No Time to Lose - Oxfam

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“Security forces that abuse civilians do not win the populace’s trust and confidence; they may even be a cause of the insurgency. A comprehensive security force development program identifies and addresses biases as well as improper or corrupt practices.’ US Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, 2006 implicated powerbroker. No investigation was ever conducted. 71 Nor was there any investigation, apology or compensation following the shooting in Kandahar. 72 AIHRC’s research on mistreatment and abuse in law enforcement institutions found that of 171 complaints lodged, just three per cent had been investigated, and not one had resulted in prosecution. 73 In the case of civilian casualty incidents resulting from legitimate ANSF operations, transparent investigations are rarely conducted, and such incidents are almost never followed by appropriate apology and redress. The lack of accountability is nowhere more pronounced than in the case of the ALP. The theory is that ‘if an ALP member gets out of line, the complaints will be made to the elders’, and ‘the elders will then sit down with the leaders and say “this is unacceptable, you’ve got to clean up your act.” 74 But this theory assumes that community members feel able to raise complaints without fear of retaliation; that the elders act in the interests of their community and are not just former warlords using the platform of the ALP to provide legitimacy to their own militia; and that ALP recruits will accept the disciplinary measures imposed. But as one human rights worker remarks, ‘who cares about the shura? The ALP doesn’t care about the shura, and people don’t report things to the shura, either because of fear of retaliation, or because the shura lacks legitimacy, or just because they know that nothing will come of it.’ 75 Even where the right ingredients are in place – an ALP genuinely selected by a legitimate shura with the community’s interests at heart – a remaining question is what the shura can do with a problem that it is unable to solve. The theory is that shuras may refer issues to the district authorities. But the whole premise of the ALP program is that units are stood up where insecurity is such that regular police forces cannot be established. And if district authorities are unable to travel to the villages, it is difficult to see how they will support the shura in holding the ALP to account. Failure to combat abusive conduct on the part of the ANSF and the climate of impunity in which such abuse takes place, or to improve the government’s response to ‘collateral damage’, could have serious political repercussions. It is well understood that armed opposition groups are responsible both for the largest number of civilian casualties and for the most serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 76 – but Afghan communities harbour a strongly felt belief that their own security forces must be held to a higher standard. As one investigator with the AIHRC explained to Oxfam, ‘everybody knows that the Taliban abuse human rights, but people have more hope from their own forces. And where there’s a lot of hope, there’s a lot of blame.’ 77 Abuses on the part of the ANSF provoke outrage, and this outrage is exacerbated by a perceived lack 16
of accountability. ‘Collateral damage’ similarly provokes outrage where such incidents are not followed by appropriate investigation, apology and redress, including the payment of adequate compensation. This undermines popular support for (and the perceived legitimacy of) the GIRoA, thus undermining international efforts to foster the development of effective governance. 78 But addressing the accountability of the ANSF is not only a political imperative; it is also a legal obligation. The remainder of this paper describes the nature of the legal obligation of supporting states vis-àvis the conduct of the ANSF, and some of the steps that have been taken to promote accountability; and recommends particular action that can be taken by the GIRoA and the international community in order to develop more accountable security forces. 17
Page 1 and 2: Joint Briefing Paper 10 May 2011 No
Page 3 and 4: Combating abusive conduct on the pa
Page 5 and 6: Introduction In March 2011, Afghan
Page 7 and 8: The Afghan National Security Forces
Page 9 and 10: countability, and the risk of the p
Page 11 and 12: ‘Unfortunately the coalition and
Page 13 and 14: that the ANSF are in many cases no
Page 15: ‘The problem of killings by the p
Page 19 and 20: may be expected to use them in viol
Page 21 and 22: who have committed violations; whet
Page 23 and 24: Promoting Accountability What’s b
Page 25 and 26: tion/prosecution, in practice this
Page 27 and 28: Defence in early 2009 provides that
Page 29 and 30: sure that affected individuals are
Page 31 and 32: Conclusion States have been pouring
Page 33 and 34: 28 Ibid 30-31. 29 Department of the
Page 35 and 36: states is described as being ‘to
Page 37: © Oxfam International May 2011. Th

No Time to Lose - Oxfam

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