Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

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The Soviet/CEMA NudcHr Power
Programs and Their Requirements
for Enriched Uranium·
Key Judgments
IlIformatlon a"ailab/~
as Q[ 31 August /983
was uud In this uport.
Total installed nuclear generating capacity in the Soviet Union and other
CEMA countries increased from about 1,000 megawatts (electrical) at the
start of the 1970s to over 22,000 megawatts by the en·d of 1982. Well-publicized,
long-range Soviet/CEMA plans call for approximately 100,000
megawatts of installed capacity by 1990 in Soviet-designed anu -fueled
reactors.
.j
We have examined in detail all avail~ble information frame.
,:}f existing reactors,
those under construction, and those in various plaflning stages. On the basis
of this examination, we believe that a capacity of about 100,000 megawatts
will not be achieved in 1990, but probably will be achieved at some time in
the mid-I 990s. We estimate that actual capacity as of 1990 could be as
high as 88,000 megawatts, but is more likely to range from 60,000 to
70,OOO,megawatts.
The fraction of Soviet uranium enrichmellt capacity allocated to the
Soviet/CEMA nuclear power program increased from essentially zero in
the early 1970s to a cumulative total of about 15 percent of output-
22,OOO-metric-ton separative work units (MTSWU}-by the end of 1982.
We believe this demand will rise dramatically (to 80,000 or more
MTSWU) by 1990, C
J.
In addition to supporting its own r.uclear power program and those of other
CEMA countries, the Soviet Union operates a commercial toll-enrichment
program through which it sells uranium enrichment services (not the
uranium i~eli) to the nuclear power programs of various Western countries.
The toll enrichment program began in 1973. Cumulative enrichment
requirements from the program amounted to about 24,000 MTSWU by
the end of 1982 and are expected to il\l.:rcasc to about 50,000 MTSWU by
the early 19905.
Taken together, the Soviet/CEMA nuclet.r power programs and tollenrichment
program requirements for enriched uranium will account for
( .Jof total r.apacity by 1990. By the mid-1990s, we believe
that total Soviet requirements for enriched uranium (including those for
nuclear weapons and naval nuclear propulsion, as well as power reactors
and toll enrichment services) will outstrip our projections of Soviet
capacity. It is therefore likely that the Soviets will bring additional
production on line between now and the early 1990s.
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