Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Tht Man/ifaclurins: lrr!raSlrUClllrcffJr the<br />
:Vile/car ['OK'U rnduslr)'<br />
Tht manufacturillg irr!rllstruclurt' for Ihe SOI'jet nucltur<br />
p""'a illllusu)" Is dil'lded Into IhY! morC' or Itss<br />
distillci subsels. 01lC' group, compostd qf ol·tr 500<br />
major cillcrpr/SI"S, lIIakf's ('Oil/pollen IS for RBM K<br />
Tl.'aClors. The logistic niglllmare qf Iht ROM K sup.<br />
['Ort Indusir)' is a IIIaill rCUSOl1 this rcaclor has bten<br />
scheduld for gradualphastollt. The olher-llnd<br />
much slllallcr--groltp qf support enterprises manu.<br />
faclurn compor-ellls/or I'I'ER rcaclors and Is sched.<br />
ultd to produce for the brccder reactor prograll/. In<br />
Ihe Ill/ler grollp qf ellterprises are the Jrhorsk Heal:\,<br />
Equipment plant near Unillgrod and tIle ",oll/mash<br />
plant olltside Volgodo/uk, tK'O qf Ihe 10rg(11 nuclcar.<br />
cOl1lponelll'fobricorion/adlilies in Ihe K·orld. 8ullhe<br />
AlolI/mash plant has ShOk'1I a disapPOinting puform.<br />
once sillct producliOIl qf VVER pussure I"tsscls<br />
began In 1978. Far frOIll btl/Ig a showcase lIudear<br />
asumbly plan I. Alollllllash has bun plagued ... llh<br />
problems-poor mallogtlllmi. prOdllclion qf subslon.<br />
dord COIIIl'OneI/lS, alld plol/l dalllagl! froll/ grOlll;d<br />
subsidettC'e.<br />
nuclear prOl:ram as wcll as safety rCI'iews will proba.<br />
bly mcan that the economic rationale for a largc.scale<br />
brceder·rcactor program currently targeted to start in<br />
the latc 1990s will be croded.<br />
The InHuenee of <strong>Nuclear</strong>.lndustry InfrKstrueture<br />
The large investment thc SOl'icts hal'e made in manu.<br />
fzcturing plants that supply the nuclear industry \\ill<br />
bolstcr their commitment to a growing and little.<br />
changco program (see inset). <strong>Plant</strong>s manufacturing<br />
components for Soviet·designed reactors are located<br />
not only in the USSR but also throuahout Eastern<br />
Europe. The SOI'iets ha\'e invested tens of billions of<br />
rubles and millions of dollars of hard currency im.<br />
ports in building and equipping their facilities. They<br />
hne accomplished many of their /loals for ecntraliz.<br />
ing component production and for intceratine the<br />
capabilities of the CEMA. The East European coun.<br />
tries. for e.\ample. can produce: nearly all thc components<br />
for power plants using VVER·~40 reactorswith<br />
the notable c.~ccptiun of nuclear·fud ass.:m!llies.<br />
Moreo\'cr, VVER and RO~IK rluclcar 1>OI\'cr plants<br />
buill in the USSR cunlain man) key component.<br />
nunu(actured in Eastcrn Europe. '<br />
Because it appears likely to We~h:rn 'lbscrvcrs llut<br />
the failure: of or an in3dcqu3te operation31 ran~e of<br />
certain componc:nts could bal'C: contributed to Ihe<br />
Chcrnobyl' accid:nt. the absence of ~epcrcussions in<br />
Ihe .Min iSlr)' of <strong>Power</strong> Machine Buildinll or the<br />
Ministry of the: Electrical Equipment Industry i1<br />
surprising. The IAEA speci31 OIcctilll: on Chcrnob)i'<br />
prcwided insight 00 this maUer. Accordin& 10 the<br />
Soviet 3ccounl of the accident. improper dcsians. not<br />
poorly built components, explained cntirc:ly the inabil,<br />
ity of certain systems to perform as expected." Thus,<br />
in a pen'crse: way, the <strong>Chernobyl</strong>' accident is aood<br />
news for the equipment manufacturing ministries<br />
because they were implicitly certified as competenL<br />
Indeed. it is possible that more resourCes "ill be<br />
assigned to them so that equipment for modifications<br />
c;!n be produced qllickly.<br />
Antinuclear Voices In (he USSR<br />
Antinuclear mo\'cments as they exist in the West are<br />
nOI possible in the USSR. Mose:ow's control oraans<br />
probably would effectively prohibit the organization<br />
of an antinuclear group of substantial size and almost<br />
ccrtainly would prel'ent public demonstrations or cir.<br />
culation of publications containing vicws opposed to<br />
official policies on nuclear energy. The Soviets have<br />
also minimized the opportunities for an antinuclear<br />
lobby by mounting an e/Teetil'e pronuclear.eampaign<br />
that ad\'ertiscs the advantages of nuclear power: fuel<br />
~\;ngs, less environmental impact than coal, and<br />
lower overall costs.<br />
Ne\·crthcJcss. antinuclear sentiments exist in the<br />
USSR, and they receive some degree of official<br />
acknowledgment. Three groups that hal'e questioned<br />
" In the nuclc.u indu!!.uy. as in other SO ... ·icl induslrin, rnpoRs,ilril.<br />
ilks (or dcsi£'ns of cqui(lt11cnt 2nd "bnts .He undlcd br institutes<br />
ud burC3US thll Of"(:Ulc nculy indc('(ndent1y or the ~J\u(~ur.<br />
i~ :tnd con!'Uucl;on ortosniLalion) thaI usc the doianl<br />
20