filtered venting for core-melt
accidents in nuclear power plant design
and that a decision on whether
and how to proceed with this specific
requirement be made within one year
of the notice" [181.
The Commission, however, did not
commit the necessary resources. Now,
almost three years later, it is further
away from such a decision than it was
then.
The Commission could also be
pressured into adopting the recommendation
made to it in a September
10, 1980 letter from its Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards:
that it proceed without further delay
to require utilities to do design and
risk
reduction studies with regard to
the installation of filtered vent
systems on their nuclear power plants
119).
Of course the filtered vent strategy
should not be pursued to the exclusion
of other containment improvement
strategies which may also prove
useful. We have focused on the vented
containment concept here because it is
specific evidence for our more general
contention that there is a great potential
for enhancing the capabilities of
reactor containment buildings to retain
the radioactivity from accidents
which might otherwise contaminate
an area "the size of Connecticut." [See
box.) D
1. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Theoretical
Possibilities and Consequences ofMajor
Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants,
WASH-740(1975).
2. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Documents
Relating to the Re-examination of
WASH-740. Approximately 200 unpublished
documents, dating from 1964 lo 1966. were
made available lo the public in the Commission's
public document room in 1973 as a result
of suits and threats of suits under the Freedom
of Information Act. See also David Burnham,
"A. EC. Files Show Effort lo Conceal
Safety Perils." N.Y. Times (Nov. 11. 1974).
3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor
Safety Study (Washington. DC.
wASH-14

232
It is possible that it will take an accident
more serious than Three Mile Island to overcome the inertia
that Is holding back further development of containment improvements.
clcai Planl Fiic" (Scpl. 16. 1975); Daniel F.
Ford, Henry W. Kendall. I awrcncc S. Tye.
Brown's Ferry: The Renulalory Failure (Cambridge,
Mass.: Union of Concerned Scicniisls.
1976).
5. Report of the President's Commission on
the AixidenI at Three Mile Island (1979).
6. We have assumed conlainmcnl atmosphere
lemperalurcs of about
150 degrees Centigrade
in these calculations.
The free volume in a containment typical of
those used in most operating U.S. boiling water
reactors is about 7.900 cubic meters. The efjeclive
free volume of boiling water reactor containments
may be less than half of their nominal
volumes, however, since the volume over the
pressure suppression pool is connected to that
of the "dry well" by what amounts to a one-way
valve. Therefore, it would be possible, in principle,
for steam to drive the "noncondensabic"
gases into the 40 percent of the total free volume
over the pressure suppression pool, leaving the
pressure in that chamber at a much higher level
than in the dry well surrounding the reactor vessel
after the steam condensed. (See Figure 2 for
a representation of these chambers in a boiling
water containment . The range of pressures cited
in the text allows for this possibility.)
7. In the Three Mile Island accident an estimated
44 to 63 percent of the 22,600 kilograms
of zirconium in the core were oxidized. See Report
of the President's Commission on the Accident
al Three Mile Island, (staff reports), II. p.
14.
I. For a "high-carbonate concrete" having 80
weight percent CaCOi and an initial
the core debris on the reactor cavity
radius of
floor of
3.05 meters the "wechsl" code predicts that the
core will have penetrated 80 centimeters into the
concrete 10 hours after it
has landed on the surface
and will have thereby released 27 metric
tonnes of CO,, 13 of CO. 9 of H.O, and 140
kilograms of Hj. The carbon monoxide and hydrogen
result from reactions between CO, and
HiO and hot metals (steel and zirconium) in the
melt. The oxides of carbon would add about
two-thirds of an atmosphere to the pressurization
of a small containment. A "medium-carbonate"
concrete is characterized as having 46
weight percent CaCO, and therefore presumably
would release about half as much CO;
plus CO. Another code, "inter ," predicts about
twice as much gas evolved as wechsl. See also
W.B. Murfm, I., p. 5. 18.
9. W.B. Murfin, Report of Ihe Zion/lndian
Point Study (U.S. nrc nuregcr 1409-1413,
1980), Summary, p. 49.
10. Report of the Task Force on Power Emergency
Cooling. "Emergency Core Cooling,"
U.S. Ate, liD-24226 (1966). p.9.
11. "Report to the aps by the Study Group on
Light- Water Reactor Safety." Review of Modern
Physics 47. Sup. No. I (1975), p. S7.
12. B. Cosset, H.M. Simpson, L. Cave, C.K.
Chan. D. OkrenI and I. Catton, Post-Accident
Filtration as a Means of Improving Containmeni
Effectiveness (University of California at
Los Angeles. UCLA tN(..-7775. 1977). The principal
radioisotopes which would not be removed
by such a filtered vent system would be the noble
gases: radioactive kryplon and xenon
13. D. Carlson and J Hickman. A Valuelm
pact Assessment of Alternate Containment
Comep/s (Washington. DC: Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, NliRt-c..( H-0165, 1978). The
Murfin Report estimates a S20 million price tag.
More elaborate versions would cost more.
14. M. Levenson and F. Rahn (Electric
Power Research Institute). "Realistic Estimates
of the Consequences of Nuclear Accidents."
paper presented al the International Meeting of
the American Nuclear Society, Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 20, 1980).
15. John O'Neill. "Scientists Say NRC Greatly
Overestimates Accident Risks," Nuclear Industry
(Dk. 1980), p. 27.
16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Technical Bases for Estimating Fission Product
Behavior During I. WR Accidents, nureg-0722.
draft (March 6. 1981; final. June 1981). The
basic points in the nrc experts' review were immediately
apparent to knowledgeable readers of
the Institute report. See Frank von Hippel, an
invited briefing to the nrc as recorded in the
transcript, "nrc Meeting on Iodine Release
from Accidents and Estimates of Consequences."
(Nov. 18, 1980), pp. 38-61. For accidents
in which the damage is sufficient to open
large pathways from the core to
the containment,
there will not be sufficient water available
to trap the radioactive materials of concern, nor
will the pathway be so tortuous that a significant
amount will stick to surfaces before
reaching the conlainmenl atmosphere. Similarly,
if the containment fails early enough, there
will be insufficient time for aerosols to settle to
the reactor building floor. These three mechanisms
are the basis for the claims made in the
Electric Power Research Institute report.
17. Government bill to Swedish Parliament.
1980/81 :90. It is expected that the Barseback reactor
would be equipped with a filtered vent system
by 1985.
18. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, r^tl-2
Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report
(Washington. DC; nurec-0585. 1979), pp.
3-5.
19. Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards
letter to the nrc on "Additional acrs
comments on Hydrogen Control and Improvement
of Containment Capability" (Sept. 8.
1980). The point was reiterated in a Feb. 10.
1981 acrs letter on "acrs Report on Requirements
for Near-Term Construction Permits and
Manufacturing Licenses."
20. Jan Beyea. "Some Long-Term Consequences
of Hypothetical Major Releases of Radioactivity
to the Atmosphere from Three Mile
Island," a report to the President's Council on
Environmental Quality (Princeton University,
Center for
Report #109, 1980).
Energy and Environmental Studies
21. The longest lived radioiodine of concern
for reactor accidents is eight-day half-life iodinc-131.
of which only one-thousandth the
original will remain after eight weeks. The area
of land contamination will, therefi re,
have decreased
after eight weeks by orders of magnitude
from its original size During the period of
contamination it would be quite straightforward
to arrange where necessary that dairy
cattle be shificd from pasture to relatively
uncontaminated stored feed, and to divert any
contaminated milk to the production of powdered
milk, cheese, etc.. which could be stored
until its radioactive contamination had decayed
to negligible levels.
22. U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation. Sources and Effects of
Ionizing Radiation (New York : United Nations,
1977), p. 414; U.S. National Academy of Sciences.
Committee on the Biological Effects of
Ionizing Radiation. The Effects on Population
of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation
(Washington. DC. 1980); Eliot Marshall,
"New A-Bomb Data Shown to Radiation Experts,"
Science 212 (1981), p. 1.364 and the
lelated letters in Science 213 (1981). pp. 5. 8.
392, 602, 604.
23. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Manual of Protection Action Guides and Protective
Actions for Nuclear Incidents (Washington.
D.C: EPA-520/1-75-001. 1975). Table
5.2.
24. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Environmental Analysis of the Uranium Fuel
Cycle II: Nuclear Power Reactors (W ashington,
D.C: EPA-520/9-73-003-C. 1973). Table 40.
25. L.H. Hcmpclmann and others. Journal
of the National Cancer Inslilule. 55 (1975). p.
519.
26. U.S. FDA. Proposed Recommendations
on Use of Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking
Agent in a Radiation Emergency (April
1981). For an early release, the thyroid dose
from the 21-hour half-life isotope iodine-133
would be approximately one-third that of iodine-131.
In March 1954. 22 Marshallese children
on Rongelap atoll
received an estimated
700 to 1.200 rem thyroid dose from drinking
water contaminated with such short-lived
radioiodines from the "Bravo" H-bomb lesl.
Almost all subsequently required thyroid
surgery and were put on lifetime thyroid hormone
medication. (Robert A. Conard and others.
Review of the Medical Findings in a
Marshallese Population Twenty-Six Years
After Accidental Exposure to Radioactive Fallout
(Brookhaven National Laboratory. BNL
51261. 1980].)
27. A detailed discussion of the derivation of
Figures 5 and 6 may be found in. Jan Beyea and
Frank von Hippel. Nuclear Reactor Accidents:
The Value of Improved Conlainmenl (Princeton
University. Center for Energy and Environmental
Studies Report »94. 1980).
28. Although it is not possible to filler out the
noble gases, doses in excess of 10 rem would be
received from the noble gases over an area
which would be smaller ihan I percenl of 10.000
square kilometers.
August/September 1982 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scienlists 59

233
Senator Domenici. Thank you, very much. Did you recommend
the tax on just nuclear power?
Dr. Beyea. At this point, yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. Why do you not put the tax on coal generating
power, also?
Dr. Beyea. Well, we might go along with that, too, but in terms
of the political climate, I think there is a political possibility at this
time to put a tax on nuclear power that the public would accept.
Senator Domenici. Well, I think some of us would more readily
accept it if it were shared. Environmental problems are not unique
to nuclear. If we invent a new reactor, it apparently would be
available also to solve some of the problems that coal presents;
would it not?
Dr. Beyea. If you are trying to suggest that I would oppose a tax
on coal, I would not necessarily oppose a tax on coal.
Senator Domenici. No, I really was not. I was just wondering,
and you gave me the answer. You think it is more vulnerable now
so it would be supported, if I understand you correctly.
Dr. Beyea. I think there is a recognition on the part of the public
that nuclear power has problems—at least this generation of
plants—has problems that are not desirable. And I think that you
must do something to respond to that concern. One response that
you have heard today by Howard Denton is to do little immediately;
perhaps work on the GE containment.
Another response is to go back to the public and say, we recognize
there is a problem and we want to do something about it. It is
going to take some money to do that, and will you support that
kind of tax?
Senator Domenici. Let me ask you one other question. The Audubon
Society has—you work for them?
Dr. Beyea. That is correct.
Senator Domenici. What kind of scientific staff, aside from you,
do they have? Are you it, or do they have a number of them?
Dr. Beyea. We have, in terms of scientific staff, we have about
six Ph.D.'s that cover all our topics, mainly wildlife; most of the
Ph.D. staffs are associated with wildlife. There are two Ph.D.'s that
are relevant to this field. I have a staff of three full time people
who also work with me.
Senator Domenici. Since you are telling us that recommendations
have not been made yet but they are going to be obviously, at
some point, you are giving this committee advance of what you are
thinking about, if I gathered your testimony right.
What is the process by which the Audubon Society will make
their decision?
Dr. Beyea. What we will do, and what we have done with our
previous reports on energy is to circulate them to a wide range of
people, our friends and our enemies, to get their response. We will
be circulating these ideas to other environmental groups to see if
they can generate any support among those groups.
We also will be sending this testimony, these ideas, to people in
the nuclear industry to see what their comments are.
We believe that it is time that we talk to each other and we
intend to do that.

234
Senator Domenici. I appreciate the answer. Thank you, very
much.
Mr. Taylor, would you do me a favor—probably we could get this
information somewhere else, but nonetheless, if you have it—you
gave us the example of cancer from the high-level radiation resulting
from the bomb. I understand Dr. Beyea thinks it might not be
totally relevant, and I am not going to pass judgment on that.
But, can you furnish us or give us the source of that information
so that someone like myself and other members would be able to
talk about it, examine and see what those numbers mean?
Mr. Taylor. It comes from the U.S. Commission that was designated
to follow up on the survivors of the bombings, and I can give
you the exact terminology, location, and i will do that.
Senator Domenici. Would you do that through our staff, please?
Staff, would you put that together, at least for this Senator and
circulate it if anybody else is interested; I would like to have that
myself, in all events.
What is an inherently safe reactor mean?
Mr. Taylor. I would like to comment. I don't think there is anything
in this world. Senator, that is inherently safe. There has
been a tradition in the nuclear power industry in the United States
to take advantage of intrinsic features in the systems that will
make them more stable and easier to control. The very earliest discover,
with great glee, was that it v/as possible to have a negative
temperature coefficient.
That is, if the temperature of the reactor went up, the reaction
rate went down. So you had built in the physical laws of the
system a tendency to keep stable. We have maintained that as a
very important design feature.
Another one is the natural circulation, the capability for coolants
to, by thermal convection, provide cooling without the need for
pumping, and equipment to move the coolant around.
Another in the liquid metal systems has been what is called the
Dopplar coefficient, an effect, again a physical law in the fuel. As
the power goes up, there is a tendency for the reaction rate to come
down, and the gas-cool reactor, one of the benefits of graphite is
that it represents, in the way it is operated in this country—not
necessarily in the Soviet Union—a large heat sink which captures
excess heat and minimizes the need for people to act immediately.
I think from our experience, we should enlarge on the contribution
of these intrinsic safety features in all our systems; lightwater,
gas-cooled, and liquid metal.
But to say that we could carry them to the point that we have
intrinsic safety, it is a Madison Avenue statement.
Dr. Dean. I agree with much of what Mr. Taylor said, but when
we use the word "inherently" safe, passively safe, this is a reactor
design which has the power limited such that there can be upsets
in the system, that operator action is not required; that no automatic
powered safety systems must come into operation to protect
the health and safety of the public.
For example, if you were to lose feedwater. You lose it, the operators
don't have to worry about reestablishing feedwater to protect
the safety of the public. The reactor is located underground and it
can lose all power, all cooling, except the cooling that naturally

235
occurs to the Earth. It is intrinsic; the laws of nature would prevent
the fuel from overheating, such that it would release the fission
products just because the earth is still surrounding.
That is an example of the inherent safety features of the modular
HTGR.
Senator Domenici. Dr. Beyea, when you mentioned proceeding
with the research for the next generation, generally you were alluding
to the same kind of technology that they have been talking
about?
Dr. Beyea. That Dr. Dean has been talking about. Technology
that relies on basic physical principles, chemical principles, or its
safety does not rely on mechanical equipment.
Senator Domenici. I have to close the hearing down. I have about
four or five written questions that I would submit for your response.
But, I would ask, since I do not have it prepared, if you,
Mr. Pate, or any of you, would take the quote from the newspaper
article that Senator Metzenbaum used, indicating, whoever wrote
it, their version as written about accidents since Three Mile Island.
I wonder if somebody could do an analysis of that and tell us
what you think it means, or if it does not state the case as you see
it, prepare written remarks so that we would have that in the
record. Could you do that for us?
Dr. Pate. Yes, sir. I would be pleased to.
Senator Domenici. All right. Anybody else could do that or—is it
outside their
Mr. Taylor. I would be glad to respond, also, Senator.
Senator Domenici. All right. I really did that because I do not
understand that threshold issue described by the NRC, and these.
So somewhere, there is some definitional change that has occurred,
it appears to me, or somebody is way off base.
All right, if there is nothing further, let me before we close say
to you. Dr. Schulten, we are very appreciative that you would be
here and that you would take so much time and effort on your own
to come from your homeland to ours. We appreciate that very
much. And, to the rest of you, we are most appreciative.
We will recess the hearing until the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon, the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the
Chair.]

APPENDIX
Responses to Additional Committee Questions
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460
JUL 2 2
OFFICE OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Honorable James A. McClure
Chairman
Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Enclosed are our responses to the questions contained
in your June 30, 1986 letter to Sheldon Meyers, Director,
Office of Radiation Programs, who testified before the Committee
on June 19, 1986 concerning the Chernobyl accident
and its implications for the domestic nuclear industry.
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
(Manson) Wilson
Administrator
rnal Affairs
(237)

238
RESPONSES TO eOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS TO JUNE 19, 1986 HEARING
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
01. Why are there so few federal monitoring stations in Alaska
when the Arctic is a known "sink" for atmospheric pollutants,
and the first traces of radioactivity over North America
resulting from Chernobyl were located over the Gulf of Alaska?
Al. The Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS)
is a nationwide monitoring program that is operated jointly by
State and local personnel and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). EPA provides the sampling equipment, supplies,
and laboratory analyses of samples. State and local governments
provide the personnel that collect the samples and pay for the
electricity required to run the samplers. In the event of an
incident such as Chernobyl, radioactivity will be first detected
in air and precipitation. There are 67 ERAMS stations that
collect air particulates and precipitation. With the exception
of Maryland and Massachusetts, there are one or more air sampling
stations in each of the fifty States. Because nuclear debris
from incidents like Chernobyl or foreign tests of nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere is widely dispersed in the atmosphere,
this distribution of the 67 stations is sufficient to monitor
the track of air contamination as it moves across the United
States and to determine if additional sampling (milk, food, and
water) or other actions are required.
In Alaska there are two air particulate sampling stations and
milk samples are collected from the Palmer, Alaska, milk shed.
The air particulate stations in Alaska, located in Anchorage
and Juneau, are maintained in a ready standby mode and can be
activated by phone, as required. Following the Chernobyl
accident both stations operated continuously until June 1
when atmospheric radioactivity had returned to near normal
levels. Milk was collected twice per week through the month
of June when the normal monthly sampling program was resumed.
We believe that the monitoring stations in Alaska are
sufficient to provide early warning of contamination and allow
appropriate protective actions to be taken. However, if the
State or the Arctic Research Commission is willing to provide
personnel to operate stations, we would be happy to discuss the
number and location of additional monitoring sites in Alaska.
Q2 . The major monitoring response to the Chernobyl accident
was by State and University personnel primarily because of
a perceived insufficent Federal capacity to respond. In
light of the ad-hoc nature of the monitoring program in
Alaska, and the presence of several University, State,
and Federal groups involved in monitoring, do you see a
role for the Arctic Research Commission to help coordinate
the monitoring program?

.
.
239
A2 . As noted above, we would be glad to consult with the Arctic
Research Commission in identifying operators and station
locations
Q3. Are the nuclear particles that are being monitored by
EPA representative ol: the nuclear particles that could be
produced by an accident at any of the existing nuclear
power plants around the world? or are there "holes"
in our particle monitoring capability?
A3. We feel our monitoring program provides adequate coverage to
detect any major release of radioactivity in the environment
as it traverses the United States at the lower altitudes. As
far as "holes" in our monitoring capability, any program can
be more detailed and extensive with more sampling sites and
analyses; however, this must be balanced with other programs
and the resources and personnel available.
Q4. Is there any merit to the claims that our nuclear fallout
monitoring capability is insufficient to protect the safety and
health of our citizens? ...i.e., are there dangerous particles
in the atmosphere that we don't or can't monitor?
A4 . We feel that our national monitoring system which analyzes
major radionuclides and pathways of concern is sufficient
to protect the safety and health of U.S. citizens. We do not
routinely monitor for gaseous radionuclides. We are presently
considering the monitoring of gaseous radioactivity at a
representative number (20) of the present air particulate
stations
Q5. Please explain, in layman's terms, the situation with
respect to radioactivity levels at and around the Chernobyl
plant, and to a distance of 18 miles.
How much activity will be allowed within the 18 mile
radius of the plant over the next year and longer periods
of time?
A5 . As of this time, we have not received information from
the U.S.S.R. that we would need to address this question.
The Soviets are giving a briefing on the Chernobyl accident
in Vienna, Austria, at the end of August. We hope this
forum will provide the information needed to adequately
address your questions.

240
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
ON
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
HEARING OF JUNE 19, 1986
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
AUGUST 1986

241
QUESTION 1. Some people have said that the Chernobyl
reactor did have a containment system of
sorts. But as I understand it, the reactor
had merely a pressure suppression system and
'other safety features that were designed
more to protect the reactor from damage, as
opposed to protecting the public from
injury. Can you elaborate on this?
ANSWER .
Our present understanding of the design of the Chernobyl Unit 4
reactor that was involved in the recent accident is based on
available documents and discussions with technical experts
familiar with Soviet reactor technology. That information is not
sufficient to allow a complete understanding of the reactor and
containment design at this time. However, it is clear that the
Chernobyl design did not have a containment structure surrounding
the primary reactor system such as is used on U.S. licensed
reactors .
Portions of the Chernobyl reactor design perform some of the same
functions as in the U.S. licensed designs. However, the designs
are not directly comparable. In the Chernobyl design, the fuel is
held in fuel tubes containing multiple fuel elements and the
cooling water. These fuel tubes are designed for pressures
approximately equal to the design pressure of the fuel elements in
some U.S. reactors (about 1500 psig). The fuel tubes are then

242
2yEST20N_l. (Continued) - 2 -
enclosed in a graphite matrix used as the moderator and is part of
a region of the Chernobyl design referred to as the "vault". We
do not believe that the part of the vault that surrounds the fuel
and graphite has any appreciable pressure retention capability.
The Chernobyl plant does contain certain compartments that are
designed to withstand piping failures in those compartments, as
well as a pressure suppression system utilizing pools of water as
in U.S. boiling water reactors.
In summary, there does not appear to have been any structure at
Chernobyl having an appreciable pressure retention capability
surrounding the reactor core, equivalent to the containments used
in U.S. plants.
Commissioner Asselstine adds the following:
T agree with the Commission statement that information about the
Chernobyl plant design is not sufficiently detailed to allow a
complete understanding of the design at this time. However, I
believe that the Commission's response creates an overly
optimistic impression of U.S. containment performance as compared
with the Chernobyl design. For example, the Commission's response
fails to mention the existence of primary system equipment outside
the containments in U.S. reactors cr the existence of pathways
which could bypass U.S. containments.

243
QUESnON_l. (Continued) 3 -
For U.S. pressurized water reactors, a significant portion of the
area of the primary reactor system consists of thousands of steam
generator tubes, which at many reactors are cracked and/or
corroded. A rupture of those tubes represents a containment
bypass release 'scenario in that the secondary side of the steam
generators is isolated from the environment by relief valves, not
a containment structure. In U.S. boiling water reactors, the
primary core coolant path exits the containment structure. In
both types of U.S. plants, there are piping connections to the
primary reactor system which exit the containment structure and
which have design pressures far below that of the primary system
piping. Thus, U.S. reactors have built-in containment bypass
pathways. This is not to say that each core meltdown in a U.S.
plant would result in substantial offsite releases.
With regard to the Soviet Union reactor designs, I agree with the
Commission that their plants have different designs than U.S.
plants. However, there appear to be some interesting similarities
in the design bases which were used here and in the Soviet Union.
In the attached response to Question C.4 (which was provided to
the Commission by the NRC staff as background information for a
Congressional hearing in May), the staff wrote that the Chernobyl
reactor and portions of the inlet and outlet piping were
surrounded by a "vault" with a design pressure of 27 psi which was
in turn connected to a pressure suppression pool. This
information provided the basis for my previous comments on the
Chernobyl and U.S. containment designs. The NRC staff is now

244
C[U E S Tj^O N_j_ . (Continued) 4 -
saying that the overall core region surrounding the fuel and
control rods does not have any appreciable pressure retention
capability. However, the plant does contain certain compartments
that are designed to withstand piping failures, as well as a
pressure suppression system. The design basis for the plant
appears to be similar to that for U.S. plants. The Commission's
regulations are founded on a postulated break of the largest pipe
in a zone or a break in one of the thousands of steam generator
tubes. The Commission deems multiple ruptures beyond the design
basis. For this and other reasons, the U.S. plants have
vulnerabilities to substantial releases of radioactivity off-site
in the event of a large-scale core meltdown accident. So do those
of the Sovi et Union .
I believe the principal issue raised by the Chernobyl accident is
not whether the plants in the Soviet Union have a different design
than those in the United States. Rather, recognizing that the
estimated quantity of fission products released at Chernobyl could
be equaled or exceeded by a core meltdown accident at a U.S.
plant, the issues raised &re: Do the U.S. reactor containments
have sufficient capabilities for coping with core meltdown
phenomena and have we done enough to prevent core meltdown
accidents?

245
QUESTION C.tt . What do we know about Russian practice regarding
SAFETY features SUCH AS CONTAINMENT VS.
CONFINEMENT?
ANSWER .
Unit ^ at Chej^nobyl contains characteristics of both containment
AND confinement. THERE ARE TWO REGIONS THAT APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED
TO WITHSTAND 27 PSI AND 57 PSI. THESE VOLUMES ARE IN TURN
INTERCONNECTED WITH TWO SUPPRESSION POOLS VIA PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVES AND DOWNCOMERS. THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF THE PLANT ARE
HOUSED WITHIN A CONFINEMENT STRUCTURE. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS
DISCUSSION, THE CONFINEMENT BUILDING CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
FILTRATION SYSTEM WITH LITTLE OR NO PRESSURE RETENTION CAPABILITY.
The FIRST CONTAINMENT REGION, REFERRED TO AS THE REACTOR VAULT,
IS SHOWN IN THE ENCLOSED FIGURES. IT SURROUNDS THE REACTOR AND
PORTIONS OF THE INLET AND OUTLET WATER PIPING. THE DESIGN PRESSURE
IS .18 MPA (27 PSI). At LEAST TWO RELIEF VALVES CONNECT THIS
REGION TO THE SUPPRESSION POOL(S). ThE SETPOINT OF THESE VALVES
IS .02 MPA (3 PSI). Enclosed piping consists of relatively small
DIAMETER (I.E., 6 INCH DIAMETER) TUBING THEREBY ELIMINATING THE
NEED FOR A HIGHER DESIGN PRESSURE.

246
QUESTION C.t< . (Continued) - 2 -
The second containment region encloses the major diameter piping
and headers of the system. the largest pipe in this volume is
90 CM (35 INCH) IN DIAMETER. ThE BOUNDARY OF THE ENCLOSED
VOLUME IS SHOWN IN THE ATTACHED FIGURE. THIS REGION HAS A DESIGN
PRESSURE OF .35 MPA (57 PSi). DOWNCOMERS CONNECT THIS REGION
TO THE SUPPRESSION POOLS. ThE SUPPRESSION POOLS ARE ARRANGED
ONE ON TOP OF THE OTHER, AS SHOWN IN THE ATTACHED FIGURE. EACH
POOL REGION IS APPROXIMATELY EIGHT FEET HIGH WITH A POOL DEPTH
OF ABOUT
il FT.
We are not AWARE OF ANY OVERHEAD SPRAY SYSTEMS OR DYNAMIC COOLING
SYSTEMS INSIDE OF THE CONFINEMENT BUILDING SIMILAR TO THOSE USED
IN U.S. LWRS.

247

248
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249
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250
gyESTJ^0N_2. What are the main safety issues that you believe
might have to be revisited in the U.S. as a result
of "lessons learned" from Chernobyl?
ANSWER .
There are three main areas which the NRC will examine for
"lessons learned" as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The
first area deals with those issues involving accident prevention.
The NRC will attempt to identify the initiating event, the
relationship of the Chernobyl plant design to the accidents and
transients that could occur in plants of that design, and to
assess the likelihood of such events. This relationship will be
compared to U.S. plants to systematically identify any
similarities and differences. The NRC will also be examining the
USSR approach to safety features that can potentially reduce
radiological consequences, such as containments, and at severe
accident management and accident recovery procedures.
The second area the NRC will investigate deals with the issues
involving emergency response planning. This includes
international cooperation and early warning programs as well as
reassessing the adequacy of current U.S. programs in light of any
lessons learned from Chernobyl. The NRC will be involved with
wide range planning efforts regarding radiation assessment, feed
chain impacts, and other environmental impacts. Close
coordination with other U.S. agencies, such as the Environmental

251
QUESTION 2. (Continued) - 2 -
Prote^;ion Agency and the Food and Drug Administration, will be
requi red.
The third and last major area is source term and accident
consequences. A major effort will be to examine how the
radiological release mechanism that occurred at Chernobyl apply to
'.S. ""eactors, and whether the NRC's current model's ability to
prp^ict radiological source terms remain valid. The validity of
current meteorological models for transport of radionuclides in
the atmosphere will also be investigated.
Commissioner Asselstine adds:
In my judgment, there are several lessons that we can learn from
Chernobyl and should apply to the U.S. nuclear program. Some of
these lessons reinforce previous safety decisions made in this
country. In this vein, the Chernobyl accident seems to
demonstrate the wisdom of some of the new safety requirements
adopted in the United States in the wake of the Three Mile Island
accident in 1979. One example is improved emergency planning
around commercial nuclear power plants, which provides an added
measure of public protection, independent of plant safety systems,
to mitigate the consequences of an accident resulting in the
offsite release of radioactivity. Another example is the addition
of hydrogen control features on certain types of plants which are
intended to prevent large-scale hydrogen explosions that could
breach the reactor containment. And still another example is the

252
gi)EST20N_2. (Continued) - 3 -
environmental qualification of electrical equipment which is
intended to ensure that necessary safety equipment will continue
to function under serious accident conditions such as heat,
moisture and radiation. All of these measures reflected a
recognition after the Three Mile Island accident that severe
reactor accidents involving the melting of the reactor core and
the potential release of substantial amounts of radioactivity can
in fact occur. Obviously, the Chernobyl accident reinforces the
validity of that judgment.
But perhaps the most important lesson of the Chernobyl accident
has to do with the acceptability of a severe accident in the
United States and the adequacy of the measures now being taken by
the industry and the NRC to prevent such an accident. For this
accident brings home the fact that severe reactor accidents which
involve melting of the reactor core, the potential for dangerous
exposures to radiation, the potential for extensive land
contamination, and public stress and trauma, can occur. The
fundamental lesson from Chernobyl must be that such an accident is
simply unacceptable, and we must make every effort to reduce or
eliminate the chance of such an accident in this country. The
central question is whether our present regulatory approach and
the level of performance of the U.S. plants are fully consistent
with this most fundamental lesson of Chernobyl. I must conclude,
based upon the experience of the past few years, that they are
not, and that we should be pursuing additional features both to
reduce the possibility of a core meltdown accident in this country

253
fiU E S no N_2 . (Continued)
- 4 -
and to mitigate the adverse effects of such an accident should one
occur.
Foreign experience demonstrates that there are practical and
reasonable opti.ons available to reduce the severe accident risk in
this country as well. I would propose a three-part program to
achieve this objective. First, each of the 100 operating plants
in the U.S. should be reexamined to identify design deficiencies
and vulnerabilities, of the type seen in our recent serious
operating events and plant safety analyses, that could cause or
contribute to a severe accident. Second, improvement programs
should be required in areas of demonstrated weak performance at
the U.S. plants such as management, maintenance, personnel
performance and equipment reliability. Our objective should be to
bring all U.S. plants up to the highest standards of operating
performance being achieved in other countries. We should insist
upon rapid improvement in the case of those U.S. plants with a
history of poor performance.
Third, new design features should be considered for existing and
future U.S. plants which have the potential to reduce both the
likelihood and the consequences of a core meltdown accident. The
design features being added in foreign plants, such as an added
independent decay heat removal system, improvements in the
reliability of reactor control systems and emergency power supply
systems, systems to protect against the loss of power to operate
cooling and safety systems, and systems to allow the controlled
63-756 0-86-9

254
2yESnON_2. (continued) - 5 -
venting from some reactor containments, provide a good starting
point for this review.
Taken together, these measures should lead to a substantial
reduction in the risk of a core meltdown accident in this country.
They would also represent a return to the vigilant and
forward-looking safety philosophy advocated by the President's
Commission on the Three Mile Island Accident. If we are to heed
the lessons of the Chernobyl accident, we must return to a safety
approach that stresses the need to improve plant performance, to
learn the lessons of operating experience, and to pursue practical
safety improvements in existing as well as any future plants in
order to reduce the risk of a core meltdown to a level that is as
low as reasonably achievable.

255
QUESTION 3 . Just to set the record straight, what is the
population within a 10-mile radius of Shoreham?
ANSWER .
The population within a 10-mile radius* for the Shoreham
Nuclear Power Station is as follows:
1985 POPULATION (PROJECTED)
WINTER
SUMMER
0-10 miles 138,500 160,000
(SOURCE: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Local Offsite Radiological
Emergency Response Plan, Revision 6, January 1986)
*Population data is for the plume exposure pathway Emergency
Planning Zone which is about 10-miles in radius.

256
gUESTX0N_4. What is the population within a 10-mile radius
of Indian Point?
Answer .
The population within a 10-mile radius of the Indian Point
Nuclear Power Plant is as follows:
i^90_Po£ulation_|Proiected2
0-10 miles 247,400
(Source: NRC Staff Testimony in Indian Point Special
Proceeding, January 24, 1983)

257
QUESTION 5. If you were to choose between the current licensing
process and the revised process proposed in
legislation submitted by NRC and DOE to Congress,
which process is better in terms of enhancing the
'safety of nuclear power? Which process is
preferable in terms of meaningful public input?
Which process would lead to a better technology, a
more streamlined construction and licensing
time-period, a more reliable power plant, and lower
electricity costs for ratepayers?
ANSWER .
The following answers are based on the provisions of S. 836, the
NRC proposal, without attempting to account for differences in
S. 2073, the DOE proposal. As the Commission indicated in
testimony before the Senate Committe on Energy and Natural
Resources earlier this year, however, the differences between the
NRC and DOE legislative proposals are small. Therefore, they
would not likely affect the answers given below.
The revised licensing process in the proposed legislation would
result in the development of more complete information at an
earlier stage of the licensing process. Standardization would
foster improvements in design, management, and operation of

258
QUESTX0N_5. (Continued) - 2
nuclear plants. It would also facilitate operator training and
exchange of technical information. These improvements should
enhance the safety of nuclear power. The proposed legislation
would also provide an opportunity for public participation at a
more appropriate stage of the licensing process; after significant
design information is made available but before construction is
allowed to begin. This would make public input more meaningful.
Because of improved safety, as discussed above, the licensing
process in the proposed legislation would be more likely to lead
to a better technology and a more reliable power plant. By
requiring some issues to be decided earlier and by precluding
relitigation of issues except in carefully defined circumstances,
the licensing process in the proposed legislation would also
result in a more streamlined construction and licensing period,
which should reduce the time and, therefore, the cost of
constructing a nuclear power plant and placing it into operation.
This, coupled with increased reliability of nuclear power plants,
should result in lower electricity costs for ratepayers, assuming
no increase in such costs that could be attributed to other
factors .
Commissioner Asselstine adds:
I favor encouraging standardization. However, I have two
fundamental concerns about the licensing process as proposed by
both the NRC and DOE bill .

259
2UEST|0N_5. (Continued; 3 -
First, I believe that we should require the use of standardized
designs and that a standardized design be essentially complete.
The proposals allow for the use of custom designs and permit
approval of something less than a complete standardized design.
This can only perpetuate the problems encountered to date with
custom designs which were caused by trying to design as one built
the
plant.
Second, I believe that the public should have an opportunity for a
hearing at the preoperational stage. The bills as now written
provide at best a discretionary hearing at that stage. Several
issues cannot be raised earlier in the process -- emergency
planning, operational readiness and whether the plant has been
built as designed and in accordance with regulations. The public
should have an opportunity for input on this kind of issue before
the plant is allowed to operated.

260
2iiiSIiON_i- Could you tell us what the NRC's budget profile for
safety research has been over the last 4 years?
ANSWER.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH
PROGRAM SUPPORT FUNDS
FY 1983 - FY 1986
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 86
Reactor Engineering
Thermal Hydraulic Transients
LOFT
$35.3
35.6
15.0
$43.4 $38.8 $36.5
36.9 24.0 18.7
Accident
Evaluation
48.0
44.5 37.4 28.6
Reactor Operations &
Risk
Advanced
Reactors
25.7 20.1 16.6 14.2
9.1 8.9 2.6
Waste
Management,
Earth Sciences & Health
10.6 19.1 13,6 11.2
TOTAL $189.3 $172.9 $133.0 $109.2

261
SMilII2!!_Z- ^° "^ "°" ^^^^ ^"^ in-pi le safety testing
capabilities in this country? Where would one have
to go to get answers to safety questions requiring
such
capabilities?
ANSWER.
There is one safety test facility still available in the
U.S. for safety tests on short segments (12 to 18 inches long) of
light water reactor fuel rods: the Annular Core Research Reactor
at Sandia National Laboratories. Other test facilities used in the
past are LOFT and PBF at Idaho National Engineering Laboratories.
LOFT has been disassembled and PBF is on standby awaiting decommissioning.
The Annular Core Research Reactor is used by DOE's
Defense Program activities as well as by NRC research programs.
Through an international agreement, NRC has sponsored tests of
full length LWR fuel rods at Canada's NRU reactor. In addition,
France has a small test reactor called PHEBUS that ' s carrying out
a program of transient tests similar to some of the tests carried
out earlier in the U.S. The PHEBUS reactor may be upgraded to have
a steady state capability like the PBF; this upgrade is unlikely
before 1990 at the earliest. We are continuing to negotiate with
the French CEA regarding an agreement for sharing in the work at
PHEBUS.

262
QUESTI ON 8 . Wouldn't having uniform, standardized plants make
NRC's work more focused and efficient in terms of
regulating, licensing, inspecting, training, and
providing safety in nuclear power plants?
ANSWER
Yes. Standardization would greatly enhance the NRC's regulatory
responsibilities related to licensing, inspecting and training.
Available resources could be concentrated on fewer designs,
allowing the development of a greater base of experience and
evaluation skills. The staff's effort would be enhanced by
avoiding the dilution inherent in spreading the resources among
many designs with different systems and operating parameters.

263
SMilllO^l-^- You attended the IAEA special meeting of the Board
of Governors after the Chernobyl accident. What
follow-up activities were proposed at this
meeting, and what role does NRC play in these IAEA
activities?
ANSWER.
NRC will participate in several upcoming IAEA meetings over the
next several months. The first will be a meeting, (expected in
late August) during which the Soviet Union will report on the causes
of the Chernobyl accident. There will also be meetings in which
binding international early warning and coordination agreements
will be drafted. There will be a meeting of worldwide experts
that will develop and propose ways to improve safety. The final
meeting will be a conference of governments convened to consider
the recommendations of the experts meeting. In addition to these
meetings, there is also underway a general movement to strengthen
the role of the IAEA in responding to accidents such as
Chernobyl. For example, the role of the Operational Safety
Assessment Review Teams will be strengthened through mechanisms
such as increasing the inspection frequency. The Incident
Reporting System will likewise be improved.

264
9yi5IiON_9. (Continued) 2 -
The NRC has been informed that the International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group, which advises the IAEA Inspector General, will
also be strengthened. Finally, other U. N. -sponsored
organizations, such as the U. N. Scientific Committee on Effects
of Atomic Radia'tion, and the World Health Organization will
become more actively involved in responding to nuclear accidents.
In addition, the NRC actively participates in activities of the
Committee for the Safety of Nuclear Installations, which operates
under the auspices of the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency. This
Committee is beginning to become actively involved in the
assessment of the Chernobyl accident.
A group of senior NRC scientists and engineers has been appointed
to continue the study of the accident and recommend to the
Commission any action that might be needed for the U.S. nuclear
regulatory
program.

I
A
265
QU E ST 1 N_ 1 ,
year ago, the NRC staff stated, in response to a
House Committee inquiry, that there was a 50%
chance of a severe core damage accident in one of
the 100 plants operating in the U.S. over the next
'20 years. More recently, the NRC staff revised
their estimate, in light of post-TMI improvements,
to only one chance in eight (12") for the 100
plants operating over the next 20 years. I think
this data is somewhat misleading because a severe
core accident doesn't by any means translate into
public injury. In fact, the TMI accident was 70%
core meltdown accident, and no significant amounts
of radiation were released to the public.
In terms of public consequences, then, what are the
probabilities that a severe core damage accident,
should that occur in any U.S. reactor, would result
in significant offsite release of radiation?
ANSWER_^
It is true that in calculating the probability of a severe core
damage accident almost all probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs)
assume that loss of core cooling invariably leads to massive core
melt, subsequent reactor vessel failure and challenge of the
containment. In fact, these assumptions are only valid for

266
QUESTION 10. (Continued) 2 -
specific sequences, that involve failure of operators to take
certain actions and/or non-recoverable failure of safety systems.
Our current estimates suggest that given the sequences involving a
loss of core cooling, there exists approximately a 1 in 2 to 1 in
10 chance that >,he damaged core will be arrested and remain inside
the reactor vessel .
If the damaged core remains in the vessel, as happened at TMI, the
offsite radiological releases would be very low as has also been
predicted by PRAS. Moreover, even if the core melts through the
vessel and enters the containment, if the containment sprays or
other such mitigating features provided, remain functional there
is a high probability that containment integrity will be
maintained with negligible offsite consequences.
However, there are low probability events that can be postulated
which involve not only the failures which produced the core
meltdown, but also involve failures of containment sprays and heat
removal systems. In these cases containment failure is predicted
to occur. The consequences though, will depend on the specific
containment design, design features of the plant, and site
characteri sties .
Commissioner Asselstine adds:
There is no precise and reliable quantitative answer to the
question. Rather, there are quantitative and qualitative

267
QUESTION 10. (Continued) 3 -
indications that taken together serve as the basis for any
estimate of the likelihood of a core melt accident.
With regard to quantitative indications, the Commission has
previously stated that the most complete and recent PRAs suggest
.3
core-melt frequencies in the range of 10 per reactor year to
4 -4
10 per reactor year, with a typical value of 3x10 per reactor
year. Based on this latter value as an industry average and given
a population of 100 reactors operating over a period of 20 years,
the Commission has estimated the likelihood of a severe core melt
accident in the next 20 years to be 45 percent. (See the
Commission's response to Question 21(a) in the April 16, 1985
letter to Congressman Markey from Chairman Palladino.) The value
of 45 percent has been estimated by the Commission through the
- X t
formula P=l-e , where P is the cumulative probability of an
event occurring over time t, and x is the likelihood of the event.
-4
In this case, t equals 20 years and x equals 3x10 per reactor
year times 100 reactors.
The PRA estimates given above have substantial uncertainties that
span a factor of about 10 above and below the reported values. I
believe it is mandatory that consideration of these uncertainties
be factored into any application of such point estimates. Thus,
the cumulative probability of a core meltdown accident in the next
/ /

.
268
QUESTION 10. (Continued) - 4 -
20 years, based only on PRA estimates and their uncertainties,
ranges anywhere from 0.99 to 0.06. These values have been derived
by using the same formula that the Commission has used and by
varying x to reflect the factor of 10 uncertainty in the point
estimates .
Regarding the upper limit of 0.99, actuarial experience with
reactor accidents indicates that the industry average core
_3
meltdown frequency is not above 10 per reactor year. Core
meltdown accidents involve multiple failures and a progression of
events that make close calls somewhat identifiable. If the
industry average of the core meltdown frequency were as high as
_3
10 per reactor year, one would expect more close calls on core
meltdowns than appear to have occurred within the more than 800
reactor years of the U.S. nuclear power experience. However, such
actuarial inferences must be made cautiously in part because the
operating reactors continue to surprise us. What actuarial
experience we have is severely limited by our lack of detailed
understanding of the performance of the plants, their designs,
their weak spots, and because of the wide variations in the
designs and in utility capabilities. Further, the usefulness of
actuarial experience in drawing broad conclusions about commercial
nuclear reactors is highly controversial and fraught with
uncertai nti es

269
QUESTION 10. (Continued) - 5
With regard to qua! i tati ti ve indicators, I should note that, in
the document serving as a significant part of the technical basis
for the. Commission's Severe Accident Policy Statement, there is
the following observation: "There is a distinct possibility of
one or more additional severe reactor accidents, beyond the one at
Three Mile Island, in the remaining service life of the plants now
in operation or under construction, unless the estimated accident
frequency declines sharply with modifications, or has been
significantly overestimated in current PRAs and actuarial
inferences." (See NUREG-1070, "NRC Policy on Future Reactor
Designs: Decisions on Severe Accident Issues in Nuclear Power
Plant Regulations," August 1984, page 108.) On the question of
whether probabilistic risk assessments significantly overestimate
core meltdown probabilities, the Commission's chief safety officer
has observed: "I believe that the recent Davis-Besse event
illustrates that, in the real world, system and component
reliabilities can degrade below those we and the industry
routinely assume in estimating core melt frequencies. Our
regulatory process should require margins against such degradation
and also to reflect the uncertainties in our PRA estimates." (See
memorandum dated June 27, 1985, from Harold R. Denton to William
J. Dircks.) I would also point out that other operating
experience indicates that a total loss of a safety system is not a
rare event, that multiple independent failures do occur, that
there are component and reliability problems, that operating
practices are frequently deficient, and that there are a wide

270
QUESTION 10. (Continued) - 6 -
range of adverse systems interactions. These actual experiences
are not supportive of the notion that a severe accident in the
U.S. equal to or more severe than the Three Mile Island accident
is an unlikely event over the next 20 years.
»
Further, many believe that the largest single factor affecting the
likelihood of a severe core damage accident rests with the human
factor -- the people who manage, operate and maintain nuclear
power plants. Whether the contribution is very high or very low
depends upon the utilities' commitments, attitudes, actions, and
capabilities. Because of the extreme complexity of the plants,
mediocrity and complacency on the part of the utilities are not
acceptable over the long term. The utilities must have the
ability to anticipate problems, react properly to unanticipated
events, and adequately maintain and operate their plants.
Unfortunately, many utilities do not now meet this test.
As the Commission has recently acknowledged to the Congress, the
current generation of nuclear power plants in this country can
best be characterized as a complex technology that is not fully
mature. Resolution of safety issues over the past thirty years
has been left to what one industry executive has called the rough,
tough, surly competitive elements. Safety systems are limited
because of cost considerations. Containment capabilities are
minimized to reduce costs. For example, to keep the containment
size down, crucial pumps, heat exchangers, and emergency water

271
QUESTION 10. (Continued) - 7
supplies have been located outside the containment, which results
in flow paths for highly contaminated water that can effectively
bypass the containment. Core power densities have been driven to
the limits of materials capabilities such that, in the event of a
loss of coolant" accident, external water supplies must be rapidly
injected into the core to keep it from melting. And, the balance
of plant is designed to lower standards than the reactor systems
to minimize the costs. These competitive forces are what led to
the level of safety achieved in the current generation of nuclear
power plants and are in part responsible for the poor performance
of some of our plants.
Taking the above together and absent fundamental changes in the
nuclear industry and in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, I
believe we should expect to see a severe core damage accident at a
U.S. plant within the next 20 years.
However, a core melt accident does not automatically mean that
there will be significant offsite releases of radioactivity.
According to the NRC staff one cannot preclude the release of
large fractions of the core inventory. Using extrapolated data,
release magnitudes at Chernobyl were, according to the NRC staff,
similar to those in the Reactor Safety Study {WASH-1400) release
categories PWR 1, 2 or BWR 1, 2. However, uncertainties in
atmospheric transport, dispersion, measurements, and other
possible release scenarios are such that one cannot preclude

272
QUESTION 10. (Continued) - 8 -
radioactivity release magnitudes similar to those in WASH-1400 PWR
3 or BWR 3 release categories. These release categories contain
many accident scenarios, including small break loss of coolant
with failure of the containment sprays, interfacing systems loss
of coolant (i.e'. , accidents involving overpressurization of low
pressure piping that is outside of the containment but is
connected to the high pressure primary cooling piping such that
the loss of coolant occurs outside of the containment rather than
the design basis loss of coolant inside containment), anticipated
transients without scram, station blackout, and loss of coolant
accidents with failure of emergency core cooling injection.
The specific release category that results from these scenarios is
dependent on core meltdown phenomena and containment response
thereto. While much progress has been made in understanding these
since WASH-1400 was published in 1975, there remain very
substantial uncertainties in evaluating them. For example, during
a core meltdown, theoretical source term calculations include
models for plating out of significant quantities of fission
products within the primary system. However, the models do not
evaluate or poorly evaluate the effects of the heating of the
primary system by the plated-out fission products to determine
whether this phenomenon alters the sequence of events and the
release category. Steam explosions and their effects on
containment and resuspension of fission products are still in
dispute. These are just two examples of the mary uncertainties

I
273
QUESTION 10. (Continued) - 9
and unknowns regarding the release categories which could result
from serious core meltdown sequences.
With regard to the likelihood of the various sequences, for the
reasons given above I would say that none of the sequences can be
ruled out. A number of precursor events have occurred at U.S.
reactors for each of the above scenarios.

274
QUESTION 11 Is there more work that could and should be done to
resolve uncertainties associated with the source
term issue? What kinds of research are still
needed? Do we have the facilities to do the
"research? Has the NRC proposed this in its FY 87
program
plans?
ANSWER^
One of the main objectives of the NRC's Severe Accident Research
Program (SARP) has been the identification and resolution of major
technical areas of uncertainty arising from the complex phenomena
encountered during postulated LWR meltdown events.
In the process of reassessment of the technical bases for
estimating source terms; and, in re-evaluating the risk from six
representative plants; the NRC and its technical consultants and
contractors at the DOE national laboratories have identified
twelve well defined areas of uncertainty for which more
information is needed. These are:
Core Concrete interaction
Direct Containment Heating
Hydrogen generation & burning
Radionuclide
revaporization
Containment
Containment
venting
Performance
Chemical form of iodine
Secondary containment effect
Natural circulation in the
primary system
Steam
explosions
Common cause failure
Melt Progression

:
i
275
QUESTION 11. (Continued) - 2 -
If no new phenomena turn up, facilities and programs are currently
in place to better quantify and reduce the uncertainties in these
areas for the current FY 1987 budget plan. The FY 1987 budget
Includes $29 million for this program. It is expected that
these complex areas will require continued research beyond FY
1987, with significant modifications to the existing ca 1 cu 1 a t
ona 1
methodology extending into FY 1989. The detailed program plan is
set forth in NUREG-0900 (Rev. 1) - "The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Severe Accident Research Program." The program has also
been favorably reviewed by the ACRS in their current report to
Congress. Budget projections to carry out this program are as
fol 1 ows
During the period FY 1982 through FY 1986, the NRC has received
about $15 Million in direct contributions and $9 Million in in-kind
services from foreign sources for cooperative research in this
area. Support from foreign sources is expected to continue in
FY 1987 and bevond.

276
gUESTX0N_J.2^ The Plant involved in the Davis-Besse Accident has
a Babcock and Wilcox Reactor. That reactor has
been involved in several serious accidents,
including Three Mile Island and Rancho Seco. Even
'the NRC admitted it has concerns about the safety
of the Babcock and Wilcox Reactors.
With such serious warning signals, why does the NRC
conclude that plants with these reactors pose no
undue risk and should be allowed to keep running
without major modifications?
ANSWER,
The utilities have made a significant number of improvements in
their plants since the TMI accident to enhance their performance.
The staff is concerned that even though utilities have been making
these improvements, the number and complexity of events in the B&W
plants has not decreased as expected. As a result, we have
initiated a reassessment of the B&W plants. This activity will
include an assessment of the thermal -hydraul i c design,
instrumentation, control and power supplies along with a review of
operating experience and operator training and response.
The staff believes that the B&W reactors can safely continue to
operate while the NRC reassess the B&W plant design requirements,

277
QUESTION 12. (Continued) - 2 -
The recent events at the Davis-Besse plant in June 1985 and at
Rancho Seco in December of 1985 have concerned the staff.
However, in the case of the Davis-Besse plant, the NRC Incident
Investigative Team concluded that the root cause of the event was
"The licensee's' lack of attention to detail in the care of plant
equipment." This was a plant-specific finding.
With respect to the Rancho Seco event, the root cause was
identified as "design weakness and vulnerabilities in the ICS"
which "were not adequately compensated by other design features,
plant procedures or operator training." Information presented to
the NRC by the B&W Regulatory Response Group has demonstrated that
a loss of ICS power at other B&W plants would not have resulted in
as severe an over-cooling event as that experienced at Rancho Seco
due to plant design differences and previous actions taken to
compensate for a loss of ICS power event.
It should be recognized that these recent events had little or no
offsite consequences. Therefore, neither event posed an undue
risk to the public health and safety. However, the staff is
concerned about the complexity of the post-trip response exhibited
by these events. As a result, we have initiated a reassessment of
the B&W plants in order to identify potential plant modifications
which would improve plant response to anticipated operational
transients .

278
SMiiliON-ii •
(Continued) 3 -
Thus, while the recent events at B&W plants have reinforced our
concerns regarding the sensitivity of the B&W plants to
operational transients, we have concluded that continued operation
of the B&W plants during the assessment does not pose a undue risk
to the public health and safety.
Commissioner Asselstine adds:
The Commission's response indicates that a reassessment of B&W
plants has been initiated. However, I have misgivings about the
scope of the reassessment and the decision to give the B&W owners
the lead in that reassessment.
Following the TMI accident in 1979, the NRC required the industry
to reexamine many aspects of the B&W design, including the
integrated control system and the auxiliary feedwater systems.
The Davis-Besse and Rancho Seco events of 1985 illustrate that
that industry reexamination did not lead to the necessary
improvements to the B&W plants. The Commission, in essence, has
said that the best approach to resolving the known design
weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the B&W plants is to ask the
industry once again to reexamine the plants. I do not agree.
Although B&W and the utilities which operate B&W plants should be
involved in the reassessment program, I do not believe that they
should be given the leadership role in conducting the
reassessment.

279
QUESTION 1 2. (Continued) - 4 -
Further, there appears to be some concern on the part of the ACRS
with regard to the scope of the reexamination. In a July 16, 1986
letter from the Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards to the Commission's Executive Director for Operations,
ACRS questions 'the scope and effectiveness of the B&W Owners Group
review. According to the ACRS:
At the time of our Subcommittee meeting the BW06 program's
main emphasis seemed to be directed at improving plant
on-line performance, rather than addressing the safety
objectives of the NRC-B&W reassessment initiative. Our
review of this program indicates that it may lead to
improved plant on-line performance; however, we are
concerned that plant safety does not appear to be its
central focus. We believe it should be. While it is true
that improved plant performance could represent safer
operation, that is not an inescapable outcome.
The ACRS letter raises several specific concerns regarding the B&W
Owners Group program, including the fact that apparently little
attention is being given to decay heat removal despite the
importance of decay heat removal in ensuring public protection. I
am particularly disturbed by the fact that we are identifying
potentially significant deficiencies in the B&W Owners Group
review after six months have elapsed in this one-year effort. I
believe that the concerns identified by the ACPS are further
evidence that giving the lead role to the industry in this
reassessment of the safety of the B&W design was ill-advised. I
believe that an independent review of the B&W design, as I
proposed last year following the June 9, 1985 operating event at
the Davis-Besse plant, would be more useful.

280
QiiiS T J^N_J_2 . (Continued)
- 5
Finally, I disagree with the Commission's stated conclusion that
because the Davis-Besse and Rancho Seco events had little or no
offsite consequences, they did not pose an undue risk to the
public health and safety. In my view, both events disclosed
examples of past management practices which resulted in a
significant deterioration in equipment condition and reliability,
and in poor operations performance. These management breakdowns
have resulted in extended plant shutdowns at both plants and in
extensive improvement programs which are aimed at correcting the
many consequences of the management failures at these plants. In
my view, the management breakdowns at these plants and the
resulting deterioration in plant safety systems reliability and
operations performance posed an undue risk to the public health
and safety by creating the potential for a much more serious
accident.

281
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON. O. C. 20555
July 16. 1986
Mr. Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr.
Stello:
SUBJECT: ACRS COMMENTS ON THE BABCOCK S WILCOX (B&W) OWNERS GROUP
SAFETY AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
During its 315th meeting, July 10-12, 1986, the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards discussed the B&W Owners Group Safety and Performance
Improvement Program. The ACRS Subcommittee on Babcock & Wilcox Reactor
Plants met in Washington, O.C. on June 25, 1986 to discuss the program.
The Subcommittee had the benefit of discussions with representatives and
consultants of the B&W Owners Group (BWOG) and the NRC Staff. We also
had the benefit of the documents listed.
Recent events at some BSW plants have resulted in increased NRC concern
regarding the frequency of reactor trips and complexity of the transients
in B&W plants. These concerns have led the NRC Cotmiissi oners and
the Staff to call for a broad reassessment of B&W plants to assure that
they provide acceptable levels of safety. At the request of the Staff,
the BWOG has taken a lead role in performing the reassessment.
At the time of our Subcoinni ttee meeting the BWOG program's main emphasis
seemed to be directed at improving plant on-line performance, rather
than addressing the safety objectives of the NRC-B&W reassessment
initiative. Our review of this program indicates that it may lead to
improved plant on-line performance; however, we are concerned that plant
safety does not appear to be its central focus. We believe it should
be. While it is true that improved plant performance could represent
safer operation, that is not an inescapable outcome.
We offer the following additional observations and recommendations:
1. An examination of the operating history of B&W plants indicates
that three B&W plants, operated by one utility, have operated with
little cause for concern. The incidents that have produced concerns
iiave occurred at plants operated by several other utilities.
It seems logical, in seeking root causes of substandard performance,
to look at the effect of operating organizations on system
performance, rather than concentrating entirely on system design.
2. There is the observation, primarily from analysis but partially
confirmed by experience, that B&W systems respond differently,
perhaps less favorably, to upsets than do the pressurized water

282
Mr. Victor Stello, Jr. - 2
- July 16. 1986
reactor (PWR) plants with Combustion Engineering or Uestlnghouse
reactor systems. This should not be surprising — they were
designed to respond differently. The once-through steam generator,
the integrated control system, and different piping arrangements
and ajjxiliary capacities give a nuclear steam supply system that is
more quickly responsive to load changes and other external challenges
than the other PWRs. Whether, from the perspective of
safety, this is good, bad, or indifferent is not yet clear. The
NRC Staff and the BWOG should focus on this observation and come to
an engineering determination as to its significance.
3. We are concerned that apparently little attention Is being given to
decay heat removal. We note that, even given a complex transient,
if the ability to trip the reactor and renove decay heat is preserved
the ability to protect the public is ensured.
We expect to meet again with the BWOG and the NRC Staff to continue
discussions.
Sincerely,"
Qu^a u. ?
David A. Ward
Chairman
References :
Y. B&W Owners Group Trip Reduction and Transient Response Improvements
Program, BAW-1919, Revision 00, May 1986
2. Letter from D. Crutchfield, NRC, to H. Tucker, BWOG, Subject:
B&W Design Reassessment, dated June 2, 1986
3. Letter from H. B. Tucker, BWOG, to C. Wylie, ACRS, Subject: BSW
Owners Group Safety and Performance Improvement Program, dated July
10, 1986

283
g U E S T 1 N 13. What are the main safety issues that you believe
might have to be revisited in the U.S. as a result
of "lessons learned" from Chernobyl?
ANSWER.
See response to question number 2.

284
Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
July 17, 1986
Honorable James A. McClure
Chairman, Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On June 19, 1986, Mary L. Walker, Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Safety, and Health, and Delbert Bunch,
Principal Deputy Secretary for Reactor Deployment, appeared
before your Committee to discuss the effects of the
Chernobyl accident on the U.S. nuclear industry.
Following that hearing, you submitted written questions for
our response to supplement the record. Enclosed are the
answers to those questions, which also have been sent
directly to the Committee staff.
If you have any questions, please have your staff call Mike
Gilmore or Cathy Hamilton on 252-4277. They will be happy
to assist.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
Robert G. Rabben
Assistant General Counsel
for Legislation

I
285
POST-HEARING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
RELATING TO THE
JUNE 19, 1986, HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
WITNESSES: MARY L. WALKER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH
AMD
DELBERT F. BUNCH
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR REACTOR DEPLOYMENT

286
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 1: Even though DOE's review of the N-reactor in Hanford revealed
no significant safety deficiencies, I recall that the review
team did make a number of recommendations for improvements to
the plant in certain areas. Could you elaborate on these
recommendations? Who will decide if and when to make these
improvements? Will the Office of Environment, Safety, and
Health oversee this activity?
Answer: The Special Safety Review by ES&H which looked at the
N-Reactor with respect to graphite fire protection and the
adequacy of the reactor's confinement system was completed and
the report was released on May 19. That review had the
following
recommendations.
Fire Protection for Graphite Moderator
Although the Team concluded that postulated accident
scenarios leading to dangerous mixtures of combustible gases
were not credible, it recommended that the reliability and
availability of the inert gas monitoring system, as a safetyrelated
system, be reevaluated and new technical specifications
be established, as necessary, to reflect the value of
the system in the fire/explosion protection of the reactor.
The Team further recommended that hydrogen levels in the inert
gas be monitored to further strengthen the present gas
monitoring
Confinement
system.
System
The Team recommended that the probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) that has been initiated should be used to verify that
challenges to the confinement have been comprehensively
encompassed, and, once completed, the PRA should be

287
2
maintained current. Computer models of the accidents that
form the confinement system design bases should continue to
be maintained current and should be based on current
probabilistic
risk assessments.
The Team further recommended, in the interest of further
assuring the expected performance of the steam vent valves
under accident conditions, verification testing should be
conducted of a vent valve to determine the effect of the wet
steam release on its subsequent closure and seal tightness.
The Department of Energy (DOE) has a number of additional
N-Reactor reviews that are ongoing which will lead to numerous
recommendations for improvement. These reviews include:
A Technical Safety Appraisal by ES&H of the reactor
operation.
A design review by ES&H of the adequacy of the
plant's
safety features.
A review by a panel of experts on the design of N-
Reactor in light of the Chernobyl accident.
A safety review by the National Academies of Sciences
and Engineering of all of DOE's Category A reactors
(N-Reactor included) in light of the Chernobyl
accident.

The
288
DOE line management responsible for the N-Reactor will address
3
all recommendations and proceed with an orderly program of
implementation.
.
Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Safety, and Health will track the Department's
progress on the recommendations until they can be closed out.

289
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A.MCCLURE
Question 2a: If DOE's production reactors had to be shutdown for any length
of time for whatever safety improvement might come out of the
Chernobyl "lessons learned", what impact would this have in
terms of national security?
Answer: The Nation's nuclear deterrent is critically dependent upon the
continued operation of the existing defense production
reactors. An unscheduled prolonged outage may begin to impact
the availability of the necessary quantities of nuclear
material required to support the Nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile.

290
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 2b: Does the Department have any plans to revisit its 1983 proposal
to build one or more New Production Reactors?
Answer: The Department of Energy decision to deploy a New Production
Reactor (NPR) has been deferred until completion of life
extension studies for the existing Savannah River Plant
production reactors and refurbishment plans for the N Reactor
are finalized and requirements for material production confirm
the need for an NPR.

291
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 4: You state that the confinement systems at DOE's production
reactors meet federal requirements for protecting the public.
Whose federal requirements are you referring to? How do these
compare with NRC's requirements?
Answer: The existing confinement systems for the Department of Energy
production reactors were selected and designed as the most
appropriate method of reducing radionuclide releases in the
event of an accident and assuring that doses at the boundry and
beyond are within DOE requirements. These requirements cite
Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations found at 10 CFR Part
100.

292
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 3: How much would it cost to upgrade the confinement systems at
Savannah River to make these systems perform more like
containment systems?
Answer: As part of its ongoing program to assure the safe operation of
its reactors, the Department investigated the cost and benefits
of constructing containment structures. The modification of
the four Savannah River Plant reactors and the N Reactor at the
Hanford site from confinement to containment would be
physically feasible, but would clearly be an extremely
difficult job costing from $3-$5 billion and requiring 3-4
years of construction time. The job would require
strengthening and lining of the building walls, sealing or
providing automatic shutoffs for all building penetrations,
relocating some equipment and systems, and providing new
systems where necessary. All of these new and existing systems
would have to be examined and analyzed in detail for
compatibility with existing systems to ensure a total system
operation. The addition of containment would provide only a
small improvement in the protection of the public, would not
significantly increase the overall safety of the reactors and
would therefore, not be a cost effective improvement to public
safety.

293
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 5: DOE laboratories have carried out most of the safety research
programs managed by both the NRC and the DOE. What" has been
the budget profile for safety research at these two agencies
over the last four years?
Answer: The NRC research budget for the last 4 years is tabulated
below.
($ in Millions)
FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986
$189.3 $173.0 $132.5 $109.?
The DOE safety budget viewed in a broad sense includes light
water reactor (LWR), liquid metal reactor (LMR), and high
temperature gas reactor (HTGR) safety research conducted by
the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy as well as portions of
programs in the DOE Offices of Energy Research and
Environment, Safety, and Health.
The Office of Nuclear Energy LWR safety budget over the last
4 years has been:
($ in Millions)
FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986
LWR $15.0 $??.0 $31.3 $27.9

294
Answer 5
(continupd): The LWP work consisted mainly of tests on the Loss-of-Fluid-
Test (LOFT), Three rh'le Island (TMI) research and development,
and advanced LWR concepts that will provide for safety
improvements. In the LNR and HTGR areas, a comparable number
would be $14.8 million for safety aspects of advanced
reactors and related safety research and development as well
as $46.0 million for operation of the Transient Reactor Test
(TREAT)
facility.
The DOE Office of Energy Research budget for conducting
research on the biological health effects from radiation has
averaged approximately $39.0 million in each of the last
4 fiscal years.
The oversight functions and activities assigned to the DOE
Office of Environment, Safety, and Health have been budgeted
at nearly $17.0 million for fiscal years 1985 and 1986 and
includes work on earthquake protection, health physics and
dosimetry, and emergency preparedness.

295
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Ouestion 6: NRC's nuclear safety research budget has dropped
substantially over the last several years. Has DOE's budget
increased to take up the slack? Does DOE have any plans
underway to build up its generic safety research capabilities
to take over where NRC left off?
Answer: The DOE Light Water Reactor (LWR) research program has not,
in general, taken over work that was dropped by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) because of cuts in the NRC
budget. This is due in part to the fact that some of their
work in our view was not focused on resolution of high
priority issues and in part due to the differences in scope
of NRC programs as compared with DOE programs. The thrust of
DOE'S LWR safety research is primarily directed towards
reactors for the future. Given the strong relationships
between NRC, industry and DOE programs, the Department will
continue to closely coordinate its programs with those of the
NRC to maximize use of the available R&D resources.

296
QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 7: In terms of safety research facilities at DOE labs, do we
have the same capabilities that we had back in 1979 when DOE
was called upon in response to TMI? Please describe what DOE
actually has done over the last 7 years to address the TMI
accident.
Answer: The DOE labs now have fewer large facilities for performing
safety research than they had in 1979, as indicated in the
response to Question 8. Immediately following the TMI-2
accident, both the Semiscale and Loss-of-Fluid-Test (LOFT)
facilities were used to understand the accident scenario and
over the subsequent 7 year period many experiments were
performed on both facilities to study the full spectrum of
small breaks and transients whose importance was highlighted
by TMI-2. The DOE ran an international consortium of
countries to fund the LOFT experiments over the past 3 years,
and the final experiment in this series was particularly
important to the understanding of TMI.
The DOE has also funded a TMI-2 program which has developed a
substantial amount of information in areas of fuel and waste
handling, cleanup from a severe accident, and accident
evaluation. Information from this program is shared with
industry and government agencies both domestically and
internationally. DOE has provided the technology to handle
the accident wastes and to remove the damaged core, has taken

297
-2-
Answer 7
(continued): possession of the wastes, and is removing the core debris
from TMI.
More broadly, DOE has funded research in the areas of source
term and severe accident research, and is currently funding
research on fission product transport, deposition and
revolatization and on core melt progression. Work has also
been conducted on improved safety systems, ones that would
provide additional capabilities to withstand the event that
took place at TMI-2. This research is coordinated with that
of NRC and focused on the non-regulatory interests of
industry.

298
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 8: Of the safety research facilities at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, which are still operating? Which are
on standby? Which are permanently shutdown? Was the
decision to shutdown these facilities based on budgetary
considerations or on the lack of need for further safety
research? Could we reactivate these facilities if needed?
In what time-period? At what cost?
Answer: None of the following six safety research facilities at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) are operating.
The Power Burst Facility (PBF), most recently used for severe
accident and source term research, is on a standby status,
due to NRC budgetary constraints. NRC concluded that the
Information obtained from other facilities, while not as good
as that from the PBF, was justified based on cost-benefit
considerations. It could be reactivated in 12 weeks at a
cost of $500,000 and operated for $6.5 million per year plus
the cost of fuel trains and analysis.
The Loss-of-Fuel Test Facility (LOFT), used for large scale
reactor system accident simulation, was permanently shut down
this spring. The cost of facility operation compared to the
value of experimental results was not favorable for continued
operation of this reactor. The LOFT reactor has been removed
from the containment/control room complex and cannot be
reused. The building complex is now in a decontaminated
state.

299
-2-
Answer 8
(continued): The Semiscale Facility, used for reactor system thermal
hydraulic studies, was shut down due to NRC budgetary
constraints. It could be reactivated in 28 weeks and
operated for $4.0 million per year plus the cost of any
special modifications and analysis.
The Two-Phase Loop, used for two-phase water hydraulic
studies, was shut down due to budgetary constraints. It
could be reactivated in 26 weeks at a cost of $1.0 million.
The Air Water Loop, used to simulate two-phase water flow
conditions for instrumentation calibration, was shut down due
to budgetary constraints. It could be reactivated in
16 weeks at a cost of $70,000.
The Slowdown Loop, used for high pressure two-phase transient
calibration of instruments for the PBF and LOFT, was tied to
operation of these
facilities.
However, the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II), the
Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility, and the Zero Power
Plutonium Reactor (ZPPR) are operational and being utilized
for Safety research and other activities in support of
advanced concepts.

300
QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 9: Is there more work that could and should be done to resolve
uncertainties associated with the source term issue? What
kinds of research are still needed? Do we have the
facilities to do such research? Has NPC or DOE proposed such
research in their FY 1987 budget request?
Answer: There are several areas of research that could be conducted
to resolve uncertainties associated with the source term
issue. These include deposition and revaporization of
various radioactive species; transport of various fission
products through pipes, rooms, and buildings in the presence
of various aerosols; high pressure core melt ejection; coreconcrete
interaction; core melt progression and hydrogen
generation; hydrogen combustion; containment failure mode and
timing; and computer code assessment and validation. The
degree to which uncertainties must be resolved, however,
depends upon the use to which the source term data is being
applied. For example, prior to Chernobyl, there was growing
consensus that the remaining uncertainties in the source term
were not so large, so that sheltering as opposed to
evacuation would be an appropriate response in implementing
the emergency response plan for some reactor types. On the
other hand, more work to reduce uncertainties would be
necessary to establish new siting criteria.

301
-2-
Answer 9
(continued): The facilities exist in DOE laboratories to do most of this
research with the exceptions of large scale containment
studies and integral-system fission product release and
transport, which can be done in foreign laboratories where
the United States has close relations. In the FY 1987 budget
request, DOE has proposed $6 million and NRC $19 million
worth of work relevant to the issues listed above.

302
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 10: You have been involved in the emergency response exercise at
the Shoreham plant in Long Island. The state and local
officials still refuse to participate in these drills. Some
people perceive the problem as being that of evacuating the
entire Long Island population -- a problem that even I would
admit to being difficult at best. Could you estimate what
the actual population density is in a 10-mile radius of
Shoreham? How about a 20-mile radius? 30-miles? How about
populations surrounding the Seabrook or the Shearon Harris
plants where similar problems exist in terms of state and
local refusal to cooperate?
Answer: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at 10 CFR 50.47(c)f?)
prescribes two emeraency planning zones (EPZ's) for licensing
purposes — a plume exposure pathway of about 10 miles in
radius from the plant and an ingestion pathway of about
50 miles in radius from the plant. The exact size and
configuration of these EPZ's is determined by local emergency
response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such
conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics,
access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. Any protective
action portion of an emergency response plan, including
evacuation, only applies to the 10-mile EPZ.
Based on utility figures supplied to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and NRC, the approximate population in the
10-mile EPZ for Shoreham is 139,000 in winter and 160,000 in
summer; Seabrook, 147,000 in winter and ?87,000 in summer;
and Shearon Harris, 23,000. (We could find no figures for

303
Answer 10 j. --
xu
(continued): the population within a 20- or 30-inile radius of these
facilities. )
Regarding Shoreham, on August 26, 1985, the NRC Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board held that there is no "finding that there
is anything unique about the demography, topography, access
routes, or jurisdictional boundaries in the area in which
Shoreham is located ... the reactor fails to reveal any basis
to conclude that it would be impossible to fashion and
implement an effective offsite plant for the Shoreham site."
Thus, it is clear that a good, workable emergency response
plan--including provisions dealing with evacuation--exists
for the Shoreham facility. It is unfortunate that some
people have confused the Shoreham emergency response plan
with the evacuation of the entire population of Long Island.

?
304
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 11: Do you think our reactor-containment or confinement systems
(for commercial or defense production reactors) would be able
to withstand an explosion of the magnitude experienced at
Chernobyl
Answer: The information pertaining to the Chernobyl incident is not yet
detailed enough to draw a clear picture of what actually
happened nor the extent and power of the "explosion." Until
such information is available, it is not possible to speculate
on the ramifications of a similar event on our commercial or
defense production reactors.

305
nUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question I?.: Is there room for improvements in U.S. reactor containment or
confinement systems? Could you give us some examples? Where
are the major deficiencies in current containment systems
used in the U.S.?
Answer: Various changes to containment or confinement systems have
been proposed. For example, in PWR plants, some are
advocating changing a standard containment system to a
filtered-vented containment system. In BWR plants, NRC has
proposed four possible changes: hydrogen control for
Mark III systems, containment dry well sprays, provisions for
wet well venting, and inclusion of refractory materials to
direct debris material so as to avoid by-pass of the
suppression pool. But whether such changes are improvements
depends on several factors; such as, does a current
containment provide a sufficient level of safety; is a slight
improvement in safety worthwhile if the cost of the
improvement is very significant; to what degree is added
protection against extremely low probability events
worthwhile if accidents with less severe consequences are
made more probable? Reviews on the adequacy of containment
structures are being made in conjunction with the
NRC/DOE/industry review of the severe accident/source term
issue. Whether there are deficiencies that will need
correction with be identified as part of this work.

306
-2-
Answ6r 12
(continued): Work is also underway by the industry/EPRI and DOE on
advanced light water reactors. This work, especially that
related to smaller-sized LWR plants, will provide additional
opportunities for improved containment systems since they are
still in the design stage.

307
QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 13: You have submitted to Congress legislation to reform the
licensing process for building nuclear power plants. In your
opinion, does the Chernobyl accident make this legislation
any less attractive now than it was before?
Answer: No, it makes it not only more attractive but imperative. The
Chernobyl accident should serve as a reminder of the
recommendations which were made by the President's Commission
in the wake of Three Mile Island (TMI) that in order to
prevent another accident as serious as TMI, fundamental
changes are needed in the regulatory process. That was over
5 years ago and as of yet those recommendations have not been
implemented although they are clearly in the public and
national interest. Chernobyl should serve as a catalyst for
action now, not as an excuse for further procrastination.

308
QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 14: Would you agree that the current licensing process simply
doesn't work, in terms of bringing a safe plant on-line in a
reasonable period of time while allowing for meaningful
public participation. How would DOE's proposal for licensing
reform fix the current problems? How would licensing reform
affect public health and safety?
Answer: Yes, we agree that the current nuclear licensing process is
fundamentally flawed. The current design-as-you-go,
regulate-as-you-go process results in delaying key safety
decisions until construction is well underway, or in some
cases, until the plant construction is complete. The
Department's legislative proposal would result in the early
resolution of all major safety issues based upon essentially
complete design and site information. The public's
participation would be more effective since it would be both
early in the process and based upon more complete
information. With respect to public health and safety, the
Department's proposal would enhance public health and safety
by:
1. Focusing design, construction, operating and regulatory
activities on a few standard designs with which
organizations, institutions, and personnel would become
familiar and, therefore, more competent.

309
Answer 14
(continued);
2. Early resolution of all major safety issues in the basic
plant design resulting in fewer backfits which are
normally not only more expensive, but less effective.
3. Insure that any backfits that are required do, in fact,
enhance overall plant safety.
4. Encourages industry to develop standardized, advanced LWR
plant designs which will be safer than the current
operating plants and for which transfer of construction
and operating experience from one plant to the next will
be possible.

310
miESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 15: Explain how next generation plants could further improve the
safety and licensability of nuclear powerplants in this
country. What is DOE doing in terms o^ research on next
generation plants? Is the industry participating? Are
utilities interested? What has DOE's budget profile looked
like for FY's P*-87, with respect to research in High
Temperature Gas Reactors and Liquid Metal Cooled Reactors?
Answer: Advanced reactors are under development. Concepts have been
identified which have the potential for producing reliable,
low-cost power and improved safety. Each of the advanced
concepts--including advanced light water reactors (ALWR's),
liquid metal reactors (LMR's), and high temperature gas
reactors (HTGR's)--plan on certification of their respective
plant designs by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), so
future commercial applications would require addressing only
site-specific licensing issues.
In FY 1986, DOE initiated an Advanced Light Water Reactor
(ALWR) Technology program (coordinated with the Electric
Power Research Institute/utility industry ALWR program)
directed toward the availability of substantially improved
ALWR plant designs for the mid-1990's. The program is based
on cost-sharing with the performing industrial contractors
who were selected through competitive solicitation. The
program includes substantive technology development, design

311
Answer 15
(continued): verification of large ALWR plant designs leading to NRC
design certification, and mid-size (about 600 MWe) Advanced
Boiling Water Reactor and Advanced
Pressurized Water Reactor
plant design technology development.
For the LMR and HTGR modular designs, DOE is providing base
technology support in the areas of fuel cycle development and
demonstration, licensing support, and feature testing of
critical components and systems. DOE has prime contracts in
place with General Electric, Rockwell International, and
General Atomics for the conceptual design of passively safe,
economically competitive LMR and HTGR plant modules. The LMR
design contracts with General Electric and Rockwell
International include cost sharing. All of the advanced
concepts design programs have advisory boards composed of
utility members who work closely with the design teams.
Supporting work is also in progress at DOE national
laboratories.
The DOE budget profile for fiscal years 1984-1987 for the LMR
and HTGR overall programs is tabulated below.
($ in Millions)
B/0 B/0 R/A R/A
FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
LMFBR/LMR $362.3 S260.4 $228.3 $166.0
HTGR $29.8 $31.8 $30.6 $5.3

312
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 16: Will the technology for next generation plants be
sufficiently developed to offer a plant when one is most
urgently needed by utilities -- say, by the mid 1990's?
Answer: Current design and technology support schedules are directed
to an advanced prototype operating module by the mid- to
late-1990's. The general base technology for the next
generation Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) and High Temperature
Gas Reactor (HTGR) is in place to support their coimiercial
introduction in the first part of the next century. The
areas of technology where research and development is being
concentrated are fuel cycle development and demonstration,
licensing support, and feature testing of critical components
and systems. This support is essential to the development,
construction, and testing of advanced prototype systems in
the 1990's that must precede commercialization.
Certification of advanced, large-sized light water reactors
(LWR's) by the Nuclear Regulatory Coitmission for the early
1990's is proceeding based on a cooperative effort among
vendors, the Electric Power Research Institute, and the
Department of Energy. Certification of these advanced LWR
plants are based on significant technology development from
currently operating plants and an extensive cooperative
design and development effort with Japanese utilities.

313
-2-
Answer 16
(continued): Design development and testing is also underway for smaller
advanced LWR's leading to their availability by the
mid-1990's.

314
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JAMES A. MCCLURE
Question 17: Please describe the loss-of-power and loss-of-heat-sink tests
that were recently performed at EBR-II. Would you say that
this demonstrates the walk-away safety and total forgivingness
of a liquid metal cooled plant that uses metal fuel?
What other aspects of a liquid metal-cooled reactor tend to
make it much easier to operate than, say, a light water
reactor?
Answer: The Department's Civilian Reactor Research and Development
Program is directed at the development of nuclear powerplants
that are passively safe, less costly and simpler to construct
and
operate.
Two successful tests were conducted on April 3, 1986, at the
Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II); these tests
represent a major achievement in the development of future
plants. The purpose of the tests was to demonstrate the
self-shutdown characteristics of a Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR)
for highly abnormal events without need for human
intervention or the operation of active engineered components
such as control rods and pumps.
The starting point was identical for both tests with the
reactor at full power and the control system temporarily
disabled to hold the control rods at the full-power setting.
In the loss-of-power test, power was shut off to all primary
and secondary coolant pumps simulating a station blackout
while leaving the reactor running at full power without

315
-2-
Answer 17
(continued): forced cooling. As predicted, the fuel and sodium coolant
temperatures initially increased until the combined effects
of thermal expansion and natural coolant circulation shut the
reactor down.
In the loss-of-heat-sink test, power to the secondary cooling
system was turned off while the reactor continued operating.
Again, the reactor shutdown without operator action as a
result of the self-generated negative reactivity feedback
characteristics of the system. Further analyses and
confirmatory testing will be conducted to assure that
operator action, if attempted, could not defeat the safe,
inherent self-shutdown capability of the system. The strong
negative reactivity feedback exhibited in these tests are due
to a combination of the high heat conductivity of the metal
fuel and the thermal inertia of the large volume of pool
sodium in the EBR-II.
Advanced LMR's being developed by DOE are utilizing these
features. Work is also continuing in support of these
advanced concepts to develop an improved metal fuel and to
demonstrate new, simpler processes for the metal fuel cycle.
The EBR-II tests demonstrated that liquid metal reactors can
be designed to be self-regulating in protecting operators,
the public, and the financial investment. The properties

316
Answer 17
(continued): of liquid metal combined with the passive self-regulating
features of the core response offer the potential for simpler
reactor systems. In turn, reactor simplicity leads to easier
operations and maintenance. All advanced reactor designs are
striving for simpler systems; however, independent of the
reactor type, skilled and highly trained personnel are
essential to assure safe and reliable operations.

317
POST-HEARING
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
RELATING TO THE
JUNE 19, 1986 HEARING
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
WITNESS: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARY L. WALKER
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY: SENATOR METZENBAUM
63-756 0-86-11

318
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR METZEN6AUM
Question 1: DOE reactors do not have containments, but are housed in
buildinys called confinements.
a. Could the confinements withstand the pressures of a
hydrogen explosion?
b. Are DOE reactors subject to NRC safety standards?
c. Could all DOE reactors meet all NRC safety standards?
Answer: a. The DOE Category A research and production reactors (those
over 20 MWt) include a number of unique designs with
different safety systems. These systems are designed to
assure that risks of accidents are very low and prevent
large scale hydrogen generation and limit releases to
ID CFR Part 100 values. Some reactors have confinement
systems which sweep away the hydrogen as it is generated,
thus preventing an accumulation which could explode. The
ability of a containment or a confinement system to
withstand the effects of a hydrogen explosion will depend
on the size of the explosion and the strength of the
building. Some of DOE's reactors, in particular the large
production reactors, have confinement buildings and
biological shields that are very massive (reinforced
concrete walls and roofs that are several feet thick) which
could withstand a sizeable explosion. The Department has a
series of ongoing reviews at the N Reactor at Richland,
Washington, which are considering the reactor's safety In
light of the Chernobyl accident. The conclusions to date
indicate that the N Reactor is well protected from the
dangers of a Chernobyl -type accident.

319
2
b. By legislation, existing DOE reactors are exempt from NRC
licensing; however, DOE policy states that nuclear
facilities will meet standards, guides, and codes that are
applied to comparable licensed facilities. Exceptions are
granted only when the proposed alternative is judged by DOE
to provide equivalent or better protection, or when the NRC
requirement is clearly not applicable.
c. All DOE reactors did meet all NRC, or its predecessor
agency, safety standards when they were built; however, not
all DOE reactors could meet all NRC safety standards now.
The majority of DOE reactors were designed and built over
25 years ago, and many current NRC standards did not exist
at that time. Backfitting at DOE facilities, where
practical, has been performed to minimize the differences
between earlier and later plants. The DOE nuclear
facilities are continually being upgraded to meet the
intent of new and revised standards and lessons learned
from accidents and incidents such as TMI-II, the Browns
Ferry fire, etc.

320
Question Z: Please estimate the costs of damages from a Chernobyl -type
accident (I.e., core melt and escape of radiation into the
atmosphere) at the Hanford facility and the Savannah River
Plant, which required emergency evacuation up to an 18 mile
radius.
Answer: It Is really not possible to estimate the cost of damages due
to a Chernobyl -type accident at Hanford or Savannah River. The
principal uncertainties are the percentage of radioactivity
that would be released from the facility and the atmospheric
conditions that would determine the location and extent of
fallout. Even at this late date the total cost of the TMI
accident Is not known.
The replacement cost for one of the DOE production reactors
would be several billion dollars and this could dominate all
otner costs. The "burial" costs of the facil ity might be
several hundred million dollars. The other costs, compensation
for loss of life and injury, decontamination of areas, crop and
farm animal losses, and interdiction of property depend upon
the nature of the Incident and the atmospheric conditions. We
have no basis for estimating these costs.

321
Question 3: Has the DOE designed, with the cooperation of the appropriate
State and local yovernments, evacuation plans for civilian
populations near all of its nuclear facilities?
Answer: Yes. All DOE facilities have sheltering and evacuation plans
which were developed in close coordination with State and local
governments and their emergency plans. Frequent tests are
conducted to assure that these plans are effective. Hanford
and Savannah River also are participants in the emergency plans
for NRC licensed reactors; WPPSS-2, located within the Hanford
reservation, and Vogtle (Georgia Power Co.), where almost half /
of the 10 mile emergency planning zone is occupied by the
Savannah River Plant.

