Pan Am Flight 103 CIA Files.pdf - Paperless Archives

PAN AM 103 LOCKERBIE BOMBING
CIA FILES
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Pan Am Flight 103
Lockerbie Bombing CIA Files
255 pages of CIA files related to the Pan Am Flight 103, Lockerbie Bombing. The
files date from 1984 to 1999. This set of files is unique because it includes
memos on the direct handling of an intelligence source. This type of information
is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and is not often released
by the Agency.
About Pan Am Flight 103
Pan Am Flight 103 took off from London's Heathrow Airport on December 21,
1988. The 259 passengers and crew, including 189 Americans, were on their way
to New York City. Twenty-seven minutes after leaving Heathrow, at 7:02 PM,
while flying over Scotland, a bomb inside the plane exploded. Everyone on the
plane and 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland were killed. Thus the
incident is often referred to as the Lockerbie Bombing.
An article appearing in the May 11, 1989 issue of the Washington Post reported
that the Central Intelligence Agency had concluded that the Iranian government
was responsible. The CIA believed that Iran hired a Palestinian group operating in
Syria to perform the bombing. Eventually responsibility would be attributed to
Libya.
On November 14, 1991 the United States and Britain announced criminal
charges against two Libyan intelligence officers, Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and
Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. In August of 1998, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi
announced that his country would accept the United States and British plan to
put the two suspects on trial by a Scottish court convened in the Netherlands.
On April 5th, 1999 the two suspects were transported from Libya to the
Netherlands. After a 40 week trial, on January 31, 2001, a three judge panel
returned a guilty verdict against Abdel Baset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi. The panel
acquitted Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah.

About the CIA Files
This set of files covers the practice of Libya supplying weapons to terrorist
groups. The files contain CIA reports created in the years before the Pan AM 103
bombing, covering Libya's methods of sponsoring terrorism. The files contain
information on the assassinations of Libyan dissidents living abroad. One
document contains a chronology of Libyan-sponsored assassination attempts
from 1980 to 1985.
Memos outline contacts with a Libyan intelligence agent working for Libyan Arab
Airlines in Malta. He first contacted the CIA on August 10, 1988. He described
Malta as "a primary launching point" for Libyan intelligence and terrorist teams
en route to and from Europe. Two months before the bombing, a CIA memo
mentions information from the informant about a Libyan intelligence officer,
Abdelbaset Mohmed Ali al-Megrahi, and the recent removal of explosives from
storage in Malta. Al-Megrahi was eventually convicted of bombing Pan Am Flight
103.

"S8'SRE'T N(JfORN NUCONTRl\CT ORCON
LIMITED DtSlftI8WX 10 N
Centrallnle\ligcnce Ageng -
~- --------~
. WMington. D. C.20505
'. DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 December 1984
Libya: Supplying Terrorist Weapons IIIIIIII
Summary
Libya provides a wide variety of weapons to groups which"
canmi t acts of international terrorism. These weapons include
conventional pistols. assault rifles,. and submachineguns of both
~stern and Bloc origin, as well as more sophisticated or
terrorist-specific ordnance such as man-portable anti-tank and
anti-aircraft weapons silenced and concealed istols, and
ex losive devices.
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G I M 84 -102 2 1 L
December 1984
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Libya:
Supplying Terrorist Weapons
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U!ltroductlon
Libya's abil i ty to procure arms directly from other
governments and indirectly on the international gray arms market
ensures Tripoli a wi¢e range of ordnance for use by Libyan as
well as foreign terrorist groups. As a result of Tripoli's
access to weapons, Libyan hit teams as well as diverse Libyansupported
fore ign terrorist groups now possess the weapons
necessary to attack:
o
o
o
o
Low flying commercial or military aircraft using manportable
SA-7 surface-to-air missiles.
Hardened vehicles--such as armored limousines--using RPG-
7 anti-tank weapons.
Diplomatic, military, industrial add commercial
installations using rocket-Iauncheq;ordnance and
improvised Etxplosive devices. "
Individuals using a variety,of {listols, submachineguns,
and assault and sniper rifles
Given the wide range of terrorist
from Libya, some of these weapons
be used against American targets.
organizat ons that receive arms
hlilliien and will continue to
Small Arms
Conventional Firearms. \ieapons traceable to Libya have
turned up in the possession of a wide variet of terrorists
throughou t Eur and the Middle East
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G I M 8 4 -1 02 2 1 L
Decembe r 1984
CLBY _
DECL GAlJl{
DERIVED FROM COL 1-82
2
NOCONTRACT
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NUCONTRACT ORCON
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arms
undergone
have re
Rome.
Libya provided these
, who admit~ed having
and India, but claim to
t 'unidentified
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Similar Libyan-bought Italian and Belgian weapons also have
been discovered in the possession of other terrorist groups:
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This policy stands in sharp contrast with the elaborate
means by which Libya seeks to dissociate itself from the weapons
it provides to its own terrorists for attacks on Libyan
dissidents abroad. These weapons are often acquired throuyh a
circuitous network involving one or more yray market arms brokers

NOCONTRACT ORCON
RIBUTION
, 'f
~--- ._--------.
The use o~ suql) front firms--wi th no demonstrable link
a--suggests that arms procured in this fashion are _ _
d for politically sensitive terrorist actions in countries
ey mi ht be recovered
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has also acquired US-made weapons via
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NUCUNTRACT ORCUN
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C mmercial versus Militar Firearms.·· Although Libya
freque tly provides military weapons--such as Beretta
subrna.p ineguns and Browning assault rifles -and larye caliber
pistol9--to foreign terrorists, Tripoli $eems to prefer non-
_rnilitEY, c ciall available wea s for its own
operatives.
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l·
Silenced Weapons.
firearms that by their ve
in terrorist rations.
procures specially equipped
ear to be intended for use
F[bU1J
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[S]
Tripoli also supplies silenced weapons to foreign terrorist
groups. A generally reliable source reported, for example, that
in 1983 Tripoli supplied at least 30 silenced pistols to anti­
Arafat Fatah rebels.

NUCONTRACT ORCUN
IBUTION
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Although details are
acquired other exotic
it appears likely that Tripoli
designed for terrorist
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Special Ammunition. In addition to special weapons, Libya
has also sought to acquire special purpose metal-pierci
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ammunition on the arms market. F[bU3]
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ORCON
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NUCUNTRACT URCON
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In addi tionto small arms, Libya F[bU1J
prov weapons to its own ove rseas F[bU3]
operatives as well as to foreign terrorists. Most of this
[S]
ordnance--such as man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft
weapons, and explosive devices--are ideally suited for terrorist
use and clearly not intended for "defensive"
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[S]
F[bU1J
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[S]
7
ORCON

NUCONTRACT URCON
RIBUTION
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
Anti-Tank Weapons. Another potent weapon frequently
provided by Libya to foreign terrorist groups is the Soviet-style
RPG-7 rocket-launcher. This man-portable, percussion-fired
weapon weighs only 2.25 kilograms (loaded) and fires a high
explosive armor-piercing grenade capable of defeating up to 33Umm
of rolled homogeneous steel plate at zero degrees obliquity. It
has a practical range of between 3 UO. to SOU meters and is ideally
suited for use by terrorists in attacking h"ardened vehicles such
as the armored limousines used in VIP protection. We believe-...
that Libya has provided this weapon to diverse terrorist and
insurgent groups throughout Africa, the tHddle East Latin
America, and robab Eur
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[S]
Libya may. also have been the source of many of the weapons
used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which conducted
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8
ORCON

--,....--___.----------.----------'"-=c
NUCUNTRACT URCUN
RIBUTION
I
_~~:the
greEtest number of its RPG-7 attacks on British targets--over
one hunrred--during 1972-1974. Press reports indicate, for
exampl.e" that Irish authorities conf iscated 5 tons of weapons and
~arrestea several PIRA terrorists aboard a ship discovered in
~,~9 73 of f the Irish coast. This vessel--the s. S. Claud ia--
was owned by two West German gray market arms dealers and had
sailed from ~ripoli, Libya. _ - _
Crew-Served and Artillery Weapons. Libyan support for
international terrorists also includes other items of hea
es
set tleme nts
Jordanian borders. liliiii
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F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
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[S]
Libya has continued supplying large quantities of heavy
weapons to Palestinian groups even after their 1982 withdrawal
from Beirut. Most of this materiel is of S.oviet design and
probably supplied from Libya I s own stockpiles of weapons
purchased directl from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and-_
North Korea.
F[bU1J
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[S]
9
NUCUNTRACT ORCON
'TlUBUTIUN

NUCONTRACT URCON
IBUTION
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
Handgrenades and Explosives. As with firearms, much of the
F[bU1J explosive ordnance lied by Tripoli to foreign terrorists
F[bU3] be Li by a.
[S]
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In addition to standard military high explosive ordnance,
Libya provides terrorists with the components necessa
fabricate their own rovised ex losive devices.
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
F[bU1J
the more advanced bomb components suppl ied to
F[bU3] Li are of US origin.
[C]
in December 19!B Turkish security officials
discovered an improvised explosive device in a suitcase about to
ORCON

el!r It: I N\ltVKN NUl.UN.Ltu\l.T UKl.UN
LIMITED DISrRIBUT~eH
---""--
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[C]
Tripoli may also'have begun supplying foreign terrorists
with extremely sophisticated, remote-controlled improvised
explosive devices. One such device--believed ave been
supplied by Libya--has recentl been
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
F[bU1J
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[S]
SAl though no group has claimed this unsuccessful attack, we
believe that the anti-Turkish Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) have been res onsible.
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
This Czech-made explosive has been used by various terrorist
organizations since 1972, when it first appeared in Black
September Organization letter bombs. It has also been used
various Armenian terrorist rou sand
mprov
during the 1981 Libyan-backed bombing campaign in
African Republic and the Sudan.
1I1I1I1I1I1I".in several of t e
liliiii
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ORCON

NOCONTRACT ORCON
IBUTION
ts and 1m lications
. .W believe that Libya wIll continue to acquire large
lquant{~ies of weapons and to supply some of this ordnance to
Lgro~ps 'which commit acts of international terrorism. As a
recognized government, Libya can purchase most of these arms
directly from other nations. We estimate that this year alone
Tripoli received nearly one half billion dollars worth of
armame nts from the Soviet Union , Eastern Europe, Ch ina and North
Korea. Although we do not know if Moscow and other communist
governments use Libya and other patron state supporters of
terrorism to funnel arms to specific terrorist groups, we believe
that these governments are fully aware that Tripoli provides
large quantities of ordnance to such organizations.
I11III
Moreover, despite its reputation as a supporter of
intern~tional terrorism, Tripoli is still able to purchase large
quantities of small arms from Western nations. Press reports
indicate that during the first half of 1984, for example, Libya
purchased over 22UO tons of small arms and ammunition from
Spain. Similarly, in mid-1984 the Brazilian government approved
the sale of 2U,OUU 9mm Taurus MT-12A subma9hineguns to Libya.~
Even if such official, government-to-government sales could be
halted, Tripoli would still enjoy easy access to a variety o~_
ordnance--including silenced pistols and man-portable anti-tank
and anti-aircraftweapons--through private arms dealers and
brokers on the international gray arms market. _
F[bU1J
[0]
F[bU1J
[0]
Unconfirmed information also sugyests that Tripoli may
eventually be able to manufacture a wide range of weapons
itself.
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[S]
Besides the immediate threat of Libya arming international
terrorists, the problem is compounded by the longevity of modern
small arms, which, when properly cared for, can be cached for
long periods or traded from one terrorist group to another.
Thus, weapons already supplied by Libya to Palestinian
a Brazilian-made copy of the Italian Beretta M-l2
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[C)
12
ORCON

SECRE'f ~!(wQRN
LIMITED bISUHR!!TIUN
NOCUNTRACT URCUN
-
---... ....... ~. ~
! terrori.sts, for example, may turn up years from now in the
---.- -. possesslion of a violently anti-American group in Western
. Europ~.: As- a result, we believe that Libyan arms acquisitions to
~date already ensure the availability of terrorist weapons for the
~_~~~er of the century. _
FlbU1J
[0]
13
ORCON

.......:,....' Director of
If ~ "-\ Centr.'
\~.l"!J~' Intelligence
~~.~.
..
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'...:National 'Intelligene, Daily
. . . . ... .
(b) (1)
(b) (3)
.... . Monda,·. '.; .
. '.'14 January ~885
O/D/oca
CU's 505-509
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2006
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Libya-Italy: Libyan Diplomat Killed 4
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14 January 1985
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LIBYA-ITALY: Libyan Diplomat Killed
Political opponents of Libyan leader Qadhafi apparently are
responsible for killing the head of the information office for Libya's
People's Bureau in Rome yesterday. Press reports indicate a group
calling itself "AI Burqan" carried out the attack. Libya is threatening
to retaliate against the dissidents. as well as against supporter~ of
PLO Chairman Aratat and~ese Shias suspected by Tripoli ot
colluding in the operation.~
Comment: The assassination of the Libyan diplomat marks the first
serious strike by Qadhafi's political opponents since the National
Front for the Salvation ot Libya failed in its attack on Qadhafi's
headquarters last May. The killing will boost the credibility of the
dissident movement, which has been kept off balance by Qadhafi's
mix of strict security measures at home and murders of dissidents
abroad. The shadowy AI Burqan group, which claimed to have killed
Qadhafi's ranking representative in Rome last year, probably is small
and closely knit. Its links to the larger dissident organizations are
unclear·1
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I
14 January 1985
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(b) (1)
(b) (3)
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
14 January 1985
Cable
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2006
Tall leerel
CPAS HIDC 85-1)11C
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Note.
Libya-Italy: Libyan Diplomat Killed
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LIBYA-ITALY: Libyan Diplomat Killed
Political opponents of Libyan leader Qadhafi apparently are
responsible for killing the head of the information office for Libya's
People's Bureau In Rome yesterday. Press reports indicate a group
calling itself "AI Burqan" carried out the attack. Libya is threatening
to retaliate against the dissidents, as well as against supporters of
PlO Chairman Arafat and lebanese Shias suspected by Tripoli of
colluding i., the operation. D
Comment: The assassination of the Libyan diplomat marks the first
serious strike by Qadhafi's political opponents since the National
Front for the Salvation of Libya failed in its attack on Qadhafi's
headquarters last May. The killing will boost the credibility of the
dissident movement. which has been kept off balance by Qadhafi's
mix of strict security measures at home and murders of dissidents
abroad. The shadowy AI Burqan group, which claimed to have killed
Qadhafi's ranking representative in Rome last year. probably is small
and closely krlil. Its link: to the larger dissident organizations are
J
unclear·IL--____ ....
•
Til' SocI.1
~ 6 7 9
: .......

DIRECTORATE (F I NTIll IGENCE
15 February 1985
Middle East Terrorism:
;
The Threat and Possible US Responses
/
// Summary
/
Ira~1an-sponsored terrorism is the greatest threat to
US personnel and facilities in the Middle East. Islamic
radicals 1n Iran v1ew i Washington's presence and influence in
The Middle East as .ajor i~edi~nts to successful export of
their revolution and regard terrorism IS a legitimate and
effective method of attiC king the US. Iranian-sponsored
terrorism will.continue Ind possibly increase so long as the
.clerics in Tehran do not perceive any significant costs in \:)3
launching such operations.
Syria. Libya. and Palestinian radicals also are major
Middle East sponsors of terrorism. Libya regards US
invo1ve~ntin th~' regfon as the primary obstacle tc
promoting Arab military action against Israel, but is
reluctant to target· the US directly because it fears US .,
retaliation. Unlike the Iranians and libyans, Syria and the
Palestinian radicals ·do not focus on the US as their major
target, and II1Jst of their attacks are dtrected against their
exiled political opponents, moderate Arab states, or other
Palestinian gr()Ups •. Syrh and libya, like Iran, use
terrorism as an fnstrument of state policy and provide
extensive support for terrorists. b 3
1 I
ApprO~for Release
Date _________ J999 __

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Iran. Radicals in the Khome1ni regime are committed t6 spreading their
I slamTC"Tdeol ogy, and many clerics view terrorism as a legitil'flate, effective
tool of state policy, particularly against the US position in the Middle
East. Iranian-backed attacks incr~ased by about 30 percent in 1984, and the
numbers killed in Iranian-sponsored attacks outpace fatalities in strikes by
all other terrorist sponsors. Senior Iranian leaders such as Ayatollah
Montazeri. Khor.leini ',s heir-apparent, Prime Min;ste~ Musavi. anti Consulta,tive ""7-
Ass€'rlhly speaker Raf~anjani are implicated in Iranlan terrorism.. I t).:;J
-

. \ .. . .. ~ . ....
• ...'..' . • .0 . ..
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Iran generally employs radical Lebanese or Iraqi Shia, groups in fts
terrorist operations. These groups include:
The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain that was responsible
for an unsuccessful coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981.
The Islamic Call (Oawa) Party. with branches in Iraq. Bahrain. and
Kuwaft. that has bombed the US Embassy and other targets in Kuwait and
is responsible for bombings and assassinations in Iraq.
and Husayn Husawi·s Islamic Amal that operate in Lebanon and
~izballah
were behind the attacks on the US ErOOusy and the us Kari ne ~rracks b 3
as well as the IIIOre recent kidnapings of several US cftizens. .•••
Tehran also can call on individual sympathizers worldwide. including some
in the US. to mount terrorist attacks. ,vides its surro tes with 'l\
• equipment. traini and ~'
The most prominent trade~rk of Iranian-sponsored terrorism is the
willingness of some perpetrators to die in the attempt. Iranian-sponsored
Shia terrorists have carri e

group once was supported by Iraq, which appears to have abandoned
international terrorism over a year ago. Abu Nidal now depends on Syria and
may undertake operations at Syrian direction. Several other radical
Palestinian groups aligned with Syria also are involved in te orist
operations in Lebanon, Israel, and the \.lest Bank.
Hitting US Targets . ~ .
We do not believe the Syrians or the Palestinians would deliberately
attack US targets unless US actions in Lebanon or on the Arab-Israeli issue
were perceived as pos i ng a di rect, fmmedi ate threat to them. The Syri ans,
however, have not moved forcefully to prevent Iranian-spon.sored terrorism
dgainst us targets in Lehanon. Syria condons Iranian transits through
Damascus Ai rport dnd use of Syri an-co'ntrol':lrIlritory f n Lebanon' s Bekaa
Valley for terrorist-training activiti~s.
'
During the past 18 months, Libya has tri('C1 to sponsor b:o
op.er..atJ,QfiS.-

: . ...... .' .'. ..
. .
. . .
. . .. .. ..
-- US military facilities in the Persfan Gulf area. (xamples include
facilities in Bahrain or Oman supportlng US warships and the US
Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia.
-- Qadhaff mfght target US military facilities in Eurooe, such as the
tJATO cruise ml ssl1e base at Comi so in Slc1ly or the Hell1 nikon af rbase
in Greece. to exploit local opposition to the US military presence.
-- Iran and possibly Libya are Hkelyto try to strike inside the US if
they have been, or believe themselves about to be. attacked dlrectly
by the US. I·
--
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A general reluctance to support any US military ~ctfon
slim target. however. would inhibit a public endorsement
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Terrorism Review.
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10 MIlY 198j
Copy 4 1 1
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20 May 1985
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Focus-The R~ or Libya"~ponsorcd Assauination Attcmp"
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This review Is publislr~tI ~ry Ol"~r tff~/c by Ih~ Dir~clora/~ of J"/~IJi~IIC~.
Appropria/~ a"lcI~s prodllad by olh~rdtmt"ts oflM CIA as wt!1I as by ot"~r
a~etIClu Q/" th~ US l"t~lI/~e~ Comm"IIity will he conslJt!reJ for publication.
b~
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Comments aM queri~s are _Icome and may ~ dirUled to Ih~ Ex~cuti~ Editor L. "-
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":'.
Since 1980, the Libyan GO¥emment bas en,a,ed directly in more than 30
aaassination a"empts outside its bordCTS (see chronolocy), and the list continues to
,row, Althou,h the Qadha6 rc,ime bas been armin, and trainin, numerous
insur,ent and diuident ,roups as far beck as the early 19705, Liyben did not
become an actual practitioner of tel'T'Orism until late 1979, when Qadhafi betaa his
drive to eliminate dissidents permanently. Qadbafi's fcar tbat tbe inc:rc:asin,ly
active Ubyan exile movement cballenecs his claim to be the sole representative of b ~
tbe: Libyan people has provided the principal motivation."
~
Apa" from Libyan dissidents, Qadhafi's second major tar,et for terrorism bas
been selected moderate leaders in Africa and the Middle East. The persistent
objects of his unremiuinl hatred are the leaders of EcYPt, Sudan, and Chad. Yasir
Ararat, a former ally, and Jordan's Kin. Hussein are also prime enemies as
Qadhafi perceives them as tnaitors to the united Arab front acainst Israel and its
patron, the United Sta:es. Qadhafi's bostility extends as well to Saddam Husayn
or Iraq. However, Libya bas yet to implement a direct attack on any of these b.3
leaders except Habu of Chad. f/I'
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1 .. • continues to document numerous plots by Qadbafi a,ainst these b .3
pro-Wcstem leaders, but c:ontinuinc Libyan ineptitude as well as efficient security
measurcs have thus far been heavily rcsponsible for preventin. the plots from
bccominc actual attempts. Barrinc cood luck or unusual lapses in security, these
Libyan plots are no more likely to succeed in the future, despite I.he pressure from b 3
the incrc:asin,ly influential radical clement in Qadhafi's inner circle ...
US diplomats have occasionally been the object of Libyan assassination plans, but
a,ain, no attacks have occurred. After the United States sbot down two Libyan
planes durin, an exercise in the Gulf of Sidra in 1981, for example, lCYeral
incipient Libyan lISSU5ination plots acainst US diplomats in Western Europe were
uncovered. Qadhafi, however, is a praematic political c:alculator who quickly
bac:lced down when informed tbat the United~ was aware of his plans. We
believe Qadhafi (ears US retaliation and consequently has focused his attention on
non-US tareets that appear to be: more vulnerable. This helps explain, in part, why
he has thus far avoided directly tarceline: the United States or leaders like Jordan's
KinE Hus.sc:in.' •.
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Chronoloo of Ubyan-Spoasorcd
Assassinatioa Attempt ... 1980-85
"'5
614,"'
Wnt GnM."y: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan S1udent killed in Bonn by Liby~n aunman
who was anated. The assassin also wounded two German passersby, one seriously.
'The victim had been a ta'let of the Libyan relime ror at least two years.
114';1
Cy,ru: Libyan businessman assassinated in downtown Nicosia by an unidentified
&unman. The victim was the director or an offshore holdine company and was
believed to be an opponent of the Libyan relime.
'.:.,
I Mud,
It.ly: Libyan .ieweler murdered in his shop in Rome. A silencer-equipped pistol
was lert at the scene by the assassin.
AlUtric: Former Libyan Ambassador to Austria severely wounded by two shots
fired from a car outside his home in Vienna. The victim had been a member of the
ori&inalaroup ofyoune officers wbo helped Qadhafi seize power in 1969. He quit
his post in dis,ust at the rqiDle in 1980.
Cr..J: Complaint lode:ed with United Nations, alleaine Libya tried to assassinate
President Hissein Habre in September 1984. Chad provided photoeraphs of the
suitcase bomb that was to be used in the attack.
.,.-;
1984
17N_wcHr
ED": President Mubarak announces that four assassins sent to Eaypt by Libya to
kill former Libyan Prime Minister al-Bakltush had been arrested and forced to
send rake pictures to the Libyan Embassy in Malta showina Bakltush apparently
dead. The official Libyan press had Callen Cor the ploy and claimed Bakkush had
been executed by suicide squads sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the
revolution."
. -I..,
It.ly:' Libyan exile found ,a"ed and straneled in a hotel in Rome. The victim had
been the subject of Libyan deportation requests.
U,riull Ki".lIotrC One of six Libyans awaitina trial for bomb atlacks in London in
March 1983 found shot to death in a London apartment. The victim may have
been silenced by the Libyan Government.
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erne,: T,,'o Libyan studenu found murdered in their apartment in a crime
reminiscent of Libyan killinas of anti-Qadh.afi Sludents in 1980;and 1981. The two
were aaaaed. beaten. and stranaled before bcinl "hot t"'ice in the back.
. :
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GrHC': Anli-Qadhafi Lib)'an businessman killed by Iwo men on a motorbike wbo
avoided arra!. Libya's Forci,'n Minister concluded a virino Glace the same day .
Grn~': A Libyan-born Grcc:k citizen known to have distributed anti-Qadhafi
literature at his store was wounded by a Libyan employc:c of Libyan Arab Airlines .
I7Mcy
.;'
Li6yt1: JANA. the official Libyan news aaeney. announced "the Libyan masses
have decided to (orm suicide commandos "to chase: traitors and stray does wherever
they ;are and liquidate them physically."
U.iutl Ki •• tloM: British policewoman killed and 11 anti-Qadhali demonstrators
wounded by aunfire from Libyan People's Bu!cau in London. Afte~ • sieae, British
authorities found WC8p.Jns and spent shell casinp in the vacated embassy.
Li6yt1: Followina the annual Libyan General People's Conaress. the Libyan
Revolutionary Committcc:s announce that all Libyan exiles must return to Libya
or face "the death penalty." -
1911
JS,pu""kr
19Fd....".
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It.'y: Four·Libya~claimina.to be. seamen arrested in Rome while followinathc:
US Ambassador's motorcade.
Li6y.t1: Libyan General People's Congress wams all Libyans in exile to return
home or face "the anler c( the Libyan people."
1912
No attempts known.
1911
10 OctolHr
Slit/ • .: Planned assassination of visiting Chadian President Hisscin Habre failed
when those sent to conduct the operation surrendered.
Judy: Scv~ral Libyan aunmen open lire on passengers arrivina at Rome airport
(rom Aleiers. The head oflhe .major anti-Qadhafi exile eroup was the target. b.3
3
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UttJ'd Ki •• tI..: Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student murdered in London by three
Libyans who left the c:ounuy the next day.
U,u'd Ki •• tI..: Two cbildren of an anti-Qadhafi Libyan poisoned by catin,
peanuts containin, thalium. British authorities a"ested a Libyan for attempted
murder of tbe children's fatber.
U,ut~J Stun: Anti-Qadhafi student stiot in Fort Collins, Colorado; the victim
lost his ri,bt eye in tbe assault. The Libyan-bired assailant, an ex-Green Beret and
US citizen, was arrested and jailed. rie incident is the only known case: of ..
Libyan operation succcs.sfully carried outJnside the United Slates.
AI~ti·oQldllafi exile wounded by fellow Libyan in Rome afler an arlument. b \V ~ 3·/
incident was part of Qadhafi's campaien to intimidate
11.Iy: Libyan exile killed in Milan train slation by an unidentified ,unman, .. few
hours after expirstion of a dcadlinesct by Qadh.fi (or.1I Libyan exiles to return
home.
11.Iy: Libyan exile shot at in Rome. The arrested Libyan eunman said he was sent
by Libya "to kill an enemy of the people." Two accomplices escaped.
GrYft%: A Libyan exile and vocal opponent of the Libyan reeime was killed in
Athens. His throat was cut in his apartment.
1,.Iy: Libyan businessman found nabbed and straneled to ~ in a boardine
house: in Rome.
W~st Gn"...y: Libyan exile eunned down in Bonn . .A....
murder was part of Qadhafi's assassination campaien.
I.· IIIIIT •• f •• 1Iil1.II:_.·
Itldy: Libyan exile killed in Rome by one of two Libyans with whom he had been
chattinl in a hotel cafe.
5 I I I
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HlghlighfS
Awn IINIS
HhkIaII RtTaICC 111m I' t~ US llIift'CSts
US intcrcsu in Ihe Middle East face a new. serious threat or terrorist attack
followine p!"CSS alleeations of US complicity in an 8 March car bombin, in ~th
Beirut. The bomb killed some 80 Lebanese civilians and wounded scores or others.
but the apparent tarcet. prominent Hizballah cleric Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah. escaped injury •• 1It
So far. Fadlallah has responded in B low·)

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TCfTlIrisCs C-W Taqd Paris Air SItow
This biennial cvcnt. to be he Iii at Le brlet Airfield from 30 May to 9 June.
provides an excellent opportunity (or terrorists to ,ain publicity. While we have no
specific indications that European terrorists an: plannin,to sta,e an attack
.,.instlhe .ir show. the easy ac:ccss {O'airport facilities and theJ;l)t~;' be ... o(
Americans expected to auendmake the show a temptin, tar,et (or a bombin,.
Four of the US putieipan~Boeinl. HUlhes. Lockheed •• nd Northrup-were
mentioned as potential taraets in documents recovered from Wcst E~n .13
lerroristlrouPS involved in recent "anti-imperialist (ront" .ctivilies.~'·
' ..
The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction may also represent a threat. The
,roup claimed responsibility (or bombin, the US pavilion at the . Manc:illes
Intemacional Trade Fair on 29 September 1983. and an attack at the air show b "2.
would embarrass France. which is boldin, • major LARF leader. _
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SWt ao.w.c c ..... 1p Lnta 85 Dead
A (lOOrdinated bombina: campaicn cond'ucted by Sikh extremists durin, 10-12 May
lefl 85 penons ip Delhi and other citid dead and morc than I SO wounded. Marc
than a dozen bombs exploded in buses. bus stations. and other crowded .rcas: some
of the unelploded devices found and defused were boobytrappcd portable radi05.
This was the hiaM.st thri:C-day death tJlI yet attnbUrJOrSikh terrorism and the
first coordinated bombina campeian since 37 train st.tions wcre bombed on,
15 April 1984. ThC$C attacks came on the eve of the tri.1 of three Sikhs accused of
ususinatinaPrime Minister Indira G.iMihi and prior to the 6 June annivcrsary of
the Itomlin, of the Sikhs' Golden Temple by the Indian Army. Indian police have
arrested 1.000 suspects so far and beliC"c they have identified three persons
responsible for the bombrncs.tiII( >. b.3
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CCC RCRIMS Bolllbbt& Campaip AfCu Fou-M_U. Ld
On I May the Belaian terrorist eroup Combatant Communist Cells (CCC)
resumed its bombina camp.i,n with an attack that caused the first fatalities
attributable to the ,roup. A bomb pla~ a car outside the Employers'
federation of Belaium exploded and killed two firemen who had been tryina to
defuse it. Group members had distributed pamphlets at the scene warnin, of the
bOmb and phoned police I S minutes prior to the explosion. In addition to the
fatalities, several other aspects of this attack wue new for the CCC-the
distri~ut~n o~ leaflets at the scene, the warnine call, and publication of a l
~
communique an both French and Dutch . ." ~
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1'lIorft &o.M ClaI.e4 II,. "AdiotlIHRcC~"
In a series of attacks in Paris on the Rieht of I J-14 April. a branch of Israel's Bank
Lcumi. the French Natio,(.1 Immieration office. and the offices of Miffilir. a
conservative: French weekly newspaper. werc cJI;tensivcly darri3ecd. There were no
casualties. Individuals purportine t~c:prcscnt Action Dircete cI iA'1 d
. responsibility. but there arei:loubts about their cI.ims~
It appears these bombinls may be: the ",·ork of dislruntled North African
immilrants rather than Action Dirccte. For example. the communique. wrillen in
very poor French. probably was the work of a nonnative French speaker. Except
for some anti-Zionist phrases. the communique lacked the usual Action Dirccte
rhetoric and made no mention of NATO. Instead. it allaeked French treatment of
North African immilrants and alleled anti-Alaenan actions by President
Miuerrand."" . .b ~
Arraced Tatisla Terrorist Uak~ Co Adioll Directc:
On 24 April Muzaffer Kac:ar. a Turkish national. was arrested at a Paris radio
identi
Ten'CKkC Uakc:d to Carlos Apparat EJI;pdied to West Germaay
In kc:c:pine with the French policy of returning "undesirables" to their country of
oriain. urban euerriUa Maldalena KoPl' was escorted to the West German border
on 4 May. She had just completed servine a thrce-y~ sentence for transportine
arms and explosives_ Kopp was jailed with another sus~c:d terrorist. Swiss
national Bruno Breeuet. whom the French arc: still holdine on the same charee.
Prior to their sentencine in 1982. the international terrorist Carlos claimed that
the two be:lonac:d to his orlanization and warned he would strike in France: if they
were not released. A car bomb killed a woman and wounded more than 60 others
on the day the two were impri~'tcd.'"
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SdMcu r« GAL
For the fil'$l time since the Antiterrorist Liberation Group CG!\lJ appaared in
1983. two of its members have been sentenced 10 jail terms. The men were arrested
in September 1984. convicted of carryine weapons. and sentenced by ia Bayonne
court to five·ycar terms. In ~i.ris. three other GAL lnCIU,~re arrested on
13 April and charecd ·... ith the 30 March murder of a Spanis" Basque journalist .
. judicial hcarinp onthcsc three beean in Bayonne on 11 April. while Spain has - ~
be,un extradition proccedincs....
b.-J
Extradited ET A M~ Rdcucd
On 19 April a Spanish criminal court released two of the thrcc ETA terrorists
extradited from France in September. ne third was convicted and sentenced to S4
yean in prisoa. • , g , ad.'
The Spanish press is specula tin, that Madrid will noc request fuither extraditions
but will henceforth rely on French expulsions of alleaed terrorists to third
coUjtria. The acquittals 4 ZI I .. I n tJ't,..i"
,. ti appear to be a Ktback to French-Spanish
counterterrorist coopention. We believe. however. that Paris may view them as
proof of the fairness of the Sp;lnish judicial system aiid: therefore. they could
encourI,e additional cltnditi"n~ ..".
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ETA ...... Hit Mediten'U1C811 Raoc1s
On J May ETA be,an • bambini campaian .,ainst Spanish resorts. So far II
bombs have been detonated in the resort towns of Alicante:. JavC3. Villajoyosa.
Dcmesa de: Campoamor. Bcnidorm. Valenc:a, and Sidi San Juan. The bombltimed
for the: start of the resort season-have caused no injuries and little dama,e.
ETA h2S not attacked tourist tarltets since: 1919.~
b3
Wife al KiUaped lounalist Recdycs Vidcatape
On 9 May, the wife of Alec Collett received a videotape of her husband from an
anonymous source. Collett. a British journalist who works for the UN Relief and
Works Acency for Palestinian rcfulccs. was abducted south of Beirut on
2S March. The little-known ~CY9lutionary Ora:anization of Socialist Muslims
(ROSM) claimed responsibility fofthc kidnapiillif: On the tape. Collett appeared
healthy and said that he has been hcld in Beirut sin~ the 25th and that he bas
been receivine medication for his diabetes. The tape: contained no demands for his b.3
release. •• ., .'
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The videotape marks the first time CoIlet!"1 captors have been heard (rom since
their 28 March statement caaiminc credit (or the kidnaptna. That stalement
threalened continued attacks a,ainsl British tar,elS until all Muslim "(reedom
fi,hlcrs- were relcased frod! British jails. We SWpec1 ROSM is a covcrname used
b~ the Abu Nidal Group to claim credit (or auacks a,ainsl British laraClS.
Members of the Abu Nidal GroUp asc servin, lon, sentences-n.~iu:d
Kiqdom for the auempted .assassination o( the Israeli Ambassador to London in
1912._
-,--
I.aa. -llIPtwlsc Vio&alcc
In Buel1O$ Aires. the broadcasline facility of Radio Belerano was wrecked on
29 April by thrc:c bombs planlc:d by 10 men. three: o( whom were wcarin, police
uniforms. Ri,htwin, politicians have: criticizc:d the ltation for arryine "Marxist"
commentaries on Ar,entine politics. In another incide~t. in the town of La Pla.a.
65 km south of Buenos Aires. kidnapers abducted a human riahlS activist on
27 April and carved swutik.as on his body before reieasin, him.~.
This rcc:cnt spate of ri,htwin, violence coincides with the opcnin, in late April of
the lriab of ninc former Ar,entinc military leaders-tbrcc..gf ..them expresidents-accused
or human ri,hlS violations durin, the 1976-83 period or
military rule~ _ .
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Iraq: (raaiaa Eft'orts ...".
Weaketdq SIda Dissidcals.
Much of tbe terrorism auempced wilhin Iraq or
a,ainst Iraqi tarKc:ts abroad can be attributed 10
Iranian-sponsored opposition ,roups. Alt~,h Iraqi
ICCUrity is effective in counterin, InOIt auacb, these
,roup5 still manaae to carry O4It bombines and .,..,.
asaaaainations from time to time"" b .."I
Iran', efforts to cobble tocetbcr an effective rOrce: of
pliable Iraqi Sbia diaaidcnt ,roIIPS have left t'-c:
croups more weakened and dividCd than ever. Iraqi
Shi .. baYe Ial'lcly resisted Tc:hra,n'. auc:mpcs at
domination but arc split over idcolottical, leadership,
and Slratqy issues. Even if a widely respected Iraqi
Sbia lc:aclct' were to emc:r-ac, Iran probably would
undermine bis influence ....'" b ~
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Dewa S·.. If1 t~- .
Dawa (islamic Call Pllrty probably is the oldest,
brEcsl, and mosl prcsti,ious Iraqi Shia dissident
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TIle (nqi M ...... (TlIe Iraqi Sc,WllildcnJ
The Mujahidin appears to be SAIRl's primary
military wine. It was established in 1979 and is led by
Abel al-Aziz ai-Hakim. youneer brother or SAIRI
Muhammad al-
TIle ...... Ac:tJo. Orp.izadcMa
The Iranians also appear to have considerable control
over the Islamic Action Oreanization (lAO). The
croup is also known as the Islamic Work Oreanization
or Amal but is distinct from the terrorist Amal &rouP
in Lebanon. The lAO, an offshoot and rival of Dawa,
is'heaCled by Mubammad Taqi al-Modarasi. an
Iranian who ha..~ close ties to Ayatollah Khomcini.
The lAO has conducted terrorist openllions insi.sfe
and outside Iraq. but none is known 10 have been
- :"fr4--""F'~.~~-" #". • ••••••• ~;. -'.. '. ~~,
•. ~ ·.'"',~~:-- .. u •• ' .. ' •• ~~·.r~w .r.r.:~.~".:- ; 'r' '''''.
,
We ICC little ebancc of an effective Shia Gw
movement emcrcinc rrom the badly splintered rebels.
The chasms between them appear too numerous and
too wide to be easily brideed. The emcrlcnoe of a
native Iraqi Shi. leader with widespread popular
support amonl Iraq's Shias w~ld improve the rebels'
prospects, but Iran probably would view him as a
ch&lIence 10 its authority and uooetinine his
inftuenc L ;,..•.
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Iraqi Shia dissidents racc a dilemma. Without Iranian
backine and a presence in Iran. indcpc:ndent croups
would be too wcalc and too distant to build an
effective movement inside Iraq. The acceptancc of
Iranian backinc and control. however. antaconius
many Iraqi Shia leaders and taints the lroup5, in the
eyes or Iraq's Arab Sbias who hold a dccp-~cd
animositY.lainst Ihe Persians . .,.. b..::>
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Cbroaoloey of Terrorism-I98S
B~/0t4· D't dtsc,~d IIOt~llr)" fortit!" aM ;nlt'lfDt;oll4l l

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Frtllf«: W_III IN,,1c i" PII';. 6otwktl.TA~'i"lf O;"ct~. A car bomb. which
exploded outside the buildine. wounded a niehi watchman and caused considerable
damace. Action Dircc1e bomtxst the same build inc on 6 June 1982."
1IcIf.I"e.~ 1'9111ic.r c."tlltI.fe S"OIIIJ tift," Jy tffukei •• "tffelf I" JIw".ltI ...
He was seekinl a scat in local council el~ions scheduled for 16 aACJ nIDI' No
,roup has claimed credit for thekillin, .• ' b 3
We., Cdr_r. Rnol.tio""". Cd/. ct.i", '''n~ 6ft",.;".s i" O"esseIJ-f ""J
ColllCU. The attacks dama,ed a banlc. a pharmaceutical firm. and a buildine
housine the All-Metal Employers' Fedcration.~
Uh"OfC lJtullccesU.J lI"e",,' 10 kU •• , Fre"d 1l' c~s,.,,,Jel", Norbert Balil
said his cries for help droYe oft" the five ,unmen. who stole his ~
FrtlllCe: Two We~-rerlluJ ul«o",,.,,,,iClfliolU jirllU IHItflieti ill Puis. The
'explosions wounded a ni,ht watchman and caused considerable property damale. \_ A
In c:Iaimine responsibifity. Action Direc:\e alleeed ~ the Companies were O...J
producin, equipment for NATO cruise missiles.'-
JOA/lril
EVPI: Dd"e"tI""ts ill s.""" •• teJr"ir " •• tleJ om to 1M;' _II 1l000000"tffelflL EIYPI
requested that the four-two Maltese and two Britons-be prosecuted in their
respective countries. The November 1984 plan to kill (ormer Libyan Prime
Minister Bakkush was exposed after the (our suspects were apprehended and L 3
Libyan leader Qadhafi was tricked into believine his plan had succeeded . ..__- D
Ec.tulor: FOMr AYC ",etflien escllpe ''''HIl'' ,,,,,,,d fro", G"rci" More"o P,iso.
i" (}ttilo. The most important prisoner was· Hamet Vilsoonez. believed to be the
numbcjo~two man in the Alfaro Vive. Carajo! or,anizatio.n.:.l.!te other three had \_ 3
been arrested durine attempted bank robberies in Quito in J1tne \984. (~ ~
P~ Selfin-o LM",ilfoso lerr_ists II." iY"lImile slicks ", p"blie ""iilli"lls. One
or the blasts caused severe damale but no deaths at the National Stadium. where b 3
,overnment officials were countine VOles from ~he 14 April national e1ection._
Pe,,,: TAue _",e"fOlllfti tI~tulllf H __ III Prtnilfee. The bodies had been
mutilated by wild does. and one had a sicn on her chest sayin,. "This is how
the ... collaborators die'" Althoueh no ,roup claimed responsibility. the leftist
terroriSI ,roup Sendero Luminoso. which has conducted similar slayings in the b.3
province. is· suspected,..
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StIfI,II A/"ria.: ANC ","6s two Iffill;". COM;',,;n .,,4/ • kill. The C3rl)·.mornine
blasts, which caused extensive property cbmace but no Clsualties. probably were b3
meant to .. how ANC solidarity with Itriltinc mincworltersl • Wy",
,
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minor damaee but no injuries. No aroup has claimed-rcsponsibility, OS
.
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S",u.: ETA ,,_. II, tluH FNIICII ..,-.Hiln #II S,..isll trw;1I. The vehicles
wen: aboa~ a railway car at the Bc:asain station'" .
uk..-: A..J QjfKicl J-' Z~"" IUII~ti 'y ~ ill IIis Ca'. No croup has
...
yet claimed credit for the: attack .•
Cllil~: S~" /I(1fI'n"'OU 4/ntraywl '" H,UI _ S_ti •• o. The attack occuncd
just before President Pinoc:het spoke to the Dation in a radio and television address .
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£1 S.IH#lor: Ulllar_1f terrorists kill ~ 0/' s •• Jorg~. Edear Mauricio
Valenzuela, a Christian Democrat, had bcc:n kidnaped several days before his
I May installation. He was released, but his captors warned him not to assume
office. When he ienorcd the thic:ats, he was shot to dc:ath.~:...
. ..1..
Wut G_r. New ,NIl, "lff6. FN"" firM I. Co/qlU. The French
telecommunications company provides computer maintenance for the German
Army. A previously unknown' the Commando
27
•
,. 5 I ~ I
f,

