Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Ilccausc th~ I~ c.d.ting RD~IK reactors I:Omposc 53 pcrl'~nt of the nuclear Po~·tr-plant cal'aci\~- and prm'idc 6 percent of :tllthc electricity generatet! in the USSR (60 percent of nuckar·gcncratL'd powen, :t prolonged safety·rclatl-d l'QUiplllcnt relillin.: of e:ti~t· ing reactors could seriously disrupt the SOI'jet electric· ity supply. We bclim: Mosco\!' is not planning exten· sil'e modification of RUMKs, although SOI'iet inquiries to Wcstern companies sunest Moscow is considering a retrolit of additional equipment besides thatlllcnti-Jncd in their accident report to the 1.'\£:.'\." The SOI'iets appear to hal'c rejected wholesale upgrad. ing of RO~IK containment on the ground~ of techlli· cal diniculty and costs.'" The technical shoilcomings of tht RBMK reactor that contributed to the accident include a complex nuclear core that requires moderately sophisticated monitoring with computer.:lSSisted control, and the potential iostability of the nuclear reactions in the corc durini low.powcr operating conditions or if coclant is rapidly lost. These were known to SOI'iet specialists well before the <strong>Chernobyl</strong>' c,·cnts. Report· ing in the SOI'iet nuclear industry's technical jot:rnals showed that dcsign cngineers were working on these problems, so lixes may not require extraordinarily long dOll'ntimes or construction delays. Another concern surfaced by the catastrophe is the possible "ulnerability ofSol'iet nuclear power stations to multiple reaClor failure. All fi\'e of the existing pl~nts using RBMK reactors arc built around pairs of " \\'l"11Crn sup;,)licn hJ.\"C been cont~clcd ~OOUI C'Quipment for hrdroe~n monilorinc olnd icnition to detect and rec"\"('nt the (O(n\.1- lion of In uplo\h'c miulIrc thll (ovid rC1uh in the Chcrnobyr -type dC!-Iruction or oJ nuc)t;lr reactor. Olher poMibititics (or retrorn", mlY in\"oh"c .1.ddina: backup emerleae), core coolin, 3.nd imrro\'inc the J.uton\.J.(cd rC3c'or·controll~"Stcms. .; The So\-icl.\ hnc ollrcJQ\' sci; precedent on rduullo rCHol'. (or cont.linnlcnt. SO"icI pl:t.nn·~n had dc~cd by the mid·1970~ 10 .Jed contJinmcnt to dc~il"s rOl prclSurizcd·,,-;alcr h~olctors (\'\'[Rs). The cont.J.inmcnt (unclion ",",U incOlpJf:ttC"d in Ilh.3iCS ...... ith bier modc:1 VVER·HO cuCtors rctt~;nc COftl3inmCni or loc.J.lil ..:uion ot ccrlJin critic",! comroncnt~, In 19&0 1be SO\ic15 boilt their (trs.l r(Jetor with full conllinmenl.cQui"2!cnt to Ih~1 u~ed in the \\'cst. ThC'y did not, howe\·c(. retrofil 2ny or the ci~hl e.ulicr modd \'\'ER· .. ·tOs with eonllinnlCnl1. The decision not 10 enforce the umc urcty stlndHds:H 3:11 VVERs .. ~s (\roOObly innucnced by the technic~1 difTl,uh\' or such cxtensi\'C' ~"'On\lruClion 3nd by COSti. ntinlJtcd by son'~ \\'cucrn clpCrts to cQu21 the oritinll in\"l:qmcnt in the rCJelon re"Clllr •. The .:xplo~ion ;It Cbcrnobyl' ullil ~ damaced ,:ol:lponcnts of unit 3. e;llIinc alienI ion to the ri.k th~t - other .:\-ents ,uch as m;ljor lires or large pipe ruptures in onc rc~ctllr could c/ld~iiger thc other member-of a p~ir. Modilications 10 reduce Ihis risk of multiple reactor (ailure in (uture plants would require time· consuming rcdesi~n 1I'0rk. which would incrcase con· siruction costs ... -..