RULE ET AL. - On Point News

DEFS. RULE ET AL.'S AMENDED MEMO IN SUP. OF SPECIAL MOTION TO
STRIKE
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH
LIYSA NORTHON, an individual;
WAYLAND DeWITT, an individual; and JON
“TOR” DeWITT, an individual,
v.
Plaintiffs,
ANN RULE, an individual; FREE PRESS, a
division of Simon & Schuster, Inc.; SIMON &
SCHUSTER, INC., a Delaware corporation;
STATE OF OREGON; and DOES I through
XX, inclusive,
Case No. 0512-13401
DEFENDANTS’ ANN RULE, FREE
PRESS, AND SIMON & SCHUSTER’S
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS PURSUANT TO
ORS 31.150
Oral argument requested
Defendants.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. OVERVIEW 1
II. BACKGROUND 1
A. The Crime. 1
B. The Book. 4
III. DISCUSSION 6
A. Plaintiff’s Claims Arise Out of Statements and Conduct Described in
ORS 31.150(2). 7
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Show a Probability that They Will Prevail. 10
1. Plaintiffs’ defamation claim fails. 10
a. A number of statements are not “of and concerning”
any of the plaintiffs. 12
b. Many of the statements at issue are not defamatory. 12
c. Many statements at issue constitute non-actionable
statements of opinion. 12
d. The challenged statements that are not opinions are true
Page

inconsequential harm when considered in light of
unchallenged statements that cause harm to plaintiffs’
reputations. 21
2. Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of defamation as to any
of the challenged statements. 21
3. Plaintiffs cannot establish with substantial evidence the
probability they will prevail on their false light claims. 53
a. Many of the challenged statements are not about the
plaintiffs, do not place plaintiffs in a false light or
would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
53
b. Many of the statements at issue constitute nonactionable
statements of opinion. 54
c. Plaintiffs cannot prove actual malice.54
d. Liysa Northon is “libel proof” with regard to the
statements at issue, and none of the plaintiffs may
recover for lack of incremental harm and lack of
causation. 54
4. Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of invasion of privacy
by false light as to any of the challenged statements. 55
IV. CONCLUSION 88

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Bahr v. Ettinger,
88 Or App 419, 745 P2d 807 (1987) 15
Bahr v. Statesman Journal,
51 Or App 177, 624 P2d 664,
rev denied, 291 Or 118, 631 P2d 341 (1981) 15
Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, Inc.,
298 Or 434 (1986) 15, 16, 19
Bock v. Zitlenfield,
66 Or App 97, 672 P2d 1237 (1983) 12
Brennan v. Kadner,
814 NE 2d 951 (Ill App 2004) 53
Brown v. Gatti,
195 Or App 695, 99 P3d 299 (2004) 12
Card v. Pipes,
398 F Supp 2d 1126 (D Or 2004) 8
ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson,
113 Cal Rptr 2d 625 (Cal App 2001) 10
Dean v. Guard Pub. Co., Inc.,
73 Or App 656, 699 P2d 1158 (1985) 54
Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc.,
124 Cal Rptr 2d 507 (Cal 2002) 7
Fodor v. Leeman,
179 Or App 697 (2002) 15
Gardner v. Martino,
2005 WL 3465349 (D. Or. September 19, 2005) (Civil No. 05-769-HU) 8, 9
Haas v. Painter,
62 Or App 719, 662 P2d 768 (1983) 12
Hamilton v. Crown Life Ins.,
246 Or 1, 423 P2d 771 (1967) 10, 16
Hickey v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
792 F Supp 1195 (D Or 1992) 13, 15, 23
Hickey v. Settlemier,
141 Or App 103, 917 P2d 44 (1996) 12, 13
In re. Northon and Hill,
Washington County Circuit Court No. C022282CV 56, 59
King v. Menolascino,
276 Or 501, 555 P2d 442 (1976) 12
Kurdock v. Electro Scientific Industries, Inc.,

Multnomah County Circuit Court No. 0406-05889 8
Lonsdale v. Swart,
143 Or App 331, 922 P2d 1263 (1996) 18
Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc.,
15 Cal Rptr 3d 215 (Cal App 2004) 7
Marleau v. Truck Insurance Exchange,
333 Or 82, 37 P3d 148 (2001) 53
McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co.,
69 Or App 136, 685 P2d 458 (1984) 18, 19, 54, 55
Metabolife Intern., Inc. v. Wornick,
264 F3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) 1, 7
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 US 1 (1990) 13
Owens v. Maass,
323 Or 430, 918 P2d 808 (1996) 9
Partington v. Bugliosi,
56 F3d 1147 (9th Cir 1995) 13, 14, 22, 23, 24, 31, 47, 48, 52, 53, 64
Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 US 767, 106 S Ct 1558, 89 L Ed 2d 783 (1986) 15, 30
Reesman v. Highfill,
327 Or 597, 965 P2d 1030 (1998) 12, 15, 16, 18, 54
Ruebke v. Globe Comm. Corp.,
738 P2d 1246 (Kan. 1987) 16, 17, 18
Russell v. Thompson Newspapers, Inc.,
842 P2d 896 (Utah 1992) 16
Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp.,
119 Cal Rptr 2d 108 (Cal. App. 2002) 9
Slover v. Oregon St. Bd. of Clinical Social Workers,
144 Or App 565, 927 P2d 1098 (1996) 12
St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 US 727 (1968) 19
State v. Ogden,
168 Or App 249, 6 P3d 1110 (2000),
rev den 331 Or 692 (2001) 2
Thale v. Business Journal Publ'ns,
Mult. Co. No. 0402-02160 8
Time, Inc. v Hill,
385 US 374 (1967) 53
Town of Sewall’s Point v. Rhodes,
852 So 2d 949 (Fla App 2003) 53
Traditional Cat Ass’n, Inc. v. Gilbreath,
13 Cal Rptr 3d 353 (Cal App 2004) 9
Unelko Corp. v. Rooney,

912 F2d 1049 (9th Cir 1990),
cert denied, 499 US 961 (1991) 10, 13
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA,
317 F3d 1097 (9th Cir 2003) 7
Wheeler v. Green,
286 Or 99 (1979) 16, 18
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc. Inc.,
443 US 157 (1979) 16
Statutes
ORS 31.150 1, 6, 7, 8, 10, 88
ORS 31.150(2) 7
ORS 31.150(2)(d) 8, 9
ORS 31.150(3) 10
ORS 31.152(3) 88
Rules
ORCP 21A 6
ORCP 21F 6
Articles and Treatises
1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation, § 2.4.18 (3d Ed 2004) 21
American Cancer Society, Overview: Cervical Cancer, What Causes Cancer of the
Cervix? 32
Cleckley, Herve, The Mask of Sanity 22
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 22
Hare, Robert, Ph.D., Handbook of Psychopathy by 22
Peck, M. Scott, People of the Lie 22
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 56613
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652E (1977) 54
Constitutional Provisions
US Const, Amend I 7, 13, 14, 22, 24, 31, 35, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 64
Defendants Ann Rule, Free Press, and Simon & Schuster, Inc. (collectively
“defendants”) submit the following Memorandum in Support of their Special Motion to
Strike all of the claims in the Second Amended Complaint of plaintiffs Liysa Northon,
Wayland DeWitt, and Jon “Tor” DeWitt (collectively “plaintiffs”), pursuant to Oregon’s

anti-SLAPP statute, ORS 31.150.
I. OVERVIEW
Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of defendants’ conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public
interest. Plaintiffs cannot present substantial evidence establishing a probability that they
will prevail on their claims of defamation or false light. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims
should be stricken pursuant to ORS 31.150.
II.
BACKGROUND
A. The Crime.
As she has admitted in her plea of guilty to the crime of manslaughter in
the first degree, Liysa Northon intentionally shot her husband, Christopher Northon, in
the head early in the morning of October 9, 2000, as he lay in a sleeping bag at the
campsite where they had been camping with their three year-old son, Dane Northon.
Liysa Northon told police, medical staff, and her defense counsel that on the day she and
Dane drove to meet her husband at the campsite, she had left her nine-year-old son, Aukai
King, at the home of her friend Joan Monteillet. Ms. Monteillet’s home was in Dayton,
Washington, about eight hours from the campsite. Liysa Northon claimed that on the
camping trip, Christopher Northon became physically abusive and she retrieved a gun
from her car. She stated in her early interviews with law enforcement officials that she
picked up her son and shot at the sleeping bag as she left the campsite with her son. See
Birmingham Aff. at 3-5 (Declaration of Ann Rule (“Rule Decl.”) 16 and Ex. 6 thereto;
State v. Northon, Wallowa County Circuit Court No. 00101788, Trial Transcript July 17,
2001 (“Trial Transcript”) at 150:22-171:10 (Rule Decl. 11 and Ex. 1 thereto).
Following the shooting, Liysa Northon drove to the home of her brother,
Tor DeWitt. See Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 230:19-231:5. She did not tell this to
the police, however, or even to her defense counsel until later confronted by her attorneys
with the fact that her brother had revealed to them that she had been at his home early that

morning. Birmingham Aff. at 20-21. She then drove to Joan Monteillet’s house, where
she bathed. She then went to the hospital to report the alleged assault by her husband.
She was questioned there by medical staff and Deputy Kevin Larkin. Id. at 4-5.
Following a police investigation, Liysa Northon was charged with murder.
Liysa Northon claimed to have been the victim of domestic violence and claimed that in
shooting her husband, she acted to protect herself and their child. See id.
Liysa Northon’s attorney, Pat Birmingham, performed an extensive
investigation of the facts and thoroughly researched the “Battered Woman Syndrome”
defense. See Birmingham Aff. at 5-7. Mr. Birmingham moved for an order allowing
Liysa Northon to present expert testimony to assist the fact finder in understanding the
significance of evidence establishing a pattern, practice or history of abuse of Liysa
Northon. Id. at 12. The motion was denied pursuant to State v. Ogden, 168 Or App 249,
6 P3d 1110 (2000), rev den 331 Or 692 (2001). Id. Under Ogden, in order to argue this
defense, Liysa Northon would have been required to present evidence that she had been
diagnosed as suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. Birmingham discovered,
however, that the evidence that Liysa Northon suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome
was weak. Northon did not fit the profile of a “battered woman” from the outset; she did
not attempt to hide the alleged abuse but openly made many claims about it. Moreover,
the defense would have opened the door to admission of prejudicial evidence relating to
Liysa Northon’s character for truthfulness. Id. The Birmingham affidavit is replete with
instances in which Liysa Northon lied to him, to investigators, and to many others. For
just a few representative examples, she said that she had not taken out any life insurance
on her husband; that was untrue. Id. at 14. She lied about being abused by her mother,
and suffering, among other things, twenty-six broken bones. Id. at 16-17. She lied in
denying that she stopped at Jon DeWitt’s home immediately after killing her husband. Id.
at 21. She lied about possessing handcuffs. Id. She lied about having a stun gun in her
vehicle. Id. She lied about numerous thefts and burglaries and filed false insurance

claims. Id. at 23. She smuggled a message out of jail seeking to destroy a computer that
would provide damning evidence that she had in fact been planning to kill her husband.
Id. at 24-28. (She even asked counsel to help her destroy a computer because material on
it would incriminate her and her father. Id. at 24.) As a result, and along with other
considerations, Birmingham and his defense team decided to present self-defense and
defense of other as Northon’s defenses, rather than a Battered Woman Syndrome defense.
Id. at 12-13, 18.
Against her attorney’s advice, Liysa Northon discussed her case and
defense with many people, including guards, family members, friends, nurses, counselors,
and other inmates. Id. at 8. Liysa Northon’s case and her allegations of abuse and selfdefense
drew much public attention. Court TV selected her trial to broadcast nationwide.
See Rule Decl. 9, 48 and Ex. 38 thereto. The trial began on July 16, 2001. See
Birmingham Aff. at 10, 28.
During the week before trial, Liysa Northon’s computer, which she had
reported as stolen, was discovered and provided to the FBI. As the trial began, the FBI
obtained from the computer’s hard drive e-mails between Liysa Northon and her father,
Wayland Dewitt. These e-mails demonstrated that Liysa Northon planned to kill her
husband. Id. at 18. Moreover, Joan Monteillet admitted that Liysa Northon, only days
before the killing, had asked her for poison and whether she knew of any swift-running
rivers. She had also asked for Valium, sleeping pills or other “hard drugs.” Id. at 27.
Three days into the trial, Liysa Northon pleaded guilty to intentionally causing the death
of her husband while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. She was
thereafter sentenced to serve twelve years in prison for the crime. See Rule Decl. at 13
and Ex. 3 thereto.
B. The Book.
The author defendant in this case, Ann Rule, is an experienced and wellknown
investigative author. Over the past 30 years, she has published over 25 books and

1400 articles, nearly all concerning criminal cases. Twenty-four of her books have been
New York Times bestsellers, and she has won numerous literary awards for her works.
Ms. Rule’s career as a true crime writer was preceded by work in law enforcement and
the criminal justice system. She is a former Seattle policewoman and caseworker for the
Washington State Department of Public Assistance. Ms. Rule currently teaches seminars
to law enforcement groups and is a certified instructor on criminology subjects such as
Sadistic Sociopaths, Women Who Kill, and High Profile Offenders. She was on the U.S.
Justice Department Task Force that set up VI-CAP, the Violent Criminal Apprehension
Program now in place at FBI Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia, and she has testified
twice before Senate Judiciary Subcommittees on victims’ rights. See Rule Decl. 2-4.
As demonstrated herein, Ms. Rule meticulously researches and
investigates the subjects of her writing. Heart Full of Lies (the “Book”) is a story of the
people and events surrounding the confessed killing of Christopher Northon by his wife,
Liysa Northon. Ms. Rule performed an independent investigation into the facts of the
case, which ultimately culminated in the published Book that contains the statements now
challenged by plaintiffs. See Rule Decl. 5.
Ms. Rule’s investigation drew on many sources, both public and private.
She interviewed those who were involved in the official investigation and trial, including
law enforcement investigators and officials (local, state, and national), medical
examiners, attorneys and court personnel. She interviewed numerous private citizens as
well, including relatives and friends of both the victim and plaintiff. Rule Decl. 5, 10.
In addition, Ms. Rule researched public records, poring over investigative reports and
forensic evidence. She examined the court proceedings and trial testimony, as well as
media coverage of those events. Rule Decl. 5, 9, 48-49. She tested the competing
versions of events advanced by the prosecution and the defense by visiting the crime
scene and other locales throughout the Pacific Northwest and Hawaii. Rule Decl. 5.
Although plaintiff Liysa Northon declined to speak to Ms. Rule, plaintiff Northon’s voice

was heard nonetheless, through plaintiff’s correspondence, her admissions to law
enforcement personnel, and her plea of guilty.
In toto, Ms. Rule spent 800 hours, over approximately six months,
exhaustively investigating the events surrounding this crime before she began writing the
Book. Rule Decl. 6. The Book identifies its sources. It also sets forth all claims made
by everyone involved. The Book describes Liysa Northon’s claims of abuse and selfdefense,
the witness statement of Liysa Northon’s son Aukai King describing Chris
Northon’s alleged abuse of Liysa Northon (Book, p. 200), the account of Liysa Northon’s
friends of her confessions that her husband was beating her and their witnessing bruises
on her body, and statements that Christopher Northon and other pilots smoked marijuana
(Book, pp. 227, 228-229, 244, 267, 270-271). After disclosing the facts, Ms. Rule also
includes her own interpretations as to what she believes is the truth that can be gleaned
from the contradicting stories from Liysa Northon and others who knew the couple.
Ms. Rule commonly includes an Afterword in her true crime books,
providing a summary of her own analysis of the facts. The Afterword in the Book is
typical. Ms. Rule describes her own investigation and uses language demonstrating that
she is providing her own opinion and interpretation of the facts, as discussed further
herein. Ms. Rule describes the picture that emerged to her after fitting all of the pieces
together. In fact, she describes how, during her investigation, she had to face her own
strong bias in favor of a woman claiming to be the victim of domestic violence. In her
words in the Book, “I have long been a strong advocate and contributor to domestic
violence support groups. So I had to struggle with my own preconceptions and prejudices
as I began my research. In the end, I found that I could not explain the gaping
inconsistencies in [plaintiff’s] recounting of her marriage and the way her husband died.”
Book at 359.
III.
DISCUSSION
ORS 31.150, Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, provides a mechanism for

defendants to seek dismissal of cases filed that arise out of defendants’ exercise of free
speech rights concerning any public issue or issues of public interest. ORS 31.150
provides in pertinent part:
(1) A defendant may make a special motion to strike
against a claim in a civil action described in subsection (2)
of this section. The court shall grant the motion unless the
plaintiff establishes in the manner provided by subsection
(3) of this section that there is a probability that the plaintiff
will prevail on the claim. The special motion to strike shall
be treated as a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21A but
shall not be subject to ORCP 21F. Upon granting the
special motion to strike, the court shall enter a judgment of
dismissal without prejudice.
(2) A special motion to strike may be made under this
section against any claim in a civil action that arises out of:
* * * * *
(d) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest.
(3) A defendant making a special motion to strike under
the provisions of this section has the initial burden of
making a prima facie showing that the claim against which
the motion is made arises out of a statement, document or
conduct described in subsection (2) of this section. If the
defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff in the action to establish that there is a probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting
substantial evidence to support a prima facie case. If the
plaintiff meets this burden, the court shall deny the motion.
(4) In making a determination under subsection (1) of
this section, the court shall consider pleadings and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based.
The Oregon Legislature closely modeled ORS 31.150, enacted in 2001, on California’s
1992 anti-SLAPP statute. See Testimony of Dave Heyndericksx, Legislative Counsel, to
House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law, March 19, 2001, attached as
Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Duane A. Bosworth (“Bosworth Decl.”). The purpose of
anti-SLAPP statutes is to allow the “dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed
at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp. USA, 317 F3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir 2003); see also Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick,
264 F3d 832, 837 n.7 (9th Cir 2001) (explaining purpose of statute is for “protect[ion of]
individuals from meritless, harassing lawsuits whose purpose is to chill protected
expression”). There exists no requirement, however, that a moving defendant
“demonstrate that the plaintiff’s subjective intent was to chill the exercise of

constitutional speech or partition rights, or that the action had the effect of chilling such
rights.” Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc., 15 Cal Rptr 3d 215, 220 (Cal App
2004). If the challenged conduct arose from an act by the defendant in furtherance of his
right of free speech, the court may presume that the purpose of the action was to chill
defendant’s First Amendment rights. Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc.,
124 Cal Rptr 2d 507 (Cal 2002).
Plaintiffs’ claims should be stricken pursuant to ORS 31.150 because
plaintiffs’ claims arise out of conduct described in the statute, as described herein, and
plaintiffs cannot establish a probability that they will prevail on their claims.
A. Plaintiff’s Claims Arise Out of Statements and Conduct Described in ORS
31.150(2).
Plaintiffs’ claims are based on defendants’ “conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of * * * free speech in connection with a public issue
or an issue of public interest.” ORS 31.150(2)(d).
The subject matter of the Book relates to “an issue of public interest”
within the meaning of ORS 31.150(2)(d). While the term “public interest” is not defined
in the statute and there exists no reported decision of an Oregon appellate court
construing ORS 31.150, other Oregon courts applying ORS 31.150 have construed the
phrase “an issue of public interest” very broadly. For example, in Card v. Pipes, 398 F
Supp 2d 1126, 1137 (D Or 2004), a university professor sued for defamation and
intentional interference with emotional distress after the defendants published “anti-
Israel” statements attributed to plaintiff. The court held that the statements were “in
connection with an interest of public concern (alleged political activism and bias in the
college classroom).” Id. at 1136. Finding that the plaintiff could not present substantial
evidence to establish a probability that he would prevail, the court granted the
defendants’ special motion to strike both of the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 1137.
Similarly, in Gardner v. Martino, 2005 WL 3465349 (D Or September 19,
2005) (Civil No. 05-769-HU) (Findings & Recommendations adopted in their entirety by
order dated December 13, 2005), the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for false light,
defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional interference