•
•
c .. t
Wnl ~.Y: Lua, ... j ~d,"" 1ft F,tlnfll 0iIi« for Milillfry l"roat"fW'lfl
I" /(HI,.z,. Police suspect the Red Army Faction or members of its periphery were
rcspoMiblc._
S".III: ETt4 6otrr .. ,x,ltNI,.1 Hntz .1ItI ..cr;s Q/!ic,s I. S •• S,lHul' •••• tI Forti
s"'w._ i. f-'illlrill. The bombinp caused minor damacc .nd probably were 63
intended CO protest President Rea,an's viiiT io Spain..... ' .
. 1_1: B-1 tld,",J ., INi" sl.,i_ i. Rod, H. "yi.. A railroadworker b.3
discovered the dcvioc under a bench. No ,roup has claimed credic...,:: .
"
5M.y
Conice: lIIirty HfW'S ~x,IOtI, ilf Aitl«io lin&. A variety of b~;:lC$SC$ and private
residences ownccl by mainland French citizens were struck. causin, extensive
propeny dama,e. Two policemen were Ili,htly wounded while defusin, one of the
bombs. No one claimed responsibility. but the aClacks probably are the work of b 3
Corsican separatists. __
6Mq
Ikl.ilflff: CCC d.I,... ""' • • ',"1 ., .,,,tlMMni~ tUllffi";SINII~ ~IS i"
Brruuls. In a communique:, the Combatant Communist Cells (CCC) had blamed
the police for the deaths of two firemen in • I May bombin, .•
b3
7M."
S,.ill: e.,.~. urio.sly _litis I'C'I'-" I" P.""loIUL. No ,roup has claimed
,_"2..
responsibility. but ETA is suspected. . O.-J
JtlPCII: HIUM,,",,' r«l.ns lIil NIlriI.Airpon, _"tI Q/ficeworlcn. Rockcu landed
ncar the air traffic control center. a private security company's offices. and a radar
ins .... II.lion. causin, minor dama,e .nd brush lires. The leftist terrorist ,roup
Chulcaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) is believed responsible for this attack as well as for 1/\3
two similar ones in April.--..
V
Port" •• ': Rulo Fru EMTO~ ',";0. u.r US6011 601fl1Hd. A previously unknown
,roup, the Anti-Capitaliltand Anti-Militarist GrouP. claimed credit for the attaek b 3
(0 protest PortU&uese "dependence" on the United States. e.__ .
. -1...
ulHt"ort: 1" .. ~1i ,.".,,1 H.I sid.s r.66n rell qff Tyr~, /Cilli.~ ~ P.le,ti.lllu.
The raft was apparently headin, for the Israeli coast when it was interoc:pled. An
Israeli newspaper elaims that Fatah bas acoc:pted responsibility for this operation b3
and olher rccent seaborne attempts .......,..
S;.c.~: T_ III'r~SleJf«' '''''c.Ii•• crlfU 10 T.lflil Inll,.~'rts. Two
Sin,aporean citizen, arc in custody. and a conlainer or riflc:s. Slcn ,uns.
ammunition. and explosivc:s was seized. Sri Lankan officials claim the shipment
was intended for the separatise ,uerrilla ,roup PLOTE .......-
h3
28
•
1·-"

•
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e
C{
,
IOMq
I"i~ Si16 .t",~ I'OIltic.J I~n "ill",;. PIItC/d. The victim. who was president
of a Sikh pany and a former member of Parliament. was shot by two unidentified
assailants who subsequently escaped on a motor scooter . .,.,'- b3
1
1
I
i ,
.-4'.
29
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!JIll
,
.. ~:.
,
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': ..
.-4'.
I lj 0 L

Talking Points for the 001
21 January 1986
5
o 12958
.6(d) (1»1
The Liby n Internal Situation
~ . t .... JL,ot.&;:iIit '.--__ ---,
EO '129"5cl"-6- 1 (c) >1 G NOTICE APPROVED FOR RELEASE CL BY I I
.. _.... INTEL SOURCES DATE: OCT 2002 DECL OADR
. OR MBTBODS I DERIVED FROM I.fULTIPLE

TOP S!gRer ge~SITIVe
EO 12958
1.6(d) (1»1
O

.'"
,
•
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Talking Points for the DOl
28 January 1986
oadhafl'. Vulnerabilities
The US Government has
additional pre •• ure on
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
.8
Oadhafi's most significant pressure point ·is the in
of the Libyan military In unpopular foreign adventur.es.
In our view, a campaigft to increase pressure on
forces in Chad is a viable option.
Libyan officers were ntly
opposea to Libya's 1983 intervention and av~ilble
information indicates that Chad is still an unpoQular
assignment for Libyan officers.
-- I Another opt ion is highlight ing Libyan mi J i tary
assistance to Iran. Public warnings that the US
reserves the right to prevent Libyan officers from
travelling to Iran if we believe it is in support of
terrorisa, supplemented in a opiate circumstances
political, military,
_probab

-~--------------- .. --.-...... - ... - ... ------
I
I
made by the President during his news conference
1'lSserting that US measures were not aimed at the l.ihyall
people.
~~~-oadhafi h~s followed up by initiating a dotermined
domestic campaign to convince Libyans. that the US is
trying -to take away their independence. .
Increased US focus on Qadhafi personally would
demonstrate US conviction that Oadhafi himself is
responsible for Libyan lawlessness, putting the lie tr)
his persistent claims that the Libyan peoplo alone
• determine Tripoli's -terrorist policies.
A program by Washington to publicly warn Third World
governments of the dangers of receiving Libyan delegations would
raise the political cost to Tripoli of its diplomatic and
I
subversive activity. Such a program would highlight the fact
that such delegations often include Libyan intelligence and
terrorist operatives and are used to develop contacts with local
dissidents.
Issuing a travel advisory for countries where ldrgc
Libyan delegations visit probably would embarrass
Oadhafi and may prompt the host governmant to limi t
their contact with the Libyans.
Additional measures the US could take to make it more
I
difficult for Libyans to travel to Third Worlrl areas
include singling out the groups or individuals the
Libyans meet with and publicly questioning their
political affiliations.
.
S
~~RET
TOP _~

· ~
~ :i JI c;ffu"UI )? 8\~1 +--~--"--~~a~&\~o
\ Ch \ JlcrF-1
4... T ...,., ~ J .h... J)} I 0..,..:.J I U J j..:.J J _! I ... -j I I "4 J 1...1 I
~·DV. D"" l'~·n~ n"D~ ·l~·'V? ~p?n~~
4...T"""~J A..:. 4-0 JJL;.~J 4...,!~ OJ 1...11
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
17 May 1986
Captain James Stark
Director
Political~ilitary Affairs
National Security Council
Dear Captain Sta~
I thought ~ would be interested in the
attached assessment of Libyan leader Qadhafi's
domestic position since the US airstrikes in
April. The memorandum addresses the internal
p:>li tical situation as well as the Libyan
terrorist threat. As always, your oamments are
welcome.
,
'.
~
CLBY_
DOCL OADR
DERVlVED FJU.1 MULTIPLE

SECRET NOr'6Hfi WOCQNTBACT ORCON
CentIal Intelligence Agen9'
I
",
Washington. D. C.20505
.• f" i ,
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17'· July 1986
LIBYA:
Qadhafi's Political Position Since the Airstrike
)
Summary
The US strike last April has aggravated Libyan
leader Qadhafi's political problems by humiliating the
Libyan armed forces and indirectly stimulating closer
cooperation between Washington and West European
countries. In response, Qadhafi is tightening his
personal security, seeking Soviet assistance in
strengthening Libyan defense capabilities, promoting
diplomatic initiatives to ease Libya's international
isolation, and restructuring his terrorist support
apparatus to achieve greater deniability. liliiii
None of these measures are likely to significantly
improve his prospects for surviving in power. Increased
international pressure would further reduce his chances
for political survival, which we believe are only
slightly better than even through the end of the year.
Only in the unlikely event Qadhafi adjusted his radical
social and economic policies would he restore
confidence in his leadership, even among his closest
associates. Any breakdown in the morale and efficiency
of the internal security forces--which currently
protect him from all but the best-organized and
skillfully implemented plots--probably would indicate
that his demi~e is near. liliiii
i
'\
* * * * * ** *
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SECRET NOFdRN U9"ONTBACT ORCON
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NESA M#86-20109
CL BY
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE

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SECRET NOrOR" UQcoNTRACT ORCON
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I
I
; .• ~. i
I Dom~stic reactions to
Which-Qadhafi's itical
several years.
procession in Tr
only several
900,000.
demonstrations s
media--have only been stage-managed by his
have lacked the spontaneity and enthusiasm
the US strike confirm the extent to
sition has eroded over the past
the funeral
e US strike attracted
local population of about
pro-Qadhafi
by the Libyan
radical supporters and
of previous ones. II
popular discontent with
Qa
more open since the US strike •
.................................................. IILibyans are openly
scarce nanc al resources on
ineffective weaponry. This is in contrast to reporting last year
indicating that Qadhafi's pervasive security measures had
instilled a sense of fear among Libyans that permitted political
discussions only with their most trusted confidants.
anti-Qadhafi leaflets and graffiti
and Benghazi for the first time this
blame Qadhafi for Libya's economic
foreign policies (see
Libyans are publicly blaming
Qadhafi and his aggress~ve po ~cies for causing the deaths of
fellow countrymen during the Gulf of Sidr confrontation last
March and the US airstrike last April.
- - . - . . . many Libyans hope
eventually result ~n Qadhafi's removal.
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
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SECRET NvEeRU WOCQNTRACT ORCON
-

- SECRET NUf'ORM li9SQNTR8CT ORCON
-
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
The Revolutionary Committees' campaign of backstabbing and
political intrigue against military officers has been a principal
source of military discontent for several years. In 1984,
several senior officers were detained but subsequently released,
in part because revolutionary committee members blamed them for
lax security arrangements which permitted the sabotage of an
ammunition depot near Benghazi. Qadhafi's continuing emphasis on
creating a popular militia--presumably led by the Revolutionary
Committees--as a counterweight to the regular armed forces
confirms, in our judgment, the expanded influence of the
Revolutionary Committees at the expense of professional officers.
F[bU1J
F[bU31
[S]
-
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SECRET NOFORN i!JS90 bl TRACT ORCON
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SECRET NOPORlG llOcQNTRACT ORe ON
Qadhafi's Response
The bombing of Qadhafi's residence almost certainly has
convinced Qadhafi that Washington will stop at nothing to oust
him. As a result, Qadhafi has stre thened his alrea ti ht
personal security.
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
publ c appearance on
11 June--a na onal holiday commemorating the departure of US
forces from Libya in 1970--in favor of a televised speech, almost
certainly because he feared assassination.
Qadhafi's enhanced personal security is acc
renewed attempts to weed out potential plotters.
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
Qadhafi's renewed approaches to the Soviets--highlighted by
Jallud's visit to Moscow--probably are intended in part to help
shore up his domestic position. In our view, the Libyan leader
may regard increased Soviet military assistance as essential for
undercutting dissent in the officer corps and rebuilding his
international prestige. Qadhafi may also believe that giving the
appearance of closer ties to Moscow would revive traditional West
-4-

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SECRET NOPuRN UOCQNTRACT ORCON
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I
I
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Europeari concerns that increased pressure on Libya only serves
Sorlet,,-Legional interests by making Tripoli even more dependent
on Moscow.
liliiii
In addition to personal security Qadhafi's primary concern is
undermining Allied cooperation on isolating his regime. The
Libyan press is going out of its way to minimize Tripoli's
differences with West European governments in an effort to get
relations back on track. Qadhafi already has received
FlbU1J r resentatives of an Italian leftist fringe party
[CJ
he Italian vis t y
alleged illegal
fishing. At the same time, Qadhafi's carrot and stick approach
includes public threats to withhold potentially lucrative
commercial contracts unless West European governments curtail
cooperation with Washington on policy toward Libya.
Tripoli may also be trying to undermine .Arab reluctance to
support Libya in its dispute with Washington. Tripoli has
renewed its call to Arab leaders for "practical" steps toward
unity. Jallud's recent remarks in Algiers--he emphasized the
need to work for Libyan-Algerian unity--suggest that his visit
there may have been intended as a first step toward easing
Libya's isolation in the Arab world. Unity probably also is
behind Qadhafi's willingness to host a recent reconciliation
effort involving leaders of North and South Yemen.
Domestically, Qadhafi
pragmatists in the Li
plotting.
liliiii
concessions to
t to discourage
some eC1S
the "revolutionary leadership,"
downplaying Qadhafi's role. The regime is also allowing Free
Officers Deputy Chief of Staff Khuwaylidi Al-Humaydi, Inspector
General Mustafa Kharubi, and Armed Forces Commander Abu Bakr
-Yunis a greater public role. For example, Al-Humaydi gave the
keynote speech at the funeral for those Libyans killed in the US
strike. In addition, the Libyan press publicized Kharubi as the
presiding officer at the. commissioning ceremony of a new naval
vessel recently delivered by the Soviets. Increased press play,
however, has not translated into more political clout for the
pragmatists, in our view.
liliiii
bU1J
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CJ
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- SECRET NuE6RN NOCONTRACT ORCON
-

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SECRET. NOf'ORN UQCQNTBACT ORCON
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~-
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~ .• ~' !
I Oadh:afi' s concerns about the loyalty of the pragmatists
Probably: in part is behind several limited changes in. policy,
including his decision to temporarily supplement intimidation
with a iliator roach to weaken Li dissidents in
Oadhafi's new emphasis on Islam may also' reflect in part an
attempt to appease the officers. Kharubi, in particular, is
highly respected in Libya as an especially devout Muslim,
..__......__.... ~ ..·
................ i Oadhafi may also hope
reinvigorating support for Islam will diffuse lingering popular
resentment over the public hanging of students during Ramadan,
the Muslim holy month, two years ago. Tripoli reportedly also
increased food imports in late May, apparently to coincide with
Ramadan.
Prospects
liliiii
Oadhafi's extensive security precautions probably give him
only a slightly better than even chance of staying in power
through the end of this year. Increased international pressure
would further reduce hischances for survival, in our view. A
critical factor in our assessment is the reliability of Qadhafi's
security forces. There is no sign that the US strike has
weakened the loyalty of the Jamahariya Guard--his hand-picked
coup protection force--or other internal security elements. ...
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
-There are several factors that would further weaken Qadhafi's
hold on power. The one of most immediate concern would be his
failure to recover fully from the shock of the US attack.
Continuing international isolation and constraints on his
activity would further erode Qadhafi's alread diminished
of self-esteem since the str ike.
F[bU1J
[C]
~ona m tary
ocus on attacking Jamahiryah Guard
facilities and other symbols of regime support, would encourage
potential plotters to try to oust him, in our judgment. liliiii
Short of another military strike, a conviction that Qadhafi
is losing control could prompt increased infighting among members
of his inner circle. We anticipate that such activity would
-6-
ORCON

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SECRET NofiORN tlQCQNTRACT ORCON
-
~,
I
',' ,
~ ,
include ~tribal supporters of both Qadhafi and Ja1lud. In our
fuw.,...,.J.a:llud, one of the leading beneficiaries of Qadhafi' s
radical political and economic policies, would have little
interest in taking on Qadhafi directly unles.s he believed that
his position-~or 1ife--were in danger. Moreover, Qadhafi
probably realizes that removing Jallud could provoke reprisals by
Jallud's supporters, divide Libya's radical faction, and remove a
political counterweight to the more pragmatic military officers.
-Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that
Jal1ud's efforts to maintain a high profile could result in
additional instances where Qadhafi publicly humiliates his senior
deputy. At some point, this may provoke Jallud's supporters to
use violence against Qadhafi's tribesmen. Qadhafi could respond
by attempting to purge Jal1ud and his supporters, triggering
additional tribal conflicts that would sap the already diminished
strength of the regime. At a minimum, Jallud's other
opponents--especia1Iy the pragmatic elements in the armed
forces--would be encouraged to continue working against Jallud as
Qadhafi's successor. liliiii
Qadhafi always has the option of throwing potential plotters
off balance by adjusting the domestic political structure.
Curtailing the heavyhanded and radical activities of the
Revolutionary Committees to supplement the increased prominance
he is giving pragmatic military officers exemplifies the type of
action Qadhafi could take to buy time for his regime. He could
support this reversal in policy by extending his apparent
L
t in terrorist attacks.
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
So far, however, Qadhafi has found reasons to avoid making
the substantive policy changes required to enSULe his political
survival over the long term, probably because he believes
backtracking on two of his most 'cherished objectives--creating a
radical culture in Libya and achieving political predominance
among Third World revolutionaries--is uall risk.
F[bU1J
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[S]
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..--L-
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ORCON

---,--------,....------------------------""--"----
ORCON
Appendix A
Qadhafi's Economic Woes
dissatisfaction with the declining standard of
at the root of Qadhafi's diminished domestic
Libyans are
roods.
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
Libyans are using
cline. Hoardi
means to adapt to the economic
a way of life.for most and,
a thriving black market has
orts to suppress such activity.
As an indication of the extent of these illegal activities,
Qadhafi is making hoarding a political issue to try to deflect
blame for economic problems and to weed out what he regards as
"counterrevolutionary" elements in Libya. The Libyan leader is
publicly claiming that hoarding "fat cat" entrepreneurs is
causing the shortages.
Behind Libya's inability to recover from its economic
downturn are constraints imposed by the continuing soft oil
market. Crude oil earnings which provide virtually all of "
Libya's foreign exchange earnings are projected to total only
$4-5 billion this year compared with a high of $22 billion in
1981. Although Libyan oil production increased duri Ma and
June to 1.3 million barrels r da ,
e ·compan es eav ng, exports
200,000 barrels per day, while the
Libyans make preparations to market the oil themselves. The
financial benefits of increased production, however, have been
mitigated by discounts Tripoli has had to offer to obtain buyers.
For example, Tripoli has had to discount its crude oil by as much
as $1.50 per barrel below spot prices of $10 per barrel to
sustain increased exports.
liliiii
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[C]
-8-

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SECRET NOFORN MSSQNTRACT ORCON
---,--~.--------,.-----------------------'------------
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.• ,. I
I These compelling constraints are caus
~reaslngly harsh austerit measures.
~ .
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[S]
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ORCON

-
S;E;C;R;E;T~NUO~FndR~t.~~QC(
ORCON
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ORCON

.--:;iii~-----------------------
ORCON
-11-
ORCON

----~--~--------------------------------------------------------------------
ORCON
Appendix C
Prospect for Libyan Terro~ism
Oadhafi has largely put terrorist operations on hold since
the US airstrike, probably because of Tripoli's uncertainty over
and West Eur ean reactions to another Li n-su orted
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
There are other reasons for the lull in Libyan terrorist
activity. Heightened sensitivity to the Lihyan terrorist threat
among security forces worldwide has prompted increased vigilance
and international cooperation in monitoring suspected Libyan
o ratives, rticularl in Western Eur
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
s on
presence worldwide
s e ort has been furthe~ necessitated
reduce its diplomatic and intelliaence
save scarce foreign exchange. I11III
Libyan terrorist capabilities also have been diminished
intensified bureaucratic rivalries since the US strik
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
Despite these temporary tactical difficulties, the underlying
considerations motivating Oadhafi's commitment to terrorist
violence have not changed. His speeches and actions indicate
that he continues to regard himself as a preeminent revolutionary
-12-

j .
aRC ON
i'
.. ~.~--j' \
~~~: ~~~sion includes using violence to subvert US and other
r~nterests. Moreover, Qadhafi's room to moderate his
terrorist tactics is constrained by his continuing dependence on
Libya's radical faction as his most reliable. source of political
support.
dhafi recognizes that backtracking on
terrorist po
lengthy periods would undermine the
revolutionary of these radicals and possibly even their
commitment to
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
Qadhafi may already be taking steps to reassure the radicals
of his continuing commitment to terrorism. The recent killing by
masked gunmen of a Libyan exile in Paris linked to former King
Idris coincided with the revolutionary committee's symbolic
burning of a house in Tripoli formerly occupied by a relative of
the deposed monarch. liliiii .
Libyan agents reportedly also continue to surveil and plan
attacks on US and other targets. Nevertheless, we believe future
terrorist attacks sponsored by Qadhafi against us targets will
most likely be carried out by surrogate groups in order to
disquise the Libyan hand. Tripoli's reliance on
.....-rgrea surrogate~ .....""""""""
ncreases e c ance 0 a su en, success
attack in which the detection of Libyan involvement would be
virtually impossible. Qadhafi will probably be less constrained
with hiding Libyan involvement and more likely to sanction direct
-attacks on Libyan exiles and moderate Arab and African targets
because of the diminished likehood of US and Western retaliation.
-13-
aRC ON

~------~-- ~
-
[bU1J
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m
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m
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2001
/ II ~I/ /~I/I ~ flJ ~Ilill /II~ /III I ~ /II III//i~/ 111111 II~I ~I// 1/11 III
CPAS NID 85-137JX
res 2837186
13 June 1986
160 6

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Contents
Libya: Arms Support for Abu Nidal .... 4
13 June 1986
~.
I b 0 8

,
LIBYA:
Arms Support for Abu Nidal
Markings on six Bulgarian handgrenades captured Irom Libyan
terrorl.ts In Turkey In April closely match those on grenades
used In four recent attacks attributed to the Abu Nidal terrorist
group._
Four Libyans were arrested by Turkish authorities on 18 April as they
approached a US officers club in Ankara carrying handgrenades
acquired from the local Libyan People's Bureau. Analysis of markings
on the grenades indicates that they were made in Bulgaria in 1980.
They bear the same
markings
grenades
terrorists in attacks last year
on the Cafe de Paris in Rome, at the Rome and Vienna airports, and In
Malta during the EgyptAir hijaCking._
Comment: The similarities between the grenades seized in 1985 and
those captured in Turkey corroborate previous reporting that Tripoli
provides operational support for the Abu Nidal group and uses its
diplomatic installations to pass weapons to terrorists. Austrian
authorities had determined that the Vienna airport terrorists used
passports confiscated by Libya from Tunisian workers, and some of
the terrorists arrested after the Rome
they belonged to the Abu Nidal group
4
'Top----et
;;:2~
13 June 1986
I b I 3

US Sanctions R5'.IIa;:t, I.,J""~"
Opportunities for u~stel'R
... , ~ .
FlbU1J
FlbU3J
[CJ
US sauttions,alainst Libya may provide an opportunity
for Eastern Europc to earn badly needed
bard currency as well as to diversify its sources of
oil. Several East European -countries-particularly
Bullaria. Romania. and Hunlary-may seek to
supply Libya with tcchnololY and petroleum drillinl
equipment previously supplied by US firms.
Bloc countries almost certainly must weigh carefully
Tripoli's past unreliability in payinl many of its
East European suppliers. Moreover, Eastern Europc's
potential to capitalize on the sanctions depends
on West European competition because Libya, for
both economic and political reasons, is likely to
view the Bloc as a second choice. _
Turning Oil Into Hard Currency
A substantial pOrtion of the Libyan crude oil
obtained in barter deals i$ refined and reexported to
the West for bard currency! From 1980 to 1985
the relion earned $4-7 billion in hard currency
annually from re~ports of oil. Over the past
decade Libya bas provided 13 to IS percent of
Eastern Europe's non-Soviet oil imports. In 1983
Bullaria and Hungary relied the most on Libyan
oil, importing over 75 percent of their non-Soviet
oil from Libya. Poland (60 percent of non-Soviet oil
imports), Yugoslavia (30 percent), and Romania (10
percent) also counted on Libyan oil.
amounts of Libyan oil, which it
has resold on the spot market, although neither
country reports these deals. East Germany imports
little, if any. oil from Libya .•
Commercia' Ties Umited
Although Libya has played a relatively small role
in Eastern .Europe'sforeign trade, the growth in
Eastern Europe's exports to Libya since 1980-
almost 2 percent annual/~xceeds the growth 0/
the region's exports to developing countries as a
whole. In 1984 Libya purchased 10 percent 0/ the
region 's har~ currency exports to developing countries.
Hungary and Bulgaria have seen the most
rapid growth 01 exports to Libya; East Germany
has experienced a decline in sales. _
Libya provides an outlet for East European arms
and man,qacturcd goods, many 0/ which are not
competitive in Western markets. Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria have been Libya's major
East European arms suppliers. In 1983 and 1984
East European arms deliveries to Libya totaled
$480 million and $150 million. respectively. Eastern
Europe also supplies services and equipment
for oil drilling and relining and constructs largescale
projects such as re/ineries, factories. power
plants, irrigation systems. agricultural facilities.
housing, roads, and some military-related projects.
Because of the scarcity 0/ skilled professionals and
need for construction crews, Tripoli employs a
sizable number 0/ East European guest workers
-
and pays their salaries in hard currency. An
estimated 50,000 East Europeans-including 800
military advisers--currently work in Libya
.
•
I
•
Op;H)rtunities for Expanded Ties
East European firms potentially could fill some of
the gaps left as US firms comply with the sane-
tions. Bulgaria and Romania already have an established
presence in Libya as suppliers of petroleum
drilling and exploration equipment and technicians.
These countries probably could provide
additional equipment and services of sufficient
• The USSR supplies about 70 perc:ent or Eastern Europe'S oil
imporu and Lib)a. alon& with Iran and Iraq. supplies the rest.
(eM)
17
~-et
~;7S:w ,'6-01 J
:8 .\1 G,e II 1986
.... :"'I ~ ~Ji~·Eg.ad.ft_._lId."_.cf_.I¥i~~--
___..- ,"'~:-""'TO'''~ __
=-.". ____ _

..
~~--.-.; quality and quantity to maintain Libyan oil produc­
. tion and.~~pons. Tripoli is already hirinl Bullarian
, crews to ~replacc US crews in conductinl seismic
, studies and is likely to brinl in more
FlbU1J
FlbU3
[CJ
Eastern Europe: Trade With Libya.
19~
Millinn l:S S
. ,
;
;, :
i
Incentives for East European countries to replace
US firms in Libya include:
• Hllrd cllrrency lllrn;ngs. Increased sales of equipment
and services to Libya, specifically in the
petroleum sector, could ,enerate hard currencyeither
by direct payment or via reexport of more
Libyan oil. Goods and services previously supplied
by US firms totaled about $600-700 million
annually. Because of the soft oil market, Eastern
Europe may have ,oad barlaininlleverale in
strikinl barter deals with Libya. These same
market conditions, however. limit prospectS for
reexportinl more cirthis oil without puttinl additional
pressure on prices. Still, even if Eastern
"Europe marketed just one-fourth of the Libyan
oil formerly sold by US companies and prices
plunled to $10 per barrel, the relion could earn
annually nearly $200 million in hard currency.
..
• Dillersi/icGt;oll oj Oil Sources. By diversifying its
enerlY sources, Eastern Europe lowers the risk of
domestic enerlY shortfalls-a particular concern
if the Soviets decrease their oil exports to the
region. The USSR might choose to redirect some
oil expons to the West to generate hard currency
. in tbe wake of fallinl enerlY prices or retain more
oil at bome to balance supplies with growing
domestic demand. In addition, Eastern Europe
may look increasingly to Tbird World oil producers
such as Libya because the price for Soviet
oil-while payable iii East European goods-is
now almost twil:e die world price. _
The Risks
. l!:lSlerft !!urope Is probably approaching increased
Libyan commercial ties with caution. In recent
East Germ:IOY 10' --....,
HunBary 87 -----:~h. .....
Romania 127 ----.,,,
Czechoslovakia
183
YUBoslavia 204
East Germany IS' -----,
Hungary 21~ ---.....1
Romania 311
• £sllm~'~d.
~~~L Bulll:uia 6~0
- .'ccordin! '0 ollicial £2S' Europe,n ".d. SI""lio.
~echo.lo'. ~I.n .nd Polish ImportS or libyan lOOIIs arc
ne.li"bl •.
c Includinl ~om..: oil im,orts on Son~1 a.:counu .
Poland 233
Yugoslavia
447'
Bulgaria 316
years several Bloc countries have encountered difficulty
in receivin& payment for exports-includin&
military hardware-and construction services. Falling
oil prices and revenues have worsened Tripoli's
cash flow problems. Uncertainty about libya's
creditworthiness has probably limited trade between
Tripoli and the Bloc._
18
---------.___
r_~_~· ___________ u _____________

libya's cash shortage has forced some of its East
European creditors to accept payment in oil, and
even then Tripoli bas been less than reliable in
making deliveries.
i·some East' European
con
difficulty ietiini Libya to deliver oil to settle debts.
Recently. Romania blamed its inability to meet
payments due to Western banks on Libya's failure
to meet its commitment to deliver oil for resale.
Even if this accusation is exaggerated, such bad
experiences may induce Romania and other Bloc
countries to 10 slowly on expanding trade ties.
Libyan authorities are likely to continue to fa~r
these firms over the East Europeans. By emplo)'ing
Western firms, Qadbafi would not only receive
better quality goods and services but also isolate
the United States from its West European allies.
As long as Eastern Europe faces such competition.
its gains from increased commercial ties to Libya
will be restricted .•
-Outlook
I
Despite the risks, East European countries are
likely to try to supply Libya with goods and services
previously furnished by US firms. However, the
region·s ability to do so is limited. Soviet demands
I for oil and'ias equipment. coupled with its hard
, currency shortages, could persuade the USSR to
ii": look to its ~st EuroPean allies to replace Western
• I ,', i ," equipment purchases. The nee~ to supply the Soviet
':1 economy could leave little slack capacity to produce
I • ; goods for the Libyans. _
I.
i
, \ i •
Furthermore. competition from West European
.. and Asian firms also seeking to benefit from US
!, sanctions 'willlilnit the Bloc's gains.
est
many
ropean and Asian firms are interested inor
have actually taken over-previous US contracts
'I ., ,. for ci\;l en~iDeering and construction projects in
, i 1\ : Libya; . i
. " : I.' I . ~
; , I ~
. ~
F[bU1J
F[bU3]
[S]
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19
1'1 •
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(8)
APPROVED FOR RELE
DATE: FEB 2008
I
'---------'
I 'v..:::. ,v"'L.. AU

.. -."
SEfEr
IDENTIFIED LIBYAN DIPLOMAT HABIB ((LNU)), AND SAID AL ((SHABANI)),
AN EMPLOYEE OF QUALITY SHOES, LTD IN MALTA, AS SECURITY OFFICIALS.
HE HAD NO INFORMA TlON ON mREA TS TO ~
'PFFICIALS OR
FACILITIES. I ITRACE REVEALED m, 5UBJEG r IS A SUSPECT
LIBYAN ESO OFACER. ,
I
\ NO FUR/HER INFO.
3. GIAKA EXPLAINED mAT HE IS SEEKING RELOCATION INI I
BECAUSE THE LIBYAN MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION (SIC) HAs INSIRUGTED
HIM TO RETURN TO TRIPOLI EVENING OF 12 AUGUST APPARENTLY TO DISCUSS
AN INCIDENT IN WHICH GIAKA WAS INVOLVED IN MALTA IN JULY.
ACCORDING TO GIAKA, IN JUL Y AN EGYPTIAN WOMAN II WHO IS
APPARENTL Y RELATED TO FORMER EGYPTIAN LEADE~SSAR AITEMPTED TO
CUT IN LINE AT mE LAA TICKET COUNTER AT LUQA AIRPORT IN MALTA.
WHEN mE LAA MANAGER, LAMIN ((FHEMAH)) (GIAKA REFERRED TO FHEMAH AS .
-LAHMI-), TOLD HER TO GO TO mE BACK OF THE LINE, SHE PROTESTED AND
MADE A COMMOTION AT mE COUNTER. AS A RESULT, FHEMAH DID NOT
PERMIT HER ABOARD mE FLIGHT, BUT SHE DID EVENTUALL Y MAKE THE TRIP
TO LIBYA EARLIER mls WEEK, LAMI WAS ORDERED BACK TO TRIPOLI BY
mE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT A TlON TO DISCUSS mE MA ITER. FHEMAH HAS
NOT RETURNED FROM TRIPOLI AND GIAKA FEARS mAT IF HE TRA VELS TO
TRIPOLI THAT HE MAY BE JAILED. WHEN GIAKA RECEIVED HIS '
INSTRUCTIONS TO RETURN TO TRIPOLI, HE CALLED A HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT
IN JAMAHIRIYA SECURITY, MOHAMMED ((LA ml)), SEEKING LA THI'S ADVICE.
ACCORDING TO GIAKA, LA THI TOLD HIM THAT IF THE TRANSPORT MINISTRY
FELT COMPELLED TO CALL Bom LAA OFFICIALS BACK TO TRIPOLI, THEY
MUST BE IN SOME SORT OF TROUBLE. LA THI FURTHER ADVISED GIAKA TO
CONTACT HIM IMMEDIATELY WHEN HE RETURNS TO TRIPOLI.
4. ClO EXPLAINED TO GIAKA THAT HE COULD MAKE NO PROMISES
REGARDING HIS REQUEST BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY FORWARD
ANY INFORMATION GIAKA WISHED TO REVEAL TO WASHINGTON SO THAT A
DECISION COULD BE MADE mERE. GIAKA AGREED TO RETURN TOb
AFTERNOON 11 AUG AT WHICH TIME FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH J.....~O~CO~U~L~O.------J
BE CONDUCTED. BECAUSE HIS ENGLISH IS LIMITED, HIS MALTESE
FRIENDffRANSLA TOR,
AGREED TO ACCOMPANY HIM.
GIAKA STATED THAT omER
TR~~---m~ms~~wh~~~~~wEHmINTENTIONSTO
5. ALmOUGH GIAKA'S ENGLISH IS EXTREMELY LIMITED, HE
IMPRESSED ClO AS INTElliGENT, SERIOUS AND FAIRLY WELL COMPOSED
INDIVIDUAL UNDER mE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WAS FRIENDLY, VERY
COOPERATIVE AND ANSWERED ALL OF ClO'S QUESTIONS WImOUT HESITA TlON.
HE IS CURRENTL Y LIVING AT AN APPARmOTEL NEAR mE AIRPORT.
6. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS FORWARDED FOR THE
RECORD. GIAKA A ITENDED mE MAHAD-ABUSILIM-AL-SINAI TECHNICAL
COLLEGE 1977-1983. WHILE mERE, HE WAS THE LEADER OF THE SWDENT
REVOLUTIONARY COMMIITEE AND HE SWDIED ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL
ENGINEERING. UPON COMPLETION OF HIS SWDIES, HE WAS SELECTED FOR

" .
~_; c
•
.'
EMPLOYMENT AT JAMAHIRIYA SECURITY. HE INITIALLY SERVED IN THE .
SECRET FILES SECTION. HE WAS THEN MOVED TO A SECURITY COLLECTION
GROUP WHERE HE COMPILED DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON DISSIDENT
ACTIVITIES. DURING THISPERIOD, HE WAS ALSO ASSIGNED TO THE MOTOR
POOL BECAUSE OF HIS MECHANICAL ABILITIES. LATER HE HANDLED
DOMESTIC INFORMANTS WHO WERE PLACED IN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. HE
TOW C/O, THAT WHEN HE WORKED FOR JAMAHIRIYA SECURITY, HE RECEIVED
TRAINING FROM KGB INSTRUCTORS IN mIPOLI. HE TRA VELED TO BURKINA
FASSO WITH COLONEL ((QADHAFI)) IN OCTOBER 1985 IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
SECURITY OFFICER. AS A REWARD FOR HIS GOOD WORK. HE WAS OFFERED
THE LAA POSITION IN MALTA.
7. AS BONA FIDES, HE TOW C/O THAT HE IS VERY CLOSE TO
JAMAHIRIYA SECURITY OFFICERS IZZ AL-DIN AL-((HINSHARI)) AND SA'ID
((RASHID)) WHO WERE LEADERS OF THE 1976 STUDENT REVOLUTION AT
AL-FATAH UNIVERSITY. HE IS ALSO CLOSE TO COLONEL AL-((KELBESH)),
WHO WAS FORMERLY ASSIGNED IN CAIRO. HE TOW C/O THAT HE KNOWS MANY
ESO OFFICERS WHO ARE ASSIGNED ABROAD IN LPB'S AND AS STUDENTS. HE
NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT MOST OF THESE PEOPLE ARE ASSIGNED IN ALIAS.
HE TOLD C/O THAT HIS PASSPORT WAS IN HIS TRUE NAME.
8.
HE TOW
U7f3CJSEUT,RFQ}{i[JR}r{ffRB[ilmrEBUT NEVER REVEALED THAT FACT TO ANYONE.
HE APPARENTL Y FEARS SUFFICIENTLY FOR HIS SAFETY OR PERHAPS
MAINTENANCE OF HIS LIFESTYLE IN MALTA THAT HE HAS RESORTED TO
CONTACTING f

APPR0VED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
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rux/. AlIh 1515
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I
SUBJECI': 11 AUG INTERVIEW WITH GIAKA
1. LATE AFTERNOON OF 11 AUG: UBYAN WALK-IN 'ABD AlrMAJID
((GlAKA)) RETURNED To!
_!wITH HIS MALTESE TANSLATOR J
I I DURINGTHlh HREE H u'R INTERVIEW. C/O ~
TOW GIAKA THAT ~ -'- I WAS EXTREMELY INTERES:'l l!JOJurTTlllY"'H""l""';)-------'
INFORMATION, WANl1W lVASSIST HIM BUT coum NOT ACI1UPON HIS
REQUEST BY 12 AUGUST. GIAKA RESPONDED THAT HE HAD ANTICIPATED SUCH
A REPLY AND" HAD DECIDED OVERNIGHT THAT HE WOUW RETURN TO UBYAAS
INSTRUCTED ON 12 AUG. ASSUMING THAT HE IS ACQUIITED OF ANY
WRONGDOING FOR HIS ROLE IN mE AIRPORT FIASC~:::::¥LE TO
RETURN TO MALTA. HE VOWNTEERED TO WORK FO ~ __ . ______ ~N A SECRET
BASIS. HE REACHED THE DECISION NOT TO SEEK RES J~ I
BECAUSE HE DOES NOT WANT TO HURT HIS FAMILY MEMBERS WHd aVE IN
UBYA. INSTEAD, HE TOW C/O THAT HE WANTED TO REMAIN IN MALTA.
MARRY HIS MALTESE GIRLFRIEND AND START A RENTAL CAR BUSINESS AT
WHICH TIME HE WOUW COOPERATE FUUY WITH~ }GAINST UBYA.
IN RETURN FOR HIS COOPERATION, HE w~ fa ilELP HIM
UNDERGO SHAM SURGERY (AN INCISION LEA VIN

2~ pMPHASlZED 1HAZ HE WAS MERELY POSiNG QUES10NS j
kovw D Bi WASHINGHON. GIAKA APPEARED SOMEWHAT NERVOUS WHEN
DISCUSSING HIS PERSONAL SITUATION BUT BECAME RElAXED WHEN ANSWERING
QUESTIONS ABOUT UBYAN INTELUGENCE MAITERS. AS A DISTANT RElATIVE
OF KING IDRIS, HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAS WANTED TO WORK AGAINST THE
QADHAFI REGIME FOR MANY YEARS. \
3. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION GIAKA AGREED TO MEET ClO
OUTSIDE oF!
lAND HE ACCEPTED A VERY SIMPLE RECONTACT PLAN.
GIAKA STATED 1HAZ HE WOUW PREFER TO DEAL ONLY WITH ClO I ~N
THE NEAR TERM, BUT AGREED ULTIMATELY TO MEET WITH AN ARABIC
SPECIAUST. ClO ASSURED HIM OF THE CONFIDENTIAUIT OF THE
RELATIONSHIP AND SET UP A NEXT MEETING FOR 14 SEP i
~------------~
4. I I GIAKA IDENTIFIED
.SEVERAL UBYAN INTELUGENCE OFFICERS, SEVERAL UBYAN INTEL
COOPTEES, AND REVCOMMEMBERS IN MALTA. HE IS UNAWARE OF ANY
UBYAN-SPONSORED SURVEILlANCE ON 1 lCITIZENS, BUT NOTED THAT
THE COllECTION OF ANY INFORMATION BY UBYAN OPERATIVES WAS
PROFESSIONAUY REQARDING. HE ClAIMS TORE WEUACQUAINTED WITH ESO
OFFICERABDAUAH «KSANUSSI)) ON WHOM HE GAVE BONA FIDES
INFORMATION. HE WAS FAMIUAR WITH SIX OF THE SEVEN NAMES PROVIDED
I
rwD CONFIRMDTHEIR INTELAFFIUATION. HE
DESCRIBED THE BASIC STR,UCTURE OF HAYYIT ALJAMN ALJAMAHIRIYAH AND
PROVIDED THE NAMES AND BASIC BIO DATA FOR SEVERAL ESO OFFICERS
ASSIGNED ABROAD. FINAUY. HE IDENTIFIED THE TRAINING SITE USED BY
UBYAN SECURITY SERVICES TO TRAIN PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBUCAN ARMY
MEMBERS IN ADDmON TO GIVING DETAILS OF HIS OWN KGB TRAINING.
DETAILS ON THESE AND OTHER TOPICS COVERED DURING THE DEBRIEFING ARE
BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.
5. [ ]

SEckT
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
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I I :"1 _1 H:to ::;t;l:' tH:! I
I
1. EVENING OF 14 SEP 88, ~ IOFFICERl I MET
WITH I h(P/1), AND HIS lESE TRANSLA OR AS PLANNED.
EARLIER IN IRE D Y THE TRANSLATOR CALLED CIO AT
TO
CONFIRM THE MEETING.
DURING THE TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION
TO MEET COIN MALTA ON A REGULAR AND CLANDESTINE BASIS. ALTHOUGH
HE DID NOT ACCEPT C/O'S OFFER FOR MONTHLY SALARY AT THIS TIME, CIO
MADE IT CLEAR TO P/1 THAT MONEY (APPROXIMATELY USD 1,OOO/MONTH) WAS
AVAILABLE TO HIM WHILE HE WAS EMPLOYED BY LAA. P/1 EMPHASIZED THAT
THE PRIMARY BENEFITJ 6COULD PROVIDE HIM WOULD BE TO ARRANGE
SHAM SURGERY TO ENA LE HIM 1 AVOID GOVERNMENT WORK IN THE FUTURE.
WHILE HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE FACT THAT A SALARY WAS AVAILABLE, P/1
STATED THAT HE DID NOT CURRENTLY NEED MONEY BUT DID AGREE TO GIVE
THE OFFER CONSIDERATION. C/O EMPHASIZED THATJ I WAS
EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN HELPING HIM ~HILE ASS RING PII HE COULD
MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. P/1 AGREED
TO MEET CIO AGAIN ON 24 SEP.
2. DURING THE DISCUSSION P/1 ?ROVIDED SEVERAL INTEL TIDBITS
ON THE ESO AND THE LAA WHICH HE OBTAINED DIRECTLY FROM ESO
OFFICIALS DURING HIS AUGUST VISIT TO TRIPOLI. HE TOLD C/O THAT HE
TALKED BRIEFLY WITH SENIOR ESO OFFICER 'ABO AL-SALAM AL-«ZADMA))
Page 1

AND SEVERAL OF ZADMA'S IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES. THIS INFORMATION
WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY. HE TOLD C/O THAT HE RETURNED.TO
LIBYA AS DIRECTED ON 13 AUG TO DISCUSS THE INCIDEN: A: :H:1AA
COUNTER IN MALTA WHICH HAD INDUCED HIM TO CONTACT f~ IN
MID-AUGUST. HIS SUPERIORS APPARENTLY EXONERATED H ('10 q
WRONGDOING IN THE MATTER AND PERMITTED HIM TO RETURN TO MALTA.
THEY REPLACED THE LAA STATION CHIEF IN MALTA, LAMIN «FHIMAH»,
HOWEVER, WITH A NEW LAA OFFICIAL (NFl), WHICH HAS NOW FUELED P/1'S
CONCERNS THAT HIS DAYS IN MALTA ARE NUMBERED. P/1 SPECULATED THAT
HE MAY BE PERMANENTLY RECALLED TO LIBYA IN LATE 1988 OR EARLY 1989.
HIS CONCERN APPEARED TO BE INTUITIVE IN NATURE, HOWEVER, RATHER
THAN BASED ON ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE. P/1 TOLD C/O THAT ALTHOUGH HE
IS CURREN.TLY AN EMPLOYEE OF LAA, ·THE ESO CONSIDERS HIM AVAILABLE TO
PERF
ORM·SPECIFIED TASKS. P/1 NOTED THAT THE ESO CAN RECALL HIM AT
ANY TIME.
3. IN THIS REGARD, P/1 ASKED IFI IWOULD BE ABLE TO
HELP HIM RECEIVE THE SHAM SURGERY. HE TOLD C/O THAT THE REASON HE
. WANTED THE SURGERY WAS TO PERMIT HIM TO RETURN TO LIBYA WITH
EVIDENCE OF A MEDICAL DISABILITY WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO QUIETLY
RESIGN FROM HIS CURRENT POSITION AND TO AVOID ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT
WORK. IN EXPLORING WAYS IN WHICH THE SHAM SURGERY COULD BE
PERFORMED, P/1 TOLD·' C/O THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO
TRAVEL TO EUROPE FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE WOULD. HAVE TO CLEARLY
DOCUMENT THE NATURE OF HIS ILLNESS WITH THE LAA AS WELL AS WITH THE
LPB IN MALTA, JUSTIFYING THE NECESSITY OF SEEKING MEDICAL ATTENTION
ABROAD. HE FEARED THAT THIS WOULD RAISE A LOT OF QUESTIONS AND
UNWANTED SUSPICIONS AMONG LIBYAN OFFICIALS. EXPRESSING CERTAINTY
THAT ANY SURGERY WOULD HAVE TO BE PERFORMED IN MALTA, P/1 TOLD C/O
THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY A LOCAL DOCTOR WHOM HE COULD
aRIBE TO PERFORM THE SHAM SURGERY. C/O TOLD P/1 THAT THIS MIGHT
PROVE TO BE THE BEST SOLUTION AND BOTH AGREED TO GIVE THE MATTER
ADDITIONAL THOUGHT. \
I
4. P/1 SHOWED HIS CONCERN FOR HIS SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE
MEETING BY WALKING AROUND SEVERAL TIMES AND CHECKING THE DOOR AND
WINDOW. HE ALSO CHAIN SMOKED AND DRANK THREE LARGE CUPS OF COFFEE
DURING THE TWO HOUR PERIOD. UNFORTUNATELY, TIME RESTAINTS CAUSED
LARGELY BY TRANSLATION REQUIREMENTS PREVENTED C/O FROM RAISING REF
REQUIREMENTS WITH P/1. WE WILL POSE THESE QUESTIONS TO P/1 AT THE
NEXT FEW MEETINGS.
5. FOR HER PART, THE TRANSLATOR AGREED TO CONTINUE TO TO
ASSIST IN THE DISCUSSIONS. SHE ACCEPTED LM 60 (APPROXIMATELY USD
180) FOR HER SIX HOURS OF PREVIOUS WORK AND AGREED TO ACCEPT A
SALARY OF LM 10 (USD 30) PER HOUR FOR HER FUTURE SERVICES. ~l------~
6. ALTHOUGH P/1 HESITATINGLY AGREED TO HAVE C/O INTRODUCE
HIM TO AN ~ ~ARABIC SPEAKER FAMILIAR WITH LIBYAN AFFAIRS AT
SOME POIN IN IHEUTURE, HE TOLD C/O HE WANTED TO GIVE THE MATTER
Page 2

MORE THOUGHT AND AGREED_TO DISCUSS T~E PROPOSAL AT THE NEXT
MEETING. ~ IWELCOMES THE OPPOR7UNITY FOR): ITO MEET WITH
P/l IN MALIK KrIG~ WE HAVE OBTAINED ?/l'S AGREEMENI. IF 24 SEP
MEETING GOES AS PLANNED WE WOULD SCH~DULE THE NEXT MEETING WITH P/l
IN EARLY OCTOBER. PLEASE ADVISE POSSIBLE DATES THATt POULD BE
AVAILABLE FOR MEETING WITH P/l DURING THIS TIME FRAM!~-~. --~.
':"7. WE ARE OBVIOUSLY PLEASED T:=.AT P/l RETURNED TO MALTA
WITHOUT ANY APPARENT FALLOUT FROM TH~ AUGUST INCIDENT AND THAT HE
AGREED TO CONTINUE A CLANDESTINE REL;TIONSHIP WITH C/O. P/l HAS
DEMONSTRATED THAT HE IS CURRENTLY AB~E TO OBTAIN VALUABLE
INFOMATIN DIETLPHFROM ESO OFFICIALS. DESPITE HIS STATED DESIRE
TO AVOID FUTURE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMEN7, OUR GOAL WILL BE TO PERSUADE
HIM TO REJOIN THE ESO ON OUR BEHALF BY OFFERING HIM GENEROUS
REWARDS FOR HIS EFFORTS. IN THE ME~~TIME, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO BUILD
HIS CONFIDENCE IN I IB~ DEMONSTRATING OUR WILLINGNESS
TO ASSIST HIM WITH HIS NEEDS.
END OF MESSAGE
Page 3

(.bi(:l)
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(S:,) ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE _____________________________ J
DATE: FEB 2008
J
I '
1. Cl..td ;MET IIITH I J (P/I) AND HI S
TRANSLATOR, 1 FOR THR'~ nOURS EvE ING OF 29 SEP.
~~E!~~~~~~D OOTioNJ' :~L ::ETING. C1D MET P~1 AN: T/~ :T' I
AS WAS THE CASE AT 1- .,-- w IINu, In~ FIRSI OUR AS P NT
EXPLORING WAYS OF HAVING P/I UNDERGO SHAM SURGERY TO MEDICALLy
DISQUALIFY HIM FROM FUTURE GOVERNMENT SERVICE. THE SECOND HOUR WAS
SPENT WITH P/I DICUSSING DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION IN LIBYA AND
REASONS HE IS OPPOSED TO THE QADHAFl REGIME. THE THIRD HOUR HE
RESPONDED TO REQUIREMENTS AND CLARIFI:: ~N:~::~~ "; :10
~~~6~~~~;iEr~~V~~~~ I d Ii" i .. " ii'" III .. I ,: GH ASSIGNMENT
OF NEW LAA EMPLOYEES ABROAD. HE TOLD C/O HE WOULD BRING IT TO THE
NEXT MEETING.
2. T,HROUGHOUT THI DISCUSSION P!I ~:: iARTICULARLY INTERESTED
IN HOW HE WAS PERSONALLY VIEWED BY~ _. "" _ FFICIALS. C/O ASSURED
PII THAT SENIO~j JOFFICLAS 's ~~ 1M AS A HUMAN BEING
AND ADMIRED HIM',oR nl. "PPOSITION TO THEQADHAFI REGIME. C:~ 'ISO
EXPLAINED THAT~HESE OFFICIALS PRAISED HIM FOR APPROACHINGI __ . I
AND FOR AGREEING TO MEET WITH C/O ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. I
TOLDCIO THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BE VIEWED AS A TRAITOR TO HIS
COUNTRY BUT ONE WHO IS OPPOSED TO A DESPOTIC LEADER WHO IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING PAIN ON THOUSANDS OF LIBYANS. ~N
RESPONSE; C/O EXPLAINED THAT SENIOR"I I OFFiCIALS INCLUDING
I , I ARE NOT, OPPOSED TO THE L I U I /\Ii r ,uilLE BUT RATHER ARE
urrus,u 0 THE POLICIES AND LEADERSHIP OF THE QADHAFI REGIME.
3. AT THE END 'OF THE EVENING, Pll AGREED TO ~EET WITH AN
ARAB SPEAKER WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH LIBYAN MATTERS AT THE NEXT
MEETING. C/O EXPLAINED TO P/I THAT THIS WOULD BENEFIT HIM BY
OFFERING HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MATTERS DIRECTLY WI:H
SOMEWONE WHO UNDERSTANDS HIS LANGUAGE AND IS FAMILIAR WITH THE
SITUATION IN LIBYA. P/l' AGREED TO MEET AGAIN AT 2000 HOURS 5 OCT.
4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNI'TY TO HAVE II MEET
WITH PIlON 5 OCT IN AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A LEVELOF~RT THAT
IS NOT EASILY ACCOMPLISHEn THROUGH THE TRAN:::::" 'C/O TOLD PII
Co
''''OULD 8E ;NTERESTEO IN DISCUSSING, LIBYAN MA Ili"""""XLOANO HIS
PERSONAL CONCERNS IN PARTICULAR. ALTHOUGH STATION PLANS TO MEET
P/1 AND Til ON A REGULAR BASIS IN THE FUTURE, WE HOPE THAT BY ,
HAVING AN ARAB SP£AKER APPEAR ON T~E SCENE AT PERIOD~C INTERVA~S, .
ANY SKEPTISISM PII MAY HAVE THAT HIS ASSISTANCE IS NOT APPRECIATED
THAT THE ARABIST WOULD BE AN OFFICIAL FROM I I IWHO CG
BY I I WILL 9E REDUCED OR ELIMINATED.
I
h
I DOCUMENT DATE: 30 SEP
.-
S E rET -
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008 .
. (b) (1)
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1. ON 7 OCTOBER 1988 I I DISCUSSED I J
CASE IN DETAIL WITH I I WI:. ttAVt. AGREED THAT BES r COOR E
OF ACTION IS tOR r frO ACCOMPANY I I TO NEXT MEETING
WITH P/l IN VALLETTA '1'U Ul::;CUSS MEDICAL OPTIONS DIRECTLY WITH
2. BASED ON I I FOUR HOUR MEETING WITH P/l, THERE IS
LITTLE REMAINING DOUBT THAT HE WAS AND REMAINS AFFILIATED WITH
THE ESO AND ITS IMPORTANT I I SUPPORT MECHANISM.
SPECIFICS ON P/l'S PERSONAL/PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND AND
I I ASSESSMENTS OF HIS MOTIVATION AND POTEN~IAL AS A
I JPENETRATION WILL FOLLOW SEPARATELY. IN SHORT, P/l IS
SIRAIEGIC LLY PLACED IN THE VALLETTA I I WHICH HE
HIMSELF DESCRIBES AS "A PRIMARY LAUNCHING POINT" FOR LIBYAN
INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORIST TEAMS ENROUTE TO/FROM EUROPE. AT
OUR REQUEST HE IS WILLING TO POSTPONE HIS PERSONAL AMBITIONS OF
SEVERING HIS OFFICIAL POSITION WITH l
IESO IN FAVOR OF
OPENING A SMALL COMMERCIAL VENTURE 0\1 MALIA. WHILE HE WILL
WORK FOR US IN PLACE IN VALLETTA, HE IS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO
ANY LONG TERM RELOCATION TO TRIPOLI AND WILL GO TO ANY LENGTHS
TO AVOID RETURNING THERE WHEN HIS INEVITABLE RECALL OCCURS.
HIS FIRST AND PRIMARY REQUEST OF I JIS TO ENABLE HIM TO
DEFLECT AN EVENTUAL REASSIGNMENT Iv LIb! ON MEDICAL GROUNDS.
HE WOULD HOLD HIS "SCAR" AND ACCOMPANYING MEDICAL HISTORY IN
RESERVE AS A FORM OF "SAFETY NET". SHOULD HE BE REASSIGNED TO
ANOTHER OVERSEAS I I POST SUCH AS ATHENS OR ISTANBUL HE
Page 1

