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Advocacy in Cambodia: Increasing Democratic ... - Pact Cambodia

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Case Studies<br />

EMO members did not feel that it would be useful<br />

to advocate this position as they felt women should<br />

be better educated first. Eventually however, the<br />

EMOs agreed to advocate for the NEC to adopt a<br />

policy encourag<strong>in</strong>g political parties to promote<br />

party lists comprised of 30% women candidates.<br />

Some women’s groups felt they could work directly<br />

with the parties to promote this objective.<br />

The EMOs spent considerable time and effort<br />

advocat<strong>in</strong>g for the proposed changes <strong>in</strong> the draft<br />

CCEL by us<strong>in</strong>g the strategies described below. The<br />

law was f<strong>in</strong>ally passed <strong>in</strong> March 2001, but none of<br />

the proposed changes were <strong>in</strong>corporated. The only<br />

change that was <strong>in</strong>corporated was the backup<br />

position regard<strong>in</strong>g the composition of the NEC.<br />

NGO Coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g Committee (NGOCC)<br />

When the CCEL draft came out, NGOs were<br />

concerned about a provision to establish an NGO<br />

Coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g Committee (NGOCC) to coord<strong>in</strong>ate<br />

NGO observers and provide election education. No<br />

consultation had taken place with NGOs regard<strong>in</strong>g<br />

this provision <strong>in</strong> the draft. The government<br />

proposed that the NGOCC be comprised of<br />

representatives from EMOs, human rights groups,<br />

and other social justice NGOs listed by the<br />

M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior. The NEC would ultimately<br />

approve the NGOCC’s activities and have the<br />

power to dissolve it.<br />

EMOs feared that the Commune Council<br />

Election Law had been written <strong>in</strong> a way calculated<br />

to underm<strong>in</strong>e the <strong>in</strong>dependence of EMOs, by<br />

giv<strong>in</strong>g the NGOCC the ability to monitor NGO<br />

f<strong>in</strong>ances and control the NGO election statement.<br />

EMOs decided to lobby for a reduction <strong>in</strong> the<br />

NGOCC’s power and subsequently met with a<br />

number of legislators and government officials to<br />

expla<strong>in</strong> their views. The M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior<br />

countered that the NGOCC was simply a<br />

mechanism to ensure that every poll<strong>in</strong>g station<br />

had an observer, but it did eventually agree to<br />

review articles concern<strong>in</strong>g the new agency’s<br />

formation.<br />

As late as March 2001, EMOs were still<br />

lobby<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st the NGOCC but <strong>in</strong> the end the<br />

government ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed its orig<strong>in</strong>al provisions. It<br />

was this issue that caused EMOs to consider<br />

withdraw<strong>in</strong>g from the election process.<br />

Intermediaries and legal advisors argued that<br />

articles describ<strong>in</strong>g the NGOCC’s role could be<br />

<strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong> a number of ways, and a liberal<br />

<strong>in</strong>terpretation would be acceptable. Donors<br />

understood the EMOs’ concerns, but felt that their<br />

threat to withdraw from the election process was<br />

unreasonable, as no action that compromised the<br />

EMOs’ <strong>in</strong>tegrity had actually occurred. The<br />

impasse was eventually surmounted through<br />

dialogue between the EMOs and the NEC<br />

Secretary General, first at COPCEL meet<strong>in</strong>gs, and<br />

then <strong>in</strong> follow-up meet<strong>in</strong>gs. In the discussions<br />

EMOs learned that NEC technical staff agreed with<br />

the EMOs’ <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the articles, and this<br />

put the EMOs more at ease.<br />

Unfortunately, the Secretary General’s<br />

<strong>in</strong>terpretation of the statute was different from the<br />

NEC’s, and EMOs cont<strong>in</strong>ued to perceive the<br />

NGOCC as an obstruction to their work. The<br />

NGOCC limited the EMOs’ direct access to the<br />

NEC, and tried to control the EMOs by sett<strong>in</strong>g<br />

conditions for the issuance of official NEC<br />

accreditation cards. For example, the NGOCC<br />

claimed that EMO requests for accreditation cards<br />

were made too early and that EMOs did not<br />

provide enough <strong>in</strong>formation. EMOs were not<br />

advised what additional <strong>in</strong>formation was needed<br />

however, and even after provid<strong>in</strong>g complete<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation some applications were still rejected.<br />

After study<strong>in</strong>g the law, COMFREL <strong>in</strong>formed<br />

the NGOCC that it had no right to reject requests,<br />

but rather could only <strong>in</strong>dicate if requests were<br />

satisfactory or not. Requests could only be denied<br />

by the NEC. Ultimately, EMOs simply bypassed<br />

the NGOCC, submitt<strong>in</strong>g their requests directly to<br />

the NEC, which did not risk reject<strong>in</strong>g EMO<br />

requests due to concerns about negative donor<br />

reactions.<br />

<strong>Advocacy</strong> Strategies<br />

Board members of election monitor<strong>in</strong>g<br />

coalition groups are for the most part committed<br />

staff of other human rights and governance<br />

organizations. EMO staff tends to be particularly<br />

experienced <strong>in</strong> the area of human rights. It comes<br />

as little surprise then that EMOs, even those<br />

organizations that are relatively young, are strong.<br />

A solid tradition of advocacy enables them to use<br />

a range of strategies to reach their objectives.<br />

Sett<strong>in</strong>g Objectives & Distribution of Tasks<br />

When the CCEL campaign was first<br />

envisioned, EMOs had at least 20 issues that they<br />

wanted to advocate. A critical part of their<br />

advocacy process was narrow<strong>in</strong>g down their<br />

objectives so that they could focus their energy on<br />

a few top priorities. Thus, out of 20 or so <strong>in</strong>itial<br />

objectives, only three objectives were reta<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />

Another step <strong>in</strong> their advocacy process was<br />

assign<strong>in</strong>g tasks to each organization accord<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

its capacity and availability. Examples <strong>in</strong>clude<br />

assign<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividuals to lobby<strong>in</strong>g delegations,<br />

establish<strong>in</strong>g a system for send<strong>in</strong>g emails, and<br />

assign<strong>in</strong>g groups to study<strong>in</strong>g articles <strong>in</strong> the draft<br />

law. While delegat<strong>in</strong>g tasks seems like a very basic<br />

strategy, the process of do<strong>in</strong>g so provided a good<br />

way of identify<strong>in</strong>g resources and comparative<br />

strengths between advocat<strong>in</strong>g groups <strong>in</strong> order to<br />

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