with prospective economic advantage pursuant to ORS 31.150. The court held that the
statements at issue -- comments on a talk-radio show about a single consumer’s treatment
by a mom and pop retailer -- constituted statements about a public issue or an issue of
public concern. Id. at *7. In arriving at its conclusion, the Gardner court noted that state
trial courts in Oregon have broadly interpreted the meaning of an “issue of public
interest.” Id. at *5. The Gardner court referred to Kurdock v. Electro Scientific
Industries, Inc., Multnomah County Circuit Court No. 0406-05889 (statements made by
employer to other employees and shareholders concerning plaintiff’s termination are
statements made on “an issue of public interest”), and Thale v. Business Journal Publ'ns,
Mult. Co. No. 0402-02160 (dismissing under ORS 31.150 claims for libel and false light
based on statements about the plaintiff’s resignation from a company and regarding some
business decisions the plaintiff made while employed at the company). Id. As the court
further stated:
Just as persuasive are the California decisions, interpreting
California’s analogous anti-SLAPP statute, which have
broadly interpreted the “public issue” or “public interest”
standard. E.g., Traditional Cat Ass’n, Inc. v. Gilbreath, 13
Cal. Rptr. 3d 353, 356 (Cal. App. 2004) (statements
concerning a dispute among different factions of cat
breeders were matters of public interest for purposes of
anti-SLAPP statute because they “concerned matters of
public interest in the cat breeding community”); Seelig
[Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal.
App. 2002)], 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115 (discussion on radio
talk show regarding participant on television program
called “Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire” was
subject to anti-SLAPP statute because the subject of the
radio discussion, a television show featuring “the sort of
person willing to meet and marry a complete stranger on
national television,” fell within the statutory criterion of “an
issue of public interest”).
Id. If a dispute among cat breeders constitutes an issue of public interest, or a dispute
between a single consumer and a small Oregon business, there can be no question that the
statements published in a book that has sold over 500,000 copies nationwide concerning a
homicide, the trial of which was covered nationally by Court TV, and which involved a

controversial attempt to claim self-defense, last minute discovery of evidence showing
premeditation and an ultimate plea to manslaughter in the first degree, fall within the
category of speech protected by ORS 31.150(2)(d). See Gardner v. Martino, supra
(collecting Oregon and California cases demonstrating the breadth of “issue of public
interest”). Arguably the coverage of any crime constitutes an issue of public interest.
Even if that is not universal, this crime and the parties involved clearly constitute issues
of public interest.
Further, in Oregon, it is presumed “that the legislature enacts statutes in
the light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing upon those statute.”
Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 438, 918 P2d 808, 813 (1996). What the legislature meant
by “an issue of public interest” must be determined by an examination of court decisions
prior to 2001, the year the statute was adopted. Prior to 2001 (and continuing today),
courts construed the concept of “public interest” very broadly. See Hamilton v. Crown
Life Ins., 246 Or 1, 5, 423 P2d 771, 773 (1967) (holding that a private person’s suicide
was “newsworthy” and dissemination of information about the death did not raise an
actionable claim for invasion of privacy); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F2d 1049, 1056
(9th Cir 1990), cert denied, 499 US 961 (1991) (holding that a television personality’s
statement about a product on national television was a matter of public concern because it
was of general interest and was made available to the general public). It is against this
backdrop of construing “issue of public interest” and related matters very broadly that the
Legislature enacted ORS 31.150. The broad scope given to the term “an issue of public
interest” both before and after enactment of ORS 31.150 demonstrates that the conduct at
issue in this case constitutes conduct in connection with an issue of public interest.
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Show a Probability that They Will Prevail.
Because defendants meet their initial burden of making a prima facie
showing that the claim arises out of conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest, the

urden shifts to plaintiffs who must demonstrate a probability that they will prevail on
their claims. ORS 31.150(3). Plaintiffs must present “substantial evidence to support a
prima facie case.” Id. Plaintiffs may not simply rely on the allegations in the complaint,
but instead must provide sufficient evidence to permit the court to determine whether
there is a probability that they will prevail. ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 113 Cal
Rptr 2d 625, 641 (Cal App 2001). Plaintiffs cannot meet this burden.
1. Plaintiffs’ defamation claim fails.
Plaintiffs provide 56 statements from the Book which they claim are
defamatory. Each of these statements is incapable of providing a basis for an actionable
claim of defamation for one or more -- in nearly all cases multiple -- dispositive reasons.
First, some of the statements are simply not “of and concerning” any of the plaintiffs, as
described herein. Second, many of the statements are simply not defamatory. As
described herein, it is for the court to decide in the first instance whether a statement is
defamatory and for the court to disregard tenuous inferences or implications. Third, a
number of statements plaintiffs claim are defamatory instead constitute non-actionable
statements of opinion, which are constitutionally protected. Fourth, although it is not
defendants’ burden to prove the truth of any statements, the documents supporting the
statements at issue indicate the substantial truth of the statements. As described herein,
an allegedly defamatory statement is not actionable if it is substantially true; it need not
be true in every detail and non-substantial inaccuracies are overlooked. Fifth, even if
plaintiffs could somehow show the falsity of any of the challenged statements (which they
cannot), they certainly cannot establish that such statements were published with the
requisite degree of fault, and thus plaintiffs’ defamation claim necessarily fails. In
particular, because of the record described herein on which defendants relied, Northon,
who is a limited public figure, cannot show that the statements were made with actual
malice, i.e., that there is clear and convincing evidence that defendants made the
statements with knowledge of any falsity or with reckless disregard as to the truth or

falsity of the statements. Further, given the record on which defendants relied, coupled
with plaintiff Northon’s decision not to provide information to defendants, plaintiffs
cannot establish negligence on the part of defendants with respect to the statements they
cite from the Book. Sixth, Liysa Northon, who has publicly admitted to intentionally
killing her husband, is libel proof, as described herein. Her reputation is already so
sullied and diminished that the statements complained of are not actionable with regard to
her. Finally, it is clear that many of the claimed statements are not actionable as to any
plaintiff here because they cannot harm any plaintiff’s reputation beyond the harm or
diminishment to their reputation either pre-existing and unrelated to the Book or
stemming from unchallenged or other plainly non-actionable statements in the Book.
Defendants will provide background on each of these dispositive reasons
why the statements identified by plaintiffs are non-actionable. If any one of these reasons
applies to a statement, it is non-actionable. In nearly every case, whether or not each such
reason is expressly delineated beneath the specific statement at issue, multiple reasons
exist to make the statement at issue non-actionable.
a. A number of statements are not “of and concerning” any of the
plaintiffs.
In order to be actionable, defamatory statements must be “of and
concerning” the plaintiffs. Hickey v. Capital Cities/ABA, Inc., 792 F Supp 1195 (D Or
1992). As described herein, a number of statements provided by plaintiffs concern others
only and not plaintiffs, including statements about Chris Northon, Dick and Jeanne
Northon, or indeed a number of statements that are not about any person. (Moreover,
plaintiffs’ complaint on its face alleges that all statements defamed all three plaintiffs; in
fact, virtually no statement is of and concerning more than one plaintiff, if indeed one.)
b. Many of the statements at issue are not defamatory.
A defamatory statement is one that “tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community.” Brown v. Gatti, 195 Or

App 695, 99 P3d 299 (2004) (citations omitted). Whether a statement is capable of a
defamatory meaning is for the court to decide as a threshold matter. Reesman v. Highfill,
327 Or 597, 604, 965 P2d 1030, 1034 (1998). Moreover, a court will not hold any
statement actionable if the inference or implication to be drawn is tenuous. Id.; see also
King v. Menolascino, 276 Or 501, 504, 555 P2d 442, 443 (1976) (holding inferences to
be “too tenuous to make the statement capable of a defamatory meaning”). As described
in detail below, many of the challenged statements are ones that are not defamatory as a
matter of law.
c. Many statements at issue constitute non-actionable statements
of opinion.
Statements that are expressions of opinion are not actionable. Reesman,
327 Or at 605; King, 276 Or at 504; Haas v. Painter, 62 Or App 719, 725, 662 P2d 768,
771 (1983).
Whether a statement is one of opinion is a question of law for the court.
Slover v. Oregon St. Bd. of Clinical Social Workers, 144 Or App 565, 568, 927 P2d 1098,
1100 (1996); Bock v. Zitlenfield, 66 Or App 97, 672 P2d 1237 (1983). Statements of
opinion are constitutionally protected as long as they do not imply the existence of
underlying false and defamatory facts. Hickey v. Settlemier, 141 Or App 103, 110, 917
P2d 44, 48 (1996) (citing both First Amendment and Oregon cases, as well as the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 566, for the proposition that opinions are
constitutionally protected, unless they imply undisclosed defamatory facts); Hickey v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 792 F Supp 1195 (D Or 1992) (applying test set forth by United
States Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 US 1 (1990)). The Ninth
Circuit elaborated in Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir 1990), cert
denied, 499 US 961 (1991), explaining that a court must ask as a threshold matter
“whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the contested statement ‘impl[ies]
an assertion of objective fact.’”

A number of the challenged statements in the complaint are protected
opinion. In determining whether a statement is constitutionally protected, courts have
looked to: (1) the broad context of the challenged statements (whether the tenor in context
negates the impression that a defendant was asserting an objective fact); (2) the specific
context of the challenged statements; and (3) whether the statement in question can be
proven true or false. Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir 1995).
In Partington, the subject of a book describing a notorious alleged crime
and ensuing trials sued the author for defamation. Id. The Ninth Circuit gave a detailed
analysis of whether the challenged statements were the author’s opinion, concluding that
they were and were constitutionally protected. First, looking at the broad context of the
book, the court found
[T]he subject of the book -- the events that took place at
Palmyra Island and the outcome of the two trials -- is one
about which there could easily be a number of varying
rational interpretations. There is no question that the
subject matter of the book, and the sources upon which [the
author] relies in drawing his conclusions, are inherently
ambiguous, and we believe that reasonable minds could
differ as to how to interpret the events and actions
described in it. Indeed, much of the public excitement
surrounding the two trials stemmed from the fact that there
is no clear answer as to what precisely occurred at Palmyra
Island or as to why the two trials resulted in such different
outcomes.
When, as here, an author writing about a controversial
occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and
offers his personal perspective about some of its
ambiguities and disputed facts, his statements should
generally be protected by the First Amendment. Otherwise,
there would be no room for expressions of opinion by
commentators, experts in a field, figures closely involved in
a public controversy, or others whose perspectives might be
of interest to the public. Instead, authors of every sort
would be forced to provide only dry, colorless descriptions
of facts, bereft of analysis or insight * * *.
Id. at 1154. The court noted that the Supreme Court and other courts had reached the
same conclusion in similar cases, finding, “the First Amendment guarantees authors ‘the
interpretive license that is necessary when relying upon ambiguous sources’ * * *. [C]

ases clearly ‘establish that when a writer is evaluating or giving an account of inherently
ambiguous materials or subject matter, the First Amendment requires that the courts
allow latitude for interpretation.’ * * * when an ‘answer [is] within the wide range of
possibilities, [it] is precisely [when] we need and must permit a free press to ask the
question.’” Id. (citations omitted).
It is hard to imagine judicial language that more precisely captures that a
number of statements in the Book of which plaintiffs complain are not actionable. As in
Partington, the general context of many of the challenged statements here negates the
impression that defendants were asserting an objective fact. The Book frequently and
assiduously provides two sides to a particular matter and defendants state their reasons for
their conclusions. The Book is of a similar genre and type as the book at issue in
Partington, and has the same effect on its readers. In fact, it may be said that nearly all of
the statements in the Book are the author’s interpretation of facts relating to Liysa
Northon’s crime, based on the evidence the author had after 800 hours of investigation.
In any event, in the presentation of more than 350 pages of facts, it can hardly be said that
the opinions offered are based on “undisclosed facts.” The bases for the opinions stated
are clearly provided. Those opinions are therefore constitutionally protected and nonactionable.
d. The challenged statements that are not opinions are true or
substantially true.
“Truth is a complete defense in a defamation case.” Hickey v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 792 F Supp 1195 (D Or 1992) (applying state law and citing Bahr v.
Statesman Journal, 51 Or App 177, 180, 624 P2d 664, rev denied, 291 Or 118, 631 P2d
341 (1981)). Furthermore, an allegedly defamatory statement need only be substantially
true; the statement need not be literally true in every detail and minor inaccuracies will be
overlooked. Bahr v. Ettinger, 88 Or App 419, 422-23, 745 P2d 807 (1987). Of course, to
be actionable, a statement must be not only defamatory but also false. Reesman, supra,

327 Or at 603. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that with regard to
statements and matters of public concern, as here, plaintiffs in fact bear the burden of
proving falsity before there can be liability in a defamation action. Philadelphia
Newspaper, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 US 767, 106 S Ct 1558, 89 L Ed 2d 783 (1986). Plaintiffs
cannot meet this burden. As described below, the non-opinion statements published in
the Book were gathered from extensive interviews and public records, all of which point
to the substantial truth of the statements.
e. Plaintiff Northon cannot establish actual malice.
Even if plaintiffs could somehow show falsity with respect to any
statement, they could not in any circumstance establish the requisite fault to sustain a
claim. A person who is a limited public figure must demonstrate that any allegedly
defamatory statements were published with actual malice, that is, with knowledge of any
falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. Bank of Oregon v.
Independent News, Inc., 298 Or 434, 441-42 (1986). Indeed, a limited public figure
plaintiff must prove actual malice with “clear and convincing evidence.” Fodor v.
Leeman, 179 Or App 697, 701 (2002). As described herein, Liysa Northon has
transformed herself into a limited public figure.
A person may qualify as a limited public figure if that person “‘thrust
[oneself] into the vortex’ of any public issue or attempted to ‘influence the resolution’ of
any public controversy.” Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99, 115 (1979) (internal citations
omitted). Criminal conduct by itself does not necessarily render someone a limited public
figure. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assoc. Inc., 443 US 157, 168 (1979). A number
of state and federal decisions have held that a criminal offender’s participation in an issue
of public concern plays a significant role in the public figure analysis. See, e.g., Ruebke
v. Globe Comm. Corp., 738 P2d 1246, 1251-52 (Kan. 1987). After a review of Wolston
and other cases, the Ruebke court held that “the proper inquiry to determine if an
individual charged with a crime has obtained the status of a limited public figure is (1)

whether the crime committed is a ‘public controversy’ and (2) whether the nature and
extent of defendant's participation in the controversy was enough to cause him to become
a ‘public figure.’” In Yancey v. Hamilton, 786 SW2d 854, 859 (Ky. 1989), the Kentucky
Supreme Court observed that a plaintiff's confession of a “heinous” crime may result in
“injecting [the plaintiff] into the vortex of controversy.” Similarly, following Ruebke’s
analysis of Wolston and other cases, the Utah Supreme Court has observed that if the
crime committed created a public controversy, it is possible that the accused may be
deemed a public figure “solely by virtue of committing a crime.” Russell v. Thompson
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P2d 896, 903, n20 (Utah 1992).
The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Ruebke is directly on point. The
plaintiff in Ruebke was charged with a triple murder and kidnapping. Near the time of
trial, a national magazine published an article on the case “entitled ‘Killer Who Came
Straight From Hell,’ with an overline stating, ‘Kansas Has Another ‘In Cold Blood’
Case.’” 738 P2d at 1249. The article recounted the facts surrounding the crimes and the
police investigation. Id. When the plaintiff-criminal defendant subsequently filed a libel
action, the Kansas Supreme Court held that he qualified as a limited public figure because
of the public concern surrounding the crime and the plaintiff’s role in that controversy.
738 P2d at 1252. Rejecting the argument that the criminal defendant did not choose to be
a public figure, the court explained:
Id.
Public figure status is rather the result of acts or events
which by their nature are bound to invite comment. The
triple murder was by nature an event of great concern to the
public. The resulting investigation thrust Ruebke into the
forefront of public attention. Thus, the district court was
correct in holding that Ruebke was a limited public figure.
In this case, Northon admitted at the outset that she had shot and killed her
husband. She claimed a history of abuse and self-defense, however. Once incarcerated
she avidly discussed the facts of her case and legal theories with everyone she could

each, see Birmingham Aff. at 8, and she wrote numerous letters to friends and
acquaintances describing the events that led up to the killing, including her alleged abuse.
See id.; see also Rule Decl. 32, 35d and Exs. 22 and 25d thereto. Her family implored
the public to support and monetarily assist in Liysa Northon’s defense. Rule Decl. 18
and Ex. 8 thereto. Importantly, Liysa Northon brought additional attention to herself and
the killing by placing the blame for the crime on the victim, purposefully creating a public
controversy. She did this even though the eleventh hour discovery of new facts, including
many of her computer e-mails and the testimony of Joan Monteillet, described herein,
corroborated her hundreds of pages of journals and other writings, demonstrating that the
killing of her husband was in fact premeditated. Plaintiff’s crime and subsequent trial
were such a matter of public concern and controversy that the national television station
Court TV broadcast the entire trial live on television. Liysa Northon further “thrust
herself into the vortex of the public issue” of her sensational crime with her claims of
battered wife syndrome and imminent need for self-defense, which were subsequently
undermined by the facts.
The Oregon Court of Appeals once declined to attach public figure status
where the plaintiff’s involvement in the public controversy was involuntary. See,
Reesman v. Highfill, 149 Or App 374, 386 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 327 Or 597
(1998). In contrast to the plaintiff in Reesman, Liysa Northon here injected herself into a
public controversy by killing her husband and then claiming abuse and self defense, in the
face of the ultimate evidence of premeditation described herein. As her plea
demonstrates, there was nothing “involuntary” about her conduct. She pled guilty to
intentionally killing her husband. The investigation and trial sparked significant public
discussion and attention, of which Liysa Northon was at the forefront with her claims of
abuse and the need for self-defense. While the crash-landing pilot in Reesman was a
“quintessential involuntary participant in a newsworthy event,” 149 Or App at 386,
Northon was a quintessential voluntary participant in the newsworthy events surrounding

her actions.
Liysa Northon meets the requirements for designation as a “limited public
figure” with respect to the death of her husband. Liysa Northon was not only “drawn into
[a] public controversy,” see Wheeler, 286 Or at 117, she voluntarily created that public
controversy. Ruebke v. Globe Comm. Corp., supra.
Because Liysa Northon is a public figure, she must also prove that
defendants acted with actual malice in publishing the challenged statements. Lonsdale v.
Swart, 143 Or App 331, 922 P2d 1263, 1268 (1996). To establish actual malice, a
plaintiff may not claim “defendants rel[ied] on statements made by a single source * * *
or failed to verify statements received from an adequate news source, or performed
slipshod investigation.” McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 69 Or App 136, 140, 685
P2d 458, 461 (citations omitted). As McNabb expressly holds, each of these claims is in
fact irrelevant to establishing actual malice. The issue is never what information a
defendant failed to possess. The issue is whether a defendant possessed information that
demonstrates actual malice in the publication of a statement. A plaintiff must present
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knew the falsity of statements or that
“the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [their] publication.”
McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 69 Or App 136, 140-41, 685 P2d 458, 461 (1984)
(citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 US 727, 731 (1968)). As described herein,
defendants provide sources which support the statements now challenged. Plaintiff
Northon would not establish actual malice even if she could offer different sources or
establish some bias to a source, or can establish inadequate investigation. None of those
amounts to proof of actual malice. Plaintiffs instead must prove, with clear and
convincing evidence, that defendants knew the falsity of a statement or in fact
subjectively harbored a significant, serious doubt as to the truth or falsity of a statement.
Defendants describe the sources which support the statements made. Plaintiff Northon
has no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that defendants had in their

possession information which establishes that defendants knew the statements were false.
Similarly, plaintiff has no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that
defendants subjectively harbored significant doubts about the truth or falsity of any
statement. Plaintiff Northon cannot meet her burden of demonstrating the probability of
success on her defamation claims.
f. Plaintiffs cannot establish negligence.
Even assuming that any challenged statement in the Book could somehow
be proven false, and even if Liysa Northon were not a limited public figure, neither she
nor the other plaintiffs can demonstrate the requisite level of fault to sustain a claim.
Even a non-public figure must establish fault, that is, prove that a media defendant
negligently made the false and defamatory statements in question. Bank of Oregon v.
Independent News, Inc., 298 Or 434, 445 693 P2d 35, 43 (1985). A statement is made
“negligently” if made without due care to ascertain the truth. Id.
Defendant Rule performed more than 800 hours of investigation for this
Book, and the statements in question are supported by the sources and materials reviewed
as part of this substantial investigative effort. Further, although Ms. Rule made clear that
she would welcome the opportunity to talk to plaintiff after Northon, through a friend,
reached out to Ms. Rule once she learned that Rule was writing the Book, plaintiff
Northon ultimately refused to provide information to Ms. Rule. See Rule Decl. 37, 41
and 42 and Exs. 27, 31 and 32 thereto. In any event, even if plaintiffs could now come
forward with different sources or different facts relevant to the book, such material would
not establish any negligence by defendants in the preparation of the Book, as there was
none: the Book is well-researched and its statements about plaintiffs were made with due
care.
g. Liysa Northon is “libel proof” with regard to the statements at
issue.
The “libel proof” doctrine bars relief where a plaintiff’s reputation is so

diminished that a false statement could not damage her already sullied reputation. See
e.g., Lamb v. Rizzo, 391 F3d 1133 (10th Cir 2004). As the federal Tenth Circuit has
written, the
“libel-proof doctrine” is a judicially created doctrine that
has been applied in a number of jurisdictions for more than
two decades. It recognizes that damage to one’s reputation
is the core of a defamation action, and essentially holds
that when a plaintiff’s reputation is so diminished at
the time of publication of the allegedly defamatory
material that only nominal damages at most could
be awarded because the person’s reputation was not
capable of sustaining further harm, the plaintiff is
deemed to be libel-proof as a matter of law and is
not permitted to burden a defendant with a trial.
Elliott J. Katz, Annotation, Defamation: Who is “Libel-
Proof,” 50 A.L.R. 4th, 1257 (2004); accord 1 Robert D.
Sack, Sack on Defamation, § 2.4.18 (3d Ed 2004); The
Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 Harv L Rev 1909 (1985).
Liysa Northon has admitted to the public that she intentionally killed her husband.
Although she vociferously claimed that she was a battered woman who acted in defense
of herself and her children, evidence discovered at the 11th hour demonstrated that the
killing of her husband was premeditated. Her behavior has created such a diminished
reputation that she is libel-proof as a matter of law.
h. Plaintiffs cannot recover for any false statements because as a
matter of law those statements create inconsequential harm
when considered in light of unchallenged statements that cause
harm to plaintiffs’ reputations.
The law of defamation has established “the principle that where true
statements accompany a false one and the ‘incremental harm’ done by the falsity is
negligible, recovery is * * * forbidden * * *.” 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation, §
2.4.18 (3d Ed 2004). This is sometimes called the “incremental harm doctrine.” As Sack
has stated “the doctrine recognizes that if a publication contains major true and minor
false defamatory statements, its minor mistakes are themselves unlikely to result in
substantial harm. It therefore helps protect against litigation either seeking an undeserved

financial windfall or designed to publish a speaker for stating harmful truths rather than to
compensate the plaintiff for the insignificant falsehoods.” Id. Even where the doctrine as
such has not been expressly applied or accepted, it is closely related to causal problems
that prohibit a plaintiff from stating a defamation cause of action. Where the allegedly
false statements do not cause harm beyond statements which are either unchallenged or
non-actionable, plaintiffs fail to prove that they have been caused harm by the defamatory
statements. A number of the statements plaintiffs now claim are defamatory are in fact
non-actionable because of a lack of causation of damages, given the content of other
unchallenged or non-actionable statements made in the Book.
2. Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of defamation as to any of the
challenged statements.
Plaintiffs will be unable to prevail on their defamation claims with respect
to any of the challenged statements. The following is a complete list of each of the 56
challenged statements, followed by a brief analysis of each statement that provides some
of the reasons plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of prevailing on their claim.
Page 371:
“And yet Liysa can hardly be characterized as having no
mental illness. Her behavior falls within the parameters of
several personality disorders. Those suffering from
personality disorders behave and think quite rationally, and
yet they view the world from a different angle than the
normal person does.”
Plaintiffs are unable to succeed on their defamation claims with respect to
this statement because it clearly expresses the author’s opinion, premised in the previous
350 plus pages of fully disclosed facts. The entire “Afterword,” in which this statement is
contained, provides the author’s analysis of the facts based on information available, and
clearly expresses the opinion of the author, based on that information. It is not a bare
report of facts, but uses language that conveys the author’s own opinion.
Similarly, the statement is not susceptible of being proven true or false.
As with the statements at issue in Partington, supra, this is a statement based on facts that
are inherently “ambiguous” (what happened at the homicide site and what were Liysa

