Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant CIA Files - Paperless Archives

steam that disrupicd la·rge ponio:ls of the corc. Sonic
of the shallcred core matenal was propelled throu~h
the roof cf the reac·to·r building. '
The hot core matcrialthat was released st:.ncc\ about
30 separate lires in the unit 4 reactor ha!1 and turbine
building. as well as on the ·roof of the adjoininc unit J:
All but Ihe main fire in ihe graphile moderalor
malerialstill insideunit 4 wcrc e:O:linguished i~ a fe,,·
hours by Ihe heroic efforts or lircfichlers. The graph·
ite lire continued to burn for nearly Iwo weeks·­
carrying radioaeth'ity high inlo Ihe atmosphereuntil
it was smothered by sand, lead. dolomite. and
boron dropped from helicopters. (
Unit 3 was shut dOI\'" four hour~ after the oemuction
of unit 4. Units I and 2. located sel'eral hundred
meters from unit 4. continued producing electricity
for 24 hours after the accident. The SOI'iets rcponed
considerable radioactive contamin:l!ion cf units I. 2.
and 3.1·
ElectrIcity Losses and Increased Fuel Use
For five months following the destruction of the
Chernobyl'-4 reactor. thc plant's three surviving reac·
tors were idled. This loss of generating capacityroughly
10 percent of the lotal in Ihe Ukraine-would
have led, if uncompensated, 10 an average monthly
deficil in e1ectrieilY production of 2.4 hill ion kilowatl·
hours (kWh). But. during Ihe summer lull in electricity
demand. the Soviets were in a favorablq>osition to
offset much of this rotential deficit by stcppin2 up
electricity production from power plants burning fossil
fuels. Beginning in September, however. the sea·
sonal upsurge in demand for electricity probably
eliminated most of the painless adjustment mccha·
ni~ms.J I
change t·o night shift w~rk·t~ reduce dayi"inlc electric-
. ily dem:lnd.Thc;c ~.teps were :llikel)~ preparation for
copincwilh the prospecti·\·c short:cc of e1ectricilY,
sin" th,- SOl"ielS were only able 10 restore two rcactors
at Chernobyl" 10 partial sen'icc by the oll~et of winter.
The clTee! or. tota! fuel dellland of the cffort 10 offset
Chernobyl"-induc.ed electricity losses .appears 10 ha\'c
been minor. GiI'cn the fuel-usc capabilily o(lhe
replacement pl:ints. Ihe SO\'icts wcrc probJbh: using
an cxtra 45.000 barrels per day (bId) of oil. 229 .
million cubic metcrs per month cf natural cas. nnd
400.000 tons per month of coal' Durin!: the livemonth
period when the Chernobyl' planl produced no
electricity. the n~tion\l'jde demand for fuel oil increased
I to 2 percenl. natural gas usc erew 0.2
percent. and coal use rose by 0.3 percent.
In addition to the power losses at Cherncbyl" the
SO\'icts arc expecting cuts in output during 1987 at
the four other nuclear power plants opera tine RBMK
(Chcrnobrl"-type) reactors. C
.:J fixes to impro\'e safety will reduce power
output at these piants by about 10 percent. or nearly
10 billion kWh. in 1987. SovietC ::lt13\'e not
indicated whether this is a one-time loss in power
generation due to· temporary downtime or a derating
of the capacity of these reactors~
Returning tht Chernoby(' Planllo S~n·ic.
As soon as the Chernoby\' accident was under control.
Moscow began promoting a rapid recov(ry of powergenerating
capability at the idle plant. evincing concern
for longer term considerations affecting the
nuclear power program as well as for the immediate
c.\igcncics:
The Ukr~ine experienced electricity problems cvcn
during the summer lull in demand. Ukrainian pa rtr
chief Vladimir Sheherbitskiy. in a July speech. called
for additional ener2Y consen'ation measures. and
Ukrainian Council of Minislers chairman Aleksandr
Lyashko noted tha t some enterprises needed to
r ..,
, Moscow desired to spare the economy the degree of
eleclricity shortfall that would come in winter unless
much of the Chcrnobyl" capacity was returned to
service.
. The lotll monthly fuel bill \\"l.l nClrl)- 100.000 tons or sundud
(ucl. ,\ unil of suod:ud (uel conuins the cnCflY cquh"':llcnt of 7.000
k.iloc.llorio per kilotrJm. or 12,600 BlUSrcr pound.~
..J
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