322
Question 4: In designing evacuation plans, how large is the emergency
planning zone used by the L)OE?
Answer: The emergency planning zones (EPZ) for DOE reactors vary
considerably depending on the size, type, and location of the
reactor. The larger production reactors at Hanford and
Savannah River have EPZs equivalent to the 10 miles required
for licensed power reactors. Rather than adopting an arbitrary
distance, DOE's EPZs are based on realistic accident sequences
and consequences, using a dose criteria of 5 rem whole body and
25 rem thyroid which is derived from the EPA protective action
guides which are also used by the NRC and FEMA.

,
323
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324
00 ESTIONS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARY WALKER, DOE ^Svn. h\eify\^iCLlt»^
1. DOE reactors do not have containments, but are housed in
buildings called confinements.
Could the confinements withstand the pressures of a
hydrogen explosion?
Are DOE reactors subject to NRC safety standards?
Could all DOE reactors meet all NRC safety standards?
2. Please estimate the costs of damages from a
Chernobyl-type accident (i.e., core melt and escape of
radiation into the atmosphere) at the Hanford facility and
the Savannah river plant, which required emergency evacuation
up to an 18 mile radius.
3. Has the DOE designed, with the cooperation of the
appropriate state and local governments, evacuation plans for
civilian populations near all of its nuclear facilities?
If such plans have not been developed for all DOE
nuclear facilities, please list those facilities which do not
have plans.
4. In designing evacuation plans, how large is the emergency
planning zone used by the DOE?

PROF. DR. RUDOLF SCHULTEN
Direklor am Instirul fOr Reoktorentwidclung der
KERNfORSCHUNGSANLAGE JDUCHGmbH
Senator James A. McClure
Chairman
United States Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources
Washing; DC 20510 / USA
325
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Dear Sir:
Thank you very much for your letter dated June 25, 1986. Unfortunately I
received it only yesterday on July 30th. Due to this it was not possible
to make my responses available to you as you wished on July 9th.
But I hope my answers are still of interest to you. Please find them
in the attachement.
Sincerely,
\- fl
Enclosure

326
Questions from' Senator James A. McClure
1) After the accident at Chernobyl there was a great deal
of intense contact between members of the Russian Embassy
and German scientists. In particular, they enquired whether
we could make available our knowledge on controlling the
accident at Chernobyl. This especially involved extinguishing
burning graphite.
Furthermore, I am aware that the Nuclear Research Centre
Karlsruhe provided information about the processes of
core meltdown in the form of direct telephone conversations
between Chernobyl and Karlsruhe.
2) I personally have not had any opportunity to meet engineers
or operators from the Chernobyl nuclear power station
or to hold discussions with them.
3) The actual accident in Chernobyl primarily consisted of
the fact that a strong reaction between zirconium and
steam as well as water occurred after a power excursion
of the reactor due to overheating. A great deal of hydrogen
developed as a consequence of this reaction and this led
to at least one, perhaps even several, explosions severely
damaging the reactor building. The evolution of heat during
the reaction between zirconium and steam is extraordinarily
great so that the graphite, at least in the first few
days of accident progression, served as a heat sink and
rather contributed to moderating the impacts. Only at
a later point did surface ignition of the graphite occur,
which apparently led to a slight burn-off of the graphite.

327
Questions from Senator Wallop
1) Euratom did not undertake any special activities in
the days following the Chernobyl accident.
2) There were different reactions to the Chernobyl accident
in the European countries. The most violent reactions
were registered in the Federal Republic of Germany and
in the Scandinavian countries, whereas the other countries
did not experience such an intense reaction. Euratom
did not have any integrating function for the European
area in these discussions and reactions.
3) Euratom has not planned any discussions with the Soviet
Union on reactor safety. On the contrary, the impulses
for such discussions have been initiated by the IAEA
in Vienna, and also by the Federal Republic of Germany
at the proposal of Chancellor Kohl.
4) There is no agreement on an exchange of information
concerning severe reactor accidents between the European
Communities and the USSR. It is to be expected that
negotiations on such obligations to provide information
will be taken up at the IAEA negotiations timetabled
for September in Vienna.
5) A strong anti nuclear movement is currently under way
in the Federal Republic. Its major objective is to prevent
construction of the planned reprocessing facility at
Wackersdorf. The appointment of Mr Wallmann as Minister
of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety
was generally welcomed in the Federal Republic. In future
even more attention will undoubtedly be paid to reactor
safety. No further resolutions on the construction of
nuclear facilities are pending at the moment or for
the next two years. I believe that during this period
the Federal Government will form a more consolidated
opinion about reactor safety. In my view the concept
of passively inherently safe reactors will also be given
considerable attention by the Federal Government.

328
-2-
6) I am not aware that any scientists from Euratom have
visited the Chernobyl plant.
7) The role of graphite-moderated reactors has been intensively
.studied in the Federal Republic with respect to the
Chernobyl accident. Expert opinion and official agencies
have established that in Western reactors burning graphite
cannot pose the same type of threat as in Chernobyl.
The reason for this is that Western reactors are contained
in prestressed concrete vessels protecting the reactor
in all cases against the ingress of dangerous quantities
of air.

329
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Electric Power
Research Institute
OFFICL/VL COMMin-FE FILE
PLEASE RETURN
SENAIF COM^:lTr=f ON
Ef-fRGY AMD NA'UP,V Rr-,pi!f:-rc
yj. JUL 10 1886
WASHINGTON, OX 20510
July 08, 1986
Senator James A. McClure
Chairman
Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources
Senator Dirksen Office Building
Room SD 360
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator McClure:
The response to the questions you asked in your letter of
June 26, 1986, are forwarded herewith. I believe they include
answers to the questions posed to me by Senator
Domenici during the hearing on June 19, 1986.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate.
Sincerely,
^-f^-/j
J0hn J. Taylo'
Vice President
Nuclear Power
JJT:bg
/ 'r
cc:
Senator Domenxci
JJT:3706AD6a
3412 Hillvlew Avenue. Post Office Box 10412, Palo Alto, CA 94303 Telephone (415) 855-2000
Washington Office: 1800 /Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 700. Washington. DC 20036 (202) 872-9222

330
J. A. McClure -1- July 08, 1986
Question 1(a) :If U.S. plants were built in the future based
on a more standardized technology, would that make
EPRI's job easier with respect to analyzing safety
features and responding to operational problems?
Answer: Standardization can have many advantages in improving
both safety and economics. If a large
percentage of future plants are built based on a
more standardized technology, it should make both
government and industry responsibilities easier to
carry out with respect to analyzing safety
features and responding to operational problems.
Question 1(b): Would standardization help in your ability
to identify "lessons learned" from any specific
plant incidents?
Answer: Standardization probably would not help our ability
to identify "lessons learned" from any specific
plant incident; however, standardization would
simplify the process of determining how the
lessons learned should be applied to other plants.
Question 2: Does the Chernobyl accident heighten the need
in this country to resolve outstanding questions
related to the source term issue for U.S. commerical
plants?
Answer: In our opinion, it will be a natural result of the
Chernobyl accident to increase U.S. interest in
source term related issues. This increased
interest will auger for an acceleration of resolution
of these issues. EPRI's source term program
has for the last few years been among the highest
priority programs in EPRI's Nuclear Power
Division. This priority rating is an indication
of our feeling of urgency in resolving source term
related questions. The results to date give
strong indication that the source term for U.S.
light water reactors is substantially lower than
presently used in regulation to estimate public
risk and determine emergency planning requirements.
The data available from Chernobyl to date
has not changed our position. However, there is a
possibility that data from the accident can be
applied to further define the source term. Many
factors pertaining to the accident must be considered
carefully before any conclusions can be
drawn. We may never know, for example, the energy
JJT:3706AD6a

:
331
J. A. McClure -2- July 08, 1986
release rates during the accident or the local
meteorological conditions in the area during the
accident. In summary, Chernobyl emphasizes the
need for a thorough and realistic understanding of
degraded core accidents, superior operator training
and good emergency plans.
Question 3: Your written testimony describes in detail the
differences between U.S. and Soviet "containment"
systems. You summarize by saying that the Soviet
system would not even qualify in the U.S. as a
"containment" structure as we know it. So would
you agree that news coverage of the Chernobyl
reactor that alluded to a "containment" structure
at Chernobyl was totally misleading and even downright
incorrect?
Answer: I agree that certain news coverage of the
Chernobyl reactor that alluded to a "containment"
structure was misleading. A specific article in
that category was carried in the New York Times on
May 19. Three industry experts cited in the article
wrote a letter to the New York Times stating
that "the Chernobyl reactor has no containment in
the sense we and other safety analysts in the U.S.
use the word." A copy of their letter, as published
in the New York Times on June 3, is attached.
Question 4(a): Would you say that, given the severe core
damage (70% meltdown) that resulted from the TMI-2
accident, that we already have experienced the
parallel "worst-case" accident that proves that
Chernobyl-type consequences cannot happen in the
U.S?
Answer
In a general p robabilistic sense, the statement is
true. However , to prove in the strict sense that
a more serious accident cannot happen is such a
restrictive cr iterion that if applied to all inities
would bring all activity to a
dustrial activ
halt. In fact , in the source term work mentioned
in the respons e to Question 2, a more severe case
is assumed of core melt down which penetrates the
reactor vessel which still yields the lower source
term cited.
Question 4(b): Would you say that, for the most part, we
already incorporated any "lessons to be learned"
from the Chernobyl accident when we made the
JJT:3706AD6a

332
J. A. McClure -3- July 08, 1986
numerous safety improvements that were imposed
after the TMI-2 accident?
Answer: Yes. The lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident
have led to changes that greatly reduce the
chances of a severe core damage accident (melt
down) in a U.S. reactor. TMI-2 certainly emphasized
the importance of good containment. Even
though the TMI-2 containment withstood a hydrogen
fire, the TMI-2 accident revealed a weakness in
protecting the integrity of some containment
designs. This has led to modifications to improve
hydrogen control in a severe accident. Chernobyl
has simply re-emphasized the importance of hydrogen
control. TMI-2 emphasized the importance of
operator training and led to major improvements in
operator training and operating personnel qualifications.
Although we do not know the details yet
of the Chernobyl accident, Soviet indications of
operator error again re-emphasize this point. We
are confident that no major loopholes remain in
our approach to reactor safety.
I can say that these extremely important lessons
and many others from both accidents have already
been incorporated into our current thinking. We
now go beyond the TMI lessons and continuously
factor all safety concerns from observation or
analysis into reactor design and operations. In
our investigation of the RBMK-1000 design and the
various possible accident scenarios, there is no
evidence that would indicate an equivalent accident
might happen to a U.S. commerical reactor.
Our objective in investigating the Chernobyl accident
is to make sure. As I stated in my testimony,
a claim isn't being made that no lessons
will be learned from Chernobyl but that we must
wait to get the technical facts from the Soviets
to ascertain any correct lessons.
Question 5: Could you provide to the Committee the details
of the cancer studies done on the population in
Hiroshima?
Answer: The details of the cancer studies done on the
population at Hiroshima are voluminous. They
result from a research effort of 40 years conducted
by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC)
in cooperation with the Japanese National Insti-
JJT:3706AD6a

333
J, A. McClure -4- July 08, 1986
tute of Health (JNIH) of the Ministry of Health
and Welfare (JMHW) which is presently being pursued
by the successor agency to ABCC, the Radiation
Effects Research Foundation (RERF). ABCC was a
research agency to the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) - National Research Council (NRC)
and was supported by Contract AT-49-1-GEN-72 of
the USAEC. Funding for the RERF continued study
is by JMHW and by NAS/NRC with support from Contract
EX-76-C-28-3161 of the U.S. DOE. The
address of RERF is 5-2 Hijiyama Park, Minami Ward,
Hiroshima City 730, Japan.
Summaries of these detailed studies are contained
in the following three papers:
1. Beebe, G., Land, C. , and Kato, H. "The Hypothesis
of Radiation-accelerated Aging and the
Mortality of Japanese A-Bomb Survivors" Late
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation,
IAEA, Vienna, Vol. 1, pp 3-25, 1978. As cited
in my testimony, this study of 295,000 survivors
with excess radiation dosage revealed
that of 14,000 cancer-related deaths, 415 were
imputed from the excess radiation exposure.
2. Kato, H., and Schull, W.J, Studies of the
Mortality of A-Bomb Survivors - 1950-1978:
Part I "Cancer Mortality" Radiation Research
Vol. 90, pp 395-432, 1982. This study of
284,000 survivors showed that of 11,000 cancer-related
deaths, 526 were estimated to have
been caused by the excess radiation exposure.
3. Schull, W.J. "Atomic Bomb Survivors: Patterns
of Cancer Risk" in "Radiation Carcinogenesis:
Epedemiology and Biological Significance"
edited by Boice and Fraumani, Raven Press,
1984.
Question 6: Please comment on the news article that Senator
Bumpers referred to, that states that 1985 was the
worst year since Three Mile Island in terms of the
nuclear industry's safety record.
Answer: The Annual Report from the NRC Office for Analysis
and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) states
that there were fewer abnormal occurrences (AO) in
1985 than in 1984 and fewer on a per plant basis
than in 1984 or 1983. AEOD considers the number
JJT:3706AD6a

334
J. A. McClure -5- July 08, 1986
of AOs per year as a reasonably constant index of
the potential for serious occurrences. There is
also a strong tendency for AOs to be most prevalent
in plants licensed for less than 2 years.
There are other ways to try to judge the relative
annual operating effectiveness of nuclear
plants. We see no apparent trend indicating 1985
as an unusually bad year for safety. During 1985
NRC investigated incidents at Davis Besse, Rancho
Seco and San Onofre. Although none of the incidents
investigated was a serious threat to the
safety of the public, they did result in extended
shutdowns to correct problems. AEOD states that
those three incidents are a small sample and do
not necessarily represent a trend in the industry
safety record.

..
335
ES, TUESDAY. JUNE 3. 1986
NEW YORK TIMES
Letters
Don't Let Chernobyl Cripple U.S. Nuclear Industry
To the Editar:
With reganl to your May 1» frontpage
report that the Oternobyl nuclear
reactor had more safety features
and was closer to American design
than was assumed immediately
after the plant accident, we would
like to malie it dear that we are not
among the "experts" who have
changed our minds about the structure
of the Chernobyl reactor. We
have had accurate informatioD and
have been attempting to describe It to
the public and the press.
The Chernobyl reactor has no cootainment
in the sense we and other
safety analysts in the U.S. use the
word. In ordinary operation, the core
and graphite moderator are anTuied
behiixl barriers and covered by an
inert nitrogen gas; but these barriers
can be easily breached as they clearly
were on April 26. The difference between
confinement under favorable
circumstances and containment under
unfavorable ones is crudal.
In commercial U.S. reactors, there
is a large, strong, tested containment
to be the problem at Chernobyl.
The Chernobyl reactor is of the
RMBK 1,000 type, the most easily
available drawing of which is for one
built at Leningrad. But we recently
learned that the accident at unit 4 at
Chernobyl took place in a reactor
where a pressure-suppression pool had
been added under the reactor, as well
as strong structure around the steam
collectors and headers. This should reduce
pressure rise in case one of the
water pipes under the reaaor breaks
— one of the four most obvious accident
scenarios. It seems to have
played oo part in the April 26 accident
until cleanup, when the pool was emptied
of water. The reactor core was not
inside a strong containment, although
there is a thick biological shield above
the reactor. The building is oot filled
with inert gas, as are the containments
of reactors such as Sborefaam.
There are many lessons to be
learned from this accident: the importance
of containment and the danger
of fire, both of which we alrea4y
knew ; the slowness of accident devolopment,
which allowed time for an
unrehearsed, but orderly evmcuatica.
and that even downwind in Sweden
the effects were smaller than might
have been feared. We want to find cot
exactly what happened and further
insure that it was not a sequence of
events that we have forgotten. We
want to learn from the Russian* thetr
L' — '— »
—~^ _i— .. S ^Hit ; !0
cleamq) procedures, which we hope
never to be forced to use flrsthand.
It would be ironic If unreasonable
fear caused us to cripple our nuclear
electric capeblUty as a result of this
Russian accident, which caused us no
harm and would not have occurred in
LinnDrapek
Eowm L. Zebroski
RjCHAiiD Wilson
Cambridge, Mass., May 20, 1986
DieU,S.
The writers art, respectively, president
of Gul/ State Utilities ; a nuclear
gdentist with Electric Power Retearch
Institute, and a professor of
physics at Harvard University.
What the Figures Mean
To the Editor:
Your article on concern over Eastem
European cancers as a result of
the Cheroobyl accident (May 16)
quoted "tenutive and highly inexact"
estimates by Dr. Thomas B. Cochran
and myself of the long-term health implications
of radioactive pollution by
the nuclear-plant accident.
structure designed to withstand the We stressed that although the estimates
of thousands of extra caiKer
rise in pressure for days in case of accident.
II should hold in the event of Are deaths and tens of thousands of thyroid
problems over the next decades
and station blackout, which appeared
seem large, the risk to any individuals
other than those near the plant
would be low. The large numbers are
the result of adding very small individual
risks over a very large population.
This was not made explicit, and
we are concerned that the article may
feed rather than reduce the extraorxiinary
fear of radioactivity from Chernobyl
so evident in Europe.
Even 10,000 cancer deaths among a
population of 100 million in Eastern
Oa«la> Flcflaa
Europe wtwld raise the risk of cancer
death of the average person by coly
about .06 percent, e.g., from 20 percent
to 20.01 percent. The extra cancer
deaths from Chernobyl will therefore
be lost in the sea of cancer deaths
that would have occurred in any case.
The increased incideiKe of nonfatal
thyroid problems from inhalation
and ingestion of radioactive Iodine
131 is likely to be greater, but
even if there are 100,000 extra thyroid
cases, the average individual will
have only one extra chance in 1,000 of
developing a Cbemobyl-induced thyroid
problem.
Of course, the anonymity of most of
the victims of Chernobyl does not
make the accident any less of « disaster.
Like the equally catastrophic
chemical accident at Union Carbide's
Bhopal plant, the Chernobyl accident
tells us that we have to improve tite
designs of faciUties containing such
huge quai'.tities of volatile toxic materials.
This is why the reaction of the
U.S. and Western European nuclear
industries and their r^ulators, "It
couldn't happen here," is so disturtv
ing.
Frank von Hi ppel
Pnrf. of Public and International
Affairs, Princeton University
Princeton, N.J., May 17. 1966
•
Construction Problems
To the Editor:
An interesting article has come to
tight about conditions at the Chernobyl
plant, published in the Ukrainianlanguage
Literatuma Ukraina March
27, 1986, almost a month before the
nuclear accident. The author, Lyubov
Kovalevska, probably an engineer at
Chernobyl, recited shortcomings, excerpts
of which include:
"The time allocated for Its construction
was reduced from three
years to two, and building work began
in 19SS witb minimal supplies . .
With the tightening of plans that were
already tight, it turned out that no one
was ready — neither the designers,
nor the suppUers, nor the builders
themselves . . . The low quality of design
and costing documentation . .
caused additional labor expenditure
and caUed for reworlong, and great
material and moral efforts ... In a
word, all the shortcomings of the
building process, which are unfortunately
typical, became acute and apparent
... In 1385 some 45,500 cubic
meters of prefabricated reinforced
concrete was ordered; 3,200 were
missing, and of the C300 cubic
meters received, 6,000 were faulty."
A fuller quotation and discussion is
in the May 14 issue of Soviet Analyst
(London). Eluot R. Goodman
Providence, R.I., May 23, 1986
The writer is professor of political
science at Brown University.
'

, ,
336
IMP® OFnaAL COMM
PLEASE
Jilt
'I,'1(-
ETLE
SENATF COWMITTEC ON
FWRCY ANDNA'URAl RFSOURCfS
1100 Circle 75 Parkway [ m "^^L 2 3 1986
Suite 1500
I ,
Atlanta. Georgia 30339 L ' .
Telephone 404 953-3600 '
July 18, 1986
LnjL 11 I /
" '—' ^—'
IT
'—I
U U Ij L
.VASHING'ON. D C
?05'0
The Honorable James A. McClure
Chairman
United States Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Washington, DC 20510
Dear
Senator McClure:
Attached are my written responses to the questions you asked in follow-up
to my testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on
June 19, 1986,
We appreciated the opportunity to testify before your Committee and look
forward to providing an update on INPO activities in the future. If you have
any questions regarding these responses or INPO programs and activities in
general, please call me at (404) 980-3200 or Bill Conway, group vice
president. Industry and Government Relations, at (404) 980-3207.
Respectfully,
:k T. Pate
President
ZTP:las
Attachment

337
INPO RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS BY THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Question: INPO was established by the nuclear electric utility industry to
promote improved performance, yet the utility industry provides
financial support for INPO. How does INPO maintain its
independence from a single utility or group of utilities, and
from the NRC? What authority/clout does INPO have over member
util ities?
Answer: INPO is able to maintain its independence from any single utility
or group of utilities because each contributes but a portion of
the funding total. Rather, INPO's member utilities have
considerable financial dependence upon their INPO membership.
INPO's need for authority among its members was anticipated by
its Board of Directors which established provisions, up to and
including loss of INPO membership, for failure of any utility to
respond sufficiently to INPO initiatives. Such action would
result in grave financial consequences for such a utility,
including loss of insurance coverage from Nuclear Electric
Insurance Limited (NEIL).
To assure INPO's independence from the NRC, a Memorandum of
Agreement, with a number of supporting coordination plans, has
been endorsed by both organizations. INPO and NRC conduct their
respective activities under this Memorandum of Agreement and meet
periodically to ensure that a clear understanding of this
agreement is maintained.
Question: How does INPO assure that utility training programs that are
accredited meet the high standards necessary to achieve safe and
reliable operation of our nation's nuclear power plants? What is
the federal involvement in the accreditation process?
Answer: Federal Involvement In the accreditation process is assured by
four of the twenty members of the National Nuclear Accrediting
Board, who have been nominated to serve by the NRC. The Charter
of the National Nuclear Accrediting Board requires participation
by a federally nominated member each time an accrediting board is
convened for action.
The NRC has the opportunity to observe all facets of the
accreditation process including Accrediting Board meetings and
INPO accreditation team site visits.
The INPO professional staff responsible for reviewing utility
training programs has been carefully selected to Include persons
with a broad range of diverse backgrounds and records of high
standards of personal performance. Accreditation criteria have
been developed to ensure that accredited programs meet high
standards for performance based training. INPO also evaluates

338
accredited utility training programs as part of the normal plant
evaluation process, and reaccreditation is required every four
years.
Question: You have shown the Committee graphs that indicate overall
industry performance appears to be improving and you have also
discussed the long-term 1990 goals. Yet 1985 appeared to be one
of the worst years yet for nuclear power with the Davis-Besse and
Rancho Seco events and with the problems at TVA. How can you say
that significant improvements have been made in light of the
above problems? What did INPO do to prevent the above problems?
Answer: An important aspect of the TVA situation that is often overlooked
is the following: TVA management took the action to shut down
the Brown's Ferry plant and later the Sequoyah plant. TVA
managers were certainly mindful of interactions with the NRC and
input from INPO, but it was TVA management that took that
initiative; and management action to shut down the plants is a
far better situation for TVA, and for the industry, than
continuing to operate until a serious event occurs. So in that
sense, the management action at TVA was healthy.
In the case of Rancho Seco and Davis Besse, both the NRC and INPO
had recognized developing potential problems, and from my own
personal knowledge I can report that both organizations were
working with the senior management of both utilities to bring
about improvements in the way the plants were operated. In
retrospect, we weren't early enough and perhaps we weren't
aggressive enough.
In early Fall of 1985, INPO did take action to request that the
Rancho Seco plant remain shut down until certain corrective
actions were taken, and improvements or upgrades of certain
operational activities were put in place before the plant started
up some five weeks later.
We have strengthened our evaluation program as a result of
lessons learned at TVA, Rancho Seco, and Davis-Besse, and will do
everything we can to assist utilities and the government in
heading off those kinds of problems in the future. Just as you
do, we regret the situation faced by all three utilities
involved.
Nevertheless, as indicated in my testimony, the overall industry
record has been one of improving performance during recent years.
Question: INPO's mission is to promote the highest levels of safety and
reliability -- to promote excellence -- in the operation of
nuclear electric generating plants. How well qualified is the
INPO staff to set and enforce standards of excellence?
2-

339
Answer: INPO's strength is in its people. Over 135 individuals with
utility experience are currently on INPO's staff. In addition,
over 70 individuals who were officers in the Navy nuclear
propulsion program are now employees of INPO.
Over 55 of our personnel have held licenses or certification as
nuclear power plant senior reactor operators.
INPO's personnel selection process has been careful and thorough,
and its employees are highly qualified to set and enforce
standards of excellence.
Question: What actions has INPO taken or planned to take regarding its
program in view of the accident at Chernobyl?
Answer: Subsequent to the accident, we provided information to our
members via NUCLEAR NETWORK'^, a computerized, electronic,
international communications system typically utilized for the
exchange of information among INPO members and participants.
On May 8, 1986, the Utility Nuclear Power Oversight Committee
(UNPOC), a group of senior executives representing industry
organizations formed a task force to assess the implications of
the Chernobyl accident in order to determine a course of action
for the industry. INPO is serving a significant role as a task
force member with responsibility for ultimate development of "The
Role of Operating Personnel" chapter of the U.S. Factual Report
on Chernobyl.
Any lessons learned from our review of the Chernobyl event will
be integrated into ongoing INPO programs.
Question: How can this Committee be of help to INPO in carrying out its
mission?
Answer: We request the Committee's encouragement and endorsement of the
INPO-managed efforts as described in my testimony and as outlined
in the documents furnished with the testimony. Further, we would
appreciate having the opportunity to periodically update this
committee, and through this committee the full Congress, on INPO
activities and the operating performance of the nuclear utility
industry.
Question: With all your evaluations of everything from training to
corporate management, you should be well equipped to be able to
discover an accident waiting to happen. Have you ever had such
an occasion? Have you succeeded in getting the particular
problem resolved? Do you communicate directly with the NRC on
the problems you uncover in your reviews?

340
Answer: In today's environment, strict design controls and rigorous
technical specification requirements (established by the NRC)
provide safeguards so that plants are unlikely to fall into a
physical condition where an accident is "waiting to happen." The
greatest likelihood for a serious nuclear event resides rather in
the human side of the plant performance equation, namely through
personnel error. In order to minimize this likelihood, INPO has
focused on improved training and performance of nuclear power
plant personnel through both the accreditation and evaluation
processes. These processes examine the content and
implementation of nuclear plant training programs, the level of
knowledge of nuclear plant personnel, and the actual performance
of workers in their day-to-day activities.
NRC has access to the results of INPO's evaluations. In the
event that INPO identifies a serious situation at a nuclear power
plant, it has established procedures for informing the NRC in
accordance with 10 CFR 21.
Question: The Soviet Union is not now a member of your International
Participation Program. What is the likelihood that the Soviet
Union will join INPO so as to be able to directly share with
other INPO members its operating experience, especially the
"lessons learned" from the Chernobyl accident?
Answer: In close cooperation with DOE, NRC, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and INPO's International Participant Advisory
Committee, INPO is investigating the possibility of expanding its
international program. INPO would be pleased to provide updates
on this effort to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
as the effort progresses.
Question: Please comment on the news article that Senator Bumpers referred
to that states that 1985 was the worst year since Three Mile
Island, in terms of the nuclear industry's safety record.
Answer: INPO agrees that 1985 was not a good performance year for some
individual utilities operating nuclear facilities (i.e.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Toledo Edison, TVA).
However, the significant actions currently being taken by these
utilities to upgrade overall performance are not reflections of a
lessening of regulatory activity.
Additionally, while certain events last year received considerthat
the number of significant
able public attentio n, the fact is
events per operating nuclear power unit as adjudged by INPO has
decl i ned over 67 per cent since 1981 . This decline is indicative
of a rising threshol d of overall nu clear power plant performance
since the criteria u sed by INPO to analyze and classify events
have remained essent ially constant This information is covered
more specifically in the written te stimony and the June 1986
performance indicato r brochure atta ched to the testimony.
-4-

SAN
341
SENATE COMMITT-E ON
F'-'fm;v A.ND NA'uRAi P.';in!j"r.rs
GA Technologies Inc.
PO BOX 85608
SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA 92138
(6191 455 3000
I GATechnologies
July 2, 1986
JUL 7 198b
LJlJlEIStbOTrE
WASHINGTON, D C 20510
The Honorable James A. McClure
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
U. S. Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator McClure:
The enclosed material is respectfully submitted in
response to your request of June 25, 1986. I appreciated the
opportunity to appear before your Committee and am pleased to
have this information made part of the hearing record.
Enclosure
R. A. Dean
Senior Vice President
Reactor Programs
10955 JOHN JAY HOPKINS DR
,
DIEGO. CAUFORNIA 92121

..
342
Question 1
From what I understand, a Modular High Temperature Gas Reactor
(MHTGR) contains neither zirconium fuel cladding nor water -- two
of the major "players" that resulted in the formation of hydrogen
and the subsequent hydrogen explosion that caused the sudden,
massive release of radioactivity into the atmosphere at Chernobyl.
So this kind of accident scenario is virtually impossible for an
MHTGR. Am I correct?
Answer
Your understanding is correct. The Modular High Temperature Gas-
Cooled Reactor (MHTGR) uses inert helium gas as a coolant so that
no reaction or explosion can take place between the coolant and
the fuel, fuel coating, or structural materials in the reactor
system. Further, no zirconium is present in the system so that
even in the rare circumstance where water would enter, no
metal/water reaction would take place to result in the formation
of hydrogen with a subsequent explosion. Although water may,
under certain circumstances, react with the graphite in the core,
the reaction is endothermic (absorbs heat) and therefore selflimiting
so that the Chernobyl type scenario is virtually
impossible.
Question 2
Is there interest on the part of the utilities in buying an MHTGR,
if they prove to perform as promised?
Answer
Historically, the electric utilities have supported the HTGR
program since 1978 through Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates (GCRA), a
utility user supported and managed organization. This group
represents about a third of the nation's generating capacity. The
specific design features of the MHTGR have been determined to meet
performance, safety, and investment requirements established
specifically by the GCRA utilities. Further, these utilities are
currently leading development of a Project Plan, which calls for a
significant investment from the private sector - primarily the
utilities themselves, that would lead to the demonstration of the
MHTGR concept and to its licensing certification for replication.
These activities are based on the conviction that the concept when
demonstrated will provide an advanced, second-generation nuclear
plant for installation by utilities domestically, as well as
outside of the United States.
Question 3.
Are DOE and EPRI participating with you and others in the
development and prototype testing of the MHTGR reactor design?
Please elaborate. What kind of funding would it take to fully
design, build and test an MHTGR?

343
Answer
There is wide participation in the design, development, and
programmatic activities of the MHTGR reactor. The U.S. Department
of Energy, in addition to providing overall program management and
support, participates directly in the technical activities through
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory (INEL). ORNL has been designated as the lead
organization for the MHTGR technology development efforts. INEL
provides overall top level guidance to the program and participates
in design review. The INEL site has also been recommended
by the program participants as a prime candidate for an MHTGR
demonstration plant.
As indicated in the answer to question 2., the utility industry is
active in the MHTGR program. EPRI participation is through Gas-
Cooled Reactor Associates (GCRA) . Although limited by funding,
their participation includes representation on the GCRA Board of
Directors and participation in the various management and
technical committee activities. In addition, EPRI has redirected
the scope of a number of their ongoing development programs to
provide results which contribute to the MHTGR program.
The level of funding required to fully design, build, and test an
MHTGR is currently being developed as part of a Project Definition
Study. This study, which is supported by the utility, vendor, and
architect-engineer participants in the MHTGR program, is being
carried out under the direction of GCRA. In addition to determining
overall costs, the study will define project requirements and
scope, benefits, and limitation and recommend the basis for the
sharing between private sector and government support of the
project. Preliminary indications, with major input from Bechtel
and stone & Webster, are that the total cost to perform the
design, development, and construction, and to operate a full scale
135 MWe Modular HTGR power station in a demonstration mode for
several years is about $800 million.
o
63-756 (346)

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S. Hrg. 102-765
EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL
NUCLEAR POWERPLANT
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
NUCLEAE REGULATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIEONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JULY 22, 1992
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S. Hrg. 102-765
EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL
NUCLEAR POWERPUNT
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUECOMMITTEE ON
NUCLEAR REGULATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIEONMENT AM) PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JULY 22, 1992
Printed for the use of the Clommittee on Environment and Public Works
U.S.
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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ISBN 0-16-039183-0

,,0S10H
PUBUC UBRWV-
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota, Chairman
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. New York JOHN H. CH^^^- ^^^1^^
GEORGE J. MITCHELL, Maine
SJ'eVE S^MS, Idaho
MAX BAUCUS, Montana
DURENBERGER,
FRANK Minnesota
R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAV^
w WARNER, Virginia
HARRY REID, Nevada
JAMES M JEFFORDS, Vermont
BOB GRAHAM, Florida
ROBERT SMITH, New Hampshire
JOSEPH I. UEBERMAN, Connecticut KUB1!.ki siviiin,
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio
HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania
David M. Strauss, Staff Director
Steven J. Shimberg, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation
BOB GRAHAM, Florida, Chairman
DANIEL PATRICK MOVNmAN. New York
AJ^^^^^^^ir °^
HARRY REID, Nevada
(II)

CONTENTS
OPENING STATEMENTS
Graham, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 1
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut 25
Simpson, Hon. Alan K., U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming 2
WITNESSES
Brewer, Shelby T., ChairmEin, ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power.... 34
Prepared statement 117
Dunbar, Gary A., Executive Vice President, Los Alamos Technical Associates.. 37
Prepared statement 121
Feshbach, Murray, Research Professor of Demography, Department of Demography,
Georgetown University 22
Prepared statement 115
Garrity, Thomas F., General Manager, Power Systems Engineering Department,
G.E. Industrial and Power Systems 40
Prepared statement 157
Matkiwsky, Dr. Zenon, President, Children of Chernobyl 3
Prepared statement 48
Mettler, Dr. Fred A., Jr., Professor and Chairman, Department of Radiology,
University of New Mexico 7
Prepared statement 67
Purvis, Edward E., Ill, Senior Engineer, Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc 17
Prepared statement 93
Werteleckyj, Dr. Wladimir, Professor and Chairman, Department of Medical
Genetics, University of South Alabama 12
Prepared statement 73
Responses to additional questions from Senator Simpson 81
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS
Committee on Chornobyl Supreme Rada of Ukraine 160
Friends of the Earth 163
(III)

EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWERPLANT
WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 1992
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Pubuc Works,
Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:41 a.m. in room
406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Graham [chairman
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Senators Graham and Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GRAHAM, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator Graham. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Nuclear
Regulation will come to order.
Today the subcommittee will examine the effects on public
health and environment of the accident that occurred at the Chernobyl
nuclear plant in April of 1986, We will also use this as an
opportunity to examine what needs to be done with the aftereffects
of Chernobyl and what should be United States international
policy relative to Soviet-designed nuclear plants in the former
Soviet Union and other parts of the world.
The explosion of the reactor at Chernobyl led to the largest
single-source release of radiation into the atmosphere that has ever
been recorded. The accident released approximately 50 times niore
radioactivity than was released by the atomic bombs at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. The radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident
has affected millions of people.
According to the official statistics of the former Soviet Union, at
least 31 fire fighters and plant operators died within days of the
accident from high radiation exposure. There is
considerable evidence
that the actual death toll from acute immediate exposure
was much higher. Hundreds of thousands of persons who lived
within 30 kilometers of the accident were evacuated from their
homes. They never were able to return. Over 600,000 army soldiers
and miners were brought in from all over the former Soviet Union
to stabilize the damaged reactor in the days and months following
the accident. Many of these liquidators received doses comparable
to the doses received by the survivors of the bomb blast at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Some may have received much more.
Several million people continue to live in areas that received significant
radioactive fallout from the accident. For several years in
(1)

many are^-S, an individual's average exposure to radiation was
twice the normal exposure before the accident. The subcommittee
today will examine the effects of the Chernobyl accident upon all of
these people. We will look at the studies that have been done and
ask what additional studies need to be done.
In addition, we will hear testimony about the continuing danger
posed by the Chernobyl reactor. The concrete structure surrounding
the damaged reactor that was constructed after the accident is
sinking and cracking. The core, filled with thousands of tons of
sand and concrete, also is sinking. There is a danger that additional
radioactivity may be released from the damaged unit into the atmosphere
or into ground water.
Finally, we will ask what the needs and opportunities are for
providing assistance to the Ukraine and other affected states. I
hope that our witnesses can provide the Congress with suggestions
as to the most effective way that we can provide aid to the people
in need.
I would like to thank Senator Lieberman for his leadership in
suggesting this hearing and I commend him for all of his efforts
and assistance in bringing this matter to the attention of the subcommittee.
I hope that the efforts of the Senator and the subcommittee
can help bring some of the needed relief to the tragic victims
of this nuclear disaster.
Senator Simpson, the ranking member of this subcommittee, was
unable to attend today's hearing. His statement will be included at
this point in the record.
[Senator Simpson's statement follows:]
Statement of Hon. Alan K. Simpson, U.S. Senator From the State of Wyoming
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing on the health effects resulting
from the trsigic accident at Chernobyl unit number four in April 1986—now six
years ago. The three hearings this subcommittee has held on the safety of Soviet
designed reactors, helped shape the comparable amendments offered by the Chairman,
myself and others to the Freedom Act—the Soviet aid bill.
Our amendments will provide immediate assistance to improve the safety of the
operating nuclear plants and, in the longer term, to assess all energy options to shut
down the operating RBMKs and older VVER reactors.
The Chairman and I are acutely aware of the design deficiencies of the RBMK
graphite reactor and the tragic consequences of the Chernobyl accident.
The most significant deficiency of this design is the lack of western-styled containment—the
massive steel and concrete structure which is the final barrier against
large releases of radiation in the event of an accident.
Unlike U.S. commercial light water reactor fuel, the graphite used in the RBMK
reactor can burn and inadequate fire-protection systems are useless in such an
event.
The RBMK nuclear ch£dn reaction is faster and in the event of coolant water loss,
becomes unstable and accelerates, at Chernobyl, the RBMK core experienced such a
power increase called "positive void coefficient" which contributed to the accident.
Soviet engineers have sought to modify this tendency by backfitting RBMKs with
faster-acting control rods and other fuel design improvements.
It is interesting to note that U.S. nuclear plants are designed with "a negative
void coefficient" so that the chain reaction naturally diminishes in the event of cooling
water loss.
The RBMK design does not include redundancy of electrical and safety systems in
the event of maintenance failure or accident, nor are these systems separated from
one another so that the same failure does not affect the redundant system—these
are safety characteristic of U.S. plants.
The list of problems goes on—complicated piping designs, poor quality control and
quality of construction and so on.

It is clear that the remaining RBMK reactors—which are located in the Republics
and Lithuania—should be shut down as soon as economically and practically feasible.
The Ukrainian Parliament vote in 1991 to shut down the two operating RBMK
reactors at the Chernobyl site is a welcomed decision.
Regarding the issues to be investigated at today's hearing, I am very interested to
learn of the witnesses opinions on the continuing health impacts of the 1986 Chernobyl
accident which resulted in huge releases of radioactive material to the environment
and excessive exposure to the countless unknown.
The IAEA's initial effort to assess the health impact of the Chernobyl accident is
to be applauded, we have come to understand that their effort was an immensely
difficult one in the absence of reliable data.
Obviously, continuing research to assess the longer term affects of exposure from
the accident is needed.
I look forward to learning of the ways in which U.S. technology and expertise in
the area of decommissioning and decontamination may be exported to benefit the
citizens of Ukraine.
Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman, on the very important issues
of assessing the health impacts of the Chernobyl accident and exploring ways in
which this country may provide help and assistance to the people of Ukraine.
Senator Graham. We will hear today first from a panel composed
of scientists with special background in the consequences of
Chernobyl. Dr. Zenon Matkiwsky is the President of the Children
of Chernobyl from Union, New Jersey. Dr. Wladimir Werteleckyj is
Professor and Chairman of the Department of Medical Genetics at
the University of South Alabama. He is the acting coordinator of
the American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group. Dr. Fred Mettler
is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Radiology at the
University of New Mexico and has studied the health effects as the
team leader on the International Chernobyl Project. Dr. Edward E.
Purvis, III, is Senior Engineer of the Los Alamos Technical Associates.
Dr. Murray Feshbach is Research Professor in Demography of
the Department of Demography of Georgetown University.
As has been our practice, our hearing will be conducted in this
round-table fashion. I would ask each of you to make an opening
statement of approximately five minutes, your full statement will
be part of the record, and then we will commence with questions
and discussion among our panelists.
First, Dr. Matkiwsky. Would you please pronounce your name?
Dr. Matkiwsky. Matkiwsky.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much. Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. ZENON MATKIWSKY, PRESIDENT, CHILDREN
OF CHERNOBYL, UNION, NEW JERSEY
Dr. Matkiwsky. Thank you. Senator and ladies and gentlemen.
Our foundation is grateful to the committee for giving us the opportunity
to present this testimony.
It has been six years since the accident of the Chernobyl nuclear
station. This tragedy has inflicted irreparable damage on some of
the most fertile and productive territories of Ukraine and Byelorussia.
It is also expected to have a profound effect on the ecology and
economics of many other nations. Tremendous costs have been expended
on the containment of the dissister's aftereffects. Given the
depth of its economic crisis, Ukraine cannot cope with this massive
problem alone. For a nation which has just achieved its independence,
Chernobyl has imposed a tremendous and crippling burden.

In recent months, a great deal of new evidence has come to light
showing that Soviet authorities engsiged in an extensive coverup of
the immediate effects of the Chernobyl accident. The deceit surrounding
the accident at Chernobyl was as global in scope as the
nature of the catastrophe itself. As journalists in Moscow and Kiev
have gained access to newly-declassified documents, they have
learned that not 34 but as many as 8,000 persons, mostly nuclear
cleanup workers, have already died as a result of radiation exposure
in Chernobyl.
We now know that in the spring of 1986, the Politburo was receiving
daily updates on thousands of cleanup workers and children
who were hospitalized with radiation sickness even while publicly
Soviet officials were telling the world that the health impact
was negligible and grossly exaggerated by the western press. An article
published last April in Izvestiya reveals excerpts from secret
protocols of Politburo which directly contradict the public pronouncement
of Soviet authorities.
Beyond the immediate impact, some scientists speculated that
additional deaths resulting Chernobyl would be too few in number
and too dispersed in the population to detect. But the real longterm
tragedy of Chernobyl is just beginning to unfold, and already
the results are not only detectable, they are quite stark indeed.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Health has reported a tripling of cancers
among Ukrainian children since 1986. Most disturbing among
these is the sharp increase in thyroid cancer among children. The
number of operations performed on children with thyroid cancer
has risen from an average of two per year to 20 in 1990, 30 more in
1991, and now, after only the first five months in 1992, the incidence
of new thjn-oid cancer stands at 52. Our own national institute
of health has expressed grave concern about the growing
number of confirmed reports of thyroid cancer among small children
in northern Ukraine and southern Byelorussia.
In the hospitals sponsored by our foundation, hematologists have
also noticed a dramatic increase in the number of new leukemia
cases diagnosed since 1990. The number of congenital malformations
among newborns throughout the republic has gone up from
13,000 in 1985 to 14,400 a year between 1987 and 1990. There is
also growing evidence of extensive chromosome changes and the
potential for long-term genetic damage affecting persons living in
the Chernobyl region. A highly detailed study of German citizens
returning from the vicinity of Chernobyl following the 1986 accident
has documented a dramatic increase in structural chromosome
aberrations.
The dramatic health situation which is unfolding in Ukraine is
disputed by the health commission formed by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, which was invited by the government of
the former USSR to analyze various issues associated with the
Chernobyl accident. The commission was composed of authoritative
scientists and we give acknowledgement to their qualifications.
However, the commission was faced with constraints on cost, time,
and necessary equipment, and these conditions forced this team of
scientists to rely in part on information provided by the Soviet government.
The discrepancy between the data offered to the IAEA

the Federal prosecutor of the USSR addressed the sale of
and the information contained in the Kremlin secret files led to
some regrettable conclusions. Let me just cite the following:
In October of 1991, six months after the IAEA report was completed,
47,000 tons of meat and two million tons of milk products which
came from contaminated territories over a three-year period. The
radioactivity of these products exceeded by several hundred-fold
the maximum permissible limits on cesium established by the
IAEA. Not knowing these facts, the advisory committee accepted
the conclusion that "Doses actually received due to the ingestion of
contaminated food stuffs were substantially lower than the prescribed
intervention level, and food stuffs may have been restricted
unnecessarily."
The IAEA researchers cited radiophobia and psychological stress
as possible explanations for the reports of increased cancers and
more serious health effects. But we need to remember that radiation
illness was not even permitted as a medical chart diagnosis
in Ukraine for the first years after the accident. Any speculation
about radiophobia and the alleged exaggeration of health effects
need to be considered against the backdrop of the indisputable
coverup of Chernobyl, which for six years severely undercounted
radiation effects and falsified the medical history of Chernobyl's
earliest victims.
Another common misconception about Chernobyl is the notion
that we can extrapolate the number of latent cancers from those
that occurred after the atom bombs were dropped in Hiroshima or
Nagasaki. Such estimates ignore the fact that Chernobyl may have
released the equivalent of 100 Hiroshima bombs, water cesium, and
other isotopes. Given the increase in lung cancers noted by the
Ministry of Health, there is also a need to address the problem of
so-called radioactive hot spots which can affect the lungs and
lymph nodes. The IAEA study also did not address the synergistic
effect of radiation and other pollutants.
In conclusion, we are observing a precipitous decline in the state
of health of the Ukrainian population. We need to remember that
the IAEA study never examined the highest-risk population,
namely the 600,000 nuclear cleanup workers and the 200,000-plus
evacuees from the excursion zone. To make matters worse, health
experts do not expect the bulk of the cancers and latent health effects
from Chernobyl to occur until 10 to 15 years after initial exposure,
when the latency period for strontium, cesium, and other isotopes
have tolled.
Under the circumstances of the current economic crisis, Ukraine
will need intensive monitoring by health experts for at least 20
years, and it will need much more substantial aid from the West.
With growing urgency, the Ukrainian Parliament and the Council
of Ministers have issued official appeals for aid from western nations.
They have gone out of their way to express their gratitude to
those who have already provided aid. We are providing copies of
such pleas for assistance.
The recommendations that we propose are the U.S. Government
should increase and distribute medical aid to the newly independent
states so that a greater portion flows to the three northernmost
provinces of Ukraine, namely Chernihiv, Kiev, and Zhitomir, which

were hardest hit by radiation from Chernobyl. Additional funds
need to be appropriated to the Department of Energy and National
Institute of Health and other agencies to research on radiation
health effects, and funds which have not yet been spent need to be
devoted to the following projects in the Chernobyl region:
A long-term health study of the population which was not examined
by the IAEA team, namely the nuclear cleanup workers and
some of the 200,000 evacuees from Chernobyl, who run the highest
risk of latent cancers and other health defects. FoUowup studies
also need to be done on the general health of people living in regions
contaminated by low-level radiation, Zhitomir Province and
the Polissia region in Kiev Province in particular. The IAEA team
did not have the opportunity to look into the effects of radioactive
hot spots, and a program needs to be established for the analysis of
this problem.
Followup studies are needed to determine the extent of chromosome
aberrations and long-term genetic damage among children in
Kiev and Polissia using so-called biological dose symmetry. There is
also a need for further investigation of reports of genetic deformation
in animals and newborn children. A comparative study of thyroid
cancer incidence in children and assistance in the establishment
of a nationwide cancer registry in Ukraine and Byelorussia.
Research on the synergistic effect on radiation and other forms of
pollution. Example: a study of the combined effect of exposure to
radiation and heavy metals, such as cadmium, or a comparison of
the health condition of coal miners from the Donetsk region who
were sent to Chernobyl for cleanup duties in 1986 as compared to
the health of miners who were never sent to Chernobyl.
Assistance for the underfunded Ukrainian Environmental
Health Project based at the University of Illinois which examines
the health of mothers and children in Kiev and the four other
Ukrainian cities. Our government needs to offer incentives to U.S.
pharmaceutical firms and hospital supply companies to invest in
Ukraine to help rebuild the country's medical infrastructure and to
benefit from opening a new market in the important region. We
would recommend the creation of a scholarship fund for specialists
from Ukraine to be trained in the U.S. using American medical
equipment and procedures.
Most importantly, the West needs to help prevent future Chernobyls
by providing engineering technology and technical assistance
for the rapid decommissioning of the RBMK-model reactors which
continue to pose an ongoing threat to the health and safety of
Ukraine and its
neighboring countries. The West should promote
energy conservation and renewable energy technologies to help
reduce Ukraine's dependency on RBMK reactors and other environmentally
destructive sources of energy, such as coal.
Finally, we would encourage cooperation between Ukraine and
American nuclear experts to develop short-term solutions to the
contamination hazard posed by RBMK reactors. In particular, we
would like to see the Department of Energy explore innovative
laser techniques being developed by United Technology, such as in
Connecticut, which would allow nuclear cleanup workers to remedy
the problems of Chernobyl by remote control, without further exposure
to radiation hazards.

With growing urgency, the Ukrainian Parliament and Council of
Ministers have issued pleas to the United States for the type of assistance
recommended above. Ukrainians have gone out of their
way to express gratitude for the aid that has already been given.
The Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund looks forward to working
with this committee to help create a healthy and safe environment
for the children of Ukraine and the children of the world.
I thank you very much.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Next, Dr. Fred Mettler, Health Effects Team Leader for the
International Chernobyl Project.
STATEMENT OF DR. FRED A. METTLER, JR., PROFESSOR AND
CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF RADIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF
NEW MEXICO, AND HEALTH EFFECTS TEAM LEADER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECT
Dr. Mettler. Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here.
I would start out by reiterating at least one comment of the previous
speaker, and that is that the health effects are generally divided,
one would think, among four broad groups of people: the
firemen and workers at the plant at the time of the accident, of
whom, as you indicated, about 31 have died, but overall or at least
between 150 and 300 who suffered from what is known as acute radiation
syndrome.
Then the liquidators or the emergency accident workers, and
again, as you indicated, the numbers are probably in the range of
600,000 to 700,000 people. Those people are spread across about 12
time zones right now, making it moderately difficult to study them.
Many of those people also came to the plant as nuclear power
plant workers from other areas, and data has now come out that
many of those people had substantial exposures before they ever
got to Chernobyl, and what effect that will have is not at all clear.
A third group are the people who, you indicated, have already
been evacuated, and again, many of those have been sent to fairly
distant locations. In our travels, we did look around for records on
those people to see if we could locate them, and in fact, the records
that we found were only fragmentary, so we weren't sure it was
going to be easy to locate them and/or go to where they were to
study them.
I would say that the groups just that I've enumerated constitute
probably a million people. You need to remember that at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, we have been studying essentially with U.S.
funding about 80,000 people, survivors of the atomic bombing over
the last 45 years. That effort alone has cost us billions of dollars
over the years to study 80,000 people. The group involved here is
coming up on a million exposed people, and if one were going to
study them, you would need probably a million or two million controls
to study over the next, legitimately, 40 to 50 years. So I think
the costs of that are really staggering when one thinks about it.
The fourth group of people exposed is the general public, and
that is in fact the group that the former Soviet government asked
us to look at. We were aware at the time, and so was the Soviet
government, that other groups may, and did, receive substantially

8
more exposure. However, their exposures had ended, and the
people living in villages in contaminated areas had exposures that
were continuing, and the former Soviet government was particularly
interested in what they should do for actions in order to deal
with continuing exposures. The other ones they felt that at least at
that point there was no action to be taken to remediate them or
reduce them. So we in fact were sent out with a specific mission of
looking at the general public. The reason we didn't look at the
other groups was we weren't asked to, and they understood the
problem as well as we did.
Now, two other groups had gone to the Soviet Union before the
International Chernobyl Project, and those were groups from the
World Health Organization and from the Red Cross or Red Crescent.
They had spent several weeks pretty much on a fact-finding
mission traveling around in 1989 and concluded at the end of that
that they did not see any effects that they could determine as being
radiation effects at that particular point, but they were worried
about long-term cancers and leukemias and things like that. However,
there were a large number of reports both from the media
and from Soviet scientists which were conflicting and didn't fit in
with what was known about radiation biology, so an international
group was asked to come in and do a much more detailed study.
That group had five portions or teams. One was a historical
group to look at records, the second group was to look at environmental
sampling, and in fact, they did go to villages and take thousands
of milk samples and food samples and so on to check to see
whether the Soviet numbers were in fact correct. A third group
went in to look at dosimetry—that is, what dose the people were
actually getting who are living in those villages. That group actually
brought in equipment from France and ended up measuring over
10,000 people to determine how much cesium was in fact in their
bodies. It was not always germane to find out what's in the food;
it's really what are they getting in their bodies. So they did that to
10,000 people. They also took about 5,000 what we would call film
badges and had people carry them around in the different villages.
was asked to lead, which was the
The fourth group was the one I
health effects group, to look at what the health of the people was,
to locate Soviet data that had been obtained and critique it, and
then to finally go to villages and see what we thought the health
was and compare it to places which were essentially clean.
During 1990, our teams made 11 trips to the Soviet Union and
involved 50 physicians from over 15 different countries. Only six of
those physicians were in fact from the United States. They came
from Argentina, Australia, Greece, and so on. We ended up spending
several months in the Soviet Union traveling around to the institutes
looking at data that scientists had collected, and we interviewed
for an hour each over 100 scientists. We brought back in
experts from various countries in those specific areas later on, and
they were re-interviewed, and their original data was looked at as
opposed to the results. Then we traveled to several of the highestcontaminated
villages we could find—two in the Ukraine, three in
Byelorussia, and two in Russian Federation—and then we went to
clean villages in those regions relatively nearby to have a comparison
between the groups.

We did check soil samples and radiation measurements in the
"clean" villages to make sure that they were in fact clean. Our
findings were that when we reviewed data of Soviet scientists,
some of it in fact was quite well done. However, many of the studies
we looked at were conflicting internally. That is, a study would
find one thing one year, the effect wouldn t be there the next year,
and it would be back the third year. And, of course, most radiation
effects aren't interested in the calendar, and they don't know when
January comes and goes. So there were internally conflicting data.
Generally very few of the scientists had used control groups.
That is, they had gone to a contaminated village and studied it, but
they hadn't gone to a clean village and looked to see what was
going on there. Often we were given percentages of findings without
the real numbers, and the real numbers were very hard to
come by often. Quality control generally was not practiced. The
equipment rarely had standards performed in the morning and so
forth, and in many cases that was understandable, because they
didn't have access to the standards which we would normally have
in this country.
We saw a lot of unused equipment, equipment that had been donated
by the United States and private donors, which was sitting
unused because they didn't have the reagents to make the equipment
run. We saw equipment unused because one small part was
We saw resources
broken and they couldn't get the piece to fix it.
wasted by very well-meaning scientists because they did not have
access to literature. They did not know that those things had been
studied in the past with either positive or negative results. And we
saw a lack of scientific cooperation between republics and between
scientists often in the same institute who were not interested in
sharing data.
We did see a lot of concern among the public both in clean and
contaminated villages. About 90 percent of people that we interviewed
in highly contaminated villages thought they had or
thought they might have an illness due to radiation. The number
in perfectly clean villages was about 75 percent of the people. So
even if you went to a place outside of those areas that are marked
as contaminated on that map, 75 percent of the people think they
have or might have an illness due to radiation.
The dosimetry estimates based not on the food intake particularly,
but based on what cesium was actually in people and based on
the film monitors that they were carrying around, over the last
five vears ended up being about three rads total radiation dose.
That s about the equivalent of one CT scan, or computed tomography
scan. Those people in fact, to get that dose, were living what I
would call non-normal lives. They were looking at what food they
were eating, and they were restricting contaminated foods from
coming into their houses. They knew what spots in their village
had a lot of cesium, and they were walking around them. So they
were able to keep their doses reasonably low, but certainly not by
maintaining a normal lifestyle.
The claims of stillborns and malformations increasing in fact are
not supported by any of the data that we saw. If one looks at some
of the data which I have supplied to you, the official data from the
Byelorussian Ministry of Health in 1990 indicates that registered

10
malformations in the contaminated regions of Byelorussia was 4.3
per thousand in 1986 and was 5.3 in 1989 and in fact 7 in 1988. So
if one looks at 1986 to 1988 and 1989, it looks like it's going up.
However, if you go back and look at the data from 1980 and 1981,
you see numbers of 6 and 5.8 and so forth. So one needs to look at
the whole span of the actual data that one has. In addition, if one
looks at stillborns from the official data, you get 7.2 in 1986, 7.5 in
the year after the accident. However, in 1981 it was 7.6, higher
than either the year of the accident or the year after. So the data
has to be looked at very carefully.
up.
We did look at issues of immune deficiency as they were brought
One looks at that by looking at the incidence of viral abnormalities,
hepatitis, measles, all sorts of things, and the official data
has been given to your staffs and, again, does not support the contentions
of a general decrease in immune level.
The media had reported anemias and large thyroids. These are
things which generally are not reported in other radiation environments,
and in fact, the red blood cell is relatively resistant to radiation.
We did find children and adults with enlarged thyroids and
with anemia. We did not find more than we would have expected
in other countries nor was it different from the clean areas. We did
look at nutrition and growth of the children, and both in contaminated
and clean areas it's running right down the 50th percentile
of U.S. and USSR norms. So that nutrition appeared to be adequate.
Thus, our data concerning acute radiation effects seems to
be consistent with data that has been accumulated in other accidents
and other studies in other places.
The psychological issues that were brought up by the previous
speaker that the Project found, radiophobia—is wrong. In fact, the
findings, if one reads the technical report, are that we did not feel
there was radiophobia. We did feel there were psychological aspects,
but the people were trying to deal with living in a radiation
environment. I can tell you that when we asked people if they were
so fatigued they didn't want to get up in the morning, 89 percent in
contaminated villages said yes versus 81 percent in clean villages.
We asked about headaches. Eighty-one percent reported them in
the last three months in contaminated villages versus 77 percent in
clean villages. We asked about chest pain. It was 53 percent in contaminated
villages and 43 percent in clean villages. So there was a
slight increase, but all the numbers are much, much higher than
one would expect normally.
There have been studies done on children besides our study.
There have been 3,000 children sent to Cuba, for example, and the
conclusion of the Cubans was that they in fact did not see any radiation
effects in those children. Children have also been sent to
France and to Germany with fairly similar findings.
Now, regarding the issues of thyroid cancer and leukemia, we
looked at those very seriously, because we did expect that might be
a problem and we did expect that one could see leukemia this
early. It's a little early for thyroid cancer. If one looks and figures
that there are about 50 million people in the Ukraine and one
would apply U.S. statistics on childhood thyroid cancer, there
should be about 100 cases a year. There were two cases a year reported
before the accident, and our epidemiologists who reviewed

11
the cancer registry data in general decided that cancer reporting in
all the republics that we looked at was substantially underreported
from what should have been there. The levels are substantially
below what was reported in Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example.
So much of the data is coming from a base that was unsatisfactory
in terms of not reporting what probably was there.
Now, is
there an increase? There could be, but the data doesn't
show a definite radiation increase, and the data doesn't exclude it,
either. So we came away saying that we didn't know whether there
was an increase in thyroid cancer or leukemia at this time but that
they were issues that we would be concerned about, certainly.
We tried to predict future health effects, and we do think there
probably will be an increase in cancers over the next 70 years. If
one takes a village of 10,000 people and looks at that and says,
what will the general cancer rate be? Well, cancer deaths, at least
in the U.S., are about 17 percent, so that would be 1,700 people. We
think that might go to 1,750. So 50 people in a village of 10,000
might in fact be expected to develop cancers. Of those, about six of
those deaths would probably be from leukemias.
We did find generally poor health in the Soviet Union and poor
medical care. We felt that 15 to 20 percent of the adults that we
saw should be under the care of a doctor at the time that we saw
them. They were sick. It was predominantly hypertension, alcoholism,
and other things. Their salt intake is about 12 grams a day
compared to two grams in the U.S. They don't have a choice. They
don't have refrigerators, so they're going to continue to eat salt
and they're going to continue to be hypertensive. On the other
hand, they have no access to medicines to treat the hypertension.
The needles that we used, the disposable needles, they were trying
to save and re-use because they didn't have needles, which, of
course, goes against all of our training. But certainly dental hygiene,
the need for antibiotics, all are significant issues in all of the
areas that we went.
We think there is a definite need for increased education, as has
been pointed by the previous speaker, bringing people to this country,
teaching them. We do not think it's a good idea to just give
them a high-tech piece of equipment, one, without the education;
two, without the reagents; and three, without being able to get
access to the spare parts.
Currently, there are efforts by the Department of Energy, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the State Department, and the
National Cancer Institute. The National Cancer Institute I know is
working on protocols for studying thyroid cancer and leukemia. I
believe one of their major problems at this point is trying to figure
out who's in charge and to be able to deal with on a continuing
basis. Obviously, if one is spending millions on a project, in setting
it up and knowing the project is going to probably go for 20 or 30
years, one would like to have the same people running it from
either the Ukrainian or the Byelorussian side, and it's not easy to
figure that out at this point.
There is a lot of data available on acute radiation syndrome from
the accident, and I think at this point, as near as I can tell, the
Department of Energy is interested in following that.

12
So I think there are some things to be done, I think our project
had some benefit in getting attention off things like anemia and directing
it to the right areas where future work should be done.
Thank you.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Werteleckyj, Professor and Chairman of the Department of
Medical Genetics at the University of South Alabama.
STATEMENT OF DR. WLADIMIR WERTELECKYJ, PROFESSOR AND
CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL GENETICS, UNIVERSI-
TY OF SOUTH ALABAMA, AND ACTING COORDINATOR, AMERI-
CAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES GROUP
Dr. Werteleckyj. Thank you. I want to thank the committee for
this opportunity to present some views.
I want to point out that one of the consequences of gain in independence
was an abrupt loss of medical support that formerly
stemmed from Moscow. Another consequence was that Ukraine has
virtually no representation in key international bodies, such as the
World Health Organization, or including studies, as Dr. Mettler alluded
to. Ukraine has no foreign currency reserves, and Ukrainian
authorities have officially recognized that they are unable to cope
with the general medical crisis, much less with those issues stemming
from Chernobyl, and they have called openly for international
participation and assistance.
For brevity's sake, I'm not going to allude to myself, but I will
point out two things about the importance on the subject and what
is the group that was formed trying to contribute some ideas
toward possible solutions.
Radioactivity is the best-known example of an agent that induces
cancer, gene mutations, chromosome defects, birth defects, mental
retardation, and shortens the life span of those exposed. Furthermore,
radiation does not cause single victims. It does afflict entire
families, communities, populations, and even future generations.
Thus, the Chernobyl tragedy cannot be viewed by a few narrow,
specialized scientific windows. Such an approach guarantees the dehumanization
of a complexity such as the one that occurred in
Chernobyl.
I agree, because I am a scientist, that science is essential if we
are going to find and propagate the truth. But sciences in medicine
must be complemented by clinical wisdom if what we seek is not
just publications or scientific contributions but what we seek is
amelioration and healing. It is self-evident that science alone will
not change perceptions, attitudes, or behaviors in the case of Chernobyl
or, as a matter of fact, in any other complex issue. I'm personally
deeply concerned that Chernobyl is increasingly perceived
£is an example of a failure by industrialized nations to help those
whose tragedies were not deserved. Some politicians already find in
Chernobyl a good example why western democracies need not be
emulated. We have debated six years about helping. I firmly believe,
therefore, that America will show others the leadership and
humanism that justifies our high standing among other nations.
Concerning the American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group,
which I represent here, I want to say that we got together because

13
we are medical investigators and clinicians who hold appointments
in universities, teaching hospitals, and scientific centers. Among us
are members of the National Academy of Sciences, chairmen of
academic departments, experts in genetics, radiology, biophysics,
pediatrics, obstetrics, and other specialties. Many of us have considerable
teaching and administrative experience. Our group has developed
linkages with hundreds of U.S. and Ukrainian scientists
and physicians which are interested in Chernobyl and in bilateral
participation. The point is that we can now state unambiguously
that we know firsthand that there is a sufficient number of qualified
and interested professionals both in the U.S. and the Ukraine
that can sustain long-term comprehensive, coordinated, and independent
projects open to public perusal. Secondly, we are also certain
that U.S. academies, many foundations, and charitable organizations
will join in such efforts.
Now, we have heard here a report from Dr. Mettler about the
best-publicized and probably the worst-received study in Ukraine
about the Chernobyl disaster. This is the report by the International
Advisory Committee. This study has self-admitted limitations as
shown in their own report. The report states that the study was
not intended to have neither the rigor nor the comprehensiveness
of an elaborate long-term research study, that the number of available
independent experts and their time were limited. These were
volunteers. That the data provided by the USSR was not always
adequate nor could it be independently assessed, particularly concerning
the radiologic events that occurred during the accident.
That numerous hot spots where exceptionally high surface radioactivity
occurred have been excluded from investigation. Evidently,
the cytogenetic investigations, for reasons that I do not know, have
not been released, and indeed these are needed very badly to know
what the effects were. There were no reasons given why the most
cytogenetic common standards used to report such accidents were
not included in the report.
I want to add the following: Chernobyl is without dispute the
largest nuclear accident on record. Within one week, 90,000 children
were uprooted and evacuated. The International Advisory
Committee also reported that an astounding 72 percent of individuals
in contaminated areas were willing to relocate and abandon
their homes. The percentages of the population who thought that
the government should relocate the whole population were even
higher. The number of children and unborn exposed to this radiation
remains unknown.
In addition, under the deteriorating economic circumstances that
have occurred in those territories, we no longer can dispute that
there are other major medical problems, particularly diphtheria
epidemics which originally were denied by the authorities.
There is also a growing tendency to "ship" Ukrainian children
out of Ukraine, and we heard that 3,000 went to Cuba, which faces
difficulties to feed its own population and has limited resources for
Chernobyl victims. A growing number of Ukrainians feel that such
trends do not address the fundamental problems but actually increase
perceptions of inequity.
I will skip other points but at least make two or three more. I
think it will become unacceptable to sustain major nuclear safety

14
projects in Ukraine without a parallel and equally credible effort
in investment in people. We cannot depreciate people because the
scientific data is not as good as we wish. If I went to any community
in West Florida or South Alabama that has 10,000 individuals
and I told them that, well, maybe 50 will have to go, I will find out
that people do not understand relative risks. They understand absolute
risks. They understand what 50 is, but they don't understand
what is 50 out of 10,000. America cannot afford to be perceived
as a technological giant alone. It is our record in human
values that gives us our stature among other nations.
The considerable investment that we made in the studies of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, which we also heard about, was one of the
best and wisest scientific investments that this country ever made,
and if we had to do it again and if we had to pay twice as much, I
would like to know which United States citizen or scientist would
vote against it. So that it is not an argument whether Chernobyl
should or should not be studied. The issue is, can we afford not to?
Money alone, I will tell you right now, will not solve any problems
whatsoever. People solve problems. Organizations such as the
American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group that I represent may
facilitate linkages between American and Ukrainian medical scientists.
Also, there are many other Ukrainian organizations, both
academic and charitable, who have firsthand experience and have
established bilateral linkages with Ukraine.
There are hundreds of thousands of American-Ukrainian citizens
in this country, and they are immigrants because they could
not survive in Ukraine. These people are nurturing these organizations,
they have already formed frameworks that can facilitate the
flow of assistance through established and experienced networks
that can facilitate accountability, and they certainly understand
the contrast between those that think in terms of the former communist-dominated
areas and those that rejected communism. These
organizations are here and they can be used for creative, innovative
ways of introducing American technology and know-how
rather than using old approaches or templates that often don't
work.
I believe that the effectiveness of any aid, particularly in medicine,
will depend upon very careful planning. It is self-evident that
the contrast between the Soviet system and our system, added to
the language barriers, are phenomenal. A key role of a group like
ours is to expedite the formation of bilateral planning, bilateral coordination,
bilateral supervisory teams, and to provide as many
consultants as possible to pave the way. I think that the goals and
objectives of a medical aid program should fundamentally investigate,
cure, and ameliorate the effects of the Chernobyl disaster as
well as to instill public trust in the U.S. medical and scientific institutions.
The major goals for assistance can be grouped into two
domains: those of immediate medical assistance, and those that require
the creation of stable platforms such as an American-
Ukrainian Medical Sciences Center or equivalents.
Among the immediate needs, our group endorses the recommendations
of the International Advisory Committee wholeheartedly,
and we add a few more thoughts. The International Committee recommended
that energetic action should be taken to improve the

15
standard of medical diagnostic and research equipment and the
availability of medical supplies. For instance, Ukrainian kids need
diphtheria vaccines. The American Academy of Pediatrics recognizes
this need. Badly needed are medical programs for children
based on their potential risk for cancer. Nobody disputes this need.
Assessment of genetic effects and chromosomal abnormalities. I see
no data except from Germany or other faraway lands. That needs
to be done.
Programs to alleviate psychological effects. I remind anyone in
this room that when we had the Buffalo Creek disaster in West
Virginia, 125 people died when the dam broke, but American psychiatry
now alludes to "Buffalo Creek syndrome". Eighty percent
of the survivors had serious psychological problems. We also think
that we should develop programs with emphasis on high-risk populations,
just as the International Advisory Committee recommends.
We must focus on those that had the most exposure unwillingly.
Those are called euphemistically "hot spots". It is not rational to
accept the fact that people can walk around them, as stated a few
minutes ago.
We think that there is a deep need for public information. I
think the public is fully aware of the potential effects of radiation,
but they need to know facts and they need to trust those that dispense
these facts. For instance, after Chernobyl, there has been an
increased rate of abortions in lands as far as Italy, Denmark, and
Sweden. We have no idea about the degree of such effects of Chernobyl
on the reproductive patterns in Ukraine, direct or indirect. I
also think we need to provide incentives for joint ventures to develop
a pharmaceutical infrastructure. I think that drugs can be initially
packaged, vaccines can be initially partially manufactured by
creative tripartite or even more complex arrangements. These are
urgent matters.
We need to provide incentives for businesses to engage in joint
ventures in medical technology, and the engineering is there, but
it's focused on the defense industry. We need to particularly single
out how technology can provide Ukraine with a better food chain.
Specifically, I would like to only call attention to the issues related
to thjrroid cancer. We heard before that studies may have been
undertaken too soon. Then we should not talk. The International
Advisory Committee stated that the available data reviewed do not
provide an adequate basis for determining whether there has been
an increase in leukemia and thyroid cancer as a consequence of the
accident. Let's face the fact that there may have been 800,000 children
exposed. Investigations by Brookhaven National Laboratory
and others in the U.S. have shown that when you find thyroid
S5miptoms in radiation-exposed kids in Utah or Arizona, only 3 percent
knew that they had thyroid disease. So unless somebody goes
and studies those Ukrainian kids, nobody will know, because the
symptoms will not be apparent. And the most likely victim which
incorporates radioactive iodine is the unborn. Purely epidemiologic
studies of risks and outcomes are humanistically unacceptable. Investigations
have to include medical monitoring, health care, and
prevention. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian children need
follow up.

16
The magnitude of the problem is illustrated by the fact that the
highest level of radioactive iodine ever recorded in a single day in
the United States was as a consequence of Chernobyl on May 11th
in Vermont. In Scotland and in France, by May 10th the thyroids
of calf and cattle were removed from the market. I suggest that
human thyroids should raise the same concerns as animal thyroids.
About the psychological effects, I think that they are to be expected
and they must be handled soon, for I think, from what I understand,
the situation is deteriorating. People that deteriorate psychologically
deteriorate rationally, and solutions become more expensive
and difficult.
Now, I think we have been belaboring as to how to make aid
most effective, and whether aid will favor medium or long-term objectives
will depend on the kind of support found. I firmly believe
that the creation of an American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences
Center would provide a long-term platform for rapid and effective
introduction of technology along with clinical know-how. The process
can be initiated promptly by the establishment of centers of excellence,
which will function as independent, nongovernmental
medical and research facilities under joint U.S.-Ukrainian control
and subject to U.S. standards. Each center will promote, facilitate,
and provide a stable home base for U.S. scientists in Ukraine, and
the equivalent could be developed in the U.S.. The centers would be
eventually amalgamated into an American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences
Center, and an interim step would be an amalgamation into
an American-Ukrainian Children's Center.
The urgency of this medical crisis in Ukraine calls for an immediate
development of at least two centers of excellence, an American-Ukrainian
Cancer/Leukemia Center, because of the thyroid
leukemia threat, and an American-Ukrainian Teratogenetic
Center, because people are afraid to have children.
As a major component of a proposed American-Ukrainian Medical
Sciences Center, there should be also an information data repository
and public information program, which would include and
promote epidemiology, coordination, education, and so forth. Much
of the aid reaching Ukraine thus far, and it's considerable, has
come from American-Ukrainians and local business communities.
The plan to develop centers of excellence aims to provide incentives
for participation by businesses and nongovernmental organizations.
These centers will inherently become showcases of American
technology and know-how. An American Children's Hospital and
later an American Medical Sciences Center will provide high-quality
medical care subject to U.S. standards and be open to patients
beyond Ukraine. An impact of such medical facility in eastern
Europe is
likely to be substantial. We ask that this committee endorse
such plans and seek funding to propel implementations. We
have indications that the Ukrainian authorities are prepared to
either delegate hospitals and laboratory facilities or otherwise welcome
construction of new ones.
To conclude, I believe that substantial aid to Ukraine is warranted
on humanitarian, scientific, as well as geopolitical grounds. The
U.S. has heavily invested in the investigations of Hiroshima-Nagasaki.
A similar investment is needed to study and ameliorate Cher-

17
nobyl. An American-Ukrainian Medical Center is an effective way
to provide for the integration of complex long-term research, medical
care, and public information projects. It is also a highly visible
contribution that will demonstrate the creativity of the U.S. and its
role in a highly sensitive area.
Furthermore, a helping hand from America is the most effective
way to promote our own democracy. The fate of the emerging democracy
in Ukraine will have profound implications, and the aid
provided thus far has been primarily nongovernmental. The American-Ukrainian
community has created linkages and now probably
will be seeking from our Government leadership and support.
Thank you.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much. Doctor.
Mr. Edward Purvis, Senior Engineer of Los Alamos Technical Associates.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD E. PURVIS, III, SENIOR ENGINEER, LOS
ALAMOS TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES, INC.
Mr. Purvis. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I was assisted in the preparation of this testimony by Dr. Marvin
Goldman, who is the leader on the U.S. side of the joint working
group on the health effects of Chernobyl. His statement is included
in the submittal for the record. I will allude to information from it,
but I will concentrate on discussing the technical details about the
physical situation at Chernobyl, in particular the sarcophagus in
the nearby area. I appreciate the opportunity to review this.
To understand the current situation, it would help to best review
exactly what happened. The accident resulted from some design
flaws and some major operational problems. These led to a reactivity
excursion, which was a very large, rapid increase in power. The
actual part that really led to the results that you see lasted about
two-tenths of a second, and the power level went up to where it
generated in that burst about 32 gigajoules of energy. That's an
awful lot. It resulted in a very small fraction of the fuel in the reactor
going up to a temperature of about 13,000 degrees Fahrenheit
before the expansion of this now gaseous mass could disrupt it.
That was the major part of the damaging energy release.
What you now have is gaseous fuel putting a shock wave on the
fuel fragments, which took the graphite and the fuel—some of it
was very fine particles, some of it was larger fragments, some of it
was intact—and threw it onto the roof and into the yard. A lot of it
w£is left in what is now the sarcophagus. It was very, very hot. The
gases condensed, formed aerosols, and so forth. The hot fuel in contact
with the graphite caused burning, which resulted in radioisotopes
being released and going very high up into the atmosphere,
where they were dispersed over a very large area.
The exact amount of some isotopes, like radioactive iodine, that
were released and that were dispersed to the environment and
where it went will never be known. The reason is radioactive
iodine has a very short half-life, and there was no instrumentation
available to detect this. That data is lost. This is very important
with respect to what they were referring to on the thyroid gland
and the children in particular. Other isotopes, such as cesium, can

—
18
be and have been mapped fairly well. Some isotopes, such as strontium
and Plutonium, require soil samples. To really get a good map
and determine where all the hot spots are, you have to take a lot of
soil samples. These are very expensive. Then you'd have the data
to really know where the hot spots are. With some of the data
taken, you don't have the exact location of where the soil samples
came from, and there were problems on the measurements.
So there's a lot that still needs to be known when you get away
from the sarcophagus. But there is some pretty good information
on what the situation is in and near the sarcophagus, and from
now on I'll try and concentrate on that.
As I said, a small percentage of the fuel was vaporized and dispersed
over a very large area. Some of the fuel assemblies were
blown into the yard. Some of the fuel was on the roof. There are
video pictures which I believe you've seen that show people taking
the graphite fuel and throwing it off the roof down into the inside
of the building. There's a picture that I provided you showing one
of the workmen up on the roof shoveling up the graphite that was
laying there. The fuel elements that were out in the yard were basically
scooped up. Some of them were put in the sarcophagus. The
dirt and all the other stuff was taken to pits within 10 miles of the
sarcophagus and buried.
So you have those fission products that were put there and the
fuel which is sitting in a pit. This pit is not very far above the
water table. In fact, because of how close the water table is to the
surface of the ground, many of these burial pits may be below the
water table. When they finished the cleanup activity, a lot of the
equipment and vehicles and things that were used got very heavily
contaminated in the cleanup operation were also put in these
burial pits, and I would like to emphasize that this was done under
conditions where they really did not make sure that there was good
containment of this stuff. They were trying to clear the area so
they could work on the larger problem, and as such, they created
some significant residual problems.
At the time of the accident, there were about 420,000 pounds of
fuel in the reactor. There have been some fairly good measurements
made and some fairly good estimates made. It is now estimated
with pretty good confidence that between 12,600 and 16,800
pounds of this fuel was released from the volume which is now covered
by the sarcophagus. That's the fuel that was blown out in the
yard and that was the fine fragments that was distributed over the
area. That's the fuel that's been gathered and either returned to
the sarcophagus or buried into the burial pits.
There were 19,000 tons of material that was dropped onto the reactor
in the first month or month and a half after the accident.
This was done in an attempt to—successful attempt, I might add
prevent the fire from further dispersing and releasing radioactive
material and to do something to put some type of containment on
it. There was a tunnel over 400 feet long that was dug up under
there to allow them to put liquid nitrogen to try and bring the temperatures
down.
The combination of all these events—they basically buried the
core that was releasing the radioactivity under a big pile of dirt
and other stuff, which managed to slow but not halt the releases.

19
The temperatures, however, were so high that what happened was
the sand and other stuff Hke limestone, that was in the material
dropped on the reactor melted and formed a lava-like material.
This lava-like material contains the bulk of the fuel that remained
in what is now covered by the sarcophagus.
The RBMK reactor had a pressure relief system. In case a pressure
tube breaks, there would be a pressure pulse in the core, and
to prevent an overpressure situation, there were pipes that took
this overpressure into suppression pools under the reactor, where it
bubbled through water to attend to the pressure. The molten fuel
suspended in this lava-like mass ran through these pipes. The temperature
of the lava was less than the melting point of the pipes.
So it ran through these pipes and coated the bottom of the suppression
pools. It formed a big mass under the reactor.
There was a 6.6-foot thick concrete floor under the reactor core.
After the accident, in some places, measurements show that there
are eight to 20 inches of good concrete left, and the area above that
is remaining of the now solidified, molten core mass. The floor of
the suppression pools are coated with this lava-like substance. A lot
of it's still in the pipes. There are a couple of pictures I provided
you showing what looks like spaghetti coming out of one of the
valves, which is the molten material.
Now, this molten mass immediately after the accident was putting
out radiation dose rates on the order of 20,000 r/hour. The socalled
elephant's foot, which I provided you a picture of, is probably
down to about 2,000 r/hour now. There are certain hot spots
there which contain lots of fuel that are still on the order of 2,000
or 3,000 r/hour. There are other areas there where it's down quite
low, one r/hour or less. It depends on how much fuel dissolved in
that particular mass of lava.
Above the core on what used to be the operating floor of the reactor,
you have the fuel and graphite that was thrown in from the
roof, you have the fuel and graphite that was left laying on the
floor from the explosion, you have the fragments which settled
back in there. The vaporized fuel condensed and formed aerosols
and fine particulate matter which is in there.
Now, with that situation, after the accident they took actions to
prevent and to mitigate the releases of radionuclides. They very
rapidly designed the sarcophagus, which you've seen pictures of.
This was not what you would call a sophisticated design project
taking lots and lots of time. It was something that was worked out
really quick that could be done really quick. They scooped up the
dirt around there so they could get the radiation levels down so
that people could work. They made prefabricated frameworks near
the site which they moved into the site and pumped concrete into.
In the process of doing this, one of the things they did not do was
compact the dirt under the sarcophagus so that it could hold this
large mass of concrete and structure that they had put on top of it.
The work was done such that the normal quality control that
would be done to a massive concrete structure like that could not
be done, so you're not really assured that the concrete will be good,
strong concrete like you would find in a normal construction
project.

20
So the situation now is you have a very hastily built structure
which was built to respond to an emergency situation that covers a
region which contains lava either as a glassy mass, as a kind of friable
pumice, or as fine particulate dust, and that's what's in the
sarcophagus. The sarcophagus is not a confinement building. If you
stretch a point, it's a containment building, but it's got really big
holes in it.
Now, as a result of these measures, the release rates from the
sarcophagus area now are normally very, very low. But some of the
radionuclides inside the sarcophagus are in a form that can be released
from the sarcophagus under a number of conditions. It's not
hermetically sealed. I reiterate that. Examples of release mechanisms
are there was a big cover that went over the reactor which
weighs over 2,000 tons, which was thrown over and is sitting there
cocked on its side.
Nobody knows how well supported that cover is, is it going to fall
down. You just don't know. It might be wedged in there so solid
that there's no way you can get it to fall. It might be in there so
that it won't take too much to knock it over. If that big coyer
comes down, it's going to kick up a pretty big stack of dust, which
is going to make a significant release.
open so that birds, insects, animals come in
The sarcophagus is
and out, live in there, and this provides a mechanism for dispersing
material into the biosphere. Under some weather conditions, the
release rates go up just because of atmospheric conditions. This just
varies with the weather.
And as you mentioned in your opening remark, the sarcophagus
is crumbling. It's rusting away. The ground is settling unevenly.
The concrete is weak, and it's crumbling. I don't know whether it
will last five years or 10 years, but it's deteriorating, and as time
goes on, the holes get bigger and its ability to contain radionuclides
gets less.
The burial pits that I mentioned in the areas around there are
also a problem, because the material in these pits can diffuse into
the water table. If you look at the map, you can see where the
water goes. There are hot spots around the region. Some of them
are defined, but they're not all well defined. You don't have a nice
map that lets you know exactly what areas you should walk
around. These, I think, come from folk knowledge, and I'm not
quite sure how good the folk knowledge is.
The natural processes of decay have reduced the level of radiation
to about 15 to 20 percent of what it was originally. Another
way of putting it, though, is you had an awful lot released initially,
and 20 percent of an awful lot is still an awful lot. So there are still
problems.
The problem has not been resolved. It's being controlled. Risks
have been reduced by various actions that have been taken, but all
the actions that could be taken have not yet been taken. There are
a lot of uncertainties on just what the situation is.
Cleaning up the situation there can reduce future exposures and
further risk. You don't have to wait 100 years, or however long it
takes, for the radiation to decay from natural processes for the risk
to go away. Yes, it has gone down by about 80 percent due to natural
decay, but that goes down rapidly initially, and you're now

21
down on the kind of horizontal part of the core, not the near vertical
part. So further reductions by natural processes will be pretty
slow.
The dispersal into the biosphere will continue as migration and
so forth goes unless something is done. This has been given a very
careful look. The actions that need to be done have been identified.
There is a work breakdown structure. That will be discussed
later on. You all have been provided a copy of what are the actions
and what can be done. A lot of this, the vast bulk of it, will done
with Ukrainian resources. But there are some things that will require
resources from places other than the Ukraine. At the front
end of the process, to get things started, a need is the hard currency
that's required to get things going. The work—I'll stick to the
sarcophagus, but these comments apply to pretty much everywhere
else. The work must be done in kind of a logical sequence. First
things first.
For example, if you look at the work that has been done in the
sarcophagus to date, a lot of people went in there under controlled
conditions to get this information that we have. But when you go
to the next step of trying to get that mass of radioactive material
out and contained, people can't do that. A lot of that work is going
to have to be done by remote or robotic equipment. They don't
have that equipment. They don't have the technology to get that
situation under control where people can carry out the rest of the
job.
So what you've got to do is, first, you have to stabilize the situation
so that the dust and radioactive material isn't migrating and
the situation's better under control. Then you need to collect and
encapsulate, place under control, the material that's in the sarcophagus.
This might be something simple like chipping it up, putting
it in barrels, and putting it in a safe, secure condition. And
then third, you have to confine, decontaminate, and clean up the
remaining area. That might be done by more concrete chipping, or
it might be done by something simple like pumping concrete in.
There's a variety of actions that could be used.
At the end, there are a spectrum of options, and there are two
major ones, at each extreme, that I'll just give to scope the problem.
One option I'll call green fielding. When you finish, there's a
nice green field there with a fence around it, and that's what you
see. At the other extreme, you have a big structure over it, in
which a lot of the stuff is still there but is contained, and you now
have a permanent containment structure as opposed to the temporary
confinement structure.
There are other examples that could be used as to where the
U.S. technology can apply to this, and you all have been provided
that information. The identification of what needs to be done I
think has pretty well been identified. I think the technology is
available and we know what to do, and the quicker it's done, the
less the residual risks are. It's pretty much that simple.
Thank you very much.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Purvis.
Dr. Murray Feshbach, Research Professor of Demography,
Georgetown University.

