Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

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- --------------- [n the evacuation, some decisions may have unintentionally aggravated the potentially dangerous health situation, while others indicated that protection of its citizens was not always the top priority. For example: • [n the Pripyat' countryside, where another 20,000 persons lived, cattle and horses from the state and collective farms surrounding the city were evacuated first, beginning a day after the city WaS evacuated. People followed in buses about 24 hour.; later. According to the Kiev Oblast deputy chairman for agriculture. the animals were moved first because people were needed to load the 51,000 head of cattle. .c. indicate tllat people from some villag~ located 3 to 4 kilometers from the city of Pripyat' were not moved until 6 May, 10 days after the accident. The 30-kilometer evacuation/zone, established within the first 24 hours after the accident, was chosen because it encompassed the general population living around the reactor and did not necessarily correspond to the actual areas of high radioactivity. Legasov admitt~ to Western scientists that later radiation calculations showed a need to adjust the zone to make it correspond more closely to the actual distribution of radiation. Eleven villages in Polesskiy Rayon in Ukraine-where many of the Pripyat' people were initially evacuated-were forced to reevacuate after radiation levels were reassessed to be unsafe. Later, Moscow News criticized local officials for rushing to resettle these villages inside the zone to give an appearance of normalcy without proper consideration for the safety of the inhabitants. Despite continuing concerns amon!! scientist~. no further evacuations were authorized. C. ..J,a confidential report intended for Gorbachev established that some inhabitants of the Chernobyl' region were actually resettled in contaminated areas outside the 30-kilometer zone. The report was an attempt by Soviet scientists to alert Gorbachev to their discovery that the prevailing wind deposited radioactive particles from the radioactive plume in an irregular pattern. According to the source, isolated hot spots could be found 65 kilometers to the east of the power plant where many inhabitants of the Chernobyl' region were resettled (see figure I) Altbough C ..J they considered a second evacuation; ~ovlet authorities did not exercise this option, probably because they wanted to avoid further dislocations. While some selective evacuation beyond the 30-kilometer zone was observed near Gomel' and Chernigov starting 9 May, a decision to expand the evacuation zone to 50 kilometers would have displaced an additional 75,000 civilians in southern Belorussia alone, at a time when the designated receiving areas were overflowing with Chernobyl' evacuees. Moreover, the Soviets did no preventive evacuation, with the exception of the extensive evacuation of children in the broader region.' For example, although Mogilev Oblast in Belorussia, 320 kilometers north-... west of Chernobyl', received sufficient radiation la'uout from heavy rains on 27 and 28 April to prompt officials to close many wells, scrape and remove layers of contaminated soil, and ban sale and consumption of local milk and meat and vegetables, only the children were evacuated. Tens of thousands of people in the contaminated villages were not evacuated and received minimal information about the dangers of radiation, according to the rayon chiefphysiciani ."". . ...... ;~ The evacuation of the nearby town of Chernobyl' and its environs-with a population of some 44,OOO--was begun only after radiation levels began to rise rapidly there on 3 May. Delaying the evacuation until then also allowed May Day festivities to take place in Chernobyl', as well as in Kiev. as if nothing unusual had happened. C. ;l the 500 buses and 200 trucks that came to evacuate Chernobyl' on 3 and 4 May were the same buses' that came , Startin& 8 May. school-age children went to Pioneer camps, children between the ages of 3 and 6 were evacuated with the kinder2~rten teachers and medical workers. while children under 3 were evacuated with their mothers to vacation areas. .. 5 iauat
Figure I Evacuated and Repopulated Sites Surrounding Chemobyl" -..-....,._...., -_...-.-_.._.. ...- Soviet Union ~- Gomer Obl~~ , " '~ Rechitu~ ''"' l_~ R. S. F. S. R. Belorussian S.S.R. . 'nnavlla .Khayniki • \-
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CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENT
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CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENT
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days, so they left nearly everythin
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The 1986 Report of the U.S. Departm
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.. Soviet Nu
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"FOP SECRET NIE 11-2-71 SOVIET NUCL
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T-OPSECRa Page IV. ADVANCED NUCLEAR
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2 rop SECRET services to others and
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4 TOP SECREf-'- for 1977 is about 1
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6 TOP SECRET DISCUSSION I J I '" i
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8 TOP SECRET L ~L J TOP SECRET
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10 TOP SECRET 16.C D. Other Weapon
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12 fOP SECRET II. PRODUCTION OF NUC
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14 'fOP SECRET ium. Ten percent of
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: i. 16 TOP SECRET L J TOP SECRET
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18 fOP SECRa cumulated over the pas
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20 lOP SECRET TABLE V SOVIET NUCLEA
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22 TOP SEC-RETradioisotopes as a po
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24 TOP SECRET ing and the supply of
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28 TOP SECRET Power Utilization Ind
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32 'fOP SECRET ANNEX A (Continued)
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Soviet PWR in the near future. The
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213 29 Oktemberyan 1 Oktemberyan 2
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10.. National Forei!:n Ass('Ssmen I
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.c'- Sc @' -. USSR: Nuclear Acciden
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("oatents Overview Introduction Ind
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'. USSR: Nuclear Accidcnl Near I
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eing created by fallout from high-y
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,~ Intelligence Ji.~ or Me!b,pdS''i
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.~ Contellts Key Judgments Introduc
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stations. There is no single docume
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Svnd Figure 2 Separative Work Requi
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Figure 3 Separative Work Requiremen
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~lt(i(L increase by the end of 1990
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~ec(O' .\' OVl:r the long run, nucl
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Appendix A Existing and Planned Nuc
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Table 3 (conlinuc
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Appendix B Summary of Separative Wo
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Summary of Separative Work Units, b
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Seclcl .J The Soviet Nuclear Power
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UireC:Corace of Intelligence Secret
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Longstanding problems in manufactur
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BLANKPA.GE · .. ....
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Scop~ Nolc For 5e\'cral decades the
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steam that disrupicd la·rge ponio:
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A Chronology 01 the Recorery FJforl
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.~ ;:,o\"lcl I\"uclcar I'O\\W Planl
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,-umlrUClIon of So\icl Commercial N
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Page 169 and 170: The Chernobyl' Accident: Social and
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Page 195 and 196: Protecting Water Supplies The marsh
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Page 221 and 222: Ukrainians would prefer to seek tec
Page 223 and 224: Appendix A Players in the Aftermath
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