Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

SeCi€'----
officials who had more complete information or personal
contacts with foreigners to tell them what was
h~p'~ning. r
Gorbachev's subsequent openness and domestic reform
measures have deflected public attention from
Ch_ernobyl' to a considerable extent, and the heavy
play given to alleged foreign overreaction to the
catastrophe had some success in shifting public anger
to the West. Many citizens accepted Soviet propaganda
that the West was responsible for the panic and
hysteria surrounding Chernobyl' and that the accident
presented less public danger than the Three Mile
Island accident or the Bhopal toxic gas leak that
killed more than 2,000 persons -
Although many Soviet citizens not directly affected
by the accident ap~r to have accepted the regime's
explanation, those in the affected regions continue to
fault top officials for initially concealing the Chernobyl'
accident. and some think the regime's response to
the disaster showed the insincerity of the new openness
policy. A strongly worded indictment of incompetence,
which appeared in the June 1987 monthly
Yunost'in the form of public letters, accused local
officials at Pripyat' and Kie~'-of criminal irresponsibility
for their role in the cove~up. The fire chief, Leonid
Telyatnikov, who risked his life putting out the fire at
the plant on the night of the explosion, was quoted by
the Soviet magazine Smena as saying he was ashamed
--
of local Communist party officials who failed to use
their power to protect the population after the
disaster.
Some Soviet,intellectuals were angry with the regime
for failing to be honest. However, they blamed the
technocrats for the accident, 'believing that the traditional
arrogant attitude of nuclear bureaucracieswillingness
to take risks for the sake of scientific
progress at the expense of the people-has been the
root cause of the Chernobyl' disaster. Some ordinary
citizens share this point of view with the intellectuals.
Because they believe that this attitude is pervasive
among the Soviet technocrats, the public is reluctant
to accept the regime's assurances that the safety of
the Soviet nuclear plants has been improved in the
anermath of Chernobyl'
Health Problems
Despite Gorbachev's success in overcoming the initial
embarrassment and, even to some extent. turning the
issue to his favor, there have been real long-term
human costs, particularly in, the affected region. The
chaotic nature of the evacuation alienated a number
of the evacuees and stirred fear and resentment
among the general population, thus broadening the
psychological impact of the accident. The handling of
the evacuation has contributed to public anxiety about
health issues, which the regime has been unable to
allay fully. Moscow's concern that public fears will
have serious economic consequences including resistance
to transfers of workers to the region, inability to
sell products from the region, and increased demand
for medical services by fearful people have already
been borne out
Although the final human toll from the effects of
radiation will be difficult for scientists to predict,
many of the 135,000 evacuees from the 30-kilometer
zone have been exposed to sufficiently high levels of
radiation to increase their risk of long-term health
problems. The regime apparently acknowledged this
fact when it blamed local party leaders and ministry
officials at the recent trial of Chernobyl' plant managers
for failing to properly protect the population from
the effects of radiation fallout and for delaying the
evacuation
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