Northon’s thoughts or motivation in murdering her husband). As in Partington where the
author explained his theory of what happened, “reasonable minds could differ as to how
to interpret the events and actions described” in the Book. “When, as here, an author
writing about a controversial occurrence fairly describes the general events involved and
offers his personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts,” those
statements must be protected by the First Amendment. Partington, 56 F3d at 1154. This
statement in the Book’s “Afterword” is not actionable because it is protected opinion.
Separately, information available to defendants supports the statement, and
even if it were not protected opinion, plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice or even
negligence in its publication. Liysa Northon’s Inmate Incarceration/Transition Plan,
which sets forth the assessment of prison counselors and was signed by Liysa Northon on
January 23, 2002, reports that “Severe MH [mental health] disorder impairs functioning.”
Inmate Incarceration Plan (Rule Decl. 31 and Ex. 21 thereto). In addition, Ms. Rule is
considered an expert on criminal psychopathology. Her sources for her assessment based
on the information available include the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), as well as other books on personality disorders, including
Handbook of Psychopathy by Robert Hare, Ph.D., People of the Lie by M. Scott Peck,
and The Mask of Sanity by Herve Cleckley. See Rule Decl. 4. Plaintiffs cannot
establish the probability of success on a defamation claim premised in this statement.
Page 371:
Page 372
“Personality disorders are tenacious and almost impossible
to treat, mostly because the sociopathic subject doesn’t
want to be treated.”
“Personality disorders tend to come in clusters, and it isn’t
unusual for a subject to have three or four. Those with
antisocial personalities have virtually no empathy for others
and no conscience. They will take what they want without
the pangs of guilt most people would suffer, and never look
back.”
These statements, as such, are not of and concerning Liysa Northon. They
describe personality disorders. In Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the court explained that a

statement made by a news reporter generally about the activity in which plaintiff had been
engaged, according to the news report, was not of and concerning the plaintiff. 792 F
Supp 1195, 1199. The court explained that it was clear that the reporter “was offering his
opinion about the activity of dealing in stolen pets. [The reporter] did not mention
plaintiff, or refer to him in any way.” Id. The court made this finding despite the fact that
the statement was the lead-in to a story implicating plaintiff’s business in the practice of
stealing pets. Id. Similarly, the challenged statements in the present case discuss
personality disorders generally, and do not refer to plaintiffs. They are not of and
concerning them. The statements themselves, concerning personality disorders, are
supported by Ms. Rule’s expertise in criminal psychopathology. She used the sources
described above to reach the conclusions contained in the challenged statements.
Moreover, even if the statements were deemed to be of and concerning plaintiff Northon,
they would be protected as the opinion of the defendants, stated in the “Afterword” of the
Book, and protected for all the reasons stated by the Partington court. Plaintiffs cannot
establish a probability of succeeding on their defamation claims arising out of those
statements.
Page 361:
“It seems more likely that something like the following
occurred. Believing that Chris was almost comatose, Liysa
somehow maneuvered him so that most of his body was in
the Lostine River, while she knelt in the sand over him,
holding his head underwater.”
This statement, found in the Afterword, expressly states that it is the
author’s opinion. The author, having disclosed a mountain of facts in the previous 350
pages of the Book, speculates as to what she believes occurred. As described above,
reasonable minds could differ as to what actually occurred, and the First Amendment
guarantees that an author may express her interpretation of the facts. See Partington, 56
F3d at 1154 (“[T]he First Amendment guarantees authors ‘the interpretive license that is
necessary when relying upon ambiguous sources’ * * * [Supreme Court] cases clearly
‘establish that when a writer is evaluating or giving an account of inherently ambiguous

materials or subject matter, the First Amendment requires that the courts allow latitude
for interpretation.”) This applies whenever, as here, an author, “writing about a
controversial occurrence, fairly describes the general events involved and offers his
personal perspective about some of its ambiguities and disputed facts * * *.” Id.
Even if the statement were not protected as opinion for some reason,
which defendants expressly deny, it is not actionable because plaintiffs cannot prove
malice or negligence in its publication. Jeffrey Dovci, the laboratory supervisory of the
Oregon State Police forensic laboratory at the time of Liysa Northon’s trial testified that
impressions in the sand at the scene of the crime indicated that a smaller person, likely a
woman, had knelt in the sand facing the river, see Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at
215:13-216:17, and that the clothes that had apparently been worn by Christopher
Northon had sand in the pockets, possibly from friction or motion on the bottom of the
river, id. at 227:10-228:7. Mr. Dovci’s testimony on these subjects was described in the
Book. See Book at 300-306. Additionally, plaintiff’s computer contained e-mails in
which she discussed a plan to kill her husband and make it look like an accidental
drowning. Birmingham Aff. at 26. Liysa Northon’s own defense attorney felt at the time
of her trial that the evidence could support an argument that Liysa Northon had attempted
to push her husband into the water to make it appear as if he had drowned. Id.
Furthermore, Liysa Northon is libel proof with respect to the manner in
which he intentionally killed her husband. Her reputation was so diminished by her
public admission that she intentionally killed him that statements regarding specifically
how or her specific movements at the time of the crime do not damage her reputation.
Page 341:
“Liysa’s fallback position for custody was to have her
brother named Bjorn’s guardian. Tor DeWitt had custody
of his own two children during the week, but his divorce
from his ex-wife had apparently been bitter. Each of them
had summoned police on several occasions when their
weekend plans for custody erupted into arguments.”
The statement is not defamatory with regard to either Liysa Northon or Tor

DeWitt. It describes how she intended to care for her child following her incarceration.
It also describes Tor DeWitt’s divorce as “apparently bitter,” and discloses the basis for
that opinion -- that the police had been summoned to their homes. That statement is
supported by Exhibits 19 and 20 to the Rule Declaration. Moreover, whether a divorce
was “apparently bitter” is not susceptible of being proved true or false.
Even if any portion of the statement could be capable of actionable
defamatory meaning, plaintiffs cannot prove actual malice or negligence. By affidavit to
the court in the custody lawsuit for her son Dane Northon, Northon stated “I chose my
brother Tor Jon DeWitt to be Dane’s guardian.” (Rule Decl. 17 and Ex. 7, 9 thereto.)
Documents substantiate the fact that police had been summoned to the house when Tor
DeWitt and his ex-wife argued. (Rule Decl. 29, 30 and Exs. 19-20 thereto.) The
statements are supported by documents available to defendants.
Finally, plaintiff Tor DeWitt is in any event defeated by the incremental
harm doctrine and lack of causation. Tor DeWitt has not challenged and cannot challenge
the statement that he had gone out of his way by picking up possible evidence, two sets of
handcuffs and a stun gun that Liysa Northon had left behind at a friend’s house where she
went after shooting her husband. See Book at 280. Indeed, Tor DeWitt specifically
admitted to Liysa Northon’s attorney that he had retrieved a stun gun and two sets of
handcuffs from Liysa’s vehicle after the killing. Birmingham Aff. at 21. A statement
about an “apparently bitter” divorce, even if not opinion and even if capable of being
proven false, could not harm his reputation further.
Page 343:
“And she now insisted that she had only pleaded guilty to
manslaughter because the State had threatened to charge
members of her family as accomplices to Chris’s murder.
She had sacrificed herself not only to save Bjorn but to save
her father and perhaps her brother.”
The statement is not defamatory. The fact that Liysa Northon claimed to
have pleaded guilty to manslaughter only to protect her family from being charged as
accomplices to the murder of her husband does not damage Liysa Northon’s reputation or

that of the DeWitts.
Moreover, plaintiffs cannot establish that the statement was made with
actual malice or negligently and, although it is clearly not defendants’ burden to proof the
truth of any statement, documents show that the statement is substantially true. In Liysa
Northon’s Executive Clemency Application, which Ms. Rule researched in writing the
Book, Liysa Northon stated: “I took a (forced) plea bargain.” (Rule Decl. 28 and Ex.
18, 7(f) thereto.)
Page 325:
“A motive -- or motives -- for Liysa to want Chris dead was
obvious. Her own financial worth had shrunk markedly
during 2000, she’d lost her movie deal, given up on Craig
Elliot, and she wasn’t doing many photo shoots. But with
Chris dead, Liysa would be first in line to collect his
insurance.”
The context of this statement demonstrates that it describes the thought
processes of Liysa Northon’s own defense attorney. The entire passage, beginning on
page 324 of the Book, describes how the defense strategy had changed with the discovery
of the email evidence during the trial. The defense attorneys considered that, if the emails
were admitted at trial, the state might be able to point to a greed motive, making the
prosecution’s case stronger.
The affidavit of Mr. Birmingham supports that this was in fact his thought
process. In it, he describes a late-discovered e-mail in which Liysa Northon told a male
friend, screenwriter, that she had a financial motive for killing her husband. Birmingham
Aff. at 28. Attorney Birmingham added that he
Id. at 28-29.
[d]irectly asked [Liysa Northon] whether she had any life
insurance on her husband, and she told me she did not
* * *. However, during the course of the investigation we
learned that in fact there was a life insurance policy on
Christopher Northon. When I asked [her] about this, she
told me that the insurance was in the name of her son,
Dane, who at the time was three years old, and that he was
the sole beneficiary. I later learned that, in fact, [she] was
the primary beneficiary under the insurance policy and that
she had been making the payments.

Plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice or negligence. Even if it could be
shown that the statement contained minor inaccuracies, much of the statement, that Liysa
Northon’s financial worth had shrunk or she was not performing photo shoots, is not
defamatory and nothing in the statement could harm her reputation beyond the fact that
she admitted that she intentionally killed her husband, not to mention the various forms of
unchallenged evidence that the killing was in fact premeditated.
Page 326:
“Liysa denied ever having the items with her at all on the
camping trip.”
This statement is expressly supported by Liysa Northon’s attorney, Pat
Birmingham. He stated in his affidavit that “Jon DeWitt told me that he had retrieved the
stun gun and hand cuffs from [Liysa Northon]’s vehicle the morning after the homicide;
[Liysa Northon] denied having those items with her at all.” Birmingham Aff. at 26. The
affidavit defendants relied upon points to the substantial truth of the statement and
precludes the establishment of the requisite degree of fault. Moreover, the statement is of
and concerning plaintiff Northon only and she is libel proof and could not establish
incremental harm beyond that caused by her admitting to intentionally killing her
husband.
Page 327:
“Was it even possible that Liysa had had an accomplice
who joined her at the Lostine River campground and helped
her overpower her husband? Birmingham didn’t think so,
but sometimes he wondered about it. If someone had gone
back to the campground later to remove a pair of handcuffs,
they would have had to move the body slightly. That would
account for the odd pattern of blood that had coursed in two
different directions on Chris’s face.”
“Why had Liysa lied for so long about stopping at her brother’s
house the morning after the shooting? On the surface, it
didn’t seem to make a difference one way or another, but it
was months before she admitted it to Birmingham, Nash,
and Karnes. Tor DeWitt hadn’t helped her; he’d sent her
off to Ellen’s house and gone to work. Hours later, of
course, he had taken her to discuss her situation with his
friend Deputy Dick Bobbit.”
“And it troubled Pat Birmingham just as it puzzled Pat
Montgomery that Liysa had been so wet when she arrived

at Ellen Duveaux’s house such a long time after she raced
away.”
These sentences all provide the thought processes of Liysa Northon’s
defense counsel following the disclosure of the new evidence during trial. They are an
account of aspects of the case the defense team considered in determining whether to
recommend going forward with the trial or agreeing to a plea.
The affidavit of Mr. Birmingham provides the basis for these sentences
about the thought processes of defense counsel. He states that the new evidence, along
with the testimony of the toxicologist at trial, “caused [him] to re-evaluate the
significance of the stun gun and handcuffs.” Id. at 26. He explained,
The argument could have been made that Jon DeWitt went
to the scene of the homicide and removed the handcuffs and
perhaps staged other aspects of the scene. This would have
explained the position of Christopher Northon’s hands, the
fact that [a witness] did not see the handcuffs [in Liysa
Northon’s bag following the shooting], and the fact that the
body had been moved at some point (blood was running in
two directions on Christopher Northon’s face and there was
smeared blood on other parts of his body).
Id. at 27. Similarly, Mr. Birmingham states in his affidavit that “[Liysa Northon] did not
tell the police that she had stopped at Jon DeWitt’s house while on the way to [her
friend]’s house and she initially told me, repeatedly, that she had not stopped there.” Id.
Tor DeWitt said that she had stopped there and ultimately she admitted it. Id. at 21.
Finally, Mr. Birmingham stated in his Affidavit that he found the fact that
Liysa Northon had wet hair when she arrived at her friend’s house the morning after the
shooting “troublesome inasmuch as this was roughly eight hours after [Liysa Northon]
claimed that she had struggled with Christopher Northon in the Lostine River.”
Birmingham Aff. at 20.
The sentences report the defense attorney’s thoughts and considerations at
that time. Moreover, other testimony also supports the statements. Tor DeWitt testified
that Liysa Northon came to his home on the morning of October 9, 2000 “about a quarter
to 6:00[a.m.], stayed “about 10 minutes” and then left. He testified that Liysa Northon

picked him up at work later in the day and he rode with her to the Umatilla County
Sheriff’s Office and that he contacted Detective Bobbitt, who worked there. Trial
Transcript July 17, 2001 at 230:19-234:9. Similarly, Mr. Dovci testified that two blood
flow patterns on Christopher Northon’s face indicated that body had been moved, or had
rolled. Trial Transcript 200:12-16.
Pages 217-18 “Mackeson and Birmingham asked Liysa if she had any life
insurance policies on Chris and she said no. She told the
same thing to the defense investigators. They were to
discover later that there was a large policy on Chris. Liysa
explained that away by saying that Bjorn was the sole
beneficiary. However, Birmingham found that it was Liysa
who was the primary beneficiary, and she was paying the
premiums.”
The challenged statement is supported by Mr. Birmingham’s affidavit:
I directly asked [Liysa Northon] whether she had any life
insurance on her husband, and she told me she did not. My
investigators also asked her whether she had any life
insurance on her husband, and she told them that she did
not. However, during the course of the investigation we
learned that in fact there was a life insurance policy on
Christopher Northon. When I asked [Liysa Northon] about
this, she told me that the insurance was in the name of her
son, Dane, who at the time was three years old, and that he
was the sole beneficiary. I later learned that, in fact, [Liysa
Northon] was the primary beneficiary under the insurance
policy and that she had been making the payments.
Birmingham Aff. at 28-29. Plaintiff Northon cannot establish actual malice or
negligence, nor can she prove the falsity of the statement, as required by Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.
Page 207
“Tor DeWitt continued to insist that he had police
permission to remove what he wanted from the house. That
couldn’t have been true; Pat Montgomery instructed Dick
and the Arnesens not to take anything away because it
might have evidentiary value. And they hadn’t; they were
putting things in the garage. In fact, Montgomery had told
Dick he’d prefer they didn’t even go into Chris’s house.”
To the extent plaintiff Tor DeWitt challenges the statement because it
implies that he lied or may have meddled with possible evidence, Tor DeWitt cannot
prove that this statement causes him harm above that caused by other, established

statements and facts. Tor DeWitt admitted to Mr. Birmingham that he retrieved
handcuffs and a stun gun from Liysa Northon’s vehicle following the shooting and kept
them in his possession. Birmingham Aff. at 21. Any statement, even if false, that he
improperly entered and removed items from the Northon home do not cause incremental
damage.
Even if the statement were actionable, Tor DeWitt cannot either prove that
it is false or establish negligence. The statement is supported by witnesses Dave and
Debbie Story along with Dick Northon (Chris Northon’s father), who were all present at
the time that Tor DeWitt came to the Northon house and insisted that he had permission
to remove items from it. Rule Decl. 10a.
Page 195
“Montgomery now pondered Liysa’s recollection of the
night of the tragedy. She said she had been running in the
dark on the steeper of the two trails, holding three-year-old
Bjorn under one arm, when she fired blindly toward where
she thought Chris was.”
The statement conveys the thoughts of Detective Pat Montgomery during
the investigation. It is supported by information provided by Detective Montgomery.
Rule Decl. 10f; see also Larkin Report 10/10/2000 at 5 (Rule Decl. 21 and Ex. 11
thereto) (reporting interview with Liysa Northon). Plaintiff Northon cannot prove the
falsity of a statement regarding the detective’s thought processes, nor can she establish
actual malice or negligence in light of the detective’s own statements to defendants.
Again, Liysa Northon is libel proof. She cannot prove damage to her reputation arising
out of this statement when she has publicly admitted to intentionally killing her husband
and, moreover, evidence establishes premeditation.
Page 5 “Or was it all a clever masquerade, hiding evil?”
The context of this statement demonstrates it is protected opinion
concerning a controversial matter with claimed ambiguous facts. The First Amendment
protects this statement. See Partington, supra.
Page 40
“Instead, she had faked a histrionic attack of amnesia, like

something right out of a soap opera.”
The affidavit of Mr. Birmingham establishes that his investigation found
three witnesses, including Alan Lipp, Liysa Northon’s former fiancé, who told him that
Liysa Northon had “faked a bout of amnesia and also lied about having amnesia as a
child. Apparently, [Liysa Northon] had been in an intimate relationship with this fiancé
and one day woke up claiming that she had amnesia and that she could not remember
anything about her fiancé.” Birmingham Aff. at 16.
Mr. Lipp confirmed Mr. Birmingham’s findings to the author. Mr. Lipp
told the author that he later learned that Liysa Northon had written about her plan to fake
amnesia in her journal in advance of the event. Rule Decl. 44 and Ex. 34 thereto.
Plaintiff Northon cannot establish actual malice or negligence. Moreover,
the statement, even if it were false, does not cause harm to her in light of her admitted
killing of her husband.
Page 52
“She became convinced that she had cervical cancer, a
disease sometimes caused by venereal warts, a virus
transmitted by the penis.”
Even if this statement were not true, defendants are protected by the
incremental harm doctrine. Liysa Northon has pled guilty and admitted to the public that
she intentionally killed her husband. The statement does not harm her reputation beyond
the harm caused by her public admission that she intentionally killed her husband.
Moreover, the statement is supported by the letter Liysa Northon wrote to
a former high school boyfriend, in which she in fact claimed that she had cervical cancer.
The letter was part of the Wallowa County District Attorney’s office case file. Rule Decl.
26 and Ex. 16a thereto. This letter demonstrates that plaintiff cannot establish the
requisite fault needed to state a claim of defamation against defendants. Defendants
relied upon the letter, written by plaintiff Northon herself. In light of this letter, plaintiffs
cannot establish that the statement above was made with knowledge of any falsity or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. Plaintiff’s letter also negates any attempt by

plaintiffs to establish negligence. In fact, although it is not herein defendants’ burden to
prove the truth of any matter, the letter indicates that the statement now challenged is
substantially true.
Page 60
“Dr. David Jones ‘He listened to me, David recalled, ‘but
he said it was hard to stay away from her. She was coming
over at night and crawling through his window, and he
couldn’t seem to say no. I think her husband must have
known, but he never confronted Chris.”
Liysa Northon has admitted that she intentionally shot her husband. It is
an abuse of defendants’ time and the Court’s time that she now has asked her lawyer to
claim that she is entitled to damages because of this statement (and so many others at
issue in this case). Her otherwise diminished reputation precludes damages and this
statement is not actionable even if false. Moreover, this statement is detailed in an
Oregon State Police interview report. OSP report of interview February 21, 2001 of Dr.
David Jones, at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25e thereto.) Plaintiff could not prove actual
malice or negligence in connection with its publication.
Page 97
“Papako, loved by both his parents and his grandparents,
was a pawn in Liysa’s property strategy.”
The challenged statement is one of opinion and conclusion based on fully
disclosed facts. As described above, throughout the Book the author contributes her own
thoughts, analyses and interpretation of the facts. In the Book the author has pieced
together the early relationship of Liysa and Christopher Northon through information
obtained from interviews and researching other statements and documents. The author
describes, at page 97, a writing from Liysa Northon herself to her then husband, Don
King. The author quotes directly from this writing, in which Liysa Northon told Mr. King
about how their real property should be divided between them following their divorce,
and warned, “It will be up to you to try to convince your parents to remain friendly to me.
They should know it is in their best interest to do so, since I have custody of Aukai, but
you know how they can be * * *.” See Letter to Don from Liysa (Rule Decl. 26 and Ex.

