Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

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)Gorbachev said the precise means that can
protect the party from errors in politics are openness,
criticism, and self-criticism. "The price of these errors
is known to all of us," he added, which no doubt in
large part, applied to the Chernobyl' information
coverup.
Since April 1986, on several occasions the Soviet
media have promptly reported on accidents causing
loss of life and publicized punitive measures taken
against the officials responsible. Soviet media treatment
of the sinking of the Admiral Nakhimov passena:er
liner in August 1986 because of a:ross negligencc--apparently
drunkenncss-and the firing of
the responsible minister and prosecution of its captain
and his deputy is a strikina: example. Other disasters,
such as a collision of two passenger trains that Jdlled
40 persons because one of the engine drivers was
asleep, the spectacular methane coal mine explosion
in the Ukraine late last year, and the more recent one
in Chaykino mine in Donetsk have been reported
immediately.
A year after the accident, however, there are signs
that the Soviets are again beina: less direct about
Chernobyl' and that the openness in the months
Collowing the accident may have found its limits.
Despite signs oC popular concern, the regime has not
taken steps to give the public more of a say on these
issues. The major bureaucracies are resisting public
pressure, and there are some signs of backtracking on
glasnost:
• Two Soviet journalists complained this April in the
Soviet weekly Moscow News that information on
Chcmobyl' is being withheld and is increasingly
difficult to obtain, noting that information reported
to the International Atomic Energy Agency is not
beina: given to the public.
• The official Soviet report presented to the IAEA at
the August, 1986 meeting in Vienna, and made
widely available to the West, was never released to
the Soviet pUblic. A 20-page summary was eventually
published in the November issue of Atomnaya
Energ{ya, and Elektrlcheskiye stantsfi, both highly
technical journals with a limited distribution.
• Despite pledges of cOOperation at the outset, the
Soviets have been reluctant to share the research on
radiation data they have collected since the accident,
according to the US Department of Energy
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition
to the traditional reluctance of the Soviet Union
to disclose information, the Soviets may fear new
data will disagree with the information they have
already made public or will prove embarrassing if
future casualties appear among those being monitored,
since they have claimed the health effect will
be insignificant.
The Moscow News article suggests the traditional
argument that public opinion has no role-in the
scientific and technical sphere is still being used to
justify the restrictions. Ml'.f in the'affected bureaucracies,
and even some senior Ic:..Jers, have a vestedinterest
in ensuring the consequences of Chcmobyl'
disappear from public view. They wouid like to avoid
a real debate on the direction of the Soviet nuclear
energy policy and on the location and safetypf
existing and Cuture nuclear plants. Such a debate is
troublesome to a regime Cormally committed to
nuclear energy 'and the economic benefits of building
nuclear plants ncar highly populated areas. Moreover,
continued publicity will leave the regime open to
criticism if it is unwilling to allocate Curther resources
to deal withlong-tcrm envir.onmental and heal~h
consequences.
The news blackout during the three-week trial of
plant officials in July was further indication that
authorities are tightly controlling information on
Chernobyl'. Shortly before the trial, Soviet Foreign
Ministry officials described it as open and indicated
Western reporters could attend. On the second day of
the proceedings, however, foreign reporters were
barred from the courtroom, and the trial continued
behind closed doors. The decision to conduct the trial
in secret, possibly in an effort to avoi