-\ Modifying 1M RBMKs. Of the 29 RBMK reacton built or planned, the projCCts most \'ulnerable to canccll~tion if basic design IJaws cannot be easi:\' remedied arc the eicht rcactors at the earliest st;gcS of comlruction. Thc~e arc 1000~ted :11 the existinll Kursk and Smolensk plants and al the proposed Kostroma plant. In an April 1987 announcement of the remaining RBMK projects, the So\'iets implied, by omission, that the four reaClors at Kostroma had been dropped. Thc Kostroma plant is in Ihe earliest stages of design and site prcp;lralion work and could be canceled with the lea~t disruption. The plans cited in the SOI'iet press call for construction of four \ .SOO· MW RBMK reactors at Kostroma. due 10 come on line at two·year inlervals from 1992 to \999. A powcr station operated on natural ias could be proposed as an effecti,'c altcrnalh'c to the Koslroma nuclear plant, since large gas-fired power plants arc already in existence in the region. A gas,fircd replacement for Kostroma could be built with only minor delays to the plan fur c~panding power·&cnerating capacity. Replacement of Smolcnsk units 5 and 6 (RBMK· 1500s) and Kursk units 5 and 6 (RBMK·\oOOs) would pose grealer problems. Although assembly has jusl begun on some of thcse reaelors, abandoning them would mean a costly writeoff of Ihe construction infrastructure that is already being used to completc four other rcactors at each localion. Replacement electricity-generating cap;lcity could be either conven· tional gas-tircd or el·en nuclear, using VVER reae· tors_ It is unlikclr that the <strong>Power</strong> Ministry could complete Ihe process of site selection. design, and construction of this replacement capacity in lime to avoid a tighlening of powcrsupplies 10 the cenlral region. because the unils at Smolcnsk and Kursk were e~pccted or. lin~ in the carl), \ 990s. II
SUI'il:! NUell'lIC l'UII'Cr: Pcrfocm2nec Versus Plan --1'1.. --A.:tU"'.aI U(,'lIid(~ Gulpa1 ~--------------------------~ "u;-----------1-:-- ,, (1.~ cHinUl(1 (Of IY9~' I ... r,c.Chcrnub)"I" ~ '/ ......... I·ou Chcrno:.~r
Page 1:
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENT
Page 4 and 5:
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENT
Page 6 and 7:
days, so they left nearly everythin
Page 8 and 9:
The 1986 Report of the U.S. Departm
Page 10 and 11:
.. Soviet Nu
Page 12 and 13:
"FOP SECRET NIE 11-2-71 SOVIET NUCL
Page 14 and 15:
T-OPSECRa Page IV. ADVANCED NUCLEAR
Page 16 and 17:
2 rop SECRET services to others and
Page 18 and 19:
4 TOP SECREf-'- for 1977 is about 1
Page 20 and 21:
6 TOP SECRET DISCUSSION I J I '" i
Page 22 and 23:
8 TOP SECRET L ~L J TOP SECRET
Page 24 and 25:
10 TOP SECRET 16.C D. Other Weapon
Page 26 and 27:
12 fOP SECRET II. PRODUCTION OF NUC
Page 28 and 29:
14 'fOP SECRET ium. Ten percent of
Page 30 and 31:
: i. 16 TOP SECRET L J TOP SECRET
Page 32 and 33:
18 fOP SECRa cumulated over the pas
Page 34 and 35:
20 lOP SECRET TABLE V SOVIET NUCLEA
Page 36 and 37:
22 TOP SEC-RETradioisotopes as a po
Page 38 and 39:
24 TOP SECRET ing and the supply of
Page 40 and 41:
Blank Paqe 26
Page 42 and 43:
28 TOP SECRET Power Utilization Ind
Page 44 and 45:
,~v' -:~. '.' .~.~. ~,.'*-J ... Bla
Page 46 and 47:
32 'fOP SECRET ANNEX A (Continued)
Page 48 and 49:
Blank Daqe 34
Page 50 and 51:
Blank Pa'le 36 l
Page 52:
I~;~ - ~'.: .. "; e. iA~sjstantChie
Page 55 and 56:
Soviet PWR in the near future. The
Page 57 and 58:
I , ... i • UNCLASSIFIED , , i ~
Page 59 and 60:
.' 1 \ ~ il' . ..... .1 I. 'f I'} 1
Page 61 and 62:
213 29 Oktemberyan 1 Oktemberyan 2
Page 63 and 64:
10.. National Forei!:n Ass('Ssmen I
Page 65 and 66:
.c'- Sc @' -. USSR: Nuclear Acciden
Page 67 and 68:
("oatents Overview Introduction Ind
Page 69 and 70:
'. USSR: Nuclear Accidcnl Near I
Page 71 and 72:
• I·.~"I,~;" .. ':'It tllf': ...
