Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

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'TobleJ USSR: ,\c(uil Rnd reojcelcd Addilions 10 !'\uclc~r Po"er Plonl CJl.paellr. 19R6-90 19!6 ",linin 2 \:.':E R: I 000 _______, l~'OI,h'lC J ._____----,\·\·EK.I~_______, Ro,'no) \TER.IOOO 1987 ._----_.. _. -------- Ollllonl2~ _______\',\'ER-IOOO _______ I,nllir.> 2 RD:\!~-}~ _____ ~,'l;ir I AST-$OO 19M ~-_f"J-'O-lh··;;:a-------V\·ER'IOOO------ C:=c..'i"'m:.:.'.:.'n::..:.I ________ VVER.IOOO _____ Rouo,' I V\'ER.IOOO "hmc~il'''l-::'il-' ~1------\:.,.·\·ER.IOOO:.:..------ \'o,onClh I ".S_T~~__..____. Go,·ki,. 2 AST-SOO 19!9 Ifnllinl J RIl~IK'ISOO.:... _____ 0,1"""0 J VVER.ICOO Soulh Ukrl.:.in::..:c;.:l'-_____ SOlok"," ) RB~IK.IOOO • Dell,. 10 1991 f"J"iblc. .:.\'VER . ..!~ _____ . I~ ~ •. Coll'lci~ ._ ....___.....,.______ _I ~:OOO 10 :E:o.9O M\\, '=-1~~r.::iC>=IJ_______ I.~OO M\\'llhcroulJ in AST. t
prograllJ· The larger number of smalkr p!:tnts would also reduce cconomics uf scale in operation :Inu maintenanec. In addition, the widespread radioactil'e (;ontamination around Chernob)"!' ;rnd the increascd risks of canl:cr to people cxposcd to this radioaclil·ityare likely 10 motivate SO\'iet specialists to reconsider the decision to locate nuclear heating plants in hea\'ily populated areas. At present, in order to operalc economically, plants supplying both electricity and heated water for central heatine arc locatcd 25 kilometers or less fronl the hcat-distribution network ofa cit)'. <strong>Plant</strong>s that produce only heated Water for heating :tre sited e\'en closer-within I S kilometers of the centers of m:l.ior cities." Before the Chernob)'I' accident, SO\'ict nuclear specialists had com'inced critiesin the USSR that the nuclear hcatini plants wcre equipped with safety backups adequate to cnsere that their pro~imity to cities posed acceptable risks. Construction is under way on nuclear heating plants at Gor'kiy, Voronezh, Odessa, Minsk, and Khar'ko\' that arc scheduled to come on line beforc 1990. Canceling OJ" modifying thesc plants probably would be prohibiti\'e1y expensive, according to So\'iet calculations. The post Chernob),I' safety reviews arc likely, howe\'er, to reopen the discussion of site locations for the roughly 20 nuclear heating plants that exist only on paper in long-term plans. Until the mid-1970s So\'iet eXperts bclic\'cd that the probability of a major accident in a nuclear power plant was ~o small that massi\'e and expensi\'e con. tainlll~nt structures were unnecessary. All later model reactors (both RBMK and VVER), howel"Cr, have some form of containment. The earlier unconlained reactor models may now come under closer scrutiny si'lcC Chernob),!' has shown the potcntial impact of ,. [listin, SO'-iet standards (or nucle.n piJnl loc;uiuns -minimum uiS\:JncCl or ) lilomclcrs (km) (rol11 any J~l'ul:tlcd "'~3.1.s l.:m (ronl cities with flOPu!;JI:ons of .. .rlcast JOO.ooo. or 40 kn) from ciliCl with po~blions or I million or morC-\l"crc OInlcndcd rur nu",-1c.lr h(~lint rlant:" ("ST~) (ollo,,"in~ a rc\"icw in the lale 197Ch. what hau lx:cn c.:un.idercd :llow-prob~biljt~" a-cnl.i( the Sm"iCIS decide to impr~ safety, tl:e cil:ht uncontained \,VER reactor. m:t\. be rc\;ewed lim because of thc potential ri5ks if th; inlerrlty of components is br~achcd Impact on SOlie! :\uclcar EIIerg)" Policy At the lime of lhe Chernob)1' aecidcnt. a distioctil'e Gorbachel" imprint on the USSR's nuclear EO.zls \\-as not yet :lpparent_ Gorbachc\"'s nell' assicnmcnu al enerey ministries werc 100 r«alt 10 hare Ir.Jd a \-uible effect on the nuclear prol:r.tnl-thc nC\\' Minisler of Powcr and Electritication \\"15 appointed in March 1985. The new leadership in the various major CDeri)' ministries (oil, natural gas, coal, and po\\"erl 3pp;!rent Iy did not alter Ihe loni-Ierm cnc:rl:Y ioals When Ihe opportunity presented ilSelfin late 1985_At that time, the plan for 1986-90 (pushilll: natural us production ~nd calline for sustained Er~h in oil outpul) and Ibe existing lonl!-Term Energy Prollram (sclling coals for c.\panded roles for coal and nuclear enern in the 1990s and beyond) were publicly endorsed without changes. Early in I 9H6, howe"cr, Iherc were sil:ns thatlhe Gorbachel" cneq~y tcam wzs considering some shift all"ay from coal, with a corresponding grealer emphasis on nuclear power in the longer term. A kC)' clement in the program for a coal resurgenec-
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CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENT
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CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENT
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days, so they left nearly everythin
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The 1986 Report of the U.S. Departm
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.. Soviet Nu
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"FOP SECRET NIE 11-2-71 SOVIET NUCL
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T-OPSECRa Page IV. ADVANCED NUCLEAR
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2 rop SECRET services to others and
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4 TOP SECREf-'- for 1977 is about 1
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6 TOP SECRET DISCUSSION I J I '" i
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8 TOP SECRET L ~L J TOP SECRET
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10 TOP SECRET 16.C D. Other Weapon
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12 fOP SECRET II. PRODUCTION OF NUC
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14 'fOP SECRET ium. Ten percent of
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: i. 16 TOP SECRET L J TOP SECRET