WOULD NOT SURFACE HIS EXCLUSIONARY MEDICAL PROBLEM AND. WILL
CONTINE TO REPORT TO US IN PLACE. IF ORDERS ARRIVE FOR HIS PCS
RETURN TO LIBYA, HOWEVER, HE IS CONVINCED HE NEEDS VISUAL AND
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF A PERSISTENT PROBLEM THAT PRECLUDES HIM
FROM PHYSICAL OR MENTAL STRESS AND REQUIRES REGULAR FOLLOW UP
CONSULTATION WITH EUROPE-BASED MEDICAL SPECIALISTS.
3. I IINITIAL REACTIONS ARE POSITIVE AND HE
BELIEVES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMODATE THE ESSENCE OF P/I'S
REQUIREMENTS WITH MEDICAL EVIDENCE THAT CAN NOT BE EASILY
DISPUTED OR DISPROVED BY ROUTINE MEDICAL EXAMINATION IN
TRIPOLI. TENTATIVELY THINKING OF AN OSTENSIBLE LOWER BACK
AILMENT, SUCH AS RUPTURED DISC. P/l WILL NEED TO BE CAREFULLY
COACHED ON NORMAL SYMPTOMS OF THE SELECTED COMPLAINT AND WE
WILL DISCUSS P/I'S INSISTENCE ON COSMETIC SURGERY TO SUPPORT
HIS STORY OF EXTENSIVE TREATMENT. J kAND I I
TENTATIVELY PLAN TO ARRIVE VALLETT ON AEl RNOON LUFTHANSA
FLIGHT 5 NOVEMBER, HOLD MEETINGS THAT EVENING WITH P/l AND PLAN
ON RETURN TO I ! AFTERNOON OF THE FOLLOWING DAY.
DEPENDING ON OOICOME 0 THE MEETING, THE TWO WOULD BE PREPARED
TO RETURN IN LATE NOVEMBER TO FINALIZE THE MEDICAL HISTORY AND
PERFORM ANY MINOR MEDICAL PROCEDURES AGREED UPON. P/l IS
CERTAIN TO APPRECIATE THIS EVIDENCE OF OUR RESPONSIVENESS TO
HIS MEDICAL DEMANDS ANDI
IEXPECTS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE
TO FORMALIZE TERMS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND INITIATE EXTENSIVE
DEBRIEFINGS DURING THE LATTER HALF OF THE 5 NOVEMBER MEETING.
END OF MESSAGE
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
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(b) (3)
(S)
--- ---- -- - - J
I. ll=bj£~_ V~'l_~O
J
I --
REF:
L-I _________---.l
1. REF IS A VERY USEFUL REPORT FROM I I AND C/O
'---~ION A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT TOPIC.
MOST IMPORTANTLY IT
DEMONSTRATES P/1'S COMMITTMENT AND ABILITY TO PASS
TERRORIST-TYPE INTELLIGENCE ON A TIMELY BASIS. REGRET I I
HAS NOT YET HAD OPPORTUNITY TO SET PEN TO PAPER ON SCOPE Of HIS
RECENT DISCUSSIONS AND PLANNING WITH P/1. MEANWHILE, HE WOULD
LIKE TO NOTE THAT P/1 MENTIONED THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECT OF REF
INTEL WHOSE NAME HE GAVE AS ABD-AL-BASIT «(MAGRAHI)). THE NAME
CAME UP WHEN P/1 TRIED TO EXPLAIN PROVENANCE OF AN 8 KGS PARCEL
OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES THAT .HAD BEEN STORED UNTIL RECENTLY AT
I
I OFFICE IN VALLETTA (TO BE REPORTED SEPARATELY).
ACCORDING TO P/1, THE EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO MALTA
CIRCA 1985 BY MAGRAHI, WHOM I I UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN THEN
EMPLOYED AT I
I
2. ABD-AL-SALAM ((MARABY)) MAY BE IDENTICAL TO MUSTAFA
ABD-AL-SALAM ((MUGHAYRIBI)) WHO SERVED FORMERLY WITH THE ESO IN
LONDON. I
END OF MESSAGE
SrET
Paqe 1

(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
APPROVED FOR RELEA SE
DATE: FEB 2008
-----------------------------i:: J~~~~~~:-~~~-~~-------
I
I
-----_____ .a
.. ,
I I\l..l..unr'ANT INU ~ABLt. TO I I REPORT
J
I
t. REF INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED. BY ~ I DURING
NON-SCHEDUlED MEETING WITH C/O I
OCT.
P/1 IS ACQUAINTED WITH EL~MEGRI IIIiU 111\ .... 00 1\110 HE OBSERvED THE TWO
AS THEY ARR1VED IN MALTA ON 8 OCT. UPON HIS ARRIVAL EL-ME,GRI TOLD
P/1 AND HIS:NEW BOSS. LAA STATION CHIEF MUSTAFA «SHABANI)). THAT
PER INSTRUCTIONS FROM SANUSSI P/1 WAS TO ASSIST EL-MEGRI .AS
REQUIRED. P/1 LEARNED LATER FROM SHABANI THAT EL~MEGRI. MASSUD AND
THE. TWO OTHER UNIDENTIFIED ARABS MET AT THE AfAaIMENT IN VALLETTA
WHICH IS RENTED BY THE LAA OFFICE.' ALTHOUGH ~AS NOT INVOLVED
IN THE ATTEMPT TO SCHEDULE RESERVATIONS FOR THE GROUP'S ONWARD
TRAVEL TO CHti'niL-MEI!BJ .• JLSEDP/1 I S OFFICE.TEU:e.!::IONfT.O CALL
TR I POL I ANI! As PRES ENn"Dlrllra-rC:"ME G'R II S D I SCUSS]]JIS'.:h'X:tlf
~D"
~-....
'Alilt.~r.--·-·--··----' .... '.._-,.,--,..
'" ... " .
2. MORNING OF 10 ·OCT. P/1 OBSERVED ASHUR AND MARABY AS THEY
OARRIVED MALTA. HE OBTAINED PASSPORT INFORMATION ON THESE .
VALS'REPORTED ~ ~T THAT TIME. 'BOTH SOURCE COMMENTS
ARE FRO PIt. NO DEFINITIVE TRACES ONEL-MEGRI.
OR MARA~. DE '1\ 10 n~S FOR CORRECT SPElLING VARIATIONS.
~
DOCUMENT DATE: 11 ICT
\ -

APP?OVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
~111JJIL Vl;, 00 I
I
SUBJECT: TERRORISM: LIBYAN EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
ACTIVITIES IN MALTA

TEXT: 1. ON 8 OCTOBER 1988, LIBYAN EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZA TlON
(ESO) OFFICERS ABD'AL BASAT EL-«MEGRI)) AND ABU AGELA «MASSUD))
ARRIVED IN MALTA ABOARD A LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES (LAA) FLIGHT FROM
TRIPOLI. ABOARD THE SAME FLIGHT WAS TWO UNIDENTIFIED NON-LIBYAN
ARABS, ONE OF WHOM CARRIED A NORTH YEMENESE PASSPORT. ALTHOUGH THE
FOUR INDIVIDUALS TRA VELED SEPARATEL Y, THEY WERE IN MALTA AS A GROUP
AT THE DIRECTION OF SENIOR ESO OFFICER 'ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD
«SANUSSI)). LATER ON 8 OCTOBER, THE FOUR MET AT AN APARTMENT IN
VALLETTA WHICH IS RENTED BY THE LAA OFFICE IN MALTA.
2. UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN MALTA, EL-MEGRI ASKED THE LAA OFFICE
TO ARRANGE FLIGHT RESERVA TlONS FOR THE GROUP TO TRA VEL TO NDJAMENA,
CHAD. THE LAA OFFICE WAS UNABLE, HOWEVER, TO BOOK THE GROUP ON
CONNECTING FLIGHTS ON THE DATES WHICH WERE PROVIDED BY EL-MEGRI.
(SOURCE COMMENT: THE EXACT DA TES THAT EL-MEGRI WANTED TO TRAVEL TO
CHAD IS UNKNOWN.) FOLLOWING THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO BOOK
FLIGHT RESERVA TlONS TO CHAD, EL-MEGRI ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ESO
CHIEF IBRAHIM «BISHARI)) IN TRIPOLI BY TELEPHONE. EL-MEGRI ,
CONTACTED SENIOR ESO OFFICER MUHAMMAD «NA'AMA)) WHO INSTRUCTED
EL-MEGRI TO TELEPHONE SANUSSI. WHEN EL-MEGRI REACHED SANUSSI AND
EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTIES IN SCHEDULING FLIGHT RESERVATIONS TO
CHAD, SANUSSI BECAME FURIOUS AND INSTRUCTED EL-MEGRI TO STAND-DOWN
ON THE OPERATION. ON 10 OCTOBER, EL-MEGRI DEPARTED MALTA ENROUTE
TO ROME AND MASSUD, WHO TRAVELED ON LIBYAN PASSPORT NUMBER 835004,
AND THE TWO OTHER ARABS IN THE GROUP RETURNED TO LIBYA.
3. ON 10 OCTOBER, SENIOR ESO OFFICER NASR «ASHUR)) ARRIVED
IN MALTA TRAVELING UNDER THE ALIAS NAME -NASR «SALlM)r CARRYING
LIBYAN PASSPORT NUMBER 689008. HE WAS MET AT THE LAA AIRCRAFT BY
THE AIR MALTA DUTY OFFICER AND WAS ESCORTED THROUGH THE VIP LOUNGE.
'ARRIVING ON THE SAME FLIGHT FROM LIBYA WAS ESO OFFICER ABD'AL
SALAM EL-«MARABY)) WHO TRAVELED ON LIBYAN PASSPORT NUMBER 422898.
4. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS UNKNOWN WHAT EL-MEGRI'S MISSION
WAS AND WHY ASHUR AND MARABY ARRIVED IN MALTA TWO DAYS LATER.
GIVEN SANUSSI'S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE FOUR-MAN MISSION LED BY
EL-MEGRI, IT APPEARS THAT THE GROUP WAS PLANNING SOME TYPE OF
SPECIAL OPERATION.)

SE~T
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: 121131Z OCT 88
I. ____ _ _____ _
~----~l~.~D~URING NON-SCHEDULED MEETING EVENING OF 10 OCT,
I (P/l) REPORTED THAT THE NEW LAA STATION CHIEF IN MALTA
L,IF"1S..-::---.$ ... X......,N ... AM....,.,!.,E:: MUSTAFA ((SHABANI)) ; SEX: MALE; DPOB: CIRCA 1946,
LIBYA; CIT: LIBYAN· OCC: LAA STATION CHIEF; LOC: MALTA.
SOURCE: ILl TEXT: LAA- STATION CHIEF IN MALTA AS OF SEP
88; LAA EMPLOYEE SINCE CIRCA 1969; ESO COOPTEE.$$ NO FURTHER
STATION INFO. REQUEST I ITRACES ON SHABANI.
2. P/1 ALSO REPORTED THAT THE FORMER LAA STATION CHIEF IN
MALTA, LAMIN ((FHEMAH)) RETURNED TO MALTA IN EARLY OCT TO OPEN A
BUSINESS. P/1 NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH FHEMAH IS NOT A ESO STAFF
OFFICER, HE IS RECEIVING SOME FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM THE ESO AND
HIS BUSINESS WILL SERVE AS AN ESO FRONT COMPANY. ACCORDING TO P/1,
FHEMAH DID NOT HAVE ANY PROBLEM ACQUIRING A WORK PERMIT IN MALTA
AND HE EVEN ASKED P/1 TO FORM A PARTNERSHIP WITH HIM IN THE
VENTURE. P/l DECLINED STATING THAT HE DID NOT HAVE MUCH MONEY THAT
HE COULD CONTRIBUTE.
. .
3. DURING THE MEETING P/1 ALSO TOLD C/O THAT THE LAA OFFICE
IN MALTA RENTS FLAT NUMBER ONE AND FLAT NUMBER FIVE IN THE VALLETTA
BUILDINGS IN VALLETTA FOR USE AS TOY QUARTERS. ACCORDING TO P/l,
ESO OFFICIALS SOMETIMES USE THE FLATS AND THIS WAS WHERE THE GROUP
OF FOUR (REPORTED REF) MET UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN MALTA ON 8 OCT.
4. FINALLY, P/l REPORTED THAT QADHAFI AIDE AHMED ABU
((HARRUS)) WAS IN MALTA IN EARLY OCT :1AKING PURCHASES FOR QADHAFI.
ACCORDING TO A RUMOR WHICH SURFACED CURING HARRUS' VISIT, SINCE
Page 1

1
•
~.
MID-SEP QADHAFI HAS BEEN RESIDING ON A FARM THAT IS OPERATED BY
JAMAHIRIYA SECURITY. P/l DID NOT KNOW THE LOCATION OF THE FARM.
END OF MESSAGE
Page 2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
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(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
- - --------- -- ---
_~ "'I

HIM TO RESUME TUTORIAL IN ENGLISH AS THIS COULD EVENTUALLY
PROVIDE THE NEEDED FLEXIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION AND REINFORCE
COMPARTMENTATION. P/l'S ARABIC IS PROVINCIAL TRIPOLITANIAN
DELIVERED IN RAPID SPEECH PATTERN WHICH REQUIRED I ~TO PAY
CLOSER THAN NORMAL ATTENTION AND MAKE FREQUENT IN1ERROPI ONS
FOR CLARIFICATION. ALTHOUGH P/l IS A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE AND
STUDIED HISTORY FOR TWO YEARS AT TRIPOLI'S FATAH UNIVERSITY HE
DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE A FUNCTIONAL ABILITY IN EITHE,R
CLASSICAL ARABIC OR MORE WIDELY USED DIALECTS SUCH AS
EGYPTIAN. THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS MANAGEABLE.
4. BACKGROUND: P/l IS THE ELDEST SON (WITH TEN SIBLINGS)
BORN TO A FAIRLY WELL-TO-DO TRIPOLI MERCHANT FAMILY. DURING
HIS HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY DAYS HE WAS AN AVID FOLLOWER OF
QADHAFI'S REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES AND BECAME AN ACTIVE MEMBER
IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES WHERE HE CAME TO DEVELOP CLOSE
PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH IMPORTANT RC BUREAU MEMBERS SUCH AS ALI
«KlLANI)), MUSA «KUSA)), SA'ID «RASHID)) AND IZZ-AL-DIN
«HINSHIRI)), AMONG OTHERS. HE AVOIDED MILITARY CONSCRIPTION
THROUGH ENTRY INTO THE ESO IN CIRCA LATE 1984 AT THE TIME OF
NUMEROUS PERSONNEL TRANSFERS FROM THE RCB TO THE ESO. HE WAS
INITIALLY EMPLOYED IN THE HQS MOTOR POOL/DISPATCHER'S OFFICE.
IT TURNS OUT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF HIS ESO EXPERIENCE (WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF HIS DUTY IN MALTA) HAS BEEN IN ADMINISTRATION AND
LOGISTICS. IN CIRCA 1985 HE ATTENDED A 65 DAY TRAINING COURSE
FOR ESO ADMIN TYPES AT THE HADBA AL-KHADRA TRAINING FACILITY
WHERE EMPHASIS WAS ON ORIENTATION TO INTELLIGENCE, PHYSICAL
FITNESS, MARKSMANSHIP AND PHYSICAL SECURITY. THIS COURSE WAS
DISTINCT FROM THE CIRCA SIX MONTH BASIC OPERATIONS COURSE GIVEN
TO ESO OFFICERS HEADED FOR OPERATIONAL CAREERS. FOLLOWING
TRAINING HE WAS ASSIGNED TO HINSHIRI'S CENTRAL SECURITY
ADMINSTATION (IDARAT AMN AL MARKAZI) NEAR THE WIDDAN CINEMA
WHERE HE FIRST WORKED IN THE FILES/ARCHIVES OFFICE AND THEN IN
THE PATROLS AND SURVEILLANCE OF SMALL BUSINESSES SECTION. J
JP/l'S CIVILIAN GRADE IN Ttit; t;~V Wl\~ ~~ ~~ 0,
L'~'LL~~~IMmTAELY EQUIVALENT TO A SECOND LIEUTENANT.
5. MALTA CAREER: Pll'S TRANSFER TO I IOFFICE IN
MALTA, HE EXPLAINS, IS CONSIDERED AN ADMINISTRATIVE
CROSS-TRANSFER FROM THE ESO, ALTHOUGH HIS SALARY IS PAID
THROUGH I
IWHICH HANDLES HIS OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE
AFFAIRS. pI! ASSUMES HE IS STILL CARRIED ON THE ESO PERSONNEL
ROSTER AND THAT HISI }ASSIGNMENT IS MERELY COVER. HE
LIVES IN DREAD OF REASSIGNMENT TO ESO HQS AS HE REALIZES THAT
HE WILL BE IN FOR RE-VETTING. THIS PROCESS, WHICH HE HAS TWICE
SAMPLED EARLIER IN HIS CAREER, INCLUDES SHORT PERIODS OF
INCARCERATION AND HOSTILE INTERROGATION AT HADBA AL-KHADRA, AS
A MEANS TO REINFORCE DISCIPLINE AND LOYALTY. WHILE Pil NO
LONGER FEARS IMMINENT RECALL AS HE DID WHEN HE FIRST APPROACHED
I
I VALLETTA, ROTATION IS INEVITABLE AT SOME STAGE AND HE
WHNI6 10 eREPARE FOR THAT EVENTUALITY VIA THE SHAM SURGERY. IN
MALTA, p/1 IS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ABD-AL-SALAM «ZADMA)),
FOREIGN OPERATIONS SECTION OF THE ESO WHEREAS THE ESO
Paqe 2

COMPLEMENT WORKING OUT OF THE LPB AND HEADED BY CONSUL MUHAMMAD
AL-«LAFI» IS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF ABDULLAH «SANUSSI» AND
HIS ESO "INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE" (ISTA'LAMAT) OFFICE.
NOTE: P/I'S OPTIC OFESO ADMINISTRATION AND SET UP MAY BE
SOMEWHAT SKEWED BY HIS PROLONGED ABSENCE AND LACK OF
SENIORITY. HE CONTINUED TO MAKE REFERENCE TO ZADMA'S ULTIMATE
AUTHORITY AS DERIVING FROM HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE SECURITY
BATTALIONS. HE ALSO BELIEVES, PERSHAPS CORRECTLY, THAT LINES
OF AUTHORITY IN THE ESO ARE NOT CAREFULLY DRAWN AND THAT ON
MALTA THE ESO PRESENCE IS NOT MONOLITHIC. I I OPERATIVES
ARE NOT OFTEN INVOLVED WITH THE LPB ESO CADRES. I lIS
INCREASINGLY BEING UTILIZED BY ZADMA'S OFFICE FOR PLACEMENT OF
OFFICERS OVERSEAS. IN ADDITION TO THE DEPUTY SLOT
(TRADITIONALLY AN ESO HAVEN), THE NEW POSITIONS OF "GROUND
OPERATIONS MANAGERS" WILL HENCEFORTH BE FILLED BY ESO
PERSONNEL. '
6. MOTIVATION: THIS TOPIC WILL NEED TO BE CONSTANTLY
MONITORED SINCE I IBELIEVES IT IS LIKELY THAT THERE MAY BE
OTHER FACTORS OF WHICH WE ARE NOT YET AWARE THAT ARE DRIVING
P/I :fO COOPERATE WITH I I INTELLIGENCE. IN AGREEING TO
C/O [
JREQUEST THAT HE AGREE TO MEET WITH A VISITING
"ARABISI , PII COMMENTED THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN HE WAS
PREPARED TO MEET/COOPERATE WITH I ~ AFTER THE FIRST HOUR
OF THE 5 OCT DISCUSSIONS WITH I I IT WAS CLEAR P/I HAD
MADE UP HIS MIND ON THIS ISSUE AND WANTED TO MAKE THE BEST
ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE THAT SATISFIED HIS PRIMARY CONCERN OF
AVOIDING RECALL TO TRIPOLI AND LAYED THE FINANCIAL BASIS FOR A
NEW LIFE IN THE WORLD OF PRIVATE COMMERCE IN MALTA. THE SHAM
SURGERY OR MEDICALLY DISQUALIFYING IMPAIRMENT IS A
NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMAND OF P/I THAT HE IS HOPEFUL WILL EXEMPT HIM
FROM HAVING TO ACCEPT AN ASSIGNMENT AT ESO HQS IN TRIPOLI. ON
THE SECOND ASPECT OF HIS MOTIVATION, HE MADE A STRONG BID IN
DISCUSSIONS WITHJ lTHAT WE PERMIT/SUPPORT HIM IN LEAVING
I I AND TH ESC AL"OGETHER IN FAVOR OF SETTING UP A SMALL
CAR RENTAL AGENCY ON MALTA. HE HAS SAVED APPROXIMATELY $30,000
FROM HIS SALARY (AND WE SUSPECT ILLEGAL COMMISSIONS EARNED
THROUGH HIS I I CAPACITY, PERHAPS LOW LEVEL SMUGGLING).
HIS PROJECTED CAR RENTAL VENTURE HE ESTIMATES AS COSTING
$60,000 IN START UP EXPENSES. IMPLICIT, BUT NOT VERBALIZED,
WAS HIS HOPE THAT' WE WOULD COME UP WITH THE BALANCE SINCE SUCH
A POSITION WOULD ASSURE HIM CONTINUED (HE CLAIMED ENHANCED)
ACCESS TO ESO AND REVCOM VISITORS TO MALTA. I I FIRMLY
EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE FAR LESS INTERESTED IN SUCH A
HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSITION AND WERE QUITE SATISFIED WITH HIS
CURRENT ACCESS THROUGH I J AFTER MUCH BACK AND FORTH,
PII ACCEPTED I
IMID IERMROPOSAL THAT P/I REMAIN WHERE
HE IS, PATCH OVER DIFFERENCES HE HAS HAD WITH ESO COLLEAGUES
AND SUPERIORS AND DO WHAT HE CAN TO ENHANCE HIS UTILITY TO ESO
HEADQUARTERS AND THE LPB. P/I MADE ONE LAST BID TO "EXPAND"
HIS ACCESS, NOTING THAT THE ESO IS NOT THE ONLY LIBYAN
TERRORIST SPONSOR THAT I I SHOULD BE TRACKING (HE LISTED
THE REVCOMS, MATHABA AND AD HOC TEAMS PUT TOGETHER BY MEMBERS
. OF THE SECURITY BATTALIONS).. I I INSISTED THAT WE WANTED
HIM TO RETAIN AND IMPROVE ON HIS CURRENT ACCESS AND WHEN THE
Page 3

TIME CAME FOR HIS NATURAL ROTATION WE WOULD CONSIDER
ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD KEEP HIM FROM HAVING TO SERVE IN
TRIPOLI. FIRST PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR HIM TO TRANSFER TO
ANOTHER ~ ~SLOT, MAYBE ATHENS OR ISTANBUL. P/1 SAID
THAT WOU 0 BE EIN BUT REITERATED HIS REJECTION OF RECALL TO
TRIPOLI FOR MORE THAN A TWO WEEK CONSULTATION PERIOD. AT THIS
POINT, P/1 SAID IT WAS NOT ONLY THE RE-VETTING HE FEARS BUT THE
LIKELY PROSPECT THAT HE WOULD BE COERCED TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST
OPERATIONS IF HE IS' CLOSE AT HAND AND AVAILABLE TO THE HQS
. "PLANNERS". UNTIL YOU HAVE LED AN OPERATION (DIRT 'AMALIYA),
YOU HAVE NOT ACHIEVED THE OFFICIAL SEAL OF APPROVAL, ACCORDING
TO P/1. HE WAS SOMEWHAT REASSURED WHEN / /EXPLAINED THAT
WE WOULD USE OUR EXTENSIVE CAPABILITIES TO WATCH FOR INDICATORS
THAT HE IS ABOUT TO BE RECALLED.
7. IN'THE TIME REMAINING'J I TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON P/1'S
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ESO AND l' RRORIS1' PRESENCE ON MALTA. WE
ASKED HIM WHAT HE KNEW OF WEAPONS CACHES THAT WE WERE CERTAIN
THE ESO HAD ON THE ISLAND. P/1 STATED THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY
AWARE OF ONE CACHE OF EIGHT KILOS OF ORANGE COLORED EXPLOSIVES
(NO DETONATORS) THAT HAD BEEN STORED FOR MANY MONTHS AT THE
I I OFFICE. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE EXPLOSIVES HAD
E'lRS1' ARRIVED CIRCA 1985 WHEN ABD-AL-BASIT «MAGRAHI» WAS IN
MALTA. SOME MONTHS AGO P/1 WAS ASKED TO HELP TRANSFER THE
EXPLOSIVES TO THE LPB OFFICE OF ESO REPRESENTATIVE MUHAMMAD
AL-LAFI. ASKED WHERE THE GOODS WERE IN THE OFFICE, P/1 REPLIED
THEY HAD NOT BEEN PLACED IN A~SAFE, MERELY LOCKED IN ONE OF THE
DESK DRAWERS. RECALLING AN EARLIER REPORT FROM/ ~
I I ASKED IF ANOTHER LARGER CACHE WAS NOT STORED IN A
PRIVATE VILLA OWNED (SPECIFICALLY NOT LEASED) BY THE LPB IN THE
SALIMA DISTRICT. P/1 SAID HE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT ARMS OR
EXPLOSIVES WERE STORED THERE BUT WAS AWARE THAT LAFI HAD BEEN
DIRECTED BYESO HEADQUARTERS TO PURCHASE HIS SALlMA RESIDENCE.
OTHER LPB OFFICIAL QUARTERS ARE LEASED, NOT OWNED.
8. ESO ARRIVALS TO MALTA: IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION P/1
HAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY TO C/O I I HE SAID THAT HE HAS
HEARD INFORMALLY THAT ONE OR MORE ADDITIONS ARE SOON TO BE MADE
TO THE ESO PRESENCE IN MALTA. HE EXPECTED MUHAMMAD
AL-«'ATI)"), FORMERLY THE HEAD OF SHIPPING SECURITY AT ESO HQS,
. TO ARRIVE ON SATURDAY 8 OCTOBER FOR AN INDETERMINATE STAY.
ANOTHER SENIOR ESO OFFICER TO ARRIVE PCS SOON IS COL. ALI
«SAMI'I», WHO HAD BEEN DIRECTOR OF ESO ADMINISTRATION AND
FINANCE AND SOMEHOW INVOLVED IN THE DA'WA ISLAMIYA STRUCTURE.
P/1 DID NOT KNOW WHAT COVER SAMI'I WOULD OCCUpy IN MALTA. P/1
REPORTED THAT THE NEW I
dDEPUTY STATION CHIEF (THE
SENIOR ESO POSITION IN THE OHI E) IS KHALIFA SANUSSI
( (ABDULLAH) ), FORMERLY WITH I I IN PARIS. AN ACTIVE
LIBYAN CooPTEE OF THE ESO ON MALTA WITH ESPECIALLY CLOSE TIES
TO NASIR «ASHUR» IS MUSTAFA AL-«HASUNI», DIRECTOR OF THE
ROTS CO. LTD. WE DID NOT GET THE PRODUCT LINE FOR "ROTS" AND
ASSUME IT IS-AN ACRONYM.
~. Page 4

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(b) (3)
.DATE: FEB 2008
(8)
TUK: £'iUV 00 I
--------------------------~
SUBJ:
SENIOR PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE EXTERNAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION
L-T-EX--T-:---l-.--O-N--C-I-R-C-A--2-0--0-C-T-O-B-E-R--1-9-S-S--L-T-.--C-O-L-.--A-B-D-U-L-LA-H----------------~I ~
((SANUSSI)) WAS FORMALLY APPOINTED AS DIRECTOR OF THE
Page 1

OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION OF LIBYA'S EXTERNAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION (ESO) , REPLACING CAPT. ABD-AL-SALAM «ZADMA». ON
THE SAME DATE ZADMA WAS ASSIGNED SANUSSI'S FORMER POSITION AS
HEAD OF THE ESO'S INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION WITH A CONCURRENT
TITLE AS HEAD OF THE COUNTER TERRORIST SECTION AT ESO HQS, THE
LATTER BEING A POSITION ZADMA HAD HE~D IN 1985-86. AS AN
ADJUNCT TO HIS NEW ESO DUTIES, ZADMA HAS BEEN PLACED IN CHARGE
OF SECURITY AND LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR A PRIVATE FARM OR
REST AREA FOR LIBYAN LEADER MU'AMMAR QADHAFI BEING PREPARED
WITHIN THE TRIPOLI CITY LIMITS.
2. THE LATE OCTOBER CHANGES WERE THE OUTGROWTH OF
QADHAFI'S EARLIER DECISION TO WITHDRAW ZADMA FROM
HIGH-VISIBILITY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ACTIVITY AND RETURN
HIM TO THE SECURITY BATTALIONS IN DEFERENCE TO LIBYAN PUBLIC
OPINION. THE MOVE HAD BEEN PROMPTED BY NUMEROUS PUBLIC
COMPLAINTS OF ZADMA'S PROMINENT ROLE IN REPRESSIVE MEASURES
AGAINST LIBYAN CITIZENRY BY STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AT A
TIME WHEN QADHAFI WISHED TO REPAIR HIS PUBLIC IMAGE. QADHAFI
WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN RETURNING TH'E FIERCELY LOYAL ZADMA TO
HIS PRIVATE BODY GUARD FORCE, THE SECURITY BATTALIONS HEADED BY
KHALIFA «HUNAYSH». ZADMA PROTESTED THE PROPOSED MOVES,
SENSING THAT THEY WOULD ENTAIL SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF AUTHORITY,
AUTONOMY AND FUNDS. (SOURCE COMMENT: ZADMA IS HELD IN AWE BY
MEMBERS OF THE ESO HEADQUARTERS STAFF, NONE OF WHOM WOULD
CONSIDER DISPUTING HIS ORDERS. THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY BATTALIONS, ESPECIALLY THEIR COMMANDER KHALIFA
HUNAYSH, ARE NOT SO TIMID AND WOULD PROBABLY CHALLENGE ZADMA'S
AUTHORITARIAN METHODS OF OPERATION). ZADMA TOOK HIS CONCERNS
DIRECTLY TO QADHAFI, COMPLAINING OF A NOTIONAL HEALTH PROBLEM
THAT WOULD PREVENT HIM FROM A RETURN TO ACTIVE MILI~ARY DUTY
WITH THE SECURITY BATTALIONS. QADHAFI ACQUIESCED AND
SUGGESTED A LESS VISIBLE ROLE IN THE ESO. (SOURCE COMMENT:
DESPITE THIS NOMINAL DEMOTION WITnIN THE ESO POWER STRUCTURE,
ZADMA IS LIKELY TO RETAIN AN INDEPENDENT CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT
FOREIGN OPERATIONS UNDER HIS COUNTER TERRORIST SECTION WHICH IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPPRESSING LIBYAN DISSIDENTS AT HOME AND
ABROAD. )
3. THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND PARTLY EXPLAINS THE CURRENT
PREEMINENCE OF THE COVETED ESO OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION. IN
1985-86 THE POSITION'S PRESENT INCUMBENT, SANNUSI, HELD THE TWO
TITLES OF DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION ADMINISTRAT~ON AND HEAD
OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS. IN EARLY 1986 THE OPERATIONS
ADMINISTRATION WAS CREATED, RESPONSIBLE FOR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
SECURITY AND FIRST HEADED BY SAID «RASHID». ON 1 JANUARY
1987, A FRIDAY, RASHID TURNED OVER THE OPERATIONS
ADMINISTRATION AND WAS TRANSFERED TO THE ELECTRONIC COMPANY
(SHIRKAT AL ELEKTRUNAT), AN ESO SUBSIDIARY. A POWER STRUGGLE
ENSUED BETWEEN ZADMA AND THE ESO'S CENTRAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION HEAD, IZZ-AL-DIN «HINSHIRI», OVER WHO WOULD
INHERIT THE OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION. ZADMA EVENTUALLY
PREVAILED AND IN MARCH 1987 TOOK OVER AS DIRECTOR OF THE
OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION AND EXPANDED ITS FUNCTIONS AS A
RESULT OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND. (SOURCE COMMENT: OTHER
CHANGES WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 1 JANUARY 1987 AND REMAIN IN
EFFECT INCLUDED ABD-AL-BASIT ALI AL-«(MIGRAHI'S» TRANSFER FROM
Page 2

SE~T
HEAD OF AIRCRAFT SECURITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC STUDIES
CENTER, THEN UNDER ABDULLAH SANUSSI'S INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION. MEANWHILE, COL. RAMADAN AL-«SARQIQ» WAS
APPOINTED AS CHIEF OF AIRCRAFT SECURITY).
ACQ: (6 NOVEMBER 1988)
J:.NU VI:
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
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1:1175~~ NOV_!:H~
--~
l -
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY OF 5-6 NOVEMBER MEETINGS
1. TWO PRODUCTIVE, LATE NIGHT MEETINGS WERE HELD WITH
I IAT M1;\LTA SAFE HOUSE 5 AND 6 NOVEMBER.i----=F--=I:::R=S--=T ___---,
SESSION WAS GIVEN OVER TO MEDICAL EXAMINATION BYI
AND A DISCUSSION OF OPTIONS FOR A SHAM MEDICAL p&RO~B~L~E~~~l~I~HA~I-~
WOULD EXEMPT Pl1 FROM MILITARY SERVICE. SECOND SESSION WAS
DEVOTED TO FI DEBRIEFINGS, FURTHER VETTING DISCUSSIONS,
PLANNING ON MEANS TO ENHANCE Pil'S ESO REPUTATION AND PAVING
WAY FOR I I EXAM.
2. MEDICAL: 5 NOVEMBER MEETING BEGAN WITH pl1 STATING
THAT HE IS FAR LESS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS CONTINUED TENURE WITH
LAA/ESO IN MALTA SINCE THE LATEST REORGANIZATION OF THE ESO
LEADERSHIP (BEING SUBMITTED AS SEPARATE INTEL). THE CHANGES
DIMINISH THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HE WILL BE PRESSURED INTO
RETURNING TO ESO HQS TRIPOLI ANYTIME SOON, THEREFORE HE IS LESS
ANXIOUS ABOUT AN URGENT "MEDICAL SOLUTION" TO HIS PROBLEMS.
r-!WILL BE REPORTING GREATER DETAIL ON MEDICAL EXAM AND
PLANNING, IN r lCHANNEL. I l pl1 IS SOMETHING
OF A HYPOCHONDRIAC AND IS BEGiNNING 1'0 CONVINCE HIMSELF THAT HE
MAY ALREADY SUFFER FROM THE ACHES AND PAINS DESCRIBED TO HIM AS
$YMPTOMATIC OF A SLIPPED DISC BACK PROBLEM. pl1 WAS CLEARLY
IMPRESSED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THEI I PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
WHICH INCLUDED DRAWING THREE VIALS Of BLOOD FOR LABORATORY
ANALYSIS. HE NOW HAS DEMONSTRABLE PROOF THAT WE ARE TAKING HIS
"PROBLEM" SERIOUSLY. THE NEXT STEPS ARE UP TO HIM IN BUILDING
A CREDIBLE MEDICAL HISTORY OF BACK PROBLEMS THAT COULD EARN HIM
Page 1

A MILITARY EXEMPTION IF HE IS RECALLED TO TRIPOLI AND THEN
FEELS OBLIGED TO RESIGN FROM THE ESO. HE WILL BE VISITING A
PALESTINIAN OSTEOPATH ON MALTA THIS WEEK AND WILL COMPLAIN OF
THE APPROPRIATE SYMPTOMS AND CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY THAT WAS
CAREFULLY DESCRIBED TO HIM BY THE~ ANY REQUIREMENT FOR A
SURGICAL SCAR IS BEING DEFERRED U~HE HAS GONE THROUGH A
SERIES OF EXAMINATIONS, AND COLLECTED RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION,
BY SEVERAL MALTA-BASED BACK SPECIALISTS.
3. DEBRIEFINGS: 6 NOVEMBER SESSION DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL
2300 HRS AND LASTED UNTIL 4 A.M. THE FOLLOWING MORNING. FOR
THE FIRST TIME P/l SHOWED UP WITHOUT HIS MALTESE TRANSLATOR AND
ACCEPTED C/OS INSTRUCTIONS ON MAKING HIS WAY DIRECTLY TO THE
SAFEHOUSE. SINCE HIS DEPARTING LAA FLIGHT HAD BEEN DELAYED AND
HE WAS RUNNING LATE FOR MEETING WITH C/OS AND c::::::::J P/l TURNED
UP IN FULL LAA UNIFORM, ID'S AND SECURITY PASSES DANGLING FROM
HIS SHIRT POCKET. BESIDES ESO RESHUFFLING, P/l FURNISHED
REPORTING ON FOLLOWING TOPICS WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED
SEPARATELY:
--HIS ROLE IN AIDING ESO CONTACTS IN TRAVELLING TO LIBYA
VIA MALTA WITHOUT MALTESE EXIT/REENTRY CHACHETS IN TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS.
--OTHER ESO AND REVCOM OPERATIVES REGULARLY VISITING MALTA
WHO HAVE TASKED HIM WITH OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE
--NAMES AND PRESENT DISPOSITION OF ESO "REVOLUTIONARIES"
WHO WORKED WITH P/l IN HINSHIRI'SCENTRAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
--VARIOUS LI ___---'I APPOINTMENTS
--ESO AND REVCOM FRONT ACTIVITIES ON MALTA
4. PLANS: P/l HAS GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO IMPROVING HIS
ACCESS NOW THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED C/OS' GUIDANCE THAT HE REMAIN
WITH THE ESO IN MALTA. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, HE HAS BEEN A
"SHIRKER" WHILE IN MALTA, GENERALLY DODGING ESO ASSIGNMENTS
SINCE HIS LAA APPOINTMENT. SINCE HIS ASSIGNMENT TO MALTA P/l
HAS BELONGED TO THE ESO'S OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION (IDARAT AL
'AMALIYAT) UNTIL LATELY HEADED BY ABD-AL-SALAM «ZADMA»
(BEFORE HIM, SA'ID RASHID) WHICH CONTROLS ESO ACTIVITIES UNDER
LAA COVER (AT LEAST IN MALTA). (NOTE: IN THE NEW ESO CHANGES,
THE OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION WAS TRANSFERED TO ABDULLAH
«SANUSSI» WHO HAD BEEN HEAD OF THE INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
(IDARAT AL MA'LUMAT) AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS ('AMALIYAT AL
KHASSA).) P/l'S PRIMARY ESO ROLE WITH LAA MALTA HAS BEEN
AIRCRAFT SECURITY BUT HE IS ALSO OBLIGED TO ASSIST ESO
OPERATIVES TRANSITTING OR ON MISSIONS TO MALTA. WHEN SUCH
REQUESTS HAVE INCLUDED SMUGGLING SUSPECT PACKAGES LIKELY
CONTAINING WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVES, P/l HAS REFUSED TO COMPLY
WITH SOME DETRIMENT TO HIS REPUTATION. HE HAS, HOWEVER,
SUCCEEDED IN RECRUITING MALTESE IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS WILLING
TO ASSIST ESO MEMBERS OR COOPTEES IN CONCEALING THEIR ENTRIES
OR DEPARTURES FROM MALTA. P/l HAS FREQUENTLY SERVED AS A
FACILITATOR FOR ~SO VISITORS OR HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS ON
Page 2