22
STATEMENT OF DR. MURRAY FESHBACH, RESEARCH PROFESSOR
OF DEMOGRAPHY, DEPARTMENT OF DEMOGRAPHY, GEORGE-
TOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Feshbach. Thank you, Senator. Thank, of course, the committee
and the staff for inviting me to testify on this important
issue.
My viewpoint is that the situation is much worse than hitherto
deemed to be the case and that new evidence confirms this rising
problem.
First, I am not opposed to nuclear power per se. I am opposed to
the way the Soviets did, and the newly independent states continue
to operate their facilities. It is a very different ball game than, say,
in France or Belgium or Canada or the United States, though problems
there, of course, exist. It is also a question of whether the remaining
RBMK-t5T)e reactors, WERs, are potential accidents waiting
to happen. I believe they are, and I believe that we need to do
quite a bit. If nothing else, at least get them containment structures
to reduce it.
But it is not just Chernobyl-tjrpe reactors, civilian reactors, of
course. It is all the radiation emanating from the northern seas
where instead of 50 million curies, as released by Chernobyl, there
may be up to 3,500 million curies. Chelybinsk, with 1,200 million
curies, nuclear reactors all over the place, 600 radioactive sites in
Moscow City alone, two in Gorky Park—it is not very healthful to
the population, let alone to the potential hazard for those in Scandinavia,
let's say, who are very close to the northern seas area, but
also, I think, the United States, Canada, Japan, et cetera.
Now, in addition, the question is, how far spread is the impact of
Chernobyl? The original report, when finally it was released, told
us about five oblasts so-called, or roughly equivalent to our States:
two in the Ukraine, two in Byelorussia, and one in Russia. Well,
the first four hold, but instead of the one in Russia, the number is
15. That is the current figure where there is at least an average of
one curie of radioactivity of cesium-137 per square kilometer. So
the problem is much larger than just the terrible problem that we
knew it was before, and I will not read the list because it is in my
written testimony and go on beyond that.
In addition, we know that they have not yet measured what the
impact of Chernobyl has been in Siberia and the Far East. That is
beyond the Urals, if you wish. And that they are aware of, but they
are just beginning to measure it.
The other issue is about this renowned International Atomic
Energy Agency report, of which we heard a lot today. I believe it is
wrong for at least four reasons, some of which were addressed, not
because of the brilliant people—the physicists, epidemiologists,
medical people, whatever—they brought in, but for other reasons.
First, I think it was, of course, conducted much too early, and this
was also mentioned before by the other witness, by Dr. Mettler.
The latest data they could have had was for 1989 and more likely
for 1988, only several years after the accident. Much of the peak
experience we had from Hiroshima and Nagasaki is six, seven,
eight, nine years later when you get large numbers of leukemia
and thyroid cancer showing from low doses of radiation, let alone

23
those who got, shall we say, blasted immediately by the radiation
and their activities. And those data are begiiming to show up now,
and I will tell you about them in a few minutes.
Every Soviet analyst, epidemiologist, government advisor, or
green party member that I asked whether the IAEA people ask for
the data from the Third Administration of the Ministry of Health
in the USSR, not a single one told me that they did. Maybe they
did not know about it. Many Sovietologists do not know—whatever
we are called these days—that there is such a thing as the Third
Administration. We all know about the Fourth Administration.
The Fourth Administration is where the elite gets their medical
treatment and where there are good facilities if you survive the
surgery, because everybody is politically cleared, then the service is
very good. The question is surviving the surgery. But that is the
Fourth Administration. That is what the former Minister of Health
Chazov was in charge of.
The Third Administration, however, is where the secret data are
for all nuclear, biological, and chemical accidents, and my understanding
is that they have the data for 500,000 people. These are
the classified data and not the public data to which they were told
to lie about. There are instructions which I have cited in my book
and elsewhere which are the data what they are told they will not
classify as radiation-related.
Now, to say the least that they are very bad diagnosticians, that
they have a lack of equipment, I hae written about this many
times and it does not bear repeating. I absolutely agree with that
evaluation that we need to teach them proper epidemiology, proper
diagnostics, give them the proper equipment, et cetera, so they
really could know what is going on. But at the same time, there
are many people within the military or classified establishments
who do know, and that is certainly not Academician Il'in, who has
lied to a tremendous extent. There are many Soviets I know, or ex-
Soviets, Russians, whatever, who you mention his name and are
not very happy about it.
Then again, I think the sample was too small in putting only the
100,000 persons still resident in the region and not those who went
out to Estonia, Central Asia, the 5,000 liquidators who worked in
Latvia, the 12,000 in Uzbekistan. They were not incorporated, and I
think they deserve to have been included, even if it was difficult to
get hold of the data. That is what you were asked to do, and you do
it. I think that the testimony that was provided to them was omitted
from consideration. I know of an individual who showed them
materials for every single birth in Zhitomir, Skaya Oblast, one of
the areas that was very badly affected by the accident, and in
every single sub-unit within that oblast, what the different kinds of
congenital anomalies and the multipliers between 1985 and 1990 at
2.5 to seven times more. He tells me that these data were totally
ignored in the final writeup. Now, maybe that is true, maybe it is
not true, but it certainly is believed by all of the people that I
spoke to and a very wide range of people in the medical establishment
and the environmental establishment.
Now, because there is very short time, let me just run through
quickly the recent evidence, and it is very recent. This includes
only data published this year for what has happened over the past

24
couple of years, perhaps three years to four years after the IAEA
report could possibly have covered for the time they went and
when they were asked to do it. And again, it is not the individuals.
I think it was other kinds of limits.
In late March of 1992, the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission
on Chernobyl said that 37 Ukrainians and Byelorussians were diagnosed
with thyroid cancer in 1991 and 1992 up to that date. Before
this point in time, only one or two cases per year. In mid-April
1992 the Byelorussian Parliament said 1,700 cases of thyroid cancer
were recorded in the republic or country, with 35 children afflicted.
For 20 years up to 1986, only five adults and no children. So double
the number. Triple the number. It makes no difference. Even if
they were bad diagnosticians and you even halve the 1,700, it still
leaves an enormous gap between the numbers that could have been
the case then and which are reported now.
Since the beginning of this year—that is, up until June of this
year—an additional 299 persons were diagnosed with thyroid
cancer, including 52 children, in these first several months. That is,
again, additional to the 1,700 count. But how many were not officially
recorded? How many have not been properly diagnosed or
maybe perhaps overdiagnosed in the sense that something is exaggerated?
So again, as I said, discount the numbers even by 50 percent
in comparison to the period prior to 1986, it is just an enormous
difference.
The Byelorussian Congress on Chernobyl in April of this year,
the speaker indicated that almost 200,000 children in Byelorussia
have enlarged thyroids. Now, how many will progress into thyroid
cancer is
not known, but certainly some 5 or 10 percent. If that is
the number, another 10,000 to 20,000 additional cases. In Ukraine,
thyroid cancers increased by 17 times in the period of 1986 to 1991,
from a rate of .13 cases per 100,000 to its present level of 2.2 per
hundred thousand. The Ukrainian Minister for Cleanup of Chernobyl
has stated that this year he believes that there are 6,000 to
8,000 excess deaths in Ukraine from Chernobyl. Not 31, not 150,
250, or 5,000 over 70 years, but 6,000 to 8,000 currently. And this
does not include Byelorussia or Estonia, Russia, Latvia, and other
areas.
The Ukrainian Minister of Environment, Yuri Shcherbak, has
said that potential mortal doses of radiation have been suffered by
365,000 persons. Mr. Shcherbak is not a man who tends to exaggerate
per se. He is not only a physician, but he is also, as I said, the
Minister of Environment. And he said by this time, 7,000 persons
who participated in the emergency work have died, not 32, 150,
whatever.
Well, even if these figures are double or triple or whatever that
number is, it is many more than the numbers recorded previously,
and I think it is probably an understatement rather than an overstatement.
Of course there is radiophobia. Why shouldn't there
have been? I was in Belgium serving in the Office of the Secretary
General, Lord Carrington, as the Sovietologist-in-residence at the
time, and Belgium was affected by the plume as well, just as much
as many other areas were. I can well empathize with the fact that
people can be phobic about radiation, but, of course, the question
is, then, what is objective evidence, not just that?

25
Well, in the May 1992 issue of the Health Journal of Byelorussia,
they give data comparing three contaminated regions with five control
regions, those which were relatively clean, classified by
number of curies per square kilometer, and the numbers there are
many multiples higher—50 percent higher, or 25 percent higher, or
4 times higher, depending upon a whole long list of illnesses as diagnosed
there in comparison between the regions at the present
time. So I think we need to know much more, but again, I think
the problem is much more serious than has been measured hitherto.
Thank you. Senator.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Doctor.
As I indicated in my opening statement, this hearing is largely at
the suggestion of Senator Lieberman, who is with us.
Senator Lieberman, would you have a statement to make before
we proceed to questions?
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S.
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Senator Lieberman. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman, to thank
you for your interest in this subject. We were all startled, traumatized
when this tragedy occurred. There's a natural way in which
our attention moves on to what seemed to be more current contemporary
problems, and it's important that we not do that, we not
turn our backs on what happened at Chernobyl either from the
point of view of learning technologically, if I can put it that way,
what happened so that hopefully we can prevent it from happening
elsewhere, first and foremost, within the former Soviet Union, and
secondly, in trying to evaluate the tragic human consequences and
what we can do about them.
My own attention has been fixed by my friends in the Children
of Chernobyl group, which Dr. Matkiwsky leads, and I see Alex
Cozma from Connecticut, a friend and constituent who's here, and
it was really their coming to me that brought me back to this event
and its aftermath, and I, at the outset, wanted to thank you for responding
to that interest and for assembling this extraordinary
group of witnesses.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Senator.
This panel has been in fairly sharp disagreement with the methodology
and effectiveness of the International Chernobyl Project efforts
to assess the health effects. I wonder if, without debating the
specifics, we could talk about the methodology and what we have
learned from this process in terms of both further efforts to understand
the Chernobyl disaster and to be prepared in the event that
a similar situation necessitated an examination of its consequences.
Dr. Mettler, I wonder if you could give us your assessment of
what you think we've learned about the process of evaluating the
health impacts of a Chernobyl-t5rpe incident.
Dr. Mettler. Well, I think there are certainly a lot of lessons to
be learned. One of them is that one would like to begin the evaluation
at the time of the accident, and obviously, that evaluation
here wasn't begun until four and a half years later, at least by external
groups. Prior to that time, the Soviets themselves had diffi-

—
26
culty because much of the data was kept secret between one village
and the next, and even people who were generating data weren't
sure where it was going or what was happening to it. So I think a
lot of valuable information was lost.
There certainly is a residual major problem, particularly with
the thjn-oid, and that is that the thyroid damage will predominantly
be due to radioactive iodine, which has a very short half-life
about eight days—so that within several months after the accident,
it
was virtually impossible to make any measurements to discover
where the iodine had gone. The international group basically came
away and said, "Well, we know where the cesium is"—that s what
that map is — "but where the iodine went is another story." And
there were hundreds of thousands of measurements made of iodine
with completely different protocols, under completely different circumstances,
and the reliability of those is subject to significant
doubt.
So we don't know a lot because we weren't there early, and in
fact, the magnitude of this accident, I think, is an important problem,
and I think the distribution, as you can see from that map, is
a significant problem. The Soviets initially decided to evacuate the
30-lalometer zone, and if you get actually slightly more detailed
maps than the one that's up there, there are some places inside the
30-kilometer zone where there's very little radioactivity. So in fact,
one could be living, at least some spots, inside the 30-kilometer
zone and be getting less radiation than at some places 300 kilometers
from the accident.
Now, that, in the accident management scenario—and it's true
for the U.S. We have a 10-mile evacuation zone around our reactors.
Well, what this shows you is that if you have this type of accident,
it could go a long way and drop someplace where you're totally
unprepared, and in fact, you may end up evacuating people out
of a place that doesn't have much radioactivity and into a place
that does. And you're certainly subject to the vagaries of the
weather. We had that difficulty at TMI. I think at least on one day
at TMI, the wind changed on us 270 degrees. So evacuation is a
real problem.
Certainly the magnitude of this accident is a major problem, and
I don't think any country would have had the resources to deal
with this in what anybody would have liked to think of as an optimum
way. When one looks at distribution of potassium iodide to
block thyroid gland, less than 20 percent of the people in the contaminated
areas actually took any. But I'm not sure that we would
have had the resources to do it, either. We certainly don't have the
resources to handle measurements that quickly on that kind of a
geographical scale and in that kind of inhomogeneous fallout. So I
think it became quite clear that when you have this sort of a problem,
no country, including the U.S., can handle it alone, and an
international effort has to be done.
I think it's clear that the base line of health effects data before
the accident is extremely poor, and it wouldn't be too good in this
country, either. We don't go around doing hemoglobins on perfectly
normal children, or at least the ones that aren't complaining. And
if we went to a city or someplace in the United States and started
randomly doing blood testing, we'd find all sorts of things that

27
people just haven't complained about. So the base of data is an
issue.
I think it's extremely unfortunate that this reactor happens to
sit on the border of three republics. What we saw when we were
there was not sharing of data between republics. They all were
doing things with different methodologies, so that a study performed
in the Ukraine was being done with methodology that was
different in Byelorussia and different in Russia, so you couldn't
easily compare results. So there is a need for standardized ways of
doing things so you can at least get comparable results.
The fact that this thing is sitting on three administrative boundaries
is still causing trouble. I think you've heard a suggestion
today for a Ukrainian-American Medical Center. I can assure you
the Byelorussians would want one as well, and in fact, there are
more exposed people in Byelorussia probably.
I think we have to get away sort of from the nationalistic aspects
of it and deal with the accident itself. That is proving to be quite
difficult. I know that the current efforts by the United States are
hampered by having to try and form one agreement with people in
Minsk and a different agreement under different circumstances to
study the thyroid in Kiev and a different agreement with the Russians.
It is clear at this point, and I agree with the speaker and we
pointed this out ourselves, that acute effects in the population that
we looked at were not likely from the doses that we had expected.
Acute effects are clearly in these other populations. Studying them
is going to be a huge, major task and in fact probably an impossible
task, and that's one of the reasons in our recommendations that we
said let's find the people with the biggest doses and the ones at
most risk and study them. That goes against much of the philosophy
of this region where everybody should have everything equally,
and it's a difficult problem when you say, "I want to study this
group," and they say, "No, no, no, you have to study all 300,000
people," and you just don't have the resources or the expertise to
do that. So there's a problem between studying the people who got
the higher doses and this philosophy of everybody ought to have
the same thing, and I don't know how to solve that problem.
It is clear, as has been pointed out I think by everybody, that the
long-term effects are not generally specific to radiation. They will
be hard to sort out. When a child gets leukemia, is it a child who is
from a relatively clean area? Is it one who was from a contaminated
area? As you can see, when you get an inhomogeneous distribution
like that, when you start reporting data by oblast or state, you
get a mixture of some 75 percent of the people may not have received
much contamination and the other 25 percent might have,
and your data is all mixed up. You need to sort the data out by
contaminated areas versus noncontaminated as opposed to collecting
it by state, if you will.
I think there is a residual major problem at this point, and that
is coordination of what is to be done. I think there are a lot of
things that need to be done—education, equipment, general medical
problems. However, there are bilateral agreements which were
in place before the independence of these republics. There were bilateral
agreements between the Japanese government and the So-

28
viets, there were bilateral agreements between the Germans, the
French, the U.S., and other countries. What's happened now is that
nobody is sure where those bilateral agreements stand.
One of the people I know from the World Health Organization
was in one of these villages not so long ago, and there was a van
there studying people from Japan, there was a group from Germany
with a medical van, and there was a church group from England
with a van, and they were all set up on the town square
trying to entice people to bring their children to be studied. And, of
course, they were using totally different protocols. Nobody had the
faintest idea the other one was going to be there.
You know, this sort of disarray is a real problem, and the World
Health Organization has set itself up as a method for coordination.
Unfortunately they have decided to set up their headquarters in
Obinsk, which is outside of Moscow, and that doesn't sit well with
either Byelorussia or the Ukraine, and many of the foreign governments
are sajdng, "Well, we'll deal ourselves with the Ukraine as
opposed to through the WHO." So at this point, somebody needs to
make up their mind about how this is going to be coordinated so
the U.S. isn't doing one thing with the Ukraine, a slightly different
protocol in Byelorussia, and we find the Japanese have even a different
protocol and are doing something else.
So I think there are a lot of lessons to be gotten out of this, clearly,
and it's a problem that will go on for many years. Thank you.
Senator Graham. Do any of the other members of the panel wish
to comment on what lessons we have learned?
Dr. Matkiwsky. I'd like to make a few points.
First, I'd like to comment that Dr. Feshbach mentioned a name,
the name of Il'in. I happened to be in Kiev in February of 1990 at a
round-table discussion of about 100 people. There were scientists
from Russia, Ukraine, and other parts of the Soviet Union at that
time. He compared the Chernobyl accident to that of Three Mile
Island, which I thought it was rather unusual for him to compare
that. This same individual then gave testimonies and supplied information
to the Politburo at that time and also to the IAEA, and
I'm certain that that's who was the person that supplied most of
the information. So the lesson that I think that we all learned is
that the entire IAEA project was actually abused, unfortunately,
by the Soviets for their own purposes because of the misinformation
that they supplied. That s very unfortunate, because I think
had they not done it, we would have probably had different statistics
today.
The other point that I'd like to make is that I have statistics telling
us that the myloid leukemia is the leukemia beginning to surface,
and that is the type of leukemia that is caused by the radiation.
So up to 1990, it was almost at the same level of myloid leukemia
as it used to be before; however, now it is beginning to be on
the increase. I think that particular type should be looked at very
closely in the next 10 to 15 years.
I, 100 percent, support what Dr. Werteleckyj mentioned, and that
is the American-Ukrainian center to study the radiation and its aftereffects.
I'd also like to point out that our foundation has three
hospitals on, of course, a much smaller scale, but we are trying to
develop a medical environment which will be used by the foreign

29
—
physicians that come in. Because once we ask foreign physicians
from the United States or other parts of the world to come in and
to conduct a certain tj^je of studies or show certain techniques,
when they come to Ukraine hospitals, there's absolutely no facility
where they can feel comfortable to do certain procedures that are
done in, let's say, the United States. So we are trying to provide
them with that particular thing.
One more thing I want to add is that the article in Izvestiya,
Mrs. Yaroshin'ska's article, stated that approximately 17,000
people were hospitalized in May alone, just in May of 1986, with
acute radiation syndrome, and subsequently, in that particular
year there were over 50,000 people hospitalized for the entire year
of 1986. So those are the figures that were just recently released.
And I just want to make another point, that the physicians in
Ukraine were absolutely forbidden to give any information. I personally
was in Ukraine for approximately 14 times since January
1990, and I can tell you that I had a very difficult time getting any
type of information of the statistics and so forth. But since the
coup of 1991, that's when we started to get all kinds of information
from Moscow and from other parts of Ukraine as well, and I think
unfortunately that the IAEA was reporting that before the coup.
Had it been after the coup, I'm sure that their information would
be different.
Senator Graham. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. I don't want to dwell too much on the difference
in the response to what happened, because there's a baseline
agreement here that something terrible happened, and I presume
there's an agreement that we ought to focus on the high-risk populations
and try to improve the medical infrastructure.
But I do want to ask you, Dr. Mettler, if you can respond, because
there's such a dramatically different reaction to the IAEA
report, and basically we're being told that the report is a serious
understatement of the problem and is seriously flawed. No reflection
on you personally, as people have said. I think the main culprit
that we're being pointed to is the former Soviets, who did not
share data with you accurately. I suppose I should comment parenthetically
that it's ironic how the heavy hand of the state, even
after the state has theoretically expired, goes on in terms of what
we came to understand as classic Soviet coverup. But how do you
respond to these charges about the inaccuracy of your report?
Dr. Mettler. Well, I think, of course, we were concerned about
let me just say that there are two classes of effects that one can
study. Those are the things, let's just say, which are very common.
There were claims in the press that 30 percent of the children had
anemia, that goiter had gone from 30 percent to 70 percent, and a
think you could appreciate that
number of claims like that. Now, I
if you had something in a population that existed 30 percent and
radiation took it to 70 percent, statistically you could tell that quite
quickly if you looked at 100 people. If you examined it and suddenly
found 70 out of 100 with this, you would say, okay, that's clear
that has happened.
So that in examining the thousand-plus people that we did very
carefully and choosing them very carefully, we are able to exclude
with 99 percent statistical certainty many things. Like, did goiter
57-583 - 92 - 2

30
increase? The answer is not significantly. Did anemia increase?
The answer is no. Are the children all stunted? The answer is no.
So that the study is very clear, and I don't think you've ever heard
anybody talk about those issues.
'The issues that remain are the ones which in fact are quite rare
conditions. Obviously if something occurred, say, one in 10,000 in
the population and I looked at 10,000 people, by chance I might not
see any of those cases, or I might see two of them. And if you're
looking for something in the range of one in 10,000 occurrence, you
now need to study maybe 100,000 or a million people to see whether
there's really an increase and be sure of it. To do that, to look
for leukemia, to look for thyroid cancers, especially at these dose
levels, is a study that's going to take 30 years and is going to in-
So that
volve thousands and thousands and thousands of people.
the IAEA study never went there to look itself at how many cases
of thjrroid cancer are there.
The one thing we could do is to look at the existing Soviet data
and go from Moscow to the different institutes and see if we were
getting the same numbers and go to the institutes that they were
deriving them from, and in fact, the numbers that we got from the
Ministry of Health in Moscow, we were able to track that data, for
example, back to Minsk, where it was put together, and back to the
original people who put it together. So that if there was a coverup
at least in the cancer statistics data and in the other health data, it
was one that began at the grassroots level in many of the republics
and went all the way up.
Now, the other thing that was clear to us was that the data we
saw was abysmal. I can take the data out and show you—just pick
any chart you want, meningitis, cancer statistics, anything—^and if
you look at a given village, you'll see that in one year they may be
reporting, let's say, 50 cases of something, the next year it's two,
the next year it's 70, the next year it's one, the next year it's 80,
and you say, "Wait a minute. Meningitis doesn't know that the
year changed. What is going on here?" It's clear that doctors were
coming out from, say, Minsk, visiting that town, making a huge
number of diagnoses, and then not coming back for two years.
So the data is awful, and what we came away saying was the
data is bad. First of all, we were able to track the numbers. Second
of all, if we were going to cover up and manufacture data, we certainly
would have manufactured better data than what we were
shown. And we came away saying that we don't know if there's an
increase, that the data is jumping all over the place, and that we
can't do much with that. We can't exclude an increase, and it
doesn't prove it's there.
Senator Lieberman. Is there any effort now to try to—I'm thinking
about a couple of the statements that Dr. Feshbach made—to
update the IAEA study with fresher data?
Dr. Mettler. There is no comparable study on the books anywhere
that I know of at this point, and in fact, I think there are
some pieces beginning to be put in place. For example, I think
there
have been people from the Ukraine and from Byelorussia
who have gone now to the International Research Center for
Cancer in Lyon, France, to learn how the rest of the world puts

31
tumor registries together. There are people coming to the United
States. This is a process that is going to go on for a long time.
Our project, as I say, looked at anemia. I don't think there's any
reason to go back and look at anemia again. That's clear. One
needs to focus now down on the issues of leukemia and thyroid
cancer and spend the money on issues that in fact make sense
where we were not able to deal with issues. One of the things he
pointed out was cytogenetics. We found some semi-unusual things
both in clean and controlled villages, and we said, "Look, this is
unusual, and it needs further study." So I think one needs to
progress and not go back and repeat everjrthing we did.
Senator Lieberman. But although there is some disagreement between
you and most of the rest of the panel on the report, I take it
that you would agree that there ought to be continuing monitoring
of the high-risk groups and efforts to improve the medical infrastructure?
Dr. Mettler. Sure. This was in our recommendations. Absolutely,
yes. And particularly with regard to leukemia and thyroid,
which is in fact now what most people are focusing on, and I think
that's reasonable.
Senator Lieberman. Dr. Matkiwsky, Dr. Werteleckyj and you
mentioned a series of steps—I could call them humanitarian medical—that
we might take. What's your counsel to Senator Graham
and me about what we as two concerned U.S. Senators should put
as their priorities here? Acknowledging obviously the limited resources,
but nonetheless, the severity of the problem calls for some
reaction.
Dr. Matkiwsky. I would like to just speak to the more medical
problems rather than scientific problems or concerns. Primarily we
are interested in obviously the immediate help in situations, such
desperate need for antibiotics and medications in general, but also
to preserve the very young children, especially in the cardiac defects,
which appears to be much larger than it was before, and you
have 8,000 or 9,000 small infants dying every year from cardiac defects
whereas in the United States or other western world you can
save 90 percent of these by surgery. The Ukraine does not have
such facility to take care of that, especially now when you have a
negative birth and death ratio.
Another area is in neonatology/ paranatology, where a lot of children
also die in those areas, and they have absolutely no facility
whatsoever to preserve those infants immediately after birth and
to save them.
These centers we are trying to develop from a foundation point
of view, and we would like to obtain some help from the United
States and other Russian countries to develop these centers to preserve
those infants and children in general, and also develop a
good, sound di£ignostic hospital within these facilities that we are
talking about so that you have an adequate type of procedure to do
studies and diagnostic procedures.
Dr. Mettler. Can I make one point here? That is that I don't
think anybody disagrees that the quality of medicine is a real problem
in many areas, but let's just take this cardiac defect issue. You
take children and you start looking at children, you're going to see
defects that are sort of subclinical. There is no study in the scientif-

32
literature anywhere in the world that I'm aware of that shows
ic
an increase in cardiac defects as a result of radiation exposure.
There's no study published anywhere that shows that. So I think
that one of the issues—I mean, are we dealing with the medical
problems in the Ukraine, which are substantial, to my mind reallv
staggering, or are we dealing with a radiation effect? And I don t
want you to mix up the two here.
Dr. Werteleckyj. I have to clarify this, because I don't think the
point is well taken, because there are no such studies since you
cannot subject individuals to radiation and because there are no
published reports about heart defect issues. It does not mean that
Chernobyl is absolved as a possible cause of such defects. There's a
difference between no data and no effect.
Now, we cannot afford not to study Chernobyl, whether as members
of the human race or as citizens of the United States. We have
a poor understanding of carcinogenesis, cancer, and the effects of
radiation. We are limited severely only to one study population of
Nagasaki-Hiroshima, which is aging, otherwise we are to study experimental
models.
I think that Chernobyl is going to teach us fundamental scientific
facts that are going to benefit us and the rest of humanity. I
think that investigators with the use of biomarkers and moleculor
biotechnology are going to be able to unravel the differences of inherited
and radiation induced cancers cancers. I think that Chernobyl
is a unique opportunity, but we should not persue science without
a parallel humanistic dimension.
Senator Lieberman. Amen. I know we have to move on to the
second panel.
Mr. Purvis, you're an engineer. I'm going to see if I can ask you
to give me two numbers to questions. If I'm pushing you too hard,
you have a right to remain silent.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. The first one is you've expressed some concern
about the stability of the sarcophagus that's been erected at
Chernobyl. I don't know if you can do it numerically, but what is
the likelihood that there may be a collapse there in the next 10
years?
Mr. Purvis. As I understand it, the study that was done over
there by the people who built it kind of attributed something like
five years. It wouldn't be safe to wait for more than five years.
Senator Lieberman. So in a sense they would warrant it for five
years, but for no more?
Mr. Purvis. It's kind of like you have a bad problem in your
back yard and you go out one weekend and do something about it,
and then you're going to do something permanent.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, you know it's not forever.
Mr. Purvis. And the temporary solution, as I understand the
report, you might have five years.
Senator Graham. And the temporary solution was applied when?
Mr. Purvis. The temporary solution was in 1986, when the sarcophagus
was built.
Senator Graham. So it's been
Mr. Purvis. That's from, I guess—the study, I think, was in late
1990 or 1991. So you've got like until 1995. But the thing is, it's not

33
like on the 1st of January 1995 the thing will disappear. What you
have is it's kind of settling, it's crumbling, there are lots of holes in
it, the holes are getting bigger, it's rusting. It's just going downhill.
It's not good now, and it's just getting worse. This study basically
says they figure after about five years it will cross over the border.
Senator Lieberman. And a collapse will run the risk of unleashing
radioactive material again?
Mr. Purvis. There are a number of things right now that have a
risk of releasing it, and something like the top of the building falling
in would definitely exacerbate the situation, yes, sir.
Dr. Feshbach. A footnote, Senator, and that is I understand
there has just been a contract let with some French construction
company to build a containment structure just in the very recent
past. So I don't know what their work schedule is, whether it will
take five years, three years, et cetera, but that's my understanding
anyway.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, one last question for Mr. Purvis, another hard
one.
What are the odds that one of the other Chernobyl-type reactors
that exist throughout the former Soviet Union will go in the next
five years?
Mr. Purvis. Well, I'll tell you a short story which just shows you
about the dangers of prognostication. Back in April I was asked
that question, and I said, "Well, the most likely accident to happen
on an RBMK is a pressure tube failure. Those happen fairly frequently.
The oldest plant and the one that seems to have the most
problems is the near St. Petersburg. So if you ask me what's the
most likely accident, it would be a pressure tube failure. If you ask
me where, I would say at the plant near St. Petersburg." And five
minutes later they had the pressure tube failure at Leningrad and
the vent system plugged up, and that was the release this spring.
Senator Lieberman. What's your prediction today?
Mr. Purvis. You can talk in fact of the situation that there are a
number of problems with those reactors. You can expect more pressure
tubes to fail as well as other systems. I think you can expect
to have a situation where the vent system stops up and a release of
radiation results. There are a number of changes which have been
identified which should be done and which would reduce the risk,
in particular the possibility of the type of excursion that happened
here. I simply do not know if all of those changes have been made
on all of the reactors. I do know they've been made on some of
them. That doesn't say that you won't have other accidents, like
multiple pressure tube failures, which could in fact lead to significant
releases.
The big problem, sir, is the quality of those reactors is bad.
They've got some real quality problems as well as design problems.
When you're dealing with something that's got quality problems,
you're not quite sure what's going to fail or when.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, and when we chronicle, as people are
already doing, the characteristics of the corruption of a system of
government and of the people's lives under Soviet power, this is
one that's going to stand out. Clearly, there are so many ways in
which people were coerced and controlled, but the decline in stand-

34
ards that led to a decline in the quality of life that led ultimately,
in this case, to a tragedy which killed people and continues to
threaten their lives is really a startling story. Anyway, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has
been an extremely constructive discussion and set of very helpful
recommendations.
Our second panel will be Dr. Shelby Brewer, Chairman of ABB
Nuclear Power; Mr. Gary Dunbar, Executive Vice President of Los
Alamos Technical Associates in West Newbury, Massachusetts; and
Mr. Thomas Garrity, General Manager of the Power Systems Engineering
Department at G.E. Industrial and Power Systems, Schenectady,
New York.
First, Dr. Shelby Brewer.
Dr. Brewer. ,
STATEMENT OF DR. SHELBY T. BREWER, CHAIRMAN, ABB
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR POWER
Dr. Brewer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a written statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, and I
will proceed for about five minutes or less with an overview summary.
Your invitation letter focused on Chernobyl and the Ukraine.
I've taken the liberty of extending that subject somewhat to all of
the Russian-origin reactors in eastern Europe and in the new Commonwealth,
the former Soviet Union.
The Chernobyl accident has been very abundantly analyzed in
terms of the dynamics of the accident, how the neutronics occurred,
the design imperfections of the reactor, and the operating
causes of the accident, and most experts agree that the accident resulted
from an inherently very poor design combined with very
poor and slack station operating procedures. There was no discipline
in following procedures at the station. That combined with a
very defective and illogical design were the root causes of the accident.
Most experts also agree that these design defects are so fundamental
in nature that there is no way to retrofit them away. There
is no set of equipment modifications or redesign that can be done
on these reactors to bring them up to western standards. We're
talking here about the fundamental configuration of fuel and coolant,
the choice of materials, the way the dynamics of the system
work. As a previous witness said, the stability issue, it has a positive
void coefficient, which means as the core heats up, the power
increases rather than decreases, as it does in American-designed
reactors and other western-designed reactors.
Senator Graham. Excuse me, Mr. Brewer, if I could interrupt.
How many reactors are there currently in the former Soviet Union
or elsewhere that would have the characteristics that you've just
described?
Dr. Brewer. There are 11 RBMKs in the CIS. I
have a table in
my written testimony that shows the distribution of all reactor
types. There are 16 total, and there are 11 in Russia, three in the

35
Ukraine, and two in Lithuania. That's the RBMK, the Chernobyltype
reactor.
So improving operating procedures, improving training, et
cetera, improving station management, it is commonly felt by experts,
will have little or no effect in terms of raising RBMKs to
international and western standards, because you still have not
licked these basic design-related safety problems.
For these reasons, most experts both in and out of the Soviet
Union are practically unanimous in calling for the shutdown of
RBMKs as soon as possible. I
use the words "as soon as possible"
because the RBMKs, with the statistics I've just cited to you, Mr.
Chairman, do provide a fairly large fraction of the electrical
demand in the CIS, particularly in Russia. But consider Lithuania.
The two RBMKs in Ignalina, in Lithuania, supply about half of
that country's electrical power, and Lithuania has no economy for
substitution of generating equipment, shutting those reactors down
and bringing other types of technology in. It has no indigenous fuel
resources, so it's got a very tough problem in terms of the management
of those two Chernobyl-type reactors. That's a reality one has
to deal with.
Looking again at the total, one would say, "Well, let's shut them
all down, and let's shut them all down now." We have to look at
what is practical. Can you do that without impacting the electrical
production and, therefore, the economy? Well, it turns out that
electrical demand is decreasing in the former Soviet Union because
industrial activity is down. How far will it decrease? Can you shut
the RBMKs down and slide under the demand curve? I don't know,
and they don't know.
There are other alternatives that should be enumerated and intensively
reviewed by those republics.
Efficiency improvements in
the grid. Grid losses in that region run about 10 percent. That's the
line losses, power lost in transmitting power from the generating
station to its end use. Another alternative is repowering these
RBMKs with fossil-fueled sources, as was done in Midland and
Zimmer in this country. Wheeling power around the grid from
places where you have excess capacity to where you have a shortfall,
and a fourth possibility, longer-term, of course, is completing
the latter day 1000 MWe WER-type reactors, the pressurized
water-type reactors that are approaching western standards. But
the issue must be approached as a systems problem, an economic
problem, supply/demand, look at alternatives for meeting demand,
end-use efficiencies. And finally, how do these remediations get
paid for? We must bring to this region, to the Commonwealth of
Independent States and eastern Europe, means of entering the
world economy to generate value to generate hard currency to pay
for the reactor improvements that we, not they, insist on.
I'd like to turn now very briefly to the non-RBMK-type reactors,
the pressurized water reactors, and there are several genre of pressurized
water reactors. They are called VVER. They are similar in
concept, but not detail, to the reactors that my company constructs,
Westinghouse, and Frammatome. There are three classes of
WERs. Let's simply call them generation one, generation two,
generation three. The IAEA, the USNRC, the U.S. Department of
Energy, and the World Organization of Reactor Operators, a pleth-

inherently unsafe and should be shut down, as I said, as soon as
possible. That is a general conclusion. The second general conclusion
is that the relative safety of this evolution of pressurized
water reactors, as you would expect, the earlier ones are worse in
terms of safety attributes, and the newer 1,000-megawatt models
are relatively safer than the earlier ones. The third general conclusion
is that all of the reactors, including the 1,000-megawatt
WERs, the latter, most modern design, fail to come up to western
standards.
Another safety concern is that following the breakup of the
Soviet Union, there is a prospective breakup of the nuclear infrastructure
within eastern Europe. By that I mean in older days,
before the breakup, the infrastructure was concentrated in Russia.
That's where the designers were, that's where the engineers were,
that's where the basic research institutions were, that is where the
fuel for all of the reactors was manufactured and where most of
the major components were manufactured. The safety concern is
that now these assets are being decentralized. As Dr. Mettler on
the previous panel said with regard to iodine measurements, every-
is doing things in a different way now. Well, in nuclear
power, we feel that there is a great safety incentive for standardizing,
for doing things in a uniform, standardized way.
Another safety concern is purely economic. The economic chaos
! in that region as the region moves from a military industrial comcentrally
planned and controlled economy, to market-driven
\economics, there is huge economic turbulence, and this is being felt
in such things as the poverty of operators in nuclear power plants.
And this is a safety issue.
So where does this all take us? First of all, safety solutions
cannot be imposed. They have to be accepted by the recipient nations.
We have to recognize energy supply/demand detail of each of
the independent countries. Safety solutions cannot be imposed in
isolation. There are alternatives, non-nuclear alternatives that
must be factored in, such as conservation and increasing the efficiency
of the grid and increasing end-use efficiencies.
i
body
I
I
!
plex,
ora of nuclear institutions,
36
international and national nuclear institutions,
have studied the WERs very intensively technically,
and these assessments are now forming the basis of the recommendations
being made to G-7 and the G-24 committees for sponsoring
assistance to that region and upgrading their nuclear infrastructure.
In general, and I will just draw you a cartoon on the general conclusions
of these multitude of studies, first of all, the RBMKs are
A third conclusion I would reach is that we should encourage
that region to do things regionally.
For example, they don't need
nuclear fuel manufacturing in each of the republics. It's not economic,
and there are not enough engineering and expertise resources
to do it that way.
A fourth recommendation I would have is that before we commit
to billions and billions of dollars in reactor remediation, and I've
heard estimates from $1 billion to $40 billion, a little bit more precision
is required. That's a huge amount of money and a huge
range of money to be throwing at a problem. I think immediate actions
should be concentrating on operational safety. By that I mean

37
the training of the operators, establishment of operating procedures,
etc.—the types of things we learned at TMI and applied
after TMI.
Fifth, I think another component of the solution that we must
rivet our attention on is how their economy can support these remediations.
We must bring them not grants or aid money, but
ways of generating the economy themselves, integrating them into
the world economy with finished products as well as raw materials
so that they can enter the 21st century with us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much. Dr. Brewer.
Mr. Gary Dunbar, Executive Vice President, Los Alamos Technical
Associates.
STATEMENT OF GARY A. DUNBAR, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
LOS ALAMOS TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES, WEST NEWBURY, MAS-
SACHUSETTS
Mr. Dunbar. Thank you. Senator, for having me as your guest
today.
Today I'd like to ask this subcommittee for active support in
three important areas. Number one is the elimination of restrictions
regarding the use of appropriated funds for activities involving
the export of American know-how and technology for use in nuclear
waste management, environmental remediation associated
with radioactive releases, and in the safety and operating improvements
for Ukrainian nuclear powerplants or other powerplants of
the former Soviet Union. Those restrictions, an example of which is
Public Law 101-513, section 510, restricting the export of nuclear
technology, are major stumbling blocks to programs that we're currently
talking about.
Number two is support for pending legislation for the Freedom
Act. Specifically, we seek support for provisions of that act relative
to Chernobyl that will facilitate environmental improvement activities,
improvements to the safety of Ukrainian nuclear powerplants,
and training of Ukrainians in areas which will aid the development
of a market economy.
Number three, we seek encouragement and support for existing
programs and institutions in the United States, such as the U.S.
Trade and Development Program, Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, the Export/Import Bank, and others that can be involved
in the support of a Chernobyl comprehensive environmental
remediation project.
Last September, right after the coup, I arrived in Kiev at the invitation
of the Ukrainian government to talk to them about Chernobyl.
The first thing I asked them was if I could see the master
plan, and they looked at me with quizzical looks on their faces.
There is no master plan. The testimony that we heard earlier
today graphically illustrates that there is no master plan. There is
a great deal of confusion. It's very unclear who is studying what.
It's very unclear what is going on in Ukraine on the Chernobyl
project.
Last week, on July 16th, our company completed negotiations
with the Ministry of Chernobyl for a comprehensive Chernobyl en-

38
vironmental remediation project. This ministry of the government
is responsible for the direction and coordination of all activities in
Ukraine that relate to the Chernobyl accident. The Ministry of
Chernobyl works with sister agencies, such as the Ministry of Environment,
the Institute of Nuclear Safety, the Ministry for Energy,
UkrAtom, and the Ukraine Academy of Sciences, but it is the central
hub of the spokes on this wheel. The Ministry of Chernobyl coordinates
the activities of the other agencies.
LATA completed negotiations, and that documentation is now
before Vice Prime Minister Masik, before the Ministry of Justice,
and before the Ministry for Foreign Economic Affairs for review.
This particular program is a little bit different than the others
that you've heard about. Earlier testimony today talked about
emergency measures that were taken immediately after the accident.
Those measures included construction of the sarcophagus, the
800 burial sites for radioactive contaminated materials, and removal
of populations from villages, evacuation, and things of that type.
The second phase of activity that you've heard about is studies.
There is a great deal of international study going on, and anybody
who's been to Chernobyl runs into vans from all nations.
The program that we have worked out with the Ukrainian government,
however, is a remediation program. It's a program not designed
to study, not designed to take emergency measures, but designed
to permanently resolve the issue. This program has been
filed with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and
has been filed with the Commission of European Communities in
Brussels, and we have meetings scheduled with these organizations
to review in detail their comments on this project.
Currently, LATA is scheduled to sign a contract with the
Ukraine Government on the 5th of August that will launch this remediation
program. We envision that early phases of the program
would be supported by seed money from grant funds. The grant
funds will be sought in the United States, from international agencies,
and in Europe. Eventually, as a market economy evolves, the
program calls for support by the sovereign debt capacity of
Ukraine and operating funds of Ukraine, but that cannot happen
immediately. There are many steps to go through to build up the
financial structure to support this project.
The contract that we will sign next week covers the first 10 years
of remediation activity. We have had discussions envisioning a 30-
year program to completely eliminate the consequences of the accident
at Chernobyl.
The program is "comprehensive." It's a word they selected in the
very first letter of invitation that they sent to us. There were four
reactors operating at the time of the accident, with two more under
construction. One blew up, three continued to operate until a fire
last October, when number two went down, and now the other two
have been turned off. The program covers the accident site as well
as the three remaining reactors at the Chernobyl site. Although
the three remaining reactors are not operating, they do have to be
decommissioned and demolished.
In regard to reactor site number four, which is the reactor that
blew up, the program covers the migration of contamination. This
map will give you a superficial understanding of this very complex

39
issue. The directions that the wind blew the material are exactly
the opposite of where water is taking the contaminated material.
The water flow through ground water and surface water will
gradually move the contaminated material down through the
Dnieper River, to the Black Sea, to the Mediterranean.
The remediation program covers agricultural and food supply,
contaminated water, contaminated soils, nuclear waste management,
and health effects. It's a management program designed to
pull these various activities together and to coordinate them
toward the single goal of dose reduction to the population.
The program will utilize services of at least nine American companies,
30 colleges and universities, Sandia National Laboratories,
as well as several other United States national laboratories. It will
also facilitate the establishment of private Ukrainian companies
that will implement major portions of this work. It will set up a
basis for Ukrainian companies to compete for contracts and execute
work. It will also set up international competitions for specific
projects. The program is envisioned to create jobs in export markets
for Americans as well.
The Chernobyl accident, with its physical, environmental, health,
and psychological aspects, is the single most significant obstacle to
Ukraine emerging into the world economy and fully realizing its
potential as a nation. If you travel around Ukraine, you can't help
but be struck by the inherent wealth of the nation. It is a nation of
great resources, a very strong people, a very well educated people.
Perhaps the most baffling achievement of the 70 years of the previous
government's rule is how you could run any nation with that
potential and end up broke. You really had to be creative to squander
the resources. If Ukraine can get on its feet, it should end up
being a wealthy nation and it should have the capacity to address
its own problems.
Senator Graham. I'm afraid if we look around the world, we
could find a lot of examples of countries that are in the process of
squandering their resources.
Mr. Dunbar. Well, the agricultural resources alone here are
mind-boggling, and how you can have the potential to consistently
produce one ton of wheat per person and be an exporter of food
and still end up busted is remarkable. Anyway, we are not here to
debate that.
The accident has dramatically reduced the supply of electrical
energy. It reduced the production and supply of healthy food. And
as we've heard from others, and I have witnessed personally, it's
had a phenomenal impact on the attitude and morale of Ukrainians.
We as Americans can help Ukraine. We can help them help
themselves. Within the Ukrainian effort, the current effort that
they are going through, to face their problems and to resolve them,
they will inevitably look to other nations and adopt a model for nuclear
materials management and nuclear regulation. That process
is evolving now. It is not a highly structured one, but it nevertheless
is evolving. Any approach that they undertake to resolve their
nuclear issues will address Chernobyl first. It will be the foundation
and the building block from which everything else evolves.
The nation that Ukraine eventually adopts as a model for nuclear
management will also end up as a major supplier of technical

40
know-how, technology, and assistance. Those things will go hand in
hand. Many countries might serve as that model. Indeed, the
United States could be that model. If we end up being that model,
we end up also being a major exporter of environmental and nuclear
technology and know-how to Ukraine. It goes hand in hand.
Our program for Chernobyl, we believe, is a first important step
along that path. As Americans, we offer Chernobyl unique advantages
that are absolutely unmatched by any other country. We
have a half-century investment in nuclear science and engineering
that has produced an asset that is unsurpassed. We have programs
in environmental management and remediation that have led the
family of nations over the past three decades and have created
within the United States another technical and knowledge asset.
Our skills in program management and project management generically
are about the same as they are in any other nation, but
in the areas of nuclear and environmental concerns, they stand
head and shoulders above. Finally, the way the world economy has
turned recently, we Americans end up now being the low-cost provider.
Engineers and scientists from Germany, France, and Britain
all cost more than the American engineers and scientists.
As businessmen, we see ourselves with an advantage in the competitive
world. We have a situation where there is a great deal to
be gained. As Americans, we have an advantage to take an action
now that is morally correct in Ukraine. We have an advantage to
provide humanitarian assistance. We have an advantage to help
Ukraine move into a market economy. We have an advantage to
build a long-term relationship with a nation that should be a
strong nation and a good citizen of the world, and a relationship
that would be advantageous to our country. And we have an advantage
to help ourselves as we help others. I hope we take advantage
of our opportunity.
Thank you.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Dunbar.
Mr. Garrity.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. GARRITY, GENERAL MANAGER,
POWER SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT, G.E. INDUSTRI-
AL AND POWER SYSTEMS, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK
Mr. Garrity. Thank you. Senator.
I'd like to open by extending my thanks to the subcommittee for
its work in assembling this panel of experts to discuss the possible
solutions to the Chernobyl accident. I'd also like to express on
behalf of the General Electric Company our gratitude for the opportunity
to offer our expertise and technical insights.
As we've heard this morning, Chernobyl was the world's single
greatest nuclear reactor accident. The exact toll in human and environmental
damage may not be known for many years. Based on
what we read and analyze, it is apparent that the reactors of the
Chernobyl type were designed and constructed far below even the
earliest western technology standards. This is a critical issue, because
£is many as 16 reactors of the same design are still operating
in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

41
Further, there is no easy way of upgrading the safety systems of
these plants. Lacking the necessary technical knowledge of these
specific plants, such an endeavor by the General Electric Company
would be very impractical. What we do recommend, though, is an
in-depth review of alternative forms of energy that could eventually
replace these nuclear plants in the Commonwealth of Independent
States.
This is not the first time that we have offered our assistance to
deal with possible solutions to alternative sources of energy production
following the Chernobyl accident. We entered into very active
discussions on this topic in both 1989 and 1990. We discovered,
however, that there was no commercial basis available to fund any
support we might have been able to provide. We do see two encouraging
signs in the CIS that make such a venture more plausible of
recent.
The first is a trend toward more stability in the region's governmental
structures that may make it easier to pursue future arrangements
for assistance. The second is renewed focus on the
Chernobyl crisis on the part of the industrialized nations. It's encouraging,
for example, that although the leaders of the G-7 nations
did not grant the $700 million emergency fund requested at
the recent Munich Summit, they did approve a fund of $100 million
to carry out the appropriate emergency measures. We hope that
this type of attention to the problem continues toward what is
clearly an environment and health disaster waiting to happen.
It is our position that proven western technology possessed by
G.E. and others already exists that can provide large blocks of electric
power in a clean, efficient, cost effective, and environmentally
compatible manner and prevent most of any type of future disaster.
Today I'd like to give you a brief look at these technologies and
discuss why they are best suited to meeting the current needs of
the CIS. Before doing that, however, I'd like to take a moment to
convey what we perceive as our role and, perhaps more importantly,
your role in helping provide safe and economical power to the
Commonwealth of Independent States.
Two obstacles have existed in dealing with the Commonwealth of
States to serve this critical need for power. The first is political,
and the second is technological. The political instability in the
Commonwealth recently coupled with the inability to meet commercial
terms has made it virtually impossible for G.E. or any
other company, for that matter, to successfully enter into any
agreements on their own for supplying power equipment to the
CIS. What's needed is your assistance in contacting the appropriate
parties, making the appropriate diplomatic arrangements, and facilitating
the needed political mandates that will allow G.E. or any
other power equipment supplier to do business in the Commonwealth.
The technological side of the problem is our responsibility, and
we're more than up to that task. We have technology available
that will capably and completely support any energy option
deemed necessary, and we're prepared to offer recommendations on
what options best match the needs of the Commonwealth. We
would be more than willing to combine our technological expertise
with governmental support to form a type of super joint venture

42
that would greatly benefit the Commonwealth, as well £is U.S. industry
and trade.
The need is urgent. An ideal window of opportunity for providing
power equipment to the Commonwealth is now open and may not
come again for quite some time. Overall power consumption is
down some 30 percent due to the shutdown of many military facilities
in the region and reduced industrial output. This is a prime
opportunity to move the Commonwealth away from the substandard
technology that they now rely upon for their energy to cleaner,
safer, and more cost effective forms of power, I urge you to not let
this opportunity slip away.
Looking at the technologies available, they range from potential
long-term remedies, such as safe nuclear power, to short-term
faster fixes, such as fossil fuel plants and advance combined-cycle
applications fueled by natural g£is. In the area of nuclear energy,
new advanced technologies are being developed that will
provide
environmentally compatible, more economical nuclear power with
greater levels of safety. At GE, for instance, we are working on two
advanced light-water reactor designs sharing a common technology
base. These new technologies incorporate the best proven features
from 35 years of boiling water reactor designs and employ newly
developed controls and instrumentation, fuel and turbine technology,
and advanced simplified accident mitigation techniques for
maximum safety.
However, G.E. does not regard western-type nuclear power plants
as a near-term solution to the former Soviet Union's power needs;
rather, at most, one of several potential solutions. Fortunately,
other globally accepted sources of power generation are available
to meet the region's needs. For example, G.E. offers the latest
steam turbine technology using ultra super-critical steam conditions
with operating temperatures up to 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit
as well as having the largest installed base in the world.
While steam turbine technology offers many advantages, the best
solution for the Commonwealth in the short term is the advanced
combined-cycle application. Current combined-cycle plants are an
extremely efficient energy option, operating at thermal efficiencies
approaching 55 percent, and we believe 60 percent is obtainable
within this decade. Overall advanced combined-cycle technology
would be able to address the energy needs of the Commonwealth in
a very quick and economical manner. We strongly recommend this
course of action in the near future as the best way to take advantage
of the window of opportunity I spoke of earlier.
Looking at what we view as the bottom line in the Chernobyl situation,
the need is great and the time is now to move toward assisting
the Commonwealth with their clearly precarious energy situation.
What we and other industries require from this body is assistance
with helping to handle the political implications of such
an endeavor, and we certainly defer to your expertise in this area.
Ours is a technology mandate, and we have no doubt we can deliver
in that area. The political mandate falls to you.
We would welcome the opportunity to join forces with the U.S.
Government in helping provide the Commonwealth of Independent
States with safe, reliable, and cost effective energy options now and
into the future.

43
I thank you for your attention.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Garrity.
Dr. Brewer, you talked about the collapse of the infrastructure
for nuclear power in the former Soviet Union and in eastern
Europe. Do you believe that that collapse has increased the risk of
another Chernobyl?
Dr. Brewer. Yes, I do. As you may recall, before the collapse of
the Soviet Union itself, civilian nuclear power was administered by
an agency in Moscow called MAPI, Ministry of Atomic Power and
Industry. When the Soviet Union broke up, their responsibilities
were then confined to Russia. The Ukraine is setting up its own
nuclear ministry and so forth, and the other states are doing so as
well. So you have on the one hand a decentralization and democratization
of the country.
On the other hand, you have the transient period here where
there's some time before the other republics can get their nuclear
expertise up to grade that they had formerly been relying on the
centralized agency to provide. And the other problem with this decentralization
is economic—there are some economies of scale in
having reactor expertise centralized and fuel cycle facilities centralized
as long as their quality can be improved, but I don't see
the decentralization of these institutions and these functions as a
positive safety factor. It's a disruption, particularly now with the
general economic situation so chaotic.
Senator Graham. Do you see any greater capability of dealing
with Chernobyl today than was the case in 1986?
Dr. Brewer. Yes, the emergency procedures in eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union are far, far improved. They understand
the need for emergency procedures. They understand the
need for standardization of these procedures and training and so
forth. Responding to an accident of that magnitude from the station
perspective is orders of magnitude better than it was in 1985-
1986.
Senator Graham. Each of you has touched upon the issue of the
United States' role both from a scientific basis and also in terms of
our economic opportunities that exist. At the recent Rio conference,
there was a section within one of the treaties called Agenda
21 that related to nuclear power. If you're familiar with that, do
you have any comments about that particular provision? There's
of the Germans
also been a suggestion largely at the instigation
that there be a more detailed convention on the international
issues of nuclear power, with particular attention to the former
Soviet Union. Assuming that there is going to be such a convention,
what do you think the U.S. agenda should be at that meeting
in terms of advancing our national economic and scientific goals?
Mr. Garrity. Well, speaking to the issue of the nuclear power
option, it has been our position that the western technology and
the very high safety standards that are being incorporated in the
next generation of advanced light-water reactors both by my company
and by ABB and by Westinghouse and others I think does
speak well to the future safety and the future potential of that
energy source to address some of the other issues relative to combustion
of coal and natural gas and oil for power production in
terms of limiting the CO2 emissions as well as other greenhouse

44
gas emissions. So we think that the opportunity to consider and to
utilize nuclear power as another option for the future worldwide
production of electric energy clearly is one that should be put forward
as one of the prime candidates.
Likewise, we would support the other alternatives for cleaner
combustion, clean coal technologies, what have you, development of
more efficient power production facilities, conservation, and development
of renewable technologies. We think the energy equation
requires a balance of all of those alternatives, and that is the true
solution, I think, from a global point of view.
To the question of the Soviet reactors, I share Dr. Brewer's concern
about the current RBMK-type reactor that they are substandard,
and we do have an opportunity and a near-term solution that
is available that would be and could be directed toward shutting
those units down and safely decommissioning them. It will take
some effort on export guarantees and other types of instruments to
assist companies such as ours to participate meaningfully in that
opportunity. There have been some encouraging signs recently in
the EXIM Bank opening up several offices and moving into the
former Soviet Union. We would encourage and actively support increased
appropriations to such agencies as EXIM Bank to back up
those export guarantees that I mentioned.
Mr. Dunbar. Just to address your comment on the Rio conference,
I know nothing about the agenda you were talking about, so I
won't comment on it. If we look at the former Soviet Union right
now, we see countries where there is economic disarray. It is hard
to tell how many rubles or Ukrainian coupons you're going to get
for a dollar in any given week. Last week I went from 115 to 130 to
145 while I was in Kiev. The economy is in a mess. People don't
know how much money they earn. They don't know how much
things cost. The average person, despite great increases in salary,
still can only buy about 200 loaves of bread a month. Two hundred
loaves of bread in the United States cost about $200, so everybody
just mentally measures his own take-home pay and finds out what
his comparative wealth is.
If that situation, if that mess with economics was combined with
an absolute removal of energy supply, of electrical energy just disappearing,
we would be taking a family of nations and casting
them into some kind of a dark ages. Now, so far we've gotten
through this breakdown of communism and a transition in the
Soviet Union without widespread war and without widespread
chaos. Tragic wars have broken out, but not to the degree that
could have been. But if you remove electrical energy production capacity
from those countries by not taking action, then I can't begin
to imagine what happens.
It's a stressful situation for people now. They have the stress of
Chernobyl, which put society into turmoil. They have the stress of
a total economic and political change, and the energy supply is
very threatened. Ukraine now produces about 9,000 megawatts of
electrical energy from nuclear powerplants, based on the inventory
I did last week in Kiev. I've been working with UkrAtom in Kiev
to try to confirm my data. The Chernobyl accident alone removed
from energy production capacity 9,000 magawatts—four plants at
Chernobyl, two that were under construction, and three more

45
•
WERs that have not been turned on because of the political consequences.
Now, here we have three of their newest, theoretically safest versions
of the WER powerplants that they can't throw the switch on
because of the phobia over Chernobyl. There's 3,000 megawatts of
energy that would be a 25 to 30 percent increase in the total
supply. The existing plants that are operating—well, three went
off-line last year, and every day that goes by, the potential for
turning off more plants grows, because they need equipment, they
need training, they need every basic aspect of building the power
and energy infrastructure.
So I think in terms of priorities, some kind of a measure to hold
the Nation together is imperative. If it falls apart, it has consequences
for not just Ukraine and Byelorussia and Russia and the
others, but it has consequences for Europe and the United States.
Senator Graham. One last question before turning to Senator
Lieberman. To what degree do you think the United States should
be approaching this bilaterally or through international agencies,
and if international agencies, which existing agency would you
have most confidence in, or will there be the necessity of creating
new multinational structures to deal with the new conditions?
Dr. Brewer. Well, let me take a stab at that, Mr. Chairman.
There are so many entities and States and agencies and companies
trying to assist that region in nuclear power that it has become
very redundant, will become wasteful as big money starts flowing,
and all of these entities are very well meaning, but there's also a
lot of ambulance chasing, and it must be coordinated.
Senator Graham. So is your summary that there needs to be
more international agency intermediation?
Dr. Brewer. I wouldn't say any more international agencies, but
I think the IAEA is probably the logical international body to help
the former Soviets set priorities on what needs to be done first,
second, third, fourth, and not done at all.
just add to that. My firsthand experience as a
Mr. Dunbar. I'll
United States businessman is we compete in a world where the collaboration
between government and business for our competitors
ismuch closer and much more well orchestrated than it is for ourselves.
I meet competitors in the former Soviet Union, and the support
that they have, direct hand-in-hand support, both in money
and technical support, from their governments, far outstrips our
traditions of how business is done. So when money goes into an
international pot, when the United States taxpayers' money goes
into an international pot to be distributed, this United States competitor
sees himself at a disadvantage.
Mr. Garrity. Senator, I'd just like to add to the previous two
speakers' comments and in fact support the IAEA as the overall coordinating
agency for the standardization of upgrading or decommissioning
of the Soviet reactors. But likewise, I do share a similar
concern as Mr. Dunbar relative to the competitive environment
that we do work in, and as I suggested, I think some form of export
guarantees in the form of additional support to EXIM Bank, and
we, then, as a private industry working globally can successfully
compete both technically and commercially.
Senator Graham. Senator Lieberman.

46
'
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, you and the witnesses really
covered the questions I had, and I'll just therefore make a very
brief comment.
Obviously, there are big numbers monetarily, economically involved
in responding to Chernobyl and all the other reactors that
we're worried about as a result of Chernobyl. I hope that the
Ukrainian government shares your evaluation of the priorities
here, Mr. Dunbar, that this is really right at the top, and that with
international help and as the Ukrainian economy gets on its feet
that there will be money to support these efforts.
Then, of course, there's the other side of it, which you've all just
spoken to in response to the Chairman's question, which is, how do
we on behalf of American business workers, as the expression goes,
not only do good but do well? I mean, not only help them out, but
create some economic opportunity for American companies?
I'm troubled though not surprised to hear your response that
we're not only in a competitive environment, but we're in a competitive
environment over there in which you too often are competing
without as much support as your government as your foreign
competitors are getting from their governments, and I would invite
any—I hear the message about EXIM Bank financing, and I'd
invite anymore specific suggestions you have as to how we can be
of help to you.
In your statement, Mr. Dunbar, you made reference to some laws
and regulations that may be restricting the export of some cleanup
technologies. I think if you can pinpoint those, maybe we can try to
see if we can eliminate them.
Mr. Dunbar. Well, I'm fearful that there may be several, but the
example that has most recently come to our attention is Public
Law 101-513, section 510, which reads, "None of the funds appropriated
or made available pursuant to this act for carrying out the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 may be used to finance the export
of nuclear equipment, fuel, or technology." Our experience in deal-
that over
ing with agencies of the United States Government is,
the past year, this law has been interpreted to include environmental
remediation and safety improvements to operating reactors and
various things that are related to that.
Senator Lieberman. Which sure doesn't sound like what the
original intention was.
Mr. Dunbar. Well, we don't think it was the original intention,
but no matter what the original intention was, the whole world is
now different, and we think this law needs to be revisited. We understand
it has come up in the Freedom Act and amendments have
been placed before Congress in that act to search out laws of this
type and address them, and I hope that is forthcoming.
Senator Graham. I would imagine that as a residue of the Cold
War era that we've got provisions like that scattered through many
places, and what we need now is first a gathering of those and then
an assessment of whether they continue to be in the national interest,
given the conditions that exist today as opposed to the conditions
at the time they were adopted.
Senator Lieberman. Perhaps we can do that through the subcommittee.
I thank the three of you, and again, Mr. Chairman, I

47
thank you for convening this hearing, which I think has been very
instructive and constructive.
Mr. Dunbar. Can I say one more thing?
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
Mr. Dunbar. Just as a matter of fact to bring you up to date, no
contract has been signed with anyone as of last Thursday to do
anjrthing about the sarcophagus. A week ago Thursday there was
an international meeting where a competition was announced, and
there is a schedule to sign a contract next year sometime regarding
the sarcophagus, but it is a confused situation, and if you had three
more hours I would try to explain it to you, but you still wouldn't
understand.
Senator Lieberman. I have the feeling I should be grateful that I
don't have the three hours.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Graham. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has
been a very constructive meeting and raises in the specific context
of nuclear safety some of the most fundamental questions of the
future of U.S. relations with our former adversaries, the U.S. role
both from the sense of humanitarian responsibility, science, and economics
in the next generation of environmental issues that the
world will have to contend with, and the question of how do we advance
our own national agenda by an appropriate role in this very
fr£igile area of the world.
I thank each of you for your contributions and look forward to
continuing this what I imagine will be a very long-ranging set of
U.S. interests and involvements.
[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene
at the call of the Chair.]
[Statements submitted for the record follow:]

48
The Children of Chomobyl Relief Fund
TESTIMONY
OF
ZENON MATKIWSKY, M.D.
PRESIDENT OF
THE CHILDREN OF CHORNOBYL RELIEF FUND
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMIHEE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY,
SENATE COMMIHEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT
AND PUBLIC WORKS
JULY 22, 1992
272 Old Short Hills Road, Short Hills. New Jersey 07078 201-376-5140; Fox: 201-376-4988

I am
am
49
INTRODUCTION
My name is Dr. Zenon Matkiwsky. I am
the Chief of Surgery at Uniori Hospital in
Union, New Jersey. Today I will address this Committee in my capacity as the president
and co-founder of the Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund, a humanitarian relief
organization based in Short Hills, New Jersey, with 30 affiliates nationwide.
a Board-Certified member of the American College of Surgeons, an
Assistant Professor at the New Jersey School of Medicine, and 1 am serving on the Multi-
Specialty Advisory Committee of the State of New Jersey. I a graduate of the
Pennsylvania Military College and the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine.
Since 1990,
1
have travelled to Ukraine on 14 separate occasions, to personally evaluate
the medical condition of children in hospitals In six different cities. For more information
on the Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund and its experience in Chornobyl relief work, I
have attached a two-page outline of our activities over the post two years.
We are grateful to the Commrttee, and to Senator Ueberman in particular, for
giving us the opportunity to present this testimony, and to address the critical issues
involved in the aftermath of Chornobyl.
It
has been six years since the accident at the Chornobyl nuclear power station.
This tragedy has inflicted irreparable damage on some of the most fertile and
productive territories of Ukraine and southern Belarus. It is also expected to have a
profound effect on the health, ecology, and economy of the entire world.
Tremendous costs have been expended on the "liquidation", or to be more
exact, on the containment and minimization of the disaster's after-effects.
Expenditures
for radiological protection of the public ore expected to run into the hundreds of billions
of roubles.' Given the depth of its economic crisis, Ukraine cannot cope with this
massive problem alone. For a nation which has just achieved Its independence, and
has begun to free itself from the remnants of a communist regime, Chornobyl has
Imposed a tremendous and crippling burden.
Yet to treat this as a uniquely Ukrainian tragedy would be an error. Large
concentrations of radiation and radioactive hot spots settled hundreds of miles away
from the reactor, in Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Wales.^
1 V. A. Knyzhnikov, 'Radiation Safety on the Contaminated Territories of the Chernobyl AES; A
Circle of Severe Surrounding Problems', Medical Radiology Journal, No. 1. January 1992.
2 Anspaugh, L.R.; Catlin, R.J.; Goldman, M. 'The Global Impact of the Chernobyl reactor
accident'. Science 242 (4885) 1513-1519. (1988). Gilmore, B.J.; Cranley. K. "Radionucleide
monitoring in Northern Ireland of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident". Ulster Medical
Journal 56(1), 45-53 (1987).
In a

50
very real sense, Chernobyl Is the world's problem. The plight of its victirris has become a
rrvDral issue which transcends national boundaries , and calls for international solutions.
For years, the Soviet regime maintained that only 24 to 34 people died as a
direct result of the Chornobyl meltdown. ^ As late as 1990, the Communist Health
Minister of Ukraine, Mr. Romanenko claimed that only 209 persons hove suffered illnesses
related to Chornobyl's effects.'*
The stubborn deceit involved in the Soviet coverup of Chornobyl is now coming
to light,
as we gain access to newly declassified documents from the Kremlin which
show that not 34, but as many as eight thousand persons -- mostly nuclear clean-up
workers may have already died as a result of radiation exposure in Chornobyl.' An
article published in April of this year, in "Izvestiyo" reveals excerpts from secret protocols
of the Soviet politburo which directly contradict the public pronouncements of Soviet
authorities in the spring of 1986.*
We now know that the Politburo was receiving daily updates on thousands of
clean-up workers and hundreds of local children who were hospitalized with radiation
sickness, even while publicolly, Soviet officials were telling the world that the health
impact had been grossly exaggerated by the Western press.''
Even if we considered the first weeks following the accident in isolation,
Chornobyl would rank as one of the single greatest ecological disasters of this century.
Unfortunately, the real long-term tragedy is just beginning to unfold.
3 "Chemobyl Said To Affect Health of Thousands in A Soviet Region". New York Times,
November 3, 1991.
4 Alia Yaroshin'ska, "Forty Secret Protocols of the Kremlin's Wisemen", Izvestiya, April 25, 1992.
Romanenko's assurances are still being echoed by a number of Western experts, including Dr.
Marvin Goldman, professor of radiation biology at the University of California at Davis, and
director of a Soviet-American program on health effects of nuclear operations. New Yort< Times,
supra.
5 "Chernobyl disaster worse than reported", Los Angeles Times, April 14, 1992. See also:
Medvedev, Z. The legacy of Chemobyl. New York, W.W. Norton, 1990. Davis, A.M., "Health
Care After Chemobyl: Radiation, Scarcity, and Fear". The PSR Quarteriy, March 1922, Vol. 2.
No. 1 . Davis and Medvedev lend credence to the higher death estimates in that at least 3,400
persons were sent on brief runs across the roof of the reactor, to pick up radioactive debris and
bits of graphite fuel with their bare hands. Radiation fields in this area reached as high as 10,000
rads per hour
.
"Some of these workers may well have received lethal doses, but were cared for
in military... hospitals where their illnesses were either misdiagnosed or covered up."
6 Yaroshin'ska, supra , note 4.
7 Ibid

1
.
51
The Ukrainian Ministry of Health has reported a tripling of cancers among
Ukrainian children since 1986.* (See graphs atfached.)
Most disturbing among these is
the sharp increase in thyroid cancer among children.
In the Kiev Research Institute of Endocrinology and Metabollism, the number of
operations performed on children with thyroid cancer has gone up from an average of
ty/o per year, to twenty in 1990, and thirty more in 1991.' Our own National Institutes of
Health have expressed grave concerns about the growing number of confirmed reports
of thyroid cancer among small children in northern Ukraine and southern Belarus. '° This
is an extremely rare form of cancer, that Is hardly ever encountered in children in the
West.
In the hospitals sponsored by our Fund, hematologists have also noticed a
drarrvatic increase in the number of new leukemia cases diagnosed since 1990. This
would be consistent with the latency period between initial radiation exposure in 1986,
and the point at which leukemia develops."
We are also deeply concerned about the rapid increase in health problems
affecting pregnant women and newborns in Ukraine. According to the Kiev Institute of
Pediatrics, Obstetrics & Gynecology, the rate of miscarriages has more than doubled
since 1986, and the mortality rate among women during delivery has also increased
dramatically.'^
problematic.
(See attached charts.)'^
Now, we realize that some of the information we are receiving is
anecdotal and
ALL of the reports that have been issued on Chernobyl to date call for
rrvDre research. Yet there is broad concensus that the general state of health
throughout Ukraine has deteriorated badly since 1986, and Ukraine is in dire need of
antibiotics, anti-leukemic medicine, and diagnostic equipment, as well as drastic
improvements in prenatal and neonatal care, family planning, and nutritional
supplements.
® Official Report of the Ukrainian tvlinistry of Health, 1991
9 Ibid,
10 Letter from Jacob Robbins, f^.D., Chief of Endocrinology Section, National Institutes of
Health, Department of Health & Human Services, dated February 21, 1992.
1 Davis, supra, at 19; 'Given the latency of radiogenic leukemia incidence (onset at two or
three years, peaking at seven to eight years, and elevated, but trailing off over at least 35
years). ..the threat of cancer likely will hang over individuals in exposed populations for life.'
12 Shkiryak-Nizhnik, Z., The Medical Aftermath of the Chomobyl Disaster", Lecture before the
Boston University School of Public Health, May 22, 1992.
13 Official Report of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health, 1991.

52
Health officials have been bending over backv\/ards not to attribute this
generally v\/orsening situation to radiation alone''', but at the very least, we believe that
Chornobyl has been a major contributing factor.
We are particularly disturbed by nevj studies released at a Kiev medical
conference convened last April, v*/hich show that the number of genetic malformations
among newborns throughout the republic has gone up from 13,000 in
1985, to more
than 14,400 per year between 1987 and 1990." There is also growing evidence of
extensive chromosome changes and the potential for long-term genetic damage
affecting persons living in the Chornobyl region. A highly detailed study of German
citizens returning from the vicinity of Chornobyl following the 1986 accident has
documented a dramatic increase in structural chromosome aberrations,'^ and
hematological changes in the blood of children who permanently reside in radiationcontaminated
territories is significantly higher than the levels shown in children from
Kiev."'^
The dramatic health situation which is unfolding in Ukraine is being disputed by a
health commission formed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was
invited by the government of the former USSR to analyze various issues associated with
the Chornobyl accident in 1991.'^
It Is widely known that the commission was composed of authoritative scientists
from many nations, and we need to give due acknowledgement to their qualifications.
However, the Commission was faced with objective difficulties, namely constraints on
cost, time, and necessary equipment, and these conditions forced this team of scientists
to rely in part on information provided by the Soviet government ~ most notably.
14 Ibid., Marples. supra.
15 Id.
16 Stephan, G.; Oestreicher, U. 'An increased frequency of structural chromosome aberrations
in persons present in the vicinity of Chernobyl during and after the reactor accident. Is this effect
caused by radiation exposure?' Mutation Research. 223(1), 7-12. (1969); see also BEIR-V
Committee Report (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation), National Research Council,
(National Academy of Sciences)
17 Kindzelsky, L.; Zvirkova, A.: "Indicators of Blood Disorders In Children Uving In Areas
Contaminated by Radionucleides Following the Chornobyl Accident"; Kiev Institute of
Oncology/Mev Irvstitute of Hematology (1992). See also: "Ecology's Eastern Front", U.S. News &
World Report, July 20, 1992, page 43, which cites Chornobyl as a suspected cause of
deformations in three children recently bom without eyes in northern Norway.
18 International Advisory Committee. The International Chernobyl Project. Assessment of
radiological consequences and evaluation of protective measures. An overview. Vienna:
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1991.

53
information on the actual doses of radiation released, and the estimated exposures. '^
Due to lack of time, I
cannot dwell on all the details of the IAEA study, but we need to
draw atfention to the fact that the IAEA commission worked under circumstances
dictated by a secretive regime which had oversight authority over the Chernobyl
problem.
Just as the IAEA has had to abandon some of its
conclusions about the safety of
RBMK reactors,^" we are confident that the IAEA will also re-think some of Its conclusions
about the health situation in Ukraine, once its has reviewed new documents which were
not available at the time of its initial study. Let me just cite the following example;
In September of 1991 , (6 months after the IAEA report was completed), the office
of the federal prosecutor of the USSR addressed the sole of 47.5 thousand tons of meat,
and 2 million tons of milk produced between 1986-89 on contaminated territories.
Politburo's (secret) merruDrandum admits that the radioactivity of these products
substantially exceeded the maximum permissible limits which, in May of 1986, had been
relaxed by fifty-fold on the recommendation of the Soviet Health Ministry.^'
The
In another
of the Politburo's recently declassified protocols dated August 22, 1986, Izvestiya reveals
that the Soviet Health Ministry ordered some 10,000 tons of contaminated meat to be
distributed to meatpacking plants around the country, and "to use it for the preparation
of sausage products... at a ratio of one to ten with normal meat"." Yet the IAEA
concluded that "Doses actually received due to the ingestion of contaminated
foodstuffs was substantially lower than the prescribed intervention levels of dose,
typically by a factor of 2-4, and as a consequence, foodstuffs may have been
restricted unnecessarily. "^^
19 Ibid. , at p. 3: 'The International Chernobyl Project was not intended to have the rigor or the
comprehensive scope of an elaborate, long-term research study. Nor was it even remotely
intended to duplicate the voluminous existing assessments of the environmental contamination,
the radiation exposures of the population and possible health effects due to exposures resulting
from the accident...."
20 Marples, D.R.; "Chernobyl: Five Years Later*. Soviet Geography. May 1991. pp. 291-313. (See
especially subsection entitled: "A New Interpretation of the Accident", pp. 292-294. "Chernobyl's
'Shameless Lies'; Ex-Engineer Denounces Official History*, Michael Dobbs, The Washington Post,
April 27, 1992.
21 YaroshitTska, supra, Izvestiya, 'Forty Secret Protocols.. .'
22 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the protocol specifically excluded meatpacking plants in
the Moscow area from receiving a fair share of the contaminated meat.
23 International Advisory Committee, supra, at 43.

54
The conclusions offered by the Commission have cost doubt on the necessity for
corrying out further protective and prophylactic measures, and IAEA researchers were
quick to blame 'radiophobla", hysteria and psychological stress as major health
problems, to offset reports of increased cancers, and serious health effects-^* The
scientists of the IAEA did not know, and could not have known in 1991 some of the
crucial facts which were being concealed, or filtered through the control of the
Communist Party.
The deceit surrounding the accident at Chernobyl was as global in scope as the
global nature of the catastrophe itself.
Today, you have before you newly declassified
documents, recently published in the official press which reveal some of the secrets
surrounding the early months of the Chernobyl disaster.
These documents sow the light
of day in November of 1991 -- more than half a year after the IAEA released Its report.
We need to draw attention to the fact that the IAEA commission did not have the
benefit of these documents before Issuing its report.
We should also note that crucial information about the first weeks following the
accident was controlled by a secretive regime, which ordered physicians to otter the
death certificates of Chernobyl clean-up workers, and to misdiagnose cancers or other
radiation-related illnesses. We need to remember that "radiation illness was not
permitted as a medical chart diagnosis in Ukraine for the first few years after the
accident". 25 ^^y speculation about radiophobia, and the po.ssibie exaggeration of
health effects needs to be considered against the backdrop of a massive and
indisputable coverup of Chernobyl which for six years, severely under-counted radiation
effects, and falsified the medical history of Chernobyl's earliest victims.
A number of scholarly assessments and assumptions about Chernobyl ha\/e
been based on theoretical models patterned offer the Japanese experience following
the atomic bomb blasts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On a number of levels, such models
and comparisons can be problematic, if not inappropriate .^^
24 Ibid. ; New
York Times, November 3, 1991 . supra.
25 Davis, supra, at 7: see also: "The Chernobyl Cover-Up', TIME Magazine. November 13, 1989,
page 62; Marples, D. 'Chernobyl: Five Years Later' supra, page 300; Kovalevska, L., "Chernobyl,
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'. Kiev News. No. 1234, (April 16. 1992); Chemousenko V., Undley R. This
Week. 'Coverup at Chernobyl: the bitter legacy'. London, U.K., Thames TV; (April 25, 1991).
26 Marples. D. R. "The Chomobyl nuclear disaster: a Western perspective'; The Ukrainian
Weekly. April 21, 1991.

55
First, it is well known that within the set of life-threatening components of atonnic
weaponry, only 20% of the overall impact stems from the radiation factor.
destructive factor (80%) is the actual bomb blast and radiation burns.^''
The major
Secondly, there was less contamination of Japanese land following the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts than there was following the Chornobyl release.
bomb explosions thrust the radioactive cloud into the stratosphere, and from there, it
was dispersed into a huge volume of water, over the Pacific Ocean. For this reason,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki began to be resettled safely within the first
War.28
The
tvjo years after the^
By comparison, on the territories of northern Ukraine and southern Belarus, in an area of
25,000 square kilometers, Chornobyl scattered the equivalent of 100 atomic bombs of
radioactive cesium.^' Health monitors have observed a steady expansion of
radionucleides beyond this territory. The greatest concentration of radionucleldes is
found along the northern banks of the River Pripyat. A large flood could wash a
significant volume of radiation into the Dnipro River, and the Dnipro provides drinking
water for 35 million residents of Ukraine.
Besides the danger posed by radionucleides suspended in the environment,
there is also a need to address the problem of so-called radioactive "hot spots". These
are microscopic particles of nuclear fuel, or more often, airborne concentrations of
radionucleides. They pose a huge radioactive hazard. Should these particles be
deposited in the human organism, the surrounding cells
of radioactive exposure.
would receive a colossal dose
The danger in this exposure lies in the fact that by living over a
long period of time in such a hot zone, one can accumulate an extremely large dose of
radiation in the lungs and in the lymph glands, creating local hot fields within the body,
with doses that exceed 1 ,000 rods. '° This is a carcinogenic dose. Over time, malignant
27 Hachiya, M: 'Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician - August 6 - September
30. 1945'. Wells. W. (trans and ed.) Chapel Hill. N.C. The Universit/ of North Carolina Press (1955)
28 Ibid.
29 'Chernobyl: Symbol of Soviet Failure; 5 Years Later. Scope of Disaster Emerging'. Michael
Dobbs. Washington Post, No. 142, April 26. 1991. For some isotopes, the Hiroshima equivalent
may be substantially higher. See Marples, supra , 'to attain the same amount of cesium as
produced after Chornobyl. it would be necessary to detonate 750 atomic bombs similar to those
dropped on Hiroshima.' quoting V. Tokarevskiy. professor of Physics and mathematics at the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; Radyanska Ukrayina. March 29. 1991)
30 BEIR V Report, supra.

56
tumors may develop in these hot zones. (See attached chart on tumors in the
respiratory system.)
Another disturbing situation which was not addressed by the researchers from
the IAEA was the synergistic effect of radiation and other pollutants.
The environment of
Ukraine has been catastrophically polluted by industrial mutagenic factors stemming
from chemical sources. In such industrial cities as Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk,
Mariupil, Symferopil, a catastrophic situation has developed which can be compared
to Chornobyl. For instance, in Mariupil and in Symferopil, genetic damage from the
chemical contaminants is equivalent to an annual exposure to 6 bers of radiation.^'
The Kiev region is also a major manufacturing center, with extensive chemical
pollution. In some villages on the outskirts of Kiev, the level of cadmium exceeds the
maximum permissible limit by 10 to 100 fold. There is research underway at the Kiev
Medical Institute which indicates a significant increase in the biological effects of lowlevels
of radiation when combined with heavy metals. (Embryo-toxicity and
chromosomal aberrations in particular.)
C. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we are observing a precipitous decline in the state of health of the
Ukrainian population.
We need to remember that the IAEA study never examined the
health of the highest-risk populations ~ namely the 600,000 nuclear clean-up workers
and the 200,000 evacuees from the exclusion zone.
To make matters worse, health
experts do not expect the bulk of the cancers and latent health effects from Chornobyl
to occur until ten or fifteen years after initial exposure, when the latency periods for
cesium, strontium, and other isotopes have tolled.'^
Under the circumstances of the
current economic crisis, Ukraine will need intensive monitoring by health experts for at
least the next 20 years, and it will need much more substantial assistance from the
United States and other Western nations.
With growing urgency, the Ukrainian Parliament and the Council of Ministers
have issued official appeals for aid to Western nations. They have gone out of their
way to express their gratitude to those who have already provided aid.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
31 Bilayev, S.T.; Demin, V.F.; Knyzhnikov, V. A. "The Concept of minimizing the damage to health
and welfare of the population as a result of the Chornobyl accident (Questions and Answers)";
Medical Radiology Journal, No. 1, Vol. 37, pp. 20-35 (1992).
32 'Chernobyl: Many children expected to suffer from cancer", USA Today, September 19, 1991.
See also Anspaugh, supra, and Davis, supra, who offer cor^servative ("central") long-term
estimates of 17,400 radiation-induced cancers.

57
1) The U.S. Government should increase and re-distribute medical aid to the
Newly Independent States, so that a greater portion flows to the three northernmost
provinces of Ukraine (Chernihiv, Kiev, and Zhitomir) which were hardest hit by radiation
from Chernobyl.
2) Additional funds need to be appropriated to the Department of Energy, the
National Institute of Health, and other agencies for research on radiation health effects,
(and funds which have not yet been spent need to be devoted) to the following
projects in the Chernobyl region:
a) A long-term health study of the populations which were not examined
by the IAEA team, namely, the nuclear clean-up workers and some of the 200.000
evacuees from Chernobyl, who run the highest risk of latent cancers and other health
effects.
Follow-up studies also need to be done on the general health of people living
in regions contaminated by low-level radiation. (Zhitomir Province and the Polissia
Region of Kiev Province in particular.) The IAEA team did not have an opportunity to
look into the effect of radioactive "hot-spots", and a program needs to be established
for the analysis of this problem.
b) Follow-up studies are needed, to determine the extent of
chromosome aberrations, and long-term genetic damage among children in
Kiev and
Polissia, using so-called "biological dossimetry". There is also a need for further
investigation of reports of genetic deformations in animals and newborn children.
c) A comparative study of thyroid cancer incidence in children, and
assistance in the establishment of a nationwide cancer registry in Ukraine and Belarus.
pollution.
d) Research on the synergistic effect of radiation and other forms of
Example: a study of the combined effect of exposure to radiation and heavy
metals such as cadmium, or a comparison of the health condition of coai miners from
the Donetsk Region who were sent to Chornobyl for clean-up duties in 1986, as
compared to the health of miners who were never sent to Chornobyl.
e) Assistance for the under-funded Ukrainian Environmental Health
Project based at the University of Illinois, which examines the health of mothers and
children in Kiev and four other Ukrainian cities.
3) Our government needs to offer incentives to U.S. pharmaceutical firms and
hospital supply companies to invest In Ukraine, to help rebuild the country's medical
infrastructure, and to benefit from the opening of new markets in this important region.
4) The creation of a scholarship fund for specialists from Ukroine to be trained in
the U.S., using American medical equipment and procedures.

58
10
5) Help to prevent future Chornobyls by providing engineering technology and
technical assistance for the rapid decommissioning of the RBMK-model reactors v^/hich
continue to pose an ongoing threat to the health and safety of Ukraine and tts
neighboring countries.^'
6) The promotion of energy conservation and renev^/able energy technologies,
to help reduce Ukraine's dependency on RBMK reactors and other, environmentally
destructive sources of energy such as coal.
7) Encourage cooperation between Ukrainian and American nuclear experts to
develop short-term solutions to the contamination hazards posed by RBMK reactors.
In
particular, we would like to see the Department of Energy explore innovative laser
techniques being developed by United Technologies in Connecticut, which would
allow nuclear clean-up workers to remedy problems at Chernobyl by remote control,
without further exposure to radiation hazards.
The Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund looks forward to working with this
Committee toward these ends.
33 Strong, M. "40 Chemobyls Waiting to Happen", New York Times, Op-Ed, Sunday. March 22,
1992.

59
Level of malignant tumors
of Lymphatic and Bone Marrow tissues
among people throughout Ukraine.
(The number of cases which were newly discovered each year.)
600-.
500-!
400-
300-
200-
Thousand people
—\—I—I—I—I— I-
1985 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90
The ume diseases within the population of
Zhitomir Region.
100-«
9
8
7
6
5
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

60
Level of malignant tumors in the
Trachia, Bronchus, and Lungs
among the people throughout Ukraine.
Thousand people
This Chart indicates the number
of tumors which were newly
discovered each year.
29-
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

61
Level of Malignant Diseases among
Ukrainian Children between ages to 14.
rhousand Children
(1985 to 1990)
3.0
Level of malignant diseases increased 3.8-fold in Ukraine.
Kiev Region: 3.9
Zhitomir Region: 2
Rivne Region: 5.3
Chemigiv Region: 4.2
2.5 —
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
57-583 - 92 - 3

62
Number of Newborn with Birth Defects.
(1985-1990)
Thousand children
15
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

63
The Level of non-malignant
hematological diseases among Ukrainian
Children discovered each year.
Thousand children
iililiil^:ii!i!iiiiil''ii3iliiliiM^^^
lijIU'itMllililil
1989
1990 1991

64
INFECTIOUS DISEASES
AMONG PEOPLE LIVING IN UKRAINE
A COMPARISON BETWEEN 1990 AND 1985
1) The level of Acute Respiratory Disease in contaminated regions
increased 20-fold .
The number of ill children (ages 0-16) increased 2.5-fold
over the adult population.
Of all Ukrainians suffering from Acute Respiratory Disease,
65% are children under the age of 2 years old.
2) There has been a 3-fold increase in the incidence of tuberculosis
among children under the age of 14 years old in the Zhitomir, Volyn, and
Rivno regions (in North-Central Ukraine).