16b thereto). The author then provides her own interpretation of the letter: that Liysa
Northon was using her son Aukai as a pawn in Liysa’s property strategy. The statement
conveys the author’s interpretation of Liysa Northon’s writing. The statement is not
susceptible of being proved true or false. Finally, even if the statement could be proven
false, which defendants expressly deny, it does not create any incremental harm to Liysa
Northon’s reputation above that created by her admission that she intentionally killed her
husband and by the evidence of premeditation.
Page 134
“Once, after Liysa had reacted by leaping on his back and
clinging there, scratching his face.”
Christopher Northon told a friend that Liysa Northon had leapt on
Christopher Northon’s back and scratched at his face. That friend, Dan Jones, gave the
information to the Department of Justice in a witness interview. See DOJ Report of
interview of Daniel Jones March 14, 2001. (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24g thereto).
Plaintiff Northon cannot establish actual malice or negligence. Again, even if the
statement could be proven false, that she scratched her husband’s face cannot cause harm
above that caused by her admission that she intentionally killed him.
Page 138
“His swollen and crooked nose seemed to be a more serious
injury than Liysa’s bruised knees.”
Even, if this statement were false, it cannot cause harm to Liysa Northon’s
reputation above that caused by her admission that she intentionally killed her husband.
That is dispositive. Moreover, Kris Olsen, a friend of the Northons, reported that
following an argument between them, Christopher Northon’s nose appeared to be a more
serious injury than Liysa Northon’s. Liysa Northon does not challenge the statement that
she hit her husband and gave him a bloody nose. Book at 137. She cannot establish
actual malice or negligence in the publication of the challenged statement.
Page 139
“Liysa recanted her accusations against Chris, and when the
trial date arrived, she failed to show up. She’d flown off to
Hawaii to keep from testifying.:
This statement is supported by Theresa Hampson, one of Liysa Northon’s

closest friends, who reported to the Oregon Department of Justice that, following the
incident in February 1999, when Liysa and Christopher Northon had a dispute and both
ended up with injuries, Liysa Northon “had gone to Hawaii and stayed there to avoid the
court date.” See DOJ Report of Feb. 7, 2001 Interview of Theresa Hampson (Rule Dec.
34 and Ex. 24f thereto). Moreover, plaintiff Northon is libel proof, has no incremental
harm, and could not prove actual malice or negligence in the publication of the
challenged statement.
Page 148
“And so, in August 1999, Liysa caught a flight to Maui.
Chris had arranged to be at home in Kailua to care for
Papako and Bjorn for several days while she attended the
writers’ conference. It seemed odd that she would entrust
her beloved boys to Chris after he had allegedly threatened
to kill and eat the whole family, but she apparently saw no
contradiction in that.”
It is Liysa Northon’s own report that Chris allegedly threatened to kill and
eat the whole family. See OSP report of interview of Ali Wilson at 14 (Rule Decl. 35 and
Ex. 25n). The statement that her decision seemed odd and that she apparently saw no
contradiction clearly expresses the author’s opinion. The basis for that opinion is fully
disclosed: that Liysa Northon flew to Maui for several days, leaving her children with the
man she herself claimed threatened them with bodily harm. Defendants’ opinion is
protected under the First Amendment. Even if it were not true that she ever left the
children with Chris, and even if the statement were read to imply that she was lying, the
statement cannot cause harm above that created by public knowledge that she
intentionally killed her husband.
Page 157
“Liysa told Craig that she often passed David Kelley and
Michelle Pfeiffer on the beach near her Kailua home. Their
Hawaii home was a short distance away from the Lanipo
Street house. Now, she said, Chris was so jealous, he
actually thought she was having an affair with David
Kelley. That was another exaggeration. She had barely
said ‘hi’ to Kelley and Pfeiffer. And Chris had never
accused her of having an affair with anyone.”
A number of sources provided support for these statements. See, e.g., OSP

eport of Interview of Ali Wilson (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25n); OSP report of interview of
Kris Olsen and Becky Jones (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25-l); DOJ interview of Dan Jones
(Rule Decl. 24 and Ex. 24g). Further, the statements cannot be actionable as causing
incremental harm to Liysa Northon’s reputation, given that she had admitted intentionally
killing her husband and in light of the evidence about the killing, including evidence
demonstrating premeditation.
Page 158
“It was ironic in a way. Liysa had spent more than a year
telling people how dangerous her husband was. And yet,
she didn’t leave Chris. She confided to some of her very
closest friends that sex with him was too good to give up.
Odd, because sometimes she also shuddered when she said
that he raped her and humiliated her during sex.
This is a statement of opinion and conclusion which must be protected.
As set forth in the Book and reported through Department of Justice and other witness
interviews, Liysa Northon told numerous friends and acquaintances that she was the
victim of domestic violence by her husband. However, witnesses, including Becky Jones
and Kris Olsen, reported that Liysa Northon spoke frequently of the great sex she
experienced with Christopher Northon at 6, 10. See OSP Report of Interview of Becky
Jones and Kris Olsen (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25-l thereto). Defendants’ statement of
opinion and conclusion points out that the stories do not “add up.” Even if the statement
were not protected opinion and were capable of being proven false, Liysa Northon is libel
proof and is not caused harm above that related to killing her husband.
Page 165
“Although he himself was in the midst of a divorce marked
by bitterness and custody issues, Tor DeWitt was enraged
when Marni Clark told him that Chris Northon had
assaulted his sister. It was June 2000, and the two met at a
baseball game in Walla Walla. Marni had assumed that Tor
already knew about Liysa’s troubles with Chris. But he
didn’t, and he was so angry that he called the Northons’
homes in both Bend and Hawaii, leaving a message for
Chris to call him.”
“But Tor was still mad. He called Hawaiian Airlines headquarters
in Honolulu to demand that Chris be grounded, but he gave
up, frustrated, when he couldn’t get through to anybody in
authority.”

The statements are not defamatory as to Tor DeWitt or any plaintiff. They
do not tend to “harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community.” In fact, the challenged statement tends to show that Tor DeWitt acted to
protect his sister from what he apparently believed may have been domestic violence.
Moreover, the challenged statements come directly from Tor DeWitt’s
Department of Justice interview report. He told the investigator that he learned at a
baseball game in June 2000 that Christopher Northon had allegedly assaulted Liysa
Northon. Following the baseball game, he called the Northon’s residences in Bend and
Hawaii and left messages for Christopher Northon to call him. Tor DeWitt also reported
to the Department of Justice investigator that he called Hawaiian Airlines to “have Chris
grounded.” However, he could not get through to anyone to make the complaint. See
Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24b at 1 thereto. Plaintiff Tor DeWitt could not prove the falsity
of the statements and could not establish negligence in their publication.
Page 167
“Oddly, Liysa had claimed it was Dan Jones who had
warned her that Chris wanted to kill his whole family and
eat them.”
Alice “Ali” Wilson, a friend of Liysa Northon’s reported to police
investigators that a pilot from Utah who had known Chris for twenty years told Liysa
Northon that Christopher Northon wanted to kill his family and eat them. Rule Decl.
35n and Ex. 25n at 14. Dan Jones, a good friend of the Northon’s, fit that description at
the time. Rule Decl. 34g and Ex. 24g at 1. The Oregon police and Department of
Justice questioned him about his alleged comment to Liysa Northon, which he denied
ever making and in fact found unbelievable. Even if the statement is read to imply that
Liysa lied, she is not caused any incremental harm above that caused by knowledge that
she intentionally killed her husband.
Page 168
“In August, Liysa stopped by Tor’s house in Walla Walla to
clean it, perhaps an irony in itself. But Tor was divorced by
then and raising his children alone, and he said Liysa
wanted to help him out.”

The statement is not defamatory as to any of the plaintiffs. It does not
harm anyone’s reputation. To the extent plaintiffs challenge the statement because it
implies that Liysa Northon did not keep a clean house, the statement is opinion based on
information found in police reports on interviews with, among others, Dan Jones and Kris
Olsen, who provided information that the Northon house was not kept clean. See Rule
Decl. 34g and Ex. 24g at 2 thereto; id. at 35-l and Ex. 25-l at 9 thereto. In any event,
it is outrageous that a woman who admitted to intentionally killing her husband seeks
damages for an alleged false statement about her housekeeping skills, and the doctrine of
incremental harm forecloses any claim based on the challenged statement.
Page 169
“Wayland, who had a Ph.D. degree in social work, often
spoke of the professional counseling he had done in the
Washington State Prison at Walla Walla. It’s probable that
his visits inside prison walls were on a volunteer basis. He
considered himself, however, quite expert on aberrations of
the human personality.”
The statement does not harm the reputation of Wayland DeWitt or any of
the plaintiffs. In fact, the challenged statement conveys that Dr. DeWitt is an educated
and compassionate man, performing volunteer social work in prisons, and that he had
confidence in his knowledge of personality aberrations. The statement is not defamatory.
With regard to the author’s statement that Wayland DeWitt considered
himself to be an expert, Wayland DeWitt reported to the Department of Justice that, as
the Book explains on the next page, 170, he had diagnosed Christopher Northon with a
personality disorder from the DSM-IV.
Moreover, Wayland DeWitt cannot claim, even if anything in this
statement could be proven both false and capable of defamatory meaning, that the
statement caused him harm above that caused by other, non-actionable and unchallenged
statements. E-mails discovered during the trial established that Liysa Northon described
to her father, Wayland DeWitt, in detail that she planned to kill her husband.
Birmingham Aff., p. 24. She asked him for a gun. Wayland DeWitt has admitted that he

gave her a gun. Liysa Northon later asked Mr. Birmingham to help her destroy her
computer because it might incriminate her father. Id. She also told her father that he
would have to destroy his own computer. Rule Decl. 27 and Ex. 17b thereto; Book at p.
318. All of this information comes from the e-mails obtained by the F.B.I. Even if the
statement above could be proved false and defamatory, it does not create harm to
Wayland DeWitt’s reputation above that caused by the established, unchallenged facts
that Liysa Northon described to Wayland DeWitt in detail that she was planning to kill
her husband, assured him that she was sticking to her plan, asked her father, Wayland
DeWitt, for a gun to carry out her plan, and that Wayland DeWitt gave her a gun.
Page 181
“She had Bjorn under one arm, and her gun in her free
hand. She shouted that she was taking the baby and
leaving.”
The statement is not defamatory. It does not harm Liysa Northon’s
reputation that she carried her baby and a gun and shouted that she was taking the baby
and leaving, even if that were false. In fact, however, the challenged statement is an
account of Liysa Northon’s own version of the facts. Liysa Northon reported to Detective
Larkin that, following an altercation, she retrieved a gun from her car and that she went
back to her tent to pick up her son Dane. She reported that in order to get away from her
husband, she “ran by with the child with the handgun and fired a round as a warning shot
towards where her husband was sleeping and yelled something to the effect of I’m
leaving with the baby.” Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 166:4-25. She also told her
attorney that she yelled out “I’m taking Dane and we’re leaving” just before she shot her
husband while walking along the trail at the campsite where she and her husband were
sleeping. Birmingham Aff. at 4. Plaintiff cannot prove actual malice or negligence in the
publication of the challenged statement.
Page 206
“Debbie and Carrie were cleaning the refrigerator, which
was full of spoiled food, when a huge rental truck pulled
up. It was Tor and a male friend, Tor’s ex-wife, Jimmie
Rhonda, and Liysa’s newest friend, Mia Rose. Tor
stubbornly insisted he had a police detective’s permission

to take whatever items Liysa wanted from the house.”
The statement is supported by eyewitnesses Dave and Debbie Story, who
provided the information conveyed in the statement by interview to Ms. Rule. See Rule
Decl. 10a; see also OSP supplemental report at 8-9 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25m
thereto) (Jones description of incident). Tor DeWitt cannot prove negligence. The
statement does not in any event cause harm to Tor DeWitt beyond the harm arising out of
the unchallengeable fact that he took the handcuffs and stun gun after the killing.
Page 206
“It seemed like grave robbing for Liysa’s brother and
friends to swoop down to divide the possessions in Chris’s
home when the pain of his death was still achingly fresh. In
his grief, Dick felt rage, too. It was an easier emotion to
deal with than deep mourning. He swallowed his anger,
however, and began to point out innocuous items that
DeWitt’s entourage could take. They ignored him and
strode in, loading up the new washer and dryer first.
Eventually, they packed almost everything of value. Liysa
had told them that it all belonged to her now. In the end,
they removed everything save Chris’s piano -- hauling
away photographs, books, mementos. DeWitt would recall
that he saw a ‘bag of marijuana’ in Chris’s gray filing
cabinet. Perhaps he did. ”
The statement is largely a report of Dick Northon’s feelings, which were
relayed in multiple interviews. See Rule Decl. 10a. Dave and Debbie Story
corroborated Dick Northon’s account of the incident. See Rule Decl. 10a. Plaintiffs
could not establish the requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect to the challenged
statement.
It is also unclear what is claimed to be defamatory here, but in any event
even if there were any harm to any plaintiff’s reputation, it would not be over and above
the harm already arising out of unchallengeable facts and events.
Page 217
“Yet another fictional spouse succumbed to a murderous
wife who smashed his head in with a rock. And one female
character had electrocuted her husband with a stun gun
while he was in a Jacuzzi.”
The statement is not of and concerning any plaintiff. It accurately
describes what Liysa Northon had written. As described in the preceding paragraph of

the Book, Mr. Birmingham received from the district attorney’s office through discovery
copies of Liysa Northon’s short stories, letters, manuscripts and screenplay. Many of her
writings were about battered women who kill their abusive husbands. One of Liysa
Northon’s writings was about a woman who hit her husband in the temple with a rock and
killed him while they were boating on a river. Another writing was a story about a
woman who electrocuted her husband with a stun gun while he was in a hot tub or
Jacuzzi. This information is recorded in the affidavit of Pat Birmingham. Birmingham
Aff. at 7, 14. In addition, Ms. Rule was given access to the writings themselves, which
were public records, by District Attorney Dan Ousley, a few months after the trial was
completed. See Rule Decl. 26. In light of this, Northon cannot prove actual malice or
negligence in connection with the publication of the challenged statements. Further, she
is libel proof, and in any event the statement does not cause her harm above that caused
by her admitting she intentionally killed her husband.
Page 250
“Dennis Dinsmore and Pat Montgomery interviewed two of
Liysa’s staunchest supporters: her brother, Tor, and her
father, Wayland. Neither of them could offer anything but
hearsay descriptions about Chris and Liysa’s relationship,
information provided by Liysa herself.”
This statement is not defamatory, even if it were false. Moreover, the
statement is supported by Department of Justice witness interview reports that show that
Tor DeWitt and Wayland DeWitt reported only Liysa Northon’s descriptions of her
husband’s abuse. Neither one ever saw Christopher Northon abuse her. Rule Decl. 34
and Exs. 24b at 1-2, 24c at 4 thereto. In any event, the statement does not cause any harm
to Tor or Wayland DeWitt beyond that which arises from unchallengeable facts and
events.
That Liysa Northon’s brother and father knew about the relationship
between Liysa and Christopher Northon based on what Liysa Northon told them is not
defamatory. It is typical that a family member might not be witness to a married couple’s
intimate relationship, and there is nothing in the statement that tends to diminish the

eputation of any of the plaintiffs.
Finally, the statement is protected by the incremental harm defense. Tor
and Wayland DeWitt do not challenge assertions that they may have tampered with
evidence of the crime (Tor DeWitt, by removing items that Liysa Northon had with her
on the camping trip following her arrest) or discussed the crime over e-mail with Liysa
Northon prior to its execution (Wayland DeWitt). Any statement regarding their personal
observations of Liysa Northon’s relationship with her late husband does not harm their
reputation further.
Page 250
“Wayland DeWitt said that he and his daughter were very
close and talked weekly. He believed her when she told
him that Chris surrounded himself with drug dealers.”
The statement is not cable of defamatory meaning. That Wayland DeWitt
was close to his daughter and believed what she told him does not damage his own or
Liysa Northon’s reputation.
Moreover, the statement is supported by Wayland DeWitt’s interview with
the Department of Justice in which he reported that he and his daughter were “very close
and they talked weekly.” DOJ report of February 1, 2001 interview of Wayland DeWitt
at 1 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24c thereto). He also stated in that same interview that
Liysa Northon had told him that she had compiled four years of drug sales records of her
husband, and that she had observed Debbie Story deliver drugs to a house by using her
daughter. Id. In addition, he reported that he did not believe Liysa Northon had ever lied
to him. Id. at 4. His witness interview supports the statement. Accordingly, plaintiffs
could not prove the requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect to the challenged
statement and, in any event the statement causes no incremental harm to any plaintiff.
Page 250
“Indeed, she’d told him she had compiled a drug sales
record on Chris between 1991 and 1995, but someone had
removed it from the Bend house before Wayland and Tor
arrived to take away all the furniture and paperwork at her
instruction.”
The statement is not defamatory. The fact that Liysa Northon told

