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Pan Am Flight 103 CIA Files.pdf - Paperless Archives

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,<br />

b\<br />

'o~<br />

leader of the oppressed. A~ugh this goal excecds<br />

Libyan capabilities,<br />

Iy has developcd<br />

to a 'few select a "-<br />

interest wit.. .<br />

a s<br />

targeting lJS personnel and<br />

facilities and who ~ave proved their ability to carry<br />

out tcrrorist attacks . .5ucn ties allow Tripoli fa augment<br />

its striking power while minimizing the Libyan<br />

operational role-and Washington's ability to prove<br />

Libyan complicity. Qadhafi proOably believes that<br />

using non-Libyan terrorist groups also enhances his<br />

image. He often publicly portrays attacks by groups<br />

anywhere in the world as spontaneous events in an<br />

ongoing war against -colonialism and Zionism and<br />

paints himself as a leading player in this war whose<br />

revolutionary ideals are shared by the "oppressed"<br />

worldwide. It d 6 J IIr b3<br />

Radical Palestinian Groups<br />

Radical Palestinian groups have served as Qadhafi's<br />

primary clients for tcrrorist a Hacks. Support for anti­<br />

Arafat Palestinian groups has been a f'lirly consistent<br />

Libyan policy since the mid-I 970s ..-<br />

b3<br />

\J\<br />

Although Qadhafi probably has not been able to<br />

achieve the degree of control over his clients that he<br />

has sought, they have given him the ability to project<br />

power that he would not otherwise have. The Libyan<br />

leader's influence with these groups-based primarily<br />

on his ability to provide them support-is not always<br />

sufficient to solicit attacks. Qadhafi's ability to do so<br />

is circumscribed to some extent by a desire on the part<br />

€If 30ildclients to protect their indepenclence, by<br />

differences in political agendas, and by different views<br />

on how to achieve shared goals, as well as by the<br />

Libyan leader's mercurial<br />

t and reputation<br />

as an unreliable pa<br />

Rec::nt ANO operations appear to rellect accordance<br />

with Qadhafi;s terrorism agenda. <strong>Am</strong>onl! the ANO's<br />

recent targets have been a British club and a hotel<br />

used primarily by Westerners in Khartoum and a<br />

the coast of Greece.<br />

bl , b~<br />

takes sueh forms as<br />

cases,<br />

funding, weapons,<br />

safehaven, false documentation, or ideological<br />

promotion-again, with varying degrees of regularity.<br />

-.. ;,~,.-.i<br />

63<br />

9<br />

suspect he encouraged or at least<br />

dramatic reminders of Western vulnerability and the<br />

power of terrorists who share hfs goals..... b 3<br />

.. - --~<br />

Other Palestinian Groups. Qadhafi_continuesTo-fund b f J ~<br />

several radical PalestiJlian groups r d U . _. OJ<br />

~nd ...... almost certainly . pressures t h em to at,ac '-k /<br />

Wes"tern interests.' Qadhafi has consistently'ftppotted<br />

"<br />

•<br />

as<br />

3 9. 5' 5

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