65
The Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
NOVEMBER 1989 - JUNE 1992
CCRF AIRLIRS:
- November 1989: Delivered 1 ,200 lbs. of vitamins and antibiotics to Ukraine
with the aid of Parliamentary Deputy V. Yavorivsky.
- February 1990: First official airlift: 85 tons; valued at S2.5 million.
- May 1990: Second Airlift: 124 tons; valued at $4 million.
-June 1990: Third Airlift: 62 tons; valued at $.5 million.
- August 1990: Fourth Airlift: 60 tons, valued at $2.5 million.
- March 1991: Fifth Airlift: 102 tons, valued at $3.2 million.
- November 1991: Sixth Airlift: 74 tons, valued at $2. 1 million.
- April 1992: assisted Thoughts of Faith" organization in airlift
of mobile hospitals to Ternopil Region;
fuel, 3 tons of medical supplies)
(procured aircraft,
- May 1992: Delivered $300,000 of anti-leukemic nnedicine (Oncovin)
vy/ith I. Drach to Ukrainian Ministry of Health.
- June 1992: Seventh Airlift: 65 tons of medical books, computers,
and medicine, valued at $2.0 million.
CCRF - HOSPITALS
- Lviv, Western Ukraine: established a 160-bed Hospital for children with
leukemia, Hodgkins Disease, and blood disorders. Full-service hematology
laboratory with a full-year supply of reagents. Progress is being made
towards the establishment of a Cardiac Surgery Center for children born with
curable, congenital heart defects.
- Kiev: co-sponsored Kiev Children's Hospital #14; provided medicine, medical
equipment for the Kiev Regional Children's Hospital #1; and the Radiological
Dispensary for Chornobyl ProbleriB at Pushcha Vodytsia.
- Kharkiv: established the Children's Medical Center #2 For Chornobyl
Problems.
(Kharkiv harbors 72,000 evacuees from the Chornobyl region.)
272 Old Short Hills Road. Short Hills. New Jersey 07078 201-376-5140; Fox: 201-376-4988

66
The Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund
OVERSEAS TREATMENT FOR CHORNOBYL CHILDREN
- CCRF brought 14 Chornobyl children to the United States for medical care.
- CCRF helped to bring 51 children to Israel for cancer treatrnent.
COOPERATION WITH U.S. & OVERSEAS AGENCIES
- Authorized by the Ukrainian Parliament (Supreme CouncID to coordinate all
U.S. medical aid to Chornobyl victims in Ukraine.
-Invited to assist in the distribution and oversight of medical aid procured by
Project Hope and Abbott Laboratories under the initiative of President Bush,
October 1991.
- Aided CITIHOPE International in delivering 70 tons of medical supplies to
Minsk, to aid Belarussian children affected by radiation from Chornobyl,
November 1991.
- Officially sponsored and coordinated speaking tours for Dr. Yuri Spizhenko,
the Ukrainian Minister of Health; Deputy Volodymyr Yavorivsky, Chairman of
the Chornobyl Commission; and Dr. Zoreslava Shkiryak-Nizhnik, Director of the
Kiev Research Institute of Pediatrics, Obstetrics and Gynecology.
MEDICAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM
- CCRF developed an exchange progrom for Ukrainian and American
physicians; 106 U.S. physicians to date have travelled to Ukraine to train loco!
doctors in Western medical techniques. Eight Ukrainian health professionals
have undergone medical training in the U.S. through internships arranged by
CCRF.
PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGN
-CCRF has presented numerous educational seminars, vi/orkshops and
briefings In the follov»^ing cities: Albany, Allentow^n, BaltirDore, Binghamton,
Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, Flint, Hartford, Hempstead (Long Island), Los
Angeles, Minneapolis, New Haven, numerous sites In New Jersey, New York
City, ParrTKi (Ohio), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Rochester, San Diego, San
Francisco, Sarasota, Syracuse, Washington, D.C., Waterbury.
272 Old Short Hills Rood. Short Hills. New Jarsoy 07078 201-376-5140; Fox: 201-376-4988

2
67
TB8TIMOHT
Of
rr«d K, MattlMT, Jr./ M.D., M.P.H.
to tho
BEMhtm COMMITTXB OH BMVlKOMgMT MXD PUBLIC W0KK8
MUCLBMt RBOniATIQM BDBCOIIMITTBBB HBARIMO
Alan K. Slapsoii
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Jtily 22/ Iff
Voshlngton, D.C.

68
FRED A. METTLER, JR., M.D., M.P.H.
Dr. Fred Mettler is currently Professor and Chairman of the
Department of Radiology at the University of New Mexico School
of
Medicine.
He graduated with a B.A. in Mathematics from Columbia
University and in 1970 he received an M.D. degree from Thomas
Jefferson University. He performed a rotating internship at the
University of Chicago and subsequently completed a radiology and
nuclear medicine residency at Massachusetts General Hospital.
He
received a Master's Degree in Public Health from Harvard University
in 1975.
Dr. Mettler has authored over 200 scientific publications,
including 14 books. He currently is the United States
Representative to the United Nations for Radiation Effects and
is
one of the 13 members of the International Commission on Radiation
Protection. He recently was the Health Effects Team Leader of the
International Chernobyl Project and also serves as a consultant to
the World Health Organization.
He lives in Albuquerque, New Mexico with his wife Gloria and
two sons,
Erik and Larsen.
Th« statistics citsd in this tsstiaony ars azcarpts taken from
THE IHTERIIATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECT TECHNICAL REPORT, Assessment
of Radiological Consequences and Evaluation of Protective Measures,
Report by an International Advisory Committee, ISBN 92-0-129191-4,
Printed by the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

pnxlucing
ihere
69
Pan H
4. Public Health and Possible Clinical Effects of Irradiation
4.1. General Conclusions
Ai ihe time of U>c Project srud> .
were significani
non-radiaijon-related heaJth disorders in the populations
of both surveyed coniammatcd and survescd
control scttJemenis. bui no health disorders thai could be
-^ anhbuted direclJ> to radiation exposure The accidcni
had subsianual
negative psychological consequences in
lerms of anxjer> and stress due to the conunuing and
high levels of uncertainty, the occurrence of which
extended beyond the contaminaied areas of concern
These were compounded b\ socioeconomic and poliucal
changes occurring in the USSR
The official data that were examined did not indicate
B marked increase in the incidence of leukaemia or
cancers
However, the data were not deia:ied enough lo
exclude the possibility of an increase in the incidence of
some tumour types Reported absorbed thyroid dose
estimates in children are such that there ma\ be a siausticall>
deiecuble increase in the incidence of th>roid
tumours in the future
On the basis of the doses esumaied b\ the Proieci
teams and currenilN accepted radiation nsk esumaies.
hiture increases over the natural incidence of cancers or
herediury effects would be difficuh to discern, even
with large and well designed long term epidemiological
studies
4.2. Detailed Conclusions
4 2 1 Current Health Effects
Attributed to Radiation
Reported adverse health eftecls attributed to radiation
were not subsumiaied either b\ those local studies that
were adequaieU performed or b\ the studies under the
Project
Man\ of the Uxal clinical in\estigations of health
effcctN had been done p^xirK
.
confusing.
often contradictory results The reasons for these
failures included lack of well maintained equipment and
supplies, poor mformation through lack of documenia
lion and lack of access to scientific liicrature, and shortages
of well trained specialists Nevertheless, despite
these obstacles, a number of the local chnical studies
were carefully and competently performed and the
Project teams were to corroNiraic the results in most
cases
4.2-2- Specific Results
of Project Field Studies
Field studies were undertaken of continuous resident*,
of rural surveyed coni^minated settlements (with surface
contamination higher than 5?5 kBq m' (15Cikjn')
due to caesium^ and surveyed control senlements of
rOCX) to 50 000 persons, using an age matched snjd\
design The studies were performed in the second half
of 1^0 and relate tc the health status at that time The
sirateg) of the stud\ . tc elucidate major health problems
identified b\
general cUmca] examinations and sophtsucated
laboratory tests, was adequate to answer most concerns
of the popula'jon
There v^as no exhausuve tesung
of each indiMduai. and the studv did not resoUe a]i
questions relaung to poicniiaJ health effects
Psychological Disorders
There were man> imponani ps\chologicaI
problems
of anxier> and stress related to the Chemob>I accident
and in the areas studied under the Project these were
wholl> disproportionate to the biological significance oi
the radioactive contamination The>e prv"»blems are
pre\alent e\en in the sur\e\ed control settlement*;
The
consequences of the accident are inextncabK linked with
the man> socioeconomic and political developments that
were occurring in the I'SSR
.A large propi^rtion of the population had senous concerns,
these people were not acting in an irrational wav
that could be termed radiophobic The vasi maiontN oi
adults examined in K'>th the sur>e>ed contaminated
settlements and the sun eyed control senJemenis \isiied
either believed or suspected that the\
had an illness due
to radiation Most adulU'- in b».ith sur\e\ed coniaminated
and surveyed control settlements were native to the local
area and virtualh all stated that lhe> had l:\ed in the
sctlk-nients since birth, therefore reUvalion is j major
concern N^'hilc onK aS."»ui 8'> ol adults ir survc\ed control
selUcmenLv wanted to reUxaie. the adulL-.
in the sur-
\c\ed contaminated settlements were s*.^ concerned that
"2'% wanted lo rclivaie
The percentages ol the p*>pulation
who thought that the Gvi\enunent should relivale
the whole populauon were higher 20% and 83%.
respcctivel)
General Health
The children who were examined were found to be
gcncrulK health) Field studies indicated that a significant
number of adults in both survcved contaminated and
508

70
Conclusions and Recommendations
surveyed control settJements had subsianual medicaJ
problems, with lOX to 15% (excluding hypertensive
adults) requinng medical care
Haematology
Some young children with low haemoglobin levels
and low red cell counts were identified Howeser, there
was no statistically significant difference between values
Cardiovascular Disorders
Many adults were hypertensive; however, the statistics
related to both systolic and diastolic blood pressure
were similar for both surveyed coniaminated and surveyed
control settlements, and both were comparable
with published values for Moscow and Leningrad
in surveyed contaminated and surveyed control settlements
for an> age group of the populauon No difference
was found between the populaoons when leucocvies and
plateleLs were examined lirunune systems (as judged
from the lymphocyte level and the prevalence of other
diseases) did not appear to have been sigmficanily
affected b\ the accident
Neoplasms
Nurriiion
Diei appeared lo be limited in ranee bui adequate No
sipnificani differences in reported eating habits were
found between surveyed contaminated and sur\cyed
control settlements No deirimental cffecLs or. grovMh
due to voluntary or official dietary restnctions imposed
as a result of the accident »ere found There »cre no
significant differences between the growth rales of
children in sur^eyed coniaminated and surveyed control
settlements, and the rales for both groups were well
within published USSR and international norms
Adull-s
were generally overweight by international standards in
all areas studied Intake and excretion of iodine were
found to be ai the U'v. end of the accepuble range Most
other dietary constituents and components were found to
be adequate, however
vitamin intake was nt>t examined
Dietary intakes of toxic elements (lead cadmium and
mercury ) were lo\k in comparison w ith those rep»«ned
for many other countries and were well below the maxi
mum tolerable intake levels specified by international
organizations Blood lead levels were also investigated
and were found to be well within the normal range
Review of Soviet data indicated that reponed cancer
incidence had been nsing for the last decade (staning
before the Chernobyl accident occurred! and has continued
to rise at the same rate since the accident The
Project teams considered thai there had been incomplete
reporting in the pas: and could not assess whether the
rise was due lo increased incidence, methodological
differences, bener detection and diagnosis or other
causes The data did not reveal a marked increase in the
incidence of leukaemia or thyroid tumours since the
accident However, owing to the classification scheme
used and other factors, the pi^ssibility of a slight increase
in the incidence of these tumours cannot be excluded
Only hearsay information relating to such tumours was
available
Radiauon Induced Caiaracn
There was no esidencc ol radiation induced cataracts
in the general population
Biological Dosimetry
Thyroid Gland Disorders
No abnormalities in either thyroid stimulating
hormone (TSHi or thyroid hormone (free T4) were
found in children examined No statistically significant
difference was found between surveyed contaminated
and surveyed control settlements for any age group
Mean thyroid sizes and size dislnbulions were the
same for populations of surveyed contaminated and surveyed
control settlements Thyroid nodules were
extremely rare in children, they occurred in up lo \^%
of adults in both surveyed contaminated and surveyed
control settlements
Pro|CCI results are similar to those
reported for populations in (»ther countries
Chromosv>nial and somalK cell mutation assays were
performed on adults who had Wi»rkcd ouidtH»rs. selected
since their exposures were assumed !»> be the highest No
significant diderencc were found between adults living
in surveyed contaminated and survesed conIri»l senle
mcnts The data obtained were consistent w ith the
Project dose estimates
Foetal and Genetic Anomalies
Review of Soviet data for settlements in contaminated
areas of concern as well as for the three Republics as a
whole indicated relatively high infant and perinatal mortality
levels These levels prevailed before the accident
and appear to be decreasing No statistically significant

•
, t
( (iiiiiii i M
71
P«n H
evidence was. found of an increase in the incidence of
foeiai anomaJies >5 a result of radiauon exposure
4.2.3 Potenua) Delayed Health Effects
Available data reviewed did not provide an adequate
basis for determining whether there had been an increase
in leukaemia or thyroid cancers as a consequence of the
accident The data were not detailed enough to exclude
the possibility of an increase in the incidence of some
tumour t^pes On the basis of the doses estimated by the
Project teams and currentJ>
accepted radiauon nsk estimates
future increases over the natural incidence of all
cancers or hereditary effects would be difficult to discern
even with large and well designed long term
epideiTuologicaJ studies
Reported esumates of absorbed
thyroid dose in children are such that there may be a
statistically deteciabl; increase in the incidence of
thvroid tumours m the future
However, certain high risk groups (such as children with
high absorbed thyroid dosesi wiJl need specific medical
programmes t>ased on their poienual nsks
Energetic action should be taken to improve the standard
of medical, diagnostic and research equipment and
the availability of medical supplies, manuals and spare
pans
Clinical and research invesugations should emphasize
the use of appropriate control groups, standards and
quality control procedures
Improvements should be made in the statistical, data
collection and registry systems used by local scientists
by the adoption and applicauon of internationally
accepted standards and methods
There should be increased opportunities for information
exchange and greater availability of scientific literature
for local health professionals
4.3.2 Potential Delaved Health Effects
4.3. Recommendations
4.3 1 General Health and Potential
Accident Consequences
The adverse health consequences of relocation should
be considered before any
further relocation take> place
Consideration should be given to the introduction of
programme^ tf' alleviate psychological effects These
might include informational programmes for the public
Tnerc should also be educational programme^ sci up for
teachers and local ph>sic;ans in general preventive
health care and radiatK'n health effects
The current p^.'Iicy of annual physical examinations is
conceptual!) adequate for the health needs of the general
population in the contaminated areas of concern
In view of the limited resources available, the concept
of the WHO Scientific Advisory Group on the Health
Effects of Chernobyl, namely to concentrate on prospective
cohort studies of selected high nsk populations,
should be endorsed It is impractical, owing to the
extreme difficulrs and tost, to conduct long term studies
or to evaluate all persons who live in the affected
Republics
4 3 3 General Public Health Issues
in the Affected Republics
Action should be taken on adult hypencnsion and
dental hygiene as major health issues The need for continuing
programmes for lodization of salt should be reevaluated
if these are found to be necessary the cffec
tiveness of tlie chemical process should be assessed
:0I I : 'l.-ililf: .-It 1 ;irti''l 1 n t li i
ri f cmciil )i liccn I
( I :
(( I
i I f' .

72
There remain very Urge tn»s of the Soviet Union
which have conunuuDon levelt in the range of or
exceeding 15 Ci/km- (555 kBq/m^) of '"Cs Some of
these areas are located as far as 300 km from the plant
The accident and contaminated areas include three
adiTunjstratively disuna areas of the UkrSSR. BSSR and
RSFSR Populations still living in contaminated areas
are probably ui excess of half a million with at least
60 000 children still living in these areas.
In terms of revievi and correlauon of the So\ lei health
effects data, it was apparent that there were major
differences m the scienufic and nvdical tuckgrounds.
purposes and capability, not oni> between the Project
Task 4 teams and their Soviet counterparts but also
within the Soviet structure itself It was > credit to the
Soviet people thai we could work together in an effort
to achieve a common goal in terms of assessmeni of the
health effects
of Chernobyl
Correlation and corroboration of the Soviei data
mtemalK and with our data were difficult (or several
reasons One reason, which was obvious to all involved
in the project, was thai our Soviet colleagues most often
did noi have access to technology vihich is considered
Quite comjnonplacc ir. medical diagnosis and practice in
man> western countries In some of the insDtuies and
very large hospitals, modem equipmeni was present but
the equipmeni even in these often was not operaung
because of the lack of chemical reagents or minor spare
parts
A second problem was more difTicull
Many of the
Soviei health related studies were performed by well
intentioned persons who did not have »
firm foundation
in the design of scienufic experiments and the value of
consisteni methodology and controls There were man)
coniradinions in dau thai were presented ic us While
there were sottie first rate investigations these *ere in
the imnonty A number of scientists and physicians
appeared to have limited and narrow backgrounds which
caused them to make assumptions and conclusions which
did not logically follow on a scienufic basis As a result,
many of the stiidies were internally contradiaory and
assumptions were presented as facts
without the benefit
of cnucal review and examitiauon of the studies for
biases and design flaws
While there are published umform methodologies for
follow-up of certain persons affected by the accident,
these procedures are rarely, if ever, followed One
reason for this is thai the equipment and reagents needed
to follow the guidelines are simply not available
Another reason is thai the various mvesugators wish to
be independent
Unfortunately, this leads to data thai are
inconsisieni and cannot therefore be compared from
Republic to Republic or id some instances between
different institutes ic the same city
A third problem was the resuli of recent acquisition
of some modem pieces of equipriKoi b> So%iei scienusts
without the benefit of the necessary suppor; foundauon
related to useful and accurate operauon of the instruments
Calibraung standards were usualh not available
nor were operating numuals in Russian
A fourth major problem was the lack of literature
for the instrument operators and those scientists and
physicians who were designing snidies Some of the
studies were aimed at goals which have alreadv been
studied extensiveh in other countries arnl the negauve
results of which are alread) » idely published in the open
literature In some cases there seemed tc oe unreal isuc
opunusm thai ne>* technology could provide answers to
alinosi any problem and that the results were auiomaucally
correct
The technical and interpretative limitauons
of medical diagnosuc equipmeni were sometimes not
well understood
In spite of all the above limiuuons we were able to
correlate ijubstanual amount of data from a number of
Soviet studies Most of the Soviet snidies in which we
were able to confirm findings were performed on equipment
that was somewhat outdated but which the Soviet
scienusts urtderstood very well
In other areas (such as
lutixmr incideiux data) we were only able to review data
and provide comments, but we were not able to verify
the dau since we could not repeat or successfully sample
such large populauons in the time we had or with the
resources we had Is addiuon. many of the dau had
been obuined in past years and the only method of
venfication that could have been used was labour
intensive process of extensive record and pathology
review It should be clear that our findings pertain only
to those persons living in rural areas within 300 km or
so of Chernobyl They do not apply to the decontamination
workers. Chernobyl plant operators or persons
already relocated We did have a chance to examine
some of the workers and Oremen initially severely
injured in the accident and we were very impressed with
their medical care aikd outcomes; we did not. however,
collect dau in this regard.
It should also be clear that these results only represent
the «atc of h»;ili»> -t.irmg the fall of ""JO We cannot
speak of health effects in the penod before
1990 except
through knowledge of the scientific basis of radiaiion
health effects and what is currently found Our disease
detection process and study was limited to certain
specific problem areas and • general physical examinauon
Even though we detected • significant percentage
of people with major health problems requinng medical
care, supervision or treatment, it is certain that there
were addiuonal abnormaliucs in the populauon that
could only have been detected wnth addiuonal tests Oir
study IS only one set of dau points in the invesugauon
of a very large problem It is ceruin that there are facets
of the accident which need further investigation in the
future
Our review and aiulysis indicated major health
problems in several areas With some qtulifications.
the-e were no direct effects that we were able to confirm
as being directly attnbuubic to radution effects at this
ume There are clearly some effects, most noubly
psychological, which are feh to be the direct resuh
of the accident Potenual future effects such as
cancers are ro"'"*"*^ i" Pri

73
TESTIMONY OF
WLADIMIR WERTELECKYJ, M.D.
COORDINATOR OF THE
AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES GROUP
AND
PROFESSOR AND CHAIRMAN OF MEDICAL GENETICS
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
MOBILE, ALABAMA, 36688.
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
SENATE COMMIHEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
JULY 22ND OF 1992

74
I wish to thank this Committee for the opportunity to testify about health
matters that relate to the Chornobyl tragedy, the current medical
circumstances in Ukraine and the need for U.S. assistance.
INTRODUCTION
In August 1991, Ukraine declared independence after centuries of subjugation
by the former Russian-USSR empire. Four months later, support for
independence was asserted by over 90% of the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian
voters, the largest plurality in the recorded history of free elections.
Ukraine has been lacerated by the Chornobyl tragedy.
One consequence of Ukrainian independence was the abrupt loss of medical
support formerly stemming from Moscow. Another consequence is that Ukraine
has now virtually no representation in key international bodies, such as the
World Health Organization where many crucial decisions about Chornobyl
continue to be made. Also, Ukraine has no foreign currency reserves.
Ukrainian authorities recognize that they can not cope with the Chornobyl
consequences and have called for international assistance.
QUALIFICATIONS and VIEWS
Describing my qualifications is relevant because they are similar to those of
other members of the "American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group" that I
represent. In fact, our life stories are similar to those of many other
Ukrainians in the U.S. We are viewed in Ukraine as exponents of those that
were given opportunities in America; we worked, achieved and were rewarded.
The equation for America includes: hope - opportunity - work - success, and
is completed by concern and generosity for those in need.
In 1946, my family and I received assistance from the U.N. Refugee
Administration to leave Europe and travel to Argentina. Fourteen years later,
I earned my medical degree but not without the generous help of various
scholarships. After thirty years, I will soon have the honor to accept a
nomination to become a member of the Argentine Academy of Medicine. My
acceptance address will be about Cancer, Birth Defects, Public Health and
Chornobyl. Chornobyl has universal implications.
In 1962, I arrived in the U.S. with one hundred dollars and minimal knowledge
of English. I received training in pediatrics at Washington University and
the Saint Louis Children's Hospital. Five years later, I completed my
training in Medical Genetics at the Harvard School of Medicine and the Boston
Children's Hospital. I became a citizen, was drafted and served as Senior
Surgeon of the Public Health Service at the Epidemiology Branch of the
National Cancer Institute, in Bethesda, Maryland. Twelve years after landing
in the U. S., I became the Chairman of a new Department of Medical Genetics in
the College of Medicine of the University of South Alabama, in Mobile,
Alabama.
For twenty years I have endeavored to prevent birth defects and mental
retardation. I know first hand how important it is to harmonize the
relationships between scientific research, clinical services and public

.
75
education. The same comprehensive and coordinated approach is needed to
address the consequences of Chornobyl
Radioactivity is the best known example of an agent that induces cancer, gene
mutations, chromosome defects, birth defects and mental retardation.
Radiation damage extends beyond single victims; it afflicts families,
communities, populations and future generations. The Chornobyl tragedy cannot
be viewed through few narrow scientific windows; such approach dehumanizes the
complexity of this disaster.
While science is essential to find and propagate truth, sciences in medicine
must be complemented by clinical wisdom if healing and amelioration are to be
achieved. It is self-evident that science alone cannot alter perceptions,
attitudes, and behaviors which are complex matters.
I am deeply concerned that Chornobyl is increasingly perceived as an example
of a failure of industrialized nations to help those whose tragedy is
underserved. Some politicians find in Chbrnobyl an example why western
democracies need not be emulated. For six years there have been debates about
helping Ukraine with modest consequences.
I firmly believe that assistance is warranted and that America will show
others the leadership and humanism that justifies our high standing among
other nations.
I believe that Chornobyl calls for broad and JOINT solutions by U.S. -Ukrainian
scientists and clinicians. Of equal importance is the need to involve the
Ukrainian public, families and communities in the broadest sense of these
words. General trust is essential. Our experience in the Gulf Coast region
demonstrates that "each one - teach one" is one ingredient that unites
scientists and humanists under the most adverse socio-economic circumstances.
We employ a school teacher, a former diplomat and other community leaders who
succeed in erasing a "provider - recipient" mentality. Such mentality is
irrelevant in the case of birth defects or radiation effects.
In summary, the Chornobyl accident imposes upon the international scientific
community not a choice but a moral obligation to learn about its consequences.
THE
"AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES 6R0UP"
Our group brings together medical investigators and clinicians who hold
appointments in universities, teaching hospitals and scientific centers.
Among us are members of the National Academy of Sciences, chairmen of academic
departments, experts in genetics, radiology, biophysics, pediatrics,
obstetrics and other specialties. Many of us have considerable teaching and
administrative experience. Our group has developed linkages with hundreds of
U.S and Ukrainian scientists and physicians interested in Chornobyl and in
bilateral participation through joint projects.
We can state unambiguously that there is a sufficient number of qualified and
interested professionals in the U.S. and Ukraine to sustain ambitious,
comprehensive, coordinated and long-term bilateral projects. Secondly, we

76
also are certain that various academies, foundations and charitable
organizations will join in our efforts.
CHORNOBYL:
SCIENCE AND ASSISTANCE
The most publicized document about Chornobyl , rather badly received in
Ukraine, is a 1991 report by an International Advisory Committee requested by
the USSR. The study had self-admitted limitations:
The project was not intended to have either the rigor or the
comprehensiveness of an elaborate long term research study.
The number of available independent experts and their time were limited.
The data provided by the USSR was not always adequate nor could there be
an independent assessment of the radiological events at the time of the
accident.
Numerous 'hot spots' of exceptionally high surface radioactivity have
not been singled out for investigation.
Evidently, investigation of chromosomal abnormalities was not possible.
To add further perspective I would also point out that:
The Chornobyl accident is the largest release of radioactive materials
ever recorded. Within the first week after the accident of April 25th,
1986, 90,000 children were evacuated. The International Advisory
Committee ascertained that an astounding 72% of individuals in
contaminated settlements wanted to be relocated. The percentages of the
population who thought that the government should relocate the whole
population are even higher. Thousand of children and unborn were
exposed to unknown levels of radiation.
In addition to Chornobyl, deteriorating economic circumstances have
created a global medical crisis. Recurring diphtheria epidemics can no
longer be ignored.
There are growing demands to "ship" Ukrainian children for treatment
abroad. A growing number of Ukrainians feel that such trends do not
address the fundamental problems of the medical needs of Ukrainian
children.
The "sarcophagus" and damaged atomic reactor will require considerable
international efforts to dismantle this threat.
It will become unacceptable to sustain nuclear safety projects without a
parallel and equally credible attention to medical programs.
America cannot afford to be perceived as an technological giant
indifferent to human values. It is our record on human values that
lends America its stature among nations.

77
Should epidemics and other medical disasters emerge in Ukraine,
solutions will be less effective and more onerous, both financially and
politically.
The considerable U.S. investment in studies of Hiroshima-Nagasaki is one
of the most successful long-term scientific commitments ever made.
Chornobyl deserves equal consideration.
CONCERNING COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S.
MEDICAL AID
Money alone does not solve problems; people do. Organizations such our
"American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group" may facilitate linkages between
American and Ukrainian medical scientists. Other Ukrainian organizations,
academic and charitable, have also first hand experience and have established
bilateral linkages with Ukraine. A framework is already in place to
facilitate the flow of assistance through established and experienced
networks. American-Ukrainian organizations provide substantial nongovernmental
assistance to Ukraine. These organizations are nurtured by
millions of American-Ukrainians.
I believe that the effectiveness of medical aid also depends on careful
planning. It is self-evident that the strong contrasts between the former
USSR and our systems in addition to language barriers must be addressed. A
key role of our "American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group" is to expedite the
formation of bilateral planning, coordination, and supervisory teams and to
provide consultants to "pave the way".
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. MEDICAL AID
The purpose of U.S. aid should be to investigate, cure or ameliorate the
effects of the Chornobyl disaster and to instill public trust in U.S. medical
and scientific institutions.
The major goals for assistance can be grouped into two domains:
Programs of immediate medical assistance.
Creation of an AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES CENTER to include
a CHORNOBYL INFORMATION CENTER AND DATA REPOSITORY.
We endorse the recommendations made by the International Advisory Committee
and add our own (in parenthesis):
"Energetic action should be taken to improve the standard of medical
diagnostic and research equipment and the availability of medical
supplies ..."
Specific medical programs for children, based on their potential risks
for thyroid cancer. {We focus on this issue in some detail below.)
(Assessment of genetic effects and chromosomal abnormalities.)
Programs to alleviate psychological effects.
5

78
Develop programs with emphasis on high risk populations, particularly
those exposed to "hot spots".
(Develop Programs to provide:
Public Information.
Incentives for joint ventures to develop a pharmaceutical
industry.
Incentives for businesses to engage in joint ventures in medical
technology and issues related to the food chain.)
About Medical
Supplies
There is an acute need for childhood immunization, basic supplies of syringes
and needles, diagnostic equipment, etc.
About Thyroid, Leukemia and Other Cancers
The International Advisory Committee stated that "available data reviewed do
not provide an adequate basis for determining whether there has been an
increase in leukemia and thyroid cancer as a consequence of the accident". We
believe that this should be established.
Concerning thyroid cancer, there is an immediate need to establish a
surveillence program. It is estimated that 800,000 children may be at risk.
Thyroid disease is asymptomatic. Studies of children exposed to radiation
fallout have shown that only 3% knew of their disease prior to a careful
thyroid examination. A recent review from the Brookhaven National Laboratory
pointed that "more data are needed on low-dose effects of radioiodines on the
thyroid ... in view of the preponderance of thyroid abnormalities ... in
children ... (the unborn) ... further data would be desirable ... in children
and human fetuses". Another review stated "it is clearly important to attempt
to define subgroups of the population who may be extra-sensitive to the
effects of radiation to the thyroid gland." The fetal thyroid is avid for
iodine and takes up iodine by the 10th week. In Ukraine, it is not known how
many unborn and young children were exposed to radioactive iodine. It is
known that the Chornobyl environs are poor in iodine which poses an additional
risk factor for this population. Purely epidemiologic studies of risks and
outcomes are humanistically unacceptable. Investigations have to include
medical monitoring, health care and prevention.
The global problem posed by Chornobyl is further illustrated by the fact that
in France, calf thyroids were taken "off market" by May 10, 1986. Thyroids of
sheep in Scotland reached hundreds of times greater level of radiation than
those in France. In Vermont, the atomic cloud resulted in the highest reading
of radioactive iodine ever recorded in the continental U.S. (May 11th).
There are growing reports of increasing incidence in Ukraine of childhood
thyroid cancer and leukemia. The long term cancer risks from the received and
on-going chronic low dose radiation are not known.
About Psychological Effects

.
79
Massive psychological effects following disasters is well documented. In the
U.S., following the 1972 Buffalo Creek Dam disaster that killed 125 people,
80% of the population was found to be emotionally disturbed and be afflicted
by what psychiatrists called the "Buffalo Creek syndrome". It is self-evident
that the trauma of Chornobyl is enormous.
The public is aware that radiation is a cause of microcephaly, mental
retardation, cataracts, thryoid cancer, leukemia, bone cancer, birth defects,
gene mutations, chromosomal aberrations and decrease life span. In distant
Italy rigorous studies showed a sharp increase in induced abortions following
Chornobyl
To what extent Chornobyl will result in an increase in mental retardation,
microcephaly, cataracts and other complications remains to be seen.
About Genes and Chromosomal Aberrations
•Chromosome aberrations can be induced by relatively low doses of radiation. A
rigorous German study of German workers that were in the general vicinity of
Chornobyl showed a significant increase of major chromosome aberrations. I am
unaware of rigorous chromosomal studies on populations from Ukraine.
About High
Risk Populations
The International Advisory Committee recognized that there were numerous "hot
spots" of exceptional high surface radioactivity and that these were not
singled out for investigation. We agree with the recommendations of this
Committee to develop "programs with emphasis on high risk populations,
particularly those exposed to "hot spots". Evacuees from Chornobyl, clean-up
workers, firemen, and other participants in Chornobyl works require special
attention.
About Public Information Programs
These should be initiated as soon as possible and reflect the contributions of
U.S. sources.
About Incentives for Joint Ventures
(Pharmaceuticals, Medical Engineering, Food Chain, Etc.)
The development of a pharmaceutical industry (particularly vaccines) is
acutely needed.
Basic scientists, formerly employed in military projects, can provide an
important human resource to establish a medical technology base and deal with
issues related to the food chain.
AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES CENTER
The creation of an AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES CENTER will provide a
stable long term "platform" for rapid and effective introduction of technology
along with clinical "know-how".

80
The process can be initiated promptly by the establishment of "Centers of
Excellence", which will function as independent non-governmental medical and
research facilities, under joint U.S. and Ukrainian control and subject to
U.S. standards. Each "Center" will promote, facilitate, and provide a stable
"home base" for U.S. -Ukrainian research and medical care teams. The Centers
would be eventually amalgamated into an "AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES
CENTER". An interim step could be an amalgamation of "Centers" into an
"AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN CHILDREN'S CENTER".
The urgency of the medical circumstances in Ukraine call for the immediate
development of two "CENTERS":
American-Ukrainian Cancer-Leukemia Center
American-Ukrainian Terato-Genetics Center
CHORNOBYL
INFORMATION CENTER AND DATA REPOSITORY
As a major component of a proposed "American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences
Center", the Information-Data Repository Center would serve the need to create
and coordinate regional and national registries of disease incidence, tracking
and monitoring of interventions, coordinating and promoting international
interactions among medical scientists, participating in public information and
professional education, promoting informatics and computer technology, etc.
Much of the aid reaching Ukraine thus far is mostly from American-Ukrainians
and local business communities. The plan to develop "Centers of Excellence"
aims to provide incentives for participation by businesses and nongovernmental
organizations. These "Centers" will inherently become
"showcases" of American technology and "know-how". An AMERICAN CHILDREN'S
HOSPITAL and later an AMERICAN MEDICAL SCIENCES CENTER, will provide high
quality medical care, subjected to U.S. standards and be open to patients
beyond Ukraine. The impact of such medical facility on Eastern Europe is
likely to be substantial. We ask that the committee endorse our plans and
seek funding to propel implementations. We have indications that the
Ukrainian authorities are prepared to delegate hospital and laboratory
facilities or otherwise would welcome the construction of new facilities.
CONCLUSION
Substantial aid to Ukraine is warranted on humanitarian, scientific and geopolitical
grounds. The U.S. has heavily invested in the investigations of
Hiroshima-Nagasaki. A similar investment is needed to study and ameliorate
the effects of Chornobyl . An AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL CENTER is an
effective way to provide for the integration of complex long term research,
medical care and public information projects. It is also a highly visible
contribution that will demonstrate the creative U.S. role in a highly
sensitive area. Furthermore, a helping hand from America is an effective way
to promote our own democracy. The fate of the emerging democracy in Ukraine
will have profound future implications. The aid provided to Ukraine has been,
thus far, primarily non-governmental. The American-Ukrainian community has
created linkages that provide conduits for effective aid and accountability.
Millions of American-Ukrainians are now seeking from our Government leadership
and support.

81
American-Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group
Tel: 205/460-7505
Coordinator
Wladimir Werteleckyj, M D.. Professor and Chairman
Dept of Medical Genetics. CC/CB 214
University of South Alabama - Mobile. AL USA 36688
Fax: 205/460-7684
Steering Committee
Tatiana T Antonov>-ch. M.D.
Giiet Div Nephropathology
Armed Forces Inst. Pathology'
Washington. D C USA 20306
Tel: 202/576-2891
Fax: 202/576-2164
LarissaTBilaniuk.M.D,
Professor of Radiologv-
University of PennsyK-ania
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia
Philadelphia, PA USA 19104
TeL 215/5904117
Fax: 215/5904127
Myroslaw .M. Hreshchyshyn. M.D.
Professor and Chairman
Dept. ofGynecology/Obstetrics
State Uni\' New York at Buffalo
219 Bryant Street
Buffalo, NY USA 14222
Tel 716/8787138
Fax: 716/878-7874
Michael Kasha, FhD
R O. Lawion Distinguished Professor
Institute of Molecular Biophysics
Florida State University
Tallahassee. FL USA 32306
Tel 904/644-1519
Fax: 904/561-1406
BiorJ. Masnyk, PhD
Deputy Director
Divison of Cancer Biology
Diagnosis and O-nters. .N'CI-NIH
9000 Rockville Flke
Building 31, Rwjm3A03
Bethesda, MD USA 20892
Tel: 301/496-3251
Fax: 301/496W75
Askold D. Mosijczuk. Col .
Chief, Pediatics
Hcmatoiogy-Oncoiogy Service
Department of Pediau-ics
M C
Walter Reed Army Medical Center
Washington. DC USA 20307
Tel 202/576-0421
Fan 202/576-2478
August 26, 1992
Senator Alan K, Simpson
United States Senator
Committee on Environment and
Publ ic Works
Washington, D,C. 205 10-6175
Dear Senator Simpson:
Thank you for your letter of July 28th. I just returned
from a field trip to Ukraine which is the cause for the
delay of my answer. I wish to thank you for your
interest in issues relating to Chernobyl, Ukraine and
medical -humanitarian assistance. My trip during which
I met scores of Ukrainian leaders has lent further
support to the opinions I expressed during my deposition
of July 22nd,
I attach to this letter my answers to your questions.
In addition, I attach letters of support from highly
placed Ukrainian leaders. I am gratified that so many
distinguished colleagues in Ukraine agreed to support
the statements that I made to the U.S. Senate on July
22, 1992. I respectfully request that these documents
be added to the record.
I take this opportunity to extend to you my personal
thanks.
Sincerely yours.
Wladimir Werteleckyj, M.O.
Coordinator, Professor and Chairman
WW/swb
Attachments
"...to promote Academic linkages and Scientific exchange programs...

.
82
Attachment 1
Re: Question 1
What is the "synergenetlc* investigation whose results have never been released
which you referred to in your oral testimony? What were the findings and the
importance?
I regret that I could not find exactly the statement alluded to. However,
I believe that the question stems from my views about the "synergistic"
effects of global financial assistance rather than the limited effects
that purely scientific, health care or humanitarian assistance achieve if
rendered separately. This point deserves elaboration because it relates
to the letters of support concerning my previous deposition to the U.S.
Senate.
It is self-evident that in Ukraine there is an abundance of highly
qualified scientists and professionals. There is also broad recognition
that existing Ukrainian administrative structures reflect the failures of
the "centralized planning" characteristic of the former USSR. As shown in
the letters of support (Attachment 2), there is broad agreement that new
structures need to arise. Specifically, the possibility of creating
AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN MEDICAL SCIENCES CENTERS, to provide stable long term
"platforms" for rapid and effective introduction of American "know how"
was warmly received. As such "centers" grow in number, the idea of
amalgamating the "centers" into an "AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN CHILDREN'S
CENTER(S)" was also enthusiastically received. Achieving such goal would
be a monument to U.S. solidarity, to the emerging democracy of Ukraine and
to the victims of Chornobyl
Each "center" would pursue limited and well defined goals. Specific
"American-Ukrainian Task Forces" would seek to "synergistically" address
issues of education, training, health delivery and research in well
defined medical domains. For instance, in Ukraine there are scientific
reasons to expect a growing number of individuals exposed to the
radioactivity from the Chornobyl fallout to develop leukemia. An
"AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN CANCER-LEUKEMIA CENTER(S)" can be developed rapidly
with relatively modest financial resources (about 25% of the equivalent
cost in the U.S.). It must be underscored that a large proportion of such
expenditures would be for the support of U.S. scientists, U.S. suppliers
and other U.S. participants. In fact, I estimate that less than 50% of
such assistance would be for expenditures in Ukraine.
Currently, the causes of leukemia remain unknown. There are strong
scientific reasons to believe that radiation induced leukemia may reflect
different molecular alterations than "sporadic" leukemia. This view is
supported by the most eminent U.S. cytogeneticists. These highly
respected scientists strongly believe that there is an urgent call to
initiate immediately such investigations. There are no other human
populations that can be studied to answer such questions. The potential
discoveries may have tremendous scientific and economic implications.
However, because of the rapidly deteriorating social and medical
1
^

83
circumstances in Ukraine, there is a growing trend for those that can to
send their leukemic children for treatment abroad (a source of strong
social resentments by those who cannot afford such alternative). Medical
investigations concerning leukemia without concurrent health care delivery
assistance are not feasible.
The above is an illustration of a "synergistic" investment to achieve
academic, administrative, social, clinical and scientific goals. In
addition to "CANCER-LEUKEMIA", other "centers" could focus on issues such
as "birth defects", "maternal child health", etc. Each "center" is an
ideal platform for U.S. academic as well as private organizations to
demonstrate our know how and promote our technology. The "centers" can
also provide a platform to diminish the impact of competing technologies
being introduced by nearby european industrialized nations to this
important region of 50 million people.
Re: Question 2
You recommend utilizing existing frameworks, organizations and bilateral
relationships between Ukrainians and Americans to facilitate assistance. Do you
have a specific program in mind and the requirements for U.S. government
participation or funding?
To achieve the implementation of complex medical programs we recommend the
formation of goal oriented TASK FORCES. Our American-Ukrainian Medical
Sciences Group can expedite the formation of TASK FORCES because we
represent a cross section of medical disciplines and have broad linkages
with American scientific community. Each TASK FORCE would
"synergistically" address issues of education, training, administration,
technology, research and medical care delivery in well defined domains of
medical sciences. Each TASK FORCE would be composed by U.S., Ukrainian as
well as American-Ukrainian specialists. In addition to defining goals and
objectives, each TASK FORCE would seek to develop new physical and
administrative structures referred here as "centers". As shown in the
letters of support, there is clear enthusiasm for such an approach.
Ukrainian physicians and scientists abroad and in Ukraine strongly support
such a strategy (Attachment 2).
Of important relevance is the need to develop an "AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN
CANCER-LEUKEMIA CENTER(S)". With proper financial support, our
organization is in a position to develop a TASK FORCE within 60 days to be
composed of outstanding U.S. scientists, clinicians and other specialists
along with counterparts in Ukraine. I am confident, on the basis of
personal knowledge in the U.S. and Ukraine, that a functioning "center"
could be developed in the relatively short span of about one year. On the
other hand, I also unfortunately believe that funding separately
scientific, health delivery, and humanitarian projects through financial
aid through existing administrative structures in the U.S. directed at
existing Ukrainian organizations will achieve at best limited results.

84
The U.S. Government has already recognized the importance of creating
partnerships between individual scientists as reflected in programs
sponsored by the National Science Foundation and Nat-"onal Institutes of
Health. In the case of complex medical problems such as leukemia, birth
defects and biologic consequences of Chernobyl , specific TASK FORCES to
include U.S., U.S. -Ukrainian, and Ukrainian counterparts are necessary.
TASK FORCES, in addition to define goals and objectives and channel
financial assistance but must insure the creation of new physical
facilities, referred here as "centers", where U.S. style of administration
and problem solving could be implemented.

85
flep:acaBHa AyMa yKpaiHM
Kojieria 3 nHTOHL ryMamTapHoi' nojiiTHKH
252008, KHiB-8, Byji. Maxafljia rpymcBChgoro, 12/2 xeJi. 293 39 34
Professor Wolodymyr Wertelecki
Chairman, Department of Medical
Genetics University of South Alabama
Coordinator, American - Ukrainian
Medical Sciences Group
Dear Sir:
We have studied your deposition to the US Senate
concerning the Chernobyl disaster.
On behalf of the State Council of Ukraine(Duina) whose
functions include to coordination of the roles of various Ministers
to achieve a cohesive policy for Ukraine, it is with pleasure
that we support the contents of your deposition.
Furthermore, we welcome any furher assistance you may
render the US Senate or other agencies that may help Ukraine
which faces great difficulties.
We hope that you may promote and achieve a greater degree
of coordination in the efforts of those that may seek
assistance to Ukraine.
With best regards
National
Adviser
of Ukraine 'U'^^'^^ ./^^ M. Zhulynsky

86
UKRAINIAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION
OF NORTH AMERICA
NATIONAL OFFICE
V¥A
VKPAYHCbKE JIIKAPCbKE
TOBAPHCTBO
niBHIHHOl AMEPHKH
rojiOBHA ynPABA
TEL: (312) 278-6262 • 2247 W. CHICAGO AVENUE CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 60622 FAX: (312) 278-6962
W. Wertelecki, M.D.
Chairman, Dept. of Medical Genetics
University of South Alabama
Mobile, Alabama 36688
Dear Dr. W. Wertelecki:
On behalf of the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America,
I wish to extend this letter of support concerning your depositions
to the U.S. Senate.
We studied your depositions and are glad to concur with your
views about the urgent need for humanitarian and medical assistance
to Ukraine. The issues emerging from the Chernobyl tragedy
are universal and deserving of International support. The United
States is a country that not only stands as a technological giant
but is also a bastion of humanism.
We hope that the U.S. Senate will render help to Ukraine. Most
of the assistance to the USSR, now Russia, has not reached the
Ukrainian children.
Please let us know how we can assist you or the U.S.
this matter.
Senate
in
Sincerely,
/f-
L
Andrew O. Lewicky, M.D.
President, Ukrainian Medical Association of North America

I
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90
Translation of Support
Letter
Ministry of Health
Republican Scientific Hygiene Center
To:
Coordinator
U.S. -Ukrainian Medical Sciences Group
Dr. W. Werteleckyj Date: August 18, 1992
Distinguished
Professor:
We represent the principle scientific Ukrainian organization concerning
environment and its influence on the health of the Ukrainian people. We are
constituted by three institutes which incorporate in excess of 300 scientists.
Our institutes are concerned with issues that include medical aspects stemming
from the Chornobyl catastrophy, the protection of the genetic integrity of the
Ukrainian population as well as other populations. We express our willingness
and interest in collaborative projects with international scientific
organizations.
In this regard we are asking you to become our representative and the
representative of Ukrainian medical sciences in international organizations.
We hold the hope that collaborative activities will
scientists in the international community.
foster the integration of our
Signed: A.M. Serdiuk
Director of the Center
252660, Kiev 94
ul . Popudrenko 50
tel: 559-7373

.
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/
NS
LETTER OF SUPPORT
Re: Depositon to the Senate of the United States of North America
Concerning the medical care and scientific issues raised by the
Chernobyl tragedy
Dear Dr. Werteleckyj
It was a pleasure to meet you and to study your deposition to the U.S. Senate.
On behalf of Kharkiv Region Administration which represents Region Council of People's
Deputates, Kharkiv .Medical Association and .-'i.Maselsk) i. .•\.Zdoro\yj. V.Tyaglo.
L.Pidoprygora. L.Porokhnyak. I wish to to suppon your \iews.
Your deposition raises issues about the urgent need in Ukraine for technical, scientific and
humanitarian medical assistance. In this regard I would like to point out;
1
The need is urgent. .Assistance is most effecti\ e if medical sciences address humanitarian
needs concurrently.
2. We suppon the vieu that in addition to go\ermental programs, one-to-one bilateral
programs between individual scientists, clinicians, clinics, hospitals or institutes are probably
more effective.
3. The concept of joint "Ukralnlan-.-\mericaii Centers of Excellence" is likels to lose anc
speed-up the comprehensi\e multidlsciplinar\
long term and stable development of linkage>
! H. i;^..^ -v. M. B. ^,:.>, -X.i; > !• : «. -A -C- i-.'w'-

92
LtTTER OF SUPPORT 2.
Such "Centers" are also attractive because academic, private or state, plus business
organizations can participate in creating or using such "Centers".
Concerning Chernobyl, international medical assistance to Ukraine per se has been
modest. We also recognize the need for novel approaches beyond those already in place and
promoted by International Agencies. New approaches such as the "Centers" are worthy because
they fall outside of the existing frameworks. The "Centers" would attract considerable interest
from our emerging private sector concerned with medical technology.
I
lake this opportunity to express my best wishes.
Vice-Chairman Of Kharkiv
A.Zdorovyj
Region Administration
I
(

93
U.S. Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works
Statement of
Edward E. Purvis, III
Assisted by
Dr. Marvin Goldman
July 22, 1992
57-583 - 92 - 4\

94
Statement of
Edward E. Purvis, III
Principal Engineer
Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc.
July 22, 1992
Mr. Chairman, my name is Ed Purvis. I am a principal engineer with Los Alamos Technical Associates
(LATA), an environmental sciences and engineering firm that provides technical services to industry and
government agencies. Our principal work is in the fields of hazardous and radioactive materials handling
and processing, national security, the environment, and nuclear safety. LATA has appeared in the Inc. 500 .
an elite group of the nation's fastest growing companies, and has been in the Enoineering News Record's
list of the top 500 design firms since 1 981 .
programs in Russia and in Ukraine.
LATA is cun-ently involved in nuclear safety and nuclear cleanup
In 1986, I led the Department of Energy's Analysis Team's work to understand the Chernobyl-4
accident. Subsequently, we did extensive and detailed analyses and reviews of the safety of the Chernobyl
type reactors, of the various models of WERS (Soviet designed pressurized water reactors) and other Soviet
designed nuclear facilities. Results were published in DOE/NE-0076, which addresses the Chernobyl
accident, and DOE/NE-0084 and DOE/NE-0084 which address WERs. My recent activities have included
waste management, nuclear safety, and work related to cleaning up the aftermath of the ChernobyI-4
accident.
I was assisted in the preparation of this statement in regard to health effects of the Chernobyl accident
by Dr. Marvin Goldman, who is extremely knovirfedgeable in this area. He is the leader of the US/USSR joint
working group on health effects. He is Emeritus Professor of Radiology at the University of California at
Davis, recipient of the Health Physics Society's Distinguished Scientific Achievement Award, and has chaired
many committees assessing health effects of radiation.
I
appreciate this opportunity to discuss the Chernobyl accident and its results, the current status, the
continuing threat posed by the results of the accident, particularly in the area near the sarcophagus covering
Chemoby1-4. It Is necessary to understand the accident sequence in order to understand the resulting and
current situation.

95
What Happened
The Chernobyl accident resulted from major design flaws and operations problems. The design flaws
allowed the power output to increase as the temperature increased at low power levels. The control system
could not shut the reactor down fast enough to prevent a proljlem under these conditions. (This was a
unique problem with the Chernobyl type reactors which does not exist in water-cooled reactors in the West.)
To avoid this problem, the Soviets established hard and fast njles prohibiting operation at the relatively low
power levels where this flaw existed. At Chernobyl there was an operations problem that resulted in the
continued operation of the reactor in violation of these rules.
The combination of design flaws and operator actions resulted In a situation where the reactor power
increased very rapidly. The accident is estimated to have released over 32 glgajoules of energy In less than
0.2 seconds. The temperature of a small part of the fuel exceeded 13,000 degrees F. This vaporized the
fuel. The expanding fuel vapor and fission product gases reacted with the water that cooled the reactor.
The pressure tubes failed. There was a large pressure pulse that destroyed the reactor, blew fuel out of the
reactor, and released highly radioactive material to the environment. Most of the fuel remained inside the
area now covered by the sarcophagus. This fuel was extremely hot (4,000 degrees F) and was in contact
with the graphite that had been broken Into small pieces, causing the graphite to bum. The high
temperatures of the fuel and the buming graphite resulted in some of the radioactive fission products being
carried by the release plume thousands of feet into the air and being widely dispersed. Over 50 million
curies were released.
Some important information could not be obtained. For example, the exact amounts of radioactive
iodine and its distribution wUI never be l

96
The Situation In and Near the Reactor After the Accident
The ma]or releases and spread o( radionuclides took place at the tlnne of the accident and In the
period ending May 6. 1986. Table 1 provides an estimate of sonw key radlonudkJes In the reactor at the
time of the accWent Release rates were several hundred thousand curies per hour. Figure 1 shows the
release rales of radionudWes from the reactor In the period Immediately after the accWent The entire
inventory of radbacth/e nMe gases was released, as was at least 20% of the kxJine. Current estimates are
that about 30 to 40% of the core inventory of ce8lum-137 was released from the area now covered by the
sarcophagus.
TABLE 1. INVENTORY OF SEVERAL RADIONUCUDES IN THE
UNIT 4 REACTOR PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT
RadlonudUe

97
-? 15
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(0
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Figure 1.
Estimates of Radioactivity Reieases from tfie Reactor After Chemoby1-4 Accident
There were about 420,000 pounds of fuei in the reactor core at the time of the accident. It is now
estimated with good confidence that between 3 and 4% (12,600 to 16,800 pounds) of this fuel was released
from the volume that is now covered by the sarcophagus. While the larger pieces of fuel and fuel elements
were found and collected, smaller fuel fragments could not be collected. The remainder of the fuel (over
400,000 pounds) is in the sarcophagus.
The ground around the sarcophagus was scooped up and buried In pits within ten miles of the plant.
Much of the contamination gathered in the cleanup immediately after the accident was buried in these pits.
Many of the vehicles and most of the equipment used In the cleanup were also buried in pits. The water
table around the Chernobyl reactor site is dose to ground level, so there Is a danger that this contamination
is being spread into the water table.
Over 6.000 tons of material (40 tons - boron carbide. 800 tons - dolomite, 1 ,800 tons - sand and clay.
2.400 tons - lead) was dropped over the reactor from helicopters t>etween April 28 and May 2, 1986 to
reduce releases of radionuclides. Through June of 1990 over 14.000 tons of material was dropped on the
reactor. Much of this material melted and combined with fuel, graphite, and material in or near the core to

98
Figure 2. A Worker Removing Core Debris from the Roof of Chernobyl-4 After the Accident

99
form lava.' This material ran through pipes that were In the core area to vent steam from pressure tube
failures to water-filled suppression pools under the reactor (Figure 3. a cross sectional vievi/ of the Chemobyl
Unit-4, shows these pools). Figures 4 and 5 show the lava' in the pipes and pools. The gamma radiation
dose rate on the surface of some of the pipes and lava' in the summer of 1986 was on the order of 10,000
r/hour.
At some locations the dose rate was about 20,000 r/hour.
Most of the approximately 400,000 pounds of fuel that remained inside the sarcophagus Is either in
this lava,' or is present as dust and pieces of fuel on what used to be the operating floor of the reactor.
The vessel that held the core Is almost empty, although the region underneath contains most of the fuel in
lava.
Figure 6 is an isometric sicetch of the reactor that shows the reactor and adjacent regions.
The Sarcopfaaus
A number of heroic actions were taken after the accident. The water was removed from the
suppression pools to prevent a steam explosion and associated radionuclide release that would have
occurred K the core had melted through the concrete and fell into the water. A 400-foot tunnel was dug to
allow liquid nitrogen to be Injected into the core area to cool the core.
It has been found that the hot fuel had penetrated Into the concrete under the core that was originally
6.6 feet thick, unti only 8 to 20 Inches of good concrete remained in some places.
The sarcophagus (Figure 7 is an Isometric sketch of the exterkir and Figure 8 Is a cross-sectional view
of the Interior) was erected In a very short period of time to reduce releases.
Figure 9 is a picture of the
reactor after the accUent. The sarcophagus that was erected over this destroyed buUding vras not a
containment structure or a long-term solution to the problem. In order to reduce immediate risks to people
and the environment, the sarcophagus was designed and buRt very qutekly under emergency conditions.
In a very dangerous radiation zone.
The Cunent Situation In and Near the Sarcophagus
Figure 10 shows recent radiatkxi levels In the suppression pools.
There are fuel fragments, fuel assemblies, parts of fuel assemblies, and fuel rods spread about what
used to be the operating floor of the reactor. There is finely dispersed radioactive dust, called 'hot particles,'

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Figure 7.
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108
The information on the conditions in the sarcophagus was obtained in significant detaO as a result of
much courageous and hard wor(( by dedicated workers at the reactor.
The Cun-ent Risks
WhPe radiatkNi release rates from the sarcophagus are now low, much of the fuel and remaining
radknctive material is in a form that potentially could be dispersed under a number of conditions. Examples
of release mechanisms are:
• The over 2,000 ton reactor cover is tated on edge. Its stability Is unknown. If it falls it will create
a big doud of radioactive material.
• Birds, Insects, and animals live and feed in the sarcophagus. They cany radioactive material
outskle of the buPding.
• The sarcophagus is open to the environment. Releases increase under some weather
conditkxis, sometimes by a significant amount.
• The sarcophagus is deteriorating rapidly. Steel portions are rusting. Concrete is cracking and
crumbling in places.
• The immense structure of the sarcophagus Is settling unevenly. The area of the openings is
about 13,000 square feet, and the number and size of the existing openings are increasing.
In addition, there are large amounts of radioactive material buried In pits near the sites. This material
is entering the water table and could move Into the food chain, creating health risks.
It is known that there are hot spots outside the exclusion area. The limits and contents of these hot
spots are Rl defined. The population in the area that received fallout are receiving increased ex(>osures over
nomnal background, partk:uiar1y in the areas of the hot spots. The population in the areas that received
fallout is at an increased risk over people in other areas. Due to uncertainties in understanding both the
effects of low levels of radiattons, and detaPs of the exposures and distributkin, it is not possible to quantify
the extent of this risk.
15

109
Natural processas of decay have reduced the levels of the released radiation to about 15 or 20% of
the original levels. Further reductions In levels of radiation wH be slow. The most intense and damaging
doees occurred In the period immediately after the acddertt.
The health risks associated with exposure to radiation from the accident has not been eliminated; it
has been greatly reduced.
There are also risks that resJt from past exposures.
The popuiatkin at greatest risk are the small
chidren who received thyroU radiatk>n exposures due to kxline immediately after the accUent, and the
1k]uUators' who worked on the site cleanup and emergency response actions after the accUenL
Using existing knowledge and technology, it Is possible to reduce future exposure and risk with
prudent cleanup activities. The level of risk is still high enough to justify these actions. The need for some
action such as containing, or isolating, major potential release sources such as the sarcophagus, the burial
pits wtwre the debris from the emergerxry cleanup actktn was taken, and the hot spots is obvious. The need
for other cleanup actk>ns must be addressed on a cost/benefit basis with the benefit criterion being the
greatest reductkxi In human heafth risk for avalable funds.
Prot)lems
The key problem in taking needed actkm is the lack of hard cun-ency.
The cleanup of the Chemobyl
accklent does not produce a revenue stream.
Intematkinal lending agencies and banks need to have a
revenue stream to provUe the funds to assure repayment of the loan if normal banking practices are used.
Unfortunately, measures to reduce the rerfalning health risks to the population do not provkJe such a
definable reveruje streanrt
Whie cleanup and risk reductkin have both a human and economic benefit. It
Is difficirit to quantify this benefit in conventk)nal *bankat>lit/ terms.
Needed Acttons
Ukrainian people, equipment, and currency provUe the vast majority of the resources required to dean
up Cf)emobyl. There are also needs that require external resources, such as technology. The work in the
sarcophagus, for Instance, cannot be done with people because the radiation exposures are too high,
(in
(act, much of the work ttiat has been done to date has been done by people working in radiatkxi fields that
wouM be unacceptable for people in the United States.)
Work must be done with remote devices and
robots, not people.
Only when the radiatkxi levels are reduced can people work in this area.
16

110
Work must be done in a logical sequence:
• First, the radioactive material in the sarcophagus must be stabilized. This requires remote
equipment.
• Second, the fuel, the dust, the lava, and the other loose radioactive material must be coilected
and put in containers and placed in a safe repository.
Much of this requires remote equipment
• Third, the remaining radioactive materials must be either confined or decontaminated, and
cleaned up.
This will require a mix of remote equipment and people.
Evaluations to select a long-term solution need not delay priority near-term actions.
A long-temn
solution can be applied after necessary precursor actions are taken.
Long-term solutions might include
placing a stable confinement structure around the reactor (after cleanup), or a more detailed cleanup.
There are two major options, confinement versus "green fielding".
This choice, and actions between
these two extremes, are the subject of deliberation.
There are numerous other examples of needs that require U.S. technology and expertise to allow work
to be accomplished in a safe and efficient manner. Details have been Uentrfied and will be applied as soon
as possible.
The Help Needed
There are some things that can be done with Ukrainian funds and these will constitute the vast bulk
of the effort and manpower.
Hard currency is required to provMe resources and technology that are not currently available in
Ukraine.
The current economk: sltuatk>n exacerbates a very difficult situatkMi in terms of financing the hard
cun'ency poitton of the cleanup work.
This work must be done first because, despite the bravery and risk
accepted by workers at the reactor to assess the details of the situation kisUe the sarcophagus, people
cannot perform many of the tasks required to stabilize and contain the loose material. Technology and
expert help is required to allow the work to be done.
17

Ill
Clean up actions should be taken as quickly as possible.
The problems created by the Chernobyt-4
acckJent still exist. While smaller than the problems immediately after the accident, they are still significant.
Future reductions In health risks due to natural processes will occur slowly.
The current economic situation does not provkie mechanisms for Ukraine to generate the needed hard
currency.
Significant amounts of hard currency must come from outskje Ukraine to allow work to proceed
expeditiously.
The key need now is hard currency to allow remedial actions to proceed.
Thank you.
18

112
Attachment A
Health and Environmental Prolilems
In Ukraine from the
Chernobyl Accident
by Marvin Goldman
July 13, 1992
I was asked by Ed Purvis to supply a brief statement on the current issue of Chernobyl-induced health
and environmental effects. I have been studying these since the accident and have been to the former
Soviet Union 1 1 times on this Issue. As scientific group leader for the USA/USSR Working Group 7.2 on
Health Effects of the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, I have been working
with our scientific counterparts over there for the past 4 years.
This statement reflects my own personal
opinion and does not necessarily represent the official position of any official US Government agency.
The Chernobyl accident resulted in the dispersion of massive quantities of radioactive materials over
most of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the region close to the reactor, especially where it rained while
the plume was passing overhead, was particularly hard hit.
Large areas of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia are
still "coated" with a mantle of radio-cesium, an isotope with a 30-year half life, "strong" gamma and beta
radiation, and a metabolic similarity to potassium In that It Is ubiquitously passed through the food web to
people. Simply stated, it poses a threat for total txxJy exposure from external depositions as well as from
ingestion of contaminated food stuffs.
The other radiation of significance is more serious In my estimation. The short-lived isotopes of iodine,
which were released In very large quantities, delivered high radiation doses to the thyroid glands of
thousands of people down wind.
Most importantly, even larger doses were delivered to children because
of their greater consumption of contaminated milk, and because of their smaller and more active
radiosensitive thyroid glands.
The children received doses several times higher than their parents and,
unfortunately, some of the children are already demonstrating a higher than normal Incidence of thyroid
cancer. The exact figures are not yet avallatjie, but there appears to be an Increase in childhood cancer
In Belarus and Ukraine. It will be Important to perform a credible job of retrospective dosimetry as well as
of epidemiology in order to precisely quantify the risk. All I can say at this time is that there is a real
problem, and It Is Increasing.
A special problem Is associated with the many thousands of people who were recruited to help with
the cleanup and other post-acckJent activities. About a half million people were involved, and perhaps about
10% of them, many In the military, received significant exposures. This latter group is restricted mainly to

113
those involved in 1986 and part of 1987. There are reports of increased death rates, but no completed
scientific study is yet available to determine if any of the reported deaths are radiation related, or what doses
were absorbed. The continual publicity on this Issue cannot be ignored, and it is important that a credible
dose reconstruction and health survey be performed.
This contributes to the next issue as well.
Another issue today Is related to the level of distrust and confusion associated with the real and
imagined radiation exposure of the public.
This has Induced a massive "epidemic" of radiophobia. a fear
of what the radiation may have done, but which is not yet manifest.
This psychological effect is not to be
ignored, because to the people it is very real, and fear is possitjiy Increasing as a result of misinfomnatlon.
disinformation, lack of correct Icnowledge. etc.
Reports of predicted extra cancer deaths from the accident have used a variety of models and
assumptions. Basic to ail Is the fact that most late effects of radiation appear many years after exposure.
and are yet to "be counted." In addition, the risk models for extra cases over the next 45 years or so predict
anywhere from about several hundred to a third of a million.
In discussing radiation risks, I choose
to use a concept of risk increment. There is no dose so small
as to have no associated risk, i.e.. there is no threshold of safety. That is. whatever a person's lifetime
cancer risk may be. a dose of radiation adds an increment to it.
A common value in western countries is
that about one in five people die of cancer; the risk is 1 /5 or 20%. Assume that a radiation dose equal to
50 years of natural tiackground radiation increases ones cancer risk by 1%. i.e., about 1 % of the 20% cancer
risk can lie ascril^ed to natural background radiation.
This is about the value most responsible scientists
seem to accept. With few exceptions, the thyroid being the dominant exception, almost no one in the
Chernobyl down-wind areas received such a dose. Even the very best epidemiology study cannot
distinguish between two such groups, no matter how large the groups studied. Therefore, we are faced with
the problem of micro doses to mega populations, a situation where direct measurement can only confirm
that the doses were small, but not that absolutely no health consequences resulted.
My current conservative estinr^te is that no more than 5,000 to 10.000 additional cases could be
caused by the acckJent; the same model also states that the possibility of zero extra cases is not ruled out
statistically. The truth will likely lie in between, closer to zero than the upper value. But this is not a
certainty; it is an estimate based on my understanding and evaluation of doses and risks.
There f»ve been reports of a spectrum of alleged health "effects." most of which were likely not to
have t>een caused by Chernobyl's radiation. The task of separating the real from the alleged Is formidable.

114
Only a careful, credible dose reconstruction and a set o( specific epidemiology studies wBI provide the
evidence to put the issue into perspective.
It is possible that there may be 'pockets' where a time-specific increase of leukemia may occur.
There may be nrore cases of thyroW cancer in the afflicted areas, the result of doses completely delivered
5 years ago. It is not likely that there are many areas where people are now living, v^rtiere relocation is
necessary to reduce the lifetime dose by a significant fraction of what has already tieen absortied. It is
possible that almost everyone exposed has already received over 90% of their Chernobyl doses. Without
further data and informatton. It is not possible to state whether this optimism is solidly founded. I can only
end by stating that, other than what I've outlined above, the radiation doses from the accident are not
expected to deliver any more surprises.

115
Prepared Statement of Murray Feshbach, Ph.D.
I, of course, would like to thank the committee and its staff for inviting me to
testify about this important issue. My viewpoint is that the situation is much worse
than hitherto deemed to be the case, and that new evidence confirms the rising
problem.
First, please allow me to stipulate that I am NOT opposed to nuclear power, per
se. I am opposed to the way the Soviets did and the newly independent states continue
to operate their facilities. This is the hazard that particularly disturbs me because
I believe that it is a potential hazard not only for the former Soviet Union's
population, but also for the populations of Europe, the Far East and Canada and the
United States. Soviet facilities are potential accidents waiting to happen. I include
in this not only the Chernobyl-type reactor but all others, £is well as the nuclear
waste and reactor dumping sites in the Novaya Zemlya region, and the approach to
the northern seas of radiation moving from Chelyabinsk region through the Siberian
rivers.
Second, to address the Chernobyl situation more directly. It should be made clear
that the original report on the number of territories affected by the accident of 25
April 1986 is a major understatement. According to the original, somewhat delayed
report, only 5 administrative-territorial units—known as oblasts (roughly equivalent
to our state-level unit)—in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were impacted. The current
information available indicates that the total of 4 oblasts in Ukraine and Belarus
hold, but instead of 1 oblast in Russia, 15 were affected by at least an average of 1
curie of radioactivity of cesium-137 radionucleides per square kilometer.
Included in this category of at least 1 curie per square kilometer is not only the
originally reported Bryansk oblast (over 34 percent of the oblast territory), but also
Kaluga oblast (17 percent); Belgorod oblast (8 percent); Voronezh oblast (1.5 percent);
Rursk oblast (4.4 percent); Leningrad oblast (1 percent); Lipetsk oblast (8 percent);
Orel oblast (40 percent); Penza oblast (3 percent); Ryazan oblast (15 percent); Smolensk
oblast (0.5 percent); Tambov oblast (1.7 percent); Tula oblast (47 percent);
Ulyanovsk oblast (0.6 percent); and Mordovia (2 percent);
Areas with less than 1 curie per square kilometer affected, i.e., 0.5 to 0.6 curies
per square km: Tver, Novgorod and Nizhnegorod oblasts;
Areas with less than 0.4 curies per square kilometer: Saratov oblast and Udmurtia;
Areas with less than 0.3 curies per square kilometer: Rarelia;
Areas with less them 0.2 curies per square kilometer: Astrakhan, Kaliningrad,
Rostrom and Rostov oblasts, plus Chuvashia and Kalmykia;
Areas with less than 0.1 curies per square kilometer: Arkhangel'sk, Vladimir,
Volgograd, Vologda, Ivanovo, Kirov, Smara, Moscow, Murmansk, Orenburg, Perm,
Pskov and Yaroslavl oblasts, Stavropol kray, Bashkiria, Mariy El and Komi ASSR's.
An indeterminate, as yet, number of curies per square kilometer is known also to
be prevalent in the Siberian and Far Eastern regions beyond the Urals, but the
trace mounts have not yet been determined. Apparently a survey is being conducted
presently.
Whether hazardous or not, the spread throughout the former country is much
greater than indicated previously.
Third, the renowned International Atomic Ener^ Agency report about the
impact of Chernobyl on health, is, in my humble opinion, wrong. It is wrong for at
least 4 reasons, not due to the brilliant people, physicists, medical personnel, epidemiologist,
and others, but for other reasons:
1. The analysis (whether asked for or not by the then Soviet government) was conducted
much too early to see the impact of low doses of radiation on the health of
the population. Undoubtedly the latest data they could have had was for 1989, only
3 years or so after the event. Given the experience of the health impact on the Biroshima
and Nagasaki populations, some 5,6,7 years later is when the peak incidence
of leukemia and thyroid cancer shows up (again from low exposure levels), not 2 to 3
years;
2. Every Soviet analyst, epidemiologist, government advisor, and green party
member I asked about the conduct of the IAEA analysis indicated that they, the
IAEA researchers, did not ask about,, more likely did not know about, the Third
Administration of the USSR Ministry of Bealth. It is this organization which collects
data, supervises analysis, and keeps secret the data from nuclear events such
as Chernobyl as well as chemical and biological accidents. The Institute of Biophysics,
under Academician II" it seems more attached to the military than to the Academy
of Medical Sciences. Many Sovietologists did and still do not know about the

116
Third Administration. This organization reportedly had medical information about
500,000 persons involved in the region and the clean-up process.
3. The sample was too small, including only 100,000 persons stUl resident in the
region, and not those who left to return to Estonia, Latvia (5,000), Central A.sia, especially
Uzbekistan (12,000) or elsewhere within the former USSR—and therefore
whose morbidity and mortality (either short-run or now longer-run) were not incorporated
in the sample. The total number of persons involved should have been
660,000. According to the Baits, many of these individuals, especially young military
reservists called up explicitly to help in the clean-up, became very ill or died.
4. Testimony to the IAEA investigators was provided and ignored. On the one
hand, I can accept with alacrity that there are many diagnostic errors in Soviet
medicine (then and now), and I have written (with Alfred Friendly, Jr.) a major
book on health and environmental issues (entitled Ecocide in the USSR: Health and
Nature Under Siege, New York, Basic Books, 1992, 376 pp.) explicitly detailing all
the problems of Soviet medicine. On the other hand, to completely ignore some of
the evidence is a bit much. One physician from Zhitomir oblast showed me his data
(which he twice presented to the IAEA investigators), on the growth of congenital
anomalies from the period 1985 to 1989. For every subadministrative territory of the
oblast, he had rayon data for every single birth in the oblast, and their medical
status. Be found a growth of 2.5 to 7 times for all types of congenital anomalies
since the base year, 1985, the year before the accident. If one even reduces any putative
exaggeration, mis-diagnosis, by even 50 percent, the increase in anomalies in
this impacted region in such a short time is more than noteworthy. Why were these
data not incorporated? Others tell me that suggestions for specific areas to visit also
were ignored or unarranged?
5. Current data show an explosion of cases of thyroid cancer in the region. Some
selected data are, as follows:
a. In late March 1992, the Ukraine's Parliamentary Commission on Chernobyl affirmed
that 37 Ukrainian and Belorussian children were diagnosed with thyroid
cancer in 1991 and 1992. Prior to the accident, only 1 or 2 cases per year were reported;
b. In mid-AprU 1992, the Belarus Parliament was informed that 1,700 cases of thyroid
cancer were recorded in the republic /country at the beginning of 1992, with 35
children so afflicted. Prior to the accident, for the 20 years up to 1986, only 5 adults
and no children were diagnosed with thyroid cancer. Since the beginning of the
year, another 299 persons, were "officially recorded," including 52 children in the
first few months of 1992 (subsequent to the 1,700 count). Bow many were not unofficially
recorded, or incorrectly diagnosed? Incorrect diagnoses can work in both directions—undercounts
due to misdiagnosis and non-recognition, or exaggerated overstatements
of the seriousness of the given illness. The disparity pre- and postChernobyl
is enormous even were one to multiply the base period by 10 or 20 and halve
the later figure (say 200 and 850, respectively).
c. At the Belarus Congress on Chernobyl, held in April of 1992, a speaker indicated
that "almost 200,000 Belorussian children now have enlarged thyroids." Bow
many will progress into th3rroid cancer is not known, but certainly if one assumes as
little as 5 percent, this would be 10,000 additional cases;
d. In Ukraine, the rate of thyroid cancer has increased by 17 times in the period
1986 to 1991, from a rate of 0.13 cases per 100,000 population up to its present level,
or 2.2 per 100,000 population;
e. The Ukrainian Minister for Clean-up of Chernobyl stipulated in the spring of
this year that 6,000 to 8,000 excess deatli occurred due to the Chernobyl accident.
Again this is for Ukraine only and not for Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and
other republics/ countries.
f. The Ukrainian Minister of Environment, Yuri Shcherbak, stated that "potential
mortal doses of radiation were suffered by 365,000 persons (for Ukraine only). By
this time, 7,000 persons who participated in the emergency work have died." Not 32
persons as initially admitted and not the 150 later admitted, according to official
statistics, but 7,000 as a minimum for excess deaths.
To repeat, even if most of these statements by local authorities are exaggerated,
even by doubling the true levels and rates, they are significantly more than Soviet
official or the L^A results.
To indicate that radiophobia is widespread (from the results of the latter's survey)
is not surprising. If it were not so, then I certainly would believe that this rejwrt
was erroneous for this reason alone. I was then in Belgium, serving as the first, experimental
Sovietologist-in-Residence in the Office of the Secretary-General of
NATO, Lord Carrington, at the exact time of the accident. My wife and I were exposed
to the radioactivity that impacted that country as well. I can fully empathize

117
with those who are classified as phobic about radiation, but to classify all "illness"
as phsychosomatic I cannot believe based on logic and the evidence from the republics/countries
involved..
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Shelby T. Brewer
Thank you, Mr. Chgiirman, for the opportunity to app>ear before your Committee. I
am Shelby Brewer, Chairman, ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power.
ABB Inc., headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut, offers an extensive portfolio of
products and services that meet America's need for cleaner, more efficient ways to
create and apply energy in communities and industries. ABB serves customers in
several major markets, including producers and users of electrical power, pulp and
paper manufactures, hydrocarbon processors, passenger rail authorities and automotive
manufacturers. The company employs over 29,000 people at some 50 manufacturing
facilities and 300 sales and service centers nationwide. We designed 15 of the
operating reactors in the U.S. emd they have had an excellent operating record to
date.
ABB Inc. benefits from the strengths of its parent company, ABB Asea Brown
Boveri Ltd. (headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland), which is the holding company of
the ABB Asea Brown Boveri Group, a global leader in electrical engineering and
technology with 214,000 employees around the world. In 1991, ABB Group revenues
approached $29 billion, with the U.S. accounting for 19 percent of this total.
My purpose today is to present my company's perspective on the nuclear power
complex in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Europe (EE).
CHERNOBYL AND THE RBMKS
Since the Chernobyl accident of 1986, the safety of nuclear reactors operating in
Eastern Europe and the former USSR has been a subject of intense review and
debate. Most western nucleeir experts agree that the accident resulted from an inherently
poor design combined with poor station operating procedures.
Moreover, the design inadequacies of the Chernobyl class of reactors (the RBMK
tyi)e) are considered fundamental, deriving from the way the nucleeir fuel and the
coolant are configured, selection of materials, and the dynamics and control of the
fission process itself. I will avoid a long technical dissertation on this subject, but
the point is that most experts agree that safety deficiencies of the RBMK class
cannot be retrofitted away, because they are so fundamental in character.
There are sixteen of these reactors in operation currently, supplying a significant
fraction of electrical energy, particularly in Russia. While decommissioning of the
RBMKs has been urged by western authorities, it is not clear how an electricity
generating shortfall would be memaged, if, indeed, such a gap would result from
RBMK closure. The extent of a capacity shortfall, sans the RBMKs, is uncertain;
electrical demand by the industrial sector in Russia is decreasing.
Management of an electrical supply shortfall could involve a mix of options such
as:
• Repowering the RBMKs with combustion gas turbines, such as was done at the
Midland and Zimmer nuclear plants in the U.S.;
• Efficiency improvements;
• Wheeling power from Western Europe;
• Completion of the 1000 MWe WER type reactors under construction in the
CIS.
Crosscuttuig the issue of continued versus discontinued operation of the RBMKs,
the electrical energy supply/demand uncertainty, is the severe economic conditions
Eastern Europe and CIS are facing as this region transitions from central economic
planning to a marketdriven economy. The constraints on hard currency purchases
are enormous. This exacerbates the problems of the RBMKs—of exercising any of
the options I have listed above, such as substitution of gas turbines for the RBMKs,
purchasing power, or rapid completion of the 1000 MWe WER-type reactors in the
pipeline. How will these projects be paid for? It is not enough to hector and nag
them about the safety of their technol

118
It is ironic that after 70 years of lecturing the Soviet regime on the efficacy of
market-driven economies and free enterprise, we threaten a trade barrier in 1992 on
importation of CIS urEinium and urEmium enrichment services into the U.S. I refer,
of course, to the "dumping issue" now before the Commerce Department. Sale of
uranium and enrichment services is one of a very few means available to Russia to
generate hard currency needed for reactor upgrades.
REACTOR TYPES AND LOCATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CIS
There are reactor tjrpes other than the RBMK tj^ie
in Eastern Europe and CIS.
The other principal reactor type is the WER, a design conceptually similar to the
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) prevalent in Western Europe, the U.S. and Asia.
There are three principal series of WERs:
• The WER 440/230 series—a 440 MWe design developed and deployed in the
1956-1970 time frame—the first generation WER.
• The WER 440/213 series—a 440 MWe design developed and deployed in the
1970-1980 time frame—the second generation WER.
• The WER 1000/320 series—a 1000 MWe design developed and deployed in the
1970-1985 time frame—the third generation WER.
The operating reactor types and locations are summarized in Table 1.
RELATIVE SAFETY OF EE/CIS REACTORS
As I mentioned earlier, safety issues regarding EE/CIS reactors intensified following
the Chernobyl accident in 1986. While the Chernobyl reactor was an RBMK, the
issue swept across all reactors including the various VVER series.
Numerous assessments have been conducted by national and international nuclear
agencies evaluating the safety attributes of EE/CIS reactors. The IAEA, WANO,
USNllC, USDOE, and others have conducted these studies. A good summary of
these efforts was published by the USCEA in a "Source Book" in April of this year.
These assessments form the bases for formulating western assistance plans for reactor
remediation, e.g., G-7 and G-24. Without burdening you with the staggering
detail of these studies, let me qualitatively summarize the major conclusions:
1. The RBMKs are inherently unsafe and should be brought off line as soon as
possible.
2. Relative safety attributes of the WERs varies from the first generation 230
series (worst) to the third 320 series (best).
3. Relative safety attributes of EE/CIS reactors, even the 320, 1000 MWe, series
fall short of western standards.
This summary is admittedly an oversimplification
among the studies in detail.
and glosses over differences
EVOLVING NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE IN EE/CI8
Traditionally, core competence in nuclear technology, research and development,
reactor design and engineering and manufacturing for Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union has resided in Russia. Manufactured nuclear fuel was supplied
by Russia, and spent fuel was returned to Russia for disposition. Reactor equipment
was supplied by Russia. (Some large component manufacturing was done in Czechosloveikia,
but buUt to specifications established by Russian designers.) Seifety regulatory
standards were established in Russia. Economic transactions were accomplished
in rubles.
The political restructuring in Eastern Europe threatens to change these traditional
supply patterns as each EE/CIS nation strives to establish its own planning,
supply, and regulatory infrastructure. This transition raises another nuclear safety
issue: what effect will these infrastructure disruptions (decentralization) have on nuclear
safety? Can new, competent, nuclear infrastructures be established quickly
enough to economically assure a continuity of nuclear safety?
To me it makes no sense, given the other economic imperatives of the r^on, to
write off the current more or less centralized nuclear infrastructure—to dismiss
mgmufacturing and engineering and research and development resources in
Russia—and then incur the expense of replicating this infrastructure in each of the
newly independent nations. Yet this is exactly the tact some Western nuclear compemies
are on—to replace the Russia-based nuclear infi-astructure with their own. In
marketing new fuel manufacturing capability for EE/CIS, for example, they cite the
need for nuclear independence from Russia and the usual time-worn cliches about
Russian quality.
Infrastructure issues, the adequacy of attention to safety, are exacerbated by the
severe economic conditions in EE/CIS as the region shifts rapidly to market-driven

119
economies. Economic chaos and hardship are obvious. Demands to generate net
hard currency, or minimize consumption of it, are intense. Poverty and inexperience
of reactor operators during this transition period has been cited as a safety issue.
I raise these questions not as a nuclear safety phobic but instead to put these
issues in context. Nuclear reactor safety issues cannot be considered in isolation
from other problems facing the newly independent countries in EE/CIS.
ee/cis nuclear safety in a broader context
Most Western reviews of EE/CIS reactors have been objective and professional.
However, to some extent, the specific priorities and interests of Western companies
and other institutions which can benefit from elaborate remediation programs, have
given the efforts an odor of "ambulance-chasing." Moreover, many Western parties
take the position that since the West will be suppljdng grants and loan guarantees
to CIS/EE, then the West has the right to dictate the way the assistance money will
be spent. Further, the reactor safety issues have been considered in isolation from
other major problems in the CIS/EE; assessments have not addressed priorities, and
relative risks, costs, and benefits of remediations proposed.
A successful Eissistance program for improving nuclear safety cannot be imposed;
it must be carefully and realistically integrated into the economic and energy plans
of each country and region. This must be done with the full cooperation of the receiving
governments, ministries and power plant personnel. Assistance should also
be specific to the dramatically varying needs of the individual republics. For example,
it is a widely held view that the RBMK reactors are so hopelessly unsafe that
only minimal assistance should be given to them. There is the mistaken belief that
such pronouncements and the withholding of assistance will somehow lead to the
early closure of these plants. This cannot and will not happen. This May in Karlsruhe,
Minatom's Victor Sidorenko, Deputy Minister for Nuclear Energy, outlined
Russia's hopes of achieving a 30-year life from its RBMK reactors. Consider the situation
of Lithuania: the two 1500 MW RBMK reactors at Ignalina (the largest reactors
in the world) supply greater than 50% of the country's electricity needs. With
no indigenous fuel resources and an economy which can support neither the construction
of alternative thermal power stations nor the importation of their fuel, Ignalina's
reactors will need to remain on-line, generating electricty for many years to
come. That is, they will operate with or without Western aid and assistance. The
situation is similar in Bulgaria where four of the first generation WER 440-230 reactors
are operating at Kozloduy. These reactors, generally considered to be nearly
as unsafe as the RBMKs, produce approximately 18% of the country's electricity.
Closure would impose severe hardships on the general population. Some experts
even predict that plant closures and the subsequent energy shortages, when combined
with the other economic woes of the region, could even enflame civil unrest.
How then should Western governments and industry proceed?
First, it should be clearly recognized by all parties that the nuclear safety issues
cannot be addressed in isolation from the other problems facing governments, at
both the national and local levels. Nuclear power generation facilities (and the related
infrastructure), represent major sources of electricity, heat, hard currency generation,
and employment. It is imperative to let CIS/EE governments know that
this dependency is recognized and understood. Aid must be given in a way to enable
the recipients to help themselves over the near- and long-term, not just to alleviate
certain real and imagined Western concerns about reactor safety.
Second, while recognizing the nationalism of these new republics, inter-regional
cooperation in the electricity and nuclear sectors must be strongly encouraged by
Western governments. Issues such as fuel manufacturing and waste management
are most certainly best organized on a regional basis, utilizing the supply channels
of the former Soviet Union. For example. Western governments and the nuclear industry
should discourage countries considering local memufacturing of nuclear fuel
which is almost certainly counter-productive to the best long-term interests of the
region overall. Construction of such new facilities cannot be of real benefit when
one recognizes the significant world over-capacity for nuclear fuel production.
Third, the entire energy infrastructure £md electricsd demand forecasts should be
factored into the plann^ safety improvement program. This means non-nuclear as
well as nuclear generation and the grid efficiencies. For example, losses in the grid
run in the region about 10%. These are losses in transmitting power from generating
plants to end uses. Clearly significant investment in improving the grid's efficiency
could enable many regions to much more seriously contemplate closing
unsafe or inefficient generation capacity. End use efficiencies should also be addressed.
Future generation capacity proposed by the West should also consider com-

120
pleting existing plants under construction and erecting new Russian designed reactors
as well as Western supplied stations such £is new Oambined Cycle Gas Turbines.
Fourth, address real safety issues in a prioritized manner. When estimates of suitable
remediation vary from less than $1 billion USD to $40 billion USD, a bit more
analysis is indicated. In a well organized turnaround program, the first dollar spent
5rields the most benefit, and the last dollar spent, the least. You reach an asymptote,
to use some mathematic language, where further expenditures do not yield benefit,
but merely result in make-work.
The foregoing comments are not intended to downplay the real need for concrete
safety improvements in a number of areas across the full spectrum of nuclear power
plant operations. But here again, their perspective must be taken into account. The
plants have operated for a considerable time, some with availability levels the envy
of many Western plants. In particular the earlier generation VVERs (PWRs) with
six coolant loops and large water volumes are in some respects much more forgiving
that Western designs.
Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) are urgently required to take these and
other factors into account so that potential plant enhancements can be properly
prioritized relative to their costs. However, equally important is a crash effort to
define minimum safety standards in conjunction with their regulatory bodies so the
PRAs can be meaningfully assessed.
Also, the West must increase its focus on the operational staff at the plants. Several
recent incidents and most notably the Chernobyl disaster have stemmed directly
from human errors. Increasing the concern in this respect are the continued reports
from Western visitors about the very low morale of operators and the numerous
distractions they must endure with today's economic circumstances. Pointing to
the benefits of addressing the human factors. Lord Marshall has recently reported
on the great strides achieved in Bulgaria where a program of increased pay and
training for operational staff have yielded significant benefits in safe operating
practice.
Finally, the West needs to give strong attention to the financing and aid strategy
it is undertaking. No matter how attractive the West believes low-interest loans
should be, loans to correct issues which are not considered real problems by the
local government and ministry are no bargain at all. Further, Western governments
should seriously consider making gifts of aid money to address operator performance
and other key issues which the West considers to most significantly affect its
well being. Loans should be made for the safety enhancements clearly having maximum
payback in safety and efficiency based on priorities defined through the PRA
studies.
In summary, the most rapid and cost-effective route to enhanced reactor safety in
the CIS and Eastern Europe is by:
1. Promoting a greater dialogue with their officials and treating the nuclear
safety issue in a broader perspective recognizing the other serious constraints which
affect the actions of national and local officials.
2. Promoting regional based solutions and general cooperation among the governments
and Nuclear Energy Ministries of the various countries.
3. Consider the nuclear safety issues in conjunction with the complete electricity
industry infrastructure by considering regionaJ supply/demand issues, export opportunities,
grid improvements, new construction, and repowering options along with
reactor upgrades.
4. Assist their Regulators to define minimum safety standards for both RBMKs
and WERs and then prioritize the cost benefit of potential safety upgrades with
PRAs. Implement an operator support program.
5. Recognize that loans with complicated repasrment schemes are not going to
allow safety modifications and upgrades to take place at the pace desired by the
West. Develop a plan of direct aid to fully pay for the most urgent modifications.
6. Foster CIS ability to generate hard currency, needed for reactor improvements.
For example, allow the unrestrained importation of CIS uranium and uranium enrichment
services.
Thank you for your attention this morning. If my company or I can be of further
assistance in your review, we would be happy to cooperate.