Wayland DeWitt that she had compiled records and the records were missing, or that she
instructed Wayland and Tor to claim belongings in her home is not information that
damages the reputation of any plaintiffs.
This statement is supported by Wayland DeWitt’s witness interview report
with the Department of Justice. Wayland DeWitt told Dennis Dinsmore and Pat
Montgomery that Liysa Northon told him that she had compiled the drug sales records of
Christopher Northon between 1991 and 1995 but that the records were missing from her
residence. Id. Plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect
to the challenged statement.
Page 251 “Wayland acknowledged that he had given Liysa a .38
caliber revolver loaded with five rounds, along with five
extra rounds. He was aware that she kept it in her camera
bag and estimated that he gave it to her in September, a
month before Chris was shot.”
This information, too, comes directly from Wayland Dewitt’s Department
of Justice witness interview report. Wayland DeWitt told Mr. Dinsmore and Mr.
Montgomery that he “gave Liysa Northon the .38 caliber five shot revolver one year ago
last September. The gun was loaded with five (5) rounds with five (5) extra rounds. The
gun and ammunition were in a purple Crown Royal cloth bag. Liysa kept the gun in her
camera case as she had several other purple bags in the case to protect her camera lenses.”
Id. at 2. Mr. DeWitt’s report indicates that the statement is substantially true. In any
event, plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect to the
challenged statement. Moreover, the statement does not cause harm above that arising
from unchallengeable facts and events.
Page 256
“Dan said that someone had made an anonymous call to
Dave Story’s airline, complaining that Dave was a drug
user and dealer. A pilots’ union rep had taken care of the
spurious accusation.”
“‘It happens a lot,’ Dan commented. ‘When pilots are involved in
divorces or child custody issues, about half of them get
anonymous complaints about drug use. It’s a method of
intimidation from ex-spouses. Even when the complaints

prove to be unfounded, they remain in pilots’ files. Liysa
knows that.”
The statement is supported by the report of Dan Jones, a friend of
Christopher Northon, to Investigator Dinsmore and Steve Briggs, Assistant Attorney
General. According to the Department of Justice report, Mr. Jones stated that he had
heard that Liysa Northon was alleging that all of Chris’s pilot friends were using drugs.
Mr. Jones also reported that someone had in fact made an anonymous call to Dave Story’s
airline, reporting him as a drug user. A union representative dealt with the complaint.
Mr. Jones also stated that it is common for pilots to get false reports of drug use to their
airlines when they are involved in a dispute with spouses and ex-spouses, and that such
complaints, even though unfounded, remain in the file of the pilot. See Rule Decl. 34
and Ex. 24g at 6-7 thereto. In light of this, plaintiffs cannot establish requisite fault to
sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement. Moreover, the statement fails to
cause harm above that caused by unchallengeable facts and events.
Page 275
“And notes made by counselors Liysa had visited said she
had talked more about how she needed to wait [to] (sic)
divorce her husband until she would get the most financial
benefits possible than she did about abuse or her fear of
him.”
The above statement is supported by materials relied upon by defendants.
As discussed in Pat Birmingham’s affidavit, Liysa Northon sought both legal and
relationship counsel in 1999. The chart notes for the counsel Liysa sought ostensibly for
issues regarding Battered Women Syndrome stated that she was also gaining advice from
an attorney about divorce. And Liysa Northon’s correspondence with the attorney
indicated a keen interest in maximizing her financial gain, and a willingness to blackmail
her husband by threatening to disclose certain information to the FAA. See Birmingham
Aff. at 14-15.
Moreover, even if the above statement were both defamatory and false
(which it is not), it concerned Liysa Northon, who is libel proof, and it does not in any
event cause her harm beyond that arising from her admission that she intentionally killed

her husband.
Page 289
“Liysa had given three versions of her gun’s misfiring. In
one, she said the gun had gone off in the car while she was
loading it, and to someone else she said it went off
accidentally just after she’d shot Chris. She told her father
she had fired it in the woods to see how the action went.”
The statement is supported by: (1) Liysa Northon’s own report to Deputy
Larkin that the gun accidentally fired while she was loading it. Trial Transcript July 17,
2001 at 168:14-24; (2) Ms. Monteillet’s testimony at trial that Liysa Northon told her on
the morning after the shooting that the gun had misfired a second shot “when she was
going back up to the car.” Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 146:5-12; and (3) Wayland
DeWitt’s report in his Department of Justice witness interview that Liysa Northon had
told him that she had fired “in the woods so she would know how the gun worked.” Rule
Decl. 34 and Ex. 24c at 2 thereto. Accordingly, plaintiff could not establish requisite
fault to sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement. Moreover, even if the
statement were false, Liysa Northon is libel proof with respect to her gun going off; she
pled guilty to intentionally killing her husband with the same gun. Statements about the
gun going off before the killing do not further damage her already sullied reputation.
Page 302
“Why would Liysa have moved Chris’s body? She had told
everyone that she was so frightened that he was coming
after her.”
The statement clearly represents the author’s opinion based on the facts
presented. The general and specific contexts of the statement support this. The chapter
in which the statement is found describes the testimony of the forensic investigators that
examined the crime scene. Mr. Dovci described during his testimony that Christopher
Northon’s face had two different blood blow patterns, which supported his conclusion
that Christopher Northon had slumped or rolled following the shot, “or somebody had
moved him.” Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 201:22-202:11.
After explaining this, the author then ponders the information: “Why
would Liysa have moved Chris’s body? She had told everyone that she was so frightened

that he was coming after her. All of her reminiscences of that dark night were of flight.
Had someone else come upon Chris and lifted him? That didn’t seem to make much
sense either. Or was it possible that there were three adults present that night? Not
likely.” Book at 302. Such constitutionally protected questionings clearly negate the
impression that defendant asserted an objective fact. The statement is protected.
Moreover, Liysa Northon has admitted to intentionally killing her husband. Any
statement regarding the specifics of the shooting or moving his body does not damage her
already sullied reputation.
Page 311
“And he was still holding the package sent to him
anonymously that contained the stun guns, although now
the prosecutors knew about their existence.”
The statement is not of and concerning any plaintiff; it’s about Pat
Birmingham. That is dispositive. Moreover, the statement is supported by Mr.
Birmingham. Birmingham Aff. at 21-22, 26-27.
Page 316
“She insisted that she had surreptitiously taped Chris and
another pilot giggling about alternating drug tests so they
could fool their airline. The tape had been in the sheriff’s
evidence room since it was found in the Northons’ Bend
home. It has nothing on it but some innocuous
conversations ”
The statement is supported by the interview of Pat Montgomery, who told
the author that Liysa Northon had insisted that she had an audio tape recording of
Christopher Northon and another pilot discussing “beating” their airline’s drug test. The
tape that supposedly contained the recording proved to have only innocuous
conversations. See Rule Decl. 10f. In light of this, plaintiff cannot establish the
requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement. Moreover,
even if the statement were false and defamatory, a statement that Northon taped a
conversation of her husband or even, if inferred, that she lied about its content, does not
harm her already sullied reputation further.
Page 329
[T]hat Liysa Northon had been planning her husband’s
death for a long time, probably more than a year.”

The statement is taken out of context. The passage from which the
statement is taken describes Mr. Birmingham’s thought processes just before Liysa
Northon pled guilty to manslaughter. The entire sentence from which it is taken reads,
“The State would have a field day demonstrating that Liysa Northon had been planning
her husband’s death for a long time, probably more than a year.” The statement
accurately reflects the defense attorney’s apprehension about Liysa Northon’s case and
defense of self-defense or defense of another. Birmingham Aff. at 29. Plaintiffs cannot
establish the falsity of the actual statement about Birmingham’s thoughts, nor can they
establish requisite fault.
Page 350
“It didn’t matter that there wasn’t a word of truth in what
Liysa was saying; even the thought was humiliating.”
This statement describes the thoughts and feelings of Dick and Jeannie
Northon. The context is a description of the custody lawsuit for Dane Northon. The
Book describes that in the course of the lawsuit, Liysa Northon accused Dick Northon of
sexually molesting his son, Christopher, and alleged that Jeannie Northon had been a
prostitute. Plaintiffs do not challenge these statements concerning Liysa Northon’s
accusations. The passage describes Dick and Jeannie Northon’s reaction to Liysa
Northon’s accusations. It states that Jeannie’s heart was breaking for Dick because of the
accusation, and that the couple found the accusations humiliating, despite the fact that
they were not true. Rule Decl. 10d. Even if the statement could somehow be proven
false and defamatory regarding Liysa, she is libel proof and statements about her
accusations in a custody hearing do not further diminish her already sullied reputation.
Page 359
“I believe that Liysa spent two years creating a monstrous
persona for Chris, one cunningly designed to make her
actions appear justifiable when she lured him to a lonely
place, far from help, and shot him in the head.”
“An exhaustive review of the preparations Liysa made for this
deadly weekend casts an appalling picture across the screen
of one’s mind.”
The statements are clearly opinion. They are contained in the Book’s

Afterword, which, as described above, sets forth a detailed account of the author’s
analysis and opinion of what occurred, based on all of the facts gathered from her
research and the disclosure of those facts in over 350 pages. Having set forth the results
of her investigation, including information collected from Liysa Northon’s friends and
relatives, the author explains, “I believe * * *.” In addition, the author uses colorful
language to convey her analysis, further establishing this as protected opinion.
Again, authors must be constitutionally permitted to relay their
interpretations of the facts. See Partington, 56 F3d at 1154 (“[T]he First Amendment
guarantees authors ‘the interpretive license that is necessary when relying upon
ambiguous sources’ * * *. [C]ases clearly ‘establish that when a writer is evaluating or
giving an account of inherently ambiguous materials or subject matter, the First
Amendment requires that the courts allow latitude for interpretation.”)
Page 360
Page 361
Page 361
Page 364
Page 371
Page 372
“He [Papako] would have enjoyed camping, but instead she
chose to leave him hundreds of miles away, a detour which
meant she had at least sixteen hours of grueling driving.
Was it because Papako was old enough to recognize what
was going to happen and would surely remember it?”
“Had Chris been given slow poison even before their
deadly camping trip? She had emailed her father months
earlier to say that ‘drowning is the best in terms of
detection’ but she wanted a gun ‘for backup.’”
“Liysa must have taken off his soaked clothing (with the
pockets full of sand from the struggle in the river) and
removed his sodden shoes, hanging his clothes on the
remaining camp chair. If he were found naked, it would
support her frequent claims that he raped her.”
“Liysa considered herself, above all, a wonderful mother,
and it may never have occurred to her that her carefully
premeditated plans to kill Chris wouldn’t work out.”
“She certainly planned the trip to the Lostine River.”
“Liysa also seems to be histrionic, acting out dramatic
scenes and delighting in calling attention to herself.”
The statements are brought together because they are all found in the
Afterword and they all express opinions and conclusions premised in the disclosed facts

on which the author relies. The context of the statements negates the impression that
defendants were asserting an objective fact. The statements use colorful language
conveying speculation and surmise as to what actually occurred. These statements must
be protected under the First Amendment. Partington, 56 F3d at 1154.
The opinions arise from disclosed facts. For example, it is unchallenged
that Liysa Northon drove hundreds of miles out of the way to leave her nine year-old son
with a friend and took her three year-old son with them camping. Birmingham Aff. at 4-
5. Similarly, Liysa Northon had in fact emailed her father prior to the shooting, writing
that “drowning is the best in terms of detection” but she wanted a gun “for backup.” Rule
Decl. 27 and Ex. 17b thereto. Mr. Dovci testified that Christopher Northon’s wet
clothing was found at the campsite hanging on a camping chair, with river water in the
pockets. Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 193:12-194:3. The defendants are
constitutionally permitted to provide analysis and opinion arising from these facts.
Page 371
“A thorough search of hospital records in every town where
the DeWitts lived failed to show even one notation of
Liysa’s suffering a broken nose, much less twenty-six
broken bones.”
The statement is supported by the investigation of Liysa Northon’s defense
team, who learned of Liysa’s claim that she had suffered twenty-six broken bones from
abuse as a child at the hands of her mother. Mr. Birmingham reviewed Liysa Northon’s
medical records and found the claims to be untrue. Birmingham Aff. at 16-17. Liysa
Northon’s father and brother both also denied that Liysa Northon had suffered broken
bones while a child. See DOJ report of interview January 23, 2001 of Dr. Jon DeWitt at
3; DOJ report of interview February 1, 2001 of Wayland DeWitt at 3 (Rule Decl. 34 and
Exs. 24b and 24c thereto). Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot establish requisite fault to
sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement. Further, even if the statement
were false, and it were inferred from the statement that Liysa lied, statements about her
lying do not further damage her already sullied reputation.

Page 373
“When their first project wasn’t picked up by a studio,
Liysa dropped Elliot and plunged into such depression that
she didn’t comb her hair or change her clothes, and
remained locked behind her blinds.”
It is outrageous that plaintiff Northon burdens defendants and the Court
with this claim and so many others like it. She has admitted to intentionally killing her
husband. Even if this statement could be proven false, it does not create harm beyond
that already arising from given facts and events. Moreover, the statement is supported.
First, Phil Hetz, Liysa Northon’s former brother-in-law, reported to police that Liysa
Northon was “depressed” when her screenplay did not sell. See OSP report of interview
of Phil Hetz January 10, 2001 at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25d at 5 thereto). And
witnesses reported that Liysa stopped taking care of herself around the time the project
failed. Kris Olsen confirmed that Liysa Northon did not take care of herself and had
dirty, uncombed hair. Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25-l at 9 thereto.
Page 103
“She’s kind of weird, too, she went to a kahuna once, trying
to get a hex put on somebody she was mad at. -- Dave
Story”
Again, the challenged statement is protected by the incremental harm
defense and the fact that Northon is libel-proof. Having admitted to shooting and killing
her husband, the fact that she was “kind of weird” does not damage her reputation further.
Page 157
Page 158
“Liysa wanted more children, and she beseeched him to
leave his wife and family to be with her.”
“They had talked about having a sexual relationship, but
Craig said he held back.”
It is dispositive that these statements cannot cause harm to plaintiff
Northon beyond that already suffered by her sullied reputation. Moreover, the statements
are supported by e-mails and police reports. See Rule Decl. 27 and Ex 17a thereto; 34
and Ex. 24a thereto.
Page 194
“They looked like ordinary fingernail scratches, and yet, in
some ways, they looked almost like burns.”
First, the statement is not of and concerning any plaintiff. Second, the

statement is supported by Mr. Birmingham’s affidavit, in which he explains that the
pathologist who performed the autopsy on Christopher Northon testified that “the
elongated abrasions on Christopher Northon’s chest did not follow a particular pattern,
that they were not symmetrical, and that they were not consistent with ordinary fingernail
scratches.”
The defense team concluded that the marks on Christopher Northon’s chest
could have been evidence of a burn from a stun gun. Birmingham Aff. at 25-26.
Accordingly, plaintiffs could not establish requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect to
the challenged statement. In addition, the statement fails to cause harm above that arising
from unchallengeable facts and events.
Page 218
“Liysa could not resist discussing the fact of her case and
the legal theories that her lawyers developed by
brainstorming, with the guards, her family, friends, nurses,
and counselors, even other inmates in the jail.”
The statement is not defamatory. In addition, it is supported: Mr.
Birmingham described in his affidavit that he “discouraged and counseled [Liysa
Northon] against discussing the facts of her case * * *. Notwithstanding my advice,
[Liysa Northon] continually did discuss the facts of her case and legal theories which we
had developed with guards, family members, friends, nurses, counselors, and other
inmates in jail.” Birmingham Aff. at 8. Plaintiff Northon could not prove requisite fault
to sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement. And it is obvious that the
statement fails to cause new harm to a plaintiff who has admitted intentionally killing her
husband.
Page 350
“She mentioned the mystery letters several times, always
attributing them to Dick, when there had been no proof that
he had anything to do with them.”
During the lawsuit over custody for Dane Northon, Liysa Northon
repeatedly referred to some anonymous threatening letters that had been sent to Liysa’s
former husband, Don King, and Billie Bell, who was retained by Deschutes County to
perform a custody evaluation. She accused the Northons of writing the letters. (Rule

Decl. 7.) Plaintiff cannot establish requisite fault.
In addition, defendants are protected by the incremental harm defense.
The fact that Liysa Northon claimed that Dick Northon wrote the threatening letters does
not harm her reputation beyond the statements she does not and cannot challenge, that she
intentionally shot and killed her husband.
Page 360
Page 360
Page 361
Page 362
Page 362
Page 363
Page 363
Page 364
Page 364
“The thought of Chris holding a knife to the throat of a
child he cherished is suspect -- and highly unlikely.”
“I think she went back to trick Chris into swallowing an
overdose of Restoril. Or perhaps she had already slipped
the sleeping pills into his lunch and she came back to see if
he was unconscious.”
Now, for good measure, Liysa zapped Chris’s chest with
one of the stun guns. He was burned, but was not
electrocuted as she had planned. And the water was frigid,
rousing Chris enough to struggle instinctively with Liysa to
get to the surface where he could breathe. This might well
have been when she suffered a black eye. It’s also quite
possible that Liysa struck her own cheekbone with a rock to
bolster her story that she’d been fighting for her life.”
“And then she must have zipped it up to his chin. Chris
couldn’t get out of the bag.”
It’s not likely that she shot blindly * * * asleep in their tent
beyond Chris’s body.”
“Liysa probably took Chris’s cell phone and his car keys
with her, tossed them out into the brush or down the
mountain as she headed north.”
“I think that Liysa refreshed her ‘drowned rat’ look
somewhere along the way.”
“She seemed completely ignorant of how much can be
determined through postmortem examinations and blood
and urine tests. She obviously thought the shooting would
appear so cut and dried to the authorities that she wouldn’t
even spend a night in jail.”
“Liysa’s own explanations and recollections simply did not
fit, and she changed her versions of Chris’s shooting often
enough to make investigators blink.”
These statements are all clearly opinion and conclusions. They are once
again all taken from the Afterword and they summarize and analyze the facts set forth

throughout the Book. They are protected under the First Amendment. Partington, 56
F3d at 1154.
Defendants here provide representative samples of the support and
background of these statements. For example, numerous witnesses told police and
investigators that Christopher Northon was proud of and utterly devoted to his son Dane.
See OSP report of interview March 2, 2001 of Gay Bradshaw at 4 (Rule Decl. 35 and
Ex. 25a thereto) (“Chris loved his son tremendously * * * Chris’s son was everything to
Chris); DOJ report of interview June 21, 2001 of Jane Pultz at 3 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex.
24-l thereto) (stating that Chris Northon was “very proud” of Dane and Aukai); OSP
report of interview with Kris Olsen and Becky Jones at 9 (Rule Dec. 35 and Ex. 35-l
thereto) (stating that Chris Northon would not want to give up Dane, but would not resist
Liysa leaving). Robert Middleberg, M.D. testified for the state that Christopher Northon
had an extremely high dose of Restoril, a sedative, in his body, enough to render him
unconscious. See Trial Transcript July 18, 2001 at 355:16-357:17; Birmingham Aff. at
19. In addition, the defense team concluded that the red marks on Christopher Northon’s
chest were consistent with burns from a stun gun. Birmingham Aff at 26. And Liysa
Northon’s own attorney questioned the fact that Liysa Northon’s hair and clothing was
still wet when she arrived at Joan Monteillet’s house around 7:00 in the morning,
following the alleged struggle in the river the previous evening. Birmingham Aff. at 20;
see Trial Transcript 182:25-183:20 (describing timeline).
These samples are of course not complete and they need not be. It is
dispositive that all of the statements are constitutionally protected opinion.
3. Plaintiffs cannot establish with substantial evidence the probability
they will prevail on their false light claims.
In order to succeed on this set of claims, plaintiffs must prove that the
statements they identify: (1) place them in a false light; (2) which would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) that defendants had knowledge of falsity or

acted in reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statements, that is, that
defendant acted with actual malice. Marleau v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 333 Or 82,
92, 37 P3d 148 (2001) (listing elements of claim).
Plaintiffs’ false light claims fail for largely the same reasons as their
defamation claims. The same First Amendment defenses that apply to defamation also
apply to false light. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 US 374, 387-88 (1967); Partington, 56
F3d at 1160 (rejecting false light claims as to challenged statements “for the same reason
that we rejected his defamation claims based on those statements: both statements are
protected by the First Amendment, regardless of the form of tort alleged.”); Brennan v.
Kadner, 814 NE 2d 951, 959 (Ill App 2004) (statement of non-actionable opinion
protected by First Amendment in context of false light claim); Town of Sewall’s Point v.
Rhodes, 852 So 2d 949, 950-51 (Fla App 2003) (statements of opinion protected by First
Amendment and not actionable as defamation or as basis for false light claim).
a. Many of the challenged statements are not about the plaintiffs,
do not place plaintiffs in a false light or would not be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.
As described below, many of the challenged statements are not about the
plaintiffs, do not place plaintiffs in a false light and/or would not be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. Plaintiffs must also prove that the alleged falsehood was false to a
“material and substantial” degree. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 US 374, 386, 87 S Ct
534, 17 L Ed 2d 456 (1967) (citing with approval to New York state case holding that the
test for falsehood should be the existence of material and substantial falsification). They
cannot.
b. Many of the statements at issue constitute non-actionable
statements of opinion.
As with plaintiffs’ defamation claim, statements that are expressions of
opinion are not actionable. Reesman, 327 Or at 605. As addressed below, many of the
challenged statements are statements of opinion.