Page 73 and 74:
.:. }-~;:. ~- .,- ~ -"
Page 75:
.( .. 3~~;. ° t···:"":· ,)~ o
Page 79 and 80: '\ ;" I , ," I. .1 t
Page 81 and 82: i I:: II!"." - -----_._---- -"..:,
Page 83 and 84: eing created by fallout from high-y
Page 85 and 86: ,~ Intelligence Ji.~ or Me!b,pdS''i
Page 88 and 89: .~ Contellts Key Judgments Introduc
Page 90 and 91: stations. There is no single docume
Page 92 and 93: Svnd Figure 2 Separative Work Requi
Page 94 and 95: Figure 3 Separative Work Requiremen
Page 96 and 97: ~lt(i(L increase by the end of 1990
Page 98 and 99: ~ec(O' .\' OVl:r the long run, nucl
Page 101 and 102: Appendix A Existing and Planned Nuc
Page 103 and 104: Table 3 (conlinuc
Page 105 and 106: Appendix B Summary of Separative Wo
Page 107 and 108: Summary of Separative Work Units, b
Page 109 and 110: Seclcl .J The Soviet Nuclear Power
Page 111 and 112: UireC:Corace of Intelligence Secret
Page 113 and 114: Longstanding problems in manufactur
Page 115 and 116: BLANKPA.GE · .. ....
Page 117 and 118: Scop~ Nolc For 5e\'cral decades the
Page 119 and 120: steam that disrupicd la·rge ponio:
Page 121 and 122: [ ] .. [ . 4. . " ... "" ]
Page 123 and 124: A Chronology 01 the Recorery FJforl
Page 125 and 126: .~ ;:,o\"lcl I\"uclcar I'O\\W Planl
Page 127: ,-umlrUClIon of So\icl Commercial N
Page 131 and 132: I\CI\' YI'Kclly :11 SII\'i~1 Nudr:a
Page 133 and 134: prograllJ· The larger number of sm
Page 135 and 136: ~(Ci (( Ajta slIIt!."ing till: ,,'s
Page 137 and 138: Tht Man/ifaclurins: lrr!raSlrUClllr
Page 139 and 140: . .- : .. c.··.-;·· . Ct:\ c'[r
Page 141 and 142: 1/1 public testimonials, :1 /lumber
Page 143 and 144: Warning Page Deleted B-3 : .~. ,. -
Page 145 and 146: • 'i:'
Page 147 and 148: 3 ? 55 757" 77 nqm r 7: T? r .1- ,
Page 149 and 150: NlCARAGUA: Government Crackdown Con
Page 151 and 152: . .. ' .!Iv ,>-·a".. .• '. .....
Page 153 and 154: TT7EE. .... 103 • t ~ ~ i< s-. "
Page 155 and 156: " .~.' ,... , .: . ,.'. ' .. ' " ..
Page 157 and 158: •• ~;, ~ • • .. .. t: • .
Page 159 and 160: - ... . .• ,~, . . ... ...... . .
Page 161 and 162: • ! :" -- ., , : 'j ; I ..... ..
Page 163 and 164: I ,Aizrrcsz t ! '. ! 0(1) b(3) I I
Page 165 and 166: o (1) b (3) I I . I i I I I i .' ..
Page 167 and 168: " Wandna Notice Intelligence Source
Page 169 and 170: The Chernobyl' Accident: Social and
Page 171 and 172: The Chernobyl' Accident: Social and
Page 173 and 174: '. ..,j The new consciousness about
Page 175 and 176: Contents Scope Note Summary ... _ .
Page 177 and 178: lAxity and Poor Design of tire Clre
Page 179 and 180:
Secn~1 The official figure on the n
Page 181 and 182:
Figure I Evacuated and Repopulated
Page 183 and 184:
MeliCi 1 Fi~.n 2. a} Mill/ary r~urv
Page 185 and 186:
Tire CMI Ddense Role in Clrernobyl'
Page 187 and 188:
Sir ,; 1"._" lilt: MQY tylSO ISSUt:
Page 189 and 190:
"tice'€t Political FaUout From Ch
Page 191 and 192:
SeCi€'---- officials who had more
Page 193 and 194:
,SQQ!Fct ...) • Citizens as far a
Page 195 and 196:
Protecting Water Supplies The marsh
Page 197 and 198:
BCCiCi . c _ ;J workers went on str
Page 199 and 200:
,it tet Chernobyl' has even been in
Page 201 and 202:
Incidents in Soviet Nuclear Power P
Page 203 and 204:
Relocation Moscow announced Ihe eva
Page 205 and 206:
.-Seeret - Criticism of official su
Page 207 and 208:
• Finally, the Gorbachev regime w
Page 209 and 210:
- • • '" t •• '=. f. 0... '
Page 211 and 212:
- . . .. . . ,--, -, '-" -,. ......
Page 213 and 214:
" ,-, -=t -=t:,' . . " .. '' ' . .
Page 215 and 216:
· . ~ %"l. • .' • ,i' .' ... .
Page 217 and 218:
~L in dealing with the incident, ra
Page 219 and 220:
~~~IAL ter at the AES to manage the
Page 221 and 222:
Ukrainians would prefer to seek tec
Page 223 and 224:
Appendix A Players in the Aftermath
show all

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?