121
Table 1.—Operating Reactors in CIS/EE *

122
NEED FOR AID IS RECOGNIZED
Western Nations, including the United States, have recognized the importance of
economic assistance to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union.
The recent G7 meeting in Munich provided further evidence of this international
understanding. The world-wide consequences of total economic collapse in the
Newly Independent States is understood and feared. As western nations grapple
with the problem, an agenda of concerns has become clear—control of the weapons
of mass destruction, stabilized energy resources and supply, and food production and
supply. This agenda, designed to minimize the chance of war, is also necessary to
build a strong future of economic interdependence.
The problem with Aid is not the recognition of the need or the development of an
agenda. The problem is in the design of specific programs. Within the principals of
creating jobs and export markets for Americans, we have worked with the Government
of Ukraine to develop a program that will assist in the resolution of the problems
created by the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Over the past
six years since the accident, a great deal of work has been done by the Soviet
Union, the European Community and the United States This work dwelt with emergency
conditions and research. However, very little work has been undertaken to
reduce the magnitude of the contamination or to reduce the dose exposure of the
population. The program we have developed goes beyond research and commences
an orderly procedure, based on a new regulatory structure, to remediate the damage
caused by the accident.
ENERGY AND FOOD
Ukraine inherently has the wealth to become one of the world's more prosperous
nations. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet system, Ukraine was an exporter of food,
energy, and industrial products. Currently, 30.76 percent (or 9,295 MWe) of the operating
Nuclear Power Plants of the former Soviet Union are Ukrainian. Ukraine
could increase its energy production by 30.66 percent, to 12,145 MWe, if western approaches
to nuclear safety can be implemented at just three existing Nuclear Power
Plants.
However, in the socialist systems this export of valuable products failed to create
wealth for Ukraine. If that capacity to export is revived and combined with a
market economy, Ukraine should emerge as a prosperous nation. And a nation that
can afford to resolve the problems created by that Chernobyl accident.
The wealth of the United States is substantially based on the same two attributes,
sustained ability to export food to the world and long periods of energy independence.
These attributes, combined with a healthy political and economic system,
helped the United States to become an economic leader in the world. In many ways,
Ukraine is like the United States—abundant resources, well educated people, sound
work ethics, family oriented values, a peace loving people with a strong desire to
better themselves and their nation. It should be easy for Ukraine and the United
States to create bridges of mutual interest and support.
CHERNOBYL IS BLOCKING PROGRESS
Ukraine has one major stumbling block that prevents it for realizing its potential—the
Chernobyl accident. Time for transition and the support of world economic
institutions will bring Ukraine and the other new republics to market economies.
But Ukraine will not derive the benefits of this transition as long as the shadow of
Chernobyl obscures the path to the future. If Ukraine is to once again export
energy, and now receive the benefits in a market economy, Chernobyl must be addressed.
If Ukraine is to export food, Chernobyl must be addressed. Chernobyl is not
simply a technical problem or an environmental problem, it is also a political and
economic problem. Western approaches to environmental remediation and nuclear
safety must be implemented and proven effective if Ukreiine is to have an optimistic
future
Independent States
History causes the United States and other western nations to 5deld a monopoly
of attention to Moscow. This dominance of Moscow in the approaches of the United
States to the Newly Independent States belies the new realities. Ukraine is an independent
state, a new nation. Going to Moscow to address nuclear safety problems at
the twenty-one Nuclear Power Plants in Ukraine will not work. The decisions that
will resolve Chernobyl and create a prosperous Ukraine will be made in Kiev. The
plan I am presenting is a Ukrainian plan, the result of a collaborative effort by the
responsible Ukrainian Government Ministries and Los Alamos Technical eissociates,
Inc.

123
FORMULA FOR FUNDING
American assistance to Ukraine should be constructed to provide benefit to
Ukraine and to the United States. It is not necessary, indeed, it is fooUsh, to release
the money of the American taxpayer to the custody of international institutions
where it is used to support European efforts to build market position in the Newly
Independent States. American assistance should produce real and measurable improvement
in Ukraine and should produce measurable economic benefit to the
United States. Achieving such mutual benefit is neither difficult nor mysterious.
America's competitors readily understand the formula.
Seed Money with Strings Attached
First, seed money or grants are required to start the process. However, these
grants must require that resources of United States firms be employed to executed
the mission of the grant. Additionally, the grants must require a suitable in-kind
match from the receiving nation.
Several objectives are achieved by these simple requirements. First, the money of
the United States is used to employ citizens of the United States and a substantial
portion of the money is further spent in the United States, providing additional economic
benefit. More important, the work under the grant is executed using American
approaches and technology, building a foundation for additional American and
Ukraine interaction. Second, by requiring an in-kind match, it is assured that
American and Ukrainian scientists and engineers will work together on the project
funded by the grant. This builds the most important aspect of any business enterprise,
mutual understanding and respect. This process will also implant the most
important element of the market economy transition; management systems.
Management Systems
There is no effective way to communicate in this testimony the breadth and depth
of the chasm that separates Communist and American management approaches.
Only day to day personal experience can demonstrate the magnitude of this difference
in approach. If Ukraine is to succeed in its transition, management approaches
of a market economy must be learned. Western nations will make a tremendous
error if they simply supply money to the Newly Independent States. Another string
is that with grants or loans, western management systems must be employed. This
will, of course, provide auditable accountability for the use of funds, a critical but
minor benefit. More importantly, this string will imbed management practices that
are vital for the success of the transition to a market economy. That is why the
program that we present has created a management system as the first step, before
funds are sought.
Sovereign Debt
Finally, Ukraine must stand on its own feet and build its own future. It is necessary
that grants be structured in a program that leads Ukraine to the ability to
provide the funding itself. If the export capacity of Ukraine can be revitalized then
the capacity to assume long term debt is created. This will allow Ukraine to support
its own programs; will enable Ukraine to purchase necessary services and goods;
and will empower Ukraine to build its future. The path from grants to loans should
be clear in the conditions and program of any grant. If such loans were to be provided
directly to Ukraine, instead of through international institutions, then we could
be assured that the services and good of the United States would be utilized.
In summary, grants have the following requirements:
• Clear objectives and plans
• Use of American resources
• In-kind matches from receiving nation
• Use of American management systems and approaches
• Clearly leads to future use of receiving nation's funds or sovereign debt.
Loans have the following requirements:
• Clear objectives and plans
• Use of American resources in collaboration with receiving nation resources
Use of American management systems and approaches.
America's assets
Why should the United States undertake this program? The economic benefits described
are valuable in themselves, but there are other opportunities that are also
attractive. What is there about the Chernobyl opportunity that offers a special advantage
to the United States?

124
There are four primary assets held by the United States that are unmatched by
our international competitors. Utilizing these assets will provide Ukraine with the
best the world has to offer gmd will firmly establish an economic bridge between
Ukraine and the United States.
Nuclear Science and Engineering
No other nation can match the technical prowess of the United States in nuclear
science and engineering. Over the past fifty years, the national investment of the
United States in nuclear energy and technology has been unmatched in its magnitude
and effectiveness.
This is an asset with an uncertain future and is endanger of being lost. While *^his
asset made the United States powerful in the cold war, it can make the United
States economically strong in the new world. The technology, knowledge and skills
of this asset are precisely what is needed to address the Chernobyl situation and to
restore Ukraine's capacity for economic vitality.
Other nations have impressive resources to offer, but it is clear that the United
States is the provider of first choice. United States industry. National Laboratories
and Educational institutions are combined in this program to provide the best.
Environmental Remediation
Despite the flamboyant rhetoric of conferences and the press, the programs for
protection and remediation of the environment in the United States are unsurpassed.
Over the past three decades, we have spent hundreds of millions to protect
and improve our environment. In this process we have created technology and
knowledge resources that are unmatched. Evidence supporting this statement is the
very program being presented. The Government of Ukraine has lived with the Chernobyl
for over six years now; they have worked with organizations from all parts of
the world; they have extensive research being conducted by the Europeans; they
have interviewed and visited private firms and government institutions in many
countries; and only from the United States have they received a comprehensive approach
to remedy the problems of the Chernobyl accident. The reason for this is
simple. Only in the United States have professional scientist and engineers undertaken
and successfully implemented comprehensive environmental restoration programs.
Program and Project Management
All industrialized nations have good program and project management capabilities.
There are, however, unique management issues in environmental remediation
projects. From a project management view, these project are totally different from
building a tower, a tunnel, a bridge or a industria complex. Environmental programs
must be managed to produce results in situation with frequently changing
scientific and engineering datas and criteria. Management approaches have been developed
in the past decade that have proven effective for these tj^pes of programs.
Again, the environmental programs of the United States are unique in their approach
to project management. This is yet another special attribute that our plan
presents to Ukraine.
Highly Competitive Technical Services
We have strong competitive strengths and we are the low cost provider. In business,
we are positioned to win.
The program I am presenting does not exist in a passive business world, indeed,
there is a great deal of competition for the Chernobyl project and the future business
relations with Ukraine. What I have told you is widely know and understood. I
recently attended a meeting in Kiev with Germans, British, French, and Italians.
All of the firms from these nations where there to obtain work on the Chernobyl
project. In addition, European financial institutions attended in order to begin to
their evaluation of funding approaches. This opportunity will move from a plan to
reality, with or Without the United States.
Since the United States hgis such strong competitive assets and since the private
firms of the United States cost less than the British, French and Germans it is logical
for us, not just to participate, but to lead.
FRAGILITY OF INmATIVE
There is a sasdng in business that windows of opportunity open slowly and shut
fast. This is true of the situation with the Newly Independent States and the Chernobyl
problem. The governments and citizens of these nations know that they must
get on with their lives. They must make the best decision they can and proceed with

125
their transition to a new forms of government and economy. The opportunity presented
today is short hved—it is to be acted on or it goes away.
This plan was produced by entrepreneurial initiative—a characteristic that has
historically made American business strong. This initiative must now begin implementation
and for that, we need the support of the United States government.
Brand new programs are not required. We simply need support for the Chernobyl
Plan from existing government institutions and in new legislation now being considered
by Congress.
In the section that follows, I present an outline overview of the plan for Chernobyl.
CHERNOBYL COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDLATION PROGRAM
Introduction
MinChernobyl requires funding to establish a system to mitigate, reduce and,
where possible, eliminate the consequences throughout Ukraine of the 1986 accident
at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. A management and technical support team
will be assembled, and preliminary plans will be developed for an integrated approach
to gathering information, assembling appropriate technology, and conducting,
under the direction of MinChernobyl, a comprehensive cleanup and remediation
project.
On August 2, 1990, Goskomchernobyl UkSSR was established by the Supreme
Soviet then converted to MinChernobyl in May of 1991 as the Ministry responsible
for all Ukrainian Government actions regarding consequences of the Chernobyl accident.
Since the events of Autumn 1992, including fires at the powerplant, the independence
of Ukraine, and the decision of the Parliament of Ukraine to cease operations
at the powerplant, responsibilities of MinChernobyl have expanded.
Mission
The main tasks of MinChernobyl are:
• To solve the entire complex of problems regarding the elimination of consequences
of the Chernobyl accident, protection of the population, and coordination of
research and medical institutions, state, and other establishments and organizations
of Ukraine;
• To resolve financing of all scientific and technical projects;
• To conduct analyses of the scientific and technical projects and other developments;
• To control Ukrainian material and technical supply; and,
• To accomplish scientific, technical, and economic connections with other republics
and organizations abroad.
Organizations at the site which formerly reported to the central government of
the Soviet Union, such as "Complex Expedition" (responsible for the Sarcophagus),
now report to MinChernobyl. In addition, MinChernobyl shares responsibility for decommissioning
of the remaining power generating reactors.
In order to complete remediation of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident,
the work has been organized into four phases which will take place over a thirtyyear
period. Table 1 identifies Project phases and estimated costs. This grant request
is for Phase One to be approved and funded now, and for Phase Two to be
reviewed, approved and funded later.
Project Management
MinChernobyl, after an extensive review of private firms in Europe £md United
States, selected Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc. (LATA) as Project Manager
and Systems Integrator for the entire project. LATA assembled a base team of private
companies and universities to assist in the technical work. In addition, LATA
secured the cooperation of Sandia National Laboratories to serve as coordinator and
integrator for all US National Laboratory participation. Sandia's role will be to
assess, enhance, and demonstrate where necessary, and to transfer state-of-the-art
technologies to LATA for use on the project. Augmenting this US base team will be
Ukrainian and other international firms. Competitive procurement for specific sub
projects will be in accord with the procedures of the funding source.
The base team consists of the following organizations.
Prime Contractor
• Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc.
Subcontractors
• Lockheed AWC
• Westinghouse SEG
57-583 - 92 - 5

126
• CompuChem Laboratories
• Metcalf & Eddy
• Harding Lawson Associates
• ESA
• Transmar
• New Jersey Marine Science Consortium (30 Colleges and Universities)
National Laboratories
• Sandia National Laboratory—Coordinator
• Argonne National Laboratory
• Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
• Los Alamos National Laboratory
• Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
• Oak Ridge National Laboratory
• Pacific Northwest Laboratory
Phase One
The Project Definition Phase, consists of six tasks:
1. Establishment of a Financial Mechanism to generate funds for pa5dng for the
execution of the full Project.
2. Development of a Preliminary Program Plan for the Project.
3. Compilation of the information necessary to replace lost power generation capacity
and decommission Chernobyl reactors 1, 2, and 3.
4. Compilation of the information necessary to determine a permanent resolution
for the destroyed Chernobyl reactor 4 and the "Sarcophagus."
5. Preliminary training to foster the establishment of private competitive Ukrainian
firms.
6. International food conference to identify potential approaches to supply milk
and meat to 2.6 million people living in contaminated areas.
Phases are primarily defined by the nature of work to be done. Phases will overlap
in time, depending upon the specific requirements and urgency of the work.
Funding for each phase may come from: a) grants or gifts; b) MinChernobyl operational
funds, including funds from the Commonwealth; and, c) debt financing.
Table 1.—Cost Estimate
Item

127
Table 1.—Cost Estimate—Continued
Item

128
Decommissioning the Power Plant
A decision has been made that further operation of all units at the Chernobyl nuclear
Power Plant will be terminated, the units decommissioned, and appropriate
remedial actions taken. Specific plans must be developed rapidly to shut down the
plant, remove and dispose of fuel, decommission the facilities associated with the
operation of Chernobyl units 1, 2, and 3, and to take remedial actions concerning
radioactive contamination associated with these units.
Contamination Migration
The accident in 1986 created a large contaminated area in Russia, Byelorussia
and Ukraine as contaminated materials were distributed to a large area by atmospheric
winds. Over the past five years, contaminated materials have continued to
move, carried by winds, water currents, insects, and animals without respect for national
boundaries. Migration of this contamination must be better understood and
actions must be identified and implemented to stop this movement. Ultimately, the
contaminated area must be reduced.
Situations Which Create Chronic Problems Within Ukraine
Food Supply
The radiation dose contribution to individuals and to the general population from
the production, processing, and distribution and consumption of food must be kept
within acceptable limits.
Water
Water is a concern because it is consumed by the population and because water
transports contamination to other locations. The specific concern within Ukraine is
the long-term supply of contamination-free potable water.
Soils
Contaminated soU not only impacts food production, it also provides material that
can become re-suspended in the atmosphere and thereby spread contamination.
Highly contaminated areas must be identified, mapped, and cleaned up.
Waste Management and Decontamination
Operations, facilities and equipment must be developed and deployed to collect
contaminated material, retrieve temporarily stored contaminated material, and decontaminate
materials, equipment and structures, and build repositories, and transport
and dispose of contaminated waste and materials.
Health Care
Much of the effort since the accident in 1986 has focused on the health of the
population. This effort must continue for several generations. The necessary work
includes epidemiological studies of the general population, as well as decontamination
of workers; episodic, emergency and short-term health care; and, a documentation
and archival system. In addition, health care facilities, medications and other
supplies are needed.
Population Care
The physical, social and psychological welfare of the population impacted by the
Chernobyl accident is a complex and long-term problem area. Efforts made on
behalf of the population include everything from housing to relocation to individual
counseling.
Institutional Infrastructure Need
Planning and Management
A comprehensive plan for cleanup of the contamination and other problems created
by the accident does not now exist. One of the most pressing needs of MinChernobyl
is to develop a comprehensive plan which coordinates all research, cleanup,
decontamination, health care and institutional infrastructure development, and a
plan which is credible in the international community.
Financial
Financial infrastructure needs to include a) establishment of a mechanism that
will provide sufficient, long-term funding from Ukraine resources; b) development of
financial management systems and accounting practices that will assure responsible
control of funds; and, c) obtaining funds to bridge the change in government structure
from the central government to the independent government of Ukraine.

129
Nuclear Materlai;s Management
Ukraine requires development of an infrastructure of standards, regulations and
government offices to oversee and control the production, transportation, use, and
ultimate disposal of nuclear material and waste.
Program and Project Management
Goal oriented program and project management techniques that are common in
some nations must be adopted and developed in Ukraine to assure that stated objectives
are actually accomplished.
Training
Training of Ukrainians in technology, management and business practices is required
for MinChernobyl to fulfill its mission in the new government of Ukraine
and in its market economy.
Organization— Work Organization Concepts
The work organization for part of Phase One, and all of Phases Two, Three and
Four is subdivided into four major elements based on the nature of the work to be
performed. These four elements are:
1. Business Operations and Management
2. Technical Support
3. Operations
4. Technology Assessment, Enhancement, and Transfer Business Operations and
Management
This element contains those functions that support Project Management and are
necessary to achieve the success of the technical work. These include the following
Management Areas:
1.1 Standards and Compliance
1.2 Liaison
1.3 Finance and Administration
Technical Support
The Technical Support element is comprised of functions that directly support the
technical projects. Economy is achieved by combining these functions into a centralized
support element. Such centralization also facilitates progress monitoring, quality
control, and credibility of the results. The Management Areas for the Support
element are:
2.1 Data Management
2.2 Technical Services
2.3 Training Program
Operations
The Operations element is divided into nine Project Areas for performance of the
actual scientific, engineering, field, and construction work required to remediate the
contamination from the Chernobyl Power Plant accident. The nine areas are defined
based on environmental and physical systems that are contaminated. This approach
groups technologies and activities into similar and related disciplines, and
will enhance the effectiveness of the total remediation work by facilitating execution
of a comprehensive, integrated plan for remediation. The nine Project Areas
are:
3.1 Decommissioning and Decontamination of Power Plant
3.2 Reactor 4 Site
3.3 Contamination Migration
3.4 Agriculture and Food
3.5 Water
3.6 Soils
3.7 Waste Management
3.8 Health
3.9 Population Care
Technology Assessment, Enhancement, and Transfer
The objective of the technology assessment, enhancement, and transfer element is
to provide for the use of advanced, state-of-the-art technologies existing at US National
Laboratories in all phases of the project. Individuals from the US National
Laboratories will participate in all planning activities for performing the actual scientific,
engineering, field, and construction work required to remediate the contamination
from the Chernobyl Power Plant Accident. System engineering and integration
methodologies will be used to prioritize remedial actions, identify advanced

130
technologies, and perform trade-off analyses of candidate processes. Six areas are defined
based on a systems engineering approach, and these areas will be matrixed
into all other work areas. This approach groups technologies and expertise into a
system framework that incorporates all related disciplines and enhances the effectiveness
of the remediation effort.
Specific activities that Sandia National Laboratories will pursue include the following:
1. Coordination and integration of all US National Laboratory participation.
2. Site characterization
3. Systems analysis
4. Hazardous materials characterization, immobilization, confinement and containment
5. Performance and risk assessment
6. Earth and atmospheric science
7. Waste transportation and management
8. Hazardous materials monitoring, cleanup, handling, packaging, storage, and
disposal
9. Environmental restoration
The six Project Areas are:
4.1 Database Development
4.2 Preliminary Hazard Assessment
4.3 Remediation Objectives
4.4 Systems Analysis
4.5 Systems Enhancement and Demonstration
4.6 Technology Transfer
Project Definition— Scope of Work
PHASE ONE
Task One— Financial Mechanism
The Mission of MinChernobyl and the Chernobyl Accident Contamination Remediation
Project can be achieved only if long-term, consistent funding is assured. To
provide this assurance, it is necessary to establish a government/industry mechanism
or institutional infrastructure that will provide a dependable source of revenue.
With a source of revenue in place, MinChernobyl will then be able to plan
multi-year programs, select cost effective actions, prioritize activities to achieve the
greatest result, and consider debt financing approaches.
MinChernobyl has embarked on preliminary efforts to explore feasible approaches
and the steps necessary to implement a financial support mechanism. Assisted by
Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc. (LATA), MinChernobyl has met with World
Bank, EXIM BANK, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. In addition, preliminary exploration of the
necessary changes to Ukraine law have begun.
Sub-tasks
1. Conduct program definition discussions and make findings in Ukraine and the
United States to determine the parameters for various import/export transactions,
requirements for laws facilitating international work on Chernobyl, and needed infrastructure
support. This work will involve representatives from LATA, meeting
with Ukraine officials in Ukraine and in the United States.
2. Prepare draft laws and regulations necessary to support the financial mechanism
in Ukraine. This work will involve review of Ukrainian laws and regulations
regarding trade and taxation, as well as international agreements which may apply
to Ukraine and to the Chernobyl project.
Deuverables
1. Overview report on institutional infrastructure support required for long-term
financial support of Ukraine Chernobyl Accident Contamination Remediation
Project.
2. Draft laws and regulations to support Chernobyl Accident Contamination Remediation
Project.
Schedule
Week One—Notification of Award of Grant
Weeks Two, Three and Four—Mobilization and meetings with parties in the
United States
Weeks Five and Six—Meetings in Europe and Ukraine regarding Institutional requirements

131
Weeks Seven and Eight—Preliminary report preparation and begin draft of laws
and regulations
Weeks Nine and Ten Ukraine—Delegation in United States for coordination reviews
and technology evaluations
Weeks Eleven and Twelve—Meetings in Ukraine and Europe.
Weeks Thirteen, Fourteen and Fifteen—Final report preparation and draft of
laws and regulations.
Equipment
Two notebook computers and portable printer.
Cost
The total cost of Task One is estimated at US $120,000.
Task Two Project Definition— Preuminary Program Plan
The consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant are an
immense, complex, and multifaceted social/technical/health problem. The resolution
of this problem can only be achieved by successful implementation of many
small, well thought out, and purposeful steps which are all orchestrated to achieve
one goal: the elimination of these consequences. The implementation of these small
steps requires a plan.
The plan for Chernobyl must integrate a wide multi-disciplinary effort into a
force working for a common goal. To develop this plan, the first step is collection,
organization, and dissemination of existing information. This task is defined to compile
this baseline information.
Sub-tasks
1. Collect available data and documentation concerning current and recent conditions
at the Chernobyl site regarding:
1.1 Migration or transport of radioactive contamination, including
a. Atmospheric transport of radioactive contamination,
b. Potential sites or conditions where re-suspension of radioactive contamination
occurs or is likely to occur,
c. Actions taken or under consideration to prevent or reduce atmospheric transport
or migration of contamination,
d. Extent of radioactive contamination of water, silts and sediments,
e. Surface water and groundwater transport of radioactive contamination,
f. Chemical and physical interaction of radioactive contaminated particles and
material with the environment,
g. Meteorological data and phenomena relative to atmospheric and water transport
of contamination,
1.2 Agriculture, food and biota, including
a. Biota in the affected areas and their contribution to population dose,
b. Food chain and population diet patterns
c. Food processing, inspection and distribution
d. Biota transport of radioactive contamination,
e. Actions taken or under consideration to prevent or reduce contamination of
population food supply,
1.3 Potable water supply, including
a. Potential for radioactive contamination of potable water and water supply
system,
b. Existing water treatment and distribution system,
c. Actions taken or under consideration to prevent or reduce contamination of
population water supply,
1.4 Soils, including
a. Radioactive contamination of soils, including extent, nature of contaminate,
depth in soil of contamination,
b. TjTJes of soils including physical and chemical data,
c. Techniques used to assess hazard of areas of contaminated soil,
d. Actions taken or under consideration to prevent or reduce contamination of
soil,
1.5 Waste management, including
a. Sampling and analysis of waste materials,
b. Number, location and extent of burial sites,
c. Actions taken or under consideration to decontaminate materials, equipment,
facilities or communities,
d. Technologies currently used for decontamination activities.

132
e. Techniques for management and control of contaminated waste generated by
decontamination activity,
f. Number, location, extent and physical characteristics of disposal facilities or repositories
for radioactive waste,
g. Methods of transportation, handling and packaging of radioactive waste,
h. methods of waste treatment and disposal,
i. Documentation processes for radioactive waste management,
1.6 Health Care in the affected area, including
a. Epidemiological studies completed and in progress,
b. Health care facilities, staffing, equipment and supplies, and
1.7 Population Care, including
a. Condition of resettlement areas, including transportation infrastructure,
human habitat, employment, energy supply, water supply and sewage treatment,
and social support amenities,
b. Construction capability, including supply production of building materials and
on-site capabilities.
2. Selected representative documents will be translated to English.
3. Establish three information centers by:
3.1 Supplying IAEA with copies of representative selections of collected data and
documents,
3.2 Creating and organizing an information center at MinChernobyl's office in
Kiev, and
3.3 Creating and organizing an information center in Boston, Massachusetts in
the United States.
Deuverables
1. Program Plan baseline report containing a S5mopsis of existing information, directory
of persons and institutions with relevant information or resources, identification
of data needs and specifications for quality of data required, and presentation
of any alternatives currently identified for the approaches to specific situations regarding:
a. Standards and Compliance
b. Data Management
c. Field instrumentation
d. Analytical and radiological laboratory
e. Radiation Safety
f. Meteorology
g. Training
h. Contamination Migration
i. Agriculture and Food
j. Potable Water Supply
k. Contaminated Soils
1. Waste Management
m. Population Care
n. Information collected in tasks three and four below
2. Detailed work plan for the collection of additional required data, identification
of specific projects, establishing procedures for determining cost/benefit tradeoffs,
identification of schedule and funding limitations or parameters, as necessary for
development of an integrated comprehensive plan for addressing the consequences
of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. The work plan shall also
present a schedule for completion of the comprehensive plan and cost estimate for
the work.
Schedule
Week One—Notification of Award of Grant
Weeks Two through Six—Mobilization
Weeks Six through Twenty—Data and document collection in Ukraine and
Russia, including interviews with key persons and translation of representative documents
Weeks Twenty through Twenty-six—Preliminary report preparation
Weeks Twenty-six through Thirty-two—Establish information centers
Weeks Thirty-two through Thirty-eight—Final report preparation.
Equipment Required
Ten portable computers with software and portable printers .
Six desk top computers with software and laser printers.
Five portable copy machines.
Four high volume stationary copy machines.

133
Four sets dictation and transcribing equipment.
Cost
The total cost of Task Two is estimated at US $820,000.
Task Three Project Definition— Replacement Power and Reactors i, 2,
AND 3 Decommissioning
There were four 1000 MWe powerplants operating at Chernobyl in 1986, with two
additional powerplants under construction. Explosions and fires destroyed the reactor
of Unit #4 in 1986, and fires destroyed the generators of Unit #2 in 1991. Construction
of Units # 5 and # 6 was suspended after the 1986 accident. It is the intention
of Ukraine to shut down all of the remaining RBMK Model 1000 nuclear reactors.
Most of the infrastructure, some of which is radioactively contaminated, for
the production and distribution of approximately 5000 MWe of electric power still
exists at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station.
Ukraine needs more electric power, both for internal economic growth and for
export to gain "hard" currency. In order to accomplish its mission of remediating
the effects of the Chernobyl Accident, MinChernobyl and UAEP need to know
whether significant electrical generating and distributing capacity can be reclaimed
at the Chernobyl Station. MinChernobyl and UAEP also need to know whether significant
increases can be obtained in generating capacity of other Ukrainian (nuclear
and non-nuclear) electrical generating stations through upgrades in equipment
and controls and efficiency of operation
In order to proceed logically and safely with replacement power and the decommissioning
of the reactors, it will be necessary to collect and evaluate existing data
regarding the present configuration of the reactors, their operating history, fuel
loading and burn-up, and the procedures which are followed during reactor operation.
Sub-tasks
1. Collect available data and documentation concerning current and recent conditions
at the Chernobyl site regarding:
1.1 Present configuration of the three reactors,
1.2 Operating history of the reactors,
1.3 Fuel loading and burn-up,
1.4 Existing operating procedures, and
1.5 Existing fuel and material disposal practices and facilities,
2. Collect available data and documentation concerning replacement power supply
requirements and options.
2.1 Condition of the power grid and other support facilities at the Chernobyl site,
2.2 Condition of the partially completed power generation stations,
2.3 Condition of generation facilities at blocks 1, 2, and 3, and
2.4 Market potential for export of electricity to European states.
3. Selected representative documents will be translated to English.
4. Requirements for Decommissioning Plan Report
5. Feasibility of replacement Power Report
Deuverables
1. Decommissioning Plan Report
Operating reactors 1, 2, and 3 baseline report containing a synopsis of existing
information, directory of persons and institutions with relevant information or resources,
identification of data needs and specifications for quality of data required,
and presentation of alternatives currently identified for the long term shutdown
and decontamination of the reactors and adjunct facilities.
2. Feasibility of Replacement Power Report
Replacement Power Supply baseline report containing a sjTiopsis of existing information,
directory of persons and institutions with relevant information or resources,
identification of data needs and specifications for quality of data, and presentation
of alternatives currently identified for making up the power supply lost by the accident
and decommissioning of the Chernobyl Power Stations reactors.
Schedule
Week One—Notification of Award of Grant
Weeks Two through Six—Mobilization
Weeks Six through Twenty—Data and document collection in Ukraine and
Russia, including interviews with keys persons and translations of representative
documents
Weeks twenty-one through twenty-four—Report preparation

134
Equipment Required
Four notebook computers with software and two portable printers .
One set dictation and transcribing equipment.
(Note: Equipment will be left in the custody of MinChernobyl for use on the Chernobyl
project and will be temporarily available to future delegations from the
United States.)
Cost
The total cost of Task Three is estimated at US $1,700,000.
Task Four Project Definition— Reactor 4 Site
MinChernobyl has decided that an international competition is the appropriate
approach to determining the ultimate disposition of Reactor 4 Site (sarcophagus). In
addition to the long term concerns at the site, there are also requirements for maintenance
and expedited measures to address urgent and threatening hazard conditions.
To respond to either of these objectives it is necessary to compile basic information
on the existing conditions or a baseline data report and determine the criteria
for long term resolution of the site.
Sub-tasks
1. Collect available data and documentation concerning current and recent conditions
at the Chernobyl Reactor 4 Site regarding:
1.1 Present configuration of destroyed reactor 4,
1.2 Present configuration and condition of the containment structure know as the
sarcophagus,
1.3 Present maintenance operations at the site,
1.4 Identified conditions requiring urgent actions to reduce threat of additional radioactive
contamination release, and
1.5 Present condition, configuration and operation of support facilities.
2. Selected representative documents will be translated to English.
3. Prepare reports.
Deuverables
1. Reactor 4 Site baseline report containing a synopsis of existing information, directory
of persons and institutions with relevant information or resources, identification
of data needs and specifications for quality of data required, and presentation
of any alternatives currently identified for the long-term disposition of the "sarcophagus".
2. Detailed work plan for the collection of additional required data, identification
and evaluation of alternatives, and competitive procedure to be used to select an
alternative for implementation. Work plan shall also present a schedule and cost
estimate for the work.
Schedule
Week One—Notification of Award of Grant
Weeks Two through Six—Mobilization
Weeks Six through Fifteen—Data and document collection in Ukraine and Russia,
including interviews with key persons and translation of representative documents
Weeks Fifteen through Twenty—Report preparation
Equipment Required
Two portable computers with software and portable printers .
One set dictation and transcribing equipment.
Cost
The total cost of Task Three is estimated at US $665,000.
Task Five— Preliminary Training
The Chernobyl project, costing hundreds of millions of dollars and spanning
twenty to thirty years, pragmatically requires that most of the technical, scientific
and construction work be performed by Ukrainians. The transition to a market
form of economy, intrinsically, requires that private Ukrainian firms be created
who can compete for this work. These two requirements are emphasized by the
planned use of funds from international banking organizations (World Bank, et al)
who further require competitive procurement practices.
Many private companies have been formed in Ukraine. However, while entrepreneurial,
they lack the specific, practical knowledge of how to operate successfully in
competitive marketplace. This preliminary training will provide a core group of

. Develop
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Ukrainian entrepreneurs with the practical, real-world knowledge to operate successful
technical service companies in a competitive world.
For the Chernobyl project, specific types of companies will be required; Technical
Service Companies. These are companies offering engineering, scientific and construction
services in areas such as:
• Construction (New Shelter or "Sarcophagus" for damaged Block four, water
treatment facilities, earth moving and materials handling for soils decontamination,
food processing facility construction),
• Remedial investigation and feasibility studies (sample collection, contamination
computer modeling, identification and evaluation of remediation technology),
• Design (engineering plans, specifications and bid documents for remediation
projects), and
• Project Management (Critical Path Scheduling, Earned Value Management, etc)
The training will combine academic and practitioner trainers from the United
States with specialized trainers from Ukraine. The training will be conducted under
the auspices of MinChernobyl. The content will include:
How to start a Technical Services Company (Business Plan),
Who are the clients or customers (Ukraine government as a client).
Economics of a Technical Services Company (flow of funds, key indicators, etc.).
Management Information Systems (MIS) for a Technical Services Company,
Critical Path Method (CPM) scheduling for projects,
Project Management,
Marketing,
Preparing successful proposals,
Cost estimating.
Legal requirements in Ukraine (Ukrainian Trainer)
Sub Tasks
detailed training plan and course materials.
.1 Develop final curriculum
.2 Develop course materials and handouts
.3 Develop computer based training aides for Economics, MIS, CPM, etc.
.4 Assembling video materials
.5 Translation
2. Training in Kiev.
3. Evaluation of training report
4.1 Evaluation of training by trainees
4.2 Evaluation by MinChernobyl
4.3 Identification of needed improvements for future training
Deuverables
1. Trainer's Manual—20 copies
2. Student Course Book—40 copies
3. Training Evaluation Report
Schedule
Week One—Notification of Award of Grant
Weeks Two through Four—Mobilization of Training Team
Weeks Five Through Nine—Preparation of Trainer's Manual and Student Course
Book's
Week Ten—Training Team review and travel preparation
Weeks Eleven through Sixteen—Training in Kiev
Weeks Seventeen through Eighteen—Prepare Evaluation Report
Equipment Required
Six Desk Top Computers with software, network and one printer.
Computer projection device
Overhead Projector
Electrical conversion devices
Miscellaneous supplies (easel, flip charts, markers, tape, notebooks, paper, etc.)
(Note: All equipment will be left in the custody of MinChernobyl at the end of the
training and will be available for future training courses)
Cost
The total cost of Task Five is estimated at US $600,000.
Task Six— Food Conference
The contaminated land area in Ukraine has a population of 2,600,000 people. A
significant path of radiation exposure is the consumption of milk and meat. The

136
total dosage through food, milk and meat constitutes 80 percent of the total dosage
exposure. There are two conceptual solutions to this problem; change the food of
cattle and dairy cows to a non-contaminated material and/or bring milk and meat
from non-contaminated areas to the towns and villages in the contaminated area.
While these concepts are easy to grasp, there are many practical considerations and
details to be resolved before an actual plan can be developed and implemented.
The objective of the Food Conference is to identify specific, feasible approaches to
the supply of milk and meat for the 2,600,000 people. With specific approaches identified,
follow on work can develop detailed implementation plans, arrange for funding,
possibly attract investment capital, and implement projects to resolve this problem.
The Food Conference will involve a cross section of Ukrainian government institutional
representatives. United States government, academic and business representatives
and specialists in the total Chernobyl problem. A small core group of these
will be specially prepared with knowledge of Ukrainian conditions and culture as
well as United States f>otential technologies and management approaches. The
actual conference will consist of presentation of papers and problem solving workshops.
Since part of the objective is to attract potential investment capital, representatives
from the United States food industry will be invited to attend. To encourage
this attendance, the conference will be held in the United States.
Sub-tasks
1. Ukraine delegation visit to United States
1.1 Arrange itinerary for visits to dairy and meat processing facilities, food distribution
facilities, food industry companies, and academic institutions.
1.2 Delegation visit
1.3 Delegation report
2. United States Delegation visit to Ukraine
2.1 Arrange itinerary for visit to typical affected towns and villages, food processing
facilities, food distribution facilities and related institutions.
2.2 Delegation visits
2.3 Delegation report
3. Food Conference
4. Report
Deliverables
1. Ukraine Delegation Report
2. United States Delegation Report
3. Food Conference Report
Schedule
Week One—Notification of Award of Grant
Week Two through Five—Mobilization of Ukrainian and United States Delegations
Weeks Six through Eight—Ukraine Delegation visits United States
Weeks Nine and Ten—Return of Ukraine Delegation and departure of United
States Delegation and preparation of Ukraine Delegation Report
Weeks Eleven through Thirteen—United States Delegation visits Ukraine and
preparation of United States Delegation report
Weeks Fourteen and Fifteen—Food Conference
Weeks Sixteen through Eighteen—Prepare Food Conference Report
EQUIPME^fT Required
Two Notebook computers, software, and portable printer.
Video camera and supplies
Cost
The total cost of Task Six is estimated at US $ 500,000.
PHASE TWO
Comprehensive Planning— Concept Outline
The Work Plan is divided into four project elements: Business Operations and
Management, Technical Support, Operations, and Technology Assessment, Enhancement,
and Transfer. The Business Operations and Management and Technical Support
elements, in turn, are divided into Management Areas; the Operations element
into Project Areeis. A brief overview of each Mansigement and Project Area is followed
by a more detailed discussion of Sub-areas, with emphasis on the objectives to

137
be achieved during the first phase. Ten weeks will be devoted to Mobilization (the
gathering of project resources); this will be followed by a twelve-week period of Full
Project Planning in the Ukraine, and then by a six-week period for the consolidation
of the detailed area and Sub-area descriptions into a Comprehensive Integrated
Plan.
In each Management and Project Area, Phase Two sets forth the immediate actions
to be undertaken as soon as project funds are available. Many of these actions
will be administrative and thus generic—that is, common to several or all areas and
sub-areas. These common actions are set forth at the end of the Work Plan and incorporated
by reference in the detailed write-ups. Immediate actions that are specific
to individual Management and Project areas are listed for each area under Phase
Two, which is described at the end of this section.
Description of the Work to be Performed
Project and management areas will accomplish certain immediate actions to be
initiated as soon as possible after notice to proceed. Actions will be performed by
each area for mobilization, full project planning, and development of a comprehensive
integrated plan. Mobilization actions will be accomplished in the first 10 weeks
of the project; full project planning will be accomplished during the following 12
weeks in the Ukraine and other international locations; and, the comprehensive integrated
plan will be prepared as the final step. Each project and management area
described in the project work plan will perform the following actions:
Mobiuzation
Foreign Preparations
• Complete Service and Elquipment contracts
• Identify data requirements for planning
• Determine and assemble equipment and supplies
Technology Evaluation Visit
• Prepare for and host representatives of MinChernobyl to international facilities
for the purpose of evaluating potential technology and capabilities
Kiev Preparations
• Arrange for passports, visas, and immunizations
• Conduct medical screening and make travel and communication arrangements
• Arrange for provision of offices, housing, food, local transportation and other
personnel support for Full Project Planning team
Full Project Planning
Conduct an overview/orientation visit to critical and representative areas to include
the Ukraine and other selected areas
Identify and establish contact with Ukrainian technical and management representatives
Visit selected institutions and agencies to determine availability of pertinent data
(to include international organizations)
Obtain copies of applicable studies, research reports and other documents, and arrange
for translations
Conduct initial assessments of adequacy of available data
Establish requirements for additional information and data acquisition
Develop scope of work for full project execution, including scheduling, staffing requirements,
coordination with other sub-areas and sub-projects, and support requirements
Identify gmd schedule the phase-in of subcontractors for specific sub-areas and
sub-projects, as appropriate
Develop Authorization Request Work Plan for Phase three.
Comprehensive Integrated Plan
Coordinate with other project areas to develop interfaces and to ensure joint utilization
of facilities and staff.
Identify and resolve conflicts and eliminate gaps in planning.
Combine development and utilization of Ukrainian affiliates and sources.
Prepare Comprehensive Integrated Project Plan with description of the work, critical
path schedule, and order-of-magnitude cost estimate.
Deuverables
The deliverables for the immediate action phase of the project are:
Deliverable 1—Authorization Request Work Plan for Task 2 for each appropriate
Sub-project

—
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Deliverable 2—Full Project Plan documents for each sub-project that describe detailed
activities to be performed, schedules, and cost estimates for work to be performed
beyond Phase Two
Deliverable 3—Comprehensive Integrated Plan document that integrates the Full
Project Plans from each sub-project into a single plan for work to be performed
beyond Phase Two and includes detailed work descriptions, schedules, and cost estimates.
Schedule
Mobilization—Ten weeks to complete all work from the date the Notice to Proceed
is received.
Full Project Planning—Twelve weeks to complete all work from the date Mobilization
is complete.
Comprehensive Integrated Plan—Six weeks to complete all work from the date
Full Project Planning is complete.
Work Areas
The Management areas encompass Business Operations and Management and
Technical Support elements to provide centralized control and coordination, uniform
communication with outside entities, timely and cost-effective response to contract
requirements, and economical mechanisms for project-wide support.
1.0 business operations and management areas
Business Operations and Management Area 1.1
Standards and Compliance
This management area will provide project-wide coordination and staff supervision
of project activities related to standard setting and compliance, environmental
evaluations, and quality assurance and control. Included in this management area is
the development and maintenance of dose models and dose assessments for various
conditions and options. These, in turn, are used for determining where remedial actions
are required and for evaluating the effectiveness of remediation options. Because
health and safety standards and practices are vital to the well-being of the
project participants, this function is included in Management Area 1.
Sub-areas
1.1.1 Guidelines for Remedial Actions
Applicable laws, standards and protection guides will be studied and interpretations
developed for use throughout the program in recommending site-specific guidelines
for remedial actions, lliese guidelines will be presented as recommendations
by a contractor for MinChernobyl approval and, when approved, will be interpreted
for and applied to remediation activities.
1.1.2 Dose Assessment
A master data base will be established and maintained throughout the project.
Pre-existing radiological data will be collected and verified where possible, and additional
data will be collected continuously from all project and sub-project areas.
Models will be constructed to facilitate the estimation and prediction of human dose
in all demographic groups. Dose assessments will be prepared for all affected sites
under existing radiological conditions and under conditions expected to exist following
postulated remediation actions. Post-remediation dose assessments will be made
and entered into permanent program documentation.
1.1.S Health and Safety
This sub-area will provide coordination and staff supervision of all activities related
to the health and safety of project participants. Its major divisions will be medical,
industrial, and health physics. A small service group under this sub-area will
provide preventive health services, limited primary care, referrals, and coordination
of medical evacuations as required. The industrial safety component will be charged
primarily with job-site safety in field activities, assisting subcontractors with safety
planning and implementation. The health physics component will advise and assist
operations project areas and other staff and support elements as required in the
preparation of radiation safety plans and will conduct field inspections and audits to
ensure that accepted radiation safety practices are being followed.
1.1.4 Environmental Evaluation
This sub-area includes coordination with Ukrainian authorities and others as appropriate
to determine requirements for environmental documentation pertaining to
all phases of field work. Formats and procedures will be established for submission
of information and plans by sub-projects, including proposed environmental protec-

139
tion measures. As required, these plans will be submitted to appropriate Ukrainian
officials for approval.
1.1.5 Quality Assurance
The quality assurance (QA) sub-area includes the establishment of quality assurance
requirements for all project areas and for selected management sub-areas. QA
plans will be developed at these project and sub-area levels, reviewed by the QA
staff, and incorporated in an overall cleanup project QA plan. Audit and follow-up
will be performed at all stages and fully documented.
Business Operations and Management Area 1.2—Liaison
agencies as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Bank,
This management area provides points of contact, coordination, and liaison with a
variety of outside entities. In Ukraine, this will include both government and private
groups and the media. Elsewhere in the international arena, it will include
other republics and the All-Union Academy of Sciences, as well as such international
and others as appropriate. In the United States, it will include such agencies as the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Agency for International
Development (AID), as well as government agencies concerned with technology
transfer and treaty-related exchanges. Project-related visits by Ukrainian government
officials will be coordinated by liaison staff.
Sub-areas
1.2.1 Technical Liaison
Assistance will be provided to project area and data management staff in opening
channels for the exchange of project information and technical data, especially pertaining
to Chernobyl accident-related activities in the other affected republics. Coordination
will be established for the exchange of information and data with the
IAEA and with the Nuclear Energy Agency (Europe) and the All-Union Academy of
Sciences. Close coordination will be maintained with the U.S. Government agencies
concerned with technology transfer and with U.S. obligations and constraints under
international treaties and agreements. Such agencies will be kept fully and currently
informed of appropriate portions of project plans, and their assistance will be
sought in timely resolution of issues. Contact will be maintained with funding and
loan guarantee agencies and others as potential sources of financial support.
1.2.2 Client and Community Relations
A concerted effort will be made throughout the project to establish and maintain
credibility with the population. All information bearing on public health and safety
will be openly published and explained. Schools, community groups, and the media
will be encouraged to observe and comment. An initial technology transfer visit of
Ukrainian officials to project-related international facilities will be coordinated, as
will any subsequent project-related visits.
Business Operations and Management Area 1.3—Finance and Administration
Sub-AREAS
1.3.1 Project Finance
This sub-area will oversee the finance activity for the entire project. The work
will involve control of budget forecasting and maintenance, financial and transactional
operations, and export financing development.
1.3.2 Logistics and Procurement
This sub-area will provide staff support to the overall project management contract
as well as the subcontracts with international and Ukrainian firms. It will
oversee, draft, review, and finalize all procedures and contracts involving competitive
procurement of goods, services, and equipment. It will make all necessary preparations
and arrangements for transportation, accommodations and meals for all
employees, contractors, and agents of the project while they are in the Ukraine.
1.3.3 Legal
, .„
This sub-area will provide staff guidance in all legal matters and will oversee, coordinate
and provide liaison with outside counsel in matters related to the project.
1.3.4 Management Information System
This sub-area will oversee the specification, acquisition, implementation, and operations
of the financial and project management information systems.
1.3.5 Management Assistance
This sub-area will have general responsibility for the management assistance portion
of this project. Included will be assistance to the Ukrainian Representative and

140
MinChemobyl in both technical and project management and commercial and finance
management and planning.
2.0 TECHNICAL SUPPORT MANAGEMENT AREAS
Support Management Area 2.1—Data Management
This management area will develop guidelines to be implemented project-wide for
the man£igement of technical data. The data management function will ensure uniformity
of data storage and retrieval through a technical information system. It will
provide requirements for project documentation including preparation, submittal,
storage, distribution, retrieval, and archiving of such documentation to ensure that
an accurate and complete historical record of the project is maintained. In addition,
a research support function will be provided to establish guidelines for the exchange
of technical information among project participants and between the project and
outside organizations.
Sub-AREAS
2.1.1 Technical Information System
This sub-area wUl develop a system of hardware, software, and procedures for the
management of technical information. Protocols will be developed for storage and
retrieval of technical information, and data formats and communication interfaces
will be prescribed. The technical information system will ensure that specified data
and associated information are managed uniformly throughout the project. A control
system will be established to ensure quality and currency of data. This sub-area
will provide for the identification of data and information management requirements,
preparation of hardware and software specifications, preparation of a technical
information management plan, development of software systems to meet requirements,
configuration of hardware systems, and installation and operation of
hardware and software systems.
3.1.2 Documentation
Work performed in the documentation sub-area will ensure that management systems
and procedures are established to collect and preserve information generated
during the course of the project. This information will serve as a historical record of
work activities and will be preserved and archived in a manner that facilitates effective
retrieval. Procedures will be prepared that place requirements on the project
areas for documenting technical work and that provide direction regarding formats
and criteria for submitting documents as well as for retrieving, distributing, and archiving
documents. A computerized tracking system will be established for cataloguing
documents during distribution, storage, archival, and retrieval activities.
2.1.S Research Support
Pursuant to MinChemobyl guidance, this sub-area will create and establish guidelines
for a system to provide for the exchange of technical information and docunaents
among the program participants £ind between the program and outside organizations.
Guidelines will include subjects such as technical information release,
interfaces for information transfer, and a system for responding to and tracking information
requests.
Technical Support Management Area 2.2—Technical Services
Technical support common to two or more project or management areas will in
general be furnished from this Management Area. Initially, this will include
common field instrumentation, analytical laboratory services, wide-area contamination
surveys, radiation protection, dosimetry, personal decontamination, and meteorological
and statistical support. Other technical service areas may be added as required.
Sub-AREAS
2.2.1 Common Field Instrumentation
In consultation with all project areas, a catalog will be developed of instrumentation
planned for field use. This catalog will be reviewed for commonalty and interchange
ability. Plans will be developed and implemented for procurement, calibration,
maintenance, and related services.
2.2.2 Analytical and Radiological Laboratory
The laboratory will provide a full range of services using both fixed and mobile
facilities. Services to be provided will include coordination of sampling, sampling
protocols, sample preparation, counting, chemistry, radiochemistry, spectral analyses,
sample management and archiving, and the provision of calibration standards

141
and services. The laboratory will also provide calibration maintenance and repair
services for specified field instrumentation.
2.2.3 Contamination Survey
Surface concentrations of gamma-emitting radionuclides will be measured over
the entire affected area, using airborne detection and positioning systems. Spectral
information will be plotted on geographic maps and entered into the master data
base. Finer-grained surveys will be made with ground-based and hand-held instruments.
Statistical methods will be used to develop surface and subsurface sampling
plans, which will be implemented in all areas of known or suspected contamination.
2.2.4 Radiation Safety
Radiation safety services will be provided for all project participants. Included
will be the provision of personnel dosimeters, protective clothing and equipment,
and decontamination of personnel, clothing, and equipment, as well as collection of
samples for bioassay as required. Individual dose records will be established and
maintained. Environmental monitoring of work sites will be provided as required.
2.2.5 Meteorology Support
Historical data will be assembled and examined to assist in site characterization
and migration/suspension studies. A forecasting capability will be established to
assist in project scheduling and in radiological safety planning. Real-time meteorological
monitoring networks will be maintained as required in and around contaminated
work sites.
2.2.6 Statistical Support
Statistical methods will be applied in many aspects of both field and laboratory
work. Statisticians will assist in the design of sampling plans, in selecting samples
for analysis, and in interpretation of results.
Technical Support Management Area 2.3—Training Program
In order to maximize the opportunity for Ukrainian nationals to participate
through emplojmient in the project, an extensive training program will be conducted
throughout the duration of the project. Individual jobs and team tasks will be
identified to be performed under supervision of Ukrainian subcontractors, pursuant
to direction of program project personnel. Prospective subcontractors will be provided
assistance and training in business organization and management to facilitate
their early integration into the program team. For each job specialty, the training
organization will develop and implement pre-employment screening standards,
training plans, and certification procedures.
Sub-AREAS
2.3.1 Program Development
In coordination with project and management area leaders, this sub-area will establish
quantitative and qualitative training needs, assist with the development of
lesson plans and training aids, and arrange for recruitment and training of Ukrainian
instruction staff. It will also arrange for and coordinate translating and interpreting
services.
2.3.2 Facilities
Through the use of Ukrainian subcontractors, facilities will be identified or established,
equipped for training, and maintained and operated. Required transportation,
feeding and other support, including administrative services, will be similarly
provided.
2.3.3 Guidance Manuals
This sub-area will provide to all participating contractors guidance manuals for
use in developing their individual components of the training program. Formats, introductory
material and assistance will be provided for the development of readily
translatable text. The guidance manuals will address availability and preferences
for training aids, customary instructional techniques, and cultural considerations as
well as existing sources of reference materials in the native language.
2.3.4 Program Implementation
The training program will be implemented early in the project, m accordance
with the overall training plan. Progress will be continuously monitored and evaluated
to assess and improve training effectiveness.

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3.0 OPERATIONS PROJECT AREAS
Operations Project Area 3.1—Decommissioning Power Plant
This project area addresses all of the activities required for the decommissioning
of the operable reactors at the Chernobyl site. This will require the removal of fissionable
components of the units, removal and disposal of contaminated items, decontamination
to the extent possible of on-site facilities and equipment, and the
placement of all items in a safe configuration.
The sub-projects described below must, in general, be accomplished sequentially,
since the start of one may require the successful completion of the other.
Sub-projects
3.1.1 Prepare Written Decommissioning and Decontamination Plan
A plan and schedule for the decommissioning of the reactors will be prepared for
the review and approval by MinChernobyl. The plan will contain the standards to
be met by the decommissioning activities and the schedule will contain options for
delays in the decontamination should this appear desirable.
3.1.2 Interim Safety Measures
Safety measures to be in place during the decommissioning phase will be identified
and implemented. These will include, but not be limited to:
• Establishment of a site-wide monitoring and surveillance system;
• Provision of fire protection systems or supplement existing systems during decommissioning;
• Provision of additional ventilation to accommodate radioactivity which may be
released during decommissioning and decontamination;
• Review of structural and foundation capacity of long-term viability; and,
• Shutting off and sealing all passageways and openings not in use to restrict possible
release of radioactivity.
3.1.3 Decommission Reactors
In order to proceed with the decommissioning and decontamination of the three
operable reactors at the Chernobyl site, it is first required that they be placed in a
non-critical configuration, and that it be assured that they cannot be restarted. Initially,
this is achieved by the insertion of poison control elements, but modifications
to the control system and eventual removal of fuel is also required.
3.1.4 Reactor Cool-Down
Following reactor shutdown, it will be necessary to maintain coolant circulation
to remove the decay heat residual. The length of time this is required depends on
the fuel loading, fuel burn-up and recent operating history of the reactor. Cool-down
progress is monitored by temperatures in the reactor, but may vary within individual
fuel elements. For this reason, calculations of heat generation as well as measurements
will be employed.
3.1.5 Remove Fuel
Following the reactor cool-down period, removal of the fuel from the reactor
vessel can be accomplished. This operation will be completely remote and will be
accomplished with the existing fuel handling equipment. The fuel will then be
either placed in additional cooling or packaged for disposition. The decision will
depend on the fuel conditions at the time of cool-down and the facilities available to
receive the spent fuel.
3.1.6 Liquid Decontamination
With fuel removed from the reactor, decontamination of the coolant loops can proceed.
This will first require sampling for radioactive and other pollutants, then
treatment. Treatments may include filtration, precipitation, ion exchange or evaporation.
The goal is to dispose of the water completely, leaving only residues to be
disposed of as radioactive waste.
3.1.7 Cleanup and Dismantle Facility and Equipment
AVith the reactor facility empty of fuel and liquid, disassembly of equipment and
facilities can be accomplished. Detailed monitoring of each item will be required to
determine the proper safe procedure for decommissioning and the proper disposal
method. Material which can be decontaminated for reuse will be treated accordingly.
Equipment such as control room components and electrical generators will be
examined for possible reuse. Activities related to the cleanup of Unit 4 will be surveyed
for possible synergism.
3.1.8 Containment

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The reactor vessel, primary shielding, and structure surrounding the reactor may
be too radioactive to be safely dismantled. This portion of the facility will be contained
and sealed for long-term, on-site monitoring to prevent release of radioactivity
to the public.
3.1.9 Waste Management
All components removed from the reactor and all waste generated during decommissioning
and decontamination operations will be treated or packaged for disposal.
Concurrent activities associated with the Unit 4 contamination remediation project
will be utilized whenever possible.
Operations Project Area 3.2—Reactor 4 Site
This project area has two major purposes: 1) to design and implement as rapidly
as feasible the measures necessary to prevent any further accidental release of radiation
from the Reactor 4 site or other occurrence that may pose an environmental
or population hazard, and 2) to develop, design, and implement a comprehensive
plan to render the Reactor 4 site radiologically safe and environmentally benign.
Sub-projects
3.2.1 Existing Conditions Assessment
This sub-project team will collect and examine all available data concerning the
current condition of the reactor site; interview knowledgeable officials, scientists,
and technicians; and conduct exploratory and diagnostic activities leading to a complete
characterization of the facility.
3.2.2 Interim Safety Measures
This sub-project team will design and implement interim safety measures that
will improve safety in and around the Reactor 4 site pending implementation of permanent
remediation measures. Using the results of the assessment of existing conditions,
an evaluation will be made of the risks to site workers, the surrounding population,
and the environment resulting from the current conditions. Interim measures
will then be identified to reduce or eliminate these risks. Such measures will
include improved fire protection, increeised structural support, and removal and disposal
of unneeded structures and hazardous materials. Specific near-term remediation
measures will be recommended, and those approved will be implemented.
3.2.3 Best Case for Fuel Removal
The purpose of this sub-project is to develop and present the best case for removing
the melted fuel from the damaged reactor and its surroundings. Methods to accomplish
removal will be examined, and a summary safety assessment will be prepared
to identify the hazards and risks associated with this course of action. Decontamination
or other remediation of the structures remaining after fuel removal also
will be addressed.
3.2.4 Best Case for Fuel Containment
The purpose of this sub-project is to develop and present the best case for containing
the melted fuel in the damaged reactor site. Alternative and improved methods
of containment will be examined to select the one presenting the least long-term
risk and lowest long-term maintenance cost. A summary safety assessment will be
prepared to identify the hazards and risks associated with this course of action.
3.2.5 Technology Recommendation
Following the development of detailed analyses of the two major remediation alternatives
(removal and containment), a preferred course of action will be recommended.
In addition to the purely technical evaluation of alternatives, this recommendation
will consider the economic and environmental cost and public acceptance
of the proposed post-remediation site condition.
3.2.6 Design
Upon acceptance by MinChemobyl of the action recommended, design criteria
will be developed and incorporated in a request for proposal, to be issued by Min-
Chemobyl, seeking international competition for the containment design contract.
During the design phase, this sub-project will provide progress monitoring and an
independent review of the design effort.
3.2.7 Construction
Following completion and acceptance of the design, the same procedures (i.e., criteria,
request for proposal, independent review) will be followed for construction of
the containment system.
3.2.8 Surveillance

144
Following completion of the Reactor 4 site construction, long-term monitoring of
the facility and site will be required. This sub-project will provide a detailed surveillance
plan that identifies measurements to be made, location and frequency of
measurement, scheduled analysis and interpretation of results, and independent
review and documentation.
Operations Project Area 3.3—Contamination Migration
There are two principal modes of contamination transport or migration: air and
water. The transport of contamination by air, immediately after the accident and in
the intervening years has spread contamination to the west and to the northeast.
The water flow for both groundwater and surface water tends to be in the opposite
direction of the air transport. Water tends to move contaminated material to the
south.
For this situation to be controlled and eventually eliminated, two things must be
accomplished. First, the release of new contamination to the environment must
cease, Second, the mechanics and chemistry of the contamination transport modes
must be understood and then corrected. This involves the identification, characterization
and elimination of existing eirid potential sources of new contamination release,
the computer modeling of the air and water transport phenomena, and the
modeling of the chemistry interaction of contamination particles in the environment.
A third mode of contamination migration is through the biological food chain.
This mode is addressed in Project Area 3.4—Agriculture and Food.
Sub-projects
3.3.1 Air
The air contamination transport mechanism will be characterized through the
review of existing data, acquisition of new meteorological data, performance of resuspension
studies, and air transport modeling. Remediation technologies will be
identified, and appropriate technologies will be selected for implementation. The selected
technologies will then be implemented.
3.3.1.1 Re-suspension Studies
In these studies, the team will review and assess the adequacy of existing information
(to include meteorological data) related to the evaluation of the airborne
transport mechanism for contaminant dispersal. Additional data and information
needs will be identified and methods will be defined to acquire the data and information.
In addition, a program will be developed and implemented to acquire meteorological
data throughout the Chernobyl accident contamination remediation program.
Re-suspension mechanisms (to include high winds, fires, and dust created
during agricultural activities) will be defined, and analytical and field studies will
be conducted to characterize these postulated events in terms of the potential for resuspension,
mass loading, particle size, dispersion characteristics, and radionuclide
content, among others.
3.3.1.2 Air Transport Modeling
A model wUl be established for analyzing the transport of contamination through
the atmosphere. Existing models will be identified and assessed for their applicability
to the Chernobyl conditions. Based on predetermined criteria for model performance,
specific models will be selected and/or developed that will appropriately represent
the air transport characteristics of the region. Models wQl use existing meteorology
data and new data as they become available, as well as contamination data
and results of the re-suspension studies, to determine and predict the nature and
extent of contamination transport.
3.3.1.3 Air Remediation Technology Evaluation
The results of the re-suspension studies and the air transport modeling will be
used to characterize the contamination resulting from airborne transport of the
region affected by the Chernobyl accident. Remediation technologies will be identified
that could have a mitigating effect on the dose resulting from re-suspension and
air transport. For the purpose of evaluation, remediation technology performance
criteria will be identified using standards developed for cleanup. Viable technologies
for remediation will be identified and described. Remediation alternatives will be
developed using the identified technologies, and each alternative will be characterized
and evaluated in terms of the performance criteria. Alternatives will be ranked
based on the results of the evaluation, and remediation measures will be recommended.
Among these measures may be:
• washing,

145
• fixation,
• restrictions on land use,
• agricultural practices, and
• concentration and removal of contaminants.
3.3.1.4 Air Remediation
Following acceptance and approval of remediation options, the project team will
either implement each approved recommendation or assist MinChernobyl in its implementation.
This sub-project team will provide a remediation technology implementation
plan, identify and acquire resources, implement the selected options,
monitor and control performance of the implementation activities, and perform
post-remediation verification for effectiveness. Periodic progress reports will be provided,
and a post-remediation status report will be prepared.
3.3.2 Water
This project area will determine the contamination levels in water sources (i.e.,
surface water, groundwater, storm water, and silt and sediment), characterize the
transport of contaminants, evaluate remediation technologies, and recommend specific
remediation alternatives for addressing unacceptable contamination migration
in affected water sources. This project area team will collect site information to establish
contamination levels, develop and use water models, identify and characterize
remediation technologies, and recommend appropriate remediation technologies
for implementation.
3.3.2.1 Existing Information Assessment and Site Characterization
Relevant information related to site characterization for water will be identified
using multinational sources. The information will be collected and assessed as to
quality and adequacy for characterizing the nature and extent of contamination;
predicting the fate and transport of contaminants in surface water, groundwater
and sediments; and evaluating risks to the area inhabitants from the drinking
water supply. The adequacy of available information for evaluating remediation
technology options will also be assessed. A plan for additional data collection to fill
data gaps will be developed, and sampling and analyses will be performed to characterize
the water quality of the site. This information will provide input to the modeling
of contaminant transport through the water pathway.
3.3.2.2 Fate and Transport Modeling of Pripyat and Dnieper River and Other Surface
Waters
This sub-project will include development and use of models of the Pripyat and
Dnieper Rivers and their associated transport characteristics. The objective will be
to evaluate existing conditions, assist in developing a monitoring program, and
assess the effectiveness and impacts of remediation measures. The evaluation will
use reports of past modeling efforts and previously gathered data as well as field
measurements yet to be made. Models will be developed or modified and used as a
basis for defining the data requirements and the need for additional measurements.
Modeling will then be conducted to evaluate the contamination transport characteristics
of the rivers. The models will be used to accomplish the following:
1. assess critical gaps in available information needed to characterize surface flow
systems and transport mechanisms;
2. prioritize data needs for site characterization;
3. evaluate baseline concentrations of radionuclides in surface water under conditions
of no remedial action; and,
4. evaluate the consequences and effectiveness of alternative remediation actions
for contaminated surface water.
3.3.2.3 Fate and Transport Modeling of Groundwater
This sub-project will construct and calibrate models that adequately represent the
site-specific fate and transport mechanisms for groundwater and will use these
models to accomplish the following:
1. assess critical gaps in available information needed to characterize subsurface
flow systems and transport mechanisms;
2. prioritize data needs for site characterization;
3. evaluate baseline concentrations of radionuclides in groundwater under conditions
of no remedial action; and,
4. evaluate the consequences and effectiveness of alternative remediation actions
for contaminated groundwater.
3.3.2.4 Storm Water Impact Evaluation
This sub-project will evaluate the impacts of storm water on the transport of contamination
to various receptors, including surface water bodies, groundwater, and

146
soils. Previous studies and investigations of storm water in the area will be identified
including studies directly related to the accident as well as other storm water
and drainage studies such as drainage master plans, non-point source investigations,
and storm water management modeling efforts. Based on the review of past work,
areas of particular concern will be identified and studies and evaluations will be
prepared to define the problem and facilitate design of remediation measures. Parameters
that need to be quantified include contamination sources to other media,
such as surface water and groundwater. Models to be used will include those previously
used for Chernobyl, as well as state-of-the-art models from other sources.
3.3.2.5 Water Remediation Technology Evaluation
This sub-project will provide an evaluation of the different methods for water remediation
applicable to this project. Information will be obtained on existing remediation
technologies and will be combined with the results of the site characterization,
fate and transport modeling, and storm water impact evaluation sub-projects.
The remediation technology information and the results will be used to identify
suitable technology alternatives to remediate unacceptable contamination conditions
for rivers, surface water, groundwater, and storm water. For the purpose of
evaluation, remediation technology performance criteria will be identified using
standards developed for cleanup. Viable technologies for remediation will be identified
and described. Remediation alternatives will be developed using the identified
technologies, and each alternative will be characterized and evaluated in terms of
the performance criteria. Alternatives will be ranked based on the results of the
evaluation, and remediation measures will be recommended. Included among these
measures may be re-routing or diversion of sources, settling and precipitation of
contaminants, restricted use planning, and treatment at the point of use.
3.3.2.6 Water Remediation
Following acceptance and approval of remediation options, the project team will
either implement each approved recommendation or assist MinChemobyl in its implementation.
This sub-project team will provide a remediation technology implementation
plan, identify and acquire resources, implement the selected options,
monitor and control performance of the implementation activities, and perform
post-remediation verification for effectiveness. Periodic progress reports will be provided,
and a post-remediation status report will be prepared.
3.3.2.7 Silt and Sediment Remediation Technology Evaluation
This sub-project will provide an evaluation of the different methods for silt and
sediment remediation. Based on the site characterization and past modeling work,
the areas where silt and sediments may need remediation will be identified. A preliminary
evaluation of these areas will be made to facilitate review of the available
technologies and will include estimates of volumes and generic location (i.e., wetland,
river, or reservoir). In postulating possible remediation options, available technologies
will be reviewed for applicability, environmental impacts, local capabilities,
and costs. Local availability of capabilities and resources will be significant factors
in technology evaluation. For the purpose of evaluation, remediation technology performance
criteria will be identified using standards developed for cleanup. Viable
technologies for remediation will be identified and described. Remediation alternatives
will be developed using the identified technologies, and each alternative will
be characterized and evaluated in terms of the performance criteria. Alternatives
will be ranked based on the results of the evaluation, and remediation measures
will be recommended. These measures may include dredging, capping, treatment,
and disposal.
3.3.2.8 Silt and Sediment Remediation
The result of the site characterization and the silt and sediment remediation technology
evaluation sub-projects will be a set of recommended alternatives for silt and
sediment remediation. This sub-project will provide a remediation technology implenientation
plan, identify and acquire resources, implement the selected options, provide
a performance monitoring and control function for the implementation activities,
and perform post-remediation verification for effectiveness. Periodic progress
reports will be provided, and a post-remediation status report will be prepared.
Operations Project Area 3.4—Agriculture and Food
Sub-projects
3.4.1 Biota
The biota of the contaminated area affect dosage to man in two ways: (1) by serving
as a mechanism or vector for the entry of radioactive contaminants into man's
food chain, and (2) by serving as a means of transport from one geographic area or

147
environmental compartment to another. This project area will catalog the biota of
the affected areas, assess their contribution to population dose, evaluate remedial
technologies, and recommend remedial actions.
3.^.1.1 Food Chain Characterization
The food chain to man will be described in detail to identify potential pathways to
man for radioactive contaminants. Samples of food-chain constituents will be analyzed
for concentrations of radioactive elements and the results entered into a data
base for dose assessment. Food consumption patterns will be studied and a diet
model constructed for each segment of the population (e.g., age groups, rural vs.
urban, etc.). With these diet models and contamination levels determined by laboratory
analyses, the un-remediated dose commitment will be calculated.
3.Jt.l.2 Transport Characterization
All of the flora and fauna of the affected region will be catalogued, and their potential
for contributing to the transport of radioactive contaminants from one
region or area to another will be evaluated. Transport models will be constructed
and used to predict contaminant migration (both qualitatively and quantitatively) in
all affected areas.
3.^.1.3 Biota Remediation Technology Evaluation
Techniques will be evaluated for reducing dose to man caused by food-chain contamination
or entrainment of contaminants and transport out of controlled areas.
For the purpose of evaluation, remediation technology performance criteria will be
identified using standards developed for cleanup. Viable technologies for remediation
will be identified and described. Remediation alternatives will be developed
using the identified technologies, and each alternative will be characterized and
evaluated in terms of the performance criteria. Alternatives will be ranked based on
the results of the evaluation, and remediation measures will be recommended.
These measures may include such elements as:
• Cleanup and removal,
• Fixation,
• Elimination or control of vector species,
• Modification of agricultural practices,
• Changes in land utilization, and
• Changes in food processing or dietary custom.
3.4.1.4 Biota Remediation
Following acceptance and approval of remediation options, the project team ^yill
either implement each approved recommendation or assist MinChernobyl in its implementation.
This sub-project team will provide a remediation technology implementation
plan, identify and acquire resources, implement the selected options,
monitor and control performance of the implementation activities, and perform
post-remediation verification for effectiveness. Periodic progress reports will be provided,
and a post-remediation status report will be prepared.
Operations Project Area 3.5—Drinking Water
At the present, radioactive contamination of the potable water supply does not
appear to be a problem. However, existing data on water, silts and sediments, as
well as current computer based models indicate radioactive contamination is being
transported by water. This creates a situation where the public water supply may
become threatened with contamination.
Sub-projects
3.5.1 Drinking Water Supply Characterization
An assessment will be performed to characterize drinking water sources in terms
of origin, manner of collection, and manner of distribution and delivery to users.
Public and private water supplies will be identified, and existing water quality data
and additional water sample data will be reviewed to characterize the extent of contamination.
An evaluation will also be performed to locate and identify contamination
sources and mechanisms and to delineate affected areas and water sources.
3.5.2 Drinking Water Remediation Technology Evaluation
Using the results of the supply characterization, the team will evaluate different
methods for reducing contaminants in drinking water. For the purpose of evaluation,
remediation technology performance criteria will be identified using standards
developed for cleanup. Viable technologies for remediation will be identified and described.
Remediation alternatives will be developed using the identified technologies,
and each alternative will be characterized and evaluated in terms of the performance
criteria. Alternatives will be ranked based on the results of the evalua-

148
tion, and remediation measures will be recommended. These measures may include
cleanup of ponds and reservoirs, filtration, development of alternative sources, and
treatment at point of use.
3.5.3. Drinking Water Remediation
The results of the drinking water remediation technology evaluation will provide
a set of recommended alternatives for drinking water remediation. This sub-project
team will provide a remediation technology implementation plan, identify and acquire
resources, implement the selected options, monitor and control performance of
the implementation activities, and perform post-remediation verification for effectiveness.
Periodic progress reports will be provided, and a post-remediation status
report will be prepared.
Operations Project Area 3.6—Soils
The soils of the contaminated area contribute dosage to man in four ways: (1) external
radiation dose to those occupying or working the land; (2) leaching into
groundwater with subsequent transport into domestic water supplies; (3) re-suspension
in air, creating a respiratory hazard; and (4) uptake by plant and animal species,
resulting in direct or indirect entry into man's food chain. This project area
will characterize the soils in the affected area, determine the distribution and
nature of the contamination, and determine the significance of all the above-described
pathways. Remediation technologies will be evaluated, remedial recommendations
will be developed, and approved recommendations will be implemented.
Sub-projects
3.6.1 Site Characterization
Based upon the results of the aerial contamination survey (see Support Management
Area) and other available soils data, a sampling plan (including extensive
depth profiling) will be carried out, covering all known or suspect areas. Samples
will be examined and analyzed for radionuclide concentrations and chemical and
physical form.
3.6.2 Hazard Determination
Using statistical and modeling techniques, the hazard to man will be estimated
for each pathway, each geographical area, and each potential land use.
3.6.3 Soils Remediation Technology Evaluation
This sub-project will use the results of the site characterization and hazard determination
sub-projects to evaluate methods for reducing contaminants in soils. For
the purpose of evaluation, remediation technology performance criteria will be identified
using standards developed for cleanup. Viable technologies for remediation
will be identified and described. Remediation alternatives will be developed using
the identified technologies, and each alternative will be characterized and evaluated
in terms of the performance criteria. Alternatives will be ranked based on the results
of the evaluation, and remediation measures will be recommended. Among
these may be:
• soil removal,
• soil treatment (additives),
• changes in land usage,
• modification of agricultural practices, and
• crop selection.
3.6.4 Soils Remediation
Following acceptance and approval of remediation options, the project team will
either implement each approved recommendation or assist MinChernobyl in its implementation.
This sub-project will provide a remediation technology implementation
plan, identify and acquire resources, implement the selected options, monitor
and control performance of the implementation activities, and perform post-remediation
verification for effectiveness. Periodic progress reports will be provided, and a
post-remediation status report will be prepared.
Operations Project Area 3.7—Waste Management
This project area addresses all of the activities required for the location, identification,
retrieval, handling, decontamination, treatment, transportation, packaging,
disposal, surveillance, and documentation of radioactive waste. This project area
covers all aspects of waste management from initial planning to ultimate disposal .
Sub-projects
3.7.1 Waste Characterization

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In order to plan for and accomplish the proper management of the radioactive
waste resulting from the Chernobyl accident, sampling and analyses will be conducted
to characterize and classify the wastes as to form, physical and chemical properties,
quantity, geographic distribution, and assay of specific nuclides.
3.7.2 Waste Management Technology Evaluation
This sub-project will identify and evaluate existing technologies for radioactive
waste management. Emphasis will be placed upon existing and proven technologies.
However, new technologies will undoubtedly emerge during the course of the
project, and a concerted effort will be made to identify and adopt significant technology
improvements as they become available.
3.7.3 Retrieval of Temporarily Stored and Buried Waste
Over the past five years, radioactive materials have often been collected in temporary
storage areas. All of these locations will be identified and the contents will be
determined and documented. Waste to be retrieved will be classified, and retrieval
plans will be developed and implemented. Retrieval will generally be accorded lower
priority than other waste management efforts except in cases where the current
status of temporary storage sites represents an immediate hazard to public health
and safety.
3.7.4 Decontamination
In the evacuated cities of Pripyat and Chernobyl, as well as elsewhere in the near
vicinity of the reactor site, a large number of otherwise intact and usable structures
will require evaluation and either decontamination and repair or demolition. In
either case, considerable contaminated waste will be generated and will require disposal.
Decontamination technologies will be identified and selected for application
based on the t3rpe, form, and extent of contamination. Although decisions in this
sub-project will, in general, be guided by cost-benefit considerations, close coordination
with Ukrainian authorities will be required in order to ensure the preservation
of items of historic and cultural significance. This sub-project will also provide for
the decontamination or disposal of vessels, vehicles, and large items of construction
equipment.
3.7.5 Site-Generated Waste
Waste treatment, decontamination, and other project activities may generate additional
waste by distributing the existing radioactivity into materials that were
originally clean (e.g., decontamination solutions). The volume, properties, and radioactivity
of this waste will be determined in order to provide for its proper handling
and disposal. Each sub-project will result in estimates of site-generated wastes, and
technologies for their packaging and disposal will be identified and selected.
3. 7. 6 Repositories
This sub-project will define the requirements for radioactive waste repositories,
perform repository site characterizations, recommend locations where such repositories
can be built, provide design criteria for the repositories, plan for design and
construction, and recommend waste acceptance criteria and procedures for monitoring,
surveillance, and documentation.
3. 7. 7 Transportation, Packaging, and Handling
Waste management activities during the cleanup will require the handling of radioactive
waste, packaging of some wastes, and transportation of the waste to the
disposal site or repository. Some waste will be of sufficiently low levels of radioactivity
to permit contact handling while some will require remote operations. This subproject
will involve analysis of handling requirements for the different t5T)es of
waste as well as the requirements for packaging and transportation. Equipment to
perform these operations will then be specified and procured. Operating standards
and procedures will be developed for these activities.
3.7.8 Waste Treatment and Disposal
In order to render them suitable for permanent disposal, some wastes will be concentrated,
solidified, or otherwise treated. Depending on the waste form (liquid,
solid, etc.) and its radioactivity, different treatment and disposal options will be selected.
This sub-project will address the processes, equipment, and operations required
to perform the options. Treatment requirements will be identified as disposal
standards and waste characterizations are developed. Waste treatment equipment
will be procured and operations defined.
3.7.9 Waste Documentation
A necessary activity during decontamination, cleanup, and disposal is documentation
of the results. Detailed records will be maintained describing the final disposi-
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150
tion of waste, including its quantity, concentrations of contaminants, form, packaging
and containment features, and location.
Operations Project Area 3.8—Health Care
Sub-projects
3.8.1 Epidemiological Studies
Epidemiological studies of the general population within the affected area
1. Baseline evaluation of health status, including exposure to toxic substances not
related to Chernobyl, general nutrition and immunization status.
2. Periodic (6 month to 1 year) evaluation of health status via physical examination
and baseline laboratory studies.
3. Ongoing compilation of data that results from the initial and periodic health
status evaluation.
4. In order to make this data base as complete as possible, information from episodic
or emergency visits, when not received in the same center as the health status
evaluation, must be made available to data collectors.
3.8.2 Health Care Facilities
Health care centers for the use of workers, as well as the general population in
the affected area, should be established to provide consistent health care and facilitate
record keeping and epidemiological evaluation of data.
1. These facilities should be equipped with basic laboratory and radiological equipment
to enable diagnosis of episodic and emergent, as well as long-term alterations
in health.
2. Medications, intravenous fluids, sterile equipment, including syringes and disposable
needles, as well as dressing supplies, will need to be available. Sterilization
equipment for reusable instruments will need to be at each site, as well.
3. Inventory of equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals will need to be done on
a regular basis to ensure the security and efficiency of each center.
4. Disposal of contaminated equipment and supplies will be handled according to
approved procedures for the type of contamination, e.g. needle disposal.
Operations Project Area 3.9—Population Care
This area includes all activities necessary to provide human habitation and communities.
Thus, it includes construction materials production, construction of homes
and communities, and provision of community facilities and services. Detailed
breakdown of sub-projects will be prepared in Phase Two.
4.0 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENHANCEMENT, AND TRANSFER
Task 4.0 will span all four Phases of the project.
Technology assessment, enhancement, and transfer project area 4.i database
DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of this project area is to develop the needed databases for characterization
of both the waste and the site, including surface contamination characterization,
ground water contamination characterization, and atmospheric characterization.
This project area will then integrate these databases with existing technologies
and operational experiences.
Sub-projects
^.1.1 Waste Characterization
This task will involve determining and monitoring the characteristics of radioactive
waste in situ. Waste characterization will be done remotely with robotic monitoring
techniques which employ sensor- and model-based control software to measure
temperature, humidity, pressure, presence of oxygen or hydrogen, broad-band
gamma sensors, gamma spectrometers, gas chromatography, and physical sensors
for mapping the inside of the sarcophagus. For analyses that cannot be carried out
in situ, automated chemical analysis laboratories will be utilized.
Jf.1.2 Site Characterization
4.1.2.1 Surface Contamination Characterization
Aerial gamma and neutron survey data will be integrated with spot surface
sample analyses. The entire database will then be interpreted in terms of decay, mobility,
and consequence models. Gamma-ray passive tomography will be utilized to
locate fission products under concrete and soil surfaces for a considerable distance
around the Chernobyl reactor site. Three-dimensional source distribution maps will
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4.1.2.2 Ground Water Contamination Characterization
The two critical pathways for ground water contamination at the Chernobyl site
that lead to human exposure, i.e., ground water and surface water, will be identified.
In order to characterize the contamination, the physical and chemical processes
expected to occur at or near the site will be considered.
4.1.2.3 Atmospheric Contamination Characterization
Characterization of the atmospheric contamination will be accomplished via aerial
gamma and neutron survey data. In addition, meteorological data will be acquired
to improve models for the air transport of contamination. Parameters to be investigated
include the particle size distribution, dispersion characteristics, and the radio
nuclide content.
4- 1.3 Existing Technologies
A survey of existing technologies which may be beneficial to the Chernobyl Comprehensive
Environmental Remediation Project will be performed. These technologies
include: radiation survey capabilities (surface, ground water, and aerial);
health physics monitoring and radiation protection; source term analysis methods;
containment concepts; geologic performance assessment methods; and, the use of robotics
for cleanup of radioactive sites.
4-1.4 Operational Experience
The experience gained in applying the technologies mentioned above in ongoing
projects will be of great benefit to the Chernobyl cleanup efforts. This includes: the
reactor decontamination and decommissioning technologies used at Three Mile
Island; the development of high-level radioactive waste storage and transport containers;
and, the development of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, a Monitored Retrievable
Storage facility; and, the final repository.
Technology assessment, enhancement, and transfer project area 4.2 preuminary
hazard assessment
This section describes the identification, evaluation, and selection of models required
to assess the effects of radio nuclides that have been or that may be released
as a result of the 1986 incident at Chernobyl Unit #4. These models could also be
used to evaluate many of the hazards from the continued operation of Units # 1 and
#3. Unit #2 has been shut down since a fire occurred within the generators in
1991. It is anticipated that all four reactors at Chernobyl will be decommissioned
and decontaminated in the near future. The fate of the partially constructed Units
# 5 and # 6 is undetermined.
A preliminary hazard assessment for the Chernobyl site would include five general
steps:
Step 1—Identification of pathways of potential exposure.
Step 2—Screening of those pathways to identify which are of primary importance.
Step 3—Identify models that can be used to assess the pathways and to demonstrate
that those models can be integrated into a total system performance assessment.
Step 4—Select computer codes that reflect the models and implement the methodology.
Step 5—Acquire, implement, and assess computer codes for the methodology;
revise conceptual models, as necessary.
The primary areas considered by this methodology are:
• the location and nature of radio nuclide contaminants
• ground water, surface water, and aerosol transport of contaminants;
• the food chain; and,
• radiological dosimetry.
Other effects, such as inadvertent human intrusion, can be analyzed within this
methodology, but are not considered to be of primary importance.
4.2.1 Release Scenarios
Initial identification of natural and man-induced events and processes must be
done carefully to increase the likelihood that the list is exhaustive and potentially
significant events, and that potentially significant events and processes have not
been inadvertently neglected. Events and processes need to be screened on a sitespecific
basis; the number is usually large. Criteria for this screening are typically:
• physical reasonableness;
• likelihood of occurrence; and,
• potential consequence.
Even after screening of processes and events, the number of scenarios that can be
generated is likely to be impractically large. One way to reduce the number of per-

152
turbations is to include as many events and processes as possible in a base-case scenario.
Scenarios are screened on the same criteria as processes and events:
• physical reasonableness;
• likelihood of occurrence; and,
• potential consequence.
Researchers commonly decrease the number of scenarios by combining those that
have similar potential consequences. However, when cumulative likelihood of occurrence,
the cumulative likelihood of occurrence can become significant.
Scenario screening should eliminate any scenarios such that only a select
number—those with a significant likelihood of occurrence and potentially significant
consequences, based on preliminary analyses—remain for further consideration.
4.2.2 Site/Facility Conceptual Model
There are three major areas that require conceptual models for hazard assessment
at Chernobyl: 1) waste; 2) engineered facility; and, 3) site. The characteristics
of the waste include, among other things, an inventory of waste constituents, including
distribution, the quantities of each waste form, decay chains, and the half-lives
of the various radio nuclides. The engineered facilities include both the original
structures and any post-accident engineered barriers. The current configurations
and properties of these facilities must be known. Finally, site characteristics from
those in the "near-field" within the Sarcophagus to the "far-field" outside the Sarcophagus
must be understood for conceptual model development. Most of the nearfield
characteristics would be included in the waste and engineered facilities investigations.
Far-field areas of importance range from geology (geochemistry, geomorphology,
etc.), pedology, hydrology (both surface and subsurface), meteorology, ecology
(including agriculture practices), demography (including population distribution and
numbers, diet, water source and consumption, and locations of individuals in highrisk
occupations or habitations, e.g., farmers), to health physics and radiation medicine
(including the effects of external and internal doses and how these affect the
body).
and direct exposure. These pathways must end with their impact on human
4.2.S Consequence, Uncertainty, and Sensitivity Analyses
Consequence Analysis
Detailed consequence studies of each of the remaining scenarios and the pathways
involved in these scenarios must be done. Possible pathways for radio nuclide transport
at Chernobyl include atmospheric, surface water, and ground water, food materials,
health.
The output from the calculated source term (i.e., a discharge rate of radio nuclides
into the environment as a function of time) serves as an input condition for the various
transport codes. Velocity vectors are calculated independently of source term
for al transport mechanisms. The output of the geosphere transport model serves as
input to the biosphere transport model.
Uncertainty Analysis
Because of the large, temporal, and spatial scales over which risk must be assessed
at Chernobyl, the impact of uncertainties on the results of an analysis to predict
a system's behavior must be examined. Major areas of uncertainty are: 1) uncertainty
in the future state of the system; 2) model uncertainty; and, 3) data and
parameter uncertainty. The method most commonly used for propagation of parameter
uncertainty to the results of the consequence analysis in Monte Carlo simulation.
Uncertainty in the input parameters is described with a probability distribution
function. Latic hyper cube sampling is used to generate multiple vectors of
input parameter values, and a consequence analysis calculation is performed for
each of the vectors. This procedure results in multiple values of the perforrnance
measure of interest. These values are then used to express the uncertainty in results.
Other methods of considering the uncertainty in parameters are available.
Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analyses examine the relative importance of the various uncertain
input parameters to the results of a risk assessment. Risk evaluators commonly use
the results of the Monte Carlo simulation described above as the basis for a regression
analysis. The regression analysis estimates the values of the coefficients in a
regression expression. The relative importance of the uncertain parameters can
then be established by examining the magnitude of these coefficients. Other approaches
and/or techniques for sensitivity analysis have been published.
One advantage of performing a sensitivity analysis as part of an iterative risk assessment
is the feedback process to the site characterization program. This feedback

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should provide direction on gathering those data that would make the most important
contribution to reduction of uncertainty in the prediction of the risk for the
system/site.
It is important to understand that most sensitivity analysis methods only examine
the relative importance of uncertain parameters. Uncertainty in the input parameters
is commonly far less important than uncertainty in assumptions regarding the
conceptual model(s) for the system. A major drawback in the available approaches
for sensitivity analysis is their inability to address the importance of uncertainty in
assumptions in conceptual models. A critical need is the ability to develop sensitivity
analysis techniques that will permit the elucidation of the relative importance of
assumptions in conceptual models.
Technology assessment, enhancement, and transfer project area 4.3
Remediation Objectives
This sub-area will address the establishment and evaluation of environmental restoration
goals by the project management. This is a critical and complex component
of the strategic planning process, as the important factors which shape and define
the goals and objectives of the remediation project impose significant constraints on
project elements and activities. Issues such as regulatory uncertainty, definition of
acceptable contamination levels, and permissible adverse consequences, and measurements
of success will pose many challenges to the remediation project. Understanding
the impacts of these factors on the project will enhance the evolution of
efficient, comprehensive, and defensible planning.
Sub-projects
4.3.1 Regulatory Constraints
Regulations which govern activities for all facets of the remediation project must
be carefully understood to ensure that activities are undertaken in a manner which:
1) Ensures regulatory compliance of each specific activity itself, and
2) Ensures regulatory compliance on the outcome of each activity.
The first aspect of regulatory constraints involves the identification of regulatory
requirements which directly impact the undertaking of specific activities, such as
worker safety, immediate environmental hazards, and waste minimization. The
latter aspect encompasses a broader spectrum of regulatory issues which define the
fundamental direction and depth of the remediation project, such as how safe is
safe, how clean is clean, permanent disposal philosophies, and acceptable risks.
The regulatory environment establishes the framework within which the remediation
activities must be planned, undertaken, and executed. The existing regulatory
environment must be fully and clearly understood so that current requirement, constraints,
shortfalls, and conflicts in both requirements and jurisdictions are known.
The choice of specific technological options (such as use of robots versus humans), as
well as major program directions (such as minimizing the generation of new wastes
versus quicker solutions which generate large volumes of wastes) are impacted by
the regulatory environment. A clear understanding of the existing regulatory environment
will maximize the likelihood that the proposed project activities address
and comply with regulatory requirements, and facilitate identification of potential
conflicts between the regulations and proposed goals, methods, and technologies.
The future regulatory environment will be extremely important to the ultimate
resolution of the remediation project, as well. Although the future cannot be perfectly
predicted, the development of a clear understanding of the current environment,
as defined in terms of requirements, constraints, shortfalls, and conflicts, will
enhance the capabilities of project management to assess and evaluate the potential
impact of proposed regulatory changes. This will enable management to better respond
to or challenge such changes.
4.3.2 Evaluation Criteria
The development of criteria for evaluation project goals and the degree or quality
to which they are received is crucial to successful project management and defensibility
of results. Well-defined, non contradictory criteria provide a solid basis for
comparison of options which strengthen arguments for pursuing specific technology
options and program directions. Evaluation criteria can be categorized into two
major groups—objective and subjective.
Objective criteria involve metrics, guidelines, and standards by which one can
quantitatively measure specific quantities relevant to project activities or goals. Examples
of such criteria are cost, time, health consequences, risk, and resource requirements.
An example of using such criteria for decision purposes might be to
measure the trade-offs between monetary costs, resource needs (e.g., manpower) and

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health consequences between the choice of using robots or humans for certain remediation
activities.
Subjective criteria involve issues or concepts which cannot be consistently quantified
according to methods governed by the laws of physics, but which must be considered
in the process of deciding technological and programmatic options. Examples
of such criteria are aesthetics (the relative weighting of functionality against
form), political pressures, religious, and moral standards. Such criteria must be incorporated
into the planning and decision process to establish a system of rules and
guidelines for assigning quantitative or monetary values to abstract ideas. One example
is to place a value on the aesthetic desirability or value of land use options
(e.g., restricted use versus public access, or to stabilize existing structures versus returning
sites to greenfield), or to place a value on human life or a cost on human
suffering.
Two types of criteria must be identified, developed, and incorporated to permit
project management the capability to make the most informed and defensible decisions
possible.
lt.3.3 Success Indicators
The ultimate objective of the Chernobyl Comprehensive Environmental Remediation
Project is to return contaminated land areas, water sheds, and industrial facilities
to a state that will either remove all hazards and permit human use without
danger or prevent human use and exposure to hazards. This outcome will be
achieved only after a number of technically complex project activities which behave
as a dynamic system of interrelated components have been carefully managed. A
vital aspect of this management is the correct identification of inputs and outputs
which flow from one activity of this system to other activities.
The development and application of appropriate methods to determine success
metrics is crucial for the smooth management of the djTiamic system which is embodied
by the project activities. The utility of success indicators must be developed
with a close linking to the regulatory environment. Both aspects of the project will
affect each other. Regulatory requirements will define the success states which must
be achieved and measured; scientific knowledge and methods will define project
ability to meaningfully measure the achievement of these goals.
Technology assessment, enhancement, and transfer project area 4.4
Systems Analysis
This project area uses the information and analysis performed in the previous
areas, i.e., 4.1 through 4.3, as well as additional analyses, to determine the optimal
remediation options for the facility and the surrounding site. Technologies that are
appropriate for the various options are identified
Sub-projects
4.4-1 Assessment Model Development
The consequences of mothballing versus decommissioning Chernobyl Reactor #4
are evaluated in this sub-project. This will be done through the use of assessment
models which have been created based on the base-case model developed in Project
Area 4.2. SimUar analyses can be performed for Reactors #1, #2, #3, #5, and #6.
4-4-2 Remediation Option Identification
Given results of the assessment model, potential remedial actions are determined.
These remedial actions are chosen based on:
• location and nature of radio nuclide contaminants;
• ground-water, surface-water, and aerosol transport of contaminants;
• the food chEiin;
• radiological dosimetry; and,
• human interactions.
A risk assessment of the remedial actions, using fault tree and event tree logic,
will then be performed. The uncertainty associated with the actions will be included
in the model. The model will consider waste transportation, management, handling,
storage, confinement, and packaging. Areas that require detailed remediation planning
will be identified.
Once conceptual models have been formulated for the diverse areas listed above,
computer codes must be selected, modified, or created, as necessary, to accurately
reflect the conceptual models. Many computer codes already exist to model both
near-field and far-field events and processes. These should be readily applicable to
the conditions at Chernobyl. As more data become available, conceptual models and
computer codes may need to be revised and refined to reflect new data. In addition,
these models and codes can be used to determine the consequences of various scenarios,
areas that introduce large uncertainty into the hazard assessment, and the

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relative sensitivity of the results of the assessment to the various input parameters.
Results from these analyses can be used to direct further data acquisition and/or
model refinement. A further discussion of these various types of analyses is presented
below.
4.4

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Technology Assessment, Enhancement, and Transfer Project Area 4.6
Technology Transfer
Transfer of applicable US DOE technologies for use in Chernobyl decontamination
and decommissioning efforts will be based on options identified in Project Area 4.4.
Transfer of technologies will proceed in three stages: 1) industrial-scale production
or demonstration; 2) personnel training; and, 3) relocation of hardware and personnel
to the field. The training stage will overlap the production/demonstration and
reallocation stages.
j^.6.1 Industrial-Scale Production/Demonstration
Technologies available through the US DOE will be brought to industrial or nearindustrial
scale prior to application at the Chernobyl site. Full-scale equipment and
control technologies, such as telerobotic characterization and demolition equipment,
will be integrated by the developing laboratory at a designated demonstration site.
Possible process bottlenecks and equipment interface difficulties will then be identified
and explored, and necessary refinements made to systems and processes in a
non-radiological environment. The following issues will be addressed at this stage:
• Physically evaluate the applied technology
• Demonstrate and improve systems performance and reliability
• Develop and refine procedures
• Clarify personnel needs and training requirements
• Identify further technology or equipment needs
• Minimize radiation exposure through optimal technology application
For technologies that can be used away from Chernobyl, such as mechanical, geological,
and meteorological system modeling techniques, validation and verification
steps will assure applicability to the Chernobyl activities. Industrial partners will be
an integral part of the process to assure that all perceived needs are addressed.
4.6.2 Training
Training of personnel will be critical to the efficient and timely application of decontamination
and decommissioning technologies. Facilities will be established for
the training of field operators, and could include facilities where the activities described
in Section 4.6.1 are establish. Training will begin with introduction to the
concepts of the given technology and the application for which it is intended. It will
then shift to hands-on experience as the industrial-scale system or technology is determined
to be ready. As the operators become familiar with its application, further
refinement of the technology by an operator/ laboratory team may be made.
4.6.3 Relocation to the Field
When technology and operators are determined to be ready, the technology will
be transferred to Chernobyl for applications. The trained operators, supported by
the developing laboratory, will be responsible for bringing all equipment and processes
on-line.
The three-step technology transfer sequence assures transfer of a field-ready technology
and fully qualified personnel to the appropriate application on the Chernobyl
decontamination and decommissioning effort.
PHASE THREE
Mobilization, Field Investigation and Feasibility Studies—Mission Statement
Phase Three consists of mobilization, field investigations, and feasibility studies.
The purpose is to identify, characterize and define specific environmental, contamination,
health and population problems; identify and evaluate specific alternatives
for technical approaches and solutions for those problems; and select alternatives to
be implemented.
PHASE FOUR
Remediation and Construction—Mission Statement
Phase Four consists of remediation and construction. The purpose of this Phase is
the physical implementation of the alternatives selected in Phase Three.
Many Phase Four projects will proceed while Phases One, Two or Three are underway
for other projects. A typical example might be the comparison of the Sarcophagus
with ground water remediation. The Sarcophagus is a problem that requires
immediate attention and expedited remedial actions. Ground water remediation,
is a long-term problem that will required collection of a great deal of data
before effective measures can be evaluated and alternatives selected for implementation.