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18 fOP SECRa cumulated over the pas
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20 lOP SECRET TABLE V SOVIET NUCLEA
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22 TOP SEC-RETradioisotopes as a po
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24 TOP SECRET ing and the supply of
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Blank Paqe 26
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28 TOP SECRET Power Utilization Ind
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,~v' -:~. '.' .~.~. ~,.'*-J ... Bla
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32 'fOP SECRET ANNEX A (Continued)
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Blank Daqe 34
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Blank Pa'le 36 l
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I~;~ - ~'.: .. "; e. iA~sjstantChie
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Soviet PWR in the near future. The
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I , ... i • UNCLASSIFIED , , i ~
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.' 1 \ ~ il' . ..... .1 I. 'f I'} 1
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213 29 Oktemberyan 1 Oktemberyan 2
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10.. National Forei!:n Ass('Ssmen I
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.c'- Sc @' -. USSR: Nuclear Acciden
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("oatents Overview Introduction Ind
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'. USSR: Nuclear Accidcnl Near I
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• I·.~"I,~;" .. ':'It tllf': ...
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.:. }-~;:. ~- .,- ~ -"
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.( .. 3~~;. ° t···:"":· ,)~ o
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'\ ;" I , ," I. .1 t
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Page 83 and 84: eing created by fallout from high-y
Page 85 and 86: ,~ Intelligence Ji.~ or Me!b,pdS''i
Page 88 and 89: .~ Contellts Key Judgments Introduc
Page 90 and 91: stations. There is no single docume
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Page 94 and 95: Figure 3 Separative Work Requiremen
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Page 98 and 99: ~ec(O' .\' OVl:r the long run, nucl
Page 101 and 102: Appendix A Existing and Planned Nuc
Page 103 and 104: Table 3 (conlinuc
Page 105 and 106: Appendix B Summary of Separative Wo
Page 107 and 108: Summary of Separative Work Units, b
Page 109 and 110: Seclcl .J The Soviet Nuclear Power
Page 111 and 112: UireC:Corace of Intelligence Secret
Page 113 and 114: Longstanding problems in manufactur
Page 115 and 116: BLANKPA.GE · .. ....
Page 117 and 118: Scop~ Nolc For 5e\'cral decades the
Page 119 and 120: steam that disrupicd la·rge ponio:
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Page 123 and 124: A Chronology 01 the Recorery FJforl
Page 125 and 126: .~ ;:,o\"lcl I\"uclcar I'O\\W Planl
Page 127 and 128: ,-umlrUClIon of So\icl Commercial N
Page 129 and 130: SUI'il:! NUell'lIC l'UII'Cr: Pcrfoc
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Page 135 and 136: ~(Ci (( Ajta slIIt!."ing till: ,,'s
Page 137 and 138: Tht Man/ifaclurins: lrr!raSlrUClllr
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Page 141 and 142: 1/1 public testimonials, :1 /lumber
Page 143 and 144: Warning Page Deleted B-3 : .~. ,. -
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Page 147 and 148: 3 ? 55 757" 77 nqm r 7: T? r .1- ,
Page 149 and 150: NlCARAGUA: Government Crackdown Con
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Page 167 and 168: " Wandna Notice Intelligence Source
Page 169 and 170: The Chernobyl' Accident: Social and
Page 171 and 172: The Chernobyl' Accident: Social and
Page 173 and 174: '. ..,j The new consciousness about
Page 175 and 176: Contents Scope Note Summary ... _ .
Page 177 and 178: lAxity and Poor Design of tire Clre
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MeliCi 1 Fi~.n 2. a} Mill/ary r~urv
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Tire CMI Ddense Role in Clrernobyl'
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Sir ,; 1"._" lilt: MQY tylSO ISSUt:
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"tice'€t Political FaUout From Ch
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SeCi€'---- officials who had more
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,SQQ!Fct ...) • Citizens as far a
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Protecting Water Supplies The marsh
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BCCiCi . c _ ;J workers went on str
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,it tet Chernobyl' has even been in
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Incidents in Soviet Nuclear Power P
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Relocation Moscow announced Ihe eva
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.-Seeret - Criticism of official su
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• Finally, the Gorbachev regime w
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- • • '" t •• '=. f. 0... '
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" ,-, -=t -=t:,' . . " .. '' ' . .
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· . ~ %"l. • .' • ,i' .' ... .
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~L in dealing with the incident, ra
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~~~IAL ter at the AES to manage the
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Ukrainians would prefer to seek tec
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Appendix A Players in the Aftermath
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