c. Plaintiffs cannot prove actual malice.
All false light claims require proof of actual malice, that is, proof that the
defendant knew of any falsity of a statement or acted in reckless disregard as to the truth
or falsity of a statement. Dean v. Guard Pub. Co., Inc., 73 Or App 656, 660, 699 P2d
1158, 1160 (1985) (adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652E (1977)).
Proof of negligence is not sufficient. As described above, plaintiffs here
will not be able to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that defendants acted with
actual malice as to any of the statements alleged to create false light and the lack of clear
and convincing proof of actual malice will be dispositive of every false light claim made
by plaintiff. It must be remembered that actual malice cannot be demonstrated by proof
of an inadequate investigation or proof that defendants failed to obtain correct
information. Instead plaintiffs are required to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
that defendants actually knew of the falsity of a statement, or that defendants entertained
serious doubts about the truth of a statement. McNabb, supra; Dean, supra. In the
absence of clear and convincing proof of actual malice, plaintiffs’ false light claims must
be stricken.
d. Liysa Northon is “libel proof” with regard to the statements at
issue, and none of the plaintiffs may recover for lack of
incremental harm and lack of causation.
Because all First Amendment defenses apply, the libel proof plaintiff
doctrine bars Liysa Northon’s false light claims. Similarly, the incremental harm doctrine
and issues of causation prevent plaintiffs from recovering based on challenged statements
that could not have harmed plaintiffs’ reputations beyond the harm caused by the
unchallenged or non-actionable part of the publication.
4. Plaintiffs cannot establish the elements of invasion of privacy by false
light as to any of the challenged statements.
Page 341
“She realized that some of her writings were part of the
official police investigation files. ‘That is a violation of my
constitutional rights,’ Liysa wrote. I must ask you to return
my computers, papers, diaries, etc., to me. You can ship

them certified to my brother, Dr. Jon Tor DeWitt.”
The statement does not place any of the plaintiffs in a false light; it is not
highly offensive to reasonable person. It merely describes Liysa Northon’s complaint to
Daniel Ousley and her desire to have her belongings returned. Moreover, the statement is
taken directly from a letter penned by Liysa Northon to Mr. Ousley. By an undated letter
received by Mr. Ousley on January 1, 2002, Liysa Northon stated, “It has come to my
attention that Dick and Jeanne Northon [Christopher Northon’s parents] have been
receiving copies of my papers and correspondence through your office. They are using
the material to try to commit extortion. That is a violation of my constitutional rights and
I must ask you to return my computers, papers, diaries, etc., to me. You can ship them
certified to my brother, Dr. Jon Tor DeWitt.” See Rule Decl. 26 and Ex. 16c thereto.
Given the above, the challenged statement fails to be actionable under a
false light theory because plaintiffs cannot establish that the statement was made with
knowledge of any falsity or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity, and it is
plaintiffs’ burden to prove actual malice. See McNabb v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 69
Or App 136, 142-43, 685 P2d 458 (1984).
Page 325
“She told her counselors that she had to wait to leave Chris
until he made captain so she would get more money in a
divorce settlement.”
The statement does not place any of the plaintiffs in a false light; it is not
highly offensive to a reasonable person. It also fails to be actionable because plaintiff
cannot establish the statement was made with knowledge of any falsity or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity.
In addition, as described in an affidavit by Liysa Northon’s own former
attorney, Liysa Northon had consulted with another former attorney about divorcing Chris
Northon and commented on her ability to receive more in child support and other funds
once Chris Northon made captain. See Birmingham Aff. at 14.
Page 326
“There was another concern about the package that Pat
Birmingham had received in the mail. There were two sets

of handcuffs inside, along with the TASER weapons. Tor
DeWitt had told Birmingham he had retrieved the stun guns
and the handcuffs from Liysa’s vehicle the morning after
the murder. Ellen Duveaux said the TASER weapons were
in the backpack which Tor had picked up from her.”
The above statement is supported by Liysa Northon’s attorney, Pat
Birmingham, who stated in an affidavit that Tor DeWitt told him he had “retrieved the
stun gun and handcuffs from Petitioner’s vehicle the morning after the homicide.”
Birmingham Aff. at 26. Mr. Birmingham also stated that Joan Monteillet (“Ellen
Duveaux” in the book) had disclosed to the police that Liysa DeWitt “had left a pack at
her house, that inside of it was a ‘black thing with prongs,’ that Jon Dewitt called her
later and specifically asked for the pack, and that he had come and got it from her.” Id. at
27. In fact, Judge Steven Price’s letter opinion denying Liysa Northon’s petition for postconviction
relief includes in the “facts” section the following:
Ms. Northon also neglected to tell the police, doctors, and
attorney that she had also left a backpack and stun gun at
Joan Monteillet’s house. (It is unclear whether Ms.
Northon also left handcuffs at Joan Monteillet’s or if she
left them at the campsite and someone, possibly her
brother, retrieved them before the police arrived.) The
brother eventually drove to Joan Monteillet’s house and
retrieved the items left there. The brother advised the
attorneys of this. Sometime later, in mid January 2001, a
package arrived at Mr. Birmingham’s office with the stun
gun and handcuffs.
See Letter Opinion Sept. 15, 2004 in In re. Northon and Hill, Washington County Circuit
Court No. C022282CV at 2 (Rule Decl. 15 and Ex. 5 thereto) (“Northon PCR opinion
letter”)). Accordingly, the above statement fails to be actionable under a false light
theory because plaintiffs could not establish the statement was made with knowledge of
any falsity or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
Page 355
“On September 20, 2002, nineteen days before the second
anniversary of Chris’s death, Judge Stephen Tiktin wrote
his decision * * * and it ate at Dick like acid.”
The above statement is not an accurate representation of the statements in
the Book. The ellipses in the above “quotation” separates clauses from two different

sentences found seven paragraphs apart. Moreover, the “quotation” misrepresents the
content of those sentences. What the Book says is: “On September 20, 2002, nineteen
days before the second anniversary of Chris’s death, Judge Stephen Tiktin wrote his
decision on Bjorn’s custody.” Book at 355.
On Page 366 -- seven paragraphs later -- Ms. Rule wrote: “Finally, Judge
Tiktin found that it had not been proven that Dick Northon had ever committed any act of
sexual abuse against anyone. But the accusation had been made and it ate at Dick like
acid.” (emphasis added). In other words, the “decision” of Judge Tiktin was not what
“ate at Dick like acid”; rather it was the unproven “accusation” that had been made.
The statement does not portray plaintiffs in a false light; it is simply not
about plaintiffs. Moreover, that Liysa Northon accused Dick Northon, the father of the
man she admits to killing, of sexual abuse is a matter of public record -- a fact she herself
admits. See Rule Decl. 33 and Ex. 23 thereto. Liysa Northon admits to making the
accusation during a court hearing. See id. She also repeated it in legal briefing. See id.
(referencing “Dick Northon’s sexual impropriety with minors” and referring to Dick
Northon as “the accused pedophile.”). That the judge found the allegations of sexual
abuse unproven is also public record. Letter Opinion Sept. 20, 2002, Northon and
Northon, No. 01-DS-0530ST at 3 (Rule Decl. 23 and Ex. 13 thereto); see also Letter
from District Attorney regarding Clemency Application at 2 (Rule Decl. 24 and Ex. 14
thereto) (“Since that resolution of the murder charge, the Defendant has made life a living
hell for the victim’s family and friends * * *. [T]he Defendant has repeatedly made ugly,
false, and unsubstantiated claims against the family, including claims of pedophilia * * *
all of which have been rejected by the court.”). And Dick Northon’s reported emotional
response is not only reasonable but it is also verified by Dick Northon himself. See Rule
Decl. 10d. Plaintiffs could not establish actual malice in connection with the
publication of the challenged statement and, accordingly, their claim should be stricken.
Page 359
“I found that I could not explain the gaping inconsistencies

in Liysa’s recounting of her marriage and the way her
husband died.”
There is no false light contained in this sentence. As the opening of this
sentence makes clear, the statement is the author’s conclusion based on her investigation
of the facts. Opinion is constitutionally protected.
Moreover, the fact that Liysa Northon gave inconsistent versions of the
events preceding her husband’s death, for example, is a matter of public record. Officers
as well as her own friend testified to different versions of this story. As previously noted,
Liysa Northon gave at least three different accounts of those events. See Larkin
Testimony 168:14-24 (accidentally fired first shot while loading); Monteillet testimony
146:4-12 (accidentally fired second shot while going back to the car); DOJ report of
interview of Wayland DeWitt (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24c thereto) (stating Liysa
Northon had fired rounds into the woods to know how the gun worked). The public
record, as well as interview records, also demonstrate that there were inconsistencies in
how Liysa Northon’s portrayed her marriage. To give a few examples: although she
allegedly could not stand her husband, see email printed by SA A. Miller 7/16/2001 (Rule
Decl. 27 and Ex. 17c thereto) (“Basically, I’m just doing anything I can to be enough of
a commercial success so that I can get rid of Chris and not lose my house”), she was also
jealous of other women, see, e.g., DOJ witness interviews with Randy Orr, Kris Olsen,
Becky Jones, and Sharon Leighty (Rule Decl. 34 and 35 and Exs. 24k, 25i, 25-l
thereto), and she was unwilling to give up the great sex she had with her husband. See
DOJ witness interview with Becky Jones and Kris Olsen (Rule Decl. 35 and Exs. 25-l
thereto). The statement in question conveys the author’s conclusion that she could not
explain the inconsistencies; it is her opinion after reviewing the facts. Even if there were
some portion which is not protected opinion, in the absence of clear and convincing proof
of actual malice, plaintiffs’ false light claim must be stricken.
Page 296
“Pat Birmingham cross-examined Ellen Duveaux, who was
in most ways a defense witness. He didn’t say it aloud, but
Liysa hadn’t told him that she’d stopped at her brother’s

house after she shot Chris either.”
Once again, the above statement is a recounting of facts that are part of the
public record. Joan Monteillet (“Ellen Duveaux”) did testify in court that Liysa Northon
had not told her she had stopped at her brother’s house. See Trial Transcript July 17,
2001 at 147:8-10. Pat Birmingham did cross-examine Ms. Monteillet, who was a good
friend of Liysa Northon’s. See id. at 147:17-149:24. And through an affidavit,
Birmingham stated that Liysa Northon had “repeatedly denied” stopping at her brother’s
house as well, and only admitted “much later” in the representation that she had indeed
stopped at her brother’s house. See Birmingham Aff. at 21. See also Northon PCR
opinion letter at 2 (“What Ms. Northon neglected to tell police, doctors and initially, her
attorneys, was that she had stopped at her brother’s house in Walla Walla before arriving
at Joan Monteillet’s house.”). The statement reports statements made under oath.
Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 13
“Dr. Jon Keith ‘Tor’ DeWitt was a chiropractor,
specializing in sports medicine. Short and stocky, as a
bodybuilder, probably more fit than most of the athletes he
worked on. He was Liysa’s only sibling, a few years
younger than she was. Divorced and living with his
children in a house that was three blocks off the main route
to Dayton through Walla Walla, DeWitt was a man of
careful habits. He usually got up at 6:00 A.M., and he was
in the kitchen, just beginning to swallow his morning
regimen of vitamins, when he was surprised to hear the
unlocked sliding door open. He turned, startled and saw
that his sister, Liysa, had come into the dark kitchen.”
The above statement simply does not contain information that is highly
offensive to a reasonable person. It recounts the types of general facts about Tor DeWitt
that are commonly shared in a description of a person: information about occupation,
family, and residence. A reasonable person would not find it highly offensive to be
described as a doctor of careful habits who cares for his own children and is in good
physical shape.
Further, the facts disclosed were part of the public record. Dr. DeWitt

testified that he got up between 5:30 and 6:00 a.m., see Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at
233:1-2, and that his sister arrived at his home when he was having his vitamins, which is
the first thing he does in the morning. See id. at 232:16-19. The DOJ Interview of Tor
DeWitt also reports that Tor DeWitt said his sister opened the sliding door into the dark
kitchen. See Dinsmore Report Jan. 17, 2001 at 2 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24b thereto).
Plaintiffs could not establish actual malice with regard to the publication of this
statement.
Page 14
“Somewhat bemused, DeWitt said good-bye to his sister,
but urged her to call him and let him know how she was.
She had been with him for only a few minutes, and he
wondered if she hadn’t been exaggerating when she said
she’d taken a shot at Chris. He left for work, concerned,
but not really anxious. Liysa could wax very dramatic about
things that wouldn’t disturb most people.”
The above statements do not portray any plaintiff in false light because
they are not highly offensive to a reasonable person. Further, Tor DeWitt himself
testified that his sister arrived for a brief period of time in the morning in question, that he
left a short time later for an appointment and then work, and that they talked later that
day. See Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 230:21-231:21. The DOJ interview report of
Tor DeWitt also supports that he could not have been too concerned about his sister: he
told the investigators that he had been in a “hurry to get to work” that morning --
apparently even after seeing her bruised and hurt. DOJ report of interview of Dr. Tor
Dewitt at 3 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24b thereto). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Further, any inaccuracy in the above is not of a material and substantial
degree. Tor DeWitt himself testified to his sister’s arrival early in the morning in
question, to contacting the police later that day, and to again meeting up with his sister
that afternoon.
Finally, the author’s conclusion about Liysa Northon’s penchant for

exaggeration and misrepresentation is a reasonable interpretation for the author to draw,
given a review of the evidence of Liysa Northon’s life history. See, e.g., Birmingham
Aff. at 16 (“There are many witnesses who told us about other instances of gross
exaggerations or demonstrable lies told by Petitioner.”). The author reviewed scores of
emails and interview notes about Liysa Northon’s past; the investigation left the
impression that the author states above. See Rule Decl. 8.
Page 20
“Ellen Duveaux ‘She said that her mother had chased her
with a knife, screamed at her, and had broken twenty-six
bones in her body before she was sixteen, and finally old
enough to flee and live on her own.”
The statement above is not an accurate representation of what is in the
Book. The Book states (emphasis added):
“Even Ellen Duveaux didn’t know all the details of Liysa’s
childhood. But to other friends and lovers she would later
recall that she had been routinely reviled and beaten by her
mother.”
The challenged statement, absent the introductory “Ellen Duveaux” then follows.
There is no representation in the book that “Ellen Duveaux” stated that
Liysa Northon had been abused by her mother. This information came from other
sources, as recounted in Pat Birmingham’s affidavit. The statements are supported:
Liysa Northon did tell others of the alleged abuse, as Pat Birmingham’s affidavit states.
See Birmingham Aff. at 16 (“[T]here were several witnesses * * * that [were available to
testify that] Petitioner had claimed that her mother had abused her when she was a child,
that she had suffered twenty-six broken bones, and that she had been chased with a knife
* * *”); see also OSP interview report of Kris Olsen and Becky Jones at 6 (Rule Decl
35 Ex. 25-l thereto) ((“Liysa told Becky that her mom use[d] to beat her when she was a
child and she received 23 broken bones”). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Page 41
“Those who knew Liysa in the late eighties said she was

already involved with Nick when she left Tim; she just
wanted to avoid the messiness of telling.”
This statement is not actionable false light because it cannot be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Moreover, even if it were not true, plaintiffs cannot
establish actual malice. The statement is supported. Jane Lipp, the mother of her fiancé
Alan Lipp (“Tim”), told Ms. Rule the substance of what is reported. See Rule Decl. 10j.
Jane Lipp also informed police investigators that Liysa Northon had concocted a story of
amnesia as an “emotional way to get rid of him.” DOJ report of February 15, 2001
interview of Jane Lipp at 1 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24j thereto). And Alan Lipp reported
to police investigators that he was “unsure” if Liysa Northon was involved with Don King
(“Nick”) before their relationship ended. DOJ report of interview of Alan Lipp March
12, 2001 at 2 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24i thereto). It would certainly fit a pattern, given
that Alan Lipp described Liysa Northon as a “pathological liar”; her first husband, Mark
Ehlen (“Kurt Moran”), reported that Liysa Northon had been “sleeping with several other
guys” during their marriage, DOJ report of interview of Mark Ehlen March 12, 2001 at 1
(Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24i thereto); and Liysa Northon apparently began her physical
relationship with Chris Northon while still married to Don King. See OSP interview
February 21, 2001 of Dr. Dave Jones (“Dr. Jones said that he is certain Chris and Liysa
had a physical relationship before her divorce * * * ).
Page 67
“They would log into evidence every item that had
apparently been brought (sic) there by the Northons when
they came to the camp in the wilderness.”
The above statement satisfies none of the requirements necessary for false
light. There is nothing highly offensive in stating that the police collected evidence from
the scene of a potential crime. The statement is not about plaintiffs. The police did
collect evidence from the scene of the crime. See, e.g., Forensic Report of Christine G.
Ogilvie, Criminalist, 12/19/00 (Rule Decl. 22 and Ex. 12 thereto) (discussing evidence
observed at the crime). And finally, even if the statement could somehow be proven false,
plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice in connection with its publication in the Book.

Page 104
“But he was also a man who shouldered responsibility, both
for his passengers and in his personal life.”
The above statement is in reference to Chris Northon, the husband Liysa
Northon killed. It is not about any plaintiff. Describing Chris Northon as responsible
does not place Liysa Northon or any plaintiff in a false light.
The above statement is also a non-actionable statement of opinion. The
author corresponded with multiple friends and acquaintances of Chris Northon, and
reviewed numerous investigative reports of interviews with others. See Rule Decl. 10,
34-35 and Exhibits attached thereto. The above statement conveys her reasonable
opinion of Chris Northon based on this investigation. It is not subject to a claim of false
light.
Page 132
Page 133
“Chris didn’t mention [it] [sic] to his friends, but he had
prevailed upon Liysa to go to counseling with him.”
“But when she continued her derogatory monologue in their
third session, Dr. Carr interrupted her. ‘Wait a minute,
Liysa,’ she said softly. ‘What about Chris’s issues?’”
The above two quotes are extracted from the Book’s full description of the
failed counseling sessions that Chris Northon attempted to participate in with his wife.
The statements report the essence of what friends of Chris and Liysa Northon told to
police investigators, as recorded in a public record. Specifically, an OSP report on an
interview with Kris Olsen and Becky Jones, states:
Chris said that the first time he went [to counseling] Liysa
went also and just unloaded about everything bad about
Chris to the counselor. This unloading went on for one or
two sessions and then the counselor stepped in and told
Liysa this was her problem, not Chris’s. This upset Liysa
because she did not think these were her problems and quit
going to the counseling sessions.
Incident Report of interview of Kris Olsen and Becky Jones at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 & Ex.
25-l thereto). Any differences between the police report and the book are stylistic only;
the thrust is the same: Chris and Liysa Northon went to counseling. Liysa Northon turned
the counseling into a one-sided complaint session. When the counselor tried to hear

Chris’s version, Liysa Northon became upset and refused to continue counseling. See
Partington, 56 F3d at 1154 (First Amendment protection applies to an author’s
interpretation that “fairly describes the general events involved”).
In addition to the police report referenced above, the statements are also
supported by the author’s interview with Kris Olsen and Becky Jones. In that interview,
Kris Olsen stated that Chris Northon had told him Liysa Northon “unloaded” on Chris at
the couple’s first few counseling session. At the next session, the counselor stopped
Liysa and asked “what about Chris’s issues”? Liysa then quit going to counseling. (Rule
Decl. 10b). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the
statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be
stricken.
Page 135
“Chris didn’t fight back. He sat uncomfortably as she kept
pounding on him verbally.”
The above statement is not highly offensive to a reasonable person. It is
also supported by the report of eyewitnesses Kris Olsen and Becky Jones, who told an
investigator about an incident in which the four of them were at dinner. According to the
interview report, Liysa had “spent 30 minutes to an hour saying things about Chris being
selfish and other bad things about his character * * *. She would say these horrible things
about Chris and then she would just look over at him and smile * * *. Liysa was
intentionally trying to pick a fight with Chris. Chris just sat there and took it without
responding.” See Rule Decl. at 35 and Ex. 25-l thereto at 7. Plaintiffs cannot prove with
clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so
their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 166
“Liysa told Papako’s piano teacher that Bjorn had heard
Chris threaten to kill the dog. And according to her, it was
Chris who put his fists and feet through the walls of their
home.”
Even if the statement were false and it could be argued that it places
plaintiff in a false light, plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice. The above statement

ecounts information contained within public records. In a police report made by Officer
Rob Ringsage, Alice Wilson, a friend of Liysa Northon, told Officer Ringsage that Liysa
Northon had told her that Chris had threatened to kill the dog; the report continues:
“Aukai’s piano teacher, Tomi Anderson, apparently also heard this story and is aware that
Dane was very upset that his dad wanted to kill the dog.” See OSP Interview of Alice
Wilson at 12 (Rule Decl 35 and Ex. 25n thereto). And Liysa Northon had represented
that it was Chris who had damaged the walls. See undated e-mail to “Jeff” signed “with
love, Liysa” (Rule Decl. 37 and Ex. 27a thereto) (“I pulled back the wall hanging to
remind him about the hole in the sheetrock (I HATE SHEETROCK by the way) where he
had punched next to my face * * *”). Plaintiffs could not establish the requisite fault to
sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement.
Page 166
He wasn’t perfect, and it was Chris who had the
recklessness to have a drink once at his parents’ home and
then ride his bike home with Bjorn on his back.”
This statement is not about any of the plaintiffs. Moreover the author
obtained the above information from interviewing Chris Northon’s parents’, Dick and
Jeanne Northon. See Rule Decl. 10e. Plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice.
Page 168
“Tor didn’t know Chris, but he knew he didn’t like him.
He often said that he had heard a lot about Chris’s bad
behavior, even though these reports came from ‘a friend of
a friend of a friend,’ or from his sister Liysa.”
Reporting that Dr. Tor DeWitt did not like Chris Northon and had heard
rumors of his bad behavior does not place any plaintiff in a false light. A reasonable
person cannot find the statement highly offensive.
Moreover, the statement is supported by Tor DeWitt’s DOJ interview, in
which he told investigator Dinsmore that he had met Chris Northon for “a total of less
than 15 minutes,” but had heard about Chris Northon’s alleged abuse of Liysa Northon
through Liysa and her friend. Tor DeWitt also told investigator Dinsmore that he had
heard Chris Northon may have been abusive to a girlfriend who had died, but it was

information heard “only as hearsay from other friends and family members.” See Rule
Dec. at 34 and Ex. 24b at 2 thereto. Plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice.
Page 169
“As for Chris’s friends, Liysa’s descriptions of them made
them sound like the epitome of depravity and evil.
According to her, Dave Story, the minister/pilot who had
performed her marriage ceremony on the beach, was really
a drug dealer. So, she said, was his wife, Debbie. Liysa
whispered that Debbie even used the Storys’ child to
deliver the drugs while she waited in the car.”
The above statement is supported by Wayland DeWitt’s interview with the
Department of Justice, in which he reported that his daughter Liysa Northon had told him
that she had observed Debbie Story using her daughter to deliver drugs. His witness
interview supports the statement. See Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24c at 1 thereto.
A letter written by Liysa Northon herself also supports the above
statement. Liysa Northon wrote a letter to the Honolulu Police Department in which she
asserted David and Debbie Story were “involved heavily in drug trafficking” and that
they used “their minor children to deliver drugs.” Rule Decl. 20 and Ex. 10 thereto.
Plaintiffs cannot prove actual malice.
Page 182
“‘Oh,’ Liysa said, ‘one went off when I was loading it in
the car.’”
The above statement reports on information within the report by Deputy
Kevin Larkin of his interview with Liysa Northon after the homicide. See Police report of
Deputy K. Larkin 10/10/00 at 5 (Rule Decl. 21 and Ex. 11 thereto) (“I said to Northon
that I thought she told me she had only fired one round. She then told me, ‘Oh, one went
off when I loaded it at the car.’”) The statement is also supported by Deputy Larkin’s
trial testimony, in which he testified that Liysa Northon told him one shot had gone off
when she was at the car loading the gun. See Trial Transcript 7/1701 168:21-24. Any
discrepancy in the above statement is not material. Plaintiffs cannot establish actual
malice.
Page 183
“She said she was going to call a friend of her brother’s
who was a police officer in Milton-Freewater, Oregon:

Dick Bobbit.”
This statement cannot be a basis for a false light claim; it is not highly
offensive to a reasonable person. This statement is a recounting of Deputy Larkin’s
conversation with Liysa Northon, which Deputy Larkin memorialized in his police report.
See Rule Decl. 21 and Ex. 11 thereto at 6 (“She said she was going to Monteillet’s
house and would call her brother’s friend Mr. Bobett, a Milton-Freewater police
officer.”). Plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice.
Page 184
“She had left with her brother to see Dick Bobbitt.”
This statement cannot be highly offensive. Moreover, this statement
reports on information within Deputy Larkin’s police report. See Police Report of Deputy
K. Larkin 10/10/00 at 6-7 (Rule Decl. 21 and Ex. 11 thereto). Tor DeWitt’s testimony,
in which he testified that his sister picked him up at his office and drove him to the
Umatilla County Sheriff’s Department, where he knew Dick Bobbitt, also supports the
statement. See Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 233:20-234:9. Plaintiffs could not
establish the requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement.
Page 184
“Dr. Tor DeWitt and Umatilla County Sheriff’s Deputy
Dick Bobbitt were longtime friends.”
The above statement does not portray any plaintiff in a false light. It
cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person. In addition, the prosecutor stated in
his opening statement that Deputy Bobbitt and Tor DeWitt were friends. See Trial
Transcript July 17, 2001 82:1-2. And Deputy Bobbitt testified to having known Tor
DeWitt’s cousins while growing up and having “spent some time” with Tor DeWitt. See
Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 268:13-14. And Deputy Larkin’s police report states that
Liysa Northon told him that her “brother’s friend” was “Mr. Bobett [sic], a Milton-
Freewater police officer.” See Police report of Deputy K. Larkin 10/10/00 at 6 (Rule
Decl. 21 and Ex. 11 thereto). Plaintiffs cannot prove actual malice.
Page 185
“Tor asked Bobbit for advice on what they should do.”
The statement that a person with information about a possible criminal

matter called the police for advice cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Moreover, plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice.
Page 189
“Wayland and Tor DeWitt were shaken as they watched
Liysa being led away.”
The above statement cannot cast any plaintiff in a false light. Tor DeWitt
drove with his sister to the Umatilla County Sheriff’s Office to discuss the shooting.
Wayland DeWitt came to the police station as well after learning his daughter was there
being questioned. Reporting that it was emotionally upsetting for two family members to
watch another family member be arrested for murder and led away cannot be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.
Page 190
“They were all convinced that Chris had put her through
hell. She told them over and over about his cruelty and his
drunkenness.”
Plaintiffs’ Complaint claims that the Book casts false light on plaintiffs
for, among other things, alleging that Liysa Northon was not the victim of physical abuse
by Chris Northon. See Complaint at 15. It is difficult to understand how a statement
that the plaintiffs were “convinced that Chris had put her through hell” casts plaintiffs in
a false light. Rather, the above statement appears to casts plaintiffs in the exact light they
seek.
Moreover, the statement is supported. Liysa Northon’s father and brother
stood by her throughout the trial and afterwards. And Tor DeWitt testified that he had
seen his sister bruised before, Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 234:10-13, and told police
that he had suspected abuse in the past. DOJ interview report of Tor DeWitt at 1-2 (Rule
Decl. 34 and Ex. 24b attached thereto). Plaintiffs could not establish the requisite fault
to sustain a claim with respect to the challenged statement.
Page 205
“He’d taken his son’s flight bag to see if the address list
was there, but later returned it to the house.”
The above statement is in reference to Chris Northon’s father. It does not
place any plaintiff in a false light. In addition, Pat Montgomery’s police report states that

Dick Northon told him essentially what Ms. Rule wrote: that Dick Northon and Kris
Olsen removed the flight bag “to see if perhaps he had an address book in it and later
returned this flight bag to the house.” See OSP supplemental incident report at 10 (Rule
Decl 35 and Ex. 25n thereto). Plaintiffs cannot establish actual malice.
Page 209
“Although Liysa’s wasn’t a high profile case and didn’t
make headlines around the state of Oregon, it certainly was
the subject of gossip in Wallowa County, in Bend, and in
Walla Walla.”
The statement that a murder investigation in a small town was the source
of public interest in the local communities (and to those with connections to those
involved) cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Moreover, the statement is
not about any plaintiff, as such.
Page 212 “Nick also called Jeanne and Dick Northon on October 16.
He told Jeanne that Papako wanted to go to Chris’s
memorial services because he had loved him. But Liysa
wouldn’t allow it, and Papako didn’t go.”
Presumably, plaintiff Liysa Northon’s claim centers on the statement that
she would not let her young son travel to and attend a funeral. That cannot be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Moreover, Jeanne Northon told the author that Nick
called them on October 16 and conveyed the above message. See Rule Decl. 10e.
Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 247
“Throughout both her second and third marriages, Liysa
had spent ten to twenty days a year visiting the Clarks.
After she married Chris, he came with her about a third of
the time. Ben said he had liked Chris. And, like his wife,
he found Liysa ‘bright and energetic,’ but when he viewed
her personality in terms of a medical diagnosis, he thought
she would best be described as ‘manic-depressive.’”
Dr. David Hampson (“Ben Clark”) relayed the substance of the
information contained in the above statement to investigators Dinsmore and Montgomery,
and the conversation was memorialized in the investigators’ official report. See DOJ
Interview Report February 28, 2001 of David Hampson, M.D. at 2-5 (Rule Decl. 34 and

Ex. 24e thereto) (Hampson estimated Liysa Northon spent 10-20 days per year at the
Hampson house, with Chris Northon accompanying about 1/3 of the time; Hampson “felt
Liysa Northon would best be described as a “manic-depressive” although he would
require a specialist to first the diagnosis; described Chris Northon as having “a good life
* * * Chris would not waste his life on revenge”). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Page 255
“Chris would try to leave and she would run after him and
jump on his back. She’d claw at him, and he’d finally just
have to leave the house.”
The above passage expressly reports what Dan Jones, a friend of Chris’s
and fellow pilot, told investigators. The DOJ report by Investigator Dinsmore of his
interview with Dan Jones states as follows:
When Liysa wanted to argue Chris Northon reported that he
would say “I don’t want to talk right now, yet she would go
on and on and wouldn’t stop. Chris would try to leave and
Liysa would run after him and jump on his back.” Chris
indicated Liysa would “claw at him” while on his back.
Chris stated that he would tell Liysa that “I’m a big guy and
shrug her off. Chris would say this and would leave” the
house.
See Rule Decl. 24 and Ex. 24g at 6 thereto. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Page 262
“Do you still have the journal your nephew found where
Liysa outlined her plan to break off with Tim?” -- Pat
Montgomery
The statement above, placed in context, is a general recap of the
information Jane Lipp, the mother of Liysa Northon’s ex-fiancé, Alan Lipp, provided to
the authorities investigating Liysa Northon. As reported in Investigator Dinsmore’s DOJ
Interview report, Jane Lipp stated that Liysa Northon had “pulled amnesia on [her] son”
as a way to “get rid of him.” See Rule Decl. 24 and Ex. 24j at 1 thereto. Alan Lipp

supported this account, and also states in an email that his cousin no longer has
possession of the journal in which Liysa Northon described the planned amnesia attack.
A clear inference from the email is that his cousin (and, hence, his mother’s nephew) had
previously had possession of the journal. See Rule Decl. 47 and Ex. 37 thereto.
Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 266
“Apparently, even Papako walked on tiptoes around his
mother, aware that there were limits to her patience.”
This statement cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Moreover, Mary King, the mother of Liysa Northon’s second husband, Don King, and
grandmother of Aukai (“Papako” in the book), stated that she “never saw Liysa get angry
with Aukai but she knew Aukai never wanted to pin Liysa down either.” See OSP
Interview with Mary King at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25h). Plaintiffs cannot prove
with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice,
and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 271
“Chris did his own thing with his money. She paid for the
Hawaii house and he paid for the Bend house -- she was so
upset when he bought that without telling her.”
“Actually, Chris had bought that house long before he married
Liysa, but the detectives said nothing.”
The statements contained in the first paragraph are merely a recap of
Detective Montgomery’s report of an interview with a friend of Liysa Northon’s, Casey
Ewald, and her husband Brian (referenced as “Kit” and “Cal” Minton in the book). See
OSP Report of Interview April 20, 2001 at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25b thereto) (“Liysa
said Chris did his own thing with his money. Liysa said the house in Hawaii was her
house and she made the payments and the house in Bend was Chris’s house and he made
the payments. Liysa was upset because Chris bought the house in Bend without her
knowledge.”).
The statement that Chris Northon actually purchased the home before

marrying Liysa is supported by police interview records with Chris Northon’s father,
Dick Northon. Dick Northon told Detective Ringsage that his son was the “sole owner”
of the Bend home “and that Chris and Liysa had a pre-nuptial agreement which stated that
the Bend house was Chris’ and the Kailua house was Liysa’s.” See OSP report of
interview with Dick Northon at 10 (Rule Decl 35 and Ex. 25m ). If the “Bend home”
was contemplated in a prenuptial, it was purchased before the marriage. See also e-mail
from Joe Wilson at 5 (Rule Decl. 38 and Ex. 28 thereto) (“Chris’s real estate in Bend
was amassed * * * long before he met Liysa”). In any event, plaintiffs cannot prove with
clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so
their false light claims must be stricken..
Page 273
“Pat Birmingham found this information interesting and
possibly of value -- until Liysa had difficulty remembering
Ray’s last name.”
The above statement is in connection with the investigation by Liysa
Northon’s defense team into her emotional and psychological history. Her attorney, Pat
Birmingham talked with a former psychologists who had treated Lisa. According to Pat
Birmingham, the psychologist told him Lisa had said she was emotionally scarred from
losing her former fiancé, “Ray.” But Birmingham’s affidavit states that their
investigation into these claims did not support Liysa Northon’s account: that Liysa had
been with another boyfriend (and future husband) when “Ray” was killed, that Liysa
could not remember “Ray’s” last name, and that she had not learned about “Ray’s” death
until months after his death. Birmingham Aff. 15. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Page 274
“They could not fit Liysa into the parameters of the battered
wife syndrome.”
The above statement merely paraphrases the conclusion Liysa Northon’s
defense attorney Pat Birmingham recounts in his affidavit. See Birmingham Aff. at 11

line 8 (“At the outset, Petitioner did not fit the profile of a ‘Battered Woman.’”).
Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 280
“I could not and would not do anything that might lead to
the destruction of evidence in a murder investigation,
‘Birmingham recalled a long time later. But he knew that
at least one of his client’s missing computers still existed
and it hung around his neck like a rotting albatross. What
might be in that computer was anybody’s guess. At some
point, he would have to tell the State’s prosecutors that it
hadn’t really been stolen, just as he would be ethically
bound to tell them that Liysa’s brother, Tor DeWitt, had
picked up other possible evidence from Ellen Duveax’s
home.”
The portion actually in quotes in the Book is a direct quotation from
Birmingham’s affidavit. See Birmingham Aff. at 24. The rest relates to information
within the affidavit: the attorney’s concern over the missing computer and its contents, id.
at 10, 18, 28, Tor DeWitt’s statement to the attorney that he had taken a stun gun and
handcuffs from outside Ellen Duveax’s [Monteillet’s] home, id. 21, and the attorney’s
suspicion that Tor DeWitt was the person who subsequently mailed these items to Mr.
Birmingham, id., and Mr. Birmingham’s concerns about his ethical obligations to
disclose the information he acquired. Id. at 21-22; 27. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear
and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Page 281
“She thought her brother must have found the two sets of
handcuffs and the stun guns in her home in Bend.”
The above statement relates information from Mr. Birmingham’s affidavit.
Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken. Id. at 21.
Page 283
“With the help of the Connecticut State Police, a subpoena
was served on the Mintons’ residence and Trooper Jon
Holston recovered the long-missing laptop.”
This statement is not about plaintiffs and it cannot be highly offensive to a

easonable person. Moreover, as the prosecution recounted in court, the prosecution’s
investigators received an anonymous tip that the Ewalds (given the pseudonym
“Mintons” in the book) had a computer of Liysa Northon’s. The prosecution worked with
Connecticut authorities to recover the computer, which they did. See Trial Transcript
July 17, 2001 at 291:7-292:5.
Detective Pat Montgomery provided an affidavit describing these events as
part of a request for a search warrant of the computer. According to Detective
Montgomery’s affidavit, the Ewalds were hesitant to answer police questions about the
computer but that Brian Ewald indicated he would “honor a subpoena or some sort of
legal process” for releasing the computer. Detective Montgomery further stated that
Connecticut State Police Trooper Holston determined that the computer in the Ewalds’
possession was the computer reported stolen, recovered the computer, and mailed it back
to the Oregon State Police. Rule Decl. 25 and Ex. 15 thereto. Although it is not
defendants’ burden to prove truth, the above statement is substantially true in all material
respects: the prosecution used the Connecticut State Police to recover the missing
computer from the Ewalds, who had indicated they would not release the computer
without “a subpoena or some sort of legal process.” The Oregon State Police ultimately
requested a subpoena to search the contents of the computer. Plaintiffs cannot prove with
clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so
their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 283
“Liysa’s camera hadn’t been stolen either; it was also with
the Mintons.”
Liysa Northon had reported her computer stolen. It was not. The Mintons
had it. As above, many sources support that. Even if it were incorrect that the Mintons
also had her camera, plaintiff Northon is not caused harm above that arising from her
false report that her computer was stolen.
Page 285
“In all of Liysa’s screenplays, the husband character
apparently dies in the last scene when the wife kills him by

a fatal blow or bullet to his temple.”
The above statement does not portray any plaintiff in a false light. It is not
highly offensive to a reasonable person to report on the storyline or plot of plaintiff’s own
screenplays.
Moreover, Liysa Northon’s attorney, Pat Birmingham, describes Liysa
Northon’s screenplay in which a wife shoots her husband in the head with a spear gun.
See Birmingham Aff. at 13. Mr. Birmingham also relates the plots of other “diaries,
journals, and story drafts about similar scenarios,” in which wives kill or fantasize about
killing their husbands by shooting them in the head, hitting them in the temple with a
rock, and electrocuting them in the hot tub. Id. at 14. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear
and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Page 289
“Why, Briggs asked, had Liysa taken time to strap Bjorn in
his car seat when she was so afraid that Chris was after
them? Why had she said she wasn’t familiar with the area
in Wallowa County? She had family there -- she had
vacationed there. She knew it very well, indeed.”
During the state’s opening statement at trial, Assistant District Attorney
Briggs pointed out that defendant had taken the time put her child into a car seat when
supposedly worried that her husband was following them. See Trial Transcript July 17,
2001 at 86:1-3; see also 74:15-16. The District Attorney also had observed in his
opening statement that Liysa Northon stated she did not know the area around Wallowa
lake. See id. at 84:22-25. Mr. Briggs’s opening statement did question Liysa Northon’s
actions after the shooting. Cf. id. at 77:1-4 (“As I told you, the defendant drove through
all those towns, didn’t call for help, didn’t stop at a hospital * * *”). The D.A.’s inquiries
were in response to answers Liysa Northon had given to police officers and witnesses
investigating the crime. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that
the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be
stricken.

Page 306
“It was true, she said, the Liysa had asked for poison and
reacted in disbelief when Ellen said there wasn’t any on
their farm. Liysa had said, ‘You have to have something to
kill rats and mice.’”
Joan Monteillet (“Ellen” in the book) did tell police investigators that
Liysa had questioned Ms. Monteillet’s statement that they did not have any poison at their
farm, reasoning that “they must have some poison because they live on a farm and need
poison for rodents. See OSP Interview Report of Joan Monteillet at 4 (Rule Decl 35 and
Ex. 25j thereto). See also Birmingham affidavit at 27 (stating that Ms. Monteillet told a
detective that Liysa Northon “had called her on the telephone a few days before
Christopher Northon was shot to death and that she had asked if Monteillet had any
poison”). Plaintiffs could not establish the requisite fault to sustain a claim with respect
to the challenged statement.
Page 308
“Liysa’s brother, Tor, now sat in the witness chair. He
looked much like her and their father Wayland, except that
he had the thick neck and shoulders of a bodybuilder.”
The above statement, a simple description of Tor DeWitt, cannot be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and does not cast any plaintiff in a false light.
Page 326
“Chris Northon had had those strange marks on his chest,
which Dr. Khalil Helou hadn’t been able to identify during
the postmortem exam, although he was quite sure they
weren’t fingernail scratches. Oddly, they looked more like
burns.”
The above statement is not about any plaintiff. Moreover, the pathologist
testified that abrasions on Chris Northon’s chest were not consistent with fingernail
scratches. See Trial Transcript July 17, 2001 at 249:5-25. The statement that the
abrasions could have been burns also comes from the affidavit of Liysa Northon’s
attorney, Pat Birmingham, Mr. Birmingham states that one “inference that could be
drawn is that the marks on Chris Northon’s chest were the result of a burn from a stun
gun.” Birmingham Aff. at 26. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing
evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light

claims must be stricken.
Page 326
“As they prepared for trial, the defense team had shown the
autopsy photos to Dr. William Brady, the former chief
medical examiner for the state of Oregon -- who had
investigated thousands of homicides. Brady tended to agree
with Dr. Helou that the marks looked more like burns than
scratches.
Again, this is not about any plaintiff. Moreover, the defense team
consulted with Dr. Brady, a forensic pathologist, about Chris Northon’s death.
Birmingham Aff. at 6. The author discussed what she had written about the defense’s
trial preparation with Mr. Birmingham prior to publication. See Rule Decl. 10g. He
verified what she had written. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence
that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must
be stricken.
Page 328
“Chris’s bladder had been very full at autopsy; the fact that
any alcohol he had imbibed would have taken hours to
metabolize from his blood to his urine suggested that he
had not been able to empty his bladder, probably because
he had lain unconscious that long.”
This statement is not about any plaintiff. It directly reports on the
observation made by Liysa Northon’s attorney, Pat Birmingham, in his affidavit. Mr.
Birmingham stated that one “damaging inference” from the toxicology report was that
Chris Northon had “lain in the sleeping bag unconscious for a substantial period of time
before he was shot and killed,” and specifically that he had been in his sleeping bag “long
enough for the alcohol to be metabolized or passed into his bladder, and that he had not
been able to void his bladder for a substantial period of time.” See Birmingham affidavit
at 25.
The prosecution had reached similar conclusions. See Trial Transcript
July 17, 2001 at 76:17-25 (prosecutor stating “we know [Chris Northon] was asleep”
because of the amount of a sedative, Restoril, found in his blood); id. at 14B:010
(prosecutor stated that there was no alcohol found in Chris Northon’s blood, but that there