VACATION TRAVEL TO MALTA BUT HE HAS GENERALLY REFUSED TASKS
THAT HAVE HAD CLEAR TERRORIST IMPLICATIONS (OR SO HE TELLS
US). P/l REALIZES THAT HE MUST NOW MAKE UP FOR HIS PREVIOUS
MARGINAL PERFORMANCE AND BELIEVES ONE ROUTE, NOW THAT SANUSSI
IS HIS NEW BOSS, WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH AN IMPRESSIVE FI
REPORTING RECORD--WITH OUR ASSISTANCE. P/l'S REPORTING CHANNEL
IS NOT THROUGH THE LPB. ALL REPORTING IS HANDWRITTEN AND GIVEN
IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO ANY LIBYAN SKY MARSHAL ABOARD A LAA
FLIGHT IN MALTA. THE MARSHAL HAND DELIVERS THE ENVELOPE TO ESO
COL. RAMADAN AL- (. (SARQIQ) ) I CHIEF OF AIRCRAFT SECURITY, WHO
FORWARDS IT UNOPENED TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE OPERATIONS
ADMINISTRATION, NOW SANUSSI. P/l AGREES THAT TO AVOID RAISING
ESO CI ANTENNAE, HIS INCREASE IN PRODUCTION SHOULD BE GRADUAL
STARTING WITH A COUPLE OF INTERESTING REPORTS PER MONTH. HE
WOULD LIKE OUR ASSISTANCE IN GATHERING FEED MATERIAL THAT WOULD
BE OF INTERST TO LIBYAN POLICY MAKERS AND NOT LIKELY REPORTED
BY OTHER ESO SOURCES. THE INFORMATION NEED NOT BE ACURATE OR
ESPECIALLY TIMELY BUT IT NEEDS TO BE CREDIBLE. HE IS NOT
OBLIGED TO IDENTIFY SUBSOURCING EXCEPT GENERICALLY. TOPICS
SUGGESTED BY P/l WHICH ARE ON THE ESO REQUIREMENTS LIST FOR
MALTA OPERATIVES INCLUDE:
--ACTIVITIES AND CONCENTRATIONS OF ARAB (NON-LIBYAN)
RESIDENTS IN MALTA
--MALTESE GOVERNMENT'S LATEST POSITIONS PRO OR ANTI LIBYA
OR THE WEST
--DISSIDENT LIBYANS TRANSITING MALTA (P/l DOES NOT WANT TO
. GET ANY DISSIDENTS APPREHENDED BY LIBYAN/MALTESE AUTHORITIES
BUT FEELS SUCH DOCTORED REPORTING WOULD BOOST HIS ESO
REPUTATION CONSIDERABLY. IF WE CAN MANAGE TO FEED HIM SUCHINFORMATION WHICH IS
GENUINE, IT SHOULD BE AFTER THE FACT WH
EN
THE DISSIDENT(S) HAS ALREADY DEPARTED MALTA FOR UNKNOWN
DESTINATION) .
--ACTIVITIES OF THE ISRAELI EMBASSY OR MOSAD AGENTS ON
MALTA. THIS CAN BE SHEER FICTION AS THE ESO REP (AL-LAFI) AT
THE LPB HAS NO CURRENT SOURCES WITH THIS REPORTING CAPABILITY
--SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS OF PLANNED ASSASSINATION PLOTS
AGAINST LIBYAN LEADERSHIP
--DESCRIPTION OF THE MALTESE POLICE FORCE OR TECHINCAL
DRAWINGS OF LUQA AIRPORT
~~~~ICOMMENDED P/l ON THE THOUGHT HE HAS PUT INTO THIS
SCENARIO AND AGREED TO HAVE HQS EXPERTS WORK ON SOME OF THESE
SUBJECT AREAS TO PRODUCE "FEED MATERIAL". I I
STATION WILL BE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON HQS FOR SOCH INEORMAIION
WHICH DOES NOT COMPOMISE I I EQUITIES BUT SERVES TO
ENHANCE P/l'S REPUTATION AS AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR. WELCOME
COMMENTS.
5. TRADE CRAFT &1 ~ A DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON MEANS
TO IMPROVE SECURITY OF OUR REGULAR AND NON-SCHEDULED CONTACT.
P/l QUICKLY VOICED HIS NERVOUSNESS OVER ACCEPTING ANY FORM OF
TECHNICAL SPY GEAR. THIS CONCERN WAS ALLAYED AND P/l WAS ASKED
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.'
. '
TO GIVE THOUGHT TO ALTERNATIVE, NATURAL METHODS OF INITIATING
OR RECEIVING SIGNAL FOR NON-SCHEDULED CONTACT. \
Page 4

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~------------
I
IESO LEADS
1. DURING S NOVEMBE~ MALTA MEETING I ~EPORTED ON
THE FOLLOWING ESO TERRORIST SUSPECTS WHO HAVE CALLED UPON HIS
I IASSISTANCE IN THE PAST. IN FUTURE~ Pll WILL BE MORE
AMENABLE ro HELPING OUT TO ENHANCE HI~ UTILITY AND REPUTATION
WITH ESC HQS AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY.
2. CAPTAIN LATIF «SULAYMAN». TRUE NAME SAMI SALAH
«LUTAYIF». A FORMER STUDENT IN U.K. BEFORE 84-85 INCIDENTS.
MAJORING IN ENGINEERING. MAYBE CHEMICAL. SAID TO HAVE BEEN AN
OPPOSITIONIST THERE UNTIL HE WAS WOOED BACK TO THE LIBYAN LINE
SAYID «QADHAF AL-DAM». HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN MANY ESO
OPERATIONS IN EUROPE. TRAVELS OFTEN VIA MALTA TO SWITZERLAND.
IN 1987 HE CONTACTEDP/! AND WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LT. AHMAD
AL-«BARUNI» OF ESO MILITARY SECTION. AND CAPTAIN ZAWAM
«AHMAD» C. 28. OF THE SECURITY BATTALION. QADHAFI'S ELITE
GUARD FORCE). (NOTE: ZAWAM CIRCA APRI 1987 RETURNED TO THE
SECURITY BATTALION AFTER ~IS STINT WITH ESO ALONG WITH A NUMBER
OF OTHERS SELECTED BY KHALIFA «HUNAYSH». LATTER HAD
COMPLAINED TO QADHAFI THAT ALL HIS QUALIFIED. WELL TRAINED
YOUNG MEN WERE·~EING DRAWN AWAY BY ESO AND MI. QADHAFI
AUTHORIZED HUNJYSH TO RECLAIM PERSONNEL ORIGINALLY BELONGING TO
AND TRAINED BY. THE SECURITY BATTALIONS.) THE TWO TURNED UP IN
MALTA AND CONTACTED PI! SHORTLY BEFORE RAMADAN (APRIL?) ·~987
AFTER COMPLETI~ A SUCCESSFUL MISSION IN SWITZERLAND OR
NEARBY. PI! BELIEVES ,THEY HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN EITHER:
--IZZ-AL-DIN «GADAMSI» ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OR
--KILLING OF A LIBYAN CARRYING AN ALGERIAN PPT FNU
«KHARAB I SH» IN.I TALY.
3. CAPTA I N SULAYMAN .1 S CLOSE TO AL-iA'M.~g!NiN'J.14)'" ,
FORMERLY OF LAA MALTA ,WHO STARTED AND ESO FRONTCOt1PANf IN
MALTA AND NQ~&~~~f.N~tLllQ, I!AV5k.·. THE COMPANY HAS NOT
BEEN GIVEN NAME TO COMPANY YET.
SUGGESTED A JOINT PARTNERSHIP WI SON E MALTESE TY
PR I ME MIN I STER. .
4. REQUEST HQS TRACES.
APPROVED FOR RELEA
DATE: FEB 2008
DOCUMENT DATE: 14 NOV 88.
I
I

.~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB" 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: 130918Z DEC 88
-------------------------------------------------------l
I
1------------
1. DURING OPS DISCUSSIONS PRECEDING 5 DECEMBER J I IN
MALTA, ~
&PRESENTED FORCEFUL RATIONAL ARGU EN! IN
SUPPOR Ot HIS PRE IOUS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN COMPILING
SHAM INTELLIGENCE REPORTING TO BUTRESS HIS ESO CAREER. Pl1 WAS
ACUTELY DISAPPOINTED I ~DID NOT HAVE INITIAL FI REPORTS IN
HAND AT THIS MEETING. HE WE T ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HIS TENURE
WITH I ~ MALTA MAY BE IN THE BALANCE. SINCE HIS ARRIVAL,
SENIOR
I REPRESENTATIVE KHALI FA « SANUSS I)) HAS BEEN
LEARNINb THE ~PES QUICKLY. IN A FEW MORE MONTHS HE SHOULD BE
ABLE TO OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF Pl1 AND AT THAT TIME COULD
CALL FOR pl1'S REPLACEMENT, WITH LITTLE ADVANCE NOTICE, BY ONE
OF HIS OWN PROTEGES IN THE ESO.
2. Pl1 IS CONVINCED THAT HE COULD DEVELOP A REAL
"ACE-IN-THE-HOLE", AND PROLONG HIS ASSIGNMENT IN MALTA IF HE IS
ABLE TO DEVELOP AN FI REPORTING RECORD OF HIS OWN. REPORTS
WOULD BE FORWARDED IN SEALED ENVELOPS AND HANDCARRIED BY LAA
SKY MARSHALS FOR DELIVERY TO NEW ESO OPERATIONS CHIEF ABDULLAH
«SANUSSI)). Pl1 ALREADY HAS LONG STANDING PERSONAL RELATIONS
WITH SANUSSI AND BELIVES LATTER WOULD EXTEND HIM IN MALTA IF HE
WERE TO DEVELOP AN ACTIVE FI NETWORK THAT REPORTED TIDBITS
UNAVAILABLE THROUGH THE LPB'S ESO SECTION. IN REVISITING THIS
SCENARIO, pl1 WAS INSISTENT THAT WE HELP HIM BECOME MORE
VALUABLE TO THE ESO. HE HAS NO OTHER IDEAS AND DOUBTS HIS OWN
ABILITY TO INVENT TANTALYZING INTEL THAT HAS THE RIGHT RING OF
CREDIBILITY.
3. IN LIGHT OF HIS SUBSEQUENT rF~A~V~O~RA~B=L=E~ ______ ~IA~N~D~P~/~l~'~S
DEMONSTRATED ACCESS AND POTENTIAL, LI ________________________ ~I
Page 1

WOULD LIKE HQS TO RECONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL. ~
c=JWOULD ASSIST IN DRAFTING THE "FEED" INFOTION ANU PENDl G
I
HQS FAVORABLE REACTION, WE WILL SUBMIT FURTHER REFINEMENTS ON
THE PROPOSAL, INCLUDING MORE SPECIFIC TOPICS AROUND WHICH
REPORTS COULD 8E CRAFTED. I
J
4. AS HE WALKED TO THE DOOR FOLLOWING THE LENGTHY
DEBRIEFING AND! bSESSION, P/l REITERATED HIS ATTACHMENT
TO THE "FEED INEORMAII N" SCHEME AND PLED WITH I lAND
I f FOR A BIT OF ACTION AFTER ALL THE PLANNING". WELCOME
HQS EA LY RESPONSE IN ORDER THAT WE CAN BEGIN DRAFTING TWO OR
THREE REPORTS IN TIME FOR NEXT 1 I TOY TENTATIVELY
SCHEDULED FOR 16 JANUARY 1989.
END OF MESSAGE
SEc;tT
Page 2

. •
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C I It.
OPIRAn()$ amv.
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CPAS
SPOT COMMENTARY'
•
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OPS. CENTER
L OPS. CENTER
:.

•
ruN. 16f'HI e L NorDpN
CENTRAL INTElL(GENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE or INTELLIGENCE
ZZ Oecember 1988
0930 EST
SPOT COMMENTARY: PAN AM 103: Analysts of Cla1ms
We have received no forensic evidence to confIrm the cause of the crash
of Pan American AIrlines Fltght 103 yesterday; we do not rule out the
posslb'l,ty that a bomb was behind the crash.
Several groups have clatmed responsib'llty for the fneldent In telephone
calls In the UnIted States and Europe:
•
•
--A male caller cla'med that l group called the Guardfans of the IslamIc
RevolutIon had destroyed the pl~ne In retallat'on for the US shootdown of an
Iran'an a'rllner last July.
--A caller cla'ming to represent the Islam'c JIhad organizatIon told ABC
News In New York that the group had planted the bomb to commemorate Christmas.
--The Ulster Defense league allegedly Issued a telephonIc claim.
--Another anonymous caller claimed the plane had been downed by Massad,
the Israeli Intelligence servIce.
Me consIder the claIm from the GuardIans of the Islamic RevolutIon as the
.ast credible one rece1ved so far; previous attar.ks claimed by this group
suggest It Is pro-IranIan:
--Persons usIng thIs name have taken cred't for the h'jacking of an Air
Franc@ fl'ght from Frankfurt. West Germany In 1984~ 'n that Incident, an
anonymous caller demanded that France rel@ase f1v@ persons 1mpr1soned for
attempting to kill former Iran'an PrIme "'n'ster Bakht'ar 1n 1980. The group
had taken credIt for the assassination attempt as well.
-~The GuardIans of the IslaM'c Revolut'on cla'med r@sponsib'l'ty for an
assass'natton attempt aga1nst a former Cab1net M'n'ster of the Shah tn london
on 18 July 1987.
--In AprIl 1988, the Guardians of Islam took cred't for the bombing of a
veh1cle belongIng to a German bustnessfi, ..... eillployed with a f\rm Involved In.
transfer of M'ss'le technology. The anonymous caller accused the busInessman
of prov1dlng m'sslles to Iraq, thtn at war w1th Iran.
. An anonymous caller told a US dIplomatIc fac1llty tn Europe on 5 December
that a bomb'ng attempt would be _Ide agaInst a Pan American aircraft flying
from frankfurt, West Germany to the United States. The Federal Av'at'on
Admlntstratlon was notlfled of the threat and security for Pan Am fl'9 h ts out
of frankfurt was enhanced.
. .
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•
OONETOFNTTAI
MOcDRN
Ne cannot asstgn responslbtllty fnr thl~
c 1 aIm credit.
tragedy to any tlrrortst group
at this ttme. We ~nt'c'pate th~t. as often happ@n~, many groups wilt Stek to
Prepared by:
•
•

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PAGE 284
----------~------------------~----~~~~~~~~-~~-~------JL--______ --'L---
APPROVED FOR RE EASE
DATE: FEB 2008
M' : ... un ........ OF J . HY AN ~ T ORGANIZATION ·OFFICERS
THROUGH MALTA IN DECEMB~ 1988
1. 1:~' TEXT: ON 7 DECEImIlR LIBYAII EXTIlRIIAL SECURITY
ORGANIZATION (ESO) OFFICER ABDELBASET ALI «ELMEGRAHI}) ARRIVED IN
.MALTA ON A LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES (LAA) FLIGHT FROM TRIPOLi •. HE
TRAVELLED ON A LIBYAN PASSPORT UNDER THE ALIAS NAME ABO AL BASET
«ALI}). THE SAME DAY ESO OFFICERMAS'UD M. ABU «AQILAH}), AKA
«ABOUAGELA)}, ARRIVED. IN MALTA ON AN AIR MALTA FLIGHT FROM
TRIPOLI. HE TRAVELLED WITH A LIBYAN PASSPORT UNDER THE ALIAS NAME
ABU «AQILAH». .
2. ELMEGRAHI WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY THE FORMER LAA
STATION MANAGER IN MALTA AL-AMIN «FAHAYMA», AKA AL~AMIN KHALIFA
«FAHIM)}, WHO ASSISTED ELMEGRAHI THROUGH IMMIGRATION PROCESSING.
00
ELMEGRAHI ARRIVED WITH ONE BAG WHICH HE CARRIED ONBOARD THE
SE~ET
JJ;
1
j

t)
PAGE 285
AIRCRAFT WITH HIM. HE DEPARTED THE AIRPORT WITHOUT PROCESSING
THROUGH MALTESE CUSTOMS. BOTH ELMEGRAHI AND AQILAH STAYED
OVERNIGHT IN THE HOLIDAY INN AND DEPARTED MALTA TOGETHER ON 8 .
DECEMBER ABOARD A SWISS AIR FLIGHT ENROUTE TO ZURICH. BOTH ESO
OFFICERS RETURNED TO MALTA ON THE AFTERNOON OF 11 DECEMBER AND
DEPARTED FOR TRIPOLI THE SAME EVENING. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOTH
ELMEGRAHI AND AQILAH ARE ESO TECHNICAL COMMUNICATIONS EXPERTS. IT
IS LIKELY THAT ELMEGRAHI WAS CARRYING TECHNICAL
INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING EQUIPMENT WITH HIM AND THAT HE AND AQILAH
WERE INVOLVED IN SOME TYPE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATION
DURING THEIR TRIP.)
.. ~--:'

'(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
----------------------------- ------------
.-_---'I'-'...------=,DURING 20 DEC MEETING. C/O I
IASKED
I I (P/I) IF HE WAS ACQUAINTEu Wlln MOSIAfAALI
(\tIUnAI'II'IAU)) I I. PI! ST~TED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW
MUHAMMAD EITHER AS AN, EMPLOYEE OR AS A MEMBER OF THE.
LIBYAN EXTERNAL. SECUR TY ORGANIZATION (ESO). P/1 NOTED MUHAMMAD'S APPROVED FOR RELEASE
NAME AND AGREED TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON HIM. DATE: FEB 2008
OUR NEXT MEETING WITH PI! IS PLANNED FOR !6 JAN. WILL QUERY HIM
AGAIN ON MUHAMMDAD AT THAT T1ME AND ADVISE RESULTS.
END oJ .. ,""x.,
-1
\.,..
, ~ .. " " I ,'....
',.,
Nt If!1!iiiUa1 •

t;
"
~
s78
.'
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(8)
APPROVED FOR RELE
DATE: FEB 2008
r91711ZJANlJ!:I I I
L--__ -----lr/GHUGHTS OFI
IMEETINGS
1. REGRET DELA YIN REPORTING DETAILS OF 16 & 17 JANUARY
MEETINGS WI1HI liN MALTA FOLLQWING ARE HIGHUGHTS
WI1H DETAIL AND INTEL TO FOLLOW SEPARTATELY. PI1 ARRIVED AT
RRST MEETING A HALF HOUR LATE AND SEEMING FAIRLY GLUM AND
NON-RESPONSIVE mls A1TITUDE IMPROVED MARKEDLY WHEN IT BECAME
OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE BEGINING TO RESPOND WITH ASSISTANCE Wlm
FEED INFO AND AFTER DETAILED DISCUSSION OF MONmLY SALARY
ESCROW AND OPS EXPENSE REMUNERATION. .
2. Pit STARTED OFF ON 16 JAN WIm mE ALARMING NEWS THAT
HIS DAYS WITH I
VMALTA MIGHT BE ENDING SOONER THAN
ANTICIPA TED. mE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD CALLED ~
pAYROLL
OFRCER INTRIPOU, FNU ((SA'DAWI}}.TO COMPLAIN THAT HE HAD NOT
RECEIVED HIS NOVEMBER OR DECEMBER MONmLY SALARIES ($1.280
EACH). SA'DAWIINDICATED mAT WAS BECAUSE PI1 WAS BEING
TRANSFERED AND HAD ACTUALL Y BEEN ON TRANSFER UST IN 1987,
mOUGH mls WAS mREE TIMES POSTPONED. Pit IMMEDIATELY
CONTACTED j
jCHAIRMAN MUFTAH ((D/LAW}) AND AU
((DURBAN}) AI ESO, WlIA LATTER PROMISING TO STRAIGHTEN mE
MATTER OUT. IN FOLLOW UP PHONE CALL 17 JAN TO ESO OFFICER AU
((JAZlRI)). HEAD OF AIRCRAFT SECURITY. mE ENTIRE ISSUE WAS PUT
. \.
. f·--
-; ...

.'
TO REST AND PI1 WAS ASSURED THAT HIS TENURE WITH
I
[MALTA IS ASSURED FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE. THIS WAS
EXCELLENT NEWS.
3. PI1 REPORTED THAT I ~RRIVED MALTA 0730 HRS 17
JAN ACCOMPANIED BY MUHAMMAD ABD AL-«(MALlK)), SECRETARY OF THE
AL-MIRQAB MUNICIPALITY AND AT SOME TIME PREVIOUSLY HEAD OF LPBS
IN SWITZERLAND AND TURKEY. A FULL COLONEL IN THE ESO,
IfiOLDS CONCURRENT JOBS AS DIRECTOR OF THE ESO'S
RADBA AL-KHADRA TRAINING FACILITY, PRINCIPAL OFRCER OF
ABD-AL-SALAM ((ZADMA'S)) SPECIAL OPERATIONS SECTION AS WELL AS
AN UNKNOWN BUREAUCRATIC POSITION AT THE ESO TRIPOLI HQS
BUILDING. I
IWAS GREETED AT THE AIRPORT BY HIS -EYES
AND EARS- ON MALTA, ESO COOPTEE MUSTAFA ((HASUNI)), HEAD OF
ROTOS ZlRIYA (WATER PUMPS CO.) I
~;r;ILL BE RETURNING
TO TRIPOLI ON FRIDAY AND HAD pLANNED 10M WITH PI1 AND
KHALiFA ((SANUSSI)) FOR ESO DISCUSSIONS ON THURSDAY. CASE
OFFICERS FURNISHED SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS AND ELICITATION
TALKING POINTS FOR PI1 USE AND A FOLLOW UP MEETING WAS
SCHEDULED FOR PI1 WITH CIO I IEVENING OF 19 JANUARY.
iR
4. PI1 REPORTED A VERSIONOFTHEAL-~TlSLAYINGIN
ISTANBUL VERY SIMILAR TO THAT OF
~REPORTING
SEPARA TEL Y}. PI1 SAYS MOTIVE OF t= SLAyING I NOT CLEAR AND
AN ESO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY HAS BEEN SENT TO TURKEY HEADED BY
COL MUHAMMAD AL-«(KIYALI)), FORMERLY IN CHARGE OF ESO COUNTER
ESPIONAGE. HE LATER WAS JOINT HEAD OF THE ESO CENTRAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION AND THE COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION ALONG WITH
MUHAMMAD ((KILBASH)).
5. PI1 HAS HEARD FAINT RUMOR THAT IBRAHIM ((BISHARI)) MAY
BE REPLACED AS ESO DIRECTOR BY ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF
ABD-AL-RAHMAN ((SAYD)). NOTE: \
I I HAS IDENTICAL INFO. ph'S SOURCING WAS ELLIPIICAL; A
FRIEND IN THE MILITARY HAVING ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD LIKE ANY
FAVORS OUT OF HIS SOON-TQ-BE NEW BOSS, AL-SAYD. THIS IS ONE OF
mE ITEMS PI1 WILL FOLLOW UP WITHI I
6. NEWS OF OADHAFI'S SPEECH ON DISSOLVING ESO WAS FRESH AT
mls MEETING, WITH PI1 RELATING THAT MOST ESO PERSONNEL DO NOT
TAKE IT VERY SERIOUSLY. PI1 HAS ALSO PROVIDED DETAILS ON HIS
~ JMECHANISM FOR SKIRTING IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES AT LUQA
JRPORI V'l ICH WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPARATE INTEL LOOK
FORWARDS TO RESULTS OFI
I UPCOMING MEETING.
I
END OF DOCUMENT

(b) (1)
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APPROVED FOR RE
DATE: FEB 2008
1
F01517ZJAN89
I
I
I I '0 b)
J

'---_------'I SLA YING OF ESO OFFICER MUHAMMAD AL-'A TI
1. I I REPORTED ON HIS KNOWLEOOE OF THE ISTANBUL
SLA YING OF SENIOR ESO OFFICER MUHAMMAD AL-('ATI)) DURING 16
JANUARY SAFEHOUSE MEETING. PI1 HAD LEARNED OF THE INCIDENT 2-3
DAYS AFTER IT HAD HAPPENED FROM VISITING ZAWAM «AHMAD)),
PRESENTL Y A MEMBER OF THE KATiBAT AL AMN (SECURITY BA TTAUON)
AND FORMERLY A MEMBER OF ABD-AL-5ALAM «ZADMA'S)) ESO
COUNTER-TERRORIST SECTION. AT THE TIME OF ZAWAM'S INFORMA TlON,
. CIRCA 27 DECEMBER, THE ESO HAD NOT ADMITTED TO KNOWING THE
MOTIVE BEHIND 'A TI'S KILUNG. PI1 WAS AWARE THAT A COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY HAD BEEN SENT TO ISTANBUL HEADED BY ESO COL MUHAMMAD
AL-(KAYAU)), FORMERLY HEAD OF ESO'S COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION
AND RECENTL Y JOINT HEAD OF CENTRAL SECURITY ADMINISmA TION
(GSA) WITH MUHAMMAD «KILBASH)). ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE AL-'A TI KILLING SEEMED TO POINT TO A
CRIMINAL CAUSE, A LARGE SUM OF MONEY HAD BEEN FOUND ON THE
CORPSE. (NOTE: THIS IS AT VARIANCE WITH ~ I .
INFORMATION THAT A LARGE SUM WAS MISS/(; FROM HIS BODY.) PI1
AND HIS SOURCE ZAWAM DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT 'ATI
WAS KILLED BY A REGIME OPPONENT WHOM HE HAD BEEN SENT ON A
MISSION TO EXECUTE, OR THAT 'ATI WAS DEUBERA TELY KILLED BY THE
QADHAFI REGIME FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. PI1 WAS AWARE OF THE NOTE
BEARING A UBYAN PROVERB FOUND ON 'ATI'S BODY BUT WAS UNAWARE
THAT IT HAD BEEN WRITTEN IN TURKISH. HE UNDERSTANDS THERE ARE
APPROXIMATELY 1.5 MIWON UBYAN EXILES LIVING IN TURKEY, MANY
OF THEM HAVING SETTLED THERE DURING THE PERIOD OF ITAUAN
OCCUPATION. ZAWAM REPORTED THE SUM FOUND ON 'ATI'S BODY AS
$2()-3(),OOO IN HUNDRED DOLLAR DENOMINATIONS. CURIOUSLY, HE HAD
BOASTED TO TURKS WHILE DRINKING AT AN ISTANBUL BAR PRIOR TO HIS
SLA YING THA T HE WAS QADHAFI'S PERSONAL PILOT. HE WAS WEARING
AN I.AA UNIFORM WHEN MAKING THIS CLAIM. PI1 ADMITS THERE ARE .
MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT 'A TI'S DEATH AND HE WILL BE
ALERT TO OPPORTUNmES TO EUCIT FURTHER INFORMATION FROM ESO
VISITORS TO MALTA
2. PI1 HAD ADDmONAL PERSONAL AND CAREER BACKGROUND ON
'ATI. HE REMINDED C/O'S I IWD J .f:jAT 'ATI HAD BEEN
ONE OF HIS FRIENDS AND PROTECTOR IN IHE cO HEIRARCHY AND HE
SEEMED GENUINELY SADDENED BY HIS DEATH. HE DESCRIBED 'ATI AS
COURAGEOUS AND ONE WHO KEPT HIS WORD. UNUKE MANY OTHERS IN
THE ESO, HE DID NOT BRAG ABOUT HIS DEEDS IN THE AREA OF
TERRORISM OR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS. IN HIS EARLY FORTIES,
'ATI IS SURVIVED BYA WIFE, TWO SONS AND A DAUGHTER. HE WAS A
NATIVE OF BANGHAZI AND HAD SERVED TOURS IN LONDON AND
KHARTOUM. AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH HE WAS HEAD OF THE VESSELS
AND SHIPS SECURITY SECTION OF THE ESO. HE WAS EXPOSED AND
PNGED FROM LONDON FOR INVOLVEMENT IN AN ANTI-DISSIDENT CAMPAIGN
IN 1985. HE ONLY LASTED A FEW MONTHS IN KHARTOUM, HIS NEXT
ASSIGNMENT, BEFORE EGYPTIAN INTElliGENCE RAN AN EXPOSE ON HIS

.'
.~ ...;'
-:-~ .J'
.. ~-
INTEWGENCEffERRORIST CAREER IN A LOCAL SUDANESE NEWSPAPER ..
THUS EXPOSED. HE WAS QUICKLY WITHDRAWN BY THE ESO. (NOTE:
ACCORDING TO Pll. IT IS A GENERAL PRACTICE TO WITHDRAW ESO
OFFICERS ONCE THEY ARE PUBLICLY EXPOSED.) THE ESO CONSIDERED
~ TI-BURNED- AND THEREFORE THE REST OF HIS CAREER WAS IN
TRIPOLI WITH ONLY TOY TRA VEL OVERSEAS. OFTEN IN ALIAS. Pll
NOTES THAT ~ TI'S HOMETOWN WAS ZLlTIN. THEREFORE HIS USE OF
ZLITINI AS A LAST NAME AND THE OMISSION OF ~ TI, IS TECHNICALL Y
ACCEPTABLE AND DOES NOT CONSTlWTE AN ALIAS NAME. Pll ADDS.
THIS IS A COMMON PRACTICE AMONG RANKING OFFICERS WISHING TO
CONCEAL THEIR MOVEMENTS THROUGH THE USE OF PPTS BEARING
VARIATIONS ON THEIR TRUE NAMES.
SECr/Ef

(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(8)
REP RTED TI N
• RMATION D WHICH·l I IS
ATTEMPTING TO CONFIRM THROUGH OTHER SOURCES. . L __-----l
2. OF nrrJ

.. \ .
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
CJ 201018Z JAN 89
'---_____----'i FYI .
1. AS PLANNED DURING 17 JAN MEETING, ClOI lMET
~iALiITT~~_J=F7i---=-=Ec:....::R.:....:.N-=-OO~N OF 19 JAN TO DISCUSS PURPOSE OF VISIT
TO MALTA B
NO TO PASS Pll 500 MALTESE POUNDS
(APPROXIMATJ
OPS EXPENSES HE WILL INCUR IN NEAR
FUTURE. I
I(tCCOMPANIED Pll TO MEETING AND SERVED AS
TRANSLATOR.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
2. PI1 REPORTED THAT Fll HAD DEPARTED MALTA ENROUTE TO
. mlPOU EARLY AFTERNOON OF 19 JAN WITHOUT MEETING WITH Pll. PI1
11IEREFORE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TO REPORT omER THAN FACT THAT Fll
STAYED AT 11IE HOUDAY INN DURING HIS VISIT AND THAT ESO COOPTEE IN
MALTA, MUSTAFA OMAR «HASUNI)), WAS WITH Fit mROUGHOUT MOST OF HIS
STA Y. PI1 DID NOT KNOW mE PURPOSE OF FII'S VISIT. UPON·H/S
DEPARTURE, HOWEVER, Fll TOLD PII mAT HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MALTA
IN NEAR FUTURE AND 11IAT 11IE TWO OF 11IEM WOULD GET TOGETHER AT mAT
TIME TO TALK.
3. Pll ALSO REPORTED THAT HE HAD HAD A ONE HOUR CONVERSATION
ON 19 JAN wlm MUHAMMAD ABO AL-«MAUK)), SECRETARY OF mE
AL-MIRQAB MUNICIPALITY AND PREVIOUSLY HEAD OF LPBS IN SWITZERLAND
AND TURKEY. DURING mE CONVERSATION MAUKTOLD Pll mAT UBYAN
LEADER «QADHAFI)) HAD HARSHLY CRmCiZED mE ESO IN GENERAL AND
'ABO AL SALAM «(ZADMA)) IN PARTICULAR DURING mE GENERAL PEOPLE'S
CONFERENCE. MALIK STATED mAT QADHAFI WANTED TO BLAME SOMEONE FOR
mE EXCESS AND ABUSES OF mE SECURITY ORGANIZATION AND mAT ZADMA
HAD RECEIVED PARTICULARLY CRrnCAL TREATMENT. AS A RESULT OF mts

SECr/=:r
CRITICISM, Pit BELIEVES THAT OADHAFI WILL RESHUFFLE THE SENIOR
POSITIONS IN THE ESO IN THE NEAR FUTURE (BELIEVE J iHAS MORE
TO REPORT ON THIS.) Pit WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE AY Of lArS OF
ZADMA'S CURRENT STA TUS.
4. MALIKTOW Pit THATOADHAFI WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED
IN MEETING LOW-LEVEL LIBYAN OFFICIALS SUCH AS Pit WHO COULD TELL
THE LIBYAN LEADER WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT.
ACCORDING TO MALIK, OADHAFI IS NOT SA TlSF/ED THAT HIS MINISTERS ARE
PROVIDING HIM WITH ACCURA TE INFORMATION AND GOOD ADVICE. THIS
INCLUDED THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARENA IN THIS REGARD MALIK OFFERED
TO INTRODUCE Pit TO QADHAFIIN THE FUTURE SO THAT Pit COUW BRIEF
HIM ON THE POunCAL CLIMATE IN MALTA
5. AS PREARRANGED, CIO PASSED Pit THE MONEY IN AN
ARAB-ENGLISH DICTIONARY-Tit DID NOT SUSPECT THAT THE BOOK
CONTAINED MONEY. Pit USED SAFEHOUSE BA THROOM TO TRANSFER THE MONEY
TO HIS POCKET JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTING.
6. CIO REMINDED BOTH Pit AND Tit THA~ I PLANNED· TO
RETURN TO MALTA FOR 13 FEB MEETING WI P11. TI1 AGREED TO REMIND
Pit OF THE MEETING. CIO TOW Tit THAT HE WOULD CONTACT HER PRIOR
TO THE MEETING TO CONFIRM.

.' I
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( S)
I~_~_~: ______ r
I
--------
:11
r
'OF lu.UTJ.rRi IN 'BANGHA"""ZI, LIBYA
. EARLY MOIUfI G 20 JAN I (P/1 ) REPORTED TO C/O
l
'i F' it
I I~~~ IIHAI lUUtrNG HAD ERUPTED SOMETIME
DORING EVENING HO~ 19 JAN IN BANGHAZI, LIBYA~ REPORT WAS .
SKETCHY WITH FEW DETAILS, BUT P/1 REPORTED THAT COLONEL Mij'AMMAR
«QADHAFI» 'S BANGHAZI CAMP .(NFl) HAD BEEN ATTACKED AND THAT PEOPLE
HAD BEEN KILLED. FIGHTING WAS REPORTED TO BE CONTINUING INTO
MORNING HOURS OF 20 JAN. NEWS OF THE RIOTING HAS NOT BEEN
OFFICIALLY REPORTED BY LIBYAN NEWS SERVICE. P/1 HAD NO FURTHER
DETAILS AND DID NOT IDENTIFY SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION.
" ... :.1.,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
. )

S E IR E T
I
I
(b) (1)
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(8)
. . ~ 23·1448Z JAN 89 I
-----------~----- -------- ------------- --- -------
I
---
IESO OFFICER AMIN FAHAYMA'S PENDING TRAVEL ON
INTELLIGENCE/TERRORIST MISSION .
1 .. I I REPORTED ON 16-11 JANUARY 1989 THAT ESO
OFFICER AL-AMIN «FAHAYMA» IS TO EMBARK ·ON A FOREIGN .
INTELLIGENCE MISSION SOON ON BEHALF OF ABDULLAH «SANUSSI).
. FAHAYMAvWHO "'IS"SETTING UP A PRIVATE CoMPANY IN MALTA FOLLOWING
APPROVED FOR RELIfft§ LAA TOUR THERE, WAS SUMMONED TO TRIPOLI DURING THE SECOND
DATE: FEB 2008 WEEK OF JANUARY TO PREPARE FOR AN UNSPECIFIED INTELLIGENCE
MISSION ABROAD, PROBABLY IN EUROPE. IT IS. NOT KNOWN WHETHER
THIS MISSION WILL HAVE ANY rERRORIST OBJECTIVE NOR IS FAHAYMA'S
'DESTINATION KNOWN NOR THE' NAME UNDER WHICH HE WILL BE
TRAVELLING. (NOTE: P/1 MENTIONED THIS INFORMATIOlf WHEN' ASKED
IF HE WAS AWARE OF ANY LIBYAN PLANS FOR RETALIATION IN THE
EVENT.OF A u.S. STRIKE ON RABTA. FAHAYMA HAD RELATED THESE FEW
DETAILS'TO P/1 WHILE WAITING FOR THE LAA FLIGHT THAT WAS TO
TAKE HIM TO TRIPOLI. HE DID NOT SEEM TO KNOW, HIMSELF, WHAT
SANUSSI HAD IN MIND FOR HIM BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT INVOLVE
CONDUCTING'RECONAISSANcE OF AN AIR FIELD. OR COMMERCIAL
AI_RPORT. Pl1EtAlWEt)151iAl'.tmis wOULfi4NCilifjE~ING~AOOAGE l'1'
I .... ~, . - •. D'AND .'LA OUT'.OF,·:r. UNWA~. .
/
\,
..

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APPROVED FOR RELEA2
DATE: FEB 2008
I
I UK: LJ ... OUL. JAN tS~ I
------------------------------------------------------1 I
SUBJ: LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE INFLUENCE WITH MALTESE
IMMIGRATION AND AIRPORT OFFICIALS
TEXT: 1. THE LIBYAN EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION (ESO) HAS
DEVELOPED SEVERAL RECRUITED ASSETS AND COOPTEES IN MALTESE
IMMIGRATION AND AMONG LUQA AIRPORT PERSONNEL TO MONITOR THE
ACTIVITIES AND PRESENCE OF LIBYANS ON THE ISLAND AND TO ASSIST
IN THE DISCREET ONWARD TRAVEL OF ESO CONTACTS TO LIBYA.
2. TWO MALTESE OFFICIALS ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IN
FACILITATING THE NON-TRACEABLE TRAVEL TO LIBYA OF ESO CONTACTS
TRANSITING MALTA ARE IMMIGRATION POLICE OFFICER, JOHNNY
«BRIFA», AND IMMIGRATION OFFICE CLERK, SERGEANT MARIO (LNU).
THE LATTER IS ESPECIALLY USEFUL TO THE ESO IN MONITORING THE
TRAVEL TO MALTA OF SUSPECTED LIBYAN OPPOSITIONISTS SINCE HE HAS
SUSTAINED ACCESS TO MALTESE IMMIGRATION RECORDS. BRIFA'S
10f2
9/29104 1: 11 PM

." .
DUTIES INCLUDE SHIFT WORK AT THE IMMIGRATION DEPARTURE DESK AT
LUOA AIRPORT, PROCESSING PASSPORTS, EMBARCATION AND BOARDING
CARDS OF PASSENGERS DEPARTING MALTA. IN EXCHANGE FOR FAVORS
AND GIFTS FROM ESO PERSONNEL, BRIFA OCCASSIONALL Y OVERLOOKS
PLACING DEPARTURE STAMPS IN PASSPORTS OF ESO CONTACTS BOUND FOR
TRIPOLI ON LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES (LAA). SEPARATE SHEETS ARE
STAMPED WITH THE MALTA EXIT CACHET. AT THE END OF HIS SHIFT,
BRIFA SUBSTITUES THE ESO CONTACT'S EMBARCATION CARD WITH ONE
BEARING A DIFFERENT NAME SO THAT THE DEPARTURE FOR LIBYA IS NOT
ENTERED INTO MALTESE IMMIGRATION RECORDS. A SUBSTITUTE CARD IS
ALSO NECESSARY SO THAT A PASSENGER COUNT BASED ON THESE CARDS
WILL MATCH THE NUMBER LISTED ON THE LAA FLIGHT'S MANIFEST.
CONTACTS OF THE ESO RECEIVING THIS SPECIAL TREATMENT HAVE
INCLUDED FORMER MEMBERS OF LIBYAN OPPOSITION GROUPS AS WELL AS
FOREIGN REVOLUTIONARIES SUCH AS MEMBERS OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN
ARMY WHO NEED TO CONCEAL THEIR TRAVEL TO LIBYA. NEITHER BRIFA
NOR SERGEANT MARIO RECEIVES A MONTHLY AGENT SALARY FROM THE ESOBUT BOTH RECEIVE REGULAR GIF
REMUNERATION FOR THEIR SERVICES.
3. THE DUTY OFFICER OF MALTESE CIVIL AVIATION
DEPARTMENT, ODOLON «MANJON», RECEIVES REGULAR MONETARY
COMPENSATION FROM SENIOR ESO COLONEL NASIR «ASHUR» IN RETURN
FOR POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE ON MALTESE AVIATION MATTERS AND
INTERNAL POLITICS. MANJON IS NORMALLY DEBRIEFED AND HANDLED BY
ESO CUTOUT ON MALTA, MUSTAFA «HASUNI», WHO OPERATES A COMPANY
DEALING IN AGRICULTURAL PUMPING EQUIPMENT, "ROTOS ZIRIYIA".
HASUNIIS ALSO UTILIZED BY ESO OFFICER ASHUR AS A CONDUIT TO
MALTESE LABOR UNION LEADERS AND INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE
MALTESE NATIONALIST PARTY.
ACO: (17 JANUARY 1989)
20f2
9/29/04 1: 11 PM

\.
SEcfT
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
I
l,---~---,IZ.H::>4ZZ FEB tl~ I I
SUBJECT:
~ ____ ---,I - CONTACT REPORT WITH ~I ______________________ ~
1. A. DATE(S) OF MEETING: 13 & 14 FEB 89
L-________________________________________________________________ ~
13 FEB:
3. OPS:
--GAVE Pl1 SAFARI SUITE, PENTP~ CAMERA, AND WALKMAN CASSETTE
PLAYER. Pl1 WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE THESE ITEMS.
--P/I ARRIVED WITH Til BUT COULD NOT STAY LONG. HE AGREED TO
CONTACT MALTA ESO CHIEF AL-LAFI LATE~ IN THE EVENING AND QUERY HIM
CA)
tJ
Page 1

L_ rFi~Ir'i\T1~n:rJlll1n.-"-~-rrzr-_____
ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO LIBYA.
T/l.
AGREED TO MEET EVENING 14 FEB WITHOUT
14 FEB:
--QUERIED P/1 ON HASSAN S. «BAKUSH».
:---QUERIED P/1 ON 'ABO AL-FATTAH «SHARIF», I
--PASSED THREE RUMINT ITEMS ON LOCAL ISSUES. P/1 EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN RECEIVING INFO ON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:
TRAVEL OF MALTESE GOVT OFFICIALS
ISRAELI/MALTESE RELATIONS
FOREIGN DELEGATION VISITS TO MALTA
--ASKED P/1 TO CALL FOR NON-SCHED MEETING IF I
lOR
OTHER ESO OFFICIALS TRANSIT MALTA ENROUTE TO EUROPE ON A MISSION.
PLANS: !
I
---.J1 QUERY ON SHARI:e-- AND SIAL OS Of
LIBYANS IN MAL1A.
4. SECURITY:
P/1 NOTED THAT OCCUPANT OF APARTMENT ADJACENT TO S/H HAD
PEERED THROUGH A CURTAIN AT HIM WHEN HE DEPARTED S/H PREVIOUS
MEETING AND WHEN HE ARRIVED S/H THIS MEETING. HE EXPRESSED
CONCERN. WILL CHECK WITHI ITO DETERMINE WHO
THIS MAY BE.
5. ADMIN:
P/1 ASKED FOR LM 500 (USD 1,500) EXPENSE PAYMENT. WANTS IT
AT 27 FEB MEETING, BUT CONCEALED FROM I
I

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J
/27 FEB MEETING WITH{
APPROVED FOR RELE
DATE: FEB 2008
l. I I l EXHIBITED RARE DEGREE OF PUNCTUALITY
EVENING Of' "2.1 FEB i-llil:U V.Lm", r OR SCHEDULED MEETING WITH C/O I I
1 IAT 2130 HOURS ON THE DOT. P/l WAS ACCOMPAijIED BYLI ________ ~
('1'/1) WHO TRANSLATED. HE ATTRIBUTED HIS TIMELINESS TO FACT THAT HE
HAD TO RETURN TO LUQA AIRPORT LATER IN THE EVENING FOR THE ARRIVAL
OF AN UNSCHEDULED LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES (LAA) FLIGHT. AS REPORTED
REF A, DUE TO AN AIRPORT STRIKE IN ROME, THE LAA FLIGHT WHICH
NORMALLY FLIES DIRECT TRIPOLI-ROME STOPPED IN MALTA EARLIER IN THE
DAY TO REFUEL. THE AIRCRAFT WAS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO MALTA LATER
IN THE EVENING TO AGAIN REFUEL BEFORE DEPARTING FOR TRIPOLI. THE
MEETING WAS; THEREFORE, VERY BRIEF. C/O WAS ALSO PLEASED TO NOTE
THAT P/l'S ENGLISH IS IMPROVING STEADILY--APPROXlMATELY HALF OF THE
THIRTY-MINUTE DISCUSSION WAS IN ENGLISH. IN GENERAL P/1 ONLY USED
T/l TO CLARIFY QUESTIONS POSED BY C/O.
2. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING INFOJ ~ P/1
REPORTED THATJ I(F/l) HAD TOL HIM EARLIER 1 THE DAY
THAT HE PLANN 0 10 REI URN 10 MALTA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. F/l
INDICATED THAT THE TWO WOULD GET TOGETHER AT THAT TIME FOR THE
DISCUSSION HE HAD PROMISED P/1 IN LATE JAN. P/l ALSO REPORTED THAT
ESO OFFICER 'ABDEL BASET ALI ((ELMEGRAHI)) PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO
MALTA FOR APPROXIMATELY FIVE DAYS IN MID-MAR. THE PURPOSE OF
ELMEGRAHI'S VISIT IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME BUT P/1 AGREED TO
INVESTIGATE.
'" .
3. ACCORDING TO P/l ESO MAJOR ABDALLAH ((MANSUR)) RECENTLY
Page 1

.'f -
REPLACED 'ABD AL SALAM «ZADMA)) AS THE HEAD OF THE ESO'S
COUNTERTERRORIST SECTION. P/1 INDICATED THAT ZADMA REMAINS OUT OF
SIGHT AND IS LIKELY STILL AT HIS HOME NEAR SURT. TIME DID NOT
PERMIT LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON THIS MATTER. WILL DISCUSS THIS IN
GREATER DETAIL WITH P/1 AT NEXT MEETING ON 20 MAR.
4. REGARDING ESO ACTIVITIES IN MALTA, P/1 NOTED THAT SAID
«SHABANI)), AN ESO OFFICER WHO WORKED UNDER COVER AT LIBYAN-OWNED
QUALITY SHOES, RETURNED PCS TO TRIPOLI IN FEB. P/l THINKS SHABANI
WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. P/1
ALSO SAID THAT FORMER LAA STATION CHIEF IN MALTA AND ESO COOPTEE
AL-LAMIN «FAHAYMA)) OPENED HIS OWN TRAVEL AGENCY IN MOSTA IN FEB.
5. P/1 TOLD C/O THAT AN EGYPTIAN DELEGATION HAD JUST ARRIVED
IN MALTA TO DISCUSS INITIATION OF AIR SERVICE BETWEEN EGYPT AND
MALTA BY THE EGYPTIAN AIRLINE COMPANY «ZAZ)). ACCORDING TO P/1
THE ESO HAD OBTAINED THE NAMES AND PASSPORT NUMBERS OF THE SEVEN
EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS WHO ARE STAYING AT THE DRAGONARA HOTEL.
6. FINALLY, P/1 TOLD C/O THAT HE HAD INTENDED TO BRING SOME
LAA DOCUMENTS (NFl) TO THE MEETING. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE ARRIVAL OF
THE UNSCHEDULED LAA FLIGHT EARLIER IN THE DAY, P/1 WAS UNABLE TO
FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THESE PLANS. P/1 AGREED TO PASS THE PAPERS TO
T/1 LATER IN THE WEEK WHO I~ TURN WILL FORWARD THEM TO C/O.
7. AS AGREED AT PREVIOUS MEETING, C/O PASSED P/1 500 MALTESE
POUNDS IN EXPENSE MONEY IN A CASSETTE TAPE CASE. T/1 DID NOT SEE
THE MONEY. C/O ALSO GAVE T/1 SEVERAL BOOKS WHICH HE HAD ORDERED
FOR HER. P/1 AGREED TO MEETING WITH I ~ND C/O I
AT 2130 HOURS ON 20 MAR. . . L-__ ~
Paqe 2

. ,
Directorate of
Intelligence
Libya: Reviewing Terrorist
Capabiiities b ~
A Research Paper
~- ----- ,-
Cb3 ,
April19H9
C"P'" 3 7 0
APprOVjeNfor Re~e
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DirectlHsII,' of
Intelligence
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,~,:. Libya: Reviewing Terrorist
.--=;-"eapabilities ~ , b ~
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A Research Paper
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,1{"Ii 1989
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Libya: ReVie'if.Terrorist
Capabilities 0 '!J
--
Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi continues to suppOrt terrorist activi- -~
ties against US and other Western interests and has become increasingly
successful in soliciting attacks by client groups:This paper discusses the
develoPfIlent of Libya's terrorist apparatus, trends, and events
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Libya: Revieillt:!crmdst
Capllbilities b !
S~mmary .:! ...,
I,l/urllla/iult availab~
a.1: ,if I F~bruar-,' /989
""US IIsl'd in Ihis rc-port.
-.
Terrorism has been a key element of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al­
Qadhafi's foreign policy since he came to poV/er in. 1969. Qrganizationally
he has built a terrorist supPort apparatus that connc·cts classic security and
intelligen~e oper

•
Contents --\
Scope Note
Summary
--'----
Background
--------- --------.--.
Qadhafi's State Apparatus
.--- --_._-----
Qadhafi's Use or Client:;
Radical Pa'lestinian G~QUPS . ~--.--...
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v
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--- Japanese Red Army
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Hizballah
Provisional I~ish Rep~blican A~Y
Otheors
Political Security and the Terrorism Al!cnda
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------ -------.-----
Looking Ahead
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Libya: Revie~ng Terrorist
Capabilities (..... . . ~
- ':B;f
Terrorism has been a key clement of Libyan leader
Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's foreign policy since he carne
to power in 1969. He has formed an internal organizatio'n
to direct, support, and encourage terrorist operations
by Libyan agents and clients.' gather intelligence.
and enlist the support of radicals worldwide.
Over the years the ties that Qadhafi has developed to
terrorist groups have extended his reach and increased
his fircpower_ He may have achieved sufficient con­
1985 Qadhafi apparently decided to back more destructive,
indiscriminate attacks by clients. Tripoli
provided passports to Abu Nidal organiz3tion(ANO)
terrorists who attacked the EI AI ticket counter at the
Vienna,uirport in December 1985. In the spring.Qf 63-
1986.@i Iii . ,it( .lljJTr!poli to the-at~!T
the La Belle dtsco In Berlm, (eadlng to the US_ ~
airstrikes on Tripoli and Bangha;z.i on 15 APfil.~ .133
trol over a few of his clients to allow him to make the The airstrikes stunned Qadhafi and resulted in a- .
choice of target and timing of an attack. His influence spasm of retaliatory violence followed by a period of
over others has probably resulted in several terrorist quiescenceA~he 10 days arter the strikes, Qadkafi ...
operations that have accorded with his goals. ~:ed was linked to a number of1eh~rist attacks:
Background
Qadhafi's co~mitmcnt to terrorism as an instrument
of policy spans most of his 19-year rule. In 1972
Qadhafi publicly oITcred to help any anti-Western
revolutionary organization-as well as the Provisional
Irish Rep~bl~can Army (PIRA) and the Black Power
movement In the United States-and to equip any
Arab willing to strike Israel. Later the same year he
delivered on some of his promiscs by giving sanctuary
to the Palestinian terrorists who massacred II Israeli
athletes during the M'unich Ol)'mpic Games. Qadhafi
dispatched his own agents to strike Israeli targets as
early as 1973, when five Libyans were arrested at the
international airport in Rome. where they planned to
shoot down an El Al jet with a shoulder-fired missile.
In 1977 Qadhafi plolted to kill the US Ambassador to
Egypt-his first known attempt on a US targct-evcn
after assuring the new President. Jimmy Carter. lhat
he wante~mprovc relations with Wa~hington.
Qadhafi-s~perativeS began to stalk Libyan dissidents
in the mid-I 970s-following a n unsuccessful attempt
to overthrow the4-ibyan.leade'F=-'::'and have focused
primarily on exiie~-sinee then, killing ~t least 20. (n
· Dr.O •• I.·,IE rr.n ....
)Libyan involvement
in the shooting of a US Embassy communicator
in Khartoum on 16 April.
• British Foreign Secretary 1·lowe publicIy linked
Libya to the murder of two Brilish lcachers and onc
US hostage~~~":1911 oIJ19~il:-
• Two Libyans were apprehended on 18 April as they
attempted to attack the US officers club in Ank'lra
with handgrenades obtained from the Libyan People's
Bureau (LPP) there:-Thc Libyans said they had
been inslrucled t

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Libya: Terrorism-.Related Events -4
1969
/973
1976
1977
1979
1980
1981
1984
Qadhcifi overthrows Killg ldri.r.
Qadhqfi reportedly orders rhe rommander
of atl Egyptian submarille stationed
in Libya to sink the QE1. President
Sadat countermands Ihe order.
Libyans attempt to kidnap aforlller
member of Qadhcifi s inlier circle IIIho
attempted to overthrow him ill 1975.
Libyan plot to kill US Ambassador (0
Egypt uncovered.
Qadhqfi publicly announces anlidissident
campaign.
US Embassy in Tripoli Q/tackl'd.
Last two US ~iplomats wilhdrawn
from Tripoli.
French and Tunisian Embassies in
Tripoli./acked and burned while security