. . and
. . they
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(
Prepared Statement of Thomas F. Garrity
Good morning! I'd like to open by extending my thanks to this subcommittee for
its work in assembling this panel of experts to discuss potential solutions to the
long-term effects of the Chernobyl accident. This hearing should provide a much
clearer view not only of the potential health effects posed by the accident . . . but
also some concrete proposals on how the public and private sector in the U.S. can
help meet the public health and technical needs of the Ukraine and the other independent
states of the former Soviet Union.
I'd like to also express, on behalf of the General Electric Company, our gratitude
for this opportunity to offer our expertise and insights.
As you re well aware . . . Chernobyl was the world's single greatest nuclear accident.
The exact toll in human and environmental damage may not be known for
many years.
Based upon what we can read and analyze, it is apparent that reactors of the
Chernobyl type were designed and constructed far below even the earliest Western
technology standards.
Many of these reactors lack the appropriate cooling systems as well as the concrete
contEiinment structures necessary to capture radiation in the event of an accident.
This is a crucial issue because as many as 16 reactors of the same design are still
operating in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Further, there is no practical
method of uprating these plants given the overall lack of sophistication in the
equipment . GE has no interest in offering our services to decommission
any of these existing plants. Without the necessary technical knowledge of these
specific plants . . . such an endeavor would be impossible.
What we do recommend ... is an in-depth look at alternative forms of energy
that could eventually replace these nuclear plants in the CIS.
This is not the first time we have offered our assistance to deal with possible solutions
to alternative sources of energy production following the Chernobyl accident.
We entered into very active discussions on this topic in both 1989 and 1990. We discovered,
however, that there was no commercial basis available to fund any support
we may have been able to provide.
We do see two encouraging signs in the CIS that make such a venture more plausible.
The first is the apparent trend toward more stability in the regions' governmental
structures that may make it easier to pursue future arrangements for assistance.
The second is the renewed focus on the Chernobyl crisis on the part of the
Western industrialized nations.
It's encouraging, for example, that when the leaders of the G7 met in Munich re-
. . and
cently, they recognized that Chernobyl is literally a "ticking timebomb" .
while they did not grant the $700 million dollar emergency fund
requested . did approve a fund of $100 million dollars to carry out the appropriate
emergency measures. We hope that this type of attention to the problem
continues toward what is clearly an environment and health disaster waiting to
happen.
It is our position that proven Western technology . . . possessed by GE and
others . . . already exists that can provide large blocks of electric power in a clean,
efficient, cost-effective and environmentally compatible manner . . . and prevent
almost any t5T)e of disaster.
Today I d like to give you a brief look at those technologies . . . and discuss why
they are best-suited to meeting the current needs of the CIS.
Before doing that however, I'd like to take a moment to convey what we perceive
is our role . . . and perhaps more importantly . . . your role in helping provide
safe and economical power to the CIS.
obstacles Two exist in dealing with the of Independent States'
Commonwealth
critical need for power. The first is political the second is technological.
The political instability in the CIS . . . coupled with the inability to meet commercial
terms . . . makes it virtually impossible for GE ... or any company for
that matter . . to successfully enter into any agreements . on their own ... for supplying
power to countries in the CIS.
What's needed is your assistance in contacting the appropriate
making the appropriate diplomatic arrangements . . . and providing
parties . . .
the necessary safeguards such as Overseas Private Investment Corporation
insurance ... in sum, facilitating the needed political mandates that will allow
GE ... or any other power supplier ... to do business in the CIS.
The technological side of the problem is our responsibility . . . and we're more
than up to the task. We have technology available that will capably and completely

158
support any energy option deemed necessary . . . and we're prepared to offer recommendations
on what options best match the needs of the CIS.
We would be more than willing to combine our technological expertise with governmental
support to form a type of "super jointventure" that would greatly benefit
the CIS ... as well as U.S. industry and trade.
The need is urgent. An ideal window of opportunity for providing power to the
CIS is now open that may not come again for quite some time.
Overall power consumption is down some 30 percent due to the shutdown of many
military facilities in the region and reduced industrial output. This is a prime opportunity
to move the CIS away from the sub-standard technology they now rely
upon for their energy ... to cleaner, safer and more cost-effective forms of power. I
urge you to not let this opportunity slip away.
In addition . . . the large supply of natural gas in the region offers a tremendous
opportunity for moving to alternative forms of power. Presently, 20 to 25 percent of
the CIS's power generation is from natural gas. This gas is being used to fuel relatively
old and inefficient steam turbine plants that operate at thermal efficiencies of
only 35 percent. At this time ... a significant portion of the natural gas is escaping
into the atmosphere . . . contributing to the overall global pollution problem.
Estimates on the amount of natural gas escaping range anywhere from 10 to 25 percent.
Technology can harness this gas . . . and use it to provide economical power for
combined cycle powerplants . . . and that's only one example.
Looking at the technologies available . . . they range from long-term remedies
such as nuclear power ... to short-term, faster fixes such as fossil fuel plants and
advanced combined-cycle applications.
In my experience ... I have found it wise for a country to possess a diverse
supply of energy options instead of "putting all the eggs in one basket," as it
were . . . and primarily relying on a single form of technology. GE offers leading
edge technology for both the long-term and the short-term.
In the area of nuclear energy . . . new advanced technologies are being developed
that will provide safer, cleaner, and more economical nuclear power.
At GE, for instance, we are working on two advanced Light-Water Reactor designs,
sharing a common technology base. The Advanced Boiling Water
Reactor ... or ABWR ... is a standardized 1300 Megawatt unit, while the Simplified
Boiling Water Reactor ... or SBWR ... is a smaller, 600 Megawatt configuration.
Both technologies incorporate the best, proven features from boiling-water reactor
designs and employ newly developed controls and instrumentation, fuel, emd turbine
technology, and passive accident mitigation techniques for maximum safety.
We are pleased to report that the ABWR has been adopted as the next generation,
standard boiling-water reactor in Japan. In 1987, the Tokyo Electric Power
Company announced a decision to proceed with two ABWR units for their Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Nuclear Power Station.
In the United States ... the ABWR is the lead design scheduled to receive U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval as the first certified U.S. Standard plant.
We expect final approval later this year, with certification to follow in 1993.
Smaller advanced reactor designs with passive safety features are also being developed
with support from various governments and industry
associations . . . involving unprecedented international cooperation.
As an example, the Simplified Boiling Water Reactor is being developed by a
team involving over 25 organizations, from nine countries. While we've just completed
the conceptual design phase, the SBWR shows significant technical and economic
promise.
GE expects that the advanced safety and performance features of these new generations
of nuclear plants, and their successful commercialization in countries such
as Japan, will lead to more widespread acceptance of this power source early in the
next century.
We are also fortunate to be the world leader in steam turbine-generator technology.
GE boasts the latest steam turbine technology using ultra-super critical steam
conditions with operating conditions up to 1200 degrees Fahrenheit ... as well as
the largest installed base in the world. Our global installed base exceeds 8,000 units,
providing 435 Gigawatts of power.
While nuclear power and steam offer solid advantages . . . the best solution for
the CIS in the short term is the advanced combined cycle application.
This technology uses a gas turbine in tandem with a steam turbine. Heat exhaust
from a Oil turbine is captured and used to make steam to drive a steam turbine-

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159
generator. The result is a highly efficient use of fuel, with significantly lower emissions
than from conventional coal burning facilities.
This is not a new concept. What is new, however, is the highly reliable and advanced
technology that enables higher output at even higher efficiency . . . today
approaching 55 percent compared to the average 35 percent efficient gas-fired plants
now operating in the CIS. It would represent a new direction in power generation
for the CIS . . . which now lacks any viable gas turbine technology.
Advanced combined cycle technology owes most of its advantages to the maturation
of gas turbine technology.
Today's advanced heavy-duty gas turbines are the result of four decades of technology
evolution. Over this time the combustion turbine has gone from a relatively
low output, high maintenance peak demand, power source ... to a highly reliable,
high-efficiency, low maintenance base load technology.
To put these advancements in perspective, GE's first gas turbine, delivered in
1949, was a 3.5 Megawatt unit with a firing temperature of 1400 degrees F and an
efficiency rating of 16 percent.
In contrast, today we're delivering 226 Megawatt gas machines with firing temperatures
over 2350 degrees F with combined cycle efficiencies of 55 percent. Quite a
difference.
Current combined cycle plants are an extremely efficient energy
option . . . operating at thermal efficiencies approaching 55 percent. And, we believe,
60 percent is an attainable goal within this decade.
Combined-cycle powerplants, using modern combustion turbines, are evolving as
the preferred generation technology . . . and one of the best examples of the
modem-£ige high efficiency combined-cycle powerplants is the 2000 Megawatt Futsu
complex in Japan.
Fueled by liquefied natural gas, it is the largest, cleanest—and one of the most
efficient, large-scale fossil-fueled powerplants in the world.
Korea Electric Power's Seoinchon Plant, currently under construction, is a new,
2000 Megawatt combined-cycle plant. When completed this year it will be the most
thermally efficient large powerplant in the world.
This plant is a prime example of how rapidly combined cycle technology can be
applied. The overall delivery cycle for this plant was two years from order to construction.
In addition to delivering efficient, cost effective and reliable power through the
use of combined cycle applications, impressive results can be also be achieved using
gas turbines to re-power old steam plants. This process is currently underway at
Virginia Power Company's Chesterfield station where we are converting a 130
Megawatt conventional oil-fired power unit to a 450 Megawatt, gas-fired, combinedcycle
plant.
In the new configuration power output will triple . . . without any change in
plant size, as all new equipment fits in the same plot that housed the former plant.
In addition there is no increase in cooling-water use . . . and NO, and SO, emissions
will be substantially reduced, while CO2 emissions remain virtually the same!
Up until now I've been speaking of combined-cycle systems operating on natural
gas or LNG, sometimes with oil as a backup fuel. But combined cycles are not limited
to these premium fuels. And in the CIS, even though we perceive significant
amounts of natural gas are readily available . they may wish to utilize their large
supply of indigenous coal. In this case, combined cycle . . . with its significant efficiency
and exceptional environmental performance . . . can prove beneficial.
Integrated gasification combined-cycle power generation ... or IGrCC has also
been demonstrated to be effective. One demonstration plant operated successfully,
extracting gas from a variety of coals, for 27,000 hours during a five-year
period . . . with emissions about one-tenth of those required by regulations.
An IGCC powerplant uses two-stage combustion, with cleanup between the stages.
In the first stage, a coal gasifier produces a gaseous fuel. After cleanup, this cod gas
is fed to the second stage: the gas turbine of a combined-cycle powerplant.
IGCC is a commercially available technology . we're seeing substantial interest
in IGCC around the world.
Overall, advanced combined cycle technology would be able to address the energy
needs of the CIS in a very quick and economical manner. For example, a host of
small 300 Megawatt packaged powerplants could be quickly placed into operation
that would not only address varying regional needs for power but also provide a
series of "test facilities," for this technology.
We strongly recommend this course of action in the near future as the best way
to take advantage of the "window of opportunity" I spoke of earlier.

"
. . require
160
Looking at what we we view as the bottom line on the Chernobyl
situation . . . the need is great . . . and the time is now to move toward assisting
the Commonwealth of Independent States with their clearly precarious energy situation.
Many technologies exist that could address the problems in the CIS and we will
be happy to provide those technologies.
Long-term options such as nuclear energy and more immediate technologies such
as advanced combined cycle applications stand ready as proven remedies.
What we . . . and other industries . from this body ... is assistance
with handling the political implications of such an endeavor, and we certainly defer
to your expertise in this area. Ours is a technology mandate . . . and we have no
doubt can deliver in that area. The political mandate falls to you.
We would welcome the opportunity to join forces with the U.S.
Government . . . and help in providing the Commonwealth of Independent States
with safe, reliable, cost effective energy options now . . . and in the future.
Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Wolodymyr Yavorivsky, Chairman, Committee on
Chornobyl Supreme Rada of Ukraine
chornobyl: accident, tragedy, disaster
"The aftereffects of Chornobyl, these are in fact the aftereffects of the third world,
nuclear war which in April 1986 swept across our long-suffering homeland
Ukraine. —Wolodymyr Yavorivsky
The accident at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, in which only one reactor
#4 blew up, is unique in its lasting aftermaths. It led to the greatest catastrophe of
the 20th century, and caused the nation-wide disaster in Ukraine.
Geographically tied to the Ukrainian soil, it changed abruptly the lives of hundreds
of thousands of people not only in Ukraine, but in Byelorussia and Russia,
too. Its aftermaths could be compared to those of the nuclear 3rd world war. Nowadays
Chornobyl is not merely a geographical name of an ancient small town in
Ukrainian Polessye. It is the word that entered all the languages of the world as a
reminder, a warning and a call for joining efforts in wide international interaction
in the struggle for survival of mankind.
The tragedy of Chornobyl hit many people. The most horrible is that it affected
not only those living now, but also those not bom yet. Despite our strenuous efforts
this mishap will touch with its black wing the present and the following generations
of Ukrainian people and our neighbors on the Earth.
After the Chornobyl accident IJkraine was proclaimed the zone of ecological catastrophe.
Five years have passed after the day of this global tragedy. But, despite our
enormous and costly efforts, not much was done in the field of study and stabilization
of the radiological situation, improvement of health of hundreds of thousands
directly affected by Chornobyl. The difficulty of the problem becomes more vivid, its
solution gets more demanding economically and technically with time to pass.
The evaluation of the accident's scale and disastrous effects, as well as taking up
efficient measures for the minimization of the Chornobyl aftermaths, were considerably
hampered by the wrong approaches to the cause of the accident, identification
of those who concealed information about Chornobyl.
At the moment of the accident the reactor was operated with constructive defects
and it became the main cause of the disastrous development of the accident on
April 2, 1986.
The designers of RBMK-1000 reactor criminally neglected the operational regulations:
• Radiation Safety Regulations—8 items;
• General Safety Regulations—5 items.
The report made by Soviet experts at IAEA conference in August 1986 falsely
claimed the initial cause of the accident was an inconceivable combination of violations
of operating rules by the reactors' personnel". This interpretation adversely
affected the possibility of diagnosing the real cause of the accident at that time.
By the official accounts, 50 megacuries of the most dangerous radionuclides were
released to the environment. According to some scientists this figure is much bigger
and is about 1 billion curies. The scale of radioactive contamination is very large.
The contamination level of 46 per cent of Ukrainian territory is more than 1 curie
per square km. Most of the regions of Ukraine were affected, especially the districts
of Kiev, Zhitomir, Chernigov, Rovno and Volhynia regions.

161
5 mln hectares of agricultural lands, 2 mln hectares of arable lands included,
were recognized unfit for agricultural production. 1 mln hectares of woods were exposed
to radioactive contamination. Most of the timber exploitation areas were
closed. The dosed places of recreation of thousands of people, places where mushrooms,
berries and herbs were gathered became out of use.
Lasting contaminating of the Dnieper, the source of water for more than 35 mln
inhabitants of the republic, took place.
More than 150 thousand people, 60 thousand children included, got an overdose
irradiation of the thyroids.
More than 5 mln people, among them 1 mln children, are exposed to intense radiation.
The morbidity of the population increased and the psychological state of the
people worsened. 90 per cent of the questioned children touched with the black wing
of the disaster are sure they have no future.
The situation shows that despite the measures taken during the past 5 years the
problem is still acute.
At the first stages we could not estimate the real scale of the accident, its international,
social, economic, humanitarian, ecological, technological and other aspects.
The total damage costs make up approximately 170-512 billion roubles. Most of
the long-lived radionuclides accumulated within the 30-km zone from which the
people were evacuated.
Nevertheless, the area of more than 45 thousand square km in Kiev, Zhitomir,
Rovno and other regions needs urgent environmental protection measures, transition
of radionuclides to the farm produce should be lessened, the underground
water-bearing strata should be protected, etc.
Natural environment not only accumulated contaminants of the Chornobyl Nuclear
Power Plant, but also became the lasting source of contamination of food plants,
meat and dairy products, air and weakly protected underground waters.
Researchers defined the spatial areas of accumulation of cesium- 137 and migration
of radionuclides in the waters of the Dnieper reservoir cascade.
At this time the total amount of cesium- 137 in Kiev Reservoir is 7,200 curies, in
Kanev Reservoir—2,200, in Kremenchug Reservoir—300.
The increase of radioactive cesium is about 40 per cent per year.
Accumulation of radionuclides also takes place in the deep waters of Dneprodzerzhinsk
and Zaporozhye reservoirs.
The ares of cesium- 137 were also found in Kakhovka Reservoir and the Dnieper-
Bug Estuary.
ITie lack of a telemetric system of ecological monitoring of the environment in the
republic hampers the researches.
The undesirable medical and biological effects of the radioecological situation
damage the health of the population, threaten the genetic fund of Ukraine.
Right after the accident 92 thousand people were removed from the contaminated
territories of the republic.
It is planned to evacuate still more than 300 thousand people.
The total capital costs of the cleanup program of the Chornobyl aftermaths by the
year 2000 make about 20 mln roubles. But the real amount of investments necessary
for minimizing the consequences will be still greater.
And all this must be done by economically exhausted Ukraine fighting for its sovereignty.
The most horrible are the genetic consequences of the disaster. 35 mln people in
Ukraine are affected or will be affected by Chornobyl. But there are categories of
people who need special attention, special medical monitoring.
There are 150 thousand people, among them 60 thousand children, whose thyroid
glands were irradiated by the overdoses of radioactive iodine. In the thyroids of 13
thousand children the radiation measures 200 rem, 700—more than 1,500 rem, some
dozens—more than 5,000 rem. And the problem of radioactive iodine is still actual.
Iodine-131 is found in the analyses of 70-85 per cent of the residents of the contaminated
areas and cleanup workers.
There are more than 150 thousand cleanup workers who are dozed with 20 rem or
more and now reside in Ukraine.
These are near 2 mln people living in contaminated zones, whose registered level
of additional irradiation can exceed allowable stated by the republican concept of
living on contaminated territories.
These are evacuees and children born after 1986 by the members of all these
groups mentioned above.
Examining the state of health of the residents of the most affected zones, one can
observe a tendency for growing and widening of morbidity and mortality rates. The

162
health of children stirs up serious concern. Compared with the average, the morbidity
rate of thyroid diseases in Zhitomir region went up 4 times, and in Narodichie
district—6 times. In the affected zones of Kiev region the endocrine diseases morbidity
rate grew 3-5 times. On top of that, the scientists stated the growth of pregnancy
pathologiesw 1.6-3 times. The same growth is observed in cases of diseases of
skin, thyroids, blood, vegetative and vascular systems and inborn defects of newborn
children. The scientists ascertain the connection between ionizing radiation
doze and immunity worsening. This can be observed in 70 per cent of the children
evacuees.
According to the facts the health of adults is damaged, too. There is a growth of
morbidity rate in respiratory diseases 1.3 times, blood circulation—1.9 times, gastroenteric—2.7
times, endocrine system—2.1 times, genital 1.8 times. The same is
true for the Chornobyl cleanup workers. The disability rate among them grew 1.9
times.
The further problem arisen by the Chornobyl disaster is the elaboration of the
concept of further scientific research; working out methods of developing nuclear
safety of the "Shelter" unit (reactor #4); localization of highand low-active products
accumulated within the 30-km zone and its immediate vicinity; scientific and economic
activities in Chornobyl affected zones.
Besides, there is a problem of wastes piled up in the waste storage, the estimated
radioactivity of which is tenfold higher than that of the Chornobyl disaster products.
Up to now, there is no unanimous approach to what should be done to secure and
localize the fuel and fission products on the "Shelter" unit. There are still problems
of how they should be permanently stored (now there are about 800 temporary storages)
and what should be done with the equipment and materials assembled in the
open-air grounds.
There still exists the problem of decontamination, conversion of radioactive waste,
safety of surface and underground waters, recultivation of soil. No tangible results
were achieved by the researchers in geochemical and geoelectrical methods of radioactivity
elimination. Serious errors were made in the design of drainage screens and
water protection installations. The results of the measures for raising efficiency of
the purification installations, decontamination posts and equipment, researchers of
influence of the fuel substances on man were of minor importance.
Not everything was done in environmental monitoring and forecasting the radiation
situation in Ukraine.
The lack of necessary medical equipment, humble steps toward international cooperation
caused the incapability of practical medicine to protect the health of those
affected. It is not even possible to put them on the register list of those requiring
health monitoring.
Taking into consideration the danger of the Chornobyl disaster aftermath—not
only for our republic and our country, but for other European countries—the
Ukrainian parliament appealed to the governments and non-government bodies of
the world community for help in liquidation of this mishap aftermaths.
Some countries and non-government institutions already render humanitarian
help to us.
A number of firms is now working out projects for some of the Chornobyl problems
solution.
But we think the international help would be most effective in the following
areas:
• foreign investments in Chornobyl cleanup programs;
• delivery of medical and scientific equipment, production lines for medical equipment
and materials manufacture; production (or co-production) of medicines and
medical equipment;
• we will be very grateful for help in rehabilitation of the affected children;
• further cooperation between non-government bodies.
Serious consideration should be given to joint researches of technological, scientific
and practical character.
On November 20, 1990 the UNO General Assembly Resolution #A/45/190 "International
cooperation in the sphere of mollification and overcoming of the Chornobyl
Nuclear Power Plant accident aftermaths" was adopted. Pursuant to Article 2, the
General Assembly pled to the UNO bodies, institutions and programs for technical
and other specialized help especially to Ukraine. The unprecedented scale of the disaster,
its lasting anthrohopogeneous influence on present and future generations
should be borne in mind.

'
163
Not only Ukraine, but the whole world faces the problems of the Chomobyl disaster.
That is why help could be provided by the UNo and its subdivisions, and all the
international community to the benefit of all mankind.
The following problems deserve special attention:
• boosting public information campaign about the dangerous effects of radiation;
• training the medical personnel in handling new diagnostic and monitoring
equipment;
• low-level irradiation studies;
• training the social workers in rehabilitation of the affected;
• development of new decontamination equipment for agricultural areas;
• purchase of different equipment and materials (especially medical);
• encouragement of joint ventures producing baby-food and high quality equipment
for the disabled;
• development of new concepts in housing and housing construction, building materials
manufacture, planning and management.
Naturally, we cannot name all the problems, because every day the list of them
becomes longer. So the "Appeal of the Supreme Rada and the Council of Ministers
of the Ukrainian SSr to foreign parliaments, governments, peoples, international organizations
and movements on the 5th anniversary of the accident at the Chomobyl
NPP" is very actual now: "Today, once more we appeal to mind, honor and conscience
of all progressive people on the Earth, we hope that our appeal will be apprehended
with understanding, that international solidarity in the liquidation of
the consequences of the Chomobyl catastrophe will continue and strengthen. WE all
will use our knowledge, wisdom and goodwill in joint and concrete actions to the
benefit of present and future generations, for the sake of life on the Earth".
We will recur again and again to the date of 26th of April 1986. And so will do
our grandchildren and greatgrandchildren, their children and their grandchildren.
Chomobyl not only divided the lives of many people into "before" and "after". It
marked the beginning of the new times.
And we must gdways fall back on Chomobyl experience. One of the main lessons
of this tragedy is: we have to think twice before making any political, economic or
technological decisions, and we must be ready for the worst in order not to turn the
bread-basket into a radioactive waste-basket.
We simply must think whether it is really necessary to coerce the nature, to fight
it? Is it not better to live in harmony with it according to its eternal laws.
We are all one people. And we have common tragedies. We express our heartfelt
gratitude to the world community for the concern in our disaster. The Ukrainian
people will always remember the helping hand of every man and every nation,
purity and nobility of their thoughts, their charity in the times of our terrible ordeals.
Don't bid us—Ukrainians—farewell.
We are still alive.
Statement of Friends of the Earth
RUSSIAN roulette: NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION
I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The question of what to do with the dozens of aging, dangerous and understaffed
nuclear power reactors in Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet
Union constitutes a major public policy dilemma. These extraordinarily risky facilities
urgently need to be closed down. They pose imminent threats to public health
and the environment, both locally and globally.
This Report has been prepared to address this dilemma. It is being released by
Friends of the Earth-International (FOEI) for use by the G-7 countries, the countries
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as by the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, Bank for European Reconstruction and Development,
and the international Atomic Energy Agency. All of these agencies have looked at
the issues, but they are not proposing the urgent actions necessary to responsibly
protect the public. Their proposed solutions involve short-term investments in training
and longer-term investments in the reactors themselves, possibly including
building containment shells around some reactors. This is a short-sighted approach,
which will neither protect the public nor be cost-effective.
The question of what to do with these nuclear reactors is an Important hem on
the agenda of the G-7 Economic Summit, which takes place In Munich, Germany

164
from July 6-8. Because the Governments and their advisors at the World Bank,
IAEA and other agencies have not developed action plans that are commensurate
with the risks to the public, Friends of the Earth has compiled this Report.
To help Eastern European countries and the republics of the former Soviet Union
prevent further major nuclear disasters, the G-7 countries and their agents should:
1. Immediately ^ help close down fifteen nuclear power reactors of the Chernobyl
type (RBMK), sixteen reactors of the early pressurized water type (WER 440/230),
and eight second-generation pressurized water types (WER 440/213) by providing
the direct assistance of western teams of scientists and engineers and financial aid.^
The Immediate closures should include:
• all fifteen RBMK reactors in CIS and Lithuania;
• all ten WER 440/230 pressurized water nuclear plants In the CIS;*
• four reactors ^ at Kozloduy (Bulgaria);
• all eight existing pressurized water nuclear power reactors In the CSFR;® and
• Paks (Hungary) reactors 1 and 2.''
2. Through investments of at least $10 billion, mobilize and fund safe energy alternatives
in the region during the next five years, focussed on the reduction of
waste in the industrial, household, and transportation sectors, as well as on immediate
steps to invest in safe and sustainable energy.
3. Rapidly replace 50 percent of the power generated by the nuclear power reactors
with "supply side" options, including rehabilitation and better use of existing
thermal powerplants and quickly installed gas turbine combination co-generation
plants. If the goal were to provide approximately 12,000 MWe through gas turbine
combination go-generation plants, this would require an estimated investment of
about $8 billion.
4. Assist in developing energy strategies for each country whose fundamental
principles include:
• closure of all remaining nuclear power reactors as soon as possible, but within
five years;
• rapid reduction of pollution caused by outdated solid fuel use;
• a comprehensive energy efficiency approach; and
• policies to foster the development of safe and sustainable energy for the longterm.
Based on currently available information, the G-7 intends to spend about $800
million in aid money on improving the existing nuclear power reactors rather than
rapidly phasing them out. This approach seems to be based upon four main objectives:
1. To reduce the risks of nuclear accidents;
2. To decrease air pollution by replacing old lignite and coal powerplants, rather
than nuclear plants;
3. To create projects for Western companies specialized in nuclear power that face
a lack of contracts in the West;
4. To prevent a further loss of public support for the nuclear option (including
existing nuclear investments) in both Western and Eastern countries.
FOEI supports the first objective, but it advocates an alternative approach to risk
reduction—the closure of all nuclear power reactors in these countries, beginning
with the most dangerous, and rapidly phasing out the remainder.
This approach requires immediate investment in energy conservation and the development
of safe energy supplies, involving both electricity generation and measures
to induce different decisions by end-users of energy. Increases in "usable" electricity
should be followed by the prompt closure of the remaining reactors, on the
basis of risk posed by a particular facility.
The closures of all the nuclear power reactors should be sponsored by the G-7
countries on the basis of GRANTS: since the closures themselves will not yield profits,
lending money to dismantle these nuclear facilities would further deteriorate
the financial positions of these countries.
The second objective of the G-7 Governments should be met not with nuclear
energy but with a decrease in the energy intensity of these economies. At this
moment the energy use/GDP of Hungary is, for example, 3.91 times that of the European
OECI>countries. The other countries are similarly energy-inefficient.
It is folly of the highest order to follow the third and fourth objectives of the G-7
Governments. Instead, all efforts in the energy sector should be focussed on demand
reduction and the provision of safe and clean supplies. Trying to support their own
nuclear industries means that the G-7 countries will be wasting their own citizens'
money and risking disasters which can be avoided.
The G-7 Governments are presented with an unprecedented opportunity to invest
in life-sustaining rather than life-threatening options in the Eastern countries. By

165
taking forceful steps to help close down the dangerous nuclear facilities in the East,
the G-7 Governments would demonstrate their empathy with populations suffering
the impacts of Chernobyl and other nuclear accidents. In addition, the Western nations
would be helping to secure their own well-being by avoiding the possibility of a
second Chernobyl. The closures that FOEI is recommending should be facilitated by
teams of western experts—from the government, non-government, scientific and private
sectors—working in close cooperation with scientists, engineers and non-governmental
experts in the Eastern countries.
A. Overview
II.
REACTOR SAFETY
All Soviet-designed reactors present a serious and imminent threat to environmental
stability as well as to human health. They pose the following threats:
• Ill-conceived reactor design, the legacy of poor Soviet technology, presents serious
risks of accidental leaks or explosions, both major and minor;
• Poor worker training and morale risks serious errors on a day-to-day basis;
• Inadequate capital undermines the ability of plant operators to maintain minimum
safety standards; and
• The lack of uniform regulation and standards for waste disposal results in hazardous
disposal and handling of radiation and radioactive waste.
B. Reactor Design
The Soviets used two basic reactor design concepts: the RBMK graphite reactor, of
the type found at Chernobyl; and the WER pressurized water reactor, of which several
generations have been developed. Each model has unique flaws which pose different
safety risks.
1. The RBMK
The RBMK poses such severe, intractable risks that Adolf Huttl, head of the Nuclear
Energy Division of Siemens International (once one of the world's biggest constructors
of nuclear plants), has rejected the possibility of their upgrade, stating:
"The only answer is to shut them down as soon as possible." * This view has been
echoed by Mr. Klaus Topfer, Germany's environment minister.® The consensus of
the nuclear community comes down against the continued operation of the reactors.
Some of the major design flaws include:
• Positive reactivity feedback: As the reactor operates at lower power levels, the
fission reaction accelerates. Therefore, in the event of low power operation, even the
act of shutting down increases the risk of a serious accident. * " In addition, the flammability
of the graphite moderating agents intensifies the risk of a catastrophe from
either an emergency or a common-cause failure. ' ^
• The reactors have no containment vessels to lessen the impact of radiation
leaks, or protect the surroundings in the event of a core meltdown. ^ ^
• The fuel channels critical to the safety of the reactor have a history of rupture.
• 3
It is important to note that even with upgrades, the RBMK wUl not meet Western
safety standards, according to Huttl and others in the nuclear community.^*
The problems of these reactors are far from solved, as the March 24, 1992, accident
at Sosnovy Bor illustrated. In that case, radiation leaked out from an RBMK
reactor outside St. Petersburg, Russia. On the international scale of seven, the leak
was first given a three (the Chernobyl meltdown received the highest rating of
seven). 15 "The enigmatic accident disconcerted some in the scientific community. Because
RBMK design information has been "closely guarded by the Russian nuclear
bureaucracy," '^ knowledge of RBMK design is not complete in the nuclear community.
* ' This poses additional problems for their backfitting. Western experts will be
backfitting a plant of which they have, at best, only a theoretical understanding.
2. The WER UO/230
Of the WER pressurized water reactors, the first generation model 230 poses by
far the most serious set of risks. According to the IAEA, "These units clearly do not
meet current safety requirements." ^^ The major deficiencies '® include:
• The lack of a containment vessel increases radiation release risk. Adding to this
deficiency, the absence of a pressure relief system impairs the plant's ability to respond
to an emergency, while the reactor vessel's embrittlement, present at almost
every site, increases the risk of radiation release. In fact, at some of the older reactors
at Kozloduy (Bulgaria) and Bohunice (CSFR), the reactor vessels have a high
copper content, which accelerates their embrittlement further. 2°

166
• Inadequate redundancy and separation of emergency safety equipment hamper
the reactor's ability to respond to day-to-day abnormalities and increase the chance
of common-cause failures. The very design of safety systems ignores the possibility
of common-cause failures. These oversights are particularly dangerous, because components
of the 230 have been historically unreliable.
• Insufficient emergency core cooling capacity limits the reactor's ability to head
off a core meltdown. "The system lacks separation and redundancy. The lack of separation
allows the system to be almost entirely destroyed by a localized fire or accident.
The lack of redundancy makes it susceptible to simple malfunctions. Similar
problems plague the electrical system and other control systems.
• Inadequate control panels and systems put the operator at a disadvantage. Poor
monitoring of the power distribution inside the core presents unique problems for
the 230, because its safety is based on the principle of high core margins of safety,
which in turn depend on the ability to maintain a safe distribution of power.
• Substandard materials and substandard construction techniques, imported from
the USSR, affect this reactor. (The former Czechoslovakian nuclear community
claimed to be free of this problem, by virtue of their "high-quality" domestic materials.
However, the nation s nuclear safety authority, CSKAE, has consistently disagreed.)
For example, an investigation of the East German 230's revealed that the
continually poor quality of materials imported from the USSR "impaired the standard
of maintenance work in the past." ^i Such cumulative damage cannot easily be
undone.
• Inadequate fire protection increases the risk of radiation release. On this count,
however, the large water inventory, compared to other PWRs, partially compensates.
Backfitting the 230 poses further risks. In order to upgrade the emergency core
cooling system, the primary circuits and shielding must be pierced by new pipework,
which will then create a new site for radiation release. ^^ In addition, the poor construction
of the reactor subsumes the process of backfitting, because the reactor
itself was badly built. Only a complete reconstruction could solve for this problem.
Finally, judging from the German experience, backfitting will be far too costly,
and may well be impossible. To backfit the four 230's at Grelfswaldl the German
government would have had to spend an estimated -.8 billion. Not surprisingly, the
project was abandoned due to cost.^^ If the plants throughout Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union are fully upgraded to acceptable safety standards, a similar
price tag should be expected. More frighteningly, the Greifswald investigation revealed
that: "The risk of a catastrophic failure of the reactors' pressurized containers
cannot be alleviated by means of additional fittings and technical modifications."
24
3. The WER UO/213
The next generation of Soviet pressurized water reactors—the 213—corrects some
safety deficiencies, but still falls short of Western standards. ^^ According to John
Willis, in his report on WER backfitting.^s this model has several major design
flaws.
• Although an improvement over the 230, the core cooling system Is still between
10 to 50 times less reliable than contemporary Western systems.
• Even this, the second-generation model, does not have a containment system.
Therefore, there is a much higher risk of radiation release.
• The pressure redirection system's reliability remains questionable. Furthermore,
even if it succeeds in relieving pressure, a consequent radiation release is
likely.
• The model shares the 230's problems with embrittlement, redundancy, fire protection,
and substandard construction techniques and materials.
The IAEA and others in the nuclear community apparently believe that this class
of reactors can and should be backfitted to meet Western safety standards. Estimates
for a long-term backfitting program range between $6 billion and $20 billion,
with the median estimate at $10 billion. ^^
This is a high price to pay, given the inherently risky nature of backfitting. Just
as with the 230, backfitting risks the creation of new radiation release sites and fails
to solve the problem of shoddy workmanship omnipresent in Soviet-built nuclear facilities.
'The German experience with the 213 provides some indication of the potential
for backfitting. Germany's Klaus Topfer has said that the 213 located at Greifswald,
in the former East Germany, has no future in Germany, ^s
4. The WER 1000
This reactor, designed in the early eighties, represents an improvement ^9 over
the model 213; however, it too conforms only to "the international standards of the

167
late seventies." ^° Although the WER-1 000/320 reactors have a type of containment
vessel, it is more vulnerable in an emergency than Western-designed containment
vessels. All of these containment vessels have holes to permit various materials
into the reactor area (water, fuels, etc.). For example, the outlets for the piping
system are tunnels through the concrete that extend some distance from the containment
vessel about three meters above ground level, placed on columns. These
are easily damaged in an earthquake or other "event" and practically mean disruj>tion
of the containment's integrity. In general, the containment shells are 1.2
meters thick, made of steel reinforced concrete.^ * Other notable problems are:
• Its pressure vessel diameter presents a special disadvantage: because of its
small size, it provides an inadequate buffer of water between the neutron bombardment
afforded by the fuel and the vessel wall. As a result, embrittlement accelerates.
^^
• A fundamental construction error in the reactor core causes this reactor, like
the RBMK, to exhibit positive reactivity feedback at certain operating levels. "To
date no practicable solution has been found to this problem."''^
• The plant layout results in fire hazards, threatening to the safety of the installation.
3*
C. The Culture of "Acceptable Risk"
The Eastern bloc nuclear industry sprang out of the vast Soviet military-industrial
complex. Therefore, many Russian politicians argue that the industry retains a
utilitarian disregard for human life and well-being. ^^ This attitude manifests itself
in the culture of acceptable risk. Nuclear plant workers and operators simply do not
recognize the need for the level of safety that is taken for granted in the rest of the
international nuclear community. This attitude must be taken into consideration in
evaluating proposed technical backfits, as the mindset of most operators will probably
undervalue safety considerations in the day-to-day operations that will determine
the long-run safety of the plant. This carelessness appears on many levels of
the nuclear community.
Plant workers, especially since the advent of political instability, have been characterized
by a notoriously poor attention to detail and shoddy operating procedure.
In the model 230's, for example, the IAEA found a poor "safety culture". "Safety
culture embodies a top to bottom approach to plant operation from a safety perspective
and needs to be promoted." ^^ However, demoralized plant workers do not
spend the time necessary to maintain a mechanism as sophisticated £is a nuclear
plant. Workers among operators of RBMK reactors suffer from declining morale, according
to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, because the plants,
which do not receive adequate replacement investment, appear to be on the way
out. 3 7
For example, Lithuanian safety inspectors argue that the RBMK plant in Ignalina,
Lithuania, is run in complete violation of national safety standards. As a result
of shoddy workmanship, plant personnel ignored standard operating procedures,
and consequently exposed three wofflers to dangerous doses of radiation. ^^ According
to one Lithuanian safety inspector, this situation has been created, because the
nuclear bureaucracy has ignored the "human questions", and has treated its workers
poorly.
". . . it is not a crazed 'atomic lobby' sitting behind the instrumentation panel in
the various [plants]; they are normal people. . . And if society seriously wants to
have safe [plants] it is essential to resolve urgently not only the technical questions
but also the purely human ones. There should [be] no instance of a reactor operator
who brings home to his family a salary which is less than a tenth of what an average
secondhand dealer earns. . . Is it still not clear that one has to pay for safety?
And pay handsomely for the miser pays twice. .^^
.
A similar, in fact much worse, situation prevails in the Bulgarian plants, none of
which are RBMKs, at Kozloduy. Because Russian technicians have returned home,
and Bulgarian technicians have left their poorly paid jobs and poor living conditions,
the plant has suffered a massive brain drain. In addition, the plant's technology
itself (four model 230's and two model 1 OOO's) lacks adequate safeguards of its
own. Therefore, the loss of trained personnel becomes particularly problematic.
These problems have led nuclear experts to call this plant "one of the most dangerous
nuclear powerplants in the world." *°
A recent study of the plant by the Cousteau Society revealed poor inspection and
a severe lack of spare parts.* ^ The need to operate plants at high capacity, as well
as the lack of domestically manufactured spare parts have hurt efforts to maintain
the plsmt. A member of the Cousteau team. Dr. Robert Pollard concluded: "There is
essentially no dispute that Units 1-4 at the Kozloduy nuclear powerplant do not

168
meet many of the current safety standards that are considered to be the minimum
requirements needed to protect the health and safety of the pubUc." *^
Nuclear bureaucracy presents a further problem, as the agencies responsible for
inspection, compliance and maintenance of investment. For example. In February,
the Russian government halved its number of nuclear Inspectors. Less than two
months later, the accident at Sosnovy Bor was blamed on poor testing and inspection.
". . . the nuclear inspectorate ... is in chaos and strapped for cash. In a
country where making electricity has always come before safety, the inspectorate
has never been properly independent of the energy ministry." *^ Obviously, the
funding situation is unlikely to improve in the short- to medium-term, while the
government's prioritization of electricity before safety may be far harder to eradicate.
RBMKs are not the only plants that lack sufficient replacement parts. Across the
board, "the supply of spare parts dwindles." ** Even with more funding, there is no
guarantee that the mindset of the bureaucracy will change; in fact, an attempt to
reorder priorities must run into some recalcitrance, because it challenges values
people have acted on throughout their careers.
Nuclear experts share this dangerous devaluation of safety, as a recent accident
demonstrates. After the leaik at Sosnovy Bor, Western nuclear scientists observed
that the incident, though not severe, had caused significant fuel assembly damage.
However, Russian experts simply noted that the reactor safety systems had performed
admirably, and showed the success of the design. ^^ Evidently, Soviet-trained
scientists are more concerned about serious meltdowns, and less concerned about radiation
release, even with its concomitant health risks. This, however, is not simply
a matter of "education" or "re-training", because it once again reflects the significantly
different priorities of the Soviet nuclear community. It is unlikely that these
scientists do not know the health risks; rather, they do not value them. Training
cannot remedy such a difference in outlook.
Nuclear waste disposal is currently carried out, as it has always been, in a
manner that threatens the health of the environment. In particular, the nuclear nations
of Eastern Europe face a unique problem: although in previous years, the Soviets
accepted and reprocessed their wastes for no charge, in recent years, the Russians
have begun to charge for the reprocessing. The young nations argue that they
cannot afford this cost. To complicate further their waste disposal procedures. In
1990 the Russian Parliament proclaimed that no nuclear waste from other republics
or nations would be buried In Russia. In response, these countries have begun storing
irradiated fuel in temporary storage facilities, which will remain available for
approximately five more years. The countries plan to expand their permanent storage
capabilities, but they face a public that has lost confidence, given past burials of
radioactive materials.^ ^ Not only is space for waste disposal finite, but it seems that
capacity in those countries has been exceeded, as popular pressure brings itself to
bear against the construction of new facilities.
The nuclear related activities of the former Soviet Union have resulted in severe
environmental damage, leaving the young republics little room for error. Some of
the worst damage occurred because of illegal disposal of nuclear wastes in the
ocean. According to Oleg Petrov, Chief Radiologist of the Soviet Navy, the former
Soviets used to dump low- to intermediate-level waste at sea. Several nuclear warheads
have been lost at sea, in addition to those on board two sunk submarines.*''
Because of the level of dumping and leakage, damage has been caused to the delicate
Arctic environment.*® The situation has become so bad that many lakes and
rivers in the former Soviet Union have become dangerously radioactive.*^ The Russian
Government plans to take steps to remedy these problems. People's Deputy
Vorpholomeev, who chairs the committee on Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural
Resources, claimed that radioactive waste is currently the most serious environmental
problem in Russia.^"
Even in a group of legislators that is relatively concerned about these issues, however,
recalcitrance from the nuclear community, both bureaucratic and scientific, as
well as the vast extent of environmental damage to date, hinder the ability of the
state to solve for the hazards associated with nuclear wgiste and leakage. Every day
that a reactor continues to operate compounds the problem by generating new
waste and new environmental radionuclide contamination. If the reactors are not
shutdown, the republics and the countries of Eastern Europe will not be able to deal
effectively with their extensive levels of pollution.
Shoddy documentation of materials was common during the reign of the Communist
regime, because paperwork was valued less than fast energy production. As a
result, it is difficult to determine the original construction materials used in the re-

169
actors; this information gap makes inspections and backfitting particularly difficult,
if not impossible.^ ^
III.
NUCLEAR POLITICS ^^
Accompanying the development of a dangerously inefficient bureaucracy has been
the formation of public hostility toward the further development of nuclear power.
This hostility combines with the recalcitrance of the bureaucracy to render nuclear
power ultimately unworkable. This reasoning is particularly compelling since fundamental
attitudes toward nuclear energy are likely to transcend the short-term, as
has been the case in other nations, and thus are likely to affect the long-term future
of the industry and the nature of any regulation. ^^
A. Eastern Europe
1. Bulgaria
In February 1990, opposition among 40,000 citizens led to the formation of an
anti-nuclear lobby, which resulted in the cancellation of the construction of a second
nuclear reactor in Belene. In addition, expansion of the Kozloduy plant was canceled,
under public and international pressure.
2. CSFR
Funded by a German utility company (RWE), the construction of a new WER
1000 in Temelin continues. A condition of the contract apparently is that power be
exported to Germany starting in 1995, and it is possible that RWE may take an
equity position in the new facility because more investment is required. Information
about the precise situation at Temelin is difficult to obtain. Recently engineers at
the construction site discovered that the reactor was missing some equipment and
so they broke a hold about 4x5 meters in the containment vessel in order to make
the necessary repairs. This hold in the containment was then repaired. Prime Minister
Petr Pethart tried to find Western support to stop construction of the Temelin
reactor in the spring of 1992.
Public opinion in CSFR remains sharply divided, and the growing anti-nuclear
movement receives wide media coverage for its protests at all of the nuclear facilities.
Recently, the public mobilized to prevent the construction of a temporary waste
storage site in Dukovany.^** In another incident of opposition, the people of the Slovakian
town of Kosice successfully blocked the construction of two VVER 1 OOO's in
the town of Kecerovce.^^ This sentiment has spread to the government: in June,
1991, the environmental minister of CSFR joined the protest against the expansion
of nuclear power in his country. His position reveals a deep rift within the government
on the issue of nuclear power.
Austria, in support of a nuclear-free Central Europe, is uneasy with the presence
of nuclear reactors in CSFR. Earlier, Austria offered CSFR 400 MW of free electricity
in exchange for the closure of the NPP Bohunice reactor that borders Austria,
but It is doubtful if this offer is still on the table. In addition, the Austrian Ministry
for the Environment is paying for a study of energy saving possibilities. It was
begun this year by the Prague-based SEVEn Institute and the Austrian Energieverwertungsagentur.
3. Hungary
As the revolutionary government came to power in Hungary, freezing construction
of new nuclear reactors was an initiative of portions of the government. The
expansion of nuclear reactors in Paks appears to have been halted, and the planned
construction on the fifth and sixth reactors has not taken place. These developments
parallel the gains of Hungarian environmentalists, who played an important role in
the Hungarian political scene, both before and after the revolution.
B. Former Soviet Union
Opposition toward nuclear energy in the former Soviet Union stems from a distrust
of the "nuclear establishment" ^® —a distrust expressed through the protests
of a large portion of the public against the further expansion of nuclear energy. The
nuclear establishment, a IpowertuI and privileged class" ^^ in the former Soviet
Union, symbolizes the old order to the average citizen. The distrust directed against
the nuclear establishment is representative of the distrust toward the old order,
which collapsed under its lack of credibility.^*
The nuclear establishment is dominated by members of the technical community,
which denies that nuclear energy poses a real threat and "stresses that nuclear is
better than the realistic alternatives." ^^ Despite such claims, the opponents of nu-

170
clear energy have been able to block the further expansion of the industry sought
by the nuclear establishment.
However, on March 26, 1992, the success of nuclear opponents was upstaged when
the Russian government decided to "resume construction of a number of new nuclear
plants and to increase the capacity of existing ones." «° Nevertheless, that decision
seems to have been motivated not by the support of the public, but by the government's
perception of a need for nuclear energy. In fact, a recent referendum on
the construction of the Bashkir nuclear station in Russia showed 99 percent of the
voters opposed to the plant. As a result, President Boris Yeltsin has promised that it
will be converted to natural gas.®^
An additional factor, the accident at Chernobyl has aroused a prevailing fear
among Ukrainian citizens, whose support has strengthened the anti-nuclear movement.
Protests have occurred at many nuclear pleints, in particular at the Khmel'-
nitskly plant. Not surprisingly, the Green party has also recently been gaining popular
support.
Public hostility will not go away even if the bureaucracy cleans up its act, since
public mistrust will be slow to change—for good reason. This strong public opinion
and current bureaucratic inefficiency undermine the nuclear optimists' vision of the
future workability of nuclear power. Even in the presence of massive infusions of
Western funding, the potential for the "success" of nuclear power in these countries
remains highly questionable.
A. Long-term Energy Strategies
IV. ENERGY ALTERNATIVES
This proposal aims not simply at the replacement of nuclear-generated electricity
by conventional sources, but rather at the development of long-term energy strategies
designed to erase the dangerous dependence on nuclear energy and foster the
use of safe, sustainable energy. The goal of an energy strategy should be to use safe
primary energy most efficiently, in order to alleviate the need for dangerous primary
energy. Therefore, conservation should aim not only at electricity savings, but
also at savings in the total consumption of primary energy sources. Given that electricity
itself is ultimately generated by the consumption of primary energy, the conservation
of conventional primary energy frees up resources to be used in the replacement
of nuclear-generated electricity. In this way, the consumption of primary
energy connects intimately to the consumption of electricity.
For safe primary energy to be used most efficiently, it may indeed be necessary
for electricity consumption to stay constant or to increase, because in many areas
(such as in certain areas of the transportation sector) consumption of electricity is
more efficient that direct consumption of a primary energy source. However, this
does not conflict with the goal of replacing nuclear power; rather, it suggests that
the structure of energy production and use will have to shift if efficiency is to be
maximized. A sound energy strategy, then, may well involve the diversion of primary
energy sources to the generation of electricity, and the subsequent construction
of alternate generation facilities.
One possible policy solution would be a tax on any primary energy consumption
(especially oil) found to be less efficient than electric alternatives. The revenue collected
could be used to fund the construction of new generation sites for electricity.
B. Eastern Europe
As a percentage of electricity produced in 1991, nuclear power accounts for 28.6
percent in CSFR, 48.4 percent in Hungary, and 34 percent in Bulgaria. ^^ However,
the situation in the energy market remains fluid, and opportunities for short- and
long-run substitution exist.
1. Market Reform
As energy markets throughout Eastern Europe become liberalized, prices will rise
until they match international levels. In Hungary, those levels have already been
matched in coal, oil, gas, and heat markets. ^^ CSFR currently pays international
market prices for imported oil, and has targeted 1995 as the deadline for the full
elimination of all subsidies, direct and indirect, paid to the energy market. ^^ Bulgaria
has increased prices to world levels, and has begun to restructure state ownership
of the energy industry, even going so far as to privatize the natural gas industry.6
5
As power becomes more expensive, the quantity of power demanded will decrease.
However, the extent of the decrease depends on the responsiveness of quantity demanded
to price (in economic terms, the price elasticity of demand). This responsiveness
depends on the ability of final consumers to implement conservation measures.

171
To encourage this implementation, businesses and individuals need access to conservation
information and conservation technology.®^ In economies which valued
energy consumption as a symbol of progress, and conservation as a symbol of poverty,
it is unreasonable to assume that consumer of energy possess the means to improve
their energy efficiency. As a result, international assistance is needed to encourage
conservation and provide the technology necessary to save energy.
2. International Assistance
Governments and international agencies must disseminate information about conservation
technologies, as well as the benefits of conservation. Technologies such as
compact fluorescent light bulbs and improved insulation of pipes and buildings represent
just a few of the vast number of efficiency technologies available for use.®'' A
study by the US AID (Agency for International Development) lists many simple and
cost-effective measures for Eastern European industry.
Some low-cost, quick payback measures frequently recommended for the plants
studied by AID include: continuous oxygen analyzers for stack gas analysis; infrared
thermometers for the identification of heat loss sources; heat meters; steam flow
meters, leak detectors, and steam traps; electric power demand diagnostic equipment;
other diagnostic equipment such as pressure recorders, thermometers and humidity
meters, industrial stethoscopes, and gas flowmeters.®^ Observe that much of
this equipment is diagnostic: many plant operators do not know when, where, or if
they are wasting energy.
The study further lists some energy efficiency improvements: energy-efficient
lighting and control systems; high-efficiency gas and oil burners, and automatic control
systems for existing and future boilers; energy management control systems for
commercial and industrial use; high efficiency refrigeration systems; electricity
demand management systems; industrial pipe insulation; condensate extraction boilers;
incinerators which include heat recovery units; waste heat boilers; variable
speed controls installed on electric motor drives.®^
As a further measure, governments could set standards for energy efficiency. Although
this would increase the cost of domestic production, that rise would be countered
by the increase in foreign marketability of products; in turn, increased exports
could help offset the initial jump in fixed cost from improved design.'" In addition,
the savings in energy use will be particularly significant, given the especially wasteful
design of Hungarian products.'* As a final possibility, Hungarian utilities could
follow the example of US utilities, by directly investing in efficiency. Pacific Gas
and Electric, for example, the United States' largest private utility, estimates that it
can get three-quarters of Its additional power needs over the next decade through
efficiency gains as simple as improved insulation, replacement of incandescent bulbs
with fluorescent versions, and cogeneration technology. '^
Energy could also be saved in the transportation sector, which is likely to experience
a great deal of growth with the advent of increasing economic liberalization
and expanded productivity. If public transportation is not supported now, it may be
shut out in the future, as rapid economic growth may fuel the rise of the personal
auto. To encourage the development of efficiency in this sector, public transportation
should be provided, and energy efficiency standards should be applied. These
standards should penalize polluters; low energy efficiency should be taxed for the
cost it exacts from the environment.'^ By substituting for nuclear power without
increasing emission levels, conservation also avoids contributing to the high levels
of pollution already experienced throughout the region.
3. Particular Opportunities in Hungary
a. The Impact of Waste Reduction
Just as the other economies of Eastern Europe, Hungary wastes tremendous
amounts of power. Although it produces a mere quarter of Japan's output. Its per
capita energy consumption equals that of Japan.'*
As is the case throughout Eastern Europe, Hungarian industry uses a significantly
larger portion of total energy production, in comparison to the other industrialized
nations, both because Hungary harbors a disproportionate amount of energyintensive
heavy industries, and because its industries use energy inefficiently.
Market reform has begun to solve the first problem;'^ in 1990, heavy industrial
output declined by 10 percent and continued to decline in 1991. This trend has
played a role in decreased energy demand, which fell 7 percent in the first 9 months
of 1991. The government has estimated that this restructuring will account for twothirds
of the total reduction in energy intensity, while efficiency will have to account
for the remaining third.'® The emerging unemployment can be turned around

172
in part through the stimulation of sophisticated, less energy wasting branches of the
Hungari£in economy.
Several studies have confirmed the various opportunities for energy savings. An
assessment of the district heating network in Budapest suggest network energy
losses between 30 percent and 40 percent. Such losses could be offset by upgrading
heat distribution networks and developing small-scale cogeneration units in powerplants.'''
A 1990 study by Thomas Jaszay for Pacific Northwest Laboratory demonstrates
that Hungary can develop 700 MW of cogeneration capacity in the near
term, with 600 additional MW available by 2005. Since the Paks stations have an
effective capacity of 1425 MW,'^ over the long-term,''^ this represents a replacement
of 49 percent in the short-term, and 91.2 percent in the long-term. A 1988 EEC
study corroborates Jaszay's analysis, by arguing that "efficiency could provide the
same net increase in energy as a new nuclear power reactor, but do so far more
quickly and at about one-fifth the cost." *° Considering that new nuclear power reactors
produce 2 to 3 times more power than Hungary's older, smaller capacity stations,
this claim seems particularly dramatic.
Jaszay's study further argues that final energy demand in Hungary will actually
decrease in the coming years, from 1355 PJ in 1990, to 1269 PJ in 2005, and finally
to 1117 PJ in 2030. Therefore, after the installation of cogeneration through 2005,
the remaining 125 MW (3.94 PJ)®^ would be solved for by a decrease in energy
demand, which will total 152 PJ, fully 148 PJ more than necessary. In fact, since
Hungary's nuclear output in a year comes to just under 41 PJ, conservation alone
could solve for the energy crunch well before 2005. To further bolster the case for
efficiency, Jaszay now believes his estimates to be too conservative.*^
b. Trends in Supply
Although demand will continue to fall, supply likely will follow suit. Production
throughout Hungary's energy industries has been falling over the past few years, as
Hungary has become increasingly dependent on energy imports.®'' Although nuclear
power would seem then to be an effective solution, it turns out to lack economic
viability.
Since Hungary is prepared to integrate itself into the international economy, in
order to preserve a reasonable balance of trade, it must maximize the efficient utilization
of goods which it imports, while maximizing domestic production. A strategy
of energy conservation matches the first objective, and will minimize the outflow of
hard currency for energy imports. Nuclear power, however, does not match the
second objective. First, much capital must be imported in general to maintain the
Paks nuclear pleint, and much more will obviously have to be imported to upgrade it
to acceptable safety standards. Any capital expenditure associated with these loans
is capital which cannot be spent as part of a larger national conservation strategy.®*
Second, since Hungary is a net energy importer, it is unlikely to be able to export
nuclear-generated electricity for foreign exchange. Therefore, if it costs more to
produce nuclear energy than it costs to import energy, then economic resources,
which could be spent upgrading Hungary's ancient and wasteful energy infrastructure,
are being wasted.
Because investments in efficiency have been found to be one-fifth to one-seventh
the cost of nuclear electricity in Hungary,®^ both precious hard currency and scarce
domestic capital could be far better spent on efficiency than on nuclear power, particularly
in the next decade, when efficiency improvements are likely to be easiest
and have the highest payback (when energy efficiency approaches international
norms, investment will have a lower return). For the long-run, as efficiency improves
over time, so does conservation technology. For example, in the long-term,
Hungary may increase its cogeneration capacity even more;®® in addition, its economy
will certainly become less energy intensive, as it switches away from heavy industry,
which will necessarily become less profitable if Hungary needs to import
energy by using valuable foreign exchange. Finally, in the long-term, Hungary's existing
nuclear reactors (the already outdated WER 440/21 3s) will also cease to be
able to function. Therefore, it will not be difficult to fill in the short- to mediumterm
void left by the closure of these reactors.
4. Particular Opportunities in Bulgaria
In 1991, nuclear plants in Bulgaria accounted for 34 percent of electricity produced.®'
This figure includes the 2025 MW of effective generating capacity (out of
2722 MW of net generating capacity).®® However, Bulgaria poses a more extreme
form of Hungary's problem, because Bulgaria is "the most energy import-dependent
country in Eastern Europe. . . It imports almost 60 percent of its energy needs, including
virtually all of its oil and natural gas. Most of the country's domestic energy

173
production is solid fuels, either brown coal or lignite, while 36 percent of its electricity
comes from nuclear energy." **
Bulgaria has already closed its two oldest nuclear power reactors temporarily, but
has argued that it needs the power from the remaining four.^° Because of Bulgaria's
unique dependence, its reactors could be phased out a little more slowly than in
other nations. Its two oldest, currently operating reactors, both model 230's, contribute
an effective generating capacity of 659 MW, (the two closed reactors normally
contribute 604 MW) while its two new reactors, still three to four years from peak
production, have a total capacity of 1906 MW.^*
Like the other nations of Eastern Europe, Bulgaria uses more energy than other
OECD nations per unit of output, according to World Bank statistics: Bulgaria is
five times more energy intensive than the former nation of East Germany, and
more than twice as intensive as the OECD average. ^^ Data from the AID study
shows that emergency energy assistance to Bulgaria in the past has saved considerable
amounts of energy. Ck)nsidering improvements to only three types of facilities
(iron/steel mills, poultry slaughterhouses, milk factory), the investments in approximately
10 plants ^^ resulted in an estimated net savings of $184,761 ^^ per year; for
each investment, the simple payback period was just three and a half months. A
total of 2580 TOE, or .116 PJ was saved over just a few facilities. ^^
Further, the costs of choosing nuclear power over a strategy empheisizing energyefficiency
increase substantially in the case of Bulgaria, because its Kozloduy station
is in exceptionally poor operational and structural condition.^® The poor management
practices prevalent at that nuclear installation dictate a switch to increased
efficiency at other power facilities.
The current economic contraction in Bulgaria poses an unparalleled opportunity
to restructure patterns of energy production. Since 1988, electricity consumption has
fallen from 49.2 billion kWh (49,200 GWh) to 40 bUlion kWh (40,000 GWh). These
trends should continue until the middle of this decade.®'' As a result, in the encouragement
of renewed consumption, industry can focus on energy efficiency, which
can enable the economy to produce more, at less cost, without waiting for expensive
increases in energy output.
5. Particular Opportunities In CSFR
a. Conservation Potential
CSFR nuclear plants produced 2717 MW (23.8 TWh, or 85.68 PJ ^s) in 1991, or
29.4 percent of that nation's total electricity. ®® Unlike Bulgaria and Hungary, CSFR
produces 70 percent of its own energy. In addition, its economic restructuring has
proceeded very rapidly: although prices are still centrally determined by the two republics,
the prices charged to industry reflect international prices. ^°° 'This increase
in prices will be particularly effective, because industry consumes 50 percent of all
energy. *°i Since industry will be especially cash-starved over the next few years,
management will wish to scale back consumption dramatically in order to cut
costs. ^°^
A study by SEVEn,^°3 the Energy Efficiency Center in Prague concludes that 701
PJ i°* (more than eight times the amount required to replace nuclear power) may
be saved every year with retrofitting in particular industries. The retrofitting of furnaces
alone is projected to save 259 PJ/year, while efficiency improvements in secondary
energy sources contribute an additional 350 PJ/year. Decentralizing the
electricity production system will help minimize waste. The use of small cogeneration
plants (according to the SEVEn study, current technology makes possible units
of approximately 100 kW).'°^ In addition, larger-scale cogeneration technologies,
which involve the backfitting of plants to support combined heat and power production,
require little start-up time and can use indigenous production facilities.'"^ As
a final improvement in the electricity generation industry, old plants in Slovakia
could be upgraded. Particularly, improving the efficiency of three fossil fuel powerplants
from 30 percent to the western level of 42 percent would save approximately
800 MW, and would allow the closure of 2 reactors in Bohunice.*"''
The state has already begun to consider some of these options. CSFR has begun to
study efficiency alternatives, while the utilities in both the Czech and Slovak republics
have begun to study least-cost approaches to planning in electricity generation
and distribution. These approaches emphasize energy efficiency as a more economical
approach to power generation. i°* The total savings in the industrial sector is
estimated to be one-third of total energy consumption.'"® This exceeds the level of
savings necessary to shut down every nuclear plant.
These estimates include only the industrial sector; the residential sector provides
new opportunities for energy efficiency. Although industrial energy prices approach
those of Western Europe, prices in the residential areas are two to three times

174
cheaper than in Western Europe. However, since CSFR salaries are at least ten
times lower than those in Western Europe, there still exists a strong comparative
incentive for households to save energy. Information dissemination to households
could help encourage this process, and help make the demand for energy more responsive
to price increases. This could also help overcome "the most formidable barrier".
The SEVEn study concludes: "As long as the average citizen persists in thinking
that the value of energy savings is as an emergency measure taken by those
who do not have enough money for energy, [there] is no hope for the success of
energy conservation. ^1° People must then be convinced that the future of their
economy and their environment lies in energy efficiency.
b. National Energy Policy
The Federal Government, in anticipation of the economic transition, has formulated
the Federal Energy Policy, which will guide energy use and production in the
next decade. That policy places a high priority on the cleanup of CSFR's devastated
environment. The use of clean-burning fuel should help address this concern; natural
gas use is projected to rise by 5 percent of total energy consumption in the next
decade. * ^ ^ Expansion in these industries, along with the development of cogeneration
technology will allow CSFR to meet its emissions targets without the use of
nuclear power.
C. The Former Soviet Union
1. Energy Demand
a. Energy Prices
In the past, energy prices in the Soviet Union have remained stable—untouched
by the fluctuating prices of the world market. Domestic energy prices were determined
by the State Pricing Committee every 11-14 years and "have been set without
any mechanism to tie domestic energy prices to world market prices" ^'^ As
real energy prices increased, Soviet energy prices failed to do so and as a result,
"Soviet energy costs have moved further and further away from energy prices." "^
This low cost of energy gave the Soviets little incentive to save energy; in addition,
because energy was ^located on a quota system, to use less energy resulted in the
penalty of being allocated less energy. Therefore, the system itself encouraged
waste.
To lessen this existing gap, liberalization of energy prices has been a goal in the
"Main Directions of Economic Policy for Russian Federation." In May 1992, the
Russian government stepped toward this goal by increasing energy prices 5-7 fold.
Price growth will reverse the cycle which has inevitably led to the devaluation of
energy. Enterprises are receiving the message that "the time of wasteful energy utilization
is over;" "* as energy prices continue to rise, consumers will meet the rise
through conservation. In order to allow consumers to respond to this decrease in
price, the international community should provide conservation information and
technology, as loans or as aid, to end-users of energy.
b. Industry
The industrial sector of the Soviet economy has been a large consumer of energy,
"accounting for 50 percent of final energy consumption" ^^^ "Large-scale development
projects for industrial production, construction, and agriculture" "® were the
target of the first Five-Year Plan and have in large part led to such a high rate of
consumption by industry. Because industry is a major consumer of energy, "most
Soviet articles on conservation often focus on the potential for reducing the demand
for energy by industry." "^ The reduction of energy use by industry should be focussed
on moving away from such energy-intense heavy industrial production and
moving toward the production of "less energy-intensive goods." "» Technological
change and "behavioral change in managing factories" "® are also both important
components of energy conservation in the industrial sector.
c. Transportation
The transportation sector of the former Soviet Union is becoming increasingly
more important. Freight activity and collective transportation have dominated the
travel industry in the past and still continue to do so, but travel by air and private
auto is becoming more popular. Structural and technological changes in the transportation
industry could lead to greater energy efficiency.
As the economy contracts, the amount of freight activity will subsequently decline.
However, autonomous republics will "produce more local specialization and
inter-republic trade." ^^o With this substitution in output, "the role of the trucks
will likely increase" '^i with the increase in food and consumer goods. To increase

175
the energy efficiency of the economy, the international community should encourage
the maintenance of freight and collective transportation, to alleviate the need
for wasteful vehicles likes trucks and personal autos.
d. Residential
The residential sector of the former Soviet Union uses appliances sparsely, but
inefficiently. Simply implementing "more efficient energy use could reduce energy
intensities significantly." ^^^ Because economic expansion will increase demand for
home appliances in the future, such appliances must become more electrically efficient
in order to hold total electricity demand in check. Offsetting this projected increase,
however, is the much improved efficiency of modern Soviet-made appliances.
^^^ Technical assistance could encourage this trend and help prevent a significant
incresise in home electricity consumption.
2. Conservation Technologies
Electric drives consume 60 percent of the electricity of the Soviet Union. The majority
of the drives used are low-voltage drives which are inefficient in comparison
with frequently regulated electric drives (36 percent more efficient than the lowvoltage
drives). Using the more efficient regulated electric drives "will allow a 60
percent reduction of electricity used by these devices. . . and can also increase the
longevity of the equipment and regulate energy use." ^^^ The international community
should import "equipment to produce drives domestically (and) install controlled
electric drives in a wide range of industries." ^^^
The lighting systems in the former Soviet Union are insufficient and leave much
room for improvement. Simply by using more energy-efficient lighting, the former
Soviet Union could save 20 GW i^e (20,000 MW) of energy. In the United States, use
of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) has become popular. CFLs "provide the same
light as incandescent lamps with one-fourth as much energy." ^^^ Replacing incandescent
lights in the former Soviet Union with CFLs would save a significant
amount of energy.
Alternatives for lighting also include "a new generation of efficient tubes [which]
offer a 10 percent savings in commercial buildings plus substantially better color
quality." '^s ^ 50 percent savings can be reached by merely "running these lamps
with efficient electronic ballasts. . . cleaning dusty and yellowing features and sliding
a simple aluminum reflector behind the lamps." '^s
The international community should encourage replacement of present lighting
systems by assisting in the building of CFL factories or providing the former Soviet
Union with CFLs. The benefits of the investment this will produce far outweigh further
investment in nuclear technology; the "$7 million cost of a CFL factory is trivial
compared to the cost of the powerplant it replaces." ^^°
Considering all these specific improvements, among others, Russian scientist Igor
Bashmakov argues: "In 1990 the former USSR had 37 i3» GW capacity of nuclear
power stations. . . It is clear that these reactors could be decommissioned as more
stress on improvements of electricity utilization efficiency . . . would be made." ^^^
Bashmakov estimates that an average direct investment of only $2.90 for every
barrel of oil equivalent per year would save, by the year 2005: 150 million t of coal;
70 million t oil; 250 billion m^ of natural gas; 400 billion kWh electricity. Indeed,
given a nuclear capacity of 2.8 x 10* MWh, the electricity savings of 4 x 10* MWh
would more than replace losses from nuclear plants, even absent the projected reductions
in other primary energy use.*^^ In the short-term, approximately 8-9 GW
of nuclear capacity would have to be replaced, through a combination of industrial
and residential retrofitting, electrical cogeneration, and other short-term conservation
technologies.
3. Energy Supply
a. Electricity Generation
Since 1989, growth in electricity generation has decreased from a 4 percent
growth rate in 1989, to a 1 percent growth rate in 1990. A shortage of electrical generation
will result in a "supply demand gap. . . with increased likelihood of power
shortages and 'black-outs.' " '^^ The problem can be solved, safely and efficiently, by
upgrading the electrical generation industry to use improved efficiency gas turbines
and cogeneration facilities.*^*
In addition, the electricity grid has been hurt by the unavailability of nine (out of
a total of fifteen) RBMK reactors throughout the former Soviet Union. '^e These reactors
have all been temporarily shut down.

176
b. Renewable Energy
As a start to a long-term strategy dedicated to renewable energy, governments
should invest in small-scale hydro, biomass, and wind energy. This would provide an
estimated 1500 MW of capacity, which would produce 5.25 TWh/year at 40 percent
capacity. As the indigenous industry starts to develop, further capacity increases
would be possible. This program would cost between $1.14 ^^'' and $1.68 billion.*^®
c. Gas
Gas production has increased over the p£ist years but this growth has begun to
slow down due to problems within the infrastructure of the industry. ^^^ Since the
problem lies within the infrastructure and clean gas is abundant in the former
USSR (although pipes need to be upgraded), the gas industry can be further developed
as a last resort,^*" in the unlikely event that conservation and renewable technology
fail to compensate for the loss of nuclear energy. ^^^
d. Oil
In 1989 oil production fell 2.6 percent from the output of the preceding year and
has continued to decline into the 1990's. "The inadequate rate of new discoveries;
the smaller size of these new discoveries and the premature decline in production
from existing large oilfields" ^^^ partially explain this decrease. In — addition, the
lack of foreign exchange has cut off the supply of imported equipment "for the last
three years there was no new oil field developed and presently 22,500 oil wells are
out of operation partly due to lack of equipment to repair them.^*^ This trend
should be allowed to continue as part of a sound energy strategy, in order to decrease
the pressure on this nonrenewable resource; to facilitate this decrease, oil
must be used more efficiently. Efficiency could be encouraged through conservation,
and through the use of oil in electricity, where suitable and efficient.
D. Alternative Backfltting
If conservation and related cogeneration technologies fail to provide adequate
power, newer nuclear plants could be backfitted to produce natural gas. As noted
earlier,!** Russia has already begun to backfit partially constructed nuclear plants
for the use of natural gas, and another, at Voronezh, is also being retooled, at
modest conversion costs. Gas is plentiful in the Soviet Union, ^^^ and niakes up approximately
one-fifth of energy production in Hungary and 15 percent in CSFR.^"*^
Bulgaria imports most of its gas from reserves in Western Siberia. ^^^
V. CONCLUSION
The nations of the former Eastern Bloc have already suffered enormous amounts
of ecological devastation. The goal of a rational energy policy for these countries
must be to minimize environmental impact while still providing for the needs of
people. Nuclear power, with or without massive and long-term Western aid, remains
too risky to human health and the environment to serve as the basis for a sound
energy strategy.
Only conservation and alternatives to nuclear power can satisfy the basic needs of
the people while respecting the environment. The nations of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union hold much untapped potential for conservation; that potential
can be obtained at low ecological and monetary cost. Conservation should be
complemented by the pursuit of safe and sustainable supplies of energy, with the
most emphasis on renewable energy technologies, and some emphasis on clean-burning
fossil fuels like natural gas. Abandoning the pursuit of nuclear energy in these
countries will save money, nonrenewable resources, and life.
Friends of the Earth calls on the G-7 Governments and funding agencies to
accept this challenge, and to bring their collective resources to bear as a matter of
urgency. A collaborative international partnership is required to address the threats
posed by these nuclear facilities and to pay for their closure. Likewise, concerted
action by the G-7 and their principal funding agents such as the World Bank is essential
to success in making the right investments for a sustainable future. This is
not the time for timid, tepid responses.
FOOTNOTES
* The map at the end of this Report shows the location of each reactor in the region by type
and number.
^ Within a period of 3 months, or as soon as sufficient cogeneration and conservation capacity
comes on-line to substitute. As shall be argued, cogeneration and many conservation measures
can be developed in the very short-term.

