Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
.,.. 'F ,_<br />
·'<br />
ectlt:<br />
The regime brought many of these problems on itself by initially reacting<br />
with its traditional secrecy. Immediately after the accident, an information<br />
blackout was imposed until international pressure forced a grudging<br />
admission followed by a propaganda counterattack. Gorbachev himself<br />
remained silent until 14 May, almost three weeks after the accident,<br />
. probably to minimize his personal responsibility and to wait for his experts<br />
to gain control of the situation. 'r}<br />
Once Gorbachev got involved, however, he exploited the initial public<br />
relations setback to push his own reform agenda. By demonstrating that<br />
suppressing information about domestic problems can backfire, the accid'ent<br />
gave added impetus to his drive for openness in the Soviet media. Several<br />
articles in Pravda, for example, pointed out that a lack of complete information<br />
had encouraged harmful rumors, and supporters of Gorbachev's<br />
policy criticized the domestic media's early silence.<br />
Gorbachev also ~ed the accident to eliminate some Brezhnev holdovers.<br />
He retired three elderly members of the Central Committee who were<br />
rumored to share some blame for the disaster. In addition, several ministrylevel<br />
officials in the nuclear industry were fired, six Chemobyl' plant J<br />
managers received jail sentences, and 27 party officials were expelled frm<br />
the party either for contributing to the accident or Jor being inattentive to<br />
the evacuees' needs.<br />
By laying the blame on local authorities, attacking the West for exploiting<br />
the disaster, and pressing forward with domestic reform, Gorb~chev has so<br />
far largely avoided personal accountability. ( .--..'.....<br />
;l Gorbachev favored prompt publiCation of information<br />
bui met resistance in the Politburo. However, this story conceivably<br />
was put out by his supporters to exonerate him "'1<br />
The costs to regime credibility were especially serious in the Ukraine,<br />
Belorussia, and the Baltic. Dissatisfaction with the regime's handling of the<br />
<strong>Chernobyl</strong>' accident exacerbated longstanding popular frustrations in these<br />
regions:<br />
• The nuclear radioactive contamination of Ukrainian and Belorussian<br />
territory and the dislocation of Ukrainian and Belorussian people provoked<br />
dissatisfaction with the Soviet policy of placing nuclear plants near<br />
populated Centers and strengthened the environmentalist lobby in the<br />
Ukraine.<br />
• <strong>Chernobyl</strong>' sparked demonstrations in the Baltic, where ecology-sensitive<br />
issues had already provoked anti-Russian demonstrations and Moscow's<br />
callup of reservists to clean up <strong>Chernobyl</strong>' was perceived as ethnic<br />
discrimination<br />
" et<br />
vi