lorces stand idly by.
us warplanes down two Libyolllighters
that attack them over the Gu(f of
Sidra.
Libya linked /0 plol to kidllap or kill
US Ambassador to Italy.
Qadhafi resumes antidissident campaign
wilh bombings in LOlldon alld
Manchester.
1985
/986
Libyan aircrt:if't bombs Omdllrman.Sudan.
in attempt to destroy radio station
operated by Libyan dissidents ..
Members of the LOlldon 'Libyan People's
Bureau {LPBj'kill a British policewoman
while they shoot at anti-Qadha­
Ii dissidents from the LPB windows.
Libyan ship mi~es the Red Sea.
Libyall diplomat attempts (0 mail letter
bombs to Tunisian journalists critical
of Qadhafi: TUllisia severs
relatioiir--' ---'
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Egyptialls foil a Libyall attempt to kill
a prominent dissidet;( and trick Qadha­
Ii itHO admitting the plot publicly.
Libya linked to A./vO allacks Oil Rome
and Vienna airport~.
,US Na¥!:,aI.lacks.Libyancwq,,!do boafs
and SAM sile afler Libyan gllnnerslire
all US planes in the Gu(f of Sidra.
Libya linked to an allack against La
Belle disco inJ!erliff"1hat kills two US
servicemen.
US warplanes allack largers in Tripoli
and Banghazi.
Lihya Ullked /0 series of ami-US. anti­
UK a/lacks.
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1987-
-. Libyan terrorism activity drops.
Terrorist activity gradually resumes.
Libya linked (0 allack on British base
in Cyprus.
Terrorist activity increases-includes
contingency planning and surveillance
a/' US. French. and British interests.
Libya linked to attack on French restaurant
in DJibouti.
French authorities seize freighter containing
J 50 tons a/'weaponsfrom Libya
destined for use.hy PIRA.
Libya linked to attack on US private
volunt£er organization in Chad.
:tlmoSl simultaneous Libyan-instigated drawdown of
LPB personnel worldwide. The drawdown was prob·
ably prompted in part by a fear that inept agents -
would be linked to other terrorist attacks •. exposing
Tripoli to additional retaliation.
Heightened security mea~ure; in 'P,Otential target
countries.
• Lack of substantial-as opposed to rhetoricalforeign
support for Libya in the face of US_milit4¥.:.. _
action.
.,...--'.:..-
1988 Two senior Libyan agents arrested in
Senegal carrying silenced pistol alld
explosives probably for attacks against
----french targets.
Libya linked to attacks on US facilities
in Italy. Spain. Peru. Costa Rica. and
Colombia-prt;JbabJy meant to commemorate
the second anniversary of
US airstrikes . ...,
• Uncertainty I"egwiing US action should Tripoli be
linked to another anti-US attack .
• Damage to Qadhafi's primary terrorist infrastructure'"""'flc
LPBs-caused,by the expulsion of
scores of Libyan diplomats from Europe and an
The pace of Libyan activity picked up through 1987.
Qadhafi blamed US and French support to the Government
of Chad for a ser.i~ of military disasters he
suffered there during1.he spring. Tripoli was linked to
two subsequent attacks in Africa that were probably
intended to punish Paris and \Vashington for their
roles in thwarting Libyan ambitions. In March a
French restaurant in Djibouti was attacked. and in
October a bomb exploded inside a building belonging
to a US priv'ate volunteer organization in,Mollndou,
Chad. Also in October French authorities seized a
freighter containing 150 tons of weapons that were 3.-=--_
gift from~2.adhafi to the Provisional Irish Repu~y.ca.!!... .
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Qadhafi's interest in striking French t~ts in Africa
continued into carly 1988. In February two scnior
Libyan agents were.arrested at the airport in Dakar,
Senegal, attempting to smuggle and a
silenced into the
symbolism of these targets would be particularly
pleasing to Qadhafi since the planes that attacked
in 1986 were from
We strongly suspect that Qadhafi, despite a public
posture of modera tion, sponsored--{)r at least encouraged-a
series of attacks by client groups against US
targets in 1988 on or near the second anniversary of
the airs trikes:
On 14 April, an activist member of the Japanese
Red Army (IRA) detonated a car bomb outside a
usa club in Naples that killed one US servicewoman
and four Italians and wounded at least 20
others.
• On 15 April, an unidentified group bombed a US
Air Force communications facility near Torrejon,
Spain.
• On 14 April, gunmen set off explosives in the USIS
facility Medell after e~acuating the
QadhafPs State Apparatus'
In carryillg out AiH-erTorisH!:tinpliigfifQ~dh;fih;~
relied both on his own internal terrorist suppert
ratus and on his relations with
• On 16 April, in Lima, Peru, two binational centers
were bombed. The RevolutiOflary Moycment Tupac
- Amaru-a group with longstanding tics to
Qadhafi-claimed responsibility for the al\ack.
b\
b3
• On 19 April, a bomb exploded outside a USIS
binational center in San Jose, Costa Rica
five
two US citizens.
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Looking at the organizations as a'group underscorcs
the fact that Qadhafi has dcvelopcd a complex, yet
flexible, apparatus-based largely on his personal
relationship with his inner circle of advisers-to support
his terrorism activities, Throulth this apparatus
Qadhafi has directed, supported, and encouraged -
terrorist Operations by Libyan agents and c!ients;
gathered intelliltence; and promoted propaganda to
subvert hostile governments and enlist radicals in
furthering Libya's goals, The overlapping-functions of
the apparatus have almWed Qadhafitoremain at its
center by encouraging competition~ong his henchmen,
who are eager to curry favor with their leader,
and he thl!s controls his subordinates arbitrati
their OlspUI.es,
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Qadhllfi's Use of Clients \ '03
Through the various elements o[ his state apparatus,
has sought to organize a Libyan-led alliance
radical political, guerrilla, al~d tc:uorist groups to""
[ront the United States and cnhan.~c his image as
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leader of the oppressed. A~ugh this goal excecds
Libyan capabilities,
Iy has developcd
to a 'few select a "-
interest wit.. .
a s
targeting lJS personnel and
facilities and who ~ave proved their ability to carry
out tcrrorist attacks . .5ucn ties allow Tripoli fa augment
its striking power while minimizing the Libyan
operational role-and Washington's ability to prove
Libyan complicity. Qadhafi proOably believes that
using non-Libyan terrorist groups also enhances his
image. He often publicly portrays attacks by groups
anywhere in the world as spontaneous events in an
ongoing war against -colonialism and Zionism and
paints himself as a leading player in this war whose
revolutionary ideals are shared by the "oppressed"
worldwide. It d 6 J IIr b3
Radical Palestinian Groups
Radical Palestinian groups have served as Qadhafi's
primary clients for tcrrorist a Hacks. Support for anti­
Arafat Palestinian groups has been a f'lirly consistent
Libyan policy since the mid-I 970s ..-
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Although Qadhafi probably has not been able to
achieve the degree of control over his clients that he
has sought, they have given him the ability to project
power that he would not otherwise have. The Libyan
leader's influence with these groups-based primarily
on his ability to provide them support-is not always
sufficient to solicit attacks. Qadhafi's ability to do so
is circumscribed to some extent by a desire on the part
€If 30ildclients to protect their indepenclence, by
differences in political agendas, and by different views
on how to achieve shared goals, as well as by the
Libyan leader's mercurial
t and reputation
as an unreliable pa
Rec::nt ANO operations appear to rellect accordance
with Qadhafi;s terrorism agenda. Amonl! the ANO's
recent targets have been a British club and a hotel
used primarily by Westerners in Khartoum and a
the coast of Greece.
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takes sueh forms as
cases,
funding, weapons,
safehaven, false documentation, or ideological
promotion-again, with varying degrees of regularity.
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suspect he encouraged or at least
dramatic reminders of Western vulnerability and the
power of terrorists who share hfs goals..... b 3
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Other Palestinian Groups. Qadhafi_continuesTo-fund b f J ~
several radical PalestiJlian groups r d U . _. OJ
~nd ...... almost certainly . pressures t h em to at,ac '-k /
Wes"tern interests.' Qadhafi has consistently'ftppotted
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anti-PLO radical groups sin--J the ~id-1970s, when
he
Yasir Amfat had beeome too moder-
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Japanese Red Army •
During the past two years, Tripoli may' have sponsored
or encouraged several lit tacks against US interests
activist m!:mbe,rs
HizbalJah
,.Qadhafi has periodically worked with elements of.the
radical Lebanese Shia terrorist group Hizball:.h in
l.:ebanon on an ad hoc basis; SU'oni! lies have not
de'vclom:d oecause of political and rei ious differtwo
days ·~fter th~ US ati':iitrikes
however. is not a 'natural ally of Tripoli. Like most
Lebanese Shill': 'its ~embers blame QadhailTor the
disappcaw!~ in 1978.oLth;-I.ffiam M:usa Sadr, the
spiritual leader of the.l.lbanese Shla eommlltlity..;.,and
dislike Qadhafi's political views. Either reason would
~~ ,:ufficient"to 'stop further development of relationl!.
:rhe~lements·of 4he .. group·thatlipparentlY·l:6operate
with-t-he ·Libyans 'are t:)robably only mercenaries.
,llSlI
Pronsionallrisii Republican Army
Although Qadhafi almo~t certainly has little operaf---tfl:mt+i1nf11i~rc'~'~)Vet'
PIRk;-h'c-has supplied it some of
the most sophisticated weapons in his arsenal. Tripoli
has provided weapons to PIRA since at least 1973.
when Irish authorities intercepted a ship containing 5
n a rrns off the coast
b3
to press accounts,
the Libyan gave a hero's welcome to
the lone JRA survivor of the Lod Airport
upon his release from an Israeli
,,, •• n"rlII"'~ seized a
bound for Ireland carrying 150 tons of arms and
explosives:including' heavy machineguns. f1amethrowcrs,
and shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles. PIRA's
enhanced weapons capabilities have compelled British
forces to augment their defensive posture and adopt
new security measures. Qadhafi's support t(}-P~~
most likely gro\vs out of his belief"thaLlbe United~
Kingdom isa colonial~t power t
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Others
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Qadhafi has suppor'tl!d' a number of other terrorist or
-, sub .. ersive groups around the world that have anti-
Western biases.~_.II.III •••• III.IIIIi.iiI
recovered from the airstrikes a!; well as from his
disastrous military defeat by Chad in 1987. In particular,
the following developments have been instrum~ntal
in restoring Qadhafi's political streneth:
• Antiregime sentimenl in thc armed forces has recedcd,
The cease-fire with Chad in Seotember 1987
relieved one of the most salient grievances the
officers corps held against Qadhafi; and in early
1988 Qadhafi instituted economic and poli,tica,e,'i
for s that have increased his general support _
riots tnv~lving fundamentalist clem . ts in ~o
not yet appear to have under~ined Q3dha1tl$ a~
thority. Although Qadhafi's domestic standing .
could be quickly threatened-by renewed, fi.ghting
in Chad in which Libyan troops fared badly"'far
exampl~his control oTlJie regime is probably the
most secure it has beeri'1.ince the US airstriRes~
• Foreign pressure on Qadhafi has eased. In the past
18 months Qadha'fi has moved to restore diplomatic
relations with Iraq and Tunisia and participated in
both the Arab Leag'ue extraordinary summit in
Algiers in June 1988 and two subsequent Maghreb
five-party summits, He has eased his predicament in
Chad h¥~gniziqg Pr..eside-1!.t Habreand escaped
We believe that. as with Qadhafi's other client
condemnation at the Organization of African Unity
groups. pressure on -them to~nduct terrorist opera- summit in May 1988 despite being linked to an
tions against targe~ of his chqosing in exchange for _ a'29rted terrorist operation in Senegal. He has also
rCl;pc,"l/~,:":,,"lioSted visits by the heads of stale of nine African
countries .••••
West European senltment is also softening;
hosted an official visit by Qaahafi's orin.:ir:)al
'Abd ai-Salam lallud, in N()velmber;,
.Qadhafi's hard-won current strength could be quickly
undermined, however, if he is clearly linked to a new
terrorist act and comes under renewed
Despite recent incidents of internal unrest, Qadhafi
ha~rown politically! more secure during the past
yca~and that will enable him to devote more time to
implementing his terrorism agenda. He has clearly
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Indicators Q{Cltange
Given the consistency af Qadhali:r opposition to US
ond Western Interests-and his longstanding policy
Q{ giving aid to foreign radicals-he i.f ~TllliJ~~
reduce his
terrorism.
Recent
as recognition af
Chadian President Habre'stovernment. also pOint to
o Libyan willingnus to compromise under pressure.
Although we ortskeptical. Qadhali may reduce
libyan terrorism in tM hop~ af establishing better
b'3> relations with 0 new US odministration. ~
In an approach 10 0 new odministration, Qadhali
would insist on 0 cessation ar US political. economic.
ond'military pressure on libya. Tripoli. of course.
will try to minimize its concessions and Ifla)" simply
Q/Ter to stop direct targeting of US personnel and
facilities. Tripoli would probably argue-falselythat
past operationS were ilot.authoriud by Qadhali
and thai political reforms implemented Ihis year will
prevent future abuses. A/though Qadhali might. for a
time. honor an agreement to cease directly tal-get/llg
US personne~ld probably continue to
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• The arrA
_"11 '>./ficials. This might we71 be generated . !...;_.-
by domestic politics unrelated 10 gestures 10 Wash-
ington. but It woulhuggestthalt!rose'fdeologues
most closely associated with Libytf1t terrorism were
out of favor.
.. r discharge af senio'" 11 t 1.6rfi :a
• Ending direct encouragement by Ubyan aIlicials af
terrorist attacks on Us. targets.
• Dropping Libyan contacts with US radicals.
,. Cessation of (/forts to recruit radicals worldwide
for training in Libya. ~~ ,.,.~ , .• ...c --
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responsibility octiolls .
...... _'''m political strength and urrorist
octivilies. his past practice af disNonoPing diplomatic
agreements. and hi,f recent public statement,f all
suggest that he is unUkely to alter his allli-US
orientation. _
Should Qadhali make ')vertures to the United States
to improve relations. indicators that Qadhqfi Is serious
would include:
~-
would not expect Qadhali
10 drop Libyo/l 10 radical Palestinians,
whose cause has broad support in Libya.
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• Return ofprominent Libyan exile 'Abd al-Munim
al-Huni to a position ill the Libyan regime. Huni
has consistently made cessation of Libyall terrorism
and disbandment of the Revolutionary Committees
a prerequisite for his return to Tripoli .
. stage thl dr,an.rat,;c
punishment of Q diplomat or intelligence
agent caught In a terroristoperalion without changing
ihe orders th(lI instigaud the operation. Qadhafi
has o/ten "punished" senior ·Libyan offidals by placing
them under hOlls~' with iro concomitant
Ilreir
Indicators that Qadhafi plans to be eVefllllore aggressive
nright include:
The reassignment of agenl .• or officials caughl ill
Ub>'an terrorist operations 10 itr/fuemial positiolls
overseas or ill Tripoli. .
An increase of ineintives or rewards offered to
c1ltl/(ff"]{roup·s. perhaps coupled with lIIeqfures de­
.

~:.";';
•
Concerning Central America, Tripoli-llf>bably believes
there is an excellent opportunity to undermine
US influence at liuJe cost and to force Washington to
focus its resources closer to home. Because Africa
offers Tripoli a number of operational advan(agesincluding
numerous soft targets, porous borders, an
existing infrastructure, and a wealth of potential
surrogates-it has been the site of increased Libyan
terrorist interest over the last 18 months-activity
characterized by weapons smuggling, contacts with
subversives, and establishment of front companies .
.-w;
Qadhafi almost certainly will continue to use client
groups to attack US targets and in the ncar term will
probably continue to provide support such as money,
. training, documentation, and cO',nv'entio,nal
a wide range of terrorist
Qadhafi almost certainly will approach the ne\',' US
administration in an effort to improve relations. He
may privately offer to stop 'Libyan Support for terrorism
against US tareets in return for a cessation of US
political, economic, and military pressure. Nevertheless,
Qadh~ent strength and activities, his past
practice of dishonoring agreements, and his recent
public statements all suggest that he is unlikely to
alter his general anti-US policy or permanently cease
supporting terrorism . .,.
-'
-,*
~~
~
~'.:~
-'
-.

...... :.~ ,...... -., - :.... '". '. '~:,.. ~ .'.: ::0·."....... : :.~~~ ... : •.':.":' '•.. '. ':,.' ::': ....... ',' .' .':.,.
,
AI)pendix .......
Libyan Terrorist Activity by Region
The Middle East and North Africa
Although many of Qadhafi's clients are bases in the
'"Middle East, US targets arc probably at less risk
there from Liq,yan or Libyan-supported terrorists than
in other parts of the world. Qadhafi's Middle East
clients-primarily radical Palestinians-are more
likely to strike in areas where it is easier to find soft
targets, and the chances of involving supportive Arab
governments are lower: A notable exception is in
, Lebanon~ where a,ifew elements ofiHizballah, seeking
monetary gwar

•
• . ,'..' 'I .. '- ._.-
. ~ .' . . . .' ,~': '. . ... '.
J • - W" ~. _ '" ~, .. ': ~ ~
,. "'r <
he avail-
tablished In rastructure co:tt1nuc to
make the region an attractive venue for attacks. ~.
wealth of soft tar cts. easy access to the Western
media. and
ability of a
second
of the ••••••
before these
0'
18
, ..
We strongly suspect that Qadhafi sponsor~d 'two
bombings that occurred in - the
first involving
in Europe in nearly a year-indicate Qadhafi
has improved his ability to conduct deniable operations
there through client groups. _
~
J~
publicly predicted that
"/;h:!J
'0\ 0
b'?
progressives the world over would strike US fadlities-and
denied Libyan responsibility . .," b""2..
! ' .~
, 3' 9 6. 4
. .'

•
two passersby. The Revolutionary Movement Tupac
Amaru \MRTA) claimed responsibility. In early 1986,
th,c MRTA claimed that it carried out several attacks
on.uS
rd
L~bya.
'0\
b3
b\
b?
Centrlll America. Qadhafi has long supported many
groups in Central &nd South America with both the
capability and the will to strike US targets, and we
strongly suspect Libyan pressure was behind attacks
a~"tJS targets in Colombia, Peru, and Costa Rica
on or near the anniversi\ry of the airstrikes against
Tripoli. On 14 April 1988, gunmen set" off explosives
in the US.j)ination~ter
after evacuating the build'
Cllrihhelln. Qadhafi continues efforts to recruit Caribbean
clients who are
US or
!
19
' ..
, 3', 9· 6' 5

,
, ¥ .. ~
Local groups supported by Qadhafi-cspecially those
with longstanding ties and.a history or attacking US
tacgets-are the greatest risk to -
in the'
tnf'rastructure for effective operations
in Central America. South America. or the
~ '? Caribbean." ,
.Qia and the Pacific
In the Pacific and Asia, as he has in other regions,
Qadhafi has sought clients whose activities exacerbate
local problems and expand his influence while under·
mining that of the West. His efforts to establish an
.Ie
infrastructure capable of supporting terrorism, however,
have been seriously hurt by his inability to open
new LPBs and by thwPsing of an established LPB in
Canberra by A~rali1"n officials in 1987. Despite
these setbachfQadhafi retain~ contacts with grolips
of striking west.~r~.Jr.terests,in~egion.
.~ ",
•
.-
I
.,
, ..
....
----_..... ::.----:::::==

'.,
~------------------------~I I~~~~~ __ ~~~~=-~ __ ~
(b) (1) 1 1120921 Z APR tl9 [ I
(b) (2) -----------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) (3) ,
(3)
r------------------,~~>~~n~~(rd~~,TT~O~T'R~IV~d ,
I I HQ~~ I'COMMENTS BY OOB'15 APR; ..."'.
I I AVAILABILITY OF SUR~::: ~EEK OF 17 APR FOR SHAM SURGERY. '"
. 1. EVENING OF 11 APR, _____ I~TRIGGERED
NON-SCHEDULED MEETING AT SAFE Ir"PAOL." Pll, bunPANIED BY
I IWHO TRANSLATED, TOLD CIO I ITHAT HE
APPROVED FOR REL~~UST RECEIVED A TELEX INSTRUCTING HIM TO RETURN pes TO TRIPOLI
DATE: FEB 2008 ON 1 MAY 89. '( HQSIl tsEE c::::::::J CABLE FOR TEXT OF TELEX MESSAGE RE
PIllS RECALL.) ACCORDING TO Pl1, HE WILL BE REPLACED AT THE
l 10FFICE IN MALTA BY ESOOFFICER KHALIFA «SANUSSI». ~
rOLD CIO tHAT HE DID NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC JOB LINED UP IN TRIPOLI
AND THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN RETURNING TO EITHER ESO liQS OR
WORKING FOR I lIN LIBYA. HE INDICATED INSTEAD THAT HE
WANTED TO RECEIVE SHAM SURGERY (SUBJECT PREVIOUS TRAFFIC) TO ENABLE
HIM TO RESIGN FROM THE ESO~
IWITHOUT RISK OF BEING DRAFTED
INTO THE LIBYAN ARMED FORCES. WHEN CIO NOTED THAT LIKELIHOOD OF
HIS BEING DRl\FTED WAS REMOTE, Pll COUNTERED BY STATING THAT LIBYANS
HIS AGE WERE CURRENTLY BEING DRAFTED AT A STEADY PACE. HE TOLD CIO
THAT HE WANTED TO AVOID ANY RISK OF CONSCRIPTION AND REMAIN IN
MALTA TO OPEN AN AUTO· RENTAL OR IMPORT-EXPORT BUSINESS. HE OFFERED
TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE,ESO WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO CONTINUE
PROVIDING I I WITH INFORMATION ON ESOACTIVITIES.
2. bORING IHE DISCUSSION Pll TOLD CIO THAT HE HAD FOUND A
LOCA~ PHYSICIAN',r---lWHO WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE HIM WITH NECESSARY
DOCUMENTATION RE~SICAL DISABILITY. THIS PHYSICIAN HAS ALREADY
GIVEN Pll DOCUMENTS ATTESTING TO FACT HE HAS BACK PROBLEMS. Pll
ALSO.NOTED THAT MALTA ESO CHIEF MUHAMMAD AL-«LAFI» (IISA),WHO
SYMPATHIZED WITH Pll WHEN HE LEARNED OF PIllS FORTHCOMING RECALL,
AGREED TO CERTIFY ANY FORMS Pll NEEDED TO DocuMENT HIS PHYSICIAL
DISABILITY. INTERESTINGLY, AL-LAFI TOLD Pl1 THAT HE ALSO HOPES TO
RESIGN FROM THE ESO SOON AND GO INTO BUSINESS IN MALTA. IN ANY @fl.
CASE, Pll TOLD CIO THAT ALL HE NEEDED WAS'I IASSISTANCE IN .- ~,'
SEC Rfi T " (':4 ,. .'
/ ,
~'
3/
,

.{ ..
'.,: '
.: ....... .
.... :. '.' ...
PROVIDING THE SURGEON TO PERFORM THE SHAM SURGERY •. HE EXPRESSED A
PREFERENCE TO RECEIVE THE SURGERY IN MALTA AS IT WOULD BE'
PROBLEMATIC FOR HIM TO TRAVEL TO ANOTHER COUNTRY PRIOR TO HIS 1 MAY
RECALL DATE. P/1 EXPLAINEP 1HAT IF A PHYSICIAN WERE ABLE TO
PERFORM SURGERY IN APR, HE ·WOULD LIKELY BE ABLE TO JUSTIFY A TriO OR
THREE WEEK EXTENSION IN MALTA BEYOND 1 MAY TO PERMIT HIM TO RECOVER
FROM THE SURGERY.
3. NEXT MEETING WITH P/1 IS SCHEDULED FOR 1800 HOURS 15 APR,
AT WHICH TIME HE WILL BE EXPECTING POSITIVE FEEDBACK RE HIS REQUEST
FOR StrAM SURGERY. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, STATION WELCOMES OPPORTUNITY
FOR I
ITO TRAVEL TO MALTA WEEK OF 17 APR TO ATTEMPT TO
CONVINCE P/1 TO RETURN TO TRIPOLI AS A PENETRATION OF ESO HQS.
WHILEP/1 REJECTED THIS IDEA WHEN CIO SUGGESTED HE CONSIDER IT AS A
POSSIBILITY, P/1 MAY FEEL LESS RETICENT WITH T/1 NOT PRESENT AND
WITH CLEAR EXPLANATION OF THE I iBENEFITS HE WOULD RECEIVE IF
HE AGREED TO. RETURN TO TRIPOLI AS A PENETRATION OF THE ESO.
4. WELCOMEHQS9 COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE. REQUEST INFO RE
AVAILABILITY OF I ~O~ POSSIBLE SHAM SURGERY WEEK OF 17 APR. I I
THANKS •.
.
.. .' ..
\ ;.' ~ .
.. .'~'
,', " .' " '.
! '"
", .
. I

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
_____________________________ r:::l_=~=:~~:_~~~_~: ________ _________ 1 ____________
SUBJECT:
PLANNED SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE
PRESENCE IN MALTA IN 1989
TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO A LIBYAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS IN THE
LIBYAN EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION (ESO), THE LIBYAN
INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN MALTA WILL INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY IN 1989.
THE INCREASE IS EXPECTED TO INCLUDE PERSONNEL WITHIN BOTH THE ESO

AND THE LIBYAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. IT IS A DELIBERATE
EFFORT TO ENLARGE THE LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN MALTA TO
IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF INFORMATION COLLECTED, AND TO
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING SOURCES.
2 . AS PART OF THIS PLAN THE ESO HAS ALREADY EXPANDED ITS
PRESENCE IN MALTA. ESO OFFICER ALI MUHAMMAD AL- ( (SAMI' I) WAS
ASSIGNED TO THE WORLD ISLAMIC CALL SOCIETY OFFICE IN MALTA IN EARLY
1989. A SECOND ESO OFFICER, KHALIFA «SANUSSI», WAS ASSIGNED AS
THE ASSISTANT STATION MANAGER AT THE LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES OFFICE IN
MALTA. MOREOVER, THE ESO RECENTLY RECRUITED A MALTESE NATIONAL
EMPLOYED AS A VENDOR AT LUQA AIRPORT TO ASSIST IN ACQUIRING
INFORMATION ON PERSONS OF INTEREST TO THE LIBYAN SERVICE. THIS
INDIVIDUAL PREPARES BIOGRAPHIC AND ASSESSMENT INFORMATION ON
PERSONNEL OF INTEREST TO THE ESO AND FORWARDS HIS REPORTS TO ESO
HEDQUARTERS IN TRIPOLI VIA A LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES COURIER.
3. MUSTAFA «SHUQAYFA», A LIBYAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER IN MALTA WHO WAS FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO THE LIBYAN ARAB
MALTESE FISHING COMPANY, RECENTLY FORMED A BUSINESS PARTNERSHIP IN
MALTA WITH TWO OTHER LIBYAN NATIONALS, FARID «FARHAT», THE
LAFITRADE REPRESENTATIVE IN MALTA, AND NURI «HUWAYSA». THE
PARTNERSHIP HAS ACCESS TO A FOREIGN CURRENCY ACCOUNT (NFl) WHICH
CONTAINS FIVE MILLION USD FOR USE IN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING
ACTIVITIES. (SOURCE COMMENT: HUWAYSA IS A VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF
KHUWAYLIDI AL- ( (HUMAYDI) ), THE CHIEF OF THE LIBYAN MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.)
4. SOMETIME IN 1989, SALAH ABU «'AYSHA», THE HEAD OF THE
AFRICA COMPANY, AN ESO-FUNDED LIBYAN FRONT ORGANIZATION, WILL OPEN
AN ARABIC TRANSLATION BUSINESS IN MALTA. THE COMPANY WILL BE
OPERATED BY FNU AL- «TURKI» WHO IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS AN
ADVISOR BY THE AFRICA COMPANY. IN AN EFFORT TO GENERATE PERSONAL
PROFITS AND TO PROVIDE COVER FOR ESO OFFICERS, THE ESO
REPRESENTATIVE IN MALTA PLANS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMATION OF
THIS AND SEVERAL OTHER BUSINESS VENTURES IN MALTA IN 1989.
MOREOVER, MUSBAH AL-«WARFALLI», THE·HEAD OF THE NEUTRON S.A.R.L.
COMPANY LTD IN TRIPOLI, PLANS TO FORM AN OILFIELD SERVICES COMPANY
IN MALTA IN 1989. THIS COMPANY WILL ATTEMPT TO GENERATE PROFITS
WHILE PROVIDING COVER FOR ESO OFFICERS. (SOURCE COMMENT:
WARFALLI, A SENIOR ESO OFFICER, WAS EXPELLED FROM ITALY SEVERAL
YEARS AGO FOR HIS ROLE IN TARGETTING EFFORTS AGAINST LIBYAN
CITIZENS IN ITALY WHO WERE OPPOSED TO THE REGIME OF LIBYAN LEADER
COLONEL MU'AMMAR AL- «QADHAFI». HE LATER LIVED IN MALTA. IT IS
NOT KNOWN WHETHER WARFALLI PLANS TO RESIDE IN MALTA AND OPERATE
THIS BUSINESS HIMSELF.)
ACQ: (MID-APRIL 1989).
SE~

{ .

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: 181016Z APR 89 I 1
--------------------------------------------------------~-=-=-======~,-------------
ACTION REQUIRED: HQS: ~SO REQUIRE~SNTS FOR I IBY COB 25
APR. I I AVAILABILITY OF I I FOR MEETING EVENING
OF 26 APR.
'--________
1. C/O I I MET 'I I (P/1) ANDI
(T /1 ) EVENINGS OF 15 AND 17 APR TO DISCUSS AVAILABLE Ohp..,..I"T"I ..... O.,..,N=S~R~E---'
SHAM SURGERY FOR P/1. DURING 15 APR MEETING C/O OUTLINED THE RISKS
TO P/1 ASSOCIATED WITH HAVING I T fERFORM THE OPERATION
IN MALTA. AFTER LONG DISCUSSION ON AVhILHbLG bPTIONS, P/1 AGREED
TO APPROACH I
I, WITH REQUEST FOR SHAM
SURGERY. DURING fOLLOW-UP MEEIING EJENING OF 17 APR, Pl1 TOLD C/O
THATd I AGREED TO PERFORM THE SURGERY. THE PROCEDURE WILL COST
2,00 MALIESE POUNDS (APPROXIMATELY USD 6,000) WHrCH C/O SAID
I rOULD PAY FOR. P/1 EXPECTS TO RECEIVE THE SURGERY LATER
IllIJ iiGGlt, SPEND APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK RECOVERING, AND DEPART
MALTA PCS FOR TRIPOLI CIRCA 1 MAY. HE PLANS TO RESIGN FROM THE
ESO~ ~ND RETURN TO MALTA AS SOON THEREAFTER AS POSSIBLE.
HE AGREED TO MEET I I AT 2100 HOURS 26 APR. IN
ADDITION TO PROVIDING PHYsIcAL DEscRIPTION OF ESO OFFICER ABDULLAH
«MANSUR», P/1 ALSO PROVIDED UPDATE OF RECENT ESO ACTIVITES AND
PERSONNEL CHANGES IN MALTA WHICH WIL~ BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.
2. ACCORDING TO P/1, I
I
I AG RE E D TO TG"'TIT.Vn:E---rPT'1/"I----"I""W

t
'.-
SELT
THAT HIS MEDICAL FILES IN TRIPOLI DCCUMENT THE INJURY. THE SECOND
SCAR WILL BE ON HIS LOWER BACK WHIC~ WILL OSTENSIBLY BE TO CORRECT
A SERIOUS BACK PROBLEM. I I ALSO .~GREED TO PROVIDE P/l WITH
DOCUMENTATION OF THE SURGICAL PROCE:URE AS WELL AS TO RECOMMEND
FORMALLY THAT HE NOT BE EMPLOYED IN .;NY WORK THAT REQUIRES
STRENUOUS PHYSICAL ACTIVITIY. P/l 3ELIEVES THAT THIS WILL ENABLE
HIM TO RESIGN FROM THE ESO AND AVOI~ SUBSEQUENT MILITARY
CONSCRIPTION.
3. GIVEN Pil'S PLANNED VISIT TO ESO HQS IN TRIPOLI IN EARLY
MAY, REQUEST HQS FORWARD ESO REQUIR~MENTS FOR P/l BY COB 25 APR. 1'----'
END OF MESSAGE
SE~
Page 2

.'
APPROVED FOR RELEA
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(8)
I
I 1:1 1
1/ APHB9
1. DURING MEE11NG EVENING OF 17 APRI : TOW
C/O T VINCENT «VASS au)) )vAS
RE~EN I Lr RECHUlI E~ FORMER UBYAN ARAB AbNESJ SIAfiON
MANAGER IN MALTA AND ESO COOPTEE, AL-AMIN «FAHAYMA)), TO OBTAIN
>
\,.

BIO AND ASSESSMENT INFORMA TlON ON INDIVIDUALS OF INTEREST TO THE
ESO. ACCORDING TO Pit, ON THREE SEPARATE OCCAISIONS SINCE EARLY
APR VASSALLO FORWARDED ENVELOPES ADDRESSED TO FAHAYMA IN TRIPOLI
VIA THE LAA COURIER. Pit OBLIGINGLY FORWARDED THE FIRST TWO
ENVELOPES, HOWEVER, HE OPENED THE THIRD ENVELOPE WHICH VASSALLO
SAID CONSISTED OF MEDICAL INFORMATION. Pit DISCOVERED AN
ASSESSMENT REPORT TYPED IN ARABIC, APPARENTLY PREPARED BY VASSALLO,
ON A SYRIAN NATIONAL, MUHAMMAD JAMAL «DANURA)), WHO WORKS IN
MALTA Pit NOTED THAT THE REPORT, WHICH HE LATER PROVIDED TO CIO,
IS THE TYPE USED BY THE ESO TO REPORT BIO AND ASSESSMENT
INFORMATION ON AGE1:IT CANDIDATES. PI1 DID NOT KNOW IF DANURA WAS
COOPERA TlNG WITH THE ESO.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
I
------------- -- -- J ~==~:~:_~x tj~
-1
~--- - - ---
ACTION REQUIRED: HQS: ADVISE ,1__________ IACCOUNT BALANCE
BY COB 3 MAY. .
L DURING 28 APRIL MEETING, 1 I(P/1) REQUESTED THE
BALANCE OF HIS I
IACCOUNT BE PROVIDED 'fO HIM IN U.S. DOLLARS
AT NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 5 MAY 89. HE PLANS TO DEPOSIT THE
MONEY IN HIS ACCOUNT AT A MALTESE BANK PRIOR TO HIS FORTHCOMING
RETURN TO LIBYA. J 1 GIVEN THAT Pl1 HAS RECEIVED USD
$1,000 PER MONTH SINCE SEP 88,ALANCE SHOULD BE IN EXCESS OF USD
$8,000 AS OF 1 APRIL. PLEASE CONFIRM BALANCE BY COB 3 MAY.
THANKS.
END OF MESSAGE
Page 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
__________:___________________ ______ ~~~~_~~=~~_~:_~= ~J ________ ~I-------------
SUBJECT:
TRANSLATION OF LIBYAN ESO REPORT ON SYRIAN NATIONAL
1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF LIBYAN EXTERNAL SECURITY
ORGANISATION (ESO) REPORT ON SYRIAN NATIONAL MU D JAMAL
({DANURA)) (SUBJECT REFS) WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY
TRANSLATION WAS PREPARED BY 26
APR.
ENVELOPE:
(FROM) MR. LAMIEN ({FHlMAH))
FLIGHT OPERATIONS CONTROL
SEMILATAT BUILDING, TRIPOLI AIRPORT
TEL 32251
(TO)
AMMAR ABU {(KHANJAR))
TEL 802070, TRIPOLI
VIA MED TOURS SERVICES LTD.
MOSTA, MALTA TEL 498931 - 445969
FIRST INSERT: DEGREE CERTIFICATE FROM THE COLLEGE OF
ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE DATED MAY 1968
MR. MUHAMMAD AHMAD JAMAL DANURA, BACCALAUREATE DEGREE,
UNIVERSITY OF CAIRO
SECOND INSERT: . ABU DHABI NATIONAL OIL CO.,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE MARCH 4, 1986.
(ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
Page 1

CIRRICULUM VITAE - ARABIC
(PROBABLY PREPARED BY DANURA OR ANOTHER NATIVE ARABIC SPEAKER)
NAME: MUHAMMAD DANURA
FATHER: AHMAD JAMAL
MOTHER: SU'AD
DOB: 1935
POB: LOTTEGIA, SYRIA
EDUCATION:
1) GRADUATED FROM RESERVE OFFICER'S COLLEGE .IN1960-IN
ALEPPO, SYRIA
2) GRADUATED WAR COLLEGE 1962, HUMS, SYRIA (REGULAR
OFFICER)
3) BACCALAUREATE, COLLEGE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CAIRO 1968
4) 2 YEAR DIPLOMA IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STUDIES,
INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE ARAB STUDIES OF THE ARAB
UNIVERSITY, CAIRO 1970
WORK EXPERIENCE:
1) SIGNALS OFFICER, SIGNALS SCHOOL, SYRIAN ARAB ARMY
2) GENERAL ADMINISTRATION, TRAINING CENTER OF ABU
DHABI OIL CO.
3) ENGLISH LANGUAGE, LONDON, UK
SKILLS:
1) TEACHER, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING, SYRIA
1954-1957
2) EMPLOYEE, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, SYRIA 1957-1961
3) REGULAR OFFICER, SYRIAN ARAB ARMY 1962-1963
4) OFFICE DIRECTOR "ADVISOR OF ARAB OIL", SHAYHD
ABDULLAH AL-((TURAYKEI)), FORMER SAUDI MINISTER OF
PETROLEUM, BEIRUT, CAIRO, KUWAIT 1970-1973
5) BUSINESSMAN, PARTNER IN GOLD STAR COMPANY, PARIS
1973-1974
6) DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS, ABU DHABI OIL CO,
1974-1980
7) DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS FOR ZAKUM OIL FIELD
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY 1980-1985 (ON LOAN FROM ABU
DHABI OIL CO.)
8) BUSINESSMAN (PRESIDENT AND OWNER, UNITED WORKS
COMPANY-PROPRIETOR OF AL-FINIKION (POHOENICIAN)
RESTAURANT, MALTA
1987-PRESENT
OPERATIONAL SKILLS:
1) ESTABLISHING AND ADMINISTERING THE PRESS,
SPECIALIZED PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, PRINTING
BOOKS, PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION POSTERS, ANNUAL
REPORTS, ETC.
2) FOREIGN CONTACTS, PUBLIC RELATIONS, INFORMATION
3) ARTISTIC AND EDUCATIONAL MOVIE RECORDINGS
4) OFFICE ORGANIZATION, FILES, DOCUMENTS
5) PRESS REPORTS, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND THE
OPPOSITION
6) FOLLOWING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR ANALYSIS
7) MEASURE PUBLIC OPINION AND FOLLOW IT CLEARLY
8) DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING COMMERCIAL TRADE MARKS
AND LABELS OF ALL TYPES.
LANGUAGES:
Paqe 2

1) ARABIC - EXCELLENT
2) ENGLISH - GOOD
3) FRENCH - GOOD
SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH:
1) ARAB PETROLEUM, BETWEEN INSURANCE AND PARTNERSHIP
(ARAB INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH AND STUDIES)
2) WHEAT AS A STRATEGIC LINK AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION (DIPLOMATIC STUDIES - ARAB INSTITUTE OF
RESEARCH AND STUDIES)
3) DIPLOMACY OF PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM OF DIPLOMACY -
PETROLEUM AND INDUSTRY MAGAZINE, ABU DHABI
4) PETROLEUM, WEALTH AND ISSUES (PUBLISHED IN SAME
MAGAZINE AND REPRINTED IN OPEC JOURNAL
5) STRATEGY OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI STRUGGLE IN THE AREA
OF PETROLEUM--POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY,
ARAB OIL MAGAZINE, KUWAIT 1972
6) COLLECTIVE FEAR DURING THE 1967 AND 1973 WARS
(PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY)
7) ZERO POINT (ANALYSIS OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THE
OCTOBER WAR 1973)
TRANSLATION AND LITERARY WORK:
1) "MEMORIES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR - CHE
GUEVERA" INCLUDED IN THE ARAB BOOKSTORE, CAIRO 1966
2) REVIEW OF ISLAMIC HISTORY ON A STRATEGIC BASIS
(PROJECT ON HOLD FOR FINANCIAL REASONS)
I!.NU vr
I
Page 3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
_________________________:____ ~~~~_~=:=:~~_~~_~~ _______ IL
I
____ --->-[------------
SUBJECT: I ~MEETINGS IN MALTA FOR c=JTRAINING AND
PLANNING FO HIS TRIPOLI RECALL
1. THREE MEETING HELD WITH I I (P/l) 26-28 APRIL
IN MALTA SAFESITE ACCOMPISHED OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES -- A)
TEMPERING HIS SHORT TERM PLANS OF RESIGNING FROM THE ESO AND B)
COMPLETING TWO SUCCESSFUL 1 iTRAINING SESSIONS -- TO PAVE
THE WAY FOR P/1'S ACTIVE PENETRA"ION OF THE ESO/REVCOM HQS
ENVIRONMENT.
2. EARLY IN THE FIRST MEETING I I EXPLAINED TO P/1
THAT I
IHAD HIGH HOPES FOR HIM, DESPITE THE ~UDDEN
TERMINATION OF HIS PRESENT 'I
I ASSIGNMENT, BUT THAT THIS
WOULD REQUIRE HIM TO MODIFY THE TIMETABLE OF HIS OFTEN
EXPRESSED DESIRE TO RESIGN FROM THE ESO AND PURSUE PRIVATE
BUSINESS VENTURE ON MALTA. EVEN BEFORE HEARING THE
PARTICULARS, P/l EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION THAT WE WERE TAKING
HIS FUTURE SERIOUSLY.
3. P/1 DISPLAYED THE VERY REALISTIC/DRAMATIC SCAR THAT HIS
I
I HAS APPLIED TO HIS RIGHT ELBOW AND DESCRIBED
IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW HE HAD HAD THE SURGEON REMOVE A
SMALL PORTION OF BONE TO ADD TO THE CREDIBILITY. AT THIS STAGE
HE IS NOT CERTAIN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO GO THE SECOND MILE ON
HIS SCAM BY SUBMITTING TO MOCK BACK SURGERY. AFTER SUTURES ARE
REMOVED THIS WEEK, THE DOCTOR WILL PLACE HIS ARM IN A SOLID
CAST WHERE IT WILL REMAIN FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE DOCTOR WILL
Page 1

SEchT
FULLY DOCUMENT THE PROCEDURE AND GIVE WRITTEN ADVICE CONCERNING
TIMETABLE ON REMOVAL OF THE CAST. AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS, P/l
UNDERSTANDS THE MUSCLES IN THIS ARM WILL HAVE SUFFICIENTLY
ATROPHIED THAT HE WILL HAVE A REAL VICE COSMETIC IMPAIRMENT.
4. UPON HEARING PARTICULARS OF P/l'S NEW PHYSICAL
CONDITION, I I URGED P/l TO RESERVE HIS "MEDICAL EXEMPTION"
AS A FINAL TROMP CARD WITH TRIPOLI,OFFICIALDOM. IT WAS
EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD BE OF PARAMOUNT VALUE TO US AS AN
ACTIVE PENETRATION OF THE ESO HQS. P/l INTERJECTED THAT THIS
WAS NOT NECESSARILY SO SINCE HE WOULD LIKELY RETURN TO THE
I ~ADMINISTRATION WHERE HE WOULD BE MAINLY INVOLVED IN
AIRCRAEIECURITY MATTERS AND FLIGHT SCHEDULES WITH SEVERLY
RESTRICTED ACCESS TO ESO ARCHIVES OR EITHER ESPIONAGE OR
TERRORIST MATTERS. WE TOOK THIS ON BOARD AND SUGGESTED THAT HE
USE HIS FIRST FEW WEEKS BACK TO TOUCH BASES WITH HIS FORMER
COLLEAGUES, SUPERIORS AND FRIENDS TO TRY TO SECURE AN
"OFFICIAL" JOB WITH GREATER ACCESS EITHER IN THE ESO OR THE
REVCOMS. P/l PERSISTED THAT HIS ULTIMATE AIM WAS TO SET UP
SOME COMMERCIAL VENTURE IN MALTA, WITH OUR FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE, WHERE HE INSISTS HE WOULD ENJOY EXCEPTIONAL ACCESS
TO ESO VISITORS AND RESIDENT LIBYANS ON ISLAND. AFTER SOME
BACK AND FORTH, P/l AGREED TO GO SLOW ON PRESSING FOR AN EARLY
OUT FROM THE ESO. HE WILL CHECK WITH HIS FRIENDS AND MENTORS
(HINSHIRI, BISHARI, ALI KlLANI TUHAMI KHALID, AHMAD QADHAF
AL-DAM AND TO LESSER EXTEND I : I TO SEE WHAT THEY
RECOMMEND. HE NOTED THAT HE W OLD HAvE TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY
NOT TO GIVE OFFENSE TO ABDULLAH SANUSSI, WHO SINCE ZADMA'S
DEPARTURE FROM THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT, IS P/l'S IMMEDIATE
BOSS. IN THE LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE BUREAUCRACY, SWITCHES IN
PATRONAGE ARE A HIGH RISK ACTIVITY.
4. HAVING SECURED P/l'S COMMITTMENT TO REMAIN IN TRIPOLI
FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS, WE POINTED UP THE NEED FOR SOME FORM OF
I ITO CAPITALIZE ON HIS NEW ACCESS. I
Page 2

7. ALL IN ALL THESE WERE PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS FROM THE