177
' Because closing costs will involve mainly technical assistance and a scant amount of technology,
fmancial aid will not be an extremely significant part of this somewhat inexpensive step.
Decommissioning costs would appear in the long-term, and would be more significant.
* These reactors should be shut down at a lower priority than the RBMKs, and should be
given a phase-out period of 6 months to a year, in order not to shock the grid too heavily.
* This figure includes Kozloduy 1 and 2, both temporarily shut down. Kozloduy units 1-4, according
to the Cousteau study, among other sources, represent the most immediate risk, because
they am WER 440/230 types. Reactors Sand 6 are third generation 1000 MW plants, and are in
slightly better condition. Those plants should be closed within five yearn, to allow energy efficiency
and grid improvement to absorb the impact of the decreased energy supply.
* According to the study by SEVEn, the Prague, CSFR, center for the study of energy efficiency,
industrial retrofitting could substitute for these reactors in the immediate term.
' To close down all four reactors at once would shock the electricity supply too heavily, as
Hungary probably could not implement compensatory measures quickly enough. As Thomas
Jaszays study of efficiency in Hungary indicates, however, 700 MW of cogeneration capacity
could be developed in the immediate term; this would compensate for the loss of the first two
reactors. Although there is no significant difference in risk between the first pair and the
second pair, reactors 3 and 4 may have to be kept open in order to avert a catastrophic power
shortage. The remaining two reactors can be shut down within 2 years. This will require a concerted
effort to reduce demand through the funding of conservation, as documented by Jaszay,
and the longer-term expemsion of cogeneration capability. The declining Hungarian energy
demand, fostered by restructuring, will buffer the shock of decreased supply.
* Andrew Fisher. "Gaping Holes in the Safety Net." Financial Times: 1 April 1992.
* Juliet Sychrava. "Closure of Soviet Reactors Urged." Financial Times: 25 March 1992.
'"Nicholas Lenssen. Worldwatch Institute. Phone Interview. 25 June 1992. Simon Rippon.
"After Five Years, Uncertainties Remain at Chernobyl." Nuclear News. June 1991. p.49.
'
' Greenpeace document on Soviet-designed nuclear plants. Fax from Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace
U.K., dated 26 June 1992.
>2 Fisher.
* ^ Nicholas Lenssen. Worldwatch Institute. Fax dated 30 June 1992.
'* Fisher.
' * Sychrava.
»6 Mark Hibbs. "Siemens Reckons up to $12-Billion Needed from G-7 for Eastern PWRs." Nucleonics
Week: 14 May 1992, p.3.
" Hibbs, 2.
"The Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in Central emd Eastern Europe: An Overview and
Major Findings of the IAEA Project on the Safety of WWER 440 Model 230 Nuclear Power
Plants. Undated, p.2.
*9 Unless otherwise noted, all data are from IAEA report.
2° John Willis. Risk Finance: Backfit vs. Shutdown of WER Nuclear Reactors. Greenpeace
International: Amsterdam, 1991.
2
' Greenpeace document on safety of Soviet-designed reactors. In fax from Antony Froggatt,
Greenpeace UK, dated 26 June 1992.
" Willis, 13.
23 WUlis, 7.
2* Round Table 1990—seven person working group of the Greifswald reactor. Drawn up on
behalf of the Central Round Table in Berlin, May 1990. Paraphrased in Greenpeace document
on safety of Soviet-designed reactors. In fax from Antony Froggatt dated 26 June 1992.
^^ Environmental Issues. 11 October 1991.
26 Willis, 9-14.
2^ It is important to note that Western standards also suffer from many inadequacies and
pose their sham of danger to human health and the environment. Nothing in this Report should
be construed to support nuclear power as managed and promoted in Western countries.
2 8 As quoted in: Christopher Flavin, et al. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report: 1992.
May 1992. Worldwatch Institute, Greenpeace Intemationzd, WISE-Paris. p. 10.
2 9 According to Emil Bedi, energy expert at SZOPK, this reactor does have a containment
vessel, which represents the most significant improvement over the 213. According to Bert van
Pinxteren, of the FOE International Secretariat, modifications to the containment system am
being proposed to enable it to withstand higher pressures.
'^° Permanent Monitoring Group on Plant Safety. Control Report No. 13. November 1988. aqi
Greenpeace document on Soviet reactor safety, in fax from Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace UK,
dated 26 June 1992.
3' The interior skin of the vessel is 8 mm, and made of steel. Including vessel shielding, the
design has 120 mm of steel. Data from Gefahrenpotential des Atomkomplexes Temelin, June
1988, sterreichisches kologie-Institut fr angewandte Umweltvorshung.
32 Willis, 11.
33 Permanent Monitoring Group on Plant Safety: Control Report No. 13. November 1988. As
quoted in Greenpeace document on Soviet-designed reactor safety. In fax from Antony Froggatt,
Greenpeace UK, dated 26 June 1992.
3'»
Permanent Monitoring Group on Plant 35 Safety.
Strengthening Nuclear Regulation in Russia: A Report on the First Workshop on Nuclear
Waste and Safety with the committee on Ecology of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.
December 15-20,1991; February 36 3-7, 1992.
IAEA,31.
3' Matthew Wald. "Ex-Soviets Still Lag in Nuclear Safety, U.S. Finds." New York Times: 23
April 1992.
^^ Environmental Issues. 11 October, 1991.

178
^^ Environmental Issues. 11 October, 1991, p.68.
*° Flavin, et al, 10.
*^The Cousteau Society. Nuclear Safety and the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant in Bulgaria: Expert's
Report. February, 1992.
*2 Robert D. Pollard. Report on the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plants Units 1-4. January 1992.
p.9.
*^Economist. 28 March 1992. p.50.
** Flavin, et al, 14. Strengthening Nuclear Regulation in Russia, 11.
*« Mark Hibbs. Nucleonics Week. 14 May 1992. p.2.
** Flavin et al, 11. Nicholas Lenssen. Worldwatch Institute. Phone interview. 25 June 1992.
*' Strengthening Nuclear Regulation, 10. These incidents, originally reported by Greenpeace,
have now been confirmed by Russian politicians.
*^ Senator Fremk Murkowski. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Hearing
on Nuclear Reactors in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 16 June 1992. Testimony
during the cross-examination of witnesses.
** Nicholas Lenssen. "Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away." Worldwatch Paper
106. December 1991. Worldwatch Institute. p.l5.
®° Strenghtening Nuclear Regulation, 8.
5 "Willis, 14.
*^ Except where noted, all factual data is taken from Worldwatch Institute (Washington, DC)
Nuclear Power Files, courtesy of Nicholas Lenssen.
*' Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
^* Honza Bemnek. World Information Service on Energy. Feix dated 30 June 1992.
^^EmU Bedi (see note 29). In electronic mail from John Hontelez, dated 28 June 1992.
^^Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
^''Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
^^Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
^^Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
*° Anatoly Vefflin. "Russia Orders Resumption of its Nuclear Program." Reuters Information
Services. June 2,1992.
* •
From Kevin McCann, Petroleum Economics, Ltd. Fax dated 22 June 1992.
82 LAEA Newsbriefs 7:2. April/May 1992. p.54.
*' Bela Bamcr, Ian Brown, and Zsuzsa Foltanyi. Prospects for Enemy and Environment Policy
Interaction in Hungary. Paper for the Conference: Energy and the Environment in European
Economies in Transition. Undated, p. 12.
** Jaroslav Marousek. Energy and Environment: The Path of Coexistence in Czechoslovakia.
June 17-19,1992. p.7-8.
** Mark Hopkins. Business Opportunities in Eastern Europe for Energy-Efficient Industrial
Products. Jemuary 1992. The Alliance to Save Energy. 86 p.30.
Gregory Hats. "Energy Options for Hungary." Energy Policy. November 1991. p. 862.
8'Kats. Bamer, Brown, and Foltansd.
8* Mark Hopkins. Business Opportunities in Eastern Europe for Enemy-Efficient Industrial
Products. January 1992. The Alliance to Save Energy.
69 Hopkins, 21.
"Kats, 864.
^iRats, 863-4.
'2 Kats, 864.
''^
Marousek, 16. Externality analysis ours.
''*
Kats.
^* Since Hungary does not have a uniquely cheap supply of energy, it does not make economic
sense for its industries to be tilted toward energy consumption. TTiis distribution decreases its
overall competitiveness.
' 6 Earner, Brown, and Foltanyi, 9.
'^ Bamer, Brown, and Foltan)d, 11-2.
^^ This capacity figure, along with all the capacity figures in the report, is an overestimate,
because it ignores transmission losses. According to Dr. Robert Pollard of the Union of C!oncerned
Scientists, this inflates the production figure by approximately 5 percent. However, since
some energy demand estimates already account for this figure, and since its calculation opens a
new realm of dispute, these figures were left as overestimates.
^9 Calculated by Darius Lakdawalla, by multiplying cumulative load factor by net capacity in
MW. Based on figures in Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. April 1992. International Atomic
Energy Agency.
80 Kats, 859.
6 1 All conversions from MW to PJ done by Darius Lakdawalla at FOE-US, by first converting
to MWsec (multiply by 31,536,000 sec/yr), then Wsec (10^ WI MW), then using the identity 1 Wl
J/sec. That figure then was converted to PJ (1 PJ = 10'* J). According to Dr. Robert Pollard, the
conversion factor comes out to 1 MWh = 3.6 x 10' 82 J.
Kats, 862.
83 Bamer, Brown, and Foltanyi, 84 7.
Kats 859
85 Kats! 861. Based on a World Bank lending program (from 1983 to 1988) handled by the National
Bank of Hungary and the Energy Supervision Institute.
8 6 Kats. Bamer, Brown, and Foltanyi.
87
IAEA Newsbriefs 7:2. April/May 1992. p.54.
8 8 Calculated by Darius Lakdawalla, using load factor to 1990, and net generating capacity.
Data from Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. April 1992. IAEA. p. 19.
89 Hopkins, 30.

. May
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
..Hopki„.30^ 3 9999 02759 844 8
' ' Calculated by Darius Lakdawalla, FOEMJS. Data on long-term load factor and net generating
capacity from Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. April 1992.
»2Alex Hittle. Memorandum. 28 May 1992. Re: Ecoglasnost Statement on the Kozloduy Nuclear
Power Station.
'3 AID invested in a total of 48 plants throughout Eastern Europe, in the nations of Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
8* Given an initial cost of $77,837, and a total estimated savings per year of $262,598.
9* Hopkins, 19.
9«Seep.ll.
" M. Bafflerger. Power Generation and Transmission in Eastern Europe: The Outlook for Nuclear
Power in Eastern Europe. Conference in Brussels, June 1992. Electricite de France International.
** MW to PJ conversion calculated by Darius Lakdawalla at FOE-US (see note 81).
9* Marousek, 4.
•''°
Hopkins, 28. Honza Bemnek. World Information Service on Energy. Fax dated 30 June
1992.
i°« Marousek, 3.
'°2 According to Emil Bedi (see note 29) the rising cost of energy will make inevitable the
restructuring of industry away from energy-intensive endeavors.
1°^ Separate studies have corroborated these conclusions in large part. According to Emil Bedi
(see note 29) a government study revealed a potential for energy conservation of over 20 percent,
while an independent study by the World Wildlife fund estimated a potential of over 40 percent.
'"* Study calculates amount of energy that would have been saved if efficiency measures had
been in place 'OS in 1991.
Marousek. 6, 13.
'"^ Emil Bedi (see note 29). Paraphrased in electronic mail from John Hontelez, dated 28 June
1992.
>°''
Emil Bedi (see note 29). (Contained in electronic mail message from John Hontelez, dated
28 June, 1992.
'°* Marousek, 15.
109 Marousek, 5.
•'"Mzirousek, 15.
*
'
> Marousek, 13.
"2 R.c. Ckwper and L. Schipper. Energy Use and Conservation in the U.S.S.R.; Patterns, Pros-
.--.^-j e,~-.nce Division, April 1991, p.3.
'•.onomic
Growth in Russia.
rding to C!ooper emd Schip-
Boston Public Library
ansmission losses in nucleires,
but with the capacity
( 3-year Payback. Lawrence
COPLEY b^
GENERAL LI
25 June 1992.
JS: original data were mul-
1991, p.365.
»mjc Growth In Russia. The
OS 21, May 24-31, 1992.
utdown of RBMK Nuclear
The Date Due Card in the pocket indicates
the date on or before which
this book should be returned to the
Library.
Please do not remove cards from this
pocket.
supply but of too much
tie
LJnion should be to decrease
ces extracted.

178
'* Environmental Issues. 11 October, 1991, p.68.
0 Flavin, et al, 10.
**The Cousteau Society. Nuclear Safety and the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant in Bulgaria: Expert's
Report. February, 1992.
*2 Robert D. Pollard. Report on the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plants Units 1-L January 1992.
p.9.
*^Economist. 28 March 1992. p.50.
** Flavin, et al, 14. Strengthening Nuclear Regulation in Russia, 11.
** Mark Hibbs. Nucleonics Week. 14 May 1992. p.2.
** Flavin et al, 11. Nicholas Lenssen. Worldwatch Institute. Phone interview. 25 June 1992.
*''
Strengthening Nuclear Regulation, 10. These incidents, originally reported by Greenpeace,
have now been confirmed by Russian politicians.
** Senator Frank Murkowski. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Hearing
on Nuclear Reactors in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 16 June 1992. Testimony
during the cross-examination of witnesses.
*» Nicholas Lenssen. "Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away." Worldwatch Paper
106. December 1991. Worldwatch Institute. p.l5.
®° Strenghtening Nuclear Regulation, 8.
" WUlis, 14.
5 2 Except where noted, all factual data is taken from Worldwatch Institute (Washington, DC)
Nuclear Power FUes, courtesy of Nicholas Lenssen.
*' Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
** Honza Bemnek. World Information Service on Energy. Fax dated 30 June 1992.
^^Emil Bedi (see note 29). In electronic mail from John Hontelez, dated 28 June 1992.
^^Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
^''Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
^^Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
^^Strengthening Nuclear Regulation.
*" Anatoly Vefflin. "Russia Orders Resumption of its Nuclear Program." Reuters Information
Services. June 2,1992.
* 1 From Kevin McCann, Petroleum Economics, Ltd. Fax dated 22 June 1992.
«2 IAEA Newsbriefs 7:2. April/May 1992. p.54.
®' Bela Bamcr, Ian Brown, and Zsuzsa Foltanyi. Prospects for Enemy and Environment Policy
Interaction in Hungary. Paper for the Conference: Energy and the Environment in European
Economies in Transition. Undated, p. 12.
*• Jaroslav Marousek. Energy-
'
"
June 17-19,1992. p.7-8.
® 5 Mark Hopkins. Business
Products. January 1992. The ^
®8 Gregory Hats. "Energy C
^^Kats. Bamer, Brown, and
** Mark Hopkins. Business
Products. January 1992. The /
69 Hopkins, 21.
'"> Kats, 864.
^'Kats, 863-4.
^2 Kats, 864.
^^ Marousek, 16. Externalit
'* Kats.
' ^ Since Hungary does not 1
sense for its industries to be
overall competitiveness.
'* Earner, Brown, and Folt£
^^ Barner, Brown, and Folts
^* This capacity figure, aloi
because it ignores transmissii
cerned Scientists, this inflates
some energy demand estimate
new realm of dispute, these fij
'9 Calculated by Darius Lak
MW. Based on figures in Nucl
Energy Agency.
80 Kats, 859.
*' All conversions from MW
to MWsec (multiply by 31,536,1
J/sec. That figure then was co
conversion factor comes out to
«2 Kats, 862.
*='
Barner, Brown, and 84 Foltaj
Kajg g59
8 5 Kats! 86l'. Based on a Woi
tional Bank of Hungary and th
8 8 Kats. Barner, Brown, and
8 7 IAEA Newsbriefs 7:2. Apri
88 Calculated by Darius Lak
Data from Nuclear Power Reac
8 9 Hopkins, 30.

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
9999 U^/ 02759 vjy 844 OHH 8O
8 ^ C7^»::7
Hopkins, 30.
'
' Calculated by Darius Lakdawalla, FOE-US. Data on long-term load factor and net generating
capacity from Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. April 1992.
^^Alex Hittle. Memorandum. 28 May 1992. Re: Ecoglasnost Statement on the Kozloduy Nuclear
Power Station.
*3 AID invested in a total of 48 plants throughout Eastern Europe, in the nations of Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
^* Given an initial cost of $77,837, and a total estimated savings per year of $262,598.
9 5 Hopkins, 19.
96Seep.ll.
'^ M. Bafflerger. Power Generation and Transmission in Eastern Europe: The Outlook for Nuclear
Power in Ekistem Europe. Conference in Brussels, June 1992. Electricite de France International.
9* MW to PJ conversion calculated by Darius Lakdawalla at FOE-US (see note 81).
9* Marousek, 4.
'°° Hopkins, 28. Honza Bemnek. World Information Service on Energy. Fax dated 30 June
1992.
i°» Marousek, 3.
'"2 According to Emil Bedi (see note 29) the rising cost of energy will make inevitable the
restructuring of industry away from energy-intensive endeavors.
'0 3 Separate studies have corroborated these conclusions in large part. According to Emil Bedi
(see note 29) a government study revealed a potential for energy conservation of over 20 percent,
while an independent study by the World Wildlife fund estimated a potential of over 40 percent.
'"''
Study calculates amount of energy that would have been saved if efficiency measures had
been in place in 1991.
»05 Marousek. 6, 13.
'"« Emil Bedi (see note 29). Paraphrased in electronic mail from John Hontelez, dated 28 June
1992.
*°^ Emil Bedi (see note 29). Contained in electronic mail message from John Hontelez, dated
28 June, 1992.
108 Marousek, 109 15.
Marousek, 5.
"" Marousek, 15.
>«» Marousek, 13.
* * 2 R.C. Cooper and L. Schipper. Energy Use and Conservation in the U.S.S.R.; Patterns, Prospects,
and Problems. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Applied Science Division, April 1991, p.3.
* * * Cooper and Schipper, 3.
"* Igor Bashmakov. Energy Efficiency: The Future Engine of Economic Growth in Russia.
Moscow:The Moscow Center for Energy Efficiency. May •'* 1992, p.3.
Cooper and Schipper, 12.
"^ Cooper and Schipper, 12.
'" Cooper and Schipper, 26.
*" Cooper and Schipper, 26.
"* Cooper and Schipper, 26.
'2° Cooper and Schipper, 31.
•** Cooper and Schipper, *22 31.
Cooper and Schipper, 33.
'23 Newer appliances in use tend to be more energy-efficient, according to Cooper and Schipper,
23.
'24 CENEF: The Moscow Center for Energy Efficiency. Undated.
'"C^iVEF.
'2« This figure accounts for capacity utilization Goad factor) and transmission losses in nuclear
plants; therefore, it should be compared not with production figures, but with the capacity
figure of 32 GW.
'27 Evan Mills and Arthur Rosenfield. Avoid JfO Chemobyls with a 3-year Payback. Lawrence
Berkeley Labs, Berkeley, CA. March, 31,1992.
'2« Mills and Rosenfield.
129 Mills and Rosenfield.
'30 Mills and Rosenfield.
'3' Current capacity is 32 GW. Nicholas Lenssen. Phone interview. 25 June '32 1992.
Bashmeikov, 5.
'^3 Conversions to MWh performed by Darius Lakdawalla at FOE-US: original data were multiplied
by 1 MW/1 000 kW (which equals 1).
'34 Kevin McCann. Soviet Energy: Crisis or Collapse?. Energy Policy. May 1991, p.365.
'^5 Igor Bashmakov. Energy Efficiency: The Future Engine of Economic Growth In Russia. The
Moscow Center for Energy Efficiency (CENEF). May 1992, p.5.
>*« Andrei Kolesnikov. "Nuclear (Generators Stopped." Moscow News 21, May 24-31, 1992.
•3' Based on costs of $757-$l 177 per kilowatt installed.
'38 Stewart Boyle. Greenpeace Emergency Plan for Immediate Shutdown of RBMK Nuclear
Reactors. Undated. Greenpeace International.
'»» McCann, 365.
'" McCann, 369.
'*' The problem in the Soviet energy sector is not one of too little supply but of too much
demand, relative to econonaic welfare. The goal of the former Soviet Union should be to decrease
energy demand and to minimize the amount of non-renewable resources extracted.
'*2 McCann, 368.
"»3 Bashmakov, p.3.

180
'" See p. 16.
>*« Kevin McCann. "Soviet Energy: Crisis or (Dollapse?" Energy Policy. May 1991. p. 369.
'** Marousek, Appendix 3.
'" Hopkins.
REFERENCES
Barberger, M. Power Generation and Transmission in Eastern Europe: The Outlook
for Nuclear Power in Eastern Europe. Conference in Brussels, June 1992. Electricite
de France International.
Barner, Bela, and Ian Brown. Prospects for Energy and Environment Policy Integration
in Hungary. Paper for the Conference: Energy and the Environment in European
Economies in Transition. Undated.
Bashmakov, Igor. Energy Efficiency: The Future Engine of Economic Growth in
Russia. Moscow: The Moscow Center for Energy Efficiency. May 1992.
Boyle, Stewart. Greenpeace Emergency Plan for Immediate Shutdown of RBMK Nuclear
Reactors. Undated. Greenpeace International.
CENEF: The Moscow Center for Energy Efficiency. Undated.
Cooper, R.C., and L. Schipper. Energy Use and Conservation in the U.S.S.R.; Patterns,
Prospects, and Problems. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Applied Science Division.
April 1991.
Cousteau Society. Kozloduy: An Immediate Nuclear Danger to Europe? Robert D.
Pollard, Union of Concerned Scientists. Raymond Sene, Group of Scientists for
Nuclear Energy Information. February 1992.
Economist. 28 March 1992. p.50.
Environmental Issues. 11 October 1991.
Fisher, Andrew. "Gaping Holes in the Safety Net." Financial Times. 1 April 1992.
Hibbs, Mark. "Siemens Reckons up to $12-Billion Needed from G-7 for Eastern
PWRs." Nucleonics Week. 14 May 1992.
Hirsch, H., et al. Assessment of the Condition of Blocks 1 to 4 of the "Bruno
Leuschner" Nuclear Power Station at Greifswald (German Democratic Republic).
Dravm up on behalf of the Central Round Table in Berlin, May 1990.
Hopkins, Mark. Business Opportunities in Eastern Europe for Energy-Efficient Industrial
Products. January 1992. The Alliance to Save Energy.
Kats, Gregory. Energy Options for Hungary." Energy Policy. November 1991.
Kolesnikov, Andrei. "Nuclear Generators Stopped." Moscow News 21, May 24-
31,1992.
Lenssen, Nicholas. "Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away." Worldwatch
Paper 106. December 1991. Worldwatch Institute.
McCann, Kevin. "Soviet Energy: Crisis or Collapse?" Energy Policy. May 1991.
Marousek, Jaroslav. Energy and Environment: The Path of Coexistence in Czechoslovakia.
June 17-19, 1992. SEVEn, Center for Energy Efficiency, Czechoslovakia.
Mills, Evan, and Arthur Rosenfield. "Avoid 40 Chernobyls with a 3 year Payback."
Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Berkeley, CA. 31 March 1992.
Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. April 1992. International Atomic Energy
Agency. Permanent Monitoring Group on Plant Safety. Control Report No. 13.
November 1988.
Rippon, Simon. "After Five Years,
News. June 1991. pp.49-52.
Uncertainties Remain at Chernobyl." Nuclear
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in
Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview and
Maior Findings of the IAEA Proiect on the Safety of WWER UO Model 230 Nuclear
Power Plants. Undated. International Atomic Energy Agency.
Strengthening Nuclear Regulation in Russia: A Report on the First Workshop on Nuclear
Waste and Safety with the committee on Ecology of the Supreme Soviet of the
Russian Federation. December 15-20,1991; February 3-7, 1992.
Sychrava, Juliet. "Closure of Soviet Reactors Urged." Financial Times. 25 March
1992.
Verbin, Anatoly. "Russia Orders Resumption of its Nuclear Program." Reuters Information
Services. 2 June 1992.
Wald, Matthew. "Ex-Soviets Still Lag in Nuclear Safety, U.S. Finds." New York
Times, 23 April 1992.
Willis, John. Risk Finance: Backfit vs. Shutdown of WER Nuclear Reactors. Greenpeace
International: Amsterdam, 1991.
O

.
'HE LEGACY OF CHORNOBYL
1986 TO 1996 AND BEYOND
Y4.SE 2:104-1-12
Tke Legacy of Chornobyl 1986 to 1?9. .
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 23, 1996
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in
[CSCE 104-1-12]
Europe
^i
'^•j-
'"'-
-'"i'ms/i!-
OCT,s
f99s
U.S.
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
24-782 WASHINGTON : 1996
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053469-0

.
'HE LEGACY OF CHORNOBYL
1986 TO 1996 AND BEYOND
Y 4. SE 2: 104-1-12
Tie Legacy of Chornobyl 1986 to 1??. .
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 23, 1996
Printed for the use of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE 104-1-12]
OCTfg
%
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
24-782 WASmNGTON : 1996
^^
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053469-0

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
HOUSE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Chairman
JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois
FRANK R. WOLF, Vir^nia
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
Legislative Branch Commissioners
SENATE
ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York,
Co-Chairman
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
HARRY REID, Nevada
BOB GRAHAM, Florida
RUSSELL P. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
Executive Branch Commissioners
John SHATTUCK, Department of State
ASHTON Carter, Department of Defense
(Vacant), Department of Commerce
^l
Commission Staff
Dorothy Douglas Taft, Chief of Staff
Mike Hathaway, Deputy Chief of Staff
SamX^IL G. Wise, Director for International Policy
Richard P. Livingston. Senior Advisor
Mike Amitay, Staff Advisor
Maria V. Coll, Office Administrator
OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor
John Finerty, Staff Advisor
Chadwick R. Gore, Communications Director
Robert Hand, Staff Advisor
Janice Helwig, Staff Advisor
MaRLENE KauFMANN, Counsel for International Trade
Sandy List, GPO Liaison
Karen S. Lord, Counsel for Freedom of Religion, Congressional Fellow
Ronald McNamara, Staff Advisor
Michael Ochs, Staff Advisor
Peter Santighian, Staff Assistant /CompuUr SysUms Administrator
Erika Schlager, Counsel for International Law
ai)

CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Opening Statement of Chairman Christopher H. Smith 1
Statement of Serguei Martynov, Ambassador of Belarus to the United States . 3
Statement of Yuri Shcherbak, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States .... 6
Statement of Dr. Murray Feshbach, Professor, Georgetown University; author
of Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet
Regime 9
Statement of Alexander Kuzma, Children of Chomobyl Relief Fund 12
APPENDIX
Full Statement of His Excellency Serguei N. Martynov, Ambassador of the
Republic of Belarus 32
Full Statement of His Excellency Yuri Shcherbak, Ambassador of Ukraine 38
Full Statement of Alexander B. Kuzma, Director of Development, Children
of Chomobyl Relief Fund 65
Full Submission by Dr. Natalia Lakiza-Sachuk and Prof. Serhiy Pyrozhkov,
The National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine, and Prof. Mykola
Omeljanets, Ukrainian Center of Radioactive Medicine, 'Ten Years After
Chomobyl: Socio-demographic Consequences for Ukraine." 73
Page
(III)

THE LEGACY OF CHORNOBYI^1986 TO 1996
AND BEYOND
Tuesday, April 23, 1996
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC.
The Commission convened in room 2154, Rayburn House Office
Building, at 10:00 a.m., Chairman Christopher H. Smith, presiding.
Commissioners present: the Honorable Christopher H. Smith and
the Honorable Frank R. Wolf.
Witnesses present: His Excellency Serguei N. Martynov, Ambassador
of the Republic of Belarus; His Excellency Yuri Shcherbak,
Ambassador of Ukraine; Dr. Murray Feshbach, Professor, Georgetown
University; and Alexander Kuzma, Director of Development,
Children of Chomobyl Relief Fund.
Mr. Smith. The Commission will come to order. Grood morning.
Today's hearing focuses on the medical, environmental, social, political,
and economic aftermath of the Chomobyl nuclear disaster,
the world's worst nuclear accident. This Friday, April 26, marks
the tenth anniversary of one of the most bitter legacies of the Soviet
system. Chomobyl is a legacy that has had tremendous human
costs and will continue to be felt for decades to come, especially in
Ukraine and in Belarus, which bore the brunt of Chornobvl's radioactive
fallout. The explosion of the reactor at Chomobyl released
200 times more radioactivity than was released by the atomic
bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. The physical and
psychological health and welfare of hundreds of millions of people
in the region, in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, including nuclear
clean-up workers, have been harmed by Chomobyl.
To cite just one example, thyroid cancer in children in Belarus
is more than 200 times higher than normal. Several hundred thousand
still live in the surrounding contaminated areas.
The scope of the destruction, and its long-term effects, cannot be
overstated. Chornobyl's deadly fall-out continues. Inadequate decontamination
efforts have failed to eliminate the radiation. The
hurriedly erected concrete covering, the so-called "sarcophagus,"
over the obliterated fourth reactor has developed serious cracks.
Unless concerted efforts are taken to repair it, experts fear that it
will corrode, releasing tons of radioactive dust into the environment.
In addition, there are continuing concerns about radio-nuclide
pollution in the Dnipro River, Ukraine's main river, and the
source of KyiVs drinking water. Because of the latency period for
various radiation-related diseases, the most significant health impact,
regrettably, may be yet to come.
(1)

Ukraine and Belarus, which are undergoing an extremely difficult
period of transition from the devastating effects of 70 years
of communism, are simply not in a position to deal, by themselves,
with what is, ultimately, an international problem. The international
community is beginning to respond, as witnessed by the
December 1995 Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine
and the G-7. This international cooperation is vital. Hopefully,
such cooperation will help prevent future Chomobyls.
For today's hearing, I am very pleased to have this panel of very
distinguished witnesses, including the Ambassadors of the two
countries most aflFected.
Our first witness is Ambassador Serguei Martynov, Ambassador
of Belarus to the United States, since 1993. In 1991, Ambassador
Martynov served as Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Belarus to the United Nations and subsequently became
Belarus' first charge, opening the Belarus Embassy to Washington.
A career diplomat with Belarus' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Ambassador has 12 years' experience in multilateral disarmament
efforts, especially at the United Nations. The Ambassador will discuss
the impact of Chomobyl on Belarus, the country that received
70 percent of the radiation fall-out.
Our second witness. Ambassador Yuri Shcherbak, in addition to
being Ukraine's Ambassador to the United States since 1994, has
a very direct, personal connection to Chornobyl. A physician, epidemiologist,
and writer by profession, Dr. Shcherbak was an eyewitness
to the Chomobyl disaster and exposed official malfeasance
before and after the accident in his documentary novel Chornobyl.
In 1988 he founded and led the Ukrainian Green movement. He
entered politics in 1989 and was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Having never been a member of the Communist Party, he
worked closely with Andrei Sakharov. As Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Safety, he initiated
the first parliamentary investigation of Chomobyl. In 1991 and
1992, the Ambassador served as Ukraine's Minister of Environmental
Protection and, from 1992 to 1994, as Ukraine's first Ambassador
to Israel.
Dr. Murray Feshbach has been a research professor at Georgetown
University since 1981. Prior to Georgetown, he served as
Chief of the USSR Population Branch of the Foreign Demographic
Analysis Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. Dr. Feshbach is the
co-author of "Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under
Siege," published in 1992, and has more recently authored a new
book, "Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the
Soviet Regime," and edited an environmental and health atlas of
Russia. Dr. Feshbach will address Chornobyl's public health and
environmental legacy.
Finally, Alexander Kuzma is an attorney by training and has
been with the New Jersey-based Children of Chomobyl Relief Fund
since 1991. He manages the development of new programs, including
hospital development in Ukraine, and a women's and children's
health care initiative begun in Ukraine recently. Mr. Kuzma served
as Chairman of the Chomobyl Challenge '96 coalition.

—
The Helsinki Commission is very pleased and grateful that all
four of you are here to present your testimony, and Ambassador,
I would ask you to begin, at this point.
Amb. Martynov. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Honorable
Chairman Smith, Honorable Members of the Commission, ladies
and gentlemen. I am profoundly grateful to you, Mr. Chairman,
for the invitation and for the honor to take the floor before
such a distinguished audience, and I am equally indebted to you
for the initiative of holding these important hearings.
For almost 10 years since the explosion of the Chomobyl power
plant, on April 26, 1986, the Republic of Belarus has been exposed
to radioactive contamination. That date split our history, the history
of Belarus, into two epochs, before and after Chomobyl. According
to its scale, the Chomobyl disaster is the biggest
technogenic catastrophe that has ever occurred on this planet. The
United Nations General Assembly resolution estimated the
Chomobyl tragedy as the global radioeconomic catastrophe
radioecological, sorry, catastrophe.
You have rightly indicated, sir, that the effect of the explosion of
Chomobyl is equal to 200 nuclear bombs. The worst results of the
catastrophe are, unfortunately, to be found in my country, Belarus,
as you said, received 70 percent of the total radioactive fall-out. It
is not the first time that great ordeals have fallen on my country.
As you may know, we lost every third citizen in the course of the
Second World War. Now, 50 years later, Chomobyl has placed my
nation, again, on the brink of either extinction or survival. We have
to fight again for the health and for the survival of the nation.
Only 1 percent of the territory of Belarus is standard clean. The
rest is contaminated, to different degrees, from very contaminated
to relatively acceptable, if the word acceptable can be used under
the circumstances. Almost overnight, hundreds of thousands of people
were forced to say good-bye to their native lands, to leave behind
the graves of their ancestors, and to start building their lives
in quite new and unfamiliar areas. The government spends a lot
of resources and effort to try to remedy the consequences of
Chomobyl. In particular, the government has evacuated and resettled
131,000 people from the area worst affected by Chornobyl. We
had to build housing, social infrastructure, provide people jobs,
often in an open country. That has been created specifically for
these people who are, in themselves, a new category of people.
They're ecological refugees.
In spite of this effort of the government, almost two million people
continue to live in the areas which are contaminated in
Belarus. Among these two million people, there are almost 500,000
children under the age of 17, which is most striking and worrisome.
Health problems, indeed, are awesome. Above all, as I said, the
children are the most heavily affected. You have indicated, sir, that
thyroid cancer has risen dramatically. According to different estimates,
from 200 times to 300 times over the normal rate in
Belarus. Apart from the thyroid cancer problem, there are other
health problems with kids. They have a lot of respiratory diseases.
They have general immune system deficiencies. They are prone to
fall sick much more often than they used to be. About 40 percent
of school children which are affected by the radiation showed func-

tional breaches of the cardiovascular system. The general morbidity
in Belarus is increasing. We estimate that malignant neoplasm
rose, on average, by 60 percent in the years after Chornobyl.
One particular grim aspect of the consequences is that the birth
rate in Belarus has been dropping very steadily after Chornobyl.
Abortions, for fear of bearing a deformed or otherwise handicapped
child, are very much on the rise. Coupled with the economic hardships
of the transition period, we are facing what experts call now
negative growth of the population. But simply put, in plain language,
with each passing year, there are less and less Belarusians
on the earth, on the face of this earth.
There is no proven scientific knowledge of what is going to happen
in the coming years, to masses of people who are subjected to
extremely long-term—and I would say life-term—irradiation. The
majority of experts expect a further substantial increase of malignant
tumors, as well as other diseases.
Another frightening realization and truth for us is that we are
going to live with Chornobyl forever. The radioactive situation now
is primarily determined by the presence of the following radionuclides:
cesium-137, with a half-life of 30 years; strontium-90, 29
years; plutonium-239, 25,000 years; plutonium-240, over 6,000
years. To dissipate, an element needs ten half-life periods. So a
simple multiplication act gives a creeping feeling of an adverse
eternity before you, and before the country.
Health problems, Mr. Chairman, are not long. Economic losses
needed for new expenditures and related problems are mind-boggling.
Hundreds and hundreds of enterprises, both industrial and
agricultural, had to be closed down in the contaminated areas,
along with hospitals, schools, infrastructure. Twenty percent of arable
land is taken out of economic use in my country, as a consequence
of Chornobyl. According to the most modest estimate, the
economic damage incurred by Belarus as an immediate result of
the Chornobyl accident is equal to 32 annual budgets of my state.
That is about US$235 billion. Now, 10 years later, the government
is compelled to spend, year in and year out, up to 25 percent of its
annual budget to try to ameliorate the consequences of Chornobyl.
You were right to indicate, sir, that this is an additional and
huge burden on reform in my country, and the pace of that reform.
I hope members of this Congress would agree that we cannot abandon
hundreds of thousands of helpless people out there in the radioactive
cold to face the beast of Chornobyl all alone. The government
has to help them.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we were left alone
with this disaster. The nuclear power plant in Chornobyl was not
built by us. It was not serviced by us. We did not have any influence
on the processes taking place. The state that did it is gone by
now.
The consequences of the catastrophe coincided with economic crisis
and with the destruction of the very fabric of former life. This
is why, apart from purely health and economic problems, we have
to resolve a multitude of social and economic problems. We have
to construct a new Belarusian state, while doing everything, at the
same time, in order to minimize, to the extent possible, the consequences
of Chornobyl. It is extremely difficult for not only

and its
Belarus but any single country to cope with it, taking into account
the global character of the disaster.
The grim Chornobyl picture makes us recall the chilling prophecy
to be found in the Revelations. I will quote. "And a gray star fell
from the sky, on a third of the rivers. The name of the star is
Wormwood. A third of the waters turned bitter, and many people
died from the waters that had become bitter." Wormwood translates,
in Belarusian and in Ukrainian languages, as Chornobyl. A
Revelation prophecy come true is now a frightful reality for the
peoples of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and for people of the whole
world.
So this is a tragic lesson, which, as never before, brought us, citizens
of our planet, closer to each other, and makes us think over
shall we survive another unforeseeable mistake in a nuclear plant
design, or an operator's mistake at such a plant? Can we, as a
world community, afford ignoring the worst case scenarios? Do we
have enough knowledge to prevent future catastrophes? Do we
have enough statesmanship to rise above other considerations and
face the challenges of the after-Chornobyl epoch?
Belarus, as I indicated, does all it can, and more than that, to
mitigate the consequences of Chomobvl. We try also to provide the
international community with a sizable scientific contribution for
that purpose. But, again, the scale of the catastrophe and the consequences
defies capabilities of any single country.
In our view, the 10 years since the explosion at the Chornobyl
power station showed that the international community is not
quite up to the Chornobyl test. New and vigorous international cooperation
is badly needed in the following three areas.
First, we have to recognize that the plight of Chornobyl victims
in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia still demands meaningful assistance
to relieve their suffering. What is needed here is humanitarian
help, medical help, in terms of high quality equipment, especially
in early diagnosis of treatment, and modern and effective
medicine.
Second, we need to increase scientific knowledge of the disaster
consequences. We need to precisely identify scientific guidelines
to try to cope with that. The area of scientific cooperation is,
in our view, an extremely important area where we should pool together
our efforts, including on multilateral and bilateral levels.
Belarus here proceeds from the principle of free and guaranteed access
to the information on the consequences of the catastrophe. We
are investing a very important part of our research potential in
studying the effects of Chornobyl. We have a lot to share with the
world, and we are ready to do that, but we need help also.
Under the same second heading, so to say, of cooperation, we
need also cooperation to create technologies for rehabilitation of
contaminated lands, as well as technologies allowing for producing
safe foods in a contaminated environment. This is especially important
for us, because that would allow us to gradually return the affected
territories, which are large, to full and viable life. If we let
the time pass, if we fail to create acceptable conditions for life in
these areas, then a whole zone in the geographic center of Europe,
the size of several small European countries put together, will be
doomed to social, demographic, and economic degradation.

Third, we need to identify the most rational applications of international
intellectual efforts and material means. For that purpose,
Belarus has recently submitted to an international conference in
Vienna several proposals. I will just briefly enumerate them:
To set up a joint scientific, interstate center, to coordinate efforts
of the scientists, to make them more efficient.
To arrange finances for Chornobyl projects on some basis, and to
study for that purpose a proposal to set up a fund of the planet protection,
which could accumulate part of the profits of nuclear machine-building,
and power engineering industries.
Third, we need to create a viable and enforceable international
legal framework of the responsibility of states for causing nuclear
damage to other countries, which would specify proper guarantees
and compensations.
Belarus also considers that the disproportionate share of
Chomobyl's sacrifice and damage which we had to sustain, warrants
international contribution to sustainable social, economic and
environmental, and development of the Republic of Belarus and reform
in Belarus.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I will say that, for us, this tragedy
10 years ago has a clear beginning. But, unfortunately, we don't
see any foreseeable end. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, and I appreciate
your very sobering and wise counsel to the Commission. Considering
the fact that you have attempted to take these efforts to
every responsible body, including our friends in Europe, your recommendations
will not fall on deaf ears.
Mr. Wolf, a commissioner who's a member of the Appropriations
Committee and very active on human rights and child humanitarian
causes, myself, and others will do what we can to take your
recommendations and give them additional push and boost from
the Congress.
I do thank you for that very fine statement. Let me also point
out that, when you quote Scripture and the Book of Revelation, it
reminds me of something that Joseph Terelia has said. I've read
his book, and I've met him in the past. As a matter of fact, Terelia
appeared before this Commission, back in the 1980s, and talked
about Chornobyl and, quoting from the Book of Revelation, used
the Wormwood explanation just as you did. Yours is a very sobering
assessment.
Mr. Wolf, Commissioner Wolf, do you have any opening statement?
(No audible response.)
OK Mr. Ambassador?
Amb. Shcherbak. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Distinguished
Chairman, Congjressman Smith, ladies and gentlemen.
First of all, let me thank you for the great honor to be here this
morning at a congpressional hearing on the Chornobyl disaster.
In the first days of 1986, I voluntarily went to the Chornobyl
area as a doctor of medicine and writer, and began to collect testimonies
of people involved in the Chornobj^l case. Thus, I am testifying
before you today not only as an official representative of tne
Ukrainian Government, but also as an evewitness who realized
that the Chornobyl disaster was an event of a global scale.

Over 10 years after the events, I continued to study the
Chomobyl catastrophe, its causes, and effects. By the totaHty of its
consequences, the accident at the Chomobyl nuclear power plant in
1986 is the largest modem disaster, a national calamity which
radically changed the destinies of millions of people living on vast
territories. This catastrophe has brought the former Soviet Union
and the world community at large to recognize the necessity of
solving new and extremely complex, comprehensive, and unprecedented
problems, dealing practically with all spheres of life— political
and social systems, economy, industrial development, and the
state of science and technology, legal norms and laws, culture, and
morals.
Chomobyl was not simply another disaster of the sort humankind
has experienced throughout history, like fire or an earthquake
or a flood. It is a global environmental event of a new kind which
is characterized by the presence of dozens of thousands of environmental
refugees, long-term contamination of land, water and air,
and possibly irreparable damage to ecosystems. The regions affected
include not only Ukraine itself, but also Belarus, Russia,
Georgia, Poland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Great Britain,
France, Switzerland, and others. By mid-August of 1996 in
Ukraine, there were over 90,000 people from 81 settlements evacuated.
From 1990 to 1995, due to the dangerous radiation conditions,
52,000 citizens of Ukraine were resettled. According to the
latest data, as a result of the accident, there were contaminated
50.5 thousand square kilometers of the territory of Ukraine, with
the population of 2.6 million in 2,218 settlements.
Needless to say, Chomobyl also brought considerable social, economic,
psychological, medical, and other consequences. The longterm
consequences are grave and cause great tension in the work
of state agencies and medical services of Ukraine. For example,
5,000 people have lost the ability to work. The sickness of 30,000
liquidators is officially attributed to the aftermath of the catastrophe.
According to different sources, including the Ministry of
Health and NGOs, 20,000 to 30,000 people died as a result of the
accident. The population mortality in the most affected region increased
by 15.7 percent, compared to the pre-accident period.
The unprecedented measures taken in 1986-1987 for overcoming
Chomobyl's effects required, even according to very unreliable, low
figures, the sum of over $10 billion, and indirect costs were $25 billion.
Over recent years, the new, independent Ukrainian state had
to spend over three billion more to solve post-Chornobyl problems.
This sum considerably, by five times, exceeds the budget expenses
for health care, culture, and public education. Every year, Ukraine
spends 12 percent of its state budget on Chomobyl problems. More
detailed statistical data on Chomobyl's effects can be found in my
written testimony.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, on Saturday, April 20, 1996, the G-
7 Summit took place in Moscow, with the participation of Russian
President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.
Here, I would like to express my gratitude for the U.S. support of
the idea to invite the President of Ukraine to participate in this
meeting.

8
President Kuchma has confirmed the political decision of
Ukraine to shut down the Chomobyl NPP by the year 2000 under
the condition of adequate and timely financial and technical assistance
by Gr-7 countries. The President has drawn the attention of
the Gr-7 leaders to the necessity of combined efforts to upgrade the
shelter, "sarcophagus," safety, and rehabilitation of contaminated
territories. He nighly appreciated the Memorandum of Understanding,
signed last December, between Ukraine, G-7, and the European
Commission, stressing at the same time that the MOU does
not envisage clear financial obligations of the Western side.
Up to this time, Ukraine has been promised, not in the form of
legal documents yet, $2.6 billion in credit lines and $512 million in
gprants. In this connection, President Kuchma proposed to G-7 leaders
to conclude a legally binding agreement which will clearly define
the conditions, sources, and time-frame for the fund's provisions.
Without that, he stressed, Ukraine cannot take the obligation
and the responsibility for the plant decommissioning, while
having to keep proper nuclear safety standards.
It must be stressed, once again, that the issue of decommissioning
the Chomobyl NPP is directly related to the national security
of Ukraine and its independence. As you know, Ukraine is experiencing
a severe energy crisis. At this time, it is capable of covering
only 10 percent to 15 percent of its needs by its own production of
oil and gas. Various nuclear power plants produce up to 40 percent
of energy, with the Chornobyl NPP accounting for 7 percent of all
electricity generated in the country. Therefore, the problem of the
plant's shutdown is directly connected with the restructuring of
Ukraine's energy sector and introducing new facilities, which could
compensate for energy losses.
The U.S. role in G-7 decisions is highly appreciated by us. Furthermore,
on a bilateral basis, out of $225 million allocated by the
U.S. Congress to the USAID, for the fiscal year 1996, $50 million
to $70 million is to be used for energy sector and nuclear safety
problems, including $3 million allocated for the establishment of
the International Safety and Environmental Research and Development
Center, and $2.5 million for fire safety measures at the
plant's unit No. 3. The U.S. Government also provided $10 million
to the G-7 nuclear safety accounts for the projects in support of the
Chomobyl closure agreement.
Still, I want to say, frankly, that we consider such assistance for
Chomobyl-related problems insufficient.
First and foremost, we need help in making up a plan for
Ukraine's energy independence, energy saving, and efficiency, creating
our own nuclear fuel cycle with the participation of Westinghouse
Company, enhanced cooperation in the sphere of radiation
safety, personnel training, and so on.
We are ready to continue work with our U.S. colleagues for implementation
of these plans. Dear friends, Chornobyl is not only
the case for Ukraine. It is a warning to mankind at large.
Chomobyl must teach the nations of the world the dreadful lesson
of preparedness, if we are to rely on super-powerful and
hyperdangerous nuclear technology. Ten years ago, we entered a
new Chomobyl era, and we have yet to comprehend all its consequences.
Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Dr.
Feshbach?
Dr. Feshbach. Yes. I would Hke to thank the Chairman and, of
course, the members of the Commission for inviting me to speak on
this very important topic. I do not intend to read, but to highhght
some of the points from the written testimony, which I've given you
already.
One of the major questions about the Chornobyl accident is how
much radioactivity was there, and how widespread was the impact
on the Chornobyl area.
To take the latter issue first, we were first told, after a few days
of delay, that there were two oblasts—roughly equivalent to our
states—impacted by radioactivity in Russia, two in Ukraine, and
one in Belarus. We now know that the number of oblasts affected
is 18 in Russia, 11 in Ukraine, and six in Belarus.
So there was a much greater spread than previously announced,
though the key question is how much more than one curie per
square kilometer was there? Where is it 40 curies per square kilometer?
That is, of course, a much more serious level.
In northern Ukraine, southern Belarus, and parts of Bryansk
Oblast in Russia, the figure is
40 curies per square kilometer. The
total amount of curies released, the radioactivity, for a long time
was 50 million curies. Then, it became perhaps 80 million. Then,
occasionally, from officially released data it became 90 million.
Now, the current best estimates are around 150 to 200 million, or
possibly more. If this last figure is the actual amount, the longterm
impact or health consequences of the Chornobyl event may be
much greater.
Just to place it in context. Three Mile Island released a grand
total of 15 curies from beyond the containment structure itself.
It could have been much worse had there been no containment
structure, which the RBMK type reactors in the former Soviet
Union do not have to this day.
This brings me to another major concern: how many people were
involved in containment and clean-up efforts. Again, the official figure,
in the early phase, was around 300,000 so-called liquidators,
or clean-up personnel. It was never clear exactly who was included
in that figure. It later became 660,000. Now, the actual number appears
to be about 800,000 involved in the clean-up efforts. Although,
how 800,000 could have been there without getting in each
other's way, even though some actually participated only for a few
seconds—is a puzzle to me!
Regardless of the actual number, many of the clean-up personnel
did not have protective clothing, and then many of them had to
pick up hot particles, using just their bare hands. Now, we're beginning
to see some of the consequences.
To jump ahead a little bit, on a recent trip to Moscow, one of the
leading pulmonologists of the former Soviet Union, and also now,
especially in Russia, one who publishes internationally, has told me
that they are beginning to see a major increase among clean-up
personnel of lung cancer, probably due to plutonium aerosols in
their lungs that were breathed in 10 years ago during this cleanup
effort.

10
Now, if you apply the 30 percent to the 300,000, to 600,000, or
to 800,000 liquidators, you get very different results.
Now, of course, with lung cancer, one always has the problem of
the issue of smoking as a co-factor. But everybody smokes there,
so the question is the incremental addition to that, because there's
a law of equal smoking, which is the way I think of it. So you look
just for the differentials. In this case, we may begin to see many
more cases, and, apparently, there is some evidence that the cases
are increasing.
In addition to lung cancer, there is the issue of thyroid cancer.
Now thyroid cancer, particularly among children, who being younger
have a smaller thyroid, compared to adults, will be susceptible
to even a non-lethal amount of dose of radiation, in this case, of
iodinelSl, which was the initial nuclide released from the accident
site.
If the normal rate per million children, 014, is just one case,
we're now seeing evidence of it being 80 to 100 cases per million
in both Belarus and Ukraine. To make one comparison. In France,
for the last 42 years—40 years, there were 72 cases recorded. In
Belarus, during the last 2 years there were 74 cases. So, there is
a 20 times higher rate in Belarus adjusting for the same number
of years/cases, so that the impact is just devastating. That's only
what we have seen so far.
The Minister of Health of Belarus invited an independent team
from the World Health Organization, What was important about
this was that it was not the initial evaluation that much of the
health consequences were overstated or exaggerated by the people
of this region, which was, of course, quite understandable. But,
when the International Atomic Energy Agency went in, in 1989,
they only had 2 years of data, and then they didn't have all of the
data. This being the case, many thought that the consequences
were exaggerated by the local medical personnel, local institutions,
and local physicians.
It now turns out that only new thyroid cancer is beginning to
show up, as we expected it might, compared to the events in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, of 7 to 10 years later. This is why we're now
seeing these events.
The initial evaluation of this illness was not made at the right
time to make the evaluation, no matter how very capable the radiation
medicine people, the health physicists, and epidemiologists
who came in from outside.
We also have to take into account the possibility of bad
diagnostics, as well as the lack of iodine salts in the region, leading
to endemic goiter as a pre-cancerous condition.
That may have been reasonable, if the increase was about ten
times. But the increase is about 30 or more times. It's way beyond
normal—normal being improvement of the diagnostics about the
correct treatment, et cetera, among the young children. It is now
pretty well confirmed that there's a real, major increase in the
health problem. But another jump is expected again, around the
year 2005 to 2010. Currently we have, in Belarus, about 400 cases
among children
to 14. In Ukraine, there are about 200 cases, and,
in Russia, about 80 cases. Of course there are cases of thyroid cancer
among adults, which one has to take into account as well.

—
11
If you look at standardized rates by age group, for all ages, in
Gomel Oblasts, in Belarus, thyroid cancer rates are about four
times the rate they were in the 7 years prior to and after the event.
I have tried to standardize by age group, to keep it an equal comparison.
Thus, there has been a real increase.
In terms of leukemia, there has been very little, according to
published accounts. In part, that's because the USSR Ministry of
Health ordered physicians not to record it as chronic radiation sickness,
or acute radiation, in the immediate period. Therefore, much
of the leukemia was classified as something else, because physicians
were not allowed to diagnose it as radiation sickness.
However, we're now going to begin to see, I believe, a large increase.
We're seeing it, for example, from the Center of Radiation
Medicine in Kyiv, which has reported a large increase in cases of
leukemia among those aged 65 years of age and older. Thus, it is
not just among the younger people, unless they're just among the
so-called liquidators, or among the children.
There was some exaggeration, however, when it was claimed by
one physician that one out of every three persons in the republic
whether it be Belarus, Ukraine, it makes no difference—had leukemia.
Well, that's clearly just too much. But there is, undoubtedly,
many more cases of leukemia than we're aware of, because I think
they re hiding it under another coding of the classification of diseases.
It really has no meaning. But, within that, clearly is leukemia.
So we have to do more research.
Now, with lung cancer, as I indicated, we should see a major increase,
over and above the "normal" rate of lung cancer, some of
which is probably associated with cigarette smoking. But another
cause is pollution within the republics or countries, as the case
may be.
In addition, a friend of mine brought to me evidence from Philadelphia,
literally Philadelphia, where a lot of former Ukrainian
some of whom have black teeth. The
Jewish emigres have settled,
teeth look black, not from lack of cleaning, but undoubtedly from
the enamel being affected by radiation. This is just a classic case,
which is not normally seen, certainly, in the country, but you have
to look for evidence like this to determine that there was something
special about what happened.
The Israelis probably have a lot more information about which
one should inquire. But one source tells me that 40 percent or more
of recent emigres had enlarged nodules on their thyroid glands.
Among the children who came to the country as part of the immigration
from this region were low vitamin levels and high numbers
of endocrine diseases. This, of course, was differentiated between
those that came from contaminated and non-contaminated areas.
Now, to cut it a little bit shorter, one has to deal also with the
official statements versus all the other evidence. For example,
there is a Dr. Ilyin, who is a gentleman who represents the classified
section of the prior medical establishment. He says that the
Chornobyl sarcophagus is
totally secure—no cracks, or no holes in
it, or anything like that, totally contradictory to all other evidence.
He wrote in a brand-new article. Well, it just is mind-boggling in
many ways.

12
In another case, however, now he's also saying there's been some
increase in infant mortality in the area. This is a major concession
from him, without giving specific data, but just making that statement.
So maybe the evidence is building up, even for people like
Ilyin and others, that they will have to recognize that there have
been excessive consequences from the Chomobyl event.
One last thing that they indicated needs to be monitored is the
long-term, low-doses of radiation. We really don't know in this
country, that country, or any other country, what the health consequences
will be of that, so it needs to be examined for the future.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Feshbach, thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Kuzma?
Mr. Kuzma. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members
of the Commission, on behalf of the coalition, Chomobyl Challenge
'96 and the Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund, I'd like to
thank you for the opportunity to address this Commission on the
aftermath of Chomobyl.
Since 1990, our foundation has been heavily involved in providing
direct relief to the affected region. We've now completed 16 airlifts,
and numerous smaller shipments, providing about US$38 million
worth of humanitarian assistance.
We're also heavily involved in long-term hospital partnerships,
designed to upgrade the quality of care at pediatric centers which
specialize in the treatment of children with cancer and other radiation-induced
illnesses.
In the course of our relief missions, we've become quite familiar
with a wide range of health problems, which have been on the rise
since 1986; and we have been concerned about the lack of attention
that some of these problems have received.
The sharp increase in thyroid cancer has been well-documented
and discussed by the prior speakers. But these statistics of 288
cases in Ukraine, close to 400 cases in Belarus, really need to be
considered as just the tip of the iceberg. The highest incidence of
cancer usually occurs, as Professor Feshbach says, between 10 to
20 years after exposure, and there are thousands of children who
are suffering from enlarged thyroids and other conditions which indicate
that they are at risk for cancer in the future.
The members of the Commission might remember that, in last
week's Washington Post, there was a case cited of the village of
Narodichi, in the Zhytomyr district, where actually a quarter of the
children, about 466 out of 2100 children, are suffering from various
thyroid disorders that are a very alarming sign of problems to
come.
Even more troubling are the overall demographic trends, in both
Belarus and Ukraine. According to the U.N. Office of Population,
the two nations which suffered the greatest amount of fallout from
Chomobyl are also the two nations which are suffering the biggest
decline in population over the last few years.
We simply find it difficult to believe that this is a matter of coincidence.
Traditionally, Ukrainians have prided themselves on large
families and healthy children. Yet, in 1992, there were 40,000 more
deaths than live births throughout Ukraine. This ratio has declined
steadily so that, in 1995, there were 174,000 more deaths than live

13
births. We find it difficult to believe that economic hardships alone
can account for this dramatic decline.
The Boston Globe reported, in January of this year, that infertility
among Ukrainian males is now the highest in the world. The
New York Times reports that life expectancy among Russian men
has dropped by 10 years since Chornobyl. Today, infant mortality
in Ukraine stands at twice the European average, 14.3 deaths per
thousand live births.
Recent studies by the Ukrainian Ministry of Health, its Office of
Children's and Maternal Health, have shown that pre-natal and
post-partum complications have increased much more sharply in
regions which were contaminated by fallout from Chornobyl, as opposed
to areas that were non-contaminated.
Two weeks ago, at a conference at Yale University, physicians
from Ukraine and Belarus, Dr. Anna Petrova and Dr. Olesya
Hulchy, presented startlingly similar results from epidemiological
studies on women's reproductive health.
Several patterns emerged. First, anemia among pregnant women
has risen to alarming levels, over 60 percent in regions affected by
radiation, roughly in the one to five curies per square kilometer
range. Anemia is only one of the factors which greatly reduces the
ability of mothers to deliver healthy babies. Hypoxia and increases
in other normally rare conditions have also had a severe effect on
survival rates of newborns and young mothers.
A study is currently underway, under the supervision of the University
of Illinois School of Public Health, conducted by Dr. Daniel
Hryhorczuk, which is tracking more than 15,000 mothers and children
in six provinces in Ukraine, to determine the effect of economic
and environmental factors on maternal and children's
health.
This study has received really modest funding from the Soros
Foundation and the World Health Organization, yet has made
much more substantial progress than many studies which have received
far greater financial support form Western agencies.
For some time now, we've been receiving persistent reports from
our Ukrainian partners and colleagues that the rate in birth defects
has doubled in areas closest to the evacuated regions. This
has been the case both in Belarus and Ukraine.
These reports have been routinely dismissed by Western health
officials, and yet a team of Japanese experts, from the University
of Hiroshima, in 1994, studied more than 30,000 autopsies, fetuses,
and newborns in contaminated areas of Belarus.
Their findings were reported by UPI and the Kyodo News Service,
but received scant attention in Western news publications. The
Japanese team did observe nearly twice as many birth defects as
would normally be expected, and these were a wide range of problems:
severe cleft palates, missing digits, extra digits, malformations
of critical organs. These have all been reported with greater
frequency since Chornobyl.
In other areas, where the levels of contamination are higher, between
five to ten curies per square kilometer, the rate of birth defects
has actually risen eight-fold.
I personally have had an opportunity to see some of the children
and the newborns in the neonatal wards in Kyiv and Luhansk, and

14
we've been struck by the strangeness of many of the defects that
we've witnessed there. These are defects that we've never encountered
in American neonatal wards, even in some of our urban areas
and industrial areas, where one might expect to find some of these
kinds of severe defects.
Dr. Valery Kuznetsov, the Director of the Neonatal Division at
the Institute of Pediatrics in Kyiv, has noted that, since Chornobyl,
the number of birth defects has increased, but, also, that the number
of children with multiple defects has also increased noticeably.
Arguably, these are anecdotal reports, but they deserve much
broader follow-up.
Many Western scientists, particularly those involved with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, have been eager to dismiss
widespread reports of these problems by ascribing them to
radiophobia, a supposedly unfounded fear of radiation and psychological
stress. Without even looking at the population in question,
some researchers have adopted the posture of the Soviet government
in the early days following the accident, accusing the Western
media of exaggerating the problems.
We, and a lot of our colleagues in Ukraine, really find this stereotype
of hypochondria quite offensive. That is largely because, as the
Ambassador of Belarus mentioned, these are both countries that
have undergone a really staggering history of oppression and suffering,
and, if anything, have shown a great deal of resilience and
political maturity in the process of achieving their independence.
The kind of bias which had been expressed by many of the health
researchers from the West really is antithetical to the principles of
scientific inquiry. The experience with thyroid cancer, in which
many of these early reports were just dismissed out of hand, really
needs to be examined. Now that the link between Chornobyl's fallout
and thyroid cancer has been conclusively established, we believe
that the scientific community needs to assume a more openended,
open-minded posture toward other health concerns expressed
by Ukrainian and Belarusian physicians.
In 1992, when the president of our foundation and other health
experts testified on the Chornobyl aftermath before the Senate
Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety, there were grave concerns expressed
about the lack of research focusing on the highest-risk population,
that is, the clean-up workers and the families which were
evacuated from some of the most highly contaminated zones. Regrettably,
there still has been very little progress in studies of
these critical populations. We still do not really know the number
of casualties among the clean-up workers, most of them men in
their twenties and thirties, at the time of the accident. We still do
not know the leukemia cancer rates among, for instance, the 11,000
Ukrainian children who were brought to Cuba in the days of the
former Soviet Union for treatment.
We believe that there are several large clusters of Chornobyl
evacuees living in the cities of Kharkiv and Kyiv, and other settlements
around Kyiv and Minsk, who would be easily accessible and
of prime interest for long-term health studies. We're mystified as
to why more effort has not gone into studying their condition.
Regardless of the continuing debate over Chornobyl's ultimate
health impact, the Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund and our col-

15
leagues have made a long-term commitment to upgrade the quality
of care in these pediatric institutions. We're proud of CCRPs role
as a leading PVO. At the same time, we recognize that there are
many other groups which are also making vital contributions to
this international relief effort.
Among these, we're proud to be associated with groups such as
the Catholic Medical Mission Board, the Cherkassy Diabetes
Project, the Kharkiv-Cincinnati Sister Cities Program, the Ukrainian
National Women's League of America, Thoughts of Faith, Share
the Dream, and many others.
In Belarus, we've long admired the success of some of our counterparts.
In particular, the Citihope organization and the Ramapo
High School organization. Despite the progress we've made, our
board and our volunteers are painfully aware of the grim realities
that Ukraine and Belarus face. We're humbled by the enormity of
the task that lies ahead.
Hospital development is one of our key priorities, and we feel
that, as Western companies expand their investment in the former
Soviet Union, they need to be encouraged to apply the principles
of community involvement and good corporate citizenship, which
have become standard in the United States.
Community health programs can build trust and solidarity between
American businesses and government agencies and East European
partners. A wonderful example of some of this type of activity
has been a women and children's health initiative initiated by
the Monsanto Company, which has launched programs in three
rural provinces in Ukraine.
The program offers pre-natal screening, nutrition, and immunization
programs to help reduce infant mortality in regions which
have been heavily affected by environmental degradation and infectious
disease.
The Chornobyl disaster remains one of the most profound and
pivotal events in East European history. We should not and cannot
afford to minimize its impact, or to turn our backs on the victims.
We believe, based on our experience, that the people of the United
States can build very powerful relationships with the people of
Ukraine, Belarus, and western Russia, by addressing the issue of
Chornobyl head on.
We think that our government can enhance its stature as a compassionate
world leader by providing continued funding for health
programs in the CIS. Given the likelihood that health effects in
Chornobyl will intensify over the next 10 years, USAID and other
agencies should continue to provide funding for health programs in
IJkraine and Belarus beyond the current 1998 cutoff date.
Chornobyl is a unique disaster, and it requires unique approaches.
But, as a nation, we believe that the United States has
a great deal of expertise, and technology, and compassion to offer.
We should not be afraid to tap our generosity of spirit. The children
of Chornobyl share a legacy with all the children of the nuclear
age, and their future should be of concern to every society in
every corner of the world. Thank you.
Mr, Smith. Mr, Kuzma, thank you very much for your work, and
for your very fine words at this hearing. We appreciate it, and we

16
will do what we can to try to alleviate some of the suffering. I'd
like to yield to Commissioner Wolf.
Mr. Wolf. I have to leave, in fact, as I have an 11 o'clock that
I'm late for. But I didn't want to leave until I could thank you. I
think I want to commend Mr. Smith for having the hearing, and
I was overwhelmed. The enormity of the task—the phrase that I
wrote down, is so overwhelming.
I have been following this in the newspaper, and reading about
it, but I think it's just unbelievable. The profound event in Eastern
Europe. A profound event, really, in the entire world. Because I'm
sure you can study the impact. It has probably hit Moldova. It has
probably hit Romania. It has probably hit Germany, even, in ways
that we re not even seeing.
But, for the people of Belarus and Ukraine, it's unbelievable. So
don't take my leaving as any indication of my lack of interest.
These appointments have been scheduled. But I just want you to
know we'll try to work with Mr. Smith, and I've been impressed.
I would say to the gentlemen both from Belarus and also from
Ukraine, I think it's important—and I'm not sure what I'm trying
to say.
I think I know what I'm saying, and I hope it comes out well.
I think, in the relationship between the United States and the
former Soviet Union and Russia, I think you really want to be a
little careful.
I noticed that Belarus has made a special effort. You seem to be
rejoining Russia, for whatever reasons, and I don't want to get into
them now. But I think you should be careful, with regard to what
direction you look. I know your economy is tied into their economy,
but I don t sense there's going to be a lot of resources coming from
that end.
As Mr. Kuchma said, not only the American people, but the West
are very interested in this, and I sense would be interested in following
through. But I think, sometimes, political decisions unfortunately
have ramifications on the results that take place afterward.
I mean that in a very positive way. They ought not to, but the end
result is that they do.
So my profound appreciation for both of you, and for the other
two, for your testimony, and the burden that your countries have
to carry with this is just more than I really realized what it was.
I wish that more members could have heard the four of you testifying,
and, with Mr. Smith's leadership, hopefully this will get out
more. I don't know if there are many members of the press covering
this. It doesn't look like there really are a lot. But this is a very
important issue for the entire world. So, again, I apologize for leaving,
but I really want to thank all four of you. I have read, as you
were testifying, all four of the testimonies, and I just want to thank
you very much.
(Applause.)
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Wolf. Ambassador Shcherbak, last
December, as you pointed out, Ukraine and the G-7 signed a
aid pack-
Memorandum of Understanding agreeing on a financial
age to help Ukraine close down Chornobyl by the year 2000.
How would you assess the international assistance efforts with
respect to Chornobyl since 1986, and especially now, given the G-

17
7's commitment? Of the assistance that has been pledged, how
much has actually been provided?
Amb. Shcherbak. As you know, Mr. Chairman, Ukraine signed
the Memorandum of Understanding with the Gr-7 countries only
last December, Now, we have no reliable financial mechanism for
shutting down the Chomobyl plant.
Our President Kuchma, at the G-7 Summit in Moscow, raised
the proposal to sign a special agreement between Ukraine and Gr-
7 countries, which will provide special mechanisms for financial,
technical assistance for shutting down the Chomobyl plant.
As you know, there are four problems which are connected to this
shutdown of the Chornobyl plant.
First of all, there is the problem of electricity compensation. We
will lose 7 percent of the electricity—because of the energy crisis
in Ukraine. We are under very severe conditions now. This winter,
Mr. Chairman, was extremely severe, like the winter of 1941. Temperatures
were below zero, minus 20 degrees Celsius. Our energy
system worked on the verge of destruction. It was a very bad experience
this year.
First of all, we need compensation of our capacities for electricity.
Second, problems of the sarcophagus shelter. Construction of a
new sarcophagus is estimated at $2 billion. Now, Ukraine signed
agreements with Russian and French companies—we got first
money from the European Union for the project, for this new shelter.
We hope that it will be very effective aid for our country.
The third problem is radioactive waste. There are 800 "wild"
storages on the territory of the Chornobyl zone. Solid and liquid
waste is radioactive, at high radioactivity. It's very dangerous, not
only for Ukraine and Belarus, but for all of Europe, and also it's
a problem connected with shutting down the Chornobyl plant.
The fourth problem is the social impact of shutting down
Chomobyl, because, as you know, there's a new city called
Slavutich. There are 26,000 citizens in this city, and 6,000 workers
who need new jobs. It's a big problem for the Ukrainian (government.
That is why we raise the problem of reliable and adequate
aid from G-7 countries.
I believe that, after the meeting of our President with the President
of France, Jacques Chirac, we have more of an understanding
between the Gr-7, and we hope that this problem will be solved this
year.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, you periodically hear reports of accidents
that happen at Chornobyl, like reactors throughout
Ukraine.
Can you provide the Commission with the number of nuclear facilities
that are in operation in Ukraine, and what is their status
in terms of safety?
Amb. Shcherbak. Well, in Ukraine we have five nuclear plants,
14 nuclear reactors. But only two reactors are the RBMK type, the
type of unit No. 4 which exploded. There are 15 units of the old
type RBMK—the unreliable type, as you know, in the territory of
the former Soviet Union. In Lithuania, at the Ignalina nuclear
plant, there are two units. There are some in Russia, in St. Petersburg,
in Kursk, Smolensk, and other Russian plants.

18
I believe that the problem is more complex than only shutting
down the Ukrainian Chornobyl plant. It has to be solved as a comprehensive
problem, for all non-reliable units in the territory of the
former Soviet Union.
Mr. Smith. Is there more that the United States could be doing
to help Ukraine with regards to those risky reactors?
Amb. Shcherbak. Risky? Yes, sir. Absolutely. We got aid, technical
aid, from the United States for new types of reactors, WER,
for training personnel. Now, also, we had talks with the American
Commission for Nuclear Safety for more efforts in this direction.
Also, we want to create or have special fuel cycles for our nuclear
plants, with participation of American companies.
Mr. Smith. If you could be so kind to provide the Commission
with a list of humanitarian issues that need to be addressed.
Amb. Shcherbak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith, Especially specific things that the Congress could do.
You know, the executive branch obviously takes the lead in foreign
policy, but we are the purse-strings. Just by wav of background, I
also serve as Chairman of the International Operations and
Human Rights Subcommittee.
Amb. Shcherbak. Yes.
Mr. Smith. And, very often, we will work very cooperatively and
sometimes over and above what the Administration will want to do
in a given situation. So, if we have a clear assessment of what
needs to be done, I will give you my word that I will try to energize
this Congress to be much more proactive with regards to
Chornobyl, and not just leave it to the executive branch to take the
initiative. So, if you could provide that for us, I think it would be
very helpful.
Amb. Shcherbak. We can give you a list of our needs. Let me
say that we really appreciate humanitarian aid by the American
side, especially by the Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund, represented
by Mr. Kuzma. Their aid for Ukraine is estimated at $35
million-$37 million. Yes, right? Compared to official aid of maybe
$10 million. You can see that this is a very big difference. We really
appreciate the humanitarian aid.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador Martynov,
I would like to ask you that same request. That whatever you could
provide us, relative to the humanitarian concerns for the people of
Belarus, that would be helpful, as we go through our fiscal year
1997 appropriations bill for foreign assistance. Could you tell us
what is the Belarusian Government's position with respect to closure
of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. Is the G-7 agreement
of the year 2000 acceptable? Would you like it closed immediately?
Amb. Martynov. Thank vou, Mr. Chairman. First, we would
oblige with your request and submit to you information related to
the needed areas of assistance.
Secondly, on the closure of Chornobyl: we, in Belarus, do not
have any reactors or nuclear power stations which are active in our
territory, and, under the circumstances, we feel that we are hostages
to a number of old-type nuclear power stations along our perimeter.
One is obviously Chornobyl. Second is Ignalina in Lithuania, and
third is Smolensk in Russia. These are the closest to us. St. Peters-

19
burg is not too far. Greographically, Rovno is not too far, though it
is a different type of reactor, as far as I understand.
So our position is that, yes, the international community has to
take efforts to increase the safety of these stations and to close
those which are most dangerous. We do understand that our neighboring
countries have their problems in closing them altogether
and immediately, for obvious economic reasons and social reasons.
So, as I said, the international community has to display much
more statesmanship and understanding and come to help these
countries close these stations. They should no longer keep us hostages.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, how would you assess the international
assistance that has been provided? Has there been enough
so far?
Amb. Martynov. Well, I am sorry to say, but I will say frankly
that we do not perceive the international assistance as adequate,
and that we are not just greedy in this respect.
We first went to the United Nations, to the international community,
immediately after the catastrophe. But, unfortunately, the
multilateral effort did not yield too much of tangible, practical results,
though there are some.
In terms of bilateral assistance between the United States and
Belarus, we are very appreciative of the humanitarian assistance
we are getting from the U.S. people. But this assistance primarily
comes through private philanthropic organizations, non-governmental
organizations of the United States. I could name Citihope
and Ramapo School, which were already quoted here. The Global
Environment and Technology Foundation, Pittsburgh Children's
Hospital, and other foundations.
The U.S. Government provides some assistance in transportation
of these PVO-acquired medicines to Belarus. We also have an
agreement between the Department of Energy and the Ministry of
Health of Belarus for studying thyroid cancer. But this is about it.
There are also ad hoc deliveries. Say, for the tenth anniversary
of Chornobyl, which would come through or with the help of the
U.S. Government. But that's about it, again.
We need much more assistance, as I indicated, in such areas as
early diagnostics, because we are afraid a new wave of cancers is
coming up, as was confirmed here by experts also. We need early
diagnostics, we need means for treatment of the things which are
to come. The second aspect is, as I said, scientific cooperation to
understand it better. The third is that we need to reclaim, to get
back the vast areas of arable lands we have lost to radiation.
So we have to cooperate with the United States and other communities
in looking for technologies which would allow us to reuse
these lands, to get them back into the productive cycle.
So these would be the main areas where the assistance is extremely
needed. We were particularly heartened to learn from the
Administration of the new ecological emphasis in the foreign policy
of the United States. So what we would like to make sure, and to
ask you to try to make sure, is that the Chornobyl problem is included
on these ecological agenda priority items. It is to be included
not only in the aspect of the closure of Chornobyl station, but also

20
in the aspect of mitigating the consequences of Chornobyl. Thank
you.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask you, regarding the issue of resettlement
and the individuals who return to areas that are ill-affected. As far
as we know, what are the risks to them in going back prematurely?
From an agricultural point of view, and raising livestock, how do
both of your governments fence off certain areas so that people do
not return, begin growing certain crops, and then begin exporting
them or consuming them themselves?
Amb. Martynov. Well, there is what is called an exclusion zone,
which is fenced off, and is off-limits to anyone.
The Belarus Grovernment has already resettled 130,000 people,
and I understand this is the biggest resettlement pool, so to say,
in the area of Chornobyl. But we have found serious problems in
resettlement programs. First, the resources which are needed are
very large. Secondly, the people who were resettled continue to be
unhappy, because they were uprooted, they were brought to a different
environment, they have lost their old ties. They don't feel
comfortable in this situation, and the social problems which we are
facing in the new settlements are very high.
So some people choose to go back to their old places, where they
used to live; and the government does not have an enforcement
mechanism for stopping them from going to places, other than exclusion
zones. The government tries to dissuade them from doing
that, but we cannot force them to leave these areas. Basically, the
resettlement programs were for volunteers.
We find, now, ourselves in a situation where more and more people
would like to stay where they are, to live with their roots. That
increases the necessity to have technologies and possibilities to provide
them with safe foods, to provide them with means to grow safe
foods in a contaminated environment. So this is another aspect
which is very important, because what people do now, in these
areas, they consume the foods they grow.
This is the most dangerous aspect of the whole situation, when
radionuclides are getting inside through the stomach. So these are
the whole sets of problems which we have to face.
Mr. Smith. Are you beginning to see some cancers attributable
to that, or?
Amb. Martynov. Excuse me?
Mr. Smith. Are people getting sick as a result of eating foods
that have been grown?
Amb. Martynov. Absolutely. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, on the resettlement issue, are people
moving back to contaminated areas, and how do you
Amb. Shcherbak. I met those people, you know, in special contaminated
zones. It's not a large number, but maybe 100, 200 people
now live in this very contaminated zone. Practically, they're
very old people, and they don't want to resettle to another region
of Ukraine.
But let me give you some numbers. That, for the population evacuated
from the zone, about 21,000 houses were built, and 15,000
new apartments provided, Mr. Chairman, without any foreign aid,
absolutely only at Ukrainian, you know, for Ukrainian cost.

21
Mr. Smith. Dr. Feshbach, can you provide us with an overview
of the environmental damage resulting from Chornobyl?
Dr. Feshbach. Well, one is the actual damage, and there's also
some potential environmental damage. This is quite a concern, because
of the possible contamination of the Dnipro River, which
would get into the reservoir for Kyiv, thereby affecting the quality
of the water supply.
This is, in part, a question of the sarcophagus. It's a question of,
if you build another sarcophagus on top of it, whether the sub-soil
and sub-strata are strong enough to support it and not shift. But
the roof itself might even fall down, because the metal rods, which
are being exposed to radioactivity, may disintegrate on their own.
In addition, there was a lot of radioactive dust which got onto the
nearby forest. In the recent fire, a lot of it was spread. People ate
mushrooms, a major part of their diet, from the area. In fact, many
of them got sick, and some even died.
So, the issue here is the current situation, as well as the potential
future. The land is very badly damaged, and will take a long
time to recover. Still, it may be possible to clean up some of it. But
a lot of people are moving back because they don't care, and they're
going to die anyway, is what they say. They die a little earlier;
drink a little more, you know, and it just eases your way to death.
But it really is a very major social problem.
But the environmental issue is—^how shall I put it? It's hard to
comprehend. It's so big that the question becomes one of setting
priorities. You really can't deal with all of the problems at once,
and you have to understand that their choice has to be made within
a constrained budget. It's a question not only of what AID does,
or the declining proportion of money going to them and others
that's happening, but how, within the constraints that we have,
can we get other international agencies to get involved, maybe to
pick up some of the slack, and what priorities do we set for ourselves.
Thus I think what the two Ambassadors have said is very reasonable.
But, again, one issue is the environment and the other is
environmental health impact; and I find it hard to separate them.
I can give you plenty more data. But the issues and key events,
as directly related to the Chornobyl event, I think are basically
what I've described.
Mr. Smith. Is there ongoing water testing occurring?
Dr. Feshbach. Is there ongoing water?
Mr. Smith. Water testing, to determine whether or not it has become
contaminated?
Dr. Feshbach. Yes, of course, there is. But, again, it's a question
of what kind of decimeters they're using, what kind of testing
they're doing. The tests needs to be, shall we say, made comparable;
we need to have a standardized way of measuring, so that
we know exactly that it's this definition, as opposed to that definition,
and not some local definitions.
This is always a problem. Then the question is who do you bring
in to do it. I think the OECD would be a very good candidate organization.
It has a good reputation and does a lot of this water testing.
So we should try to encourage this kind of organization to do
it. It doesn't necessarily have to be an American organization. But

22
we're a part of that organization, and let others also contribute to
that.
I don't think the United States has to do everything, but I think
we have to do a lot. Don't misunderstand me. But we have to
choose what to do and choose the priorities very carefully.
Mr. Smith. What about testing of the aquifer?
Dr. Feshbach. Well, the testing of the aquifer is going on now.
So far, it hasn't been determined to be dangerous. We have an embassy
there, we have a lot of people there from various organizations.
A lot of commercial organizations are there, and they'll stay
there in the immediate future. But, if there's a further accident,
then it may become very different.
Mr. Smith. In talking about lung cancers, as mentioned in your
testimony, has there been an increase in bronchiolar, alveolar carcinoma,
which is the
Dr. Feshbach. I don't have such precise data from there. I wish
I did, so that I would know precisely what kinds of cancer that they
have. Somebody literally asked me that question two days ago, over
the weekend. A cancer specialist was in town for a big meeting,
and I told him I don't have those data.
Now, maybe they're available, maybe they're not available. But
I hope, if I could go to Kyiv, or to Minsk, whatever, as the case may
be, to do some work, I would ask those kinds of questions. But now
I don't know the answer.
Mr. Smith. OK Could you provide information, because, obviously,
that's a plutonium-based cancer.
Dr. Feshbach. Yes. I would want to know it, too.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Dr. Feshbach. And I'd certainlv be happy to.
Mr. Smith. Could you tell us, aoctor, why the mortality rate estimates
vary so widely?
Dr. Feshbach. Oh, sure. But one must separate what is a direct
consequence of the Chornobyl event from natural causes of death.
For the former, the number of liquidators or clean-up personnel
that, as I tried to describe, is now almost a three times differential,
from 300,000 to 800,000. Not, obviously, exactly three times, but a
little less.
But it's also the question of whether, as many allege, including
myself, that this is specifically due to Chornobyl, or not due to the
Chornobyl event.
How many people would have died otherwise? It's very hard to
determine it. But, when you see differential rates of this level, of
30 times versus, let's say, 10 times, you always have to be sure
that it's not a statistical anomaly—that it's not because there are
better diagnostics and not because we're paying more attention to
this issue. Rather, there's something that we missed before, that
they're now getting currently. It happens in the United States, too.
I mean, something may happen so you go out and look for salmonella.
So, you go out and look for this problem, or that problem,
and you may find that the increase is there, but it's because the
prior figure was not as accurate as it should have been. Certainly,
this seems to be the case much more than before, and we need to
know. It's part of the secrecy of the system.

23
One of the problems with the International Atomic Energy 1989
Agency survey of the event of 1986 was they didn't know there was
a third administration in the Ministry of Health in the USSR. This
was the secret component. It now has a slightly different name.
But they didn't know it existed, because they didn't know the Soviet
system. They didn't know to ask where the nuclear, biological,
chemical warfare accident data are collected, hidden, not published,
etcetera.
The root cause is you have rules that change diagnostics. You
know, you don't say that somebody has a plague, you call it hepatitis;
or, in this case, acute radiation sickness might be called appendicitis,
or something like that. This was a practice there. There
was a State Secrets Act that was in place at the time.
This occurs, as we saw from the work of Alia Yaroshinska, who
collected some of the protocols of the working group of the Politburo,
which told her to lie, period.
So we have to be very careful that what we're seeing now is not
a major increase compared to what was there before, but you have
to make the balance in both cases. That's part of the problem of
trying to tell what is the excess deaths. Now, I was asked to do
this, at one time, by Radio Liberty, as it happened, and I looked
at normal mortality tables. How many people survive of this age
gproup? Now, the trouble is, I didn't have a precise definition of who
the age group of the liquidators were, the clean-up personnel. But
you can make some assumptions.
It seemed to me, at that time when I did it, 3 or 4 years ago,
there was four to five thousand excess deaths among this group.
Now, they're talking about six to eight thousand. That's in Ukraine
alone. Some people are talking about 20,000 or 30,000. That's in
addition to the thyroid cancer deaths. It's in addition to the infant
mortality deaths. But we don't know precisely.
Somebody from the Ministry of Chornobyl, at this conference that
Mr. Kuzma talked about, at Yale, where I also gave a talk, used
another figure that was, I think, just much too high. Now, he may
be correct, and I may be quite wrong. But that it's all really part
of this difficulty of calculation is really what I'm trying to say.
Mr. Smith. How many people, in your estimation, are still living
in contaminated areas? And what is the threat of people being resettled
in those contaminated areas?
Dr. Feshbach. I really don't know any precise number. I would
guess it's probably several thousand within the 30-kilometer zone.
Nevertheless, even if it's 1,000, or 500, the danger is, of course,
much higher. But, you know, there also are half-lives of these
radionuclides. Iodine-131's is only 8 days, although others may last
longer. Cesium 137 may last 30 years, as well as strontium 90.
But these are elderly people, and you don't know whether it's
going to be the last key to push them over at the last mortality
stage, or it's just overall difficulty of living conditions. But I don't
know the exact number. You get estimates all the time, and I don't
know how good they are. They vary. You might quote something
in January, and somebody in March will say something quite different.

It's
of.
24
It's just not determinate yet, really. But it's not a large number.
not 30,000 to 50,000, something like that. That I'm quite sure
Mr. Smith. To what extent do you think post-traumatic stress
has had an impact in terms of increasing people's propensity to get
sick?
Dr. FeshuACH. Well, let me tell you my personal experience. I
lived in Brussels at the time. I was the Sovietologist in residence
at the office of the Secretary Greneral of NATO, Lord Carrington.
I was stressed out, too, let me tell you, because the plume also
reached to the whole compass, and reached to us in Brussels as
well. I mean, I wasn't happy with it, but I hopefully got over it.
I don't know how well I'm responding to your question.
But of course, the people who lived there were undoubtedly very
stressed. But to say and blame everything, as the International
Atomic Energy first report did, or as Dr. Ilyin and many others still
do, to blame everything on this radiophobia. That's a bit much.
Now, I think there are exaggerations on the other side, just as
much as there are exaggerations on this side. This is not trying to
trying to be reasonable, and to get a precise medical
be eclectic. It's
definition.
But there is no doubt that there is a post-traumatic stress syndrome,
which has probably weakened the immune system, which
has probably then made many people more susceptible to other illnesses.
So, you could say it's linked back to Chornobyl.
But, to say everything is due to post-traumatic stress, I don't believe
that either. Nonetheless, I believe many do have this PTS
syndrome.
Mr. Smith. One final question, if I could. In the Bryansk Oblast,
in western Russia.
Dr. Feshbach. Yes.
Mr. Smith. What has been the impact of Chornobyl on that region?
Dr. Feshbach. Well, we've had about 60 cases of thyroid cancer
among children. Sixty-four is the number, the latest number that
I've seen, which is much higher than they ever had before. No
question about it. But it also is one of the ones which was very
heavily impacted. I could show you a map of that in my atlas on
environmental health.
But it's also a question of proper diagnostics. I just don't know
whether they're as precise as some other groups are. Whether they
have these papillary carcinoma slides. They haven't shown them to
the WHO, as far as I know. Only the Belarusians, as far as I know,
invited the WHO. The Ukrainians are quite capable of doing it
also. But I just don't know precisely how they have diagnosed it.
But I assume it's now done correctly, because they have learned
from the others. But I assume we'll see more. Regrettably, but we'll
see more.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Dr. Feshbach.
Dr. Feshbach. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Kuzma, just a few questions.
Mr. Kuzma. Sure.
Mr. Smith. Besides yourself, how many other NGOs are active
in Ukraine?