was some in his urine, meaning the body had had time to process it). Plaintiffs cannot
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual
malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 355 “Tor DeWitt testified for his sister, identifying himself as ‘a
physician.’”
The above statement does not cast false light on any of the plaintiffs
because it is not highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Page 371
“She didn’t leave home at sixteen as she claims; it’s
questionable that she was grounded for an entire year for
getting drunk at her prom.”
Liysa Northon’s propensity to tell false stories about her childhood was
documented in a public record by her own attorney, Pat Birmingham. See Birmingham
Aff. at 12 (“Petitioner made a number of false statements to Dr. Larsen, which
compromised the validity of his expert opinion. For example, she described her mother
as verbally and physically abusive * * *. She claimed that the abuse continued from age
4 ‘to the age of 16 when she could protect herself.’”); see also DOJ Interview of Dr. Jon
Keith Tor DeWitt January 17, 2001 at 3 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24b thereto) (“When
asked if Liysa had ever been grounded for a year for drinking, or any other significant
amount of time, DeWitt said this had not happened * * *. DeWitt denied that Liysa had
ever received any broken bones as a result of physical abuse by their mother.”). Given
the documented questions about Liysa Northon’s credibility, it is certainly reasonable to
question some of Liysa Northon’s other claims, and the First Amendment protects such
comment.
Page 18
“The DeWitts moved to Warrensburg, Missouri, when
Liysa was about six months old. Her second child, Jon
Keith, called ‘Tor,’ was born on November 7, 1963.”
The above statement is simply not highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The statement merely reports information obtained by defendants. See Rule Dec. 39 and
Ex. 29 thereto (email posting letter from Bobbi Chitwood, Liysa Northon’s aunt stating

that Liysa “moved to Warrensburg, Missouri when she was about 6 months old.”).
Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 28
“Liysa actually lived with Kurt for four years until January
1985.”
The above statement does not cast false light on any plaintiff, because it is
not highly offensive to a reasonable person. Moreover, Liysa Northon and her first
husband, Mark Ehlen (given the pseudonym “Kurt Moran” in the book) were married
from 1981 until 1987, and did not separate until 1985. See DOJ Interview of Mark Ehlen
January 29, 2001 at 1 (Rule Decl. 34 and Ex. 24d) (“Ehlen married Liysa Dewitt
(Northon) in 1981, they separated in January 1985, and they divorced in 1987.”). It is not
highly offensive to a reasonable person to report that a married couple lived together.
Any inaccuracy within the statement is not material. Liysa Northon was married to Ehlen
for six years. The precise amount of time they actually lived together is not material.
Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 32
“She said that she was the only woman to pass the test to be
a Navy Seal.”
The above statement reports what Dan Jones told investigators in an
interview about Liysa Northon’s past. The report by DOJ Investigator Dinsmore states
that Dan Jones told the investigators that Liysa Northon and Don King “talked about
Liysa being the first female to take and pass the Navy SEAL course.” Rule Decl. 34
and Ex. 24g at 6 thereto. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that
the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be
stricken.
Page 33
“Liysa was always drawn to men of a certain physical type.
She was only five feet four, but she liked her men a foot
taller, lean and muscular and except for Makimo blond and
blue eyed.”

This statement cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The
above statement should also be placed in the context of the very next sentence within the
book, which plaintiffs notably do not take exception to: “High intelligence was also a
quality she looked for.” In other words, Ms. Rule describes Liysa Northon as being
attracted to tall, fit, and intelligent men -- not exactly the type of description most
reasonable people would find objectionable. Moreover, her three husbands all were tall,
lean and muscular, as was her former fiancé, Alan Lipp. See email from Allipp dated
October 29, 2002 (Rule Decl. 44 and Ex. 34 thereto) (“As for Mark Ehlen [Liysa’s first
husband], he fit the physical description of Don [King, Liysa’s second husband], Chris
[Northon, Liysa’s third husband], and I [Alan Lipp, former fiancé] in as much as he was
tall and slender, but I recall that he had dark brown hair.”). Plaintiffs cannot prove with
clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so
their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 39
“Liysa had outlined her very detailed plot to fake amnesia
so that she could break up with Tim without any
recriminations. She had written it all down as if it were a
play or a novel, and then she had followed her own plan
right up to her hysterical acting out as Tim drove her to the
airport.”
Liysa Northon’s own former attorney Pat Birmingham concluded she had
“faked” her amnesia. See Birmingham Aff. at 16. Moreover, the statement recounts the
information Liysa Northon’s former fiancé, Alan Lipp (given the pseudonym “Tim
Sands”) and his mother, Jane Lipp, provided to the police investigators and Ms. Rule
about Liysa Northon’s fabrication of amnesia. The DOJ interview of Alan Lipp describes
in detail Liysa Northon’s alleged amnesia attack on the way to the airport. See DOJ
Interview Alan Lipp March 12, 2001 at 2 (Rule Decl. 34, Ex. 24i). And Alan Lipp’s
emails to Ms. Rule discuss how he later learned that the whole scenario had been written
out in advance in her diary. See Rule Decl. 45, Ex. 35 thereto. Plaintiffs cannot prove
with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice,

and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 42
“In reality, she had only two years of college, mostly
elective courses at Oregon State and the University of
Hawaii.”
The information does not place any plaintiffs in false light; it cannot be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. Moreover, the author requested information
about Liysa Northon’s education from her aunt, Bobbi Chitwood. Ms. Chitwood
responded through the e-mail of a friend, stating that Liysa Northon “attended 2 years of
college at Oregon State.” Although the e-mail states that Liysa Northon subsequently
moved to Hawaii, it does not mention any other college education. See e-mail from
sweetpea@eoni.com dated March 27, 2003 (Rule Decl. 39 and Ex. 29 thereto).
Although her former fiancé, Alan Lipp, told Ms. Rule that Liysa Northon claimed to have
graduated from University of Hawaii, Ms. Rule did not find any proof to back Liysa
Northon’s claim up. See Rule Decl. 46 and Ex. 36 thereto.
Any inaccuracy is not of a material or substantial degree. Plaintiffs cannot
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual
malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 43
“There was no indication at all that he was ready to leave
his wife and stop Liysa from going down the aisle with
Nick.
Reporting that an apparently happily-married man did not plan to leave his
wife to stop Liysa Northon from marrying someone else is not highly offensive to a
reasonable person. It certainly does not place any plaintiff in a false light. Plaintiffs
cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with
actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
In addition, the above statements are Ms. Rule’s opinion of what might
have occurred. See Book at 42 (“More likely, she had seen him in the mid-eighties
because she had written a very long letter then to the man she called Kevin [Tracy]
* * *.”). In that letter, Liysa Northon describes her love for “Tracy” and about how he

had suspected she wanted -- at some unspecified time in the past -- to get back together
with him. See Rule Decl. 26 and Ex. 16a attached thereto. The timeframe within the
letter is unspecified, and Ms. Rule notes that the above is her opinion. The facts remain
that Liysa Northon did marry “Nick,” and “Kevin” did not stop her. Plaintiffs cannot
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual
malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 45
“She cared little about cleaning house or doing laundry or
cooking.”
This statement cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Moreover, the statement is supported by many people interviewed during the police
investigation. See Rule Decl. 34-35 and Exs. 24g, 25e and 25-l thereto (Dan Jones,
Joe Wilson, and Kris Olsen all provided information that the Northon house was not kept
clean). For example, according to a police report of an interview with Becky Jones and
Kris Olsen, “Chris [Northon] was a neat person and Liysa [Northon] was not * * *. She
would leave food on the table and the house would be a mess when Chris would come
home. Clothes would be scattered all over the house * * *.” OSP Report of Interview
with Kris Olsen and Becky Jones at 9 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25-l thereto). Maggie
Wilson, a friend and wife of one of Chris Northon’s former roommates, told investigator
Pat Montgomery that “Christopher was immaculate and everything was clean and in
order. Liysa lived in chaos and did not keep the house the way Christopher lived prior to
the marriage.”). OSP report of interview with Maggie Wilson October 9, 2000 (Rule
Decl. 35 and Ex. 25o thereto). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing
evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light
claims must be stricken.
Page 52
“Now she wanted to reunite with him. But Tim wasn’t at
all interested in starting up again with Liysa.”
The above statement does not place any plaintiff in a false light. The
above statement concerns a time when Liysa Northon was having marital difficulties with

a former husband. It is a matter of public record that the marriage ended in divorce.
“Tim’s” interest [Alan Lipp, a former boyfriend] -- or lack of interest -- in Liysa Northon
at the time is simply not a highly offensive reflection on Liysa Northon.
The statement is supported; to DOJ investigator Dinsmore, Alan Lipp
described his contact with Liysa Northon after the end of their relationship as “polite
social contact.” He further told the investigator that he “would take the relationship with
an alcoholic ex-wife over having any involvement or attachment with Liysa Northon.”
DOJ interview report of Allan Lipp March 12, 2001 at 2 (Rule Decl 34 and Ex. 24i
thereto). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement
was published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 76
“He wasn’t yet nine when he had a job with George Barret,
who owned a neighboring ranch. Chris changed irrigation
pipes in the morning and the evenings.”
The above statement does not concern plaintiffs in any manner, and cannot
be the source for any false light claim by any of them. It reports on the childhood of
Chris Northon, through the memory of his parents. See Rule Decl. 10c. Plaintiffs
cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with
actual malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 77
“I asked Chris why on earth they did that, and he didn’t lie,
he never lied.”
The above statement is not about any plaintiff and cannot be the source of
a false light claim by any of them. The statement, which is a quote from Chris Northon’s
mother, Jeanne, is made in regards to her son, Chris Northon, during his youth, and not
the plaintiffs. See Rule Decl. 10c.
Page 79
“Unlike a lot of parents, Jeanne and Dick had relatively few
problems when their three children were in their teens.”
This statement fails to support a false light claim by plaintiffs for the same
reasons as the last statement. It is simply not about any plaintiff. It merely reports
information conveyed by Chris Northon’s parents to Ms. Rule. See Rule Decl. 10c.

Page 82
“Gina ‘He placed his mom on a pedestal, and he treated
every woman with respect.’”
The statement is not about any plaintiff. The above quotation is a
description of Chris Northon by Gina Jones, a former roommate and wife of one of his
friends. It is simply a friend’s opinion of Chris Northon. The fact that not everyone held
the same view of Chris Northon as plaintiffs does not make reporting on those opinions
susceptible to a claim of false light. Gina Jones made the above statement in an interview
with Detective Montgomery. See OSP Report of interview with Jeff and Gina Jones at 8
(Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25g thereto). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing
evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light
claims must be stricken.
Page 86
“They drifted apart and Maka eventually married someone
else.”
This is a statement about Chris Northon, not plaintiffs. Once again, it is
not apparent how the above statement, about a woman whom Chris Northon had dated
before meeting Liysa Northon, even possibly casts false light on plaintiffs. Even
assuming it were false in some respect, it is outrageous that plaintiffs make a false light
claim based on it.
Moreover, in an interview with Detective Montgomery, Dr. Dave Jones
stated that Chris Northon had been in a relationship with “Maka” in the early 199’s, but
Maka had “wanted to start a family and may have married.” See OSP report of interview
of Dr. Dave Jones February 21, 2001 at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25f thereto). Joe
Wilson also told Detective Montgomery about the love Chris and Maka shared. He also
stated that Maka had died of a brain tumor in the mid 1990’s. See OSP report of
interview of Dr. Dave Jones February 21, 2001 at 4-5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25e
thereto). See also Rule Decl. 43 and Ex. 33 thereto (e-mail to Ms. Rule, discussing
Maka, and signed “Isabella”). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing evidence
that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light claims must

e stricken.
Page 89
As far as Nick knew, Liysa hadn’t actually sold any of her
screenplays, although she’d been commissioned to do an
outline for a movie about a surfer on the north shore. ‘She
was paid some money for a romantic comedy, I think,’ he
said, ‘but it was never produced.’”
The above statement, reporting on the recollection of one of Liysa
Northon’s former husbands about of her screenwriting efforts, is not highly offensive a
reasonable person. Moreover, it reports on the information Don King provided to the
Department of Justice in an interview. See DOJ interview Donald King May 1, 2001 at 3
(Rule Decl 34 and Ex. 24h thereto) ((“King did not believe Northon ever sold any plays,
although she was commissioned for a play about a surfer on the north shore. Liysa was
paid some money, but the romantic comedy was never produced.”)). Plaintiffs cannot
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual
malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 101
“Chris arrived later and found her hysterical in a recovery
room.”
This statement cannot be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The
above statement is part of a recounting of Chris Northon’s trip to Seattle to visit Liysa
Northon after learning her pregnancy had terminated. The statement is the author’s
recounting of events that Chris Northon had discussed with his friend, Joe Wilson. Joe
Wilson relayed the information to Ms. Rule, who reported the general facts. See Rule
Decl. 10h.
Page 103
“Liysa resented Chris’s need for exercise after flights.”
The above statement does not cast false light on any plaintiff. The fact
that a spouse may be frustrated by her spouse’s decision to exercise instead of visiting
with family after extended amounts of time at work is not highly offensive to a reasonable
person.
Moreover, Chris Northon’s friend, Dan Jones, made the above observation

in an interview with DOJ Investigator Dinsmore, as recorded in Dinsmore’s report. DOJ
Interview with Daniel Jones March 14, 2001 at 4 (Rule Decl 34 and Ex. 24g thereto )
(“Liysa Northon never seemed to understand that when Chris came home from sitting in a
plane cockpit * * * he physically needed to move and work out.”). Plaintiffs cannot
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual
malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 108
“Liysa was extremely jealous of the women who had been
in Chris’s life, and she watched him warily whenever he
was around any attractive woman. But Arne Arnesen began
to see that it was something more than that. ‘She wanted to
keep Chris away from everyone else. She didn’t even like
it when he spent time with us or his other friends.’”
The above statement summarizes what Kris Olsen and Becky Jones (given
the pseudonyms Arne and Carrie Arnesen and in the book) told investigators. See OSP
report of interview of Kris Olsen and Becky Jones at 5 (Rule Decl. 35, Ex. 25-l thereto)
(“Liysa was insanely jealous of other women. Becky Jones heard this statement and said
that it was not just women, Liysa was jealous of other people.”). Plaintiffs cannot prove
with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice,
and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 128
“‘Liysa told me Chris tried to strangle her,’ Jeanne said still
shocked, ‘and she told me she had marks on her neck. I
looked but I couldn’t see anything. Her neck looked
perfectly fine to me.’” -- Jeanne Northon
The above statement reports what Jeanne Northon told to police Detective
Montgomery. Detective Montgomery’s report conveys the substance of the statement
above: that Jeanne Northon told him that Liysa Northon had contacted her in 1996 or
1997 and told her Chris Northon had tried to choke her. Liysa and Jeanne met the next
day and Jeanne looked for the marks of abuse that Liysa “tried to show her” on Liysa’s
wrists and neck, but that Jeanne did not see any marks. See OSP report of interview of
Jeanne Northon (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25k thereto). Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear
and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their

false light claims must be stricken.
Page 135
“We were really yelling * * * roundhouse punch between
my eyes.”
The above statement is part of a description of a verbal fight that turned
physical between Liysa and Chris Northon in 1999. The fact of this fight is part of the
public record. Chris Northon described this incident to Arne Arneson [Kris Olsen], who
relayed to police investigators what Chris Northon told him. See OSP Report of
interview of Kris Olsen and Becky Jones (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25-l thereto. Kris
Olsen also discussed this event with Ms. Rule. See Rule Decl. 10b. Plaintiffs cannot
prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual
malice, and so their false light claims must be stricken.
Page 147
“All of Liysa’s books and screen play treatments still had a
central figure * * * and the heroine would destroy him
completely to save her sons.”
As an initial matter, the above “quotation” is not an accurate
representation of the statements within the book. The Book states that the “central
figure” in Liysa Northon’s books and screen play treatments was the heroine: “a very
strong and courageous woman * * *.” The Book later states that the heroine would
destroy her cruel and dangerous husband to save her sons.
In any event, the above statement is not actionable as false light. First, it is
not highly offensive to a reasonable person. That Liysa Northon wrote extensively on the
general story line described by the author -- of an abused wife who kills or dreams of
killing her husband -- was information that was part of the public record. See
Birmingham Aff. at 14.
The Birmingham affidavit supports that Liysa Northon wrote extensively
on the general topic of abused women. Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear and convincing
evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their false light
claims must be stricken.

Page 155
“‘Chris was ordered to take anger management classes after
that,’ she told Craig. That wasn’t true either. Liysa didn’t
say that Chris had voluntarily gone to therapy to try to heal
their marriage.”
DOJ Investigator Dinsmore’s report of his interview with “Craig” states
that he told him “Liysa Northon said Chris was to take anger management following this
incident.” DOJ report of interview of July 9, 2001 at 3 (Rule Dec. 34 and Ex. 24a
thereto).
That Chris Northon sought therapy is supported by his psychologist. Dr.
Linda J. Carr, stated in a letter that “Mr. Northon originally sought therapy to attempt to
deal with the conflicts in his marriage.” See Carr Letter March 2, 1999 at 1 (Rule Decl.
19 and Ex. 9 thereto). Kris Olsen and Becky Jones told police investigators that he had
gone to counseling, and that Liysa Northon at first went with him. Although Liysa
Northon quit attending the sessions, Chris “thought the counseling was beneficial and he
enjoyed the sessions and continued without Liysa.” See OSP report of interview of Kris
Olsen & Becky Jones at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25-l thereto).
Page 69
“It appeared that the person on top in the kneeling position
near the river’s edge had been either a woman or a man
with small hands.”
Investigator Dovci investigated the scene and testified to the above
statement. See Trial Testimony July 17, 2001 at 214:17-216:17. See also Forensic
Report of Christine G. Ogilvie, Criminalist, Dec. 19, 2000 at 1 (Rule Decl. 22 and Ex.
12 thereto) (discussing evidence observed at the crime) Plaintiffs cannot prove with clear
and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so their
false light claims must be stricken.
Page 160
“Her whole life had been ruled by her need for instant
gratification, and she had wanted this movie deal
tremendously.”
Phil Hetz, Liysa Northon’s former brother-in-law and a person she trusted
enough to send a letter from prison, reported to police that Liysa Northon was

“depressed” when her screenplay did not sell. See OSP report of interview of Phil Hetz
January 10, 2001 at 5 (Rule Decl. 35 and Ex. 25d thereto). Plaintiffs cannot prove with
clear and convincing evidence that the statement was published with actual malice, and so
their false light claims must be stricken. Moreover, the statement also includes protected
opinion, based on the author’s investigation of Liysa Northon’s life and the observations
of those who knew her, about the way Liysa Northon had lived her life up to that time.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion should be granted and
plaintiffs’ complaint should be stricken in its entirety, pursuant to ORS 31.150. Plaintiffs
cannot establish with substantial evidence the probability that they will prevail on their
claims. Pursuant to ORS 31.152(3) defendants are entitled to their reasonable attorney
fees.
DATED this 12th day of May, 2006.
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
By
Duane A. Bosworth, OSB #82507
Of Attorneys for Defendants Rule, Free Press,
Simon & SchusterCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS’
ANN RULE, FREE PRESS, AND SIMON & SCHUSTER’S AMENDED
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS PURSUANT TO ORS 31.150 on:
L.E. Ashcroft, OSB #79150
Ashcroft Wiles, LLP
1820 Commercial Street, SE
Salem, Oregon 97304
Telephone (503) 364-6734
Facsimile (503) 364-6735
Jennifer A McCauley, OSB #01339
David B. Wiles, OSB #90135
Ashcroft Wiles, LLP
1000 S.W. Broadway, Suite 1500
Portland, Oregon 97205
Telephone: (503) 226-3515

Facsimile (503) 226-4050
Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Stephen D. Krohn, OSB #78117
Assistant Attorney General
1162 Court Street NE
Salem, Oregon 97301-4096
Telephone: (503) 378-6313
Facsimile (503) 378-2056
Of Attorneys for Defendant State of Oregon
by mailing a copy thereof in a sealed, first-class postage prepaid envelope,
addressed to said attorney’s last-known address and deposited in the U.S.
mail at Portland, Oregon on the date set forth below;
by causing a copy thereof to be hand-delivered to said attorney’s address
as shown above on the date set forth below;
by personally handing a copy thereof to said attorney on the date set forth
below;
by sending a copy thereof via overnight courier in a sealed, prepaid
envelope, addressed to said attorney’s last-known address on the date set
forth below; or
by faxing a copy thereof to said attorney at his/her last-known facsimile
number on the date set forth below.
Dated this 12th day of May, 2006.
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
By
Duane A. Bosworth, OSB #82507
Of Attorneys for Defendants Rule, Free Press,
Simon & Schuster