MORALE AND PLANNING VIEWPOINT. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT P/l
HAS ABANDONED HIS MID-TERM GOAL OF SETTING UP A MALTA BASED
BUSINESS AT OUR EXPENSE. P/l ACKNOWLEDGED HIMSELF THAT A
RESIGNATION FROM THE ESO IS PROBABLY MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT
SOUNDS AND WOULD SURELY STRETCH OUT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. HE HAS
GIVEN HIS WORD TO EXPLORE IN-PLACE POSITIONS WITH THE ESO OR
REVCOMS THAT WILL SATISFY OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR CLOSE ACCESS TO
INTEL AND TERRORIST PLANNING WHILE AFFORDING HIM SOME
OPPORTUNITY FOR PERIODIC TRAVEL OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE EXPECTS
TO BE ABLE TO PARLAY HIS MEDICAL TREATMENT INTO A TEN DAY TO
TWO WEEK EXTENSION ON HIS PCS DEPARTURE. A MEETING HAS BEEN
SCHEDULED FOR 5 MAY WITH c/ol
lAND WRAP
UP LOOSE ADMINISTRATIVE ENDS INCLUDING PAYMENT Of HIS ESCROW
BALANCE AND FUNDS FOR NEXT TRAVEL OUT OF LIBYA TO MALTA. Ir-----~
END OF MESSAGE
Page 3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE·
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
1 l1l5l4Z MAY Cl9 I r
I
SUBJECT:
10 MAY MEETING WITH
I
1. AFTERNOON OF 10 MAY, C/O I I INTRODUCED
r-r.---,-----,IC/O I I TOI I AND r-I ----I
i prrSAFEHOOSE !:'hUL BECAUSE T/1 WAS ONLY ABLE TO STA'i' At
MEETING A FEW MINIUTES, I I GAVE HER A RIDE BACK TO HER HOME
WHICH GAVE P/l AND I 10PPORTUNITY TO BECOME ACQUAINTED.
I I LATER RETURNED TO SAFEHOUSE FOR SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE
MEETING. WHEN P/l LEARNED THAT I I WOULD NOT LIKELY
BE RETURNING TO MALTA TO MEET HIM IN THE FUTURE, HE EXPRESSED
REGRET. GIVEN THAT I ISPEAKS ARABIC, HOWEVER, P/l STATED THAT
HE LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING HIM IN MALTA DURING P/l'S PLANNED
PERIODIC VISITS FROM LIBYA. DURING MEETING P/l PROVIDED SEVERAL
ITEMS OF INFORMATION RE LIBYA WHICHI ~ILL FORWARD
SEPARATELY. .!
2. ACCORDING TO P/l, SENIOR I I OFFICER ABO AL-BASIT
AL-( (MAGRAHI)) ARRIVED IN MALTA EARLIER IN THE DAY ON 10 MAY WITH
ESO COOPTEE AL-AMIN ((FAHAYMA)). P/l WILL SEE AL-MAGRAHI LATER
THIS WEEK AND WILL QUERY HIM ON FUTURE POSSIBLE OVERSEAS POSITIONS
IN I
I P/l NOTED THAT AL-MAGRAHI IS VERY CLOSE TO SENIOR
ESO OFFICER 'ABDALLAH ((SANUSSI)). P/l, THEREFORE, PLANS TO ASK
AL-MAGRAHI TO SCHEDULE AN APPOINTMENT FOR HIM WITH SANUSSI IN LATE
MAY. P/l ASKED TO MEET C/O I IAGAIN LATER IN THE WEEK TO
DISCUSS DETAILS OF AL-MAGRAHI'S VISIT AND TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL
LOCAL nRUMINT" ITEMS FOR PASSAGE TO SANUSSI VIA AL-MAGRAHI. P/l,
WHO PLANS TO DEPART MALTA ON 20 MAY, BELIEVES THAT IF HE CAN
PROVIDE GOOD INFORMATION TO SANUSSI THROUGH AL-MAGRAHI JUST PRIOR
TO HIS RETURN TO LIBYA, IT WILL IMPROVE HIS JOB PROSPECTS IN THE
ESO. IT WAS AGREED THAT p/1 AND C/O I IWILL MEET AT 1200 HOURS
ON 12 MAY.
3, P/l ALSO TOLD C/OS THAT HE PLANS TO SEE REVCOM LEADER
Page ~

SEc/:s.T
'ALI AL-((KILANI)) FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO LIBYA. HE NOTED THAT
PREVIOUS "RUMINT" WHICH HE HAD FORWARDED TO KILANI HAD BEEN VERY
FAVORABLY RECEIVED AND HE BELIEVES THAT KILANI MAY OFFER HIM SOME
EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES.
4. DURING MEETING P/l ANNOUNCED THAT HE PLANS TO MARRY HIS
MALTESE GIRLFRIEND IN JULY AND LIVE WITH HER IN TRIPOLI. HE HOPES
THAT THIS COMBINED WITH HIS RECENT PERFORMANCE AS AN FI COLLECTOR
WILL IMPROVE HIS CHANCES OF TRAVELLING TO MALTA ON A REGULAR BASIS
FOR THE ESO OR THE REVCOMS.
P/l WAS PAID USD 7,200 BALANCE IN HIS I IT ANU t

(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
SUBJ: LIBYAN GOVERNMENT CLOSURE OF UNIVERSITIES AND ASSAULT
UPON OPPOSITIONIST HEADQUARTERS IN AN EFFORT TO CURB
GROWING CIVIL UNREST
TEXT: 1. IN EARLY APRIL 1989, THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT ORDERED
ALL UNIVERSITIES TO CANCEL CLASSES AND CLOSE CAMPUSES FOR THE
DURATION OF RAMADAN. THE ORDER CAME AS A SURPRISE TO MOST
LIBYAN ACADEMICS AND APPEARED TO BE IN REACTION TO GROWING
UNREST AMONG THE STUDENT AND YOUNGER POPULATION THROUGHOUT THE
COUNTRY. AS OF THE END OF RAMADAN (EARLY MAY 1989) IT REMAINED
UNCLEAR WHEN OR IF THE UNIVERSITIES WOULD ONCE AGAIN BE
REOPENED FOR COMPLETION OF THE ACADEMIC YEAR.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
2. IN A SEPARATE BUT RELATED ACTION IN APRIL 1989,
GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES IDENTIFIED AND SEIZED TEN OFFICES OF
THE OPPOSITIONIST MOVEMENT KNOWN AS THE "TAQFIR WA HIJRA"
MOVEMENT. THIS MOVEMENT HAD BEEN BLAMED BY LIBYAN AUTHORITIES
OF INCITING LIBYAN YOUTH TO STAGE PROTESTS AGAINST THE QADHAFI
lof2
9/29/04 12:48 PM

REGIME AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF ITS LEADERS WERE ARRESTED
AND CHARGED WITH CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE.
3. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE ABOVE ACTIONS TOOK PLACE
CONCURRENTLY WITH RISING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE THROUGHOUT THE
ZAWIYAH REGION OF WESTERN LIBYA DURING THE MONTHS OF APRIL AND
EARLY MAY 1989. LIBYAN AUTHORITIES WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
CONCERNED REGARDING ANTI-REGIME DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE ZAWIYAH
REGION. HOWEVER. NO DEFINITIVE PLAN OF ACTION TO CONFRONT THE
PROBLEM HAD BEEN APPROVED OTHER THAN THOSE MEASURES DESCRIBED
ABOVE.)
2of2
9/29/04 12:48 PM

(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
1 •. C/O I JM.EI WITH I I (P/l) AND
I'~N~~~~~~(.CU~OO~~JURTTY OR cl\(T~~~D~~i~I~'~Tn ~~R~~~ ~~ h~NC*~TA
MEETING. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 31 AUG WITH I 10FFICER
II FOR P/! DEBRIEFING FOLLOWED BY EVENING 4 =S=EP=.=F=U.K=:l __
'~ICAL CHECK-UP. ~=:.::.::::,
..J1=·====-
2. I NTH: ~Jlrl;JlfD.A:TED~:.t..:lB.xAN~SE.CUIH:r''iiAND~lN.'!E.l1:ld·GENCE:{~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE
OFrfo..tr'C£.ru.·PRESENCE-M!I·NtMAt·!f'A+·OUT:t';:f.NED~tBE·lOW.t!i:.'. DATE: FEB 2008
A • L A A 0 F F ICE t. . ... . .' .
- I:.T:::t/C·Ot::;·~·KHA'Lf

·.;~~V~II~~.~I~lu~a~~~.~V~ll~~~Q~~~C~~~V~.~L-____________ ~
x. ~ D. AND THE REST: AMIR((SAHID», A JANA JOURNALIST, IS A
$" MEMBER OF THE INTERNAL SERVICE, GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT
(GID) AND BASED OUT OF THE LOCULTURAL CENTER. P/l BELIEVES
THERE IS ANOTHER ESO OFFICER ACtiNG IN THE ,ASSISTANT MANAGER
POSITION A~ THE LIBYAN-OWNED THIA ~QTEL, AND SOME SUPPORT IS
PROVIDED BY THE MALTESE-LIBYAN HOLD~NG COMPANY LOCATEO OUTSIDE
VALLETTA CITY GATE. PER P/l, MUHAMMAD ((SHAMBISH», MANAGER OF THE
JERMA PALACE HOTEL, ALSO LIBYAN-OWNED, HAS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH AHMAD ((QADAFI», COUSI,N OF COLONEL QADAFI. ALL IN ALL, THERE
ARE SIX CONFIRMED ESO (EXCLUDING HABIB) AND ONE GID OFFICER IN
MALTA. Pil ADDED THAT THERE ARE MANY OTHER LIBYAN-OWNED OR
FINANCED BUSINESSES IN MALTA WHICH COULD BE CALLED ON IF NECESSARY.
3. AS REPORTED r--I Pil DOES NOT BELIEVE EXPLOSIVES HIDDEN
IN AN 'UNACCOMPANIED sVTTCA5r COULD BE INSERTED INTO THE HANDLING
PROCESS AT LIA. LAAlE SO OFFICERS' ACCESS TO LIA FACILITIES AND
PERSONNEL SUGGEST THAT THEY COULD DEVELOP/RECRUITSOURCES THERE,
HOWEVER., ALSO S UG I
V I A 0 I P POU, 0 OV
N
WHEN EXPL N LA, 'ALTHOUGH HE CERTAINL
COULD HAVE BEEN COMPARTMENTED FROM THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION.
BECAUSE P/l BELIEVES HE HAD THE BEST CONTACTS AT LIA, HE DOES NOT
THINK THIS TYPE OF OPERATION COULD HAVE BEEN,SLIPPED BY HIM.
4,. IN A RELATED MATTER, P~l IS DEVELOPI:G' p~~~~~ I ~:
SECURITY CHIEF I r I BY
PROVIDING HIM WI IH A FREE MALIA- UNUUN-UUbLINIKIK HIS
OAUGHTER. ,P/l, WHO IS ,PERSONALLY PAYING FOR THE TICKET, BELIEVES
THIS INVESTMENT WILL PAY OF~ 'O~HIM.PROfESSIONALLY DOWN THE ROAD.
(STATION PLANS TO WAIVE P/l OFF Of THIS VENTURE SINCE I I ~S
CLOSELY ASSOC I ATED WITH THE MALTESE 1\ I NTELLI GENCE!ISERv I CE AND
BECAUSE HE INSINUATED TO C/O I ~HAT HE HAD PLAYED' A ROLE IN·
EFFECTING THE PNG OF I IFROM~MALTA. WE BELIEV~THAT P/l
COULD LIKELY JEOPARDIZE HIS STATUS I'N, MALTA SHOULD HE CONTINUE THIS
PURSUITJ .
: 5. OPS: AS MEETING WAS 'CLOSING, tlO 'RAISED POSSIBI,LITY OF
REV I EW I NG P/ 11 S COMMO PLAN.' ASKED. ABOUT HIS I I'NUMBER AND
PAROLE, P/l' REFER~ED TO T/l WHO, RECITED FROMNOI ES IN HER· ADDRESS ..,
BOOK. Pll DID NOT'APPEAR TO HAVE MADE ANY E.FFORT._TO.MEl\ORlZE:.-1:I:IE-, ..- - _...
COMMO PLAN. -_ .....
C 0 TRE 0
ISE THE ISSUE (WITHOUT Til
PRESENT)' AT'THE NEXT MEETING. BELIEVE P/lIS ACCEPTANCE OF
IMPERSONAL COMMO IS RELUCTANT AT BEST. WE PLAN TO DISCUSS THIS
ISSUE WITHI I OFFICE~I I BEFORE NEXT MEETING.
EN,D O·J MESSAGE -1
. ... !""t 5#"
":
DOCUMENT DATE: 30 AUG 89
I
I
\"

(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(8)
-:~~~~~:-~~~-~:------j ~------------
'---------'
1. TEAR LINE INFO BELOW WAS PROVIDED BY (P/]) AT
SCHEDULED MEETING WITH C/OI ION 28 AUG 89. ED THE
INFORMATION THROUGH NORMAL COOK:)t OF HIS DUTIES AS I l
OFF I CER. P/l PERSONALLY CONDUCTED PARA ONE DEFENS I VC ;)C"Uf\ I IY
CHECK IN 1986. PARA TWO STEMS FROM P/lIS EARLIER ASSIGNMENT IN
MALTA AND FACT THAT HE WAS QUESTIONED RE ANY SOURCES/CONTACTS HE
COULD TURN OVER TOJ
IOFFICERS IN MALTA AT THE AIRPORT
DURING HIS LATEST TRIP HERE.
2. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE PARTICULAR SECURITY
[WHO
l:~ A~G~~~~~: A~ tUQA ACTS
INTERNATIONAL
AS TRANSLATOR
AIRPORT
DURING
WERE
MEETINGS
PROVIDED
WITH
BY
P/1.
I. Ii .. ITION ALLOWS HER DIRECT ACCESS TO BAGGAGE HANDLING
AT THE AIRPORT. I
:
\
--------------------------~TEAR LINE-----------------------------
COUNTRY: MALTA/LIBYA
SUBJ: PRIVATE COMMENTS BY LIB,(AN ARAB AIRLINES EMPLOYEE ON
EXTERNAL SECURITY OFFICE SURVEY OF LUQA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT IN MALTA
~T~EY.XT~:~'l.--FiSPME~AVKTIIN~G~PR~I~V~A~V-,JA~~~\~n,.~,~. ,=~.~ ~,~,.,~~,~_~,:,~,~~w~ ~~.~~,------~~l
.. __
EXRLOYU.;SA 10 ,THAT.,·THE·'LI BY AN· EXTER A [, SECURTI' c' OFFICE~.{(ESO)·t
C'ONDUCTED"~k' DEF ENSl VE";'S ECUR I'Tyl~SURVEY, OF.:THE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
t- -- DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TVT: ULL:L:q It. '::>1:.1:' 0:1 .J
- - ---- - -,--- -- ------ ------- - ------
1--------
~--~3~·~--~~~~~~~=_~~1 WOULD APPRECIATE STATION QUERYING
(P/I) ABOUI IRE EOLLOWING:
A. WHAT HAS P/1 LEARNED FROM LIBYAN INTEL CIRCLES REGARDING
PAN AM 103?
B. WHAT ARE LIBYAN OFFICIALS ARE SAYING ABOUT THE INCIDENT?
C. IS P/1 AWARE OF THE USE OF MALTA AS A STAGING AREA FOR
RADICAL PALESTINIANS?
D. DOES P/1 KNOW AN ABU TALEB FROM SWEDEN?
E. IS P/1 AWARE OF ANY RADICAL PALESTINIAN ACTIVITY IN DENMARK
OR SWEDEN?
Page 1

'.
F. FINALLY, IS P/l AWARE OF ANY LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE PFLP-GC CELL LED BY DALQAMUNI IN FRANKFURT?
4. LOOK FORWARD TO STATION'S RESPONSE.
END OF MESSAGE
Page 2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
c=J1JTT3

TOPICS WERE COVERED DURING THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, WHICH WAS
CONDUCTED PRIMARILY IN ARABIC WITH FREQUENT BUT LIMITED UTILIZATION
OF ENGLISH, WHICH P/1 SPEAKS AT ABOUT THE -2 LEVEL. THE MOST
IMPORTANT ISSUE CLARIFIED WAS THE EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND PERSONAL
CAREER ASPIRATIONS OF P/1. IN SHORT, P/1 ADAMANTLY STATED THAT HE
HAS NO INTENTION TO RETURN TO THE SERVICE OF THE ESO AND IS PRE­
SENTLY CONTEMPLATING AN OFFER TO JOIN THE ·OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT"
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES (RC) IN TRIPOLI. WE ARE
DISAPPOINTED WITH THIS APPARENT REVERSAL OF INTENTIONS ON P/1 'S
PART AND WILL NOW CONSIDER OTHER OPTIONS FOR OUR FUTURE
RELATIONSHIP.
2. STATUS WITH ESO: P/1 EXPLAINED THAT HE PERSONALLY MET
WITH SENIOR ESO OFFICER AHMAD «QADAF» AL-DAM TWICE IN TRIPOLI
SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN TO LIBYA IN EARLY JUNE 1989. AT THE FIRST
MEETING, P/1 REQUESTED PERMISSION TO PROCEED WITH HIS OFFICIAL
WRITTEN REQUEST, SUBMITTED FROM MALTA IN MAY, TO BE PLACED ON ·SICK
LEAVE STATUS· DUE TO HIS WELL-DOCUMENTED ARM SURGERY PROBLEMS.,
QADAF AL-DAM INFORMED P/1 THAT THE REQUEST WOULD BE GRANTED, HOW­
EVER, PI1 WOULD BE PLACED ON A STATUS WITHOUT PAY. P/1 THEN MET
WITH SENIOR RC MEMBER ALI «KILANI» WHO OFFERED HIM A POSITION IN
THE ·OPERATIONS ROOM" OF THE RC HEADQUARTERS IN TRIPOLI. P/1
BELIEVES THAT SUCH A POSITION WOULD PERMIT HIM TO MAKE PERIODIC
TOY'S THROUGHOUT AFRICA AND EUROPE ON RC "BUSINESS.· IN P/1 'S
OPINION, THE RC IS MUCH MORE POWERFUL THAN THE ESO AND HE WOULD
THUS HAVE BETTER ·ACCESS· TO INFORMATION OF ·VALUE" TO I I
P/1 TENTATIVELY ACCEPTED KILANI'S JOB OFFER AND WILL MEE I WI I A AIM
AGAIN IN OCTOBER WHEN IT IS EXPECTED THAT HIS ARM WILL BE IMPROVED,
ALLOWING HIM TO RETURN TO ACTIVE WORK STATUS. P/1 MET FOR A SECOND
TIME WITH QADAF AL-DAM AND OFFICIALLY ADVISED HIM THAT HE ACCEPTED
THE TRANSFER TO LEAVE WITHOUT PAY STATUS AND THAT HE WAS
CONSIDERING OTHER CAREER OPTIONS OUTSIDE THE ESO ..
4. FINANCES: P/1 REQUESTED REIMBURSEMENT OF 1,000 LM FOR A
SECOND OPERATION ON HIS ARM. P/1 ALSO REQUESTED REIMBURSEMENT OF
500 LM FOR 20 DAYS OF HOTEL, CAR RENTAL AND PER DIEM EXPENSES
ENCOUNTERED ON THIS TRIP TO MALTA. I /OFFICER~ I PLANS
TO PROVIDE THE ABOVE FUNDING TO P/1 AT MEETING ON 4 S P I IN
ADDITION TO $5,000 SALARY OWED P/1 THROUGH AUGUST 1989. P/1 WILL

BE ADVISED, IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS, ON 4 SEPT THAT WE WILL NOT
PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR OPERATIONS ON HIS
ARM. P/1 WILL ALSO BE TOLD THAT WE WILL ONLY CONTINUE HIS $1,000
PER MONTH SALARY PAYMENT THROUGH REMAINDER OF 1.989. IF P/1 IS NOT
ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE SUSTAINED AND DEFINED ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF
INTELLIGENCE VALUE BY JANUARY 1990,bc
~ILL CEASE ALL SALARY
AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT UNTIL SUCH AESS CANE PROVEN AGAIN.
5. P/1'S CAVEAT ON COOPERATION: DURING COURSE OF
DISCUSSIONS ONI
I P/1 BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE, AND CLARIFIED
HIS CONDITIONS FOR COOPERATING WITH I I P/1 STATED THAT HE
NEVER INTENDED TO BECOME A ·SPY" FOR I ('ND THAT HE DESPISED
SPYS, AND THAT WAS WHY HE WANTED OUT OF THE E O. P/1 STATED
CLEARLY, AND WITH EMOTION, THAT HE WILL ONLY REPORT ON TERRORIST­
RELATED INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ESO AND THAT HE WILL NEVER
REPORT ON ROUTINE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS. P/1 STATED
THAT HIS INTENTIONS HAVE BEEN CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING AND HE WAS
NEVER GOING TO CHANGE.
6. ASSESSMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT P/1 WILL NEVER BE THE PENE-
TRATION OF THE ESO THAT WE HAD ANTICIPATED. P/1 IS NOW OUT OF THE
ESO AND HAS NO INTENTION TO ATIEMPT TO REGAIN DIRECT ACCESS.
UNFORTUNATELY, IT APPEARS THAT OUR ASSISTING HIM IN SCAM SURGERY ON
HIS ARM TO AVOID MILITARY SERVICE HAS HAD THE REVERSE RESULT THAT
WE HAD INTENDED. IT HAS ALSO ALLOWED HIM TO AVOID FURTHER SERVICE
WITH THE ESO, P/1'S TRUE INTENTION FROM THE BEGINNING. P/1 HAS
NEVER BEEN A TRUE STAFF MEMBER OF THE ESO AND AS HE STATED AT THIS
MEETING, HE WAS COOPTED WITH WORKING WITH THE ESO AND HE NOW WANTS
NOTHING TO DO WITH THEM OR THEIR ACTIVITIES. P/1 WOULD PREFER TO
REMAIN ON MALTA.
7. PLANS: WE CLEARLY ARE NOW FACED·WITH TWO OPTIONS:
A. WAIT THE REMAINDER OF 1989 AND SEE WHAT POSITION OF
ACCESS P/1 IS ABLE TO DEVELOP WITHIN THE RC. WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHAT
A POSITION WITHIN THE ·OPERATIONS ROOM" WILL PROVIDE P/1 ACCESS TO,
ONLY TIME WILL TELL. REQUEST HQS ADVISE DETAILS CONCERNING RC
·OPERATIONS ROOM" ACTIVITIES AND ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE
REPORTING VALUE.
B. ENCOURAGE PI1 TO RETURN TO MALTA AND ESTABLISH FRONT
COMPANY FOR PERIODIC USE BY ESO OPERATIVES ON MALTA. P/1 MIGHT
POSSIBLY AGREE TO SUCH A PROPOSAL IF WE PROVIDED HIM WITH REQUIRED
FUNDING. WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW MUCH IT WOULD COST TO SET PI1 UP OR
EVEN WHAT LEVEL OF ACCESS SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD ALLOW. WE HAVE
NOT DISCUSSED THIS OPTION WITH P/1 YET BUT WELCOME HQS VIEWS.
8. NEXT MEETING: I joFFICERJ dANDI I DOCTOR
WILL MEET WITH P/1 ALONE EVENING 4 SE I. DIS USSIONS WILL BE LIM-
ITED DUE TO LANGUAGE PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT BEST TO LIMIT
UTILIZATION OF T/1, AS IT IS CLEAR THAT PI1 DISCUSSES ISSUES MORE
OPENLY AND CLEARLY WHEN ALLOWED TO SPEAK IN ARABIC WITHOUT PRESENCE
OF T/1 SERVING AS TRANSLATOR. P/1 THINKS HE MAY BE DEPARTING ON 7

SEiEr
SEPT, HQWEVER, HE REMAINS EMPLQYED UNTIL QCTQBER AND CQULD
PQSSIBL Y REMAIN QN ISLAND L GER. FQLLQWINGHQS,I ~ AND
jplGESTIQN QF ABQVE DEV LQPMENTS, FURTHER DICUSSIQNS BETWEEN
c==:::::J AND P/1 ABQUT PARA 7 TIQNS WILL BE IN QRDER FQLLQWING HIS
RETURN TO. LIBYA AND CLARIFICATI N QF STATUS. WE WILL WANT TO.
ENSURE THAT P/1 UNDERSTANDS W T IS EXPECTED QF HIM AND WHAT HE CAN
EXPECT FRQM US IN RETURN.· QFFICER I I WILL THEREFQRE
ADVISE P/1 AT 4 SEPT MEETING THAT H S QN -TRIAL- STATUS UNTIL 1
JANUARY 1990. P/1 WILL BE INSTRUCTED 0. MAKE EVERY EFFQRT PQSSIBLE
TO. RETURN TO. MALTA IN QCTQBER TO. DIS USS FURTHER DEVELQPMENTS AND
TO. ADVISE RE HIS EMPLQYMENT STATUS.
WILL THEN BE ABLE TO.
CLEARL YEXPLAIN QUR COLLECTIVE JUDGME ARDING FUTURE
QBJECTIVES.

?
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
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(S)
TUK: UtLl.)Ll.Z, ;:,~t'

7
THE SAME BROTHERLY INTENTIONS, P/1 ACCEPTED THE MONEY
RECEIPT) AND PLEDGED HIS CONTINUED COOPERATION.
(WITHOUT
4. ON 5 SEP, P/1 SHOWED UP AT MEETING IN THE BEST SPIRITS HE
HAS SHOWN SINCE HIS INITIAL CONTACT WITH C/O. HE APPEARED TO HAVE
GIVEN SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THE REQUIREMENTS RESULTING IN REFS BAND
C. RE P/1'S STATUS WHILE HE WAS IN MALTA, BELIEVE WE CAN FIRMLY
SAY THAT HE WAS AN EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION (ESO) STAFF
OFFICER VICE COOPTEE. DURING DISCUSSION OF REF B INFO, P/1TERMED
ESO OFFICERS AS "SECURITY FIRST, LAA SECOND" WHILE COOPTEES WERE
"LAA FIRST, SECURITY SECOND." P/1 PLACED HIMSELF IN THE FIRST
CATEGORY. IN ADDITION TO REF B INFO, P/1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING
UPDATED PERSONALITY TIDBITS ON ESO OFFICERS AND COOPTEES IN MALTA:
A. MUHAMAD «AL-LAFI» - C/ESO/MALTA - P/1 STILL BELIEVES
AL-LAFI WANTS OUT OF INTEL WORK TO START HIS OWN BUSINESS. AL-LAFI
SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND MALTESE AND GENERALLY KEEPS TO HIMSELF.
B. SERGEANT HABIB UMAR «SASI» - P/1 CHARACTERIZED SASI AS
AL-LAFI'S "GOFER" WHO IS NOT TOO BRIGHT. HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TO
MONITOR LIBYAN DISSIDENTS FREQUENTLY KEEP HIM OUT CRAWLING THE
LIBYAN NIGHT-SPOTS. HE SPEAKS ARABIC ONLY.
C. LT. COL. KHALIFA «SANUSSI» AND MAJOR NEJMITTIN
«AL-AGELI» REPLACED P/1 AT HIS POSITION IN ESO/LAA. P/1 SAID
THEY ARE PROFESSIONAL INTEL QFFICERS WHO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER.
D. COLONEL 'ALI MUHAMAD «AL-SAMI'I» - ESO/ISLAMIC CALL
SOCIETY - PER P/1, BY KEEPING AL-SAMI'I AT HIS CURRENT POSITION, HE
WILL BE OUT OF THE LOOP UNTIL RETIREMENT. AL-SAMI'I DOES NOT GET
ALONG WELL WITH AL-LAFI BECAUSE OF THE FORMER'S EARLIER SENIOR
POSITION.
E. AMIR «SAHID» - GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT (GID)
IS NOT POPULAR WITH HIS COLLEAGUES BECAUSE OF HIS INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS ROLE.
F. ALI «ABJAD» - ESO COOPTEE - HAS A BRITISH WIFE WHOM HE
MET WHEN HE FLED LIBYA TO THE UK IN 1970'S. ABJAD HAS RELATIVES IN
HIGH PLACES. HIS BROTHER IBRAHIM «ABJAD» WAS ONE OF THE EARLY
INNER-CIRCLE QADAFI SUPPORTERS AND TWO OTHER BROTHERS HAVE RANK IN
THE SECURITY SERVICES. THEY ENCOURAGED ALI ABJAD TO TAKE AN LAA
POSITION IN LONDON IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR STATUS WITH QADAFI.
ALI SERVED 11 YEARS IN LONDON, FINALLY COMING TO MALTA IN 1986.
ABJAD'S WIFE IS LIVING IN THE UK. ABJAD'S ROOMMATE IN MALTA IS LAA
COOPTEE SALAH «QAJA» WHO ALSO HAS A BRITISH WIFE. THEY HOWEVER
HAVE BECOME ESTRANGED. P/1 SAID THAT THESE TWO WERE RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF LAA AREA MANAGER BASHIR «UTHMAN». P/1
KNOWS THEY ARE COOPTEES BECAUSE HE HAS A FRIEND (NFl) AT ESO HQS
WHO MEETS WITH THEM WHEN THEY RETURN TO TRIPOLI.
G. MUSTAFA «SHABANI» - ESO COOPTEE - IS A GOOD FRIEND OF
UTHMAN. P/1 CLASSIFIED THESE TWO AS CRAFTY AND CAPABLE OF CAUSING
PROBLEMS FOR BOTH LAA AND ESO PERSONNEL. UTHMAN IS NOT CONSIDERED
TO BE IN GOOD STANDING POLITICALLY BECAUSE HE EXPRESSED
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH HIS POSITION IN MALTA. HE APPARENTLY GAVE UP
HIS PRIVATE BUSINESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
Paqe 2

"GREEN BOOK," A MOVE HE NOW REGRETS.
7. P/1 PLANS TO REMAIN ON MALTA UNTIL CA 25 SEP. NEXT
MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 14 SEP. WILL ADVISE.
END OF MESSAGE
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TUK: LU.L'I'lt)t. ::;1:,;1:' tl~
- -- - ---- --- - - -- -- -
I
I
- -
SUBJECT: IREPORTING ON PAN AM 103
1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.
2. AT 19 SEP MEETING I I ] COULD NOT IDENTIFY
INDIVIDUAL WHO PURCHASED CLOTHING FOUND LII 0 SPECT SUITCASE ABOARD
PAN AM 103 FROM EITHER I ISKETCH OR FROM I ICOMPUTER IMAGE.
P/1 PLANS TO REMAIN IN MALTA AN ADDITIONAL 20 DAYS AND WILL BE
AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER TASKING AS REQUIRED. NEXT MEETING IS
SCHEDULED FOR 29 SEP.
END OF MESSAGE
Page 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ACTIVITIES LEADING UP TO PAN AM BOMBING -
ABDALBASIT ALI AL-MAGRAHI AKA 'ABD AL BASIT ALI
1. PER REF REQUEST, C(g IREVIEWED SUBJECT REF, MAS'UD
M. ABU ((AQILA)) AKA 'ABD-ALBA:"".L J. n.w.L ((AL-MAGRAHI)), WITH
I I (P/1) EVENING 16 OCT 89. PIl IDENTIFIED AL-MAGRAHI AS
TRAVELING UNDER ALIAS 'ABD AL BASIT ((ALI) TO MALTA IN LATE SEP 89
WITH FORMER LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES-(LAA) MANAGER IN VALLETTA LAMIN
((FIHMA)). THEY MET WITH MALTESE CITIZEN VINCENT ((VASSALLO)) WITH
WHOM THEY JOINTLY OWN "MEDTOURIST SERVICES," A TRAVEL AGENCr=-Y--=IN=-=----_~
MALTA. AL-MAGRAHI AND FIHMA ALSO MET WITH ESO CHIEF/MALTA I
I I WHO HAS AN INTEREST IN MEDTOURIST AS WELL (NFl) AND mlnH~E~N--~
DEPARTED AFTER TWO OR THREE DAYS. P/1 OBTAINED THE INFORMATION
FROM VASSALLO DIRECTLY. NOTE THAT P/1 PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT
VASSALLO WHO WORKS AT THE LUQA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT CAFETERIA WAS
RECRUITED BY THE LAA STATION MANAGER (NFI) TO ASSIST THE ESO IN
SPOTTING POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS.
2. P/1 HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING AL-MAGRAHI. P/1
BELIEVES FIHMA WAS A REGULAR LAA EMPLOYEE WHILE IN MALTA WHO ALSO
SERVED AS AN ESO COOPTEE.
END OF MESSAGE
Page 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
']
(b) (1)
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(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: Ljl:,j/Z OCT !j~
------------------------------------------------------
I
I
1. CIO I I MET WITH I I(P/l) ON 20 OCT 89 AT S/H
PAUL, NO CI OR SECURITY INCIDENTS OCCURRED DURING MEETING.
2. INTEL: INFORMATION BELOW SOURCED TO LAMIN ({FAMHI») WITH
WHOM pl1 HELD PRIVATE CONVERSTATION ON 20 OCT. DURING SUMMER 89,
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF 'ABD-ALBASIT ALI AL-{{MAGRAHI)), J
I
IRELATED TO PAN AM 103 BOMBING, FAHM+t--;O"B~IArrIT"1['")jE,.,D,---l
APPROVAL FOR FUNDING OF USD 150,000 FROM ESO OFFICERS MAJOR
ABDALLAH ({MANSUR)) AND ESO SENIOR MEMBER 'IZZ AL-DIN ({HINSHIRI))
TO ESTABLISH MEDTOURIST SERVICES LTD. IN MALTA. IN LATE SEP AND
EARLY OCT, FAHMI ANDAL-MAGRAHI TRAVELLED TO MALTA TO MEET WITH
MALTESE PARTNER VINCENT ({VASSALO)) TO OPEN UP THE COMPANY'S
OFFICES IN MOSTA, MALTA AND TO DEPOSIT THE ESO-SUPPLIED FUNDS IN A
MALTESE BANK (NFL). DURING THE SAME VISIT, FAHMI AND AL-MAGRAHI
MET WITH ESO OFFICER LT. COL. KHALIFA ({SANUSSI)) TO DISCUSS LOCAL
HANDLING OF FAHMI. SANUSSI REQUESTED FAHMI RETURN TO MALTA IN
MARCH 90 (AFTER HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE DAKAR ROAD RALLY) TO BEGIN
SECURITY OPERATIONS AT MEDTOURIST SERVICES. (IN THE INTERIM, WE
PLAN TO DIRECT OTHER STATION ASSETS TO GATHER INFORMATION ON
MEDTOURIST SERVICES. FIHMA HAS OFFERED TO RAISE pl1'S NAME WITH
HIS ESO CONTACTS FOR Pl1 TO ESTABLISH COVER BUSINESS IN MALTA. pl1
INSTRUCTED FIHMA NOT TO RAISE HIS NAME OR DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITIES IN
MALTA WITH ANYONE.)
3. pl1 REPORTED THAT IN AUG 89, LIBYAN LEADER COL MU'AMMAR
@
SEcFT Page 1

AL-«QADHAFI)) WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT BY ONE
OF HIS SECURITY GUARDS (NFl) AT BANGHAZI AIRPORT. THE WOULD-BE
ASSASSIN WAS KILLED ON THE TARMAC BY OTHER SECURITY GUARDS. P/I
SOURCED THE INFORMATION TO SABRI «ALLI)), A LIBYAN BUSINESSMAN WHO
RECENTLY TRAVELLED THROUGH MALTA AND WAS AT BANGHAZI AIRPORT WHEN
THE INCIDENT ALLEGEDLY OCCURRED. P/I HAD NO OTHER INFORMATION.
4. OPS: RE P/I'S CURRENT STATUS, HE WILL BE MOVING OUT OF
THE LIBYAN-OWNED JERMA PALACE HOTEL TO TAKE RESIDENCE IN WEEKLY -
HOLIDAY FLATS. P/I GAVE C/O THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS BECOMING
WEARY OF HIS NON-STATUS IN MALTA. MOREOVER, FACT THAT LPB CHIEF
AL-SHAHATI HAS NOT GIVEN HIM ANY NEW INFORMATION RE HIS POSITION AS
AN AIDE AND I
IHAS ASKED FOR A HIGHER SUM TO
PERFORM ANY ADDITIONAL MOCK-SURGERY ON HIS ARM APPEARS TO BE
FORCING THE TEMPERAMENTAL P/I INTO MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT HIS
FUTURE. WiLL ADVISE ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.
END OF MESSAGE
Paqe 2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
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(S)
TOR: 261011Z OCT 89
- - --- --- -- - -
I
J
I
l --- -
1. C/OI I MET WITH I I (P/1) ON 24 OCT 89 AT S/H
PAUL, NO SECURITY OR CI INCIDENTS OCCURRED DURING THE MEETING.
NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 5 NOV, AT S/H PAUL.
2. DURING THIS MEETING, MAJOR TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE
P/1'S INTEREST IN C/O PROVIDING FEED INFORMATION FOR P/1 TO GIVE
LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU (LPB) CHIEF AHMAD ABDIL NABBI AL-((SHAHATI))
AND P/1'S DESIRE TO HAVE A FINAL INSTANCE OF MOCK SURGERY CONDUCTED
ON HIS ARM. RE THE FORMER, REGARDLESS OF ANY EFFORTS P/1 WAS
MAKING TO INGRATIATE HIMSELF WITH THE LPB CHIEF, I I HAD
DECIDED TO TELL P/1 THAT "WASHINGTON" HAD VETOED PASSAGE OF
SIGNIFICANT/SENSATIONAL INFO (WHETHER TRUE OR FALSE) BECAUSE OF
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. AS BEFORE, ANY FEED INFO FOR THE LPB
CHIEF WOULD BE BASED SOLELY ON "RUMINT" ITEMS STATION OR P/1 COULD
PRODUCE FROM LOCAL PRESS OR GOSSIP. P/1 CLAIMED THAT BECAUSE OF
HIS NON-STATUS IN MALTA, HE WAS OUT-OF-THE-LOOP FROM ACQUIRING EVEN
"RUMINT." HE ADDED THAT IF AL-SHAHATI DOES GIVE HIM A POSITION AS
HIS AIDE, HE WOULD AGAIN BEGIN DEVELOPING SOURCES IN MALTA TO
PROVIDE INFO FOR THE LPB CHIEF'S CONSUMPTION. UNDER THESE
GUIDELINES, C/O AND P/1 THEN DISCUSSED SOME NEWSPAPER ITEMS FOR USE
WITH AL-SHAHATI. .
3. P/1 ALSO RAISED HIS INTENTION TO HAVE A FINAL ROUND OF
SURGERY CONDUCTED ON HIS ARM AND ASKED IF C/O WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP
FINANCIALLY. P/1 EXPLAINED THAT PEOPLE IN LIBYA WHO WANT TO STAY
OUT OF THE MILITARY OFTEN PAY UPWARDS OF 50,000 LIBYAN DINAR FOR
SIMILAR TYPES OF OPERATIONS. HE READILY ADMITTED THAT I I HAD
ALREADY ASSISTED WITH 3,000 LM (APPROXIMATELY 9,000 USD) TO DATE,
BUT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A "FRESH AND CONVINCING"
WOUND FOR SHOCK VALUE WITH THE MILITARY MEDICAL REVIEW BOARD.
Page 1

BECAUSE P/l'S PERMISSION FROM LOCAL ESO OFFICERS TO REMAIN IN MALTA
IS DRAWING TO AN END, P/l MUST LEAVE MALTA WITHIN ONE MONTH TO FACE
THE BOARD. THE ONLY EXCEPTION WOULD BE AL-SHAHATI'S INTERVENTION
TO KEEP P/l IN MALTA AS AN AIDE.
4. AFTER HEARING OUT P/l'S REQUESTS, C/O RAISED IN STRONG
TERMS THAT "WASHINGTON" WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT WITH
P/l'S DEMANDING NATURE. DURING HIS LATEST TRIP TO MALTA, P/l HAD
FAILED AS YET TO SECURE A PERMANENT POSITION IN EITHER LIBYA OR -
MALTA AND WAS IN NO POSITION TO INSIST ON UNQUALIFIED ASSISTANCE
FROM I JEITHER FOR REAL INTELLIGENCE FOR AL-SHAHATI OR
FINANCIAL SOP ORT FOR HIS MOCK SURGERY. ONLY IF "WASHINGTON"
BELIEVED P/l WAS STILL COOPERATING WOULD ANY ASSISTANCE BE
FORTHCOMING. P/l WAS VISIBLY NONPLUSSED BY THE NATURE AND FORCE OF
C/O'S REPRESENTATION AND FOR THE FIRST TIME SHOWED CONCERN FOR THE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF SUPPORT HE RECEIVES FROM I f C/O ALSO NOTED
THAT P/l'S ENGLISH IMPROVED AS HE MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO ASSURE
C/O OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT TASKING AND CONTROL IN THE
RELATIONSHIP. C/O SUBSEQUENTLY OFFERED TO CHECK WITH "WASHINGTON"
RE HIS REQUESTS, BUT MADE NO PROMISES.
5. BASED ON P/l'S NEAR-TERM RESOLUTION OF HIS STATUS IN
EITHER MALTA OR LIBYA, I I RECOMMENDS THAT WE PROVIDE FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE IN THE SUM OF 500 LM (1500 USD) FOR THIS FINAL PIECE OF
SURGERY FOR P/l. WE HAVE THUS FAR INVESTED HIGHLY IN P/l AND TO
ABANDON HIM AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE AT RELATIVELY LITTLE EXTRA
COST WOULD ONLY APPEAR AS DIMINISHED COMMITMENT TO HIM AND
ULTIMATELY ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR CONTROL OVER HIM AS WELL. WE
BELIEVE C/O'S LECTURE TO P/l ON WASHINGTON'S UNHAPPINESS WITH HIS
NON-STATUS HAD THE INTENDED EFFECT OF ALERTING P/l THAT OUR
RELATIONSHIP IS NOT FOREVER. REQUEST HQS AND I I CONCURRENCE.
C/O REPEATED OUR DESIRE TO HAVE P/l ACCEPT A POSITION AT THE
REVCOM OPS CENTER AND, ONLY AS A SECOND OPTION, WORK AS
AL-SHAHATI'S AIDE; P/l UNDERSTOOD. WILL ADVISE FURTHER
DEVELOPMENTS.
6. P/l DID NOT SHOW FOR 25 OCT MEETING. C/O WILL MEET HIM
NEXT ON 5 NOV AFTER HIS RETURN FROM TDY OUTSIDE MALTA.
I
END OF MESSAGE
I
Paqe 2

'f'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: 181109Z NOV 89
.-____ ~l_. __ c~/_o~I ____ ~I~A~RRA~N~G~E~D~M=E~ETING WITHJ (P/1)
IAT S/H PAL UN Ib NOv 89. NO CI
~O~R~S~E~C~U~R~I~T=Y-=I=N=C=I=D=EN=T=S=-O=C=C=U=R=R=E=D~D~U'RING THE 60-MINUTE MEETING. NEXT
CONTACT SCHEDULED FOR 19 NOV 89, 1800 HRS, AT S/H PAUL. ~I --------~
I
2. P/1 REPORTED FOLLOWING LIBYANS TRAVELLING TO MALTA:
A. $X NAME: JAMAL AL-((BAZUTI)) SEX: MALE DPOB: CA
1965, LIBYA CIT: LIBYAN OCC: STUDENT, REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
MEMBER LOC: MALTA SOURCE: I I TEXT: SUBJECT STAYED AT
THE DRAGONARA HOTEL IN MALTA 10-13 NOV 89 ON ALLEGED SHOPPING TRIP.
P/1 REPORTED THAT SUBJECT IS A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF YOUNG ZEALOTS
CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH LIBYAN LEADER MU'AMMAR AL ((QADAFI)). $$
THERE ARE NO I ITRACES IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT.
B. NAME: ABDAL HAMID AL-((MUGARBI)) SEX: MALE DPOB: CA
1964, LIBYA CIT: LIBYAN OCC: STUDENT, REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
MEMBER LOC: MALTA SOURCE: * I TEXT: SUBJECT STAYED
WITH AL-BAZUTI AT THE DRAGON RA HOTEL IN MALTA 10-13 NOV 89 ON
ALLEGED SHOPPING TRIP. P/1 REPORTED THAT SUBJECT IS A MEMBER OF A
GROUP OF YOUNG ZEALOTS CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH LIBYAN LEADER MU'AMMAR
AL ((QADAFI)). $$ q I REPORTING INDICATES INDIVIDUAL WITH
SIMILAR NAME TO SUBJECT IS ASSOCIATE OF MOHAMMAD ((SOYBA)), AN
ANNOUNCER FOR THE LIBYAN-RUN VOICE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN RADIO
STATION IN MALTA. THESE RECORDS SHOW THAT AL-MUGARBI ARRIVED ON 14
NOV. )
C. P/1 ALSO REPORTED THAT UHMAR ((LUTAYYIF)), CHIEF/GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT (GID), ACCOMPANIED AHMAD AL-((SHARIF)),
I
SEcfT Page 1

CHIEF/ISLAMIC CALL SOCIETY, TO THE RECENT ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN
MALTA.
D. P/l NOTED THAT THREE OTHER LIBYANS ARE STAYING IN A
HOLIDAY FLAT NEAR HIS APARTMENT CLOSE TO MARSAXLOKK HARBOR, SITE OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL MEETINGS. PER P/l, ONE IS A NAVY OFFICER WHO
SERVED IN ATHENS AND RECENTLY ATTENDED A COURSE (NFl) IN THE UK.
P/l COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE OTHER TWO, BUT HE ADDED THEY HAVE RENTED
THREE DIFFERENT RENTAL CARS SINCE ARRIVING ON 14 NOV. P/l
ATTEMPT TO GATHER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR NEXT MEETING.
E. IN RESPONSE TO C/O TASKING, P/l SAID HE WILL CHECK OUT
AREAS FREQUENTED BY LIBYANS AND ATTEMPT TO ELICIT FROM HIS CONTACTS
ANY UNUSUAL ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT THREATEN THE PRESIDENTIAL
MEETINGS. P/l REPORTED THAT THE "DENISBERG HOTEL" (ADDRESS 115 THE
STRAND) SEEMS TO BE CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY HIGH-LEVEL LIBYAN
OFFICIALS.
4. CHIEF ESO UNDER LAA COVER IN MALTA KHALIFA ((SANUSSI))
TOLD P/l ON 25 OCT 89 THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEX FROM THE OFFICE
OF ABDULLAH ((SANUSSI)), ESO COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, REQUESTING P/l'S
IMMEDIATE RETURN TO LIBYA. P/l HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO THE
RATIONALE BEHIND THE SPECIAL REQUEST IN THIS TELEX. THROUGH THE
INFLUENCE OF LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU (LPB) CHIEF AHMAD ABDEL NABBI
AL-((SHAHATI)), P/l WAS ABLE TO POSTPONE HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL THE
END OF THE MONTH.
5. SINCE RECEIVING THE TELEX, P/l UNDERWENT ONE MORE MOCK
SURGERY AT A COST OF LM 670 (APPROXIMATELY 2,000 USD). P/l'S
I BROKE HIS ARM AND THEY BOTH WENT TO A HOSPITAL IN MALTA FOR
ITS CARE. BELIEVE THIS LATEST PIECE OF SURGERY HAS THE NECESSARY
SHOCK VALUE WHICH P/l BELIEVES WILL GRANT HIM THE NECESSARY WAIVER
FROM MILITARY SERVICE AND LIKELY LEAVE HIM WITH PERMANENT DAMAGE TO
HIS ARM. C/O PASSED P/1 LM 500 TO PARTIALLY ASSIST WITH THE
PAYMENT FOR THE SURGERY.
I
6. RE LOCAL PERSONALITIES, P/1 SAID THAT AL-SHAHATI HAS BEEN
IN LIBYA SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING ON 25 OCT. \
AL SHAHATI TOLD P/l THAT HE HAS BEEN MEETING PRIVATELY WITH ML·u-.·,~J.""
LABOR PARTY (MLP) PARLIAMENTARIAN DENNIS ((SAMMUT)). HE DID NOT
INDICATE, HOWEVER, SUBJECT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.
7. P/l'S MOOD DURING THIS MEETING WAS FAIRLY UPBEAT. HE
PROUDLY TOLD C/O THAT HIS ARM WAS ALREADY DEVELOPING RHEUMATISM
SYMPTOMS WHICH WILL ASSIST WITH HIS MEDICAL CLAIMS. P/l EXPLAINED
THAT HE MISSED I ~MEETINGS BECAUSE OF HIS
MEETINGS WITH AL SHAHATI AND OTHER LIB ANS. C/O STRESSED
IMPORTANCE OF MAKING THE SCHEDULED TIME/DATES
Page 2

I P/l SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.
~A~S~K~E~D\TI~F"'H~E'T1N~E~EnDFEnD-nA"NvYTmHITT1INmG~pmR~InO~R~1~iO"Hn17S~DEPARTURE FOR LIBYA, P/l
REQUESTED HIS TOTAL SALARY IN U.S. DOLLARS. P/l SAID HE WILL BE
ABLE TO COVER SECURELY FOR THE ADDITIONAL FUNDS IN HIS POSSESSION.
8. WILL 'ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
ENlJ OJ:'
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
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(S)
TUK~ Lq-ro-":>::Ju IV -u-:;r
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.~
r -
1. C/O I IMET WITH I I (P/l) ON 24 NOV 89 AT S/H
PAUL, NO CI OR SECURITY INCIDENTS ENCOUNTERED,
SCHEDULED FOR 28 NOV, 1700 HRS, AT S/H PAUL ..
NEXT MEETING
2. P/l DID NOT HAVE ANY THREAT INFORMATION TO REPORT. HE
DID NOT MEET WITHI ~AS PLANNED EVENING OF 22 NOV, BUT
WILL ATTEMPT CONTACT DORING IHEEEKEND. P/l DID PASS OBSERVATION
THAT OFFICE DOORS AT THE LPB ARE UNCHARACTERISTICALLY CLOSED AND
THERE APPEARS TO BE A LARGE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS COMING AND GOING.
C/O TASKED P/l TO APPROACH c=JAND LPB CHIEF AL- ((SHAHATI)) TO
ELICIT ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING LIBYAN ACTIONS LEADING
UP TO THE PRESIDENTIAL MEETINGS. P/l ASSURED C/O THAT HE WOULD
SIGNAL C/O VIAl
IIF HE OBTAINED ANY
SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION.
3. ADMIN: P/l REQUESTED HIS TOTAL SALARY FOR NEXT MEETING
IN USD. WILL ADVISE ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
END OF MESSAGE
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
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(S)
I
TOR: 151435Z DEC 89 I I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 . VIAr-------,..rTT""l"T"T---r

5. PER P/1, LPB CHIEF AHMAD ABDIL NABBI AL-((SHAHATI)) 'S
HEALTH HAS WORSENED. HE RARELY TRAVELS FROM HIS TEMPORAt:JNGS
AT THE JERMA PALACE HOTEL AND SELDOM MEETS WITH ANYONE.
RECENTLY VOICED CONCERN TO P/1 OVER THE SHORTAGE OF CASH IN A.
ASKED IF THIS SITUATION WOULD AFFECT HIS POSITION, I 2!SPONDED
NEGATIVELY. P/1 HAS ASSESSEDc==JAS ACTING AS THE 1110 R HEAD OF
LIBYAN INTELLIGENCE ON MALTA. BECAUSE OF SEPARATE ESO OFFICES
UNDER.LPB AND LAA COVERS, THE VARIOUS COOPTEES WHO ARE ACTING ON­
DIRECT ORDERS FROM LIBYA AND THE NUMEROUS TDY'ERS, P/1 BELIEVES ~
HAS LITTLE REAL CONTROL OVER DAY-TO-DAY ESO FUNCTIONS. ACCORDI~
TO P/1, c==JWANTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIVATE BUSINESS AND PERHAPS
RETIRE FROM THE ESO BUT HAS YET TO FIND THE RIGHT NICHE.
6. RE THE BUSH-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN MALTA 2-3 DEC 89, P/1
NOTED THAT'30 LIBYANS INCLUDING DR. FNU ((ILMHADBI)) AND MILUD
((IMBERSH)) ARRIVED IN MALTA TO ASSIST WITH THE LIBYAN-FUNDED MALTA
LABOR PARTY (MLP) "GIVE PEACE A CHANCE" GATHERING. IMBERSH'S
BROTHER, COLONEL HADIM ((IMBERSH)), IS A HIGH-RANKING OFFICER IN
THE LIBYAN ARMY. FOURTEEN MEMBERS OF THE ENTOURAGE STAYED AT THE
JERMA PALACE WITH THE REMAINDER SCATTERED, IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS.
DURING THE RAINED-OUT WEEKEND, MLP LEADER KARMENU ((MIFSUD
BONNICI)) PAID A CALL ON THE GROUP AT THE JERMA PALACE.
7. ADMIN: C/O PAID P/1 I I ACCOUNT SEP-NOV SALARIES
TOTALLING USD 3,000. P/1 REQUESTED HIS DEC SALARY FOR NEXT
MEETING. IN ADDITION, P/1 RAIsED SUBJECT OF SALARY INCREASE FROM
USD 1,000 TO USD 1,500 WHICH HE CLAIMED WAS PROMISED AT 7 APR 89
MEETING WITH C/O'S I 6 I I MEMORY RECALLS THAT
THIS SUBJECT WAS RAISED WITH Plr ON C NDITION THAT HE RETURN PCS TO
LIBYA, THAT HE OBTAIN A POSITION WITH ESO OR REVCOM AND THAT HE
PERIODICALLY MEET WITH C/O AND REPORT VIA c==J WHILE WE WOULD LIKE
TO ACCOMMODATE P/1, HE HAS NOT LIVED UP TO THESE EXPECTATIONS TO
DATE. IN EFFORT TO SMOOTH OUT ANY POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, WE PLAN TO
ADVISE P/1 OF THE ABOVE, BUT ALSO PROVIDE HIM WITH USD 1,000 BONUS
INCENTIVE FOR HIM TO RETURN TO LIBYA.
WILL ADVISE RESULTS OF
END OF MESSAGE
Page 2

, l
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
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(b) (2)
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(8)
TVK: l.'il.:::>'iOl. J:J:.O:;1U I L
______________________________________________________ --1"---__ ----1------------
1. C/Ol dMET WITHd ~(P/1) ON 13 FEB 90 AT S/H
PAUL, NO SECURITY IN IDENTS T REPORT. N XT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR
15 FEB 90, 1600 HRS, AT S/H PAUL.
2. OPS: P/1 REPORTED THAT HE DID NOT LEAVE MALTA AFTER LAST
MEETING WITH C/O BECAUSE HE DECIDED TO OBTAIN A CERTIFICATE FROM
I
iINDICATING THAT HE WAS UNDER THERAPY FOR HIS MOCK
SURGERY WH CH PREVENTS HIM FROM ENTERING THE MILl P 1 CLAIMED
THAT HE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT C/O IN LATE DEC VIA
3. P/1REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HAVE TRANSITTED
MALTA:
A. IN LATE DEC 89, MOHAMMED AL-«MAJDUB)) AKA MOHAMMED
«MA'TUG)) AND MOHAMMED «MASSUD)) FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE
TRAVELLED TO MALTA WITH ONE BASQUE SPANIARD (NFl) AND ALI