25
Mr. KuzMA. There's quite a large number of NGOs that are active.
I'm more familiar just with the medical relief groups, and
even those, it's difficult to keep track of, because there are some
wonderful projects that may be operating on a small scale, in particular
cities.
When my wife and I were in Luhansk, on the eastern perimeter
of Ukraine, we met with a Baptist church, for instance, from Texas
that was very active in providing containers out there.
I'm not even sure that a lot of these groups show up in the overall
assessment of the organizations involved. So there, again, I
think it's difficult to gauge how many groups. But I know of about
15 different organizations that have developed sustained, long-term
efforts, at a fairly high level of activity, ranging from $5 million
and above in the value of their medical relief.
Mr. Smith. Has the intensity of their
waned over the last 10 years?
activities increased or
Mr. KuzMA. In some cases, it has waned. There are some smaller
groups that have. I mean, it just takes an awful lot of effort to sustain
this kind of an effort over time. Others seem to have gotten
over that survival threshold, and are doing quite well, and progressing.
I know that we've kept in touch with a number of groups,
such as Brother's Brother Foundation. The American Hospital Alliance,
that's been very active in Kyiv, and a number of other cities,
that have had very successful hospital partnerships with American
hospitals. The Ukrainian Fraternal Association, the Ukrainian Orthodox
League, has been quite active. They sort of went through
an ebb, and now have intensified some of their activities more recently.
So, it seems to me that a lot of groups really are beginning to
intensify their efforts, understanding that the peak of the crisis is
actually ahead of us. What we've noticed, in the last 2 years, has
been a bit of a revival in interest, both financially and in terms of
activity.
Mr. Smith. Does the Catholic Hospital Association lend a hand
in this?
Mr. KuZMA. Yes. The Catholic Medical Mission Board, under the
leadership of Father McMahon and Father Yannarell, has been
very active, and we've worked closely with them. I know they've
been active not just in Ukraine and Belarus, but also in Lithuania,
and really have produced a very large volume of aid going in there.
Mr. Smith. How about UNICEF?
Mr. KuzMA. I have to admit I'm not that familiar with UNICEF's
programs and how in-depth their activity's been,
Mr. Smith, We'll check it out, because I think that's very important
there.
Mr, KuzMA. Certainly.
Mr. Smith. Looking at the overall international response, governments
providing moneys—which obviously are best administered in
most cases through NGOs—^has the U.S. Government been as generous
as it should be and ought to be?
Mr. KuzMA. I hate to cast aspersions on the U.S. Grovernment in
this sense. I think, certainly, in the last few years, we've seen an
improvement both in the level of interest in the Chomobyl zone
and the Chornobyl aftermath. Also, the level of activity, I think,

26
since about 1991, when President Bush began the initiative of fuel
assistance, there's been a fairly steady acceleration. I think President
Clinton and his administration have been quite supportive, as
witnessed in their activity at the G—7 and so forth.
However, in all of our discussions with our counterparts in
Ukraine we understand that, per capita, and even in absolute
terms, relatively small European countries like Holland, and then
large countries like Germany, have actually been more forthcoming
with assistance. I think that's one aspect of the problem that, in
absolute terms of government activity, that I think there can be an
acceleration at the U.S. Grovernment level. We've been quite disturbed
by reports that we've heard from some of our colleagues at
USAID that there may actually be a trimming back of humanitarian
assistance in particular, in the years to come.
Not just in terms of the overall cutbacks in USAID, but percentage-wise,
that the amount of aid that would go toward medical programs
may be cut back. We think that's a mistake, partly because
I think a lot of the programs that have been operating in the medical
arena have been extremely cost-efficient. I think that there's
been a tremendous amount of creativity in leveraging a great deal
of aid from the corporate sector and at the grass roots level.
If we want to get literally more bang for the buck, and, to put
it more in humane terms, to save more lives per dollar invested,
I think there's a tremendous amount that the U.S. Government can
contribute.
The other problem is really in the area of disguised aid. As Ambassador
Shcherbak noted, a lot of activity that is happening at the
government level actually is overlaid over private, voluntary activity
that would already be taking place. I think that it's important
for our government—and that's something that the recipients are
aware of. I think it's very important for the government itself to
take a primal role, and not to run the risk of piggy-backing onto
just private, voluntary efforts. So that I think there is more that
we can do generally.
Mr. Smith. Have you or your organization been concerned about
people resettling in the region and being back in harm's way perhaps
infecting, or putting at risk, more children?
Mr. KuzMA. Yes. We're very worried, not just about the resettlement
back into the Chomobyl zone, but that wide swath of communities
that live just on the periphery of the dead zone, and in fairly
highly contaminated regions.
In economically strapped times, these folks are definitely going
to have an incentive to bring their produce, from their villages, into
major urban centers, whether it be Kiyv, or Chemihiv, or Lviv, or
wherever.
Again, anecdotally, we've received a lot of reports from our colleagues
at the Institute of Pediatrics, and several of the key hospitals
in Kyiv and Chemihiv, that there has been a high incidence
of gastrointestinal disorders, including stomach cancers, intestinal
cancers.
There is growing fear among many of our colleagues that have
gone into this region, and have done outreach—and now, we're
doing much more of that work in rural areas in northern
Vynnytsia, and so forth. There's a tremendous fear of the constant

—
27
bombardment of low-level radiation into human tissue, just by con-
and potatoes, and cabbage, and
suming the standard foods—^beets,
so form—that in the near future could result in an explosion of
gastrointestinal cancers similar to what we've seen with thyroid
disorders and cancers. I would echo what Ambassador Martynov
said, regarding the importance of diagnostic equipment. It's
really
got to come in.
This is a unique disaster, where we can anticipate the worst that
is yet to come, unlike the disasters of famine in Somalia, or wherever,
where the international community really was caught
offguard. Here, we know it's coming, and so it's very important for
us to provide gastroscopes, ultrasounds, basic diagnostic equipment.
We've put a lot of energy into that, in terms of blood
diagnostics.
So that, if there is an explosion in leukemia, or Hodgkins disease—and
we have seen it, in several areas, we need to be ready.
But, again, we're not an epidemiological team. We can't make those
assessments, as Dr. Feshbach can.
We think, regardless of whether or not these are radiationcaused
problems, the United States can provide an extremely valuable
service in just upgrading the quality of the medical infrastructure
in that country. God willing, maybe we'll be proven wrong. Maybe,
down the road, the impact of Chornobyl won't be as great as we
suspect it is or will be. Yet, we will still have delivered a precious
resource to these people, by helping them rebuild their medical infrastructure.
That is worth everything, from our perspective.
Mr. Smith. To the best of your knowledge, is the circle around
Chornobyl drawn too tightly, or should it be expanded?
Mr. KuzMA. Well, it should be expanded, and, in the best of
worlds, I'm sure that the Ukrainian Government and the
Belarusian Government would make those efforts. But, again, in
these brutal economic times, in these two republics, I don't know
that it's
So that the best fall-back option is
itoring,
possible for them to expand that.
really to provide better mon-
and better food monitoring and then diagnostic work, and
very intensive screening.
I think, frankly, Mr. Chairman, that it's going to be very important
for the public research community to begin to take a very hard
look at the highest risk populations.
Our suspicion has been—and I think it was borne out somewhat
by the aftermath, with thyroid cancer—that the research communities
were not looking hard enough, and not looking in the right
places. I think the thyroid cancer explosion could have been identified
by IAEA quickly, because a lot of those cases were being funneled
into the key endocrinological institutes in Kyiv and Minsk.
Had they wanted to find the problems, I think they would have
found them.
As a matter of correlation, I think if there's an intensive effort
launched in some of the regional hospitals in the Chornobyl region
over the next 3 to 5 years, to look at cancer rates in those areas
I hope we're wrong. But I think we will find those cases. That can
help us to shape the quality of the medical relief that we bring into
the affected region.

28
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask one final question. What do your volunteers,
or your personnel eat?
Mr. KuzMA. What do we eat?
Mr. Smith. When they're in country—in the affected zone, and
I'm not trying to be frivolous here.
Mr. KuzMA. No, not at all.
Mr. Smith. If these things show up, years down the line, the
donor community and the international relief workers could be seriously
affected.
Mr. KuZMA. You know, it's
a very fair question. We—most of our
volunteers go in for relatively short periods of time, to monitor the
shipments, to maintain the chain of custody to the hospitals and
so forth, and to do spot checks.
However, that's changed over the last 2 years, where we now
have permanent staff on the ground. We try to mitigate some of the
potential exposure by bringing, you know, stockpiles of our own
food into that area.
Another way to monitor that is to have relatively inexpensive
hand-held counters, these rad alerts that you can buy for 75 dollars.
We've recommended that to our staff and have procured a couple
of these for our staff. But I have to admit that most of our staff
and volunteers, after awhile, get to be fairly cavalier about the exposures
that they might be facing.
We make a point of not sending our staff into the actual
Chomobyl zone, but try to work more in the hospitals that are beyond
the zone and aid the people that were resettled there.
Mr. Smith. But they do buy food on the market and eat
Mr. Kuzma. They do, and I have, and others.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. So they potentially develop these types
of problems?
Mr. Kuzma. Yes. So that it is an ongoing risk, and the only way
to check that is to have a rad alert and to be fairly systematic in
just, at least, scanning it over your foodstuffs before you sit down
at dinner. On the other hand, Ukrainian and I'm sure Belarus hospitality
is such that it would probably be pretty offensive to do that
when you're asked out to private homes, and so forth.
So I think there's just no way of avoiding some elevated risk.
That's been a personal issue, because I've had family members that
have gone there for extended periods of time, with small children,
and asked me "what is the risk?" I had to tell them I think that
the risk is elevated, and you're definitely running the possibility of
doubling, tripling the possibility of a cancer somewhere down the
road, because there are these hot particles.
There are these small clusters, even in the vicinity of Kyiv and
it is a risk that, you know, I personally wouldn't run that risk with
young children, with my own family. But these are decisions that
each individual makes for themselves.
Mr. Smith. Ambassador Shcherbak, is there thought being given
to extending the area ineligible for growing crops or raising livestock
in order to try to mitigate the danger of contaminating the
food chain?
Amb. Shcherbak. No, I don't think so. I believe the territory of
the zone is sufficient. But maybe we must establish more restrictions
in the zone, because a lot of people live in the zone. There

29
are proposals that Kyiv be proclaimed a disaster zone. Practically,
we cannot ever create the zone including Kyiv, and I don't believe
that it would be the right decision.
The only problem is clean water, clean food. It's a big problem
for us, because, in very contaminated areas, it's the main problem
for people who live in those areas.
Mr. Smith. Mention was made earlier about a forest fire which
spread further the contamination. How far did it spread?
What other naturally occurring phenomena could cause a spreading
east, west, south, or north? And what can be done to mitigate
those dangers? Dr. Feshbach, perhaps.
Dr. Feshbach. Well, the key phrase, as I understood it, was
"naturally occurring." There's none that I can think of, unless, you
know, it's among animals, or something like that. But none really.
I mean, the forests are the biggest issue, I think, right now. There's
water, in terms of its movements, but that's about it.
Mr. Smith. Yes?
Amb. Martynov. With your permission. Chairman Smith. I just
returned yesterday from a visit to Tulane University in Louisiana,
and they are heading a joint project with a Belarusian research institution
on migration of radiation.
Apart from the forest fires, another important danger is floods,
because radioactive isotopes are also found in sediments in rivers.
They are relatively quiet, until a flood comes. This is especially
dangerous when there is a kind of sequence of floods. When the
first flood would kind of bring it up, and the next flood will carry
it much, much beyond the area.
Also, there is kind of a natural as well as human-induced migration
of other types, like on the wheels of the trucks going from this
zone to that zone, and things like that. So what we find in Belarus,
and I'm sure the Ukrainian scholars find, is that the contamination
area grows slowly, but it grows. So that also affects the problem
of evacuation or non-evacuation because, apart from the tight exclusion
zone around the Chornobyl station itself, we have other
stains of radioactivity on the territory of Belarus to relatively high
degrees.
But you cannot just evacuate people from there firstly, because
it's very expensive. Second, because you have to provide these people
with something else, and new places. And, third, because it all
changes. You cannot move people, shift people all the time, all
around. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. One final question for all of you, or anyone
who would like to answer. Is there a mechanism in place which
would continuously monitor this possible migration? Some device at
the parameters of the effective zone which, if it is migrating outward,
for instance, at a rate of 50 feet a year, or 100 feet, the radioactivity
will be detected? It's certainly not contracting; instead, I
would think, it is expanding.
Amb. Martynov. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have at least two aspects
of effort here, of which I am aware. First, we have a monitoring
network in our territory, which observes the status of radioactivity
at each given moment. So, we would be in a position to detect
sizable change in this situation.

30
Secondly, we work on mathematical models which would allow us
to basically make a prognosis of how these radioactive elements
can migrate in the future. The project I related to you a little bit
earlier, in Tulane, does exactly that. So we are in a position now
to measure the situation as it is on the ground and make projections
into the future, if we are in a position to continue with this
research,
Mr. Smith. OK.
Amb. Shcherbak. Mr. Chairman, we have, in Ukraine, in the
closed Chomobyl zone, a very strong scientific center for studying
these problems.
Maybe you saw the TV program on CNN about this center last
week. It's a very interesting study about the consequences for nature,
for the ecosystems, genetic materials.
Also, we in Ukraine have a network of laboratories, especially for
food, for milk, for water, and a very well-equipped medical center
in Kyiv for Chornobyl diseases.
Yesterday I called the Minister of Environmental Protection for
Ukraine and discussed with him the problem of American aid to
Ukraine. He says that we need very high-level equipment and a
very high-level technology laboratory for water because it's a big
proolem.
Let me draw your attention that there are very highly contaminated
areas surrounding the Chornobyl plant—not large areas, but
areas very highly contaminated by plutonium and strontium. We
are afraid that floods can be very dangerous for water, not only for
underground water resources, reservoirs, but also for rivers, for the
Dnipro. It's a very dangerous period right now.
We believe that we will get such a laboratory from EPA to support
our efforts to liquidate the consequences of the Chomobyl catastrophe.
Dr. Feshbach. Both countries have a Ministry of Chomobyl
which also has responsibilities for monitoring. Both countries now
have spin-offs from what was then a Soviet hydrometeorological
service agency, which included monitoring also. But the responsibilities
were more for air and water, in general, than radioactivity.
But they also monitored radioactivity, though they didn't publish
the data.
There is certainly these networks and other activities, but there
has to be a lot more. Part of the problem, if I may digress a little
bit, is that, until recently, most of the effort of AID, under orders
of the Confess, as well as of others, was to deal with issues of democratization
and privatization. I'm all for those, but it was to the
detriment of environment and health.
As a major priority, it's only coming up now, but now AID's
money, which also supports some of the EPA activities, is going
down. So you have this confluence of more need for this at the
same time the moneys are going down.
It's really a very difficult, shall we say, juncture, if you want to
get something done before this runs out.
As to the models, there are all kinds of models, and one has to
be very careful, because I just got a proposal in the mail the other
day, and somebody wants $1.3 million to do models as well as
ground radiation issues. One has to pick and choose. There are

31
good people there, everywhere, and bad people everywhere, and you
have to make sure it's a good model.
Mr. KuzMA. Yes. The only laboratory that I've been familiar with
over the last few years is one under the administration of Dr.
Volodya Tykhy, whose father, actually, was an heroic political prisoner
in the past who died as a result of the abuse he sustained in
a Soviet prison camp.
Dr. Tykhy has been one of the real leaders in helping to monitor
this. He's received support from the American Greenpeace organization.
Apparently, they've been running quite effectively, in recent
years, in tracking contamination of the Dnipro and other watersheds.
Just in conclusion, one other type of contamination, although it
might not seem totally relevant to this, we've been actually very
concerned about the need for additional medical care and additional
surgeries in the coming years. The fact that just the rate of
thyroid cancers is rising indicates that there probably will be surgeries
for other types of cancers.
A critical need for Ukraine, and I'm sure for Belarus, is also to
provide adequate AIDS testing, to prevent contamination of blood
through transfusions. This is a problem that the United States,
having a tragic lead on this issue, can really offer a lot to the people
of Eastern Europe to help prevent the spread of HIV infections.
We've already met with a number of people that have been tracking
this problem. There was an explosion of AIDS in
Dnipropetrovsk this year. There were five pediatric cases in
Donetsk. One of our hospitals also now has the capability to test
for AIDS. That's an area in which we can make a huge contribution
to save tens of thousands of lives in the years to come. It's another
gigantic challenge that we're facing as we try to improve the quality
of medical care in that area.
Mr. Smith. The Commission is most appreciative for your testimony.
I've been in Congress 16 years, and you are perhaps the
most informative panel I have ever heard. I can assure you, we will
provide copies of this record to many Members of Congress, especially
those who are in strategic positions to do something, on my
subcommittee, as well as on the full Committee on International
Relations.
Especially with this tragic milestone approaching on the 26th, we
should look at that as a launching pad to pursue what we haven't
done, and try to backfill, and make sure we are covering all the
bases, especially with the peak period still on the horizon. There's
so much and questions of resettlement are important, so that we
ensure more people won't be contaminated, which would be a terrible
tragedy.
Thank you for your very fine testimony. Each and every one of
you have been an excellent panel. The Commission is adjourned.
Thank you.
The hearing was concluded at 12:04 p.m.
[Written inserts follow.]

32
Commissioii on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Hearing on **The Legacy of Chomobyl - 1986 to 1996 and Beyond"
Statement of
H.E. Mr. Serguei N-Martynov Ambassador of tlie Republic of Belarus
April 23, 1996
Honorable Chairman Smith !
Honorable Co-Chainnan D'Amato !
Honorable Members of Conunission !
Ladies and gentlemen !
I am profoundly grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation and for
the opportunity to take the floor before such a distinguished audience.
For almost ten years since the explosion of the Chernobyl power plant
reactor on April 26,
1986 the RepubUc of Belarus has been exposed to radioactive
contamination. That day split Belarusian history into two epochs - before and after
Chernobyl.
According to its scale the Chernobyl accident is the biggest technogenic
catastrophe that has ever occiured on this planet. The United Nations General
Assembly sized up the Chernobyl tragedy as a global radio-ecological catastrophe.
Such words as curie, becquerel, radionucleides, radioactive contamination of
soil, radioisotope content in food and human organism, radiocaesium and
radiostrontium, plutonium and many others which had previously been used only
by a narrow circle of specialists became part of the ordinary people's vernacular.
Scientists are still arguing as to the amount of radionuclides released into
the environment by the explosion. But the margin of the argument itself is
shocking. Estimates suggest it is equal to the effect of the explosion of twenty to
two hundred nuclear bombs. The worst results of the catastrophe are to be found
in Belarus. According to international estimates, my country Belarus received 70
percent of the radioactive fallout from the explosion, and is by far the most
affected victim of the disaster.
It is not the first time that great ordeals have fallen to the lot of the
Belarusian people. Many of you are aware that every third citizen of Belarus
perished during World War 0. Now Chernobyl tragedy has raised the question of
the very survival for the Belarusian nation.

33
Only one percent of the territory of my country is standard clean from
radioactive contamination. A large number of Belarusian villages have become
empty. More than 400 settlements have become uninhabited and more than 600
schools and kindergartens have been closed. Almost overnight people were forced
to say good-bye to their native land, leave behind the graves of their ancestors and
start building their lives in new unfamihar areas.
Following the disaster, the Government evacuated 131 thousand people from
the areas worst affected by Chernobyl. Housing, social infrastructure and jobs,
often in an open country, have been created for these people.
Although 10 years passed after the accident the most polluted areas are
still functioning in the emergency regime conditions.
Abnost 2 milUon people, including 484 thousand children and teenagers 17
years and younger, continue to Uve in over 3 thousand settlements located on the
territories seriously affected by radiation.
People are Uving under a constant stress,
are prone to greater risk of diseases and are facing greater social, psychological
and economic problems. But in these places the people came to link their destinies
with their native towns and villages and most of them are not going to leave for
elsewhere.
Health consequences
Health problems are most striking and, indeed, are awesome. Above all,
the
children are the most heavily affected. Thyroid cancer among children increased
285 times. Belarusian children affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe are
vulnerable to thyroid cancer to
a greater degree than Japanese children who went
through the atomic bombing. This conclusion was made by a group of scientists
from Nagasaki on the basis of a 5-year ( May 1991 - June 1995 ) study in the city
of Gomel, Republic of Belarus.
Also, the analysis of health state of children from the contaminated
territories revealed the rise of otolaryngological diseases, biUation system diseases,
chloranemias, chronical gastritis and other digestion diseases by 40-80% in
comparison with the clean (control) areas. In 40% of schoolchildren affected by
the radiation, functional breaches of cardiovascular system were exposed.
Monitoring the health of people Uving in contaminated territories shows that
in Belarus general morbidity is increasing. MaUgnant neoplasms rose at average
by 60%. The most frightening example is the growing number of thyroid
pathologies, including thyroid gland cancer to which I have already referred.
Of urgent and special concern is also the health of the people who worked
in 1986-1987 close to the reactor that exploded trying to eliminate direct
consequences of the disaster. We now have more than 110 thousand of these
people.

34
Birth rate in Belarus has been dropping steadily and sharply after the
Chernobyl disaster. Abortions for fear of bearing a deformed or otherwise
handicapped child are on the rise. Coupled with economic hardships of the
transition period we are facing now what experts call "negative growth" of the
population. Simply put, with each passing year there is less and less Belarusians
of this Earth.
There is no proved scientific knowledge of what is going to happen in the
coming years to masses of people subjected to extremely long-term - I'd say lifeterm
- irradiation. The majority of experts expect a further substantial increase of
mahgnant tumors, as well as other diseases.
Another frightening truth is that we are going to live with Chernobyl
forever. The radioactive situation now is primarily determined by the presence of
the following radionuclides - caesium- 137 ( half- life of 30 years ), strontium-90 (
29 years ), plutonium-239 ( 24390 years ), plutonium-240 ( 6537 years ). To
dissipate, an element needs 10 half-Ufe periods. Simple multiplication gives you a
creeping feeUng of an adverse eternity.
Economic consequences
Health problems were not alone. Economic losses, need for new
expenditures and related problems are mind-bogghng.
Hundreds and hundreds of enterprises, both industrial and agricultural, had
to be closed down in the contaminated areas - along with hospitals, schools,
infrastructure. Twenty percent of arable land were taken out of economic use as a
result of the catastrophe.
According to the most modest estimates,
the economic damage incurred by
Belarus as an immediate result of the Chernobyl accident is equal to 32 annual
budgets of the Republic, i.e. 235 billion US dollars.
Now ten years later, the Government is compelled to spend, year in and
year out, up to 25% of its budget to try to cope with the aftermath of Chernobyl.
This is an additional and huge burden on the reform pace in Belarus. We cannot
abandon, and members of the US Congress, 1 hope, will agree with it, hundreds of
thousands of helpless people out there in the radioactive cold to face the beast of
Chernobyl on their own.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union we were left alone with this
disaster. This nuclear power station was not built by us, it was not serviced by us
and we did not have any influence on the processes taking place in it. The state
which did it is gone. The consequences of the catastrophe coincided with the
economic crisis, with the destruction of the very fabric of former Ufe. That is why
we have to resolve a multitude of socio-economic problems, to construct a new
Belarusian state while doing everything at the same time in order to minimize to

35
an extent possible the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. And it is
extremely difficult for a single country to cope with it, taking into account the
global character of the disaster.
The grim Chernobyl picture makes us recall the chilling prophecy.
The Book of books - the Bible
- reads:" And a great star... fell from the
sky on a third of the rivers... The name of the star is Wormwood. A third of the
waters turned bitter, and many people died from the waters that had become
bitter." (Revelation; 8:10-11)
A bitter wormwood herb translates in Belarusian and Ukranian languages as
"Chernobyl". A Revelation prophecy come true is now a frightful reahty for die
peoples of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and for the peoples of the whole world.
International cooperation
This is a tragic lesson which, as never before, has brought us - the citizens
of oiu" planet
- closer to each other and made us think over: Shall we survive
another unforeseeable mistake in a nuclear plant design or an operator's mistake at
such a plant ? Can we as a world community afford ignoring the worst case
scenario ? Do we have enough knowledge to prevent future catastrophes of this
kind and to cope with the consequences of Chernobyl ? Do we have enough
statesmanship to rise above other considerations and face the challenges of the
after-Chernobyl epoch?
Obviously, Chernobyl catastrophe put to a very serious test the vitality not
only of Belarusian people but the vitaUty of the international community bonds
and the preparedness of states to cooperate meaningfully in the face of an unseen
ecological danger.
Belarus does all it can, and more than that, to mitigate the consequences of
Chernobyl and provides the international community with a sizable scientific
contribution for that purpose. The scale of the catastrophe and its consequences,
however, defies capabilities of any single country. The 10-years since the
explosion at the Chernobyl power station showed, however, that the international
community is not quite up to the Chernobyl test. New and vigorous international
cooperation is badly needed in the following three areas.
1. The world community ought to understand in full measure the current
plight of Chernobyl victims in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia and to provide
meaningful assistance to relieve their suffering. Wanted here remain adequate and
targeted humanitarian help and medical help, both in terms of high-quaUty
equipment (early diagnostics and treatment) and modem and effective medicines.
2. We need to understand how to cope with the disaster - the one which
happened and, God forbids, possible new disasters.

36
a) Undoubtedly, we will hardly be able to manage without precisely
identified scientific guidelines, without the participation and help of the world's
best scientific experts.
Belarusian scientists and experts have by now a 10-years experience in
intense study of the situation in the polluted areas. This is our continued
contribution to the international scientific cooperation. A considerable part of the
intellectual resources of Belarus is devoted to this purpose. A network of
specialized research institutes has been formed, qualified national scientific
personnel has been trained in new areas. Large-scale research is being conducted
in the field of radiation medicine, genetics, radiobiology, agricultural radiology,
manufacturing of special preparations and food additives. There is an active
research into the problems of socio-psychological and economic rehabilitation.
In Belarus in the post-Chernobyl decade we had accumulated a unique
experience on the results of the radiation effects on human beings and the
environment. We have fundamental scientific material on the reduction of negative
effects of radiation.
Here I would like to stress an important point: Belarus proceeds from the
principle of free and guaranteed access to the information on the consequences
of the catastrophe. We cooperate fully with the World Health Organization,
International Atomic Energy Agency, European Commission and other
international agencies. We are providing necessary conditions for the
implementation of international research projects in our territory. Experts from
many countries, international scientific community at large and international
agencies displayed serious interest in our scientific findings. We in Belarus are
convinced that the comprehensive results of this research should be appUed for the
purpose of overcoming the consequences of disasters.
b) We need to gain knowledge and create technologies for rehabilitation of
contaminated lands as well as technologies allowing for producing safe foods in
a
contaminated environment. This kind of cooperation will allow us to gradually
return the affected territories to full and viable Ufe. If we let the time pass, if we
fail to create acceptable conditions for Ufe in these areas - then a whole zone in
the geographic center of Europe the size of several small European countries put
together will be doomed to social, demographic and economic degradation.
3. We need to identify the most rational applications of international
intellectual efforts and material means. For that purpose Belarus has recently
submitted to the International Conference "One Decade after Chernobyl: Summing

37
up of the Consequences of the Accident" held in Vienna recently, on April 09, the
following proposals:
a) to set up a Joint Scientific Interstate Center on the problems of
Chernobyl to coordinate efforts of scientists, which would allow for increased
efficiency of their work and cooperation;
b) to arrange financing of the Chernobyl projects on equal and mutually
acceptable terms and for that purpose to set up the Fund of the Planet Protection
which could accumulate a part of profits of the nuclear machine-building and
power engineering industries in order to use these funds for the mitigation of the
consequences of nuclear catastrophes and prevention of further disasters;
c) to create a viable and enforceable international legal framework of the
responsibility of states for causing nuclear damage to other countries which would
specify appropriate guarantees and compensations. The IAEA is already
undertaking practical steps in this direction. We welcome this and call for the
speediest elaboration of such international instruments.
Belarus also considers that the disproportionate share of Chernobyl
sacrifice and damage which Belarus has to sustain warrants international
contribution to sustainable socio-economic and environmental development of the
Republic of Belarus.
step by step
During 10 years already the international community have been realizing
the bitter lessons of one of the most tragic events of the 20th century
when a creation of human mind built for the benefit of people went out of control
and scorched our earth with a radioactive tornado never seen before. And these
lessons should be learnt from for many more years to come.
For those who did not face directly the radiation disaster it may seem that
the problem of Chernobyl has lost its intenseness and topicahty. But not for the
people of Belarus, Russia, the Ukraine.
We will never agree with dehberately understated estimates of the disaster
consequences, which are presented from time to time by certain representatives of
international organizations.
For us this tragedy has a clearly expressed beginning, but unfortunately has
no foreseeable end.

38
Written Testimony
of His Excellency Yuri Shchcrbak, Ambassador of Ukraine
at a hearing to assess the social, political, health, economic and
eovironineotal legacy of the Chornobyl disaster
before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(April 23, 1996)
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished members of the United States Congress,
Ladies and Gentlemen!
First of all,
let me express my gratitude for the great honor to be
here this morning at a congressional hearing on the Chornobyl disaster
as an eyewitness of its aftermath. On the first days of May, 1986 I
voluntarily went to the Chornobyl area as a doctor of medicine and
author and begun to collect testimonies of people involved in
Chornobyl case. On the basis of such testimonies I wrote a
documentary story about Chornobyl. Being a member of the Soviet
parliament in 1989-1991, as a Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Nuclear Energ>- and Environment. 1 organized the first in history of
the Soviet Parliament public hearing on the consequences of the
Chornobyl catastrophe. Due to this activity many secret data about
the disaster were made public.
As a leader of the Green Movement of Ukraine, I
organized the
first "public trial" in 1991 for Investigation of reasons and
consequences of Chornobyl. The trial found the Communist regime
guilty. There is no doubt that Chornobyl disaster to a great extent
contributed to the demise of the Communist regime, because the

39
Ukrainian people realized that the Communist Party and its leader
Mikhail Gorbachev, hiding the truth from society,
exposed to danger
lives and health of millions of people, especially children, forcing
them to take part in May First manifestations under the conditions of
high radiation levels.
By the totality of its consequences, the accident at Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in 1986 is the largest modern disaster, a national
calamity which touched upon the destinies of millions of people living
on »'ast territories. This catastrophe has brought the Soviet Union and
the world community at large to the necessity of solving new and
extremely complex and comprehensive problems dealing practically
with all spheres of life - political and social system, economy,
industrial development and the state of science and technology, legal
norms and laws, culture and morals.
The following testimony is based upon the data contained in the
1996 National Report of Ukraine 'Ten Years After Chornobyl
Accident", 1996 report of the Ukrainian Ministry of Chornobyl Affairs
and the article "Ten Years of the Chornobyl Era" published in April
1996 issue of "Scientific American" magazine.
WHAT HAPPENTD IK CHORNOBYL?
April 26, 1986 will go into histor>' books as the date when
reactor number four of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant in
Ukraine
exploded causing death and radioactive contamination of a wide area

40
around it. The Chornobyl Plant is situated 110 kilometers (about 70
miles) from Kyiv, capital of Ukraine, and not far from the very heart
of Europe either. That industrial disaster was later qualified as the
world's major engineering and ecological catastrophe.
The events that led up to the explosion are well known. Reactor
number four, a 1,000-megawatt RBMK-1000 design, produced steam
that drove generators to make electricity. On the night of the
accident, operators were conducting a test to see how long the
generators would run without power. For this purpose, they greatly
reduced the power being produced in the reactor and blocked the flow
of steam to the generators.
Unfortunately, the RBMK-1000 has a design flaw that makes its
operation at low power unstable. In this mode of operation, any
spurious increase in the production of steam can boost the rate of
energy production in the reactor If that extra energy generates still
more steam, the result can be a runaway power surge. In addition, the
operators had disabled safety systems that could have averted the
reactor's destruction, because the systems might have interfered with
the results of the test.
At 1:23 and 40 seconds on the morning of April 26, realizing
belatedly that the situation had become hazardous, and operator
pressed a button to activate the automatic protection system. The
action was intended to shut the reactor down, but by this time it was
too late. What actually happened could be likened to a driver who

41
presses the brake pedal to slow down a car but finds instead that it
accelerates tremendously.
Within three seconds, power production in the reactor's core
surged to 100 times the normal maximum level, and there was a
drastic increase in temperature. The result was two explosions that
blew off the 2,000-metric-ton metal plate that sealed the top of the
reactor, destroying the building housing it.
There had been over 230 metric tons of fuel in unit number four,
incl'-ding 192 tons of fuel in
the core of the reactor. As a result of the
explosion and fire of the reactor, the environment was polluted by a
part of released nuclear fuel amounting to as minimum 90 million
curie of radioactivity including radioactive iodine,
cesium, plutonium,
strontium and several other Isotopes. The rest of fuel was dispersed
within the damaged reactor and around it. Intensity of radioactivity
could be compared to that which would result from the simultaneous
explosion of 500 A-bombs similar to the one that was dropped on
Hiroshima In August 1945. The hot gases from the burning reactor
were being thrown into the atmosphere for at
least ten days after the
accident and rose to the altitude of about three thousand feet, only
gradually sinking to lower altitudes. The radioactive cloud that was
hanging above the nuclear-power plant was carried
by winds towards
the Ukrainian land of Polissya and some areas of Belarus and Russia.
A little later higher levels of radioactivity were registered in parts of
Sweden. Finland. Poland. Germany, Romania. Turkey, Georgia,

42
Switzerland, France and Great Britain. The atmosphere of the whole
northern hemisphere was affected.
COMBATING THE CATASTROPHE
Military units of the Soviet Armed Forces and specialized
units
of some ministries and departments were engaged in clearing up the
rubble, providing access to the ruined reactor, removing radioactive
substances thrown out of the reactor during the explosion.
The work
on 'leaning up the contaminated territories with the use of chemical
and other means began in just a few days after the explosion. A great
number of reservists were mobilized to help overcome the
consequences of the disaster.
All in all. more than 600.000 civilians and military took part in
the work of overcoming the consequences of the disaster in
1986 and
1987 (every second of them was military). About 40 ministries and
departments of Ukraine, Russian Federation and other constituent
republics of the former Soviet Union took part in this work of
enormous complexity and scope.
By incredible efforts of so^ailed "liquidators", i.e. cleanup
workers, a special Shelter later called "Sarcophagus" was built over
the damaged reactor. It was built in less than half a year owing to
self-sacrifice of the people as well as to high professionalism of experts
and technical level of national design and construction organizations.

43
The "Sarcophagus" facility was the most complicated technical
construction at that time. It reduced radioactive releases from the
reactor to the minimum; improved, in principle, the radiation situation
at the industrial site of the nuclear power plant, lessened
psychological tension of the population.
At the construction of the of the Shelter 10,000 workers were
employed. 360 thousand tons of concrete were used, about 500,000
metal constructions were erected.
For the population evacuated from
the ?one about 21,000 houses were built and 15,000 new apartments
provided. In 1989 the construction of a new city for Chernobyl NPP
personnel was initiated, and the city's population now is 26,000
people.
In order to provide efficient help to the victims, almost 2,500
doctors, 5,000 medical workers and 1,200 students of Ukrainian
colleges and universities were engaged in the works at the end of April
- beginning of May 1986. All of them were united into 230 urgently
organized dosimetry laboratories aiid over 400 special medical teams.
Soon there was established a sanitarj- epidemic service which was
reinforced with expert teams from other Ukrainian regions.
Network of radiation control sj'stem includes almost 2,200
laboratories, points and posts equipped with corresponding facilities
and Instruments, fint of all
spectrometers, radiometers, dosimeters etc.
Almost 3.300,000 samples of soil, atmospheric aerosols and releases,
water, foodstuffs, grass and forestry products are analyied annually.

44
Over 100 human irradiation meters, 20 of which are mobile, have been
installed in 12 regions.
At the same time, over 90% of technical devices used for
radiation control in the contaminated areas are outdated and need to
be replaced with modern highly sensitive efficient mobile equipment.
Beginning from 1986, decontamination works have been carried
out both at the plant and in
1,840 human settlements. The Program of
Elimination of Chornobyl NPP Accident Consequences for 1995-2000
con'^ins a provision for implementation of such works in additional 40
settlements of 7 regions of Ukraine. Unfortunately, the efficiency of
decontamination efforts on the soils is decreasing yearly, as
radionuclides get washed out with precipitation and penetrate into the
soil where a considerable part of them remains. The concentration of
radionuclides in the soil, however, contributes to lower dose rates
generated by external radiation.
RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION' OF ENVIRONMENT
Vast stretches of land in Ukraine and elsewhere were
contaminated by radioactivity. Later sur\'eys revealed that in Ukraine
alone plutonium-239 had contaminated over 700 square kilometers,
or
about 270 square miles (0.1 curie and higher per 1 sq. km.),
strontium-90 (3 curie and higher per 1 sq. km) and cesium- 137 (5
curie and higher per 1 sq. km) had contaminated over 3,420 sq. km
(about 1.320 sq. miles).

45
8
Rivers and lakes in the vicinity of Chornobyl were badly
contaminated as well, the Kyiv water reservoir in particular. Higher
levels of radioactivity were registered in all water reservoirs along the
Dnieper River, and it should be noted that these reservoirs supply
more than 30 million people of Ukraine with water. There is a
constant danger that the radionuclides can seep through the soil
and
penetrate into the underground water sources.
According to the latest data, more than 50,000 sq. kilometers
(about 19,300 sq. miles) in 74 districts of 12 regions of Ukraine were
contaminated to lesser of greater extent (these regions are: Kyiv,
Zhytomyr, Chemlhiv, Rivnc, Vinnyisya, Cherkasy, Khmelnytsky,
Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Chemivtsi, Sumy, Temopil); 2,218 towns
and villages were located within the boundaries of the contaminated
territory, and the number of people who have been affected by the
disaster is in excess of 2.6 million people, including 700,000 children.
Ukraine was proclaimed "the area of ecological disaster".
As a consequence of the Chornobyl disaster,
4.6 million hectares
of agricultural lands (3.1 million hectares of arable lands included)
and 4.4 million hectares of forests were contaminated with products of
radioactive decay. The authorities had to exclude 180 thousand
hectares of agricultural lands (52 thousand hectares in the exclusion
rone) and 157 thousand hectares of forests
(among them 40 thousand
hectares in the exclusion zone).

46
The distribution of the fallout was extremely patchy. Today,
three zones are distinguished on the contaminated territory: the
exclusion, obligatory relocation, and guaranteed voluntary relocation
zones and strict radiation control. The most affected area has been the
exclusion zone (so-called 30-km zone surrounding Chornobyl NPP),
i.e.
the territory of Ukraine which was contaminated by radionuclides
resulting from the Chornobyl accident. Those lands have been
excluded from agricultural activity, with a special form of government
control being performed by the administration of the zone. In
compliance with the law "On the legal status of the territory
contaminated by the Chornobyl accident", the zone has been
determined as the territory from which the population has been
evacuated in 1986. The total area of the exclusion zone equals 2,044
sq. km. Located within the zone are the towns of Prypyat and
Chornobyl as well as 74 more villages.
Radioactive contamination of the exclusion zone is determined
first of all
by the radionuclides of Cs-137, Sr-90 as well as transuranic
elements. As of January' 1, 1994, about 95% of radioactive
contamination remained in the upper 5-cm deep layer of soil. The
surface radioactive contamination of the zone amounts to about 110
thousand Ci of Cs-138.
127 thousand Cl of Sr-90 and 800 Ci of Pu-230
and Pu-240. The area with contamination level
higher than 15 Ci\sq.
km. of radioactive cesium and 3 Ci\sq.km. of radioactive strontium
and 0.1 Ci\sq.km. of plutonium covers 1856 sq. km.

47
10
According to maximum estimations, the Shelter incorporates
more than 200 tons of nuclear fuel with activity higher than 20
million Ci. Apart from the fuel containing masses (FCM), there is a
great deal of radioactive waste: core remains, reactor graphite,
contaminated structural elements.
In different premises of the facility
there are 3000 cu. m. of water. Its activity amounts to 0.001 to
0.00001 Cl/1 (these are primarily Cs-137, Cs-134 and Sr-90). It also
contains uranium in the form of dissolved salts - about 1 rag/1. There
are qiore than 2 metric tons of uranium and 700 kg of plutonium
inside the Shelter.
About 14 thousand of spent cassettes are stored at the spent
nuclear fuel storage site. The volume of waste accumulated at ChNPP
is more than 40,000 cu. ra. of solid waste, about 25,000 cu. m. of
liquid waste. Annually, as a result of ChNPP operation, 2,000 cu. m.
of solid and 870 cu. m. of liquid wastes are released.
Radioactive materials with total
activity of about 380 thousand
Ci and the bulk volume of about 1
million cu. m. are disposed in three
burial sites and temporar>' disposal sites. Burial and temporary'
disposal sites. Burial and temporar>- disposal sites were simple to
build, their number exceeds 800. They were made at the critical
phase
of the catastrophe without proper project preparation. All of these
places arc recorded and marked at the maps and there have been
organized engineering research and project works, in which a number
of European firms participate. Transformation of temporary storages

48
11
into the system of long-term radioactive storage is a rather difficult
technical and economic task requiring our joint efforts.
The ChNPP cooling pond covers the area of 22.9 sq. km. and
contains 160 million cu. m. of water. In 1989 - 1993, the annual
average water contamination in the cooling pond was as much as 140
to 330 picoCiM of Cs-137, 120 to 230 picoCiM of Sr-90. The total
activity of bottom sediments is up to 3.5 thousand of Cs-137, nearly
800 Ci of Sr-90 and about 3 Ci of Pu-238 and Pu-239.
Despite the measures taken, the problem of presence of
radionuclides in food remains an acute one,
in particular in the private
sector. Whereas in the public sector milk and meat comply with
existing norms, privately owned farms sometimes produce and sell
these foodstuffs contaminated beyond the acceptable limit.
Contaminated milk (over 370 Bq\kg) was found during 1991-1993 in
Volyn, Zhytomyr, Rivne and Chernihiv regions, and on individual
farms these Indices vary from 1500 to 3000 Bq\kg.
High levels of Cs contamination have been found in
mushrooms
and other forest fruit in Volyn, Kyiv, Zhvtomyr, Rivne and Chernihiv
regions. To prevent radioactive contamination of milk, mineral
fertilizers have been spread over the acid soils of 12 thousand private
farms, and 62 thousand hectares of clean pastures have been allocated
additionally.
MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES

49
12
Immediately after the accident at the orders from the Communist
party, there began a real political and propagandist battle in
interpreting the possible medical consequences of Chornobyl. The
official representatives of Soviet medicine, as well as some
representatives of the nuclear industry complex in the West tried to
deny any consequences of Chornobyl for human health. For that
people called those people "Chornobyl nightingales" which meant the
extreme optimists. On the other hand, there were "black pessimists"
whr forecast nearly death of the entire Ukrainian people.
The truth is that medical consequences are undoubtedly there,
but taking into account an exceptional complexity and multiple
factors of the process, its durability, it is very difficult today to give
their final quantitative estimate. This explains huge discrepancies in
data about deaths from the accident given by authors from different
organizations. At the same time it is immoral to deny serious medical
consequences for the health of people m Ukraine and Belarus which
appeared recently In some respectable western publications. It could
be compared to publications in anti-Semitic newspapers where they say
there where no gas cameras m Auschwitz nor Babyn Yar crimes.
Today 360 thousand liquidators live in Ukraine. They need
treatment or permanent medical supervision, rehabilitation and
comi>ensation for the damage to their health regardless of its nature.
Now. 35 thousand of them are mvalids. In addition, 3.1 million people

50
13
live or, in the year of the accident, lived in the contaminated
territories. Among them there are 1
million children.
The most complicated task is the evaluation of medical and
biological consequences of the accident, as they relate to multi-factor
effects including both objectively measurable dose loads,
the levels of
the contamination of the environment and the factors of social and
psychological nature which can not be assessed quantitatively.
Uncertainty in the assessment of the situation, distrust to the
Infonnation, ignorance of the objective information about biological
effect of radiation, sometimes false rumors, etc. objectively result in
stress to which organism reacts unpredictably and inadequately to the
exposure.
Despite the fact that a relatively small number of people died
immediately after the accident (3l person died of the acute forms of
radiation sickness), the long-term consequences are grave and cause
great tension in the work of state agencies and medical service of
Ukraine. For example, 5,000 people have lost ability to work. The
sickness of 30,000 "liquidators" is officially attributed to the
aftermath of the catastrophe. According to the Greenpeace-Ukraine
organization, over 32.000 people died as a result of the accident. The
population mortality in the most affected regions increased by 15.7%
compared to the pre-accident period.
As a consequence of inhaling aerosols containing iodine 131
immediately after the accident. 13.000 children in the region

51
14
experienced radiation doses to the thyroid of more than 2000 roentgen
equivalents, which means they received at least twice the maximum
recommended dose for nuclear industr\' workers for an entire year.
to 4,000 of these children had doses as high as 2,000 roentgen
equivalents. Because iodine collects in the thyroid gland, these
children have developed chronic inflammation of the thyroid often
giving rise to thyroid cancer. It has been estimated that within five
tears of the disaster the number of thyroid cancer had grown from 5 to
22 ? year, and from 1986 to the end of 1995, 589 cases of thyroid
cancer were recorded in children and adolescents. Ukraine's overall
rate of thyroid cancer among children has increased about 10-fold from
pre-accident levels and is now more than four cases per million.
On another subject, a group of Kyiv researchers has conducted a
medical survey of a group of liquidators and has found that the
majority of these people had the constant fatigue syndrome
accompanied by depression of a certain subclass of lymphocytes, the so
called natural killer cells which have the power to kill the cells of
tumors or virus Infected cells. The defects of natural immune system
Up
got the name of "Chornobyl AIDS" which in
the nearest future could
cause the increased rate of leukemias and malignant tumors, as well as
makes a person more susceptible to "normal infections" like bronchitis,
tonsillitis, pneumonia etc. which last longer and acquire grave clinical
forms.

52
15
Chernobyl has given rise to a psychological syndrome
comparable to that suffered by veterans at wars in Vietnam and
Afghanistan. Among children evacuated from the zone there has been a
ten- to 15-fold increase in the incidence of neuropsychiatric disorders.
The birth rate in the contaminated areas has sharply decreased,
and mortality has increased. It negatively affects an overall
demographic situation in Ukraine leading to its depopulation.
Since 1987 the overall morbidity among adult population of
Ukraine in general has risen by 3.6%, and among the Chornobyl
victims it
grew by 3.8 times. Whereas the general children's morbidity
in Ukraine within this period fell by 15%, among the children of
Chornobyl it grew by 2.1 times. The initial disability among
liquidators has grown up to 25 limes, among the people evacuated
from Chornobyl and resettled persons it grew by 4.6 times, and among
the population of contaminated areas it increased by 1.7 times. The
incidence of leukemia among liquidators aged 30 to 39 is
higher than
average. According to the Ministry of Health statistics, the deaths of
2,929 people are officially attributed to the radioactive emanation. As
of today only 19.8% liquidators could be considered "practically
healthy", and among the evacuated population this ratio is only 21%,
whereas for the population of contaminated areas the figure is 24%.

53
16
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Over the first years following the Chernobyl NPP accident,
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, funds for the implementation
of the operations aimed at the elimination of the accident
consequences were allocated from the former Soviet Union budget.
From 1992 to 1996, total amount of costs which were allocated
from the Ukrainian budget for the elimination of the accident's
consequences exceeds US $3 billion. Ukraine's budget for 1996 alone
pro^Mdes for these purposes more than US $600 million, and we will
have to make such payments for a long period of time.
At the end of 1991, pursuant to the Decree of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, the specialized Fund For The Implementation Of
Measures For The Elimination Of The Consequences Of The
Chornobyl Disaster And Social Protection Of The Population was
established as a component part of the state
budget of Ukraine. Since
1992, the operations have been financed from this fund.
The Chornobyl fund is
made up at the expense of the allocations
from enterprises and economic entities,
regardless from enterprises and
economic entities, regardless of subordination and type of ownership,
in the amount of \2% of the wages fund, the money paid to be charged
to the cost of the product.
The assets of the fund arc spent on the following:
payment of compensations and benefits;
social security payments;

54
payments related to pension benefit privileges;
capital investments;
other expenditures for the implementation of operations for the
elimination of the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster.
Unfortunately, because of the grave economic crisis, the
tendency toward cutting the specific share of the "Chornobyl" funds
against the state budget has become quite distinct. For instance, in
1995 it was only 5% compared to 15.7% in 1992.
The Chornobyl accident also resulted in the destruction of the
entire complex of traditional popular culture on a significant area of
Ukrainian Polissya which was associated with the mass migration and
dispersion of the indigenous residents in a new ecological and
geographic, as well as ethnic and cultural environment. Under these
disastrous circumstances, a decision was made aimed at conservation of
historical and cultural legacy of this region in order to foster social
and cultural rehabilitation and adaptation of the accident affected
population to their new areas of residence.
The remains of material and spiritual culture of the accidentaffected
area feature unique relic attributes which root in remote past
and are invaluable for the restoration of the ethnic history of
Ukrainian and other Slavic peoples.

55
18
LEGISLATION ON CHORNOBYL
The disaster has posed a number of issues of administrative,
social, medical and biological character.
To deal with the legal side of the problem, a special committee
was established in the Ukrainian Parliament, and a special Ministry
for Chomobyl Affairs was created within the Ukrainian Government.
These bodies adopted several dozens of laws, regulations and
instructions of unique and unprecedented character.
On February 28, 1991 the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed
the "Law On The Sutus And Social Protection Of Citizens That Have
Sustained Damage As A Result Of The Chomobyl NPP Disaster"
which provided, through attracting a significant amount of financial
and material resources,
for protection both of those who participated
in the accident cleanup operations and the people resettled from the
contaminated areas.
A special 12% tax (often called "Chomobyl tax") has been
introduced to raise funds for dealing with the disaster's aftermath.
In
February 1991, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine
adopted "The Concept Of Resident Living Of The Population In The
Areas Of Ukraine With Higher Levels Of Radioactive Contamination
Caused By The Chomobyl NPP Disaster",
passed the laws of Ukraine
"On The Legal Status Of Territory Contaminated As A Result Of The
Chornobyl NPP Disaster" and "On The Status And Social
Protection
Of Citizens That Have Sustained Damage As A Result Of The

56
19
Chernobyl NPP Disaster". In December 1991, July 1992 and in the
end of the year 1995, this Law was modified by a number of
legislative additions and amendments.
Pursuant to the adopted laws, citizens are entitled to
indemnification of damage caused to their health and property by the
Chernobyl disaster as well as priority medical care,
compensations and
benefits for living and working in the contaminated areas.
Depending
upon the risk produced by the radiation on the human organism, the
laws defined the categories of citizens who had sustained damage as
a
result of the disaster and, therefore, qualify for over 40 types of
benefits and compensations.
At present, the money that Is spent directly on the social
protection of the affected population constitutes 60% of the funds
assigned for the measures toward the elimination of the effects
of the
Chomobyl accident and social protection of the population.
In spending the money, the protection of health of the survivors
is considered top priority. This includes preferential medical care, freeof-charge
preferential dental care,
free prescription medication, annual
preventive medical examination by health specialists and treatment at
the specialized medical centers.
A significant amount of the money is
allocated for the improvement of the survivors' health and recreation,
supply of ecologically clean foodstuffs.
Chomobyl invalids of groups I and II are entitled to motor
vehicles free of charge. Benefits and compensations are envisaged for

57
20
children affected by the Chernobyl disaster, depending upon the levels
of the radioactive contamination in the area where they lived or
continue to live.
CURRENT CHORNOBYL PROBLEMS AND PRIORITIES
No matter how complex reasons of the accident are, first and
foremost, it's certain that they are due to shortcomings of the
construction which let
the source of utmost danger be operated with
inadequate safety system. These circumstances in conjunction with
low-quality regulatory documentation were among the main reasons of
the accident.
Over past years a complex of measures has been taken to
improve construction of the reactor's separate units and nuclear,
radiation and fire safety as well as to improve the quality of
operational documentation, which helped to increase reactor and plant
safety.
There have been laid the foundations for nuclear legislation of
Ukraine and independent bodies for the state regulation of nuclear and
radiation safety created. All of this contributes to safety in using
nuclear energy in general.
The dgcommisaioning of C>)nrnnbyl NPP is
an issue of COncem
to many in the world. With regard to this matter, as recently as on
April 18 the Ukrainian Parliament, at Its hearings, reconfirmed our
intentions to decommission the Chornobyl NPP by the year of 2000
laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between

58
21
the Government of Ukraine and the Governments of G-7 and the
European Commission in December 1995. Over April 19, 1996 G-7
Nuclear Summit in Moscow, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma
entirely confirmed the decision to close Chernobyl NPP. But without
real and concrete financial assistance by the world community Ukraine
is unable to go through it alone because of the extremely difficult
economic situation. Thus, over April 1996 Moscow G-7 summit we
were pleased to hear from G7 representatives the confirmation of
December 1995 agreement under which the G-7 pledged some $2.6
billion of credit lines and $512 million in grants, though the real
needs may be higher.
The other priority activities regarding minimization of the
consequences of the Chornobyl accident are:
- protection of the population against irradiation the sources of
which are located in the zone, and radioactive protection of the
personnel working in the zone;
• bringing under control technogenic objects that contain
radioactive materials;
- carrying out landscape design activity aimed at limiting
radionuclides migration and keeping down radioactive contamination
of the environment;
- setting up radiation contamination monitoring in the zone;
- carrying out scientific research;
- preservation of historical and cultural objects;

59
22
- ensuring proper infrastructure necessary for carrying out
activities and staying of people within the zone.
Careful investigation of the damaged 4th unit gives every reason
to think that the safety of the Shelter site may be reliably ensured for
only seven years, not 30, as is widely stated. Hence, the need to
develop, on a competitive basis, a project offering the ultimate
solution to the nuclear and radiation risks.
The exclusion zone,
where there are more than 800 radioactive
waste disposal sites are located, is another source of danger and public
anxiety. It is necessary to complete relevant designs, to select the
general contractor and to commence waste treatment and localization
works. Law enforcement and fire protection status within the zone has
to be improved; the cooling water pond and the river
Prypyat floodlands
problems should also be eliminated.
US ASSISTANCE ON CHORNOBYL RELATED ISSUES
The major role in G-7 efforts is played by the United States. It
is
noteworthy that programs of assistance to my country on Chomobyl
related areas already launched with the help of the US Government
could be described as promising and helpful in some areas and still
only promising in the others.
First of all, I should express the deep appreciation for the efforts
of the US Government to help Ukraine to cope with the nuclear safety
problems we inherited from the old Soviet regime in nuclear power

60
23
sector. These projects were implemented through the programs
developed by the Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Department of Defense. In this regard, let me
mention the establishing and equipping of the training center for
nuclear power plants operators in Khmelnytsky and various training
courses delivered there. The joint venture of the Westinghouse
Corporation with the Ukrainian partner from Kharkiv recently became
operational and would allow Ukraine to produce necessary pieces of
equipment to further increase the safety level at our nuclear power
facilities.
The earmarking by the Congress of significant funds for
further
development of the nuclear safety assistance programs creates some
optimism for the nearest future. The Government of Ukraine is very
grateful to those Senators and Congressmen who backed this
earmark.
Out of US $225 million for 1996 assistance to Ukraine, $50 million to
$70 million could be spent for energy sector and nuclear safety needs,
Including $3 million for the establishment of the International
Research Center in Chornobyl and $2.5 million for enhanced fire
safety measures at the plant's unit number three.
The US Government helped to maintain capabilities
of about a
dozen and a half US NGOs dealing with Chornobyl victims assistance.
Medical supplies and pieces of equipment we received from DOD
excess supplies and largely private sources were leveraged by various
US NGOs from small US Government grants which helped these

61
24
private religious, non-profit or cultural organizations, as well as
organizations of Ukrainian Americans, to provide humanitarian and
medical assistance for about US $35 million in the last three to four
years. The DOD earmarked some funds for programs in the field of
Chornobyl related cancers which, we hope, will
make a difference at
least for some of the innocent victims of the catastrophe. We expect a
new portion of humanitarian shipments to arrive in Ukraine this week,
the week of the tenth anniversary of the tragedy.
Two weeks ago many people in this country and around the
world had a chance to see a broadcast on CNN TV network with the
objective coverage of the status of Chornobyl related consequences.
I
think the majority of viewers were shocked to learn that the research
projects,
needed not only for Ukrainians but for the whole mankind,
are not funded enough. The same is true for environmental cleanup
programs which have been promised by the international community at
some point but afterwards largely forgotten.
Having read in the USAID 1993 annual report on assistance to
the NIS that USAID was considering the plan to help us to reduce
contamination of the Dnipro River basin,
the water supply source for
30 million Ukrainians, we were encouraged. We were much less
encouraged reading exactly the same provisions in corresponding
reports a year and two years later.
Mr. Yuri Kostenko, my successor at
the position of the Minister of environmental protection and nuclear
safety of Ukraine, visited this country a number of times asking
for

62
25
one mobile laboratory at least for monitoring the level of
contamination, not even speaking about the reduction of existing
contamination. We never got one. Announced and publicized program
for reducing the water contamination for 30 million Ukrainians ended
up as of today in providing of one mobile water purification system
producing 5 liters of clean water per minute at a children's hospital in
Kyiv. To the best of my knowledge, the mentioned assistance project
lacks funds for establishing the production line of such water
purification systems. The fact that at least one such system was
produced took place only because of Senator Moynihan and
Congressman Rangel support.
We understand that we live in the era of budget constraints,
that assistance funds already established are limited, and that other
priorities do exist. But let me draw your attention to the fact that a
lot of activities that have already been launched and those which need
to be undertaken are of global importance. Nuclear technologies are so
widespread that other disasters may occur.
In helping us to cope with
the legacy of Chornobyl, the wealthy nations would learn how to
solve such problems for themselves in the case the accident should
occur.
I would like to appeal for the common sense and reason and to
ask the United States Congress to consider the special piece of
legislation for special funding of research and monitoring assistance
programs of global significance such as long-term health, genetic and

63
26
environmental effects of radioactive contamination. Ukraine never
refused to cooperate in these matters and would bear its part of the
burden.
The Ukrainian government has assisted, in every possible way, to
the organization of cooperation and is
financing an extensive program
of scientific substantiation, as well as conducting works on the
elimination of the disaster consequences. Chornobyl zone offers unique
opportunities for the complex researches of consequences of nuclear
and radiation accidents in natural environment and for systematizatlon
of the results of exposure to constant radiation for vegetation and
animal world.
The govenunent of Ukraine calls upon all countries,
international organizations and research centers to take part in the
establishment and operation of the International Chornobyl Center on
nuclear safety, treatment of radioactive wastes and radioecological
researches. Joint activities under the auspices of the International
Center will enrich methodological arsenal,
considerably replenish data
base for further theoretical and practical researches in the field of
knowledge concerned with radiation
impact on the nature and living
organisms.
We expect that through the efforts
by governments of separate
countries and international organizations the world community will
made decisive steps towards the liquidation of consequences of the
most serious technological catastrophe in the history of humanity.

64
27
Ladies and gentlemen,
To my deep conviction, mankind has yet to fully realize the
dramatic consequences of the Chornobyl accident and the warnings it
brings. The bells of Chornobyl are especially distinctly heard these
days. Let us listen carefully to these chimes, for they remind us about
the terrible tragedy and warn about the necessity to avert new
disasters in the future.

65
STATEMENT BY
ALEXANDER B. KUZMA
Director of Development
ChUdren of Chomobyl Relief Fund
Chornobyl 10th Anniversary Hearing
Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe
Tuesday, April 23, 1996
Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Conmiission:
On behalf of the Guldren of Chomobyl Relief Fund, I would like to thank
you for giving me the opportunity to address this Conmiission on the aftermath of
the Chomobyl nuclear disaster.
Since 1990, our foundation has been heavily involved in providing
emergency relief to the affected region.
We have launched sixteen airlifts and
numerous smaller shipments, delivering more than 1000 tons of humanitarian
assistance valued at $38 million U.S. dollars.
We have also developed long-term
hospital partnerships and physicians' training programs designed to upgrade the
quality of care at pediatric centers which specialize in ihe treatment of children
with cancer and radiation-related illnesses.
In die course of our relief missions, we
have become quite familiar with a wide range of health problems which have been
on the rise since 1986 and we are concerned about the lack of attention to diese
problems.

66
The shaip increase in thyroid cancer in children has been well-documented.
In Ukraine alone, nearly 300 cases have been verified, and the rate in Belarus is
higher.
These statistics need to be considered as the "tip of the iceberg".
The
highest incidence of cancer usually occurs between ten to fifteen years after
exposure and there are thousands of children who are suffering firom enlarged
thyroids and other conditions which indicate that they are at risk for cancer in die
fiiture.
Even moie troubling are the overall demographic trends in Ukraine and
Belarus.
According to the UN Office on Population, these are the only two nations
in Europe which are experiencing a negative birth ratio.
Traditionally, Ukrainians
have prided themselves on large families and healthy children.
were 40,000 more deaths than live births throughout Ukraine.
Yet in 1992, there
This ratio has
declined steadily, so that in 1995 there were 174,000 more deaths than live births.
(Source:
Ukrainian Ministry of Health) The economic hardships facing many
families have clearly affected birth rates, however environmental factors miist also
be considered.
The Boston Globe reported in January of this year that infertility among
Ukrainian men is the highest in the world, and the New York Times reports that
the life expectancy of Russian men has dropped by 10 years since Chomobyl.
Economics and stress alone cannot account for this deteriorating situation, and the
cause of diese trends call for much closer scrutiny.
Today, infant mortality in Ukraine stands at twice the European average -
14.3 deaths per 1,000 live birAs. And recent studies by the Ukrainian Ministry of
Healtii - Office of Children's and Maternal Health have shown that prenatal and
post-partum complications have increased much more sharply in regions which
were contaminated by fallout from Chomobyl as opposed to areas that were

67
uncontaminated. Two weeks ago, at a conference at Yale University, Dr. Anna
Petrova of Belarus and Dr. Olesya Hulchy of Ukraine presented startlingly similar
results from epidemiological studies on women's reproductive healdi.
Several
striking patterns emerged. Anemia among pregnant women has risen to alarming
levels - over 60 % in regions affected by radioactive fallout (1 to 5 cxiries per
square kilometer).
Anemia is only one factor which greatly reduces the ability of
mothers to deliver healthy babies.
Hypoxia and increases in other, normally rare
conditions have also had a severe efTect on the survival rate of newborns and
yoimg mothers.
A study under tiic supervision of the University of Illinois School of Public
Health is currently imderway to track more than 15,000 mothers and newborns in
six provinces of Ukraine to determine the effect of economic and environmental
factors on maternal and children's healtii.
This study has received extremely
modest funding from the Soros Foundation and the World Health Organization, yet
has made much more substantial progress tiian many studies which have received
far greater financial support from Western agencies.
For some time now we have received persistent reports from the Ukrainian
health ministries that the rate of binh defects has doubled in areas closest to the
evacuated regions.
A team of Japanese health experts from the University of
Hiroshima studied more than 30,000 fetuses and newborns in contaminated
regions of Belarus.
Their findings were reported by UPI and the Kyodo News
Service in 1994, but received scant attention in Westem news publications. The
Jj^janese team observed nearly twice as many birth defects as would be normally
expected.
Cleft palates, missing digits, extra digits, deformed critical organs and
otiier malformations have been reported with greater frequency since Chomobyl.
In areas with higher levels of contamination (between 5 and 10 curies of cesium
per square kilometer), the rate of birth defects has risen eight-fold.

68
During repeated visits to the neonatal ward at the Kyiv Institute of
Pediatrics, Obstetrics & Gynecology I have witnessed numerous children with
defects that I have never seen in the United States.
Dr. Valery Kuznetsov, the
director of the Neonatal Division at the Institute has noted that since Chomobyl,
the number of birth defects has mcreased sharply and the number of children with
multiple defects has also increased.
Arguably, these are anecdotal reports but they
deserve much broader followup.
Members of the Commission who watched the
recent CNN documentary on Chomobyl may have been struck by the irony that
Western scientists know more about Chomobyl's impact on wild voles and field
mice Ihan they know about the genetic impact on the human population of
Ukraine.
Clearly priorities in the research establishment need to be shifted, or at
least the same level of diligence and a comparable sense of urgency needs to be
applied to human health studies.
Many Western scientists - particularly those involved with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - have been eager to dismiss widespread reports of
severe health effects by ascribing them to "radiophobia", - supposedly unfounded
fear of radiation, and psychological stress.
Without even looking at the
population in question, some researchers have adopted the posture of the Soviet
government in the early days following the accident,
accusing the Western media
of exaggerating the accident's effects and by promoting the stereotype of
Belarusians and Ukrainians as hysterics or hypochondriacs.
This kind of bias is antithetical to the principles of scientific inquiry.
It has
abeady embarrassed many well-respected scientists who prior to 1992
emphatically denied that thyroid cancer might be appearing in significant nimibers
of children in the Chomobyl zone.
Now that the link between Chomobyl's fallout
and the explosion in thyroid cancer has been conclusively established, we believe
that the scientific community needs to assume a more open-minded attitude

69
towards other health concerns expressed by Ukrainian and Belamsian physicians.
There is a great deal more that we can learn about radiation health effects, and the
tragedy of Chomobyl has created an open laboratory for this type of intensive
public health research.
There is mounting evidence that the 3.4 million people who were exposed
to excess levels of radiation since 1986 have reason to be worried about their
health and their future.
According to declassified Soviet docimients which were
published in the Russian newspaper IZVESTIYA in 1992, there is no question that
thousands of Soviet citizens were stricken with acute radiation sickness in the first
weeks following the accident
Even as he was downplaying the accident's severity
to the Western press, then Soviet President Gorbachev was receiving daily reports
from the field which contradicted his adamant denial of serious health
consequences.
Before committing suicide one year to the day after the Chomobyl crisis
began, Russian nuclear minister Igor Ligachev admitted to his colleagues that he
had misrepresented the scope of the accident to the IAEA. Exhaustive research
completed by American, Ukrainian and Swedish scientists has now established
that the amoimt of radiation released from Chomobyl was three times higher than
the estimates offered by the Soviets in Vienna in 1986. (See The Chomobyl
active phase: Why the "official view" is wrong , Alexander R. Sich, Nuclear
Engineering International, Nuclear Safety, April, 1996) The original Soviet
estimates can no longer be considered a sound basis for further discussion and the
time has come for the IAEA to overhaul its assessment of Chomobyl' s impact.
By
clinging to them, the IAEA only undermines its credibility.
In 1992, when the President of our Foundation and other experts testified on
the Chomobyl afteraiath before the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety, there
were grave concems expressed about the lack of research focusing on the highest

70
risk population - the nuclear cleanvq) workers and the families which were
evacuated from some of the most highly contaminated zones. Regrettably, there
has still been little progress made in studies of these critical populations.
We still
do not know the number of casualties among the 600,000 soldiers, miners, firemen
and construction workers - most of them in their 20s and 30s at the time of the
accident - heroic young men who risked their lives to contain the spread of
radiation. We still do not know the leukemia and cancer rates among the 1 1,000
Ukrainian children who were evacuated to Cuba for treatment.
And there are
several large clusters of Chomobyl evacuees living in the cities of Kharkiv and
Kyiv and smaller settlements surrounding Kiev and Minsk who would be easily
accessible and of prime interest for long-term health studies.
We are mystified as
to why more effort has not gone into studying their condition.
Regardless of the continuing debate over Chomobyl' s ultimate health
impact, ihe Children of Chomobyl Relief Fund has made a long-term commitment
to upgrade the quality of care for pediatric and adolescent patients in Ukraine.
Although we are proud of CCRF's role as the leading private voluntary
organization providing medical aid to Ukraine, we recognize that there are many
other groups which are also making vital contributions to the intemational relief
effort:
the Catholic Medical Mission Board, the Ukrainian Diabetes Project, the
Cincinatti-Kharkiv Sister Cities Program, the Ukrainian National Women's
League of America, the Thoughts of Faith program based in Milwaukee,
Tennessee's Share the Dream, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA to
name a few.
In Belarus, we have long admired the successes of such organizations
as Citihope and the Ramapo High School Children of Chomobyl campaign - truly
a model for caring schoolchildren everywhere.
Despite the progress we have made, our Board and our volunteers are
painfully aware of the grim realities we face in Ukraine, and we are humbled by

71
the enoimity of the task that lies ahead, in rebuilding the medical infiastiucture of
this devastated region.
As efficient and committed as we and our colleagues may
be, the pnvate voluntary sector cannot accomplish its task without substantial
assistance from the corporate and government agencies.
As Western companies
expand their investments in the former Soviet Union, they should be encouraged
apply the principles of community involvement and good corporate citizenship,
which have become standard in Europe and in the United States.
Hospital
development and community health programs can build trust and solidarity
between American businesses and dieir East European parmers. We cannot expect
Ukraine and other former Soviet republics to make a healthy transition to a new
democratic order, or to buHd a robust economy if their workforce remains sickly
and their children's future remains under a cloud.
A wonderful example of
progressive charitable activity has been a women and children's health initiative
which the Monsanto Company and its subsidiary, Searle Phannaceuticals have
launched in three rural provinces in Ukraine.
The program offers prenatal
screening, nutrition and immunization to help reduce infant mortality in regions
which have been heavily affected by environmental degradation and infectious
disease.
This cost-effective program can build on similar initiatives which have
proven very successful in improving women's and infmts' health in several
American cities.
The Chomobyl disaster remains one of the most profound and pivotal
events in East European history - indeed, in the history of the world.
We cannot
afford to minimize its impact or to turn our backs on its victims.
We believe, based on our experience, that the people of the United States
can bxiild rewarding relation^ps with the people of Ukraine and Belarus by
addressing the issue of Chomobyl head-on.
Our government can enhance its
stature as a compassionate world leader by providing continued funding for health

72
programs in the CIS.
Given the likelihood that health effects in the Chomobyl
region will intensify over ^e next five to ten years, USAID should continue to
provide funding for health programs in Ukraine and Belarus beyond the current
1998 cutoff date. To reduce costs and maximize the efficiency of government
programs, funding should not be wasted on redundant fact-finding missions but
should be channelled through organizations with a proven track record - groups
which have completed their needs assessments and developed a viable
infrastructure on the ground.
Chomobyl is a unique disaster and it requires unique approaches, but as a
nation, we have a great deal of expertise and appropriate technology to offer.
should not be afraid to tap our generosity of spirit
The children of Chomobyl
share a legacy with all the children of the Nuclear Age and their future should be
the concem of every society in every comer of the world.
Thank you.
We

73
Testimony
of Dt. Natalia Lakiza-Sachuk. Prof. Serhiy Pyroz^ov
The National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine
Ukrainian Center of Radioactive Medicine, Ukraine
and Prof. Mykola Omeljanets,
Chomobyl 10th Anniversary Hearing Commission
Cooperation in Europe. Tuesday. April 23. 1996
on Security &
Ten years after Chornobyl: Socio-demographic
consequences for Ukraine
After its independence due to the peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union,
Ukraine joined the world community as its 22nd largest country. After Russia, Ukraine has
the largest population, the largest army, and the largest economy of any of the post-Soviet
states. After Russia, it has the most advanced technology and highest educational and
scientific level of population. Ukraine is about the size of France in both territory and
population, and ranks as a major European state. The geographical center of Europe is
situated on the territory of Ukraine. For all of these reasons, development and the
situation in Ukraine, favourable and unfavourable, must necessarily be important for the
neighboring countries and for the whole World.
Ukraine is also the site of the Chomobyl nuclear reactor, the source of the greatest
nuclear reactor disaster experienced on the planet since the atomic bombs were dropped on
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and its territory is dotted with additional nuclear
power plants of similar design.
On April 26, 1986, at 1:23 am, reactor number 4 at the Chomobyl Atomic power
Station exploded. Subsequent investigations revealed that tests that were being conducted
on the operating and backap systems were mismanaged. The plant was immediately shut
down. Nonetheless, a large amount of radioactive steam was released into the atmosphere
during the explosion. The highest amount of radioactive fallout was registered in the
vicinity immediately surrounding Chomobyl. The atomic energy station and the nearby town
of Prypiat are located in northern Ukraine, 90 km north of Kyiv (Kiev), the capital of
Ukraine, a city with population of 2.8 million people.
In contrast to numerous extraordinary catastrophies and disasters, the nuclear
reactor explosion at the Chomobyl Atomic Power Station has a number of specificities,
making it extremely dangerous in the economic, social and medical sense.
First, the disasterous consequences involve large masses of people. About 62 mln
people in the countries of the former Soviet Union were exposed to ionizing
irradiation. Of
them, 18 mln people were exposed to relatively high irradiation, 4,5 mln people - to high,
and I mln people - to very high irradiation.

74
Second, the people got radiation simultaneously from all factors of radiation accident
(radioactive cloud, radioactive trail, and fall-outs), both from external and internal sources.
Third, very high levels of ionizing irradiation, going beyond the background level, will
continue to exert an adverse effect upon human organisms of the present and future
generations during hundreds of years.
Fourth, it isalmost impossible to liquidate the consequences of the disaster in an
observable future in view of long-term preservance of radionuclides in the surrounding.
Fifth, big financial, material labour resources are required for a liquidation of the
disaster consequences. Sixth, there is a need for the special programs of follow-up of health
for many millions of people during several generations lifetime.
The accident at the Chomobyl Atomic Power Station is a tragedy not only of the
Ukraine alone. It had great implications in terms of the socio-economic Ufe, technicalengineering
statues, and provision of medical service for large population groups in the
neighbouring countries. The mere fact of the expediency of using atomic power for peaceful
purposes is questionable now.
Total amount of radiation released as a result of the explosion at Chomobyl was
originally reported as 50 mln curies by Soviet authorities. During the past decade,
subsequent research in Europe and North America and new calculations have resulted in
revised estimates of up to 260 mln curies. In comparison, the amount of radiation released
at Three Mile Island in 1979 is estimated at 15 mln curies.
Disaster has had an influence on the vast territories over the world. Excessive levels
of radiation recorded in northern Scandinavia, Wales, Ireland, northern Italy, Greece, coastal
Alaska in the first weeks after the explosion. However, the heaviest problems arise out of
this disaster for the people of Russia, Belarus and especially Ukraine where the nuclear
reactor blasted and is still burning. At that time, the prevailing winds were directed north
to north-west, so the Belarus received the most widespread deposit of radioactive fallout.
With subsequent shifts in the direction of the wind, as well as rainfall, northern
regions of Ukraine, as well as the southern border of European Russia received radioactive
fallout .
The total area of soil contaminated in Ukraine with Ce-137 at density from 1 Qu and
more is over than 4,6 mln hectares - that constitute more than 5% of its territory. A
permanent 30 kilometer "dead-zone" was established around thepower station where human
habitation is forbidden. There lived almost 3 mln people on this territory who have been
affected from the consequences of Chomobyl disaster. Over 300,000 people were resettled
to the safe areas during the evacuation after the catastrophe. In addition, about 200,000
people more or 40 % of plarmed to ressetled population, are ready to move. In connection
with economic crises, the works due to the liquidation of Chornobyl explosion consequences
were limited during the last years. Due to the same economic reasons, it is still under the
consideration a question to include Kyiv in the list of contaminated territories.

75
About 5 mln people continue to live now in the areas wth a varying degree of
radioactive contamination in the Ukraine. About 1 mln people of them reside in the settlings
which by the Government of Ukraine granted various kinds of privileges in view of an
increased introduction to human organism of radionucUdes with locally produced milk. These
data illustrate only one big aspect of socio-demographic implication of the Chomobyl
explosion.
A serious result of this disaster is the emergence in Ukraine of a new demographic
catastrophe after the year 1986. We can say with certainty that Chomobyl disaster has
become the heaviest event in a demographic development of the country after the end
of the Second World War, has made the significant contribution in the worsening of a
modem demographic situation and perspectives of Ukraine's population reproduction.
As a result of the accident, the normal demographic proceses were disturbed and their
negative tendences were stimulated. Other factors
- social tensions, economic instability
and decrease of standards of life of Ukraine's population - due to a new geopolitical situation
and transition period - make the situation much worse. The poulation has sharply reacted
on total changes in environmental, socio-economic and political transformations during last
10
years: first, with curtailment of activities in a normal - economic, matrimonial and
educational
behaviour; and second, with unexpected increase of after stress reactions.
Based on the analysis of the current and previous statistical data of population reproduction
in Ukraine we concluded that within 1986-1995 years there had occured changes in all
demographic parameters, such as
number and structure of population of Ukraine, the birth
rates and infant mortaUty rates, causes of mortality and the migration level. E>ecrease of
birth rate and population aging, formation of families which do not reproduce themselves -
these are the features of Ukrainian population today.
According to the international comparison of population reproduction indices -
the birth and death rates of population and its natural increase - Ukraine has tendency to
move on the worse range places during the 5 last years. As for the birth rate (10.0 %o)
takes last place among former republics of the USSR, death rate of population (14.7%o)
- the "honorary " 2nd place among developed countries of the world, by infant
mortality rate ( 14 per 1,000 live births ) - stands at twice the European average, by the
human life span ( 68 years)
- 86th place over the world. From the 1991 there is a
depopulation in Ukraine, which has reached more than 500,(XX) persons till 1995.
The UN office on population reported that in 1994 there were only two nations in
Europe with negative population growth - Ukraine and Belarus. The report attributed this
decUne in part to increased infant mortafity and adverse health conditions stemming from
Chomobyl disaster.
Because of the mistaken evaluation of scope of the Chomobyl catastrophe during the
first post-disaster years and the wrong scientific approach toward taking appropriate.

76
antiradiation measures, there was no clear demographic strategy in the radioactive
ecological disaster areas. It is now recognized that changes in the medical-demographic
situation in the areas of radioactive contamination are directly linked with the negative
effects of socio-economic conditions of life, work and nutrition of the population, becoming
still worse after the accident, and with low level of prophilactic and curative-diagnostic
measures.
During last years there have taken place dramatic changes, due to radiation, in the
very foundation of normal reproduction of the future generations and reproduction of the
nation. Women of the childbearing age and children bom during the first years after the
explosion appeared to be most subject to being affected by its consequences. It was noted
that the former had a worse state of the reproductive system, course of pregnancy and
labour and in many cases developed a greater incidence of complications, and the latter
showed a worse condition of the fetuse and newborns. The morbidity and mortaUty
increased among them. There was a leveling off of boundaries in health statues of the
residents of these categories in the clean and contaminated areas. The demographic
behaviour of the spouses changed, and the main tendency is either
- postponement or
refusal from giving birth to a next child.
In many areas with a strict radiation observance, there was rapid decrease in the
birth rate making thus 30% in 1987 in comparison with the level of 1986. If in our earlier
investigations this peculiar feature was associated by us with the processes of evacuation.
moving away of pregnant women m order to improve their health, not wanting to conceive
at such a critical time, etc., a more thorough study has revealed significant faults of the
possibility to realize the reproductive intentions of the population. Thus, in the areas of a
strict radiation observance, in 1987 versus 1985 there was 2.2 times more still-born
children, 2.6 times more bom deficient children, 1.9 times higher the level of perinatal
death, and 1.5 times higher childrens death. The decline of birthrates in contaminated areas
now is more intensive and has more low levels than in Ukraine as a whole.
In recent years, the level of infant
mortality has increased by 51%. The main causes
of death were respiratory diseases and neoplasms. Infant mortality in conteminated regrions
is still higher than in clean control areas. The level of deaths among girls during the 1st
year of life after disaster, in comparison with boys, is still 1 .5-2.0 times higher in some
contaminated regions. In some of these areas, the proportion of boys among the newborns
is higher than that of girls (about 140 boys per 100 girls, when norm is 105 per 100) untill
this time, that is linked with the effect of radiation on the genetic apparatus. It has been
found that exposure to irradiation on fathers and mothers sexual glands may lead to a
damage of X chromosome, resulting in the increase of boys born to these parents. When
the sexual glands of both parents, and especially a pregnant mother, are exposed to
irradiation, there is the prevalence of girls born to these parents.

77
Changes in the childbearing function seen during that period were accompanied with
an increased rate of womens death in comparison with mens deathrates, the main causes
being tumours, diseases of the endocrine system, blood and hemopoietic organs, etc. Apart
from these, other reasons were also noted which had not been registered before the
accident. They included all kinds of complications developing during pregnancy, delivery and
post-delivery period. All this reflects the worsening of general and reproductive health of
women during the post-accident time.
Currently in Ukraine every 8-12 family is childless. The Boston Globe (01/26/96)
reports that Chomobyl has fueled a massive infertiUty crisis in Ukraine" - half of all men
between the ages of 13 and 29 have the problems of fertility - the higest infertility rate in
the world.
The younger female generations who enter fertile age after the Chomobyl plant
explosion do not show a sufficiently good health. According to the last examination data,
every 5-6th girl has either a therapeutical or gynecological injury that may adversely affect
her reproductive function and realization of her maternity plans.
The results of the medical-demographic investigations indicate the negative effect of
radiation situation in Ukraine upon the state of other human organisms systems -
endocrine, immune and cardiovascular and hence a significant health impairment beginning
from the year 1986. The morbidity of entire population and by all classes of diseases
increased 2.2-fold.
Specially, arise is noted in the birth anomalies, diseases of blood and hemopoietic
organs, thyroid gland hyperplasias, and neoplasms. The indices for malignant deseases and
their dynamics reflect the tendency of rise characteristic of the whole country. According to
the theoretical estimates of specialists, the excess of oncological morbidity over spontaneous
level on the controlled territory may reach about 10%. The percentage of population rated
as healthy individuals in the results of the examination conducted during last three years
decreased in the average to 1 /3 of the whole population. Among the residents of the
controlled territory, i.e. the territory being to some or other degree contaminated with
radiation, this indice decreased by half. Such decrease in the proportion of healthy subjects
during last three years is noted both among the adult and children.
Losses in Ukraine's population and the negative changes taking place in its the
nation's gene pool today promote conditions for the further worsening of the population's
reproduction potential, and the qualitative degradation of the Ukrainian nation may be the
result.
Geneticists conclude that the basis and motivation for modern population
reproduction have also changed. Before, the survival of individuals possessing physical
health was matched in necessity by the survival of the most skilled and intellectually
developed, for the development and preservation of civilization. Today, however, taking into
account the catastrophic genetic and environmental degradation, it is mainly physically

78
healthy individuals, those with no heart or lung diseases, etc., that have a real chance to
survive and bear their posterity. It means the priority of the physical health factor over the
intellectual. Besides this, the human-created air, soil and water pollution in most oblastsof
Ukraine, which alongside the Chornobyl consequences have acquired a global significance,
are the cause of much genetic damage, that can potentially develop like an avalanche. The
result would be a decrease in the birth rate and an increase of birth defects, cripplings from
birth, and hereditary diseases, as well as the appearance of new diseases.
The farther analysis of the dynamics of medical-demographic processes and health
status of the irradiated persons in Ukraine clearly shows the so-called latent period with a
duration of 3-4 years after the catastrophe. Within this period after 1986 there has taken
place a recovery of the level of the main demographic indices (birthrate, infant mortaUty,
mortality with respect to the causes, etc.) This phenomenon agrees with the existing
theories about post-radiation effects and may be linked both with the decrease in irradiation
level, and with the development in human organisms of reparation processes - a recovery of
the structure and function of cellular apparatus damaged by radiation or other agents.
Considering the results of study of health of the population of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki after nuclear bomb catastrophe, the concepts concerning a non-threshold action of
irradiation, and our own data about the short-term consequences of the Chornobyl accident,
we can mark the fifth to tenth post-accident years as the beginning of the period of the
development of its remote consequences.
Hypothetically, we can single out the following main remote medico-demographic
consequences of the accident:
- an increased frequency of tumours of the thyroid gland, predominantly in children,
with a possible lethal outcome, this being higher in women compared to men;
- an increase in the appearance of leukemia(five years after irradiation) with an
increased mortality level within 8-13 years;
- a decrease in the birthrate level due to diseases of the sexual sphere in women
within 6-12 years;
- an increase (to 20-30 %o untill 2000 year in conaminated areas) in the mortality
among young children due to diseases that might occur during the intrauterine development
and juvenile age;
- an increase in the mortality rate of adult people due to the onset of tumours of
various localization and of children who were irradiated during the intrauterine development
due to a wider spectrum of tumours, (beginning from the 10th year after the accident);
- an increase in the mortality level among middle-aged people due to wide spread
chronic diseases and illnesses that developed in association with a participation in
liquidation of the accident;

79
- a possible many-fold increase in the level of genetic efiects in the second generation
people bom from the irradiated subjects of the first generation (20-25 years after the
accident);
- a possible decrease of the lifespan resulting from excessive mortality due to the
above-listed causes.
All this taken together creates a threat
that Ukraine will have not only quantitative
reduction of population but also significant worsening of its health, the qualitative indices
of its intellectual development, degradation of genetic found and, finally, the total
destabilization of demographic development in the whole. By the contrast with economic
and political, the demographic crisis is more inert, prolonged in time and harder for
control, that has the distant negative consequences for independent stable development of
the country.
In view of the adverse action of all above-described factors of the Chornobyl
catastrophe, the Government of Ukraine, and earlier the Soviet Union, have adopted a
number of the decrees aimed at social, economic and medical protection of persons who
took part in liquidation of the accident, who were evacuated and who reside in the
controlled areas. In 1991, the Decree about the status and social protection of citizens
affected by the Chernobyl accident was adopted in Ukraine.
The above - said measures of the demographic poUcy concerned, in general, two
spheres of Ufe - socio-economic and legal. The problems of moral and psychological status
were solved to a lesser degree. Lack of first-hand information and distrust in information
given at later periods gave rise to a stress reaction in the population. All this taken
together with health impairment proceeding against the background of dramatic changes in
the socio-economic situation in the country strongly influenced the formation of the main
demographic principles and their realization by the population of Ukraine. The above facts
show that the measures taken for radiation and social protection of the population are
inadequate and there is an urgent need for the development and implementation of
additional measures in the demographic and social poUcy.
The people of Ukraine, and especially women and children, who continue to reside in
the contaminated territories and who were subjected to difierent degrees of radiation
exposure, should be refered to as a special demographic group requiring a long-term
medical-demographic control, social protection, and all kinds of assistance in the
organization and realization of their childbearing behaviour.
Without such mesures inside country, and the efiorts of people outside
of Ukraine, it
is impossible to imagine not only Ukraine's prosperity but even survival in the nearest
future.
24-782 (88)
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