Pan Am Flight 103 CIA Files.pdf - Paperless Archives
Pan Am Flight 103 CIA Files.pdf - Paperless Archives
Pan Am Flight 103 CIA Files.pdf - Paperless Archives
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leader of the oppressed. A~ugh this goal excecds<br />
Libyan capabilities,<br />
Iy has developcd<br />
to a 'few select a "-<br />
interest wit.. .<br />
a s<br />
targeting lJS personnel and<br />
facilities and who ~ave proved their ability to carry<br />
out tcrrorist attacks . .5ucn ties allow Tripoli fa augment<br />
its striking power while minimizing the Libyan<br />
operational role-and Washington's ability to prove<br />
Libyan complicity. Qadhafi proOably believes that<br />
using non-Libyan terrorist groups also enhances his<br />
image. He often publicly portrays attacks by groups<br />
anywhere in the world as spontaneous events in an<br />
ongoing war against -colonialism and Zionism and<br />
paints himself as a leading player in this war whose<br />
revolutionary ideals are shared by the "oppressed"<br />
worldwide. It d 6 J IIr b3<br />
Radical Palestinian Groups<br />
Radical Palestinian groups have served as Qadhafi's<br />
primary clients for tcrrorist a Hacks. Support for anti<br />
Arafat Palestinian groups has been a f'lirly consistent<br />
Libyan policy since the mid-I 970s ..-<br />
b3<br />
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Although Qadhafi probably has not been able to<br />
achieve the degree of control over his clients that he<br />
has sought, they have given him the ability to project<br />
power that he would not otherwise have. The Libyan<br />
leader's influence with these groups-based primarily<br />
on his ability to provide them support-is not always<br />
sufficient to solicit attacks. Qadhafi's ability to do so<br />
is circumscribed to some extent by a desire on the part<br />
€If 30ildclients to protect their indepenclence, by<br />
differences in political agendas, and by different views<br />
on how to achieve shared goals, as well as by the<br />
Libyan leader's mercurial<br />
t and reputation<br />
as an unreliable pa<br />
Rec::nt ANO operations appear to rellect accordance<br />
with Qadhafi;s terrorism agenda. <strong>Am</strong>onl! the ANO's<br />
recent targets have been a British club and a hotel<br />
used primarily by Westerners in Khartoum and a<br />
the coast of Greece.<br />
bl , b~<br />
takes sueh forms as<br />
cases,<br />
funding, weapons,<br />
safehaven, false documentation, or ideological<br />
promotion-again, with varying degrees of regularity.<br />
-.. ;,~,.-.i<br />
63<br />
9<br />
suspect he encouraged or at least<br />
dramatic reminders of Western vulnerability and the<br />
power of terrorists who share hfs goals..... b 3<br />
.. - --~<br />
Other Palestinian Groups. Qadhafi_continuesTo-fund b f J ~<br />
several radical PalestiJlian groups r d U . _. OJ<br />
~nd ...... almost certainly . pressures t h em to at,ac '-k /<br />
Wes"tern interests.' Qadhafi has consistently'ftppotted<br />
"<br />
•<br />
as<br />
3 9. 5' 5