AL-«GADIBAN)), A PROFESSOR WHO RECENTLY FINISHED STUDIES IN THE
UK, FROM LIBYA TO MEET WITH MOHAMMAD IL-«MUDIR)), CHIEF OF THE
LIBYAN PEOPLE'S BUREAU IN LEBANON, AND ANOTHER LIBYAN (NFl) AT THE
JERMA PALACE HOTEL. ACCORDING TO P/1, THEY DISCUSSED SOME SECRET
PROGRAM INVOLVING IL-MUDIR WHO DEPARTED FOR CARACAS, VENEZUALA
AFTER THE MEETING.
B. MAJOR JAMAL AL-«ASFAR)), MILITARY OPERATIONS OFFICER IN
AL-QADAFI'S OFFICE AND COUSIN OF AL-MADJUB (ABOVE), ARRIVED IN
MALTA IN LATE DEC 89 AND STAYED THROUGH 11 FEB 90. HE CLAIMED TO
BE WAITING FOR SOMEONE (NFl) FROM WEST GERMANY WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO
Page 1

1'.
o
SECRET
ARRIVE ON 8 FEB. P/1 NOTED THAT AL-ASFAR KEPT CHANGING HOTELS AND
WAS SEEN IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT LOCATIONS ON THE ISLAND.
C. LT. COLONEL AHMAD ((MOTHAR» AKA ((GLIA», ESO OFFICER,
STAYED AT THE PRELUNA HOTEL IN EARLY FEB TO MEET WITH A MANAGER OF
FRENCH/LIBYAN SEA COMPANY (NFl).
D. MOHAMMED ABU-((JAMAL», SYRIAN CITIZEN AND OWNER OF THE
PHOENICIAN (MIDDLE EASTERN) RESTAURANT, SOLD THE DINER TO SOME
PALESTINEANS AFTER INCURRING SEVERE DEBT. P/1 REPORTED THAT THE
PHOENICIAN HAS BECOME A GATHERING PLACE FOR THE LOCAL PALESTINEAN
COMMUNITY.
E. COLONEL ABU GHASAM IL-((GHANGA», CHIEF LIBYAN MILITARY
INTELLIGENGE, STAYED IN MALTA FOR TEN DAYS IN LATE DEC 89, THEN
DEPARTED FOR EGYPT.
F. LAMIN ((FIHMA», FORMER LAA STATION MANAGER AND PARTNER
IN MEDTOURIST SERVICES, A JOINT LIBYAN-MALTESE TOURIST COMPANY
WHICH P/1 REPORTED AS A POSSIBLE COVER COMPANY FOR ESO OPERATIONS
IN MALTA, VISITED MALTA TWICE IN JAN. HE MET WITH THE MALTESE
PARTNER VINCENT ((VASSALLO» AND APPARENTLY THREW A PARTY FOR THE
MEDTOURIST STAFF. PER P/1, ESO CHIEFI I IS UPSET WITH
FIHMA WHOM HE BELIEVES IS UNDERTAKING SEPARATE OPERATIONS ON MALTA
APART FROM HIS OWN TASKING. P/1 IDENTIFIED THE LOCATION OF
MEDTOURIST AS IN MOSTA ACROSS. FROM THE SUBARU DEALERSHIP.
4. P/1 OBTAINED PARA THREE INFORMATION FROM HIS OWN
OBSERVATIONS OR FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH FRIENDS/CONTACTS IN THE
LIBYAN COMMUNITY. HE COULD PROVIDE NO DETAILED INFORMATION AS TO
THE EXACT PURPOSE OF ANY OF THESE TRAVELLERS' VISITS DESPITE C/O'S
LENGTHY QUESTIONING. P/1 SAID THAT HE RARELY EXCHANGED MORE THAN
GREETINGS WITH ANY OF THESE PEOPLE.
5. P/1'S FUTURE: P/1 SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN MEETING
REGULARLY WITH FATI ((IJWALI}), A LIBYAN ENGINEER, WHO IS THE
DIRECTOR MANAGER OF "GOLDEN IMPEX" A JOINT LIBYAN/WEST GERMAN
IMPORT EXPORT FIRM WITH AN OFFICE IN MANOEL ISLAND NEAR SLIEMA.
P/1 WOULD LIKE TO REPRESENT GOLDEN IMPEX ON MALTA OR IN LIBYA. HE
ALSO REITERATED HIS INTENTION TO OBTAIN A POSITION WITH THE
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE FROM WHICH HE WOULD NEED TO OBTAIN
PERMISSION TO WORK FOR GOLDEN IMPEX. RE HIS MARRIAGE PLANS, P/1
DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS UNTIL HIS FUTURE. IS. CLEAR.
6. ADMIN: SINCE P/1 WAS IN A CAR ACCIDENT, HE REQUESTED JAN
SALARY TO PAY FOR THE DAMAGES. P/1 HAS APPARENTLY SPENT THE LARGE
SUM OF MONEY C/O PAID HIM IN DEC ON HIS MOCK SURGERIES, RENTAL CAR,
HOTEL AND LIVING EXPENSES.
7. ASSESSMENT: WHILE WE HAD OUR DOUBTS ABOUT P/1 SHOWING UP
ON 13 FEB, HIS FINANCIAL SITUATION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A MAJOR
MOTIVATING FACTOR IN MEETING WITH C/O. RE EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT
CONTACT IN DEC, WE QUESTION IF P/l MADE A DEDICATED EFFORT, BUT WE
WILL ADJUST HIS COMMO PLAN
TO AVOID ANY P
~~--tr~l'S PROCRASTINATION BEYOND REASONABLE LIMITS IS TESTING
Page 2

" , ,I
~I ~==~~I PATIENCE. WE WELCOME HQS THOUGHTS/COMMENTS ON THIS
ISSUE.
END OF MESSAGE
Paqe 3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
l.VK: .lJ.lJ

,1 .
f
4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, C/O EXPLAINED THAT WASHINGTON
HAD ENDED HIS SALARY PAYMENTS SINCE HE WAS UNWILLING TO CONFORM TO
. THE REQUIREMENTS OF A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP. P/1 APPEARED
UNPERTURBED, BUT AS PROOF OF HIS CONTINUING ACCESS TO LOW-LEVEL
INTEL, HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING IN ADDITION TO REF INFORMATION:
---IN MID-MAY, FORMER LAA EMPLOYEE LAMIN ((FIHMA)) WHO IS
CURRENTLY PART OWNER OF ESO-FUNDED "MEDTOURIST SERVICES" TRAVELED
TO JORDAN AND EGYPT. ONE OF P/1'S FRIENDS ENCOUNTERED FIHMA AT THE
CAIRO AIRPORT VIP SECTION AND ASKED HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING. FIHMA
REPLIED THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN SOME JOB WITH AN "AFRICAN
PRESIDENT" (NFl) IN EGYPT.
---MALTA ESO CHIEF I
I TOLD P/1 THAT HE HAS
EXTENDED His TOUR IN MAL1A BOT wANtS 1'0 DEVELOP AN OUTSIDE BUSINESS
. INTEREST. HE HAS TENTATIVELY AGREED TO P/1'S PLAN TO IMPORT
ELECTRONIC TOYS FROM TAIWAN TO MALTA FOR RE-EXPORT TO LIBYA. P/1
HAS FOUND A MALTA LABOR PARTY PARTNER, CARMELLO ((VELLA)), AND WILL
USEI I BROTHER IN TRIPOLI TO IMPORT THE GOODS. c=JSAID HE WILL
INVEST USD 15,000 AND P/1 USD 12,000 INTO THE VENTURE. P/1 WANTS
TO IMPORT THESE GOODS TO LIBYA VIA MALTA TO AVOID PAYING HIGH
TARIFFS. P/1 REQUESTED C/O'S ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING ADDRESSES OF
TWO TO THREE TAIWANESE TOY COMPANIES FOR USE WITH HIS FLEDGLING
BUSINESS. REQUEST HQS PROVIDE STATION WITH THIS EASILY OBTAINABLE
INFORMATION WHICH WE COULD USE WITH P/1 AT NEXT MEETING AS AN
EXAMPLE OF THE LEVEL OF OUR COMMITMENT TO. HIM.
---~COMPLAINED TO P/1 THAT THE ESO OFFICER UNDER ISLAMIC
CALL SOCIETT COVER, COLONEL 'ALI MUHAMMAD AL-((SAMI'I)), HAS
STEPPED UP HIS REPORTING ON LIBYANS IN MALTA. c==J HEARD ABOUT
SAMI'I'S ACTIVITIES INDIRECTLY FROM HIS CONTACTS IN TRIPOLI AND
APPEARED TO BE CONCERNED THAT SAMI'I WAS THREATENING HIS OWN
POSITION AS THE CHElF OF ESO OPERATIONS IN MALTA.
5. P/1 SAID HE WILL PROBABLY RETURN TO MALTA IN ONE TO THREE
MONTHS AFTER HE OBTAINS HIS RELEASE FROM THE MILITARY (BASED ON HIS
I rFUNDED MOCK OPERATIONS) AND ESTABLISHES HIS BUSINESS.
ASKED ABOUT HIS CURRENT PRIORITIES, P/1 RANKED BUSINESS NUMBER ONE
AND OBTAINING A JOB IN THE REVCOM LOW ON HIS LIST. P/1 HAS FINALLY
MARRIED HIS MALTESE GIRLFRIEND WHO IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN LIBYA.
7. I IASSESSMENT AND PLANS: FROM OUR HANDLING OF P/1,
IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT P/1 RESIGNED FROM THE ESO SHORTLY BEFORE HE
Page 2

WALKED INTO THE U.S. EMBASSY AND MET WITH I 10FFICERS. SINCE
THEN, HE HAS STEADILY ATTEMPTED TO WEAN HIMSELF AWAY FROM INVOLVE­
MENT IN LIBYAN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPTING TO BUILD A
PERSONAL BUSINESS INSTEAD. WE BELIEVE THAT P/l HAS NOT FALLEN
UNDER HOSTILE CONTROL BUT HAS SIMPLY LOST ACCESS NEARLY TWO YEARS
AFTER RESIGNING FROM THE ESO. HE IS STILL WILLING TO PROVIDE
WHATEVER INFORMATION HE CAN PASSIVELY GLEAN FROM HIS CONTACTS IN
MALTA AND LIBYA, BUT HAS BASICALLY LOST INTEREST IN ACTIVELY
PURSUING OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AT THE USG'S BEHEST.
AT BEST,
I I CONSIDERS P/l TO BE A COOPERATIVE CONTACT. HE RECOGNIZES
THAT HE NO LONGER RECEIVES A REGULAR SALARY WHICH WAS ENDED
EFFECTIVE FEB 90. NEVERTHELESS, I IDESIRES FURTHER C/O
CONTACT WITH P/l WHO MAY YET DEVELOP INFORMATION OF OPERATIONAL OR
INTELLIGENCE INTEREST IN THE LONG TERM. WE ARE PARTICULARLY
INTERESTED IN KEEPING TABS ON~THROUGH P/l'S CONTINUING CONTACT
WITH HIM. I
WELCOM~L-____________ ~~OMMENTS.
Of MESSAGE
Paqe 3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: 1 ? ," JUL 91
1
-- --- - - - ----- -- -- -
1
- -
SUBJECT. 1
FORc==JCENTER:
1- PAN AM 103.----'--__ --...-_---l1 READY TO TRAVEL
PLEASE ADVISELI ___ ----1fF THIS MESSAGE.
ACTION:
SEE BELOW.
1. C/O 1 1 MET WITH 1 b(PIl) 1
'I-------;IEVEN I NG 10 JUL 91. HE LOO KE D vv RRI E D '-TA""NTTO"----':R"E'"'A"O""'x'---"IITTO"'---------.J
DISCOSS buSINESS AT HAND. WITHOUT, PROMPTING FROM C/O, P/1
EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD MET WITH LAMIN ((FHlMAH)) CA ONE MONTH
EARLIER. P/1 HAD REQUESTED HIS ASSISTANCE TO OBTAIN HIS ESO
RELEASE PAPERS FROM ABD AL-BASIT AL-((MAGRAHI)). PER P/1, FHlMAH
CAME BACK WITH A MESSAGE DIRECTLY FROM ABDALLAH ((SANUSSI)) THAT
NEITHER HE NOR FHlMAH WERE PERMITTED TO LEAVE LIBYA BECAUSE OF PAN
AM 103 AND THE "PROBLEMS" PER FHlMAH THAT HAD BEEN CREATED IN
MALTA. FHlMAH FURTHER SAID THAT VINCENT ((VASSALLO)) HAD KEPT THEM
INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS IN THE INVESTIGATION AND IMPLIED THAT THE
"CIA" AND "OTHER SECRET SERVICES" HAD THICK FILES ON BOTH OF THEM.
FHlMAH ADDITIONALLY SAID THAT THE USD 150,000 THAT AL-MAGRAHI HAD
USED TO FOUND MED TOURS WAS FROZEN IN A BANK IN SW'ITZERLAND. UPON
CONSIDERATION OF ABOVE, AND FACT THAT HE HAD PASSED I 1 SOME
10 KG OF A YELLOW EXPLOSIVE (PROBABLY SEMTEX) IN 1988 wHICH P/1
SAID HE HAD REPORTED AT THE TIME, RUMORS IN LIBYA THAT 'IZZ AL-DIN
((HINSHIRI)) (WHO P/1 REPORTED EARLIER APPROVED THE MED TOURS
OPERATION) MAY ASSUME MINISTER OF INTERIOR POSITION, IN CONJUNCTION
WITH C/O'S 28 JUN TELEPHONE CALL, CONVINCED HIM IT WAS TIME TO
LEAVE. P/1 DEPARTED LIBYA WITH HIS WIFE FOR TUNIS ON 7 JUL, FLEW
TO MALTA AND HAS BEEN WAITING TO CONTACT C/O VIAl
IWHO
RETURNED MALTA FOR SHORT VISIT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE EOR IHE OK.
2. P/1 WAS VERY CLEAR THAT HE PREFERS NOT RETURNING TO LIBYA
AND WILL PROVIDE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE IS NECESSARY. HE IS WILLING
TO TRAVEL ANYWHERE, BUT WISHES TO AVOID DEPARTING FROM LUQA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. AS WE THOUGHT, P/1 IS CONCERNED THAT HE
Page 1

COULD BE SPOTTED BY LIBYANS WHO COULD FORCE THE MALTESE GOVERNMENT
TO RETURN HIM TO LIBYA. HE SUGGESTED DEPARTING BY SEA IF POSSIBLE.
AT THIS JUNCTURE, P/l WILL CONSIDER LEAVING HIS WIFE IN MALTA
UNTIL A LATER DATE WHEN HE CAN BE REUNITED WITH HER. P/l AND HIS
WIFE ARE STAYING WITH HER PARENTS.
3. THE BALL DOES SEEM TO BE IN OUR COURT. NEXT MEETING WITH
P/l SCHEDULED FOR 11 JUL, 2100 HRS, AT I
I
4. I I IN BEST CASE SCENARIO, WE SHOULD PROBABLY MOVE
P/l OUT OF MALTA BEFORE 12-13 JUL, THEREFORE, REQUEST I
STAND DOWN ON PLANS FOR TRAVEL TO MALTA. APPRECIATE Y~O~O~R~O~E~E~E~R-.~
END OF5MESl~S~Al,G~E~--------------------C5~~~~~E~I,-----------------~
Page 2

(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: llllUUZ ~ ~.l
--- --- -- ---- -- -- -- --
.J
l
-
SUBJECT.
- 11 JULY 91 LI ____---.JI MEETING
SUMMARY: I ~P/l) CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS MEETING
WITH DOJ PERSONNEL IS NOT A GUARANTEE OF FUTURE ASSISTANCE OR
SUPPORT AND MAY RESULT IN HIS RETURN TO MALTA WITHOUT COMPENSATION.
DUE TO P/l'S RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE HIS WIFE AND IN-LAWS PREMATURELY,
CAR PICK UP TO BEGIN EXFIL RESCHEDULED FOR SATURDAY, 13 JULY, 1600
HRS LOCAL. END SUMMARY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
1. C/OI IBRIEFED P/l ON THE DETAILS OF HIS UPCOMING
MEETING WITH DOJ PERSONNEL AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN C/O'S
INTEREST TO DATE IN P/l AND THE DOJ'S POTENTIAL USE OF HIM AS A
WITNESS. C/O STATED FORTHWRIGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEES
OF FUTURE SUPPORT FOR P/l, THE DOJ PERSONNEL WOULD EITHER ACCEPT
HIM OR REJECT HIM AS A WITNESS BASED ON HIS RESPONSE TO THEIR
INQUIRIES. IF THEY DETERMINE THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
INFO, THE USG WOULD RETURN P/l TO MALTA ANDd
~WOULD
CONSIDER CONTINUING THE RELATIONSHIP. ALTH UGH Pll WA NOT
ENTIRELY SANGUINE TO WHAT MAY HAPPEN TO HIM - "MY FUTURE IS DARK"
PER P/l - HE AGREED TO THE MEETING TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO
COMBAT WHAT HE CONSIDERS THE "BUTCHERS OF LIBYA." P/l REMINDED C/O
THAT HE LEFT BEHIND HIS FAMILY, HIS HOME AND HIS POSSESSIONS IN
ORDER TO LEAVE AND FACES AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. P/l ADDED THAT
QADHAFI'S SUPPORTERS KILL PEOPLE LIKE FLIES.
2. FOLLOWING ABOVE, P/l RECOUNTED HIS DEPARTURE FROM LIBYA.
HE HAD A MECHANIC FRIEND WHO SERVED A ONE-MONTH SENTENCE FOR
ANTI-QADHAFI ACTIVITIES DRIVE HIM TO THE TUNISIAN BORDER ON 3 JULY.
THERE HE CROSSED INTO TUNIS!A BY FOOT AND HE AND HIS WIFE TOOK A
TAXI TO TUNIS WHERE THEY STAYED AT THE CARLTON HOTEL. PER P/l, HE
DID NOT TELL ANYONE EXCEPT FOR THE MECHANIC THAT HE WANTED TO LEAVE
LIBYA. WHEN P/l'S WIFE'S FATHER CALLED P/l'S FAMILY ON 6 JULY,
THEY TOLD HIM THAT P/l MAY HAVE TRAVELLED ABROAD, PERHAPS TO
ITALY. P/l CROSSED OVER TO MALTA VIA TUNISAVIA ON 7 JULY AND
Page 1

CALLEDJ
lWHO UNFORTUNATELY DID NOT RELAY A
CLEAR ESSAGE 10 I WhEN /1 RETURNED TO MALTA ON 10 JULY,
HE CONTACTED HER AND SHE RELAYED THE INFO TO I
I
I I UPON ARRIVAL IN MALTA, P/1 ENCOUNTERED
DALAL MILODI ((NASSAR}), SYSTEMS ADMINSTRATOR AT THE JERMA PALACE
HOTEL, AND THEY EXCHANGED GREETINGS. SINCE THEN, P/1 HAS NEITHER
SPOKEN NOR SEEN ANYONE ON THE ISLAND. HE ADVISED HIS WIFE'S
IN-LAWS NOT TO LET ANYONE KNOW HE IS HERE.
3. DURING HIS STAY IN LIBYA, P/1 HAS REMAINED ON THE ESO
ROSTER AS HIS RESIGNATION HAS LANGUISHED. P/1 HAS NO IDEA WHY HE
HAS NOT BEEN SEPARATED FROM THE SERVICE. THE LAST TIME HE STOPPED
AT ESO HQS TO CHECK ON HIS SITUATION WAS TWO WEEKS PREVIOUS WHEN HE
MET ABDALLAH ((MANSUR» AND LT. COL. IL-TULHAMI ((KHALID», CHIEF
OPS, WHO HAD NO NEWS TO REPORT. P/1 SAID THAT HE HAS KEPT HIS
DISTANCE FROM THE ESO WHILE ON EXTENDED LWOP AND STAYED AT HIS
PARENT'S RESIDENCE.
4. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, P/1 WAXED ABOUT RUMORS
CIRCULATING IN LIBYA ABOUT HOW QADHAFI HAD STAYED QUIET DURING THE
GULF WAR BECAUSE HE HAD MADE A DEAL WITH THE USG TO RECEIVE
DISSIDENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS COOPERATION. HE ALSO SAID THAT MANY
SAY 6
I ABANDONS ITS LIBYAN AGENT.S ONCE THEY HAVE NO
FURT ER USE EaR THEM. AS A FURTHER ASIDE ABOUT HIS FUTURE IN
MALTA, HE BLUNTLY NOTED THAT THE MALTESE WOULD DO ANYTHING FOR
MONEY, AND THOSE AT THE TOP OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WOULD GLADLY
TURN HIM OVER IT MEANT MAKING SOME CASH. WE SUBMIT P/1'S THOUGHTS
TO GIVE AN IDEA OF HIS STATE OF MIND DURING THE MEETING. ON A MORE
RATIONALE LEVEL, HE REQUESTED THAT ARABISTS BE ON HAND DURING THE
DOJ BRIEIFNG SO HE CAN FULLY EXPLAIN ALL OF HIS INFORMATION.
5. RE THE EXFIL DEPARTURE DATE, P/1 COULD NOT AGREE TO
MORNING 12 JULY SINCE IT WOULD NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT TIME TO TAKE
CARE OF SOME BANKING MATTERS. ADDITIONALLY, P/1 WANTS TO DO
SOMETHING FOR HIS IN-LAWS WHO HAVE GENEROUSLY HOSTED THE COUPLE, SO
HE INTENDS TO SLAUGHTER A SHEEP FOR THEM ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY
MORNING. SINCE C/O WARNED P/1 OF POTENTIAL SECURITY RISKS OF
WAITING UNTIL 15 JULY AS HE INITIALLY SUGGESTED, P/1 RELENTED TO
THE 13 JULY DEPARTURE.
BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO
HOUSE P/1 AND ESCORT C/O UNTIL THE SEA EXFIL DEPARTURE DATE 13-15
JULY. WE WOULD PREFER AS QUICK A DEPARTURE AS POSSIBLE IN THIS
REGARD.
END OF MESSAGE
Page 2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2008
(b) (1)
(b) (2)
(b) (3)
(S)
TOR: 1311l9Z JUL 91
I
I
SUBJECT:
I READY FOR EXFIL
~ ____ ~. LATE EVENING 12 JULY, I I (P/l) SIGNALLED CIO
FOR EMERGENCY MEETING FOR l~ JOLI, 1100HRS, AT
AT THE TIME HE DID NOT SOUND GOOD. ~--~----------~
10 j ~ND
~--------L---------~fU~~~~~~~nr.~~~~~~·T WllH PlIo AS
~~USPECTEU~~~~-HAVING RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE OFF-ISLAND
MEETING SINCE WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE ANY CONCRETE COMMITMENTS
ABOUT HIS FUTURE. DURING A RATHER EMOTIONAL DESCUSSION, Pil
REVEALED THAT HIS WIFE IS FOUR MONTHS PREGNANT AND WITH THE ADDED
RESPONSIBILITY OF A FAMILY HE NEEDED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT HIS
SECURITY. WITHOUT MAKING ANY FIRM COMMITMENTS AND PEGGING THE DOJ
MEETING AS Pll'S ONLY HOPE FOR HIS WIFE AND THE BABY, I ~ND
I IWERE ABLE TO CONVINCE pil OF THE MERITS OF THE EXFIL
SCHEDOLED TO BEGIN LATER IN THE AFTERNOON. WHILE WE WOULD HAVE
PREFERRED BRINGING HIM UNDER OUR WING WITH THIS MEETING, IT IS
NECESSARY FOR Pil TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITH HIS WIFE AND TELL HER
! THAT HE IS GOING TO TUNIS ON BUSINESS. I
3. pil HIMSELF IS A SHATTERED PERSON. HE HAS NO INTENTION
OF RETURNING TO LIBYA AND PREFERS NOT REMAINING IN MALTA WHERE HE
BELIEVES HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER. HE COMPLAINED OF NOT BEING ABLE TO
SLEEP AND BEING CONCERNED ABOUT PEOPLE KNOCKING ON THE DOOR OR
CALLING HIM. IN THE END, HE CONCLUDED THAT WHILE THE PATH THE USG
OFFERED WAS NOT FIRM BY ANY MEANS, IT IS THE ONLY ONE. PIl
Page 1

,~
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE HAS BURNED ALL HIS
g
BRIDGES.
4. TOWARD END OF THE MEETING, EXCUSED
HIMSELF I I
I C/O 1 I AND p/1 HAD
AN EXIRA 15 [iiJINOIE;oS IOGElhEK OUKll'm " ALL OF THE BUILT UP
EMOTIONS SURROUNDING THIS CASE FLOWED. P/1 WAS SOBBING. P/1
TRUSTS I lIN HIS WORDS AS A FRIEND AND A BROTHER. HE SAID THAT
HE IS WORRIED ABOUT HIS PARENTS AND SIBLINGS IF HIS NAME SHOULD
EVER BECOME KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC. IN THIS REGARD, P/1 WAS QUITE
CLEAR THAT HE WILL AID IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO FIGHT TERRORISM BY
SHARING HIS INFORMATION, BUT HE IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL
BLOWBACK TO HIS FAMILY BACK IN LIBYA IF HIS NAME WERE TO EVER BE
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS. THIS IS AN ISSUE WE WILL NEED TO ADDRESS
WITH DOJ. WE ASSUME THAT HQS IS LOOKING INTO WHAT CAN BE DONE TO
PROTECT P/1 ' S IDENTITY FROM BECOMING PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.
5. ON THE SUBJECT OF COMPENSATION, P/1 ' S SITUATION APPEARS
CLEAR TO US. IF HE IS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE DOJ, WE SHOULD CONSIDER
HIM FOR WHAT HE IS - A DEFECTOR FROM A SENSITIVE POSITION WHO HAS
SERVED I JFAITHFULLY SINCE HIS WALK-IN IN 1988. WE CONCUR
IN P/1 I S ASSESS[vlE'JT THAT HE CANNOT NOW RETURN TO LIBYA AND THAT
STAYING IN MALTA COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS.
END OF MESSAGE
,/
Page 2

DCI
CUW1tcrtcrrorist
Center
TOP SECRET UMl~{""'"
NOFORN N
/1- m (cj2...a
8 - J>A-tf)
,;fTr1rrm~---- COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER COMMENTARY
Central
InteIUgence
Agency.
'DCr"c T
\.
15 December 1993
._ ._:: • ..:l
The Disappearance of Libyan oppositionist Mansur Kikhia
summary
The available evidence suggests that prominent Libyan
dissident Mansur Kikhia was abducted by Liby~
~arance comes on the heels of~
~ that indicate Libyan leader Q-adhaf~ is inten't
on reactivating Tripoli's
ate
Kikhia arrived in Cairo on
ing of the Arab Organization for
Human Rights (1-2 December) and afterwards visited family
members in Alexandria. He returned to Cairo to meet his
brother--a Libyan resident--on 11 December and planned to
depart for Paris on 12 December. Kikhia failed to meet his
brother who persuaded the hotel management to allow him into
Kikhia's room on 12 December. Kikhia was gone but his
ed his insul diabetes.
The Libyan Hand
There is strong circumstantial evidence that the Libyan
government abducted
minister and
i
APproved for Release
Date, JUN lOOP
NOFOI: N:FC;:>N~_~ON
TOP SEC RA GAMMA
ORVD fR HET 19-82

I ..
There are other indicators that Tripoli may have stepped up
pursuit of oppositionists:
o
o
On 12 December, Qadhafi publicly vowed to crush Libyan
oppositionists in exile and called for the assassination
of ~'"~m ~l-Huni, a prominent Egypt-based Libyan
oppositionist.
In several speeches over the past two months, Qadhafi has
accused Libyan oppositionists of working for US
intelligence ies.
HANDLE ~NNELS ONLY 2 SC# 09617-93
NOFORN NOCO CT ORCON
TOP SE UMBRA GAMMA

· .
TOP SECRET
~~GAMMA
NOFORN NOC9JW"fitAC:T ORCON
"'.
3
NOFORN Noeo CT ORCON
TOP SEC UMBRA GAMMA
SC# 09617-93

Wllhi'y;b'lO C.2Om
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
RTf 1143/93
Libyan Sanctions: /Situation Report #52
15 December 1993 1600 EDT
Highlights of sanctions-related developments over the past
two weeks include:
o
Libyan dissidents claim Tripoli's intelligence service
abducted Mansur Kikhia, a Libyan oppositionist and US
resident, in Cairo in mid-December. If true, it would be
the first act of Libyan terrorism since 1990._
p. 9
The nex~ Libyan Sanctions Situation Report will be
publish'ed on 5 January 1994.
This situation report was prepared by analysts of the Directorate
of' Intelligence and is lished on alternate Wedne
... ..-.#:_"-.
~ \ .. i:
.~~

,-
Libyan Reactions
Qadhafi vowed at a public "rally on 12 December to crush
exiled opponents and called for the assassination of former
Foreign Minister Abd-al-Munim al-Huni. Libyan dissidents have
told the press that Qadhafi's agents abducted prominent dissident
ident Mansur Kikhia in Cairo about the same t'
If Libya is
be the first time Tripoli has moved against him, but it would be
the first confirmed operation against a Libyan dissident overseas
since 1987 and the first act of terrorism since 1990. If true,
- the abduction coupled with har ~ler Libyan rhetoric toward the

I
•
, '
"'~. .
i@4
West in recent
the Pan Am 103
stance on
Qadhafi asked
Am 103 affair in
the Vatican.
International Reactions
France and Belgium both rejected Libyan proposals in late
Novembe~ to ~ the two Pan An 103 suspects in France and Belgium
es ectlvely. - _
The French judge investigating the UTA bombing also
re]ecte a Libyan offer to cooperate on that issue. The judge
did not view it as a serious offer, citing its lack 0
specificity and the pUblicity given to it by Tripoli.
tiii.

..
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FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUFQBBA/US SURVEY SHAPE BE
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC//KT//
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//
RUEABOA/HQ AFOSI IOC BOLLING AFB DC//DTA//
RUFTAKA/UCIRF AUGSBURG GE
RUEALGX/SAFE
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FM CIA
TO RUEAIJU/NPIC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA
RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//FOR INR
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
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RUCNFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RHEBAAA/DOEHQ//IN
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOA
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2//N22//
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-CI-CIS/AEAGB-ID//
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CITE CIA 530875
PAGE:1125
SERIAL: TDFIRK-314/03058-94
/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY

;;;Jt'EL
PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK 00 DLS DE (FOR NSOC).
PAGE:1126
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS
DIST: 4 MARCH 1994
COUNTRY:
SUBJ:
LIBYA
BOMBING OF LIBYAN BOEING 727 FLYING FROM BENGHAZI TO
TRIPOLI IN DECEMBER 1992
,/ DO I:
21 DECEMBER 1992 - 12 OCTOBER 1993
\
SUMMARY: ON 21 DECEMBER 1992, THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE PAN AM 103
BOMBING, A REGULARLY SCHEDULED ~IBYAN AIRLINES PASSENGER PLANE
COLLIDED WITH
)
~- J
1,·,3
TEXT: 1. ON 21 DECEMBER 1992, THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE PAN AM
103 BOMBING, A REGULARLY SCHEDULED LIBYAN AIRLINES PASSENGER
BOEING 7~ FLYING FROM BENGHAZI TO TRIPOLI COLLID~D WITH A
MILITARY'
AS THE BOEING
727 BEGA~ 11~ LANDING APPROACH INTO 1.~lPOLI INTER~ATIONAL AIRPORT.
BOTH AIRCRAFT EXPLODED AND WERE DESTROYED. THERE WERE NO
SURVIVORS ABOARD THE BOEING 727 WHICH CONTAINED 150 TO 156
PASSENGERS AND A NUMBER OF CREW MEMBERS. THE TWOI' ~REW
~EMBERS EJECTED SAFELY. L
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SHORTLY
~FTER THE COLLISION LIBYAN LEADER MU'AMMAR AL-((QADHAFI)) PUBLICLY
~NNOUNCED THAT "AMERICA" OR THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY MAY HAVE
~EENRESPONSIBLE.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2003
(b) (1)
(b) (3)
Director of Central Intelligence
Copy 0348

Terrorism RevieG
June 1995
Articles
Libya: Reinvigorating Support for Terrorismc::::::::J
I
I
Libyan leader Mu'ammer al-Qadhafi has been rebuilding Libya's
links to terrorism during the last two years, negating the cosmetic
gestures he had made in the wake of UN sanctions in April 1992.
I I
Page
.-------------------------Ir-~·~
~et
~

HighlightsD
This review is published monthly by the DCI Counterterrorist
Center. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Executive Editor I
I
Information available as of 15 June 1995 was used in this Review.
ii

Libya: Reinvigorating Support
for Terrorism \ \
Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has begun
during the last two years to rebuild Libya's links to
terrorism, negating the cosmetic gestures he had
made in the wake of UN sanctions in April 1992.
Libya has increased its financial and logistic support
for Palestinian rejectionist and terrorist
groups, such as the PFLP-GC, and Qadhafi's intelligence
apparatus continues to target Libyan dissidents,
as evidenced by the December 1993
abduction of a prominent Libyan oppositionist in
Cairo. Nonetheless, Tripoli has refrained from
sponsoring anti-Western terrorist attacks since
sanctions were imposed to stave otT harsher measures,
such as a potentially regime-threatening UN
oil embargo. There is no evidence Libya is currently
planning to attack Western targets, and
reporting suggests that Qadhafi would be unlikely
to do so unless he believed his current policy of
restraint was no longer furthering his objectives.
\ \
A Few Cosmetic Measures
Following the indictments of two Libyan intelligence
officers in November 1991 and the UN imposition of
sanctions tor its downing of Pan Am 103 over Scotland
and a French airliner (UTA 772) in Africa, Libya
embarked on a campaign to reduce its terrorist profile to
avoid additional UN sanctions or a US military strike: I
• In December 1991, Qadhafi stated that the Abu
Nidal organization was not present in Tripoli.
• Also that month, Qadhafi named Yusif al-Dibri to
head the External Security Organization (ESO),
Libya's foreign intelligence service. \ \
\ pibri was chosen because
he was "clean," and his primary task was to improve
Libya's image with the West.
• In June 1992, Qadhafi publicly promised to close the
Islamic Call Society and the World Anti-Imperialism
Center,. Libyan-sponsored organizations that
the United States Government publicly identified
as being cover organizations for Libyan terrorist
activities.
• By August 1992, Libya had razed or partially dismantled\
\ terrorist training camps,
\ \ I
Reinvigorating Terrorist Links
Over the past two years Qadhafi has reversed some of
these measures and failed to follow through with others.
Despite Qadhafi's assurances regarding Abu
Nidal, for exampl~ \
I
IAbu Nidal maintains his headquarters and
his residence in TripolLI
Septem ber 1994, Qadha!..,n'-:r""e""p:T:1 a,-;:c:-;:e.."d......-;;c:r.le::-:a:-=n,......,EL:"S""O'""c:th:-:-l~efr
Debri with Musa Kusa, a Qadhafi loyalist and longtime
intelligence officer who is wanted by French
authorities for questioning about his involvement in
the UTA 772 bombing. While less active than before,
the Islamic Call Society continues to support insurgent
groups, and the Anti-Imperialism Center
remained open as of May 1995.\ \
Qadhafi also has resumed more active involvement in
terrorist-related activities. Qadhafi may have concluded
that he has little to fear from current UN sanctions;
the UN measures have had a minimal impact on
Libya's economy because they have not seriously
eroded oil revenues, which account for more than
95 percent of Libya's export earnings. \ \
~et
~

,.~
Trying To Sabotage the Peace Process. Since the
signing of the Gaza-Jericho accord in September
1993, Qadhafi has publicly condemned the peace
process and has stepped up support for groups that
violently oppose peace with Israel. This support,
however, is less than what Qadhafi provided to such
groups in the 1980s, when Libyan financial support
for terrorists worldwide was at its zenith:
·1 IQadhafi
had resumed funding by 1994 for the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command,
most of which Tripoli had cut in 1989, and had
become the PFLP-GC's primary foreign financial
Ispons", 1
• Libya has provided sporadic funding to the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction since its leader,
Fathi Shiqaqi, met with Qadhafi in December 1993,
L-__________________________________ ~
I
ity
• In November 1994, Libya and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PH) created an organization to carry
out intifada activities in the occupied territories,
• Qadhafi pledged in a March 1995 meeting in Tripoli
to provide the Islamic Resistance Movement
(HAMAS) and PIJ militants with resources to wage
the intifada, according to public statements made by
HAMAS and PH leadersl
I
Qadhafi remains an inconsistent sponsor of these
groups, however, undermining his ability to influence
or direct their activities. Libya has often been criti-
I ~:;; ~~~~:~T by to""oS< groups fo, boing an unre
1
1
Targeting Dissidents. Libya's primary intelligence
focus, apart from opposing the peace process, remains
keeping tabs on, and occasionally assassinating, Libyan
dissidents:
• Libya's most recent direct act of international terrorism
was its apparent abduction of Mansur Kikhiya, a
prominent dissident and US permanent resident, in
Cairo in December 1993. 2 1 1
• Libyan intelligence officers continue to monitor Libyan
dissidents in a number of countries in Europe
and the Middle East.
Qadhafi's More Aggressive Stance Likely To
Continue
Because Libya's resumption of rhetorical and financial
support for rejectionist groups has not resulted in
new international sanctions, Qadhafi is likely to follow
his past pattern of increasing his support until he
meets opposition. Violent opposition to Israel has
been a cornerstone of Qadhafi's foreign policy since
he came to power in 1969, and he will not forego this
pohcy easily. Antldlssldent operations remain a pnor­
for Libyan intelligence, but we expect that the ESO
will be careful about selecting targets for assassination
to avoid possible Western retribution. c::::J
Qadhafi has refrained from any attacks against the West
since sanctions were imposed to stave off more serious
international sanctions. Qadhafi likely would reconsider
his standdown on anti-Western terrorism if he believed
that the United States or other Western countries
intended to implement actions that could threaten' his
I "'gimo. such '" tho imposition of, UN oil omb""o.
2 According to the US Code. "terrorism" is premeditated. politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets
by subnational groups or clandestine agents. usually intended to
influence an audience. "International terrorism" is terroris")------,
involving citizens or the territory of more than one country~
This article i~
.... ~ ... -----------'
2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2003
(b) (1)
(b) (3)
~------.----. --~
National
Intelligence
Daily
Saturday, 8 February 1997
~t
I ..
8 FebrUGry 1997

Table of Contents
Europe
Germany-Libya: Libyans Indicted for Disco Bombiru!..
o
~eret
8Febru~

SOUTH ASIA
EUROPE
Germany -Libya:
Libyans Indicted for Disco BombingD
German senior prosecutor Dieter Neumann yesterday announced the
indictment of five defendants, including a former Libyan security officer,
for the bombing in 1986 of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin. The trial
will begin in late June and may last up to two years. Libyan leader Qadhafi
has not yet responded publicly to the indictments. Four former Libyan
officials who allegedly participated in the attack are still wanted by
German authorities.
-It is unlikely that Libya will help German authorities apprehend
these officials, given Qadha./i's refusals to extradite the Pan Am
103 and UTA 772 bombing suspects. I I
9
~""et
;;;rru~

.L
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2003
(b) (1)
(b) (3)
'r:","·:,;,·" ~ -'? s . . .j. .~~"--~-~.-.-.---
TIER
.'. .):.; ~~.
,.{ ':.'
J~NUARY 1888;'
''.
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Articles
Terrorism ReviewD
January 1999
Libya Maintains Ties to International Terrorist Activity D
I I
Libya continues to maintain the infrastructure and state institutions
to support terrorism, despite its efforts to appear to be distancing
itself from international terrorism to gain reprieve from the UN
sanctions imposed in 1992. The External Security Organization,
which is Libya's primary intelligence body and is linked to dissident
abductions and assassinations, continued its active monitoring of
Libyan dissidents worldwide. Libya still maintains ties to Palestinian
rejectionists and other radical groups. In addition, Libya continues to
refuse to cooperate with investigations into past terrorist acts-some
dating back more than a decade. On the positive side, we have seen
no indication in the past several years that Libya has been involved
directly in terrorism against the West.c::::::::J
Page
1
~
January 1999
-~---~--~-~~---~-----~--~--~~~~---.---- -.

Highlights
I-
I-
ii

Key Dates and Events
-
-
Emerging Terrorist
Threat
This review is published monthly by the DCI Counterterrorist
Icenre~~1 __________________________________________ ~
Information available as of22 January 1999 was used in this
Review.
Reverse Blank
iii

Libya Maintains Ties to
International Terrorist Activity
I I
Libya continues to maintain the infrastructure and
state institutions to support terrorism, despite its
efforts to appear to be distancing itself from international
terrorism to gain reprieve from the UN
sanctions imposed in 1992. The External Security
Organization, which is Libya's primary intelligence
body and is linked to dissident abductions
and assassinations, continued its active monitoring
of Libyan dissidents worldwide. Libya still maintains
ties to Palestinian rejectionists and other radical
groups. In addition, Libya continues to refuse
to cooperate with investigations into past terrorist
acts-some dating back more than a decade. On
the positive side, we have seen no indication in the
past several years that Libya has been directly
involved in terrorism against the WestO
Terrorism Infrastructure Remains ActiveD
Despite moves by the Libyan Government to reduce
its terrorism profile, significant elements of Libya's
terrorism infrastructure remain in place. Most notable
are the state institutions that have provided cover for
terrorist activity in the past. In June 1992, Libyan
leader Muarnmar al-Qadhafi publicly promised to
close the World Anti-Imperialism Center (Mathaba)
and the World Islamic Call Society (WICS)-both
used as cover organizations for past terrorist activities-but
their offices remain open and are increasinglyactive.
• The Mathaba, an organization created to provide
5
covert support to various rebels and "liberation"
movements, continues to disseminate pro-Libyan
and anti-Western propaganda and forge ties to for-
I=l:.ftion
groups and sympathetic fore;gn
• The WICS functions primarily as a conduit for
financial and other support to Islamic groups and
institutions abroad, and various reports suggest that
1
Islamic Call Society Web Site.D
Libya is using the organization to increase Libyan
influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The External Security Organization (ESO) is Libya's
preeminent overseas intelligence organization and
continues to monitor actively Liby~ dissidents,
I
IShortly after the two
Libyan suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
~Ls_e __ "'-I
January 1999

were indicted in November 1991, Qadhafi promised to
reform the ESO, which has been responsible for the
surveillance, abduction, and assassination of Libyan
dissidents abroad. We believe that given the importance
as well as the potential international repercussions
associated with anti-dissident operations,
Qadhafi probably is informed of-and continues to
demand-such activities.
groups, to include the Islamic Resistance Movement
(HAMAS), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (pFLP-GC).
• Although some information indicates Libya is working
to shut down the ANO's offices and training
facilitiesJ
I
IANO members in Libya received
paramilitary training including assassination techniques
and methods for booby trapping vehicles.
• Qadhafi publicly has endorsed HAMAS and PIJ
attacks in Israel, the West Ballk, and Gaza Strip and
has promised to provide financial backing for these
groups. I
I
• In November 1995 'Ali Mebmed Abu Zaid, a Libyan
dissident and vocal opponent of Qadhafi, was
murdered in London by unidentified assailants. No
compelling evidence was found to implicate Libya
in the attack. One month after the incident, however,
a senior Libyan diplomat with close ties to the ESO
and who had previously threatened ,dissidents was
expelled from the United Kingdoml
I
I
I
• The ESO was involved in the abduction in December
1993 in Cairo and subsequent execution of a former
Libyan foreign minister who defected in the 1970s
and was a vocal opponent of the regime. I I
I
I
Libyan Support for Extremistsc::::::::J
The Libyan Government continues to provide training,
safehaven, and financial and logistical support to
Palestinian rejectionists. i Qadhafi remains vehemently
opposed to the Middle East peace process (MEPP)
and publicly has condemned the Wye accord, saying
that terrorism would continue until Israel leaves the
occupied territories)
I
Qadhafi has continued to give financial support to
groups that oppose the MEPPJ
I
IHe also has
endorsed publicly the terrorist activities of various
I
I Libya served as the main sponsor for the Abu Nidal organization
(ANO) from 1987 until recently. I
~
I
I
Libya also supports extremist groups outside the
Middle East.
• The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a Philippine Muslim
terrorist organization and separatist group, receives
funds, arms, and other assistance from Libya
2

• Qadhafi also is funding the Philippines-based Moro
Islamic Liberation Organization (Mll..O)ll ~
I
I
~lthough this group has no direct links
to terrorist activity. its membership has expressed
admiration for Palestinian groups such as HAMAS
and the terrorist activities it engages in.
2 The Moro Islamic Liberation Organization is an organization
distinct from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. D
3

~t
authorities have agreed to try the Libyans in absentia
and recently informed the United States that the trial
will begin in March 1999.
Avoiding Accountability for Terrorist ACtsc::::::::J
Tripoli does not cooperate fully with authorities investigating
bombings that implicate Libya. Ten years
after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, for example,
Qadhafi continues to provide refuge to the two Libyan
suspects and has not affirmed he will allow them to be
tried in the Netherlands as the United States and the
United Kingdom have proposed.
• Qadhafi has not followed through on his promise to
support the German investigation of the 1986 bombing
of La Belle discotheque in Berlin, which killed
two US servicemen and wounded more than 200. He
continues to shelter several former Libyan officials
who allegedly participated in that attack. c::::::::J
This article is Secret LI
____ -l
• Libya has cooperated somewhat with the French
investigation into the bombing in 1989 of UTA
Flight 772, but Qadhafi has not turned over the six
Libyan suspects to French authorities. One suspect
is Abdallah al-Sanusi, a high-ranking Libyan intelligence
official and Qadhafi's brother-in-law. French
4

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