Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - ACLU of Georgia
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - ACLU of Georgia
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - ACLU of Georgia
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Case 1:06-cv-02479-GET Document 25 Filed 09/05/2007 Page 1 <strong>of</strong> 22<br />
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br />
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA<br />
ATLANTA DIVISION<br />
DENISE GRIER, :<br />
CIVIL ACTION NO.<br />
Plaintiff, : 1:06-CV-2479-GET<br />
v. :<br />
DEKALB COUNTY, et al., :<br />
Defendants. :<br />
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT<br />
COMES NOW, Plaintiff and moves <strong>for</strong> partial summary<br />
judgment as to the liability <strong>of</strong> Defendants Caviness and<br />
DeKalb County <strong>for</strong> declaratory relief and damages.<br />
Respectfully submitted,<br />
Goldberg & Cuvillier, P.C.<br />
755 Commerce Drive, Ste. 600<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
(404) 378-7700<br />
(404) 378-7708 FAX<br />
_/s/ Ralph Goldberg__________<br />
Ralph Goldberg<br />
Bar No. 299475<br />
_/s/ Frank Derrickson________<br />
Frank Derrickson<br />
Bar No. 219350<br />
755 Commerce Drive, Ste. 600<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
(404) 373-5551<br />
(404) 378-7708 FAX<br />
Attorneys <strong>for</strong> Plaintiff
Case 1:06-cv-02479-GET Document 25 Filed 09/05/2007 Page 2 <strong>of</strong> 22<br />
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br />
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA<br />
ATLANTA DIVISION<br />
DENISE GRIER, :<br />
CIVIL ACTION NO.<br />
Plaintiff, : 1:06-CV-2479-GET<br />
v. :<br />
DEKALB COUNTY, et al., :<br />
Defendants. :<br />
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS<br />
1. Defendant R.S. Caviness acted under color <strong>of</strong> state law<br />
in arresting Plaintiff (Caviness dep. at 13, 21-22).<br />
During the time he stopped Plaintiff, she was not free to<br />
leave. Id. at 13. He had not stopped her <strong>for</strong> driving too<br />
fast or <strong>for</strong> weaving. Id. at 22.<br />
2. On February 22, 1991, the <strong>Georgia</strong> Supreme Court held<br />
that O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 was unconstitutional. Cunningham v.<br />
State, 260 Ga. 827 (1991).<br />
3. Defendant R.S. Caviness arrested Plaintiff <strong>for</strong><br />
violation <strong>of</strong> O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4. Specifically, he arrested<br />
her <strong>for</strong> the bumper sticker, which is Ex. 1 to his<br />
deposition. Caviness dep. at 27.<br />
4. While arresting Plaintiff, Defendant Caviness called<br />
<strong>for</strong> backup and took Plaintiff’s license. Caviness dep. at<br />
12, 28.<br />
2
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5. Defendant Caviness had first read O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4<br />
three or four years ago. Caviness dep. at 7.<br />
6. The book from which Defendant Caviness learned <strong>of</strong><br />
O.C.G.A. 40-1-4 was issued by DeKalb County, Caviness dep.<br />
at 21, years after the Cunningham decision.<br />
7. DeKalb County uses a s<strong>of</strong>tware program called the Gould<br />
System. Caviness dep. at 13-14.<br />
8. The Advanced Technologies Unit places the s<strong>of</strong>tware on<br />
the hard drives <strong>of</strong> the laptops used in police vehicles.<br />
Police <strong>of</strong>ficers cannot change what is on the computers.<br />
Id. at 14.<br />
9. The Gould System has no annotations. Caviness dep. at<br />
17.<br />
10. Defendant Caviness consulted the Gould System be<strong>for</strong>e<br />
issuing Plaintiff a citation <strong>for</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> O.C.G.A.<br />
§ 40-1-4. Caviness dep. at 23-24.<br />
11. If Defendant Caviness looked at the Gould System<br />
today, O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 would still be on it. Caviness<br />
dep. at 30.<br />
Respectfully submitted,<br />
Goldberg & Cuvillier, P.C.<br />
755 Commerce Drive, Ste. 600<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
_/s/ Ralph Goldberg__________<br />
Ralph Goldberg<br />
Bar No. 299475<br />
3
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(404) 378-7700<br />
(404) 378-7708 FAX<br />
_/s/ Frank Derrickson________<br />
Frank Derrickson<br />
Bar No. 219350<br />
755 Commerce Drive, Ste. 600<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
(404) 373-5551<br />
(404) 378-7708 FAX<br />
Attorneys <strong>for</strong> Plaintiff<br />
4
Case 1:06-cv-02479-GET Document 25 Filed 09/05/2007 Page 5 <strong>of</strong> 22<br />
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br />
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA<br />
ATLANTA DIVISION<br />
DENISE GRIER, :<br />
CIVIL ACTION NO.<br />
Plaintiff, : 1:06-CV-2479-GET<br />
v. :<br />
DEKALB COUNTY, et al., :<br />
Defendants. :<br />
BRIEF IN SUPPORT<br />
FACTS<br />
On February 22, 1991, the <strong>Georgia</strong> Supreme Court held<br />
that O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 was unconstitutional. Cunningham v.<br />
State, 260 Ga. 827 (1991).<br />
On March 10, 2006, Plaintiff and a friend were driving<br />
home from dinner (para. 7 <strong>of</strong> the Complaint). They were<br />
arrested by Defendant Caviness (Answer to Interr. 17 1 ). In<br />
deposition, Defendant Caviness at first quibbled about<br />
whether he had arrested Plaintiff (Caviness dep. at 12,<br />
hereafter C- ), but thereafter, he admitted he had arrested<br />
Plaintiff (C-21-22, 13).<br />
1<br />
It is hard to take the answer seriously since counsel in<br />
deference <strong>of</strong> F.R.C.P 11 made no ef<strong>for</strong>t to talk to his<br />
clients. Instead we received answers like in paragraph 5<br />
that Mr. Caviness does not know whether he is an <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong><br />
the DeKalb County Police Department or not.<br />
5
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He stopped her <strong>for</strong> having a bumper sticker that read,<br />
“I am tired <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong> the BUSHIT.” (Ex. 1 to Caviness’<br />
dep.).<br />
What happened next is disputed. Compare the answers<br />
to Defendants’ first interrogatories at question 4 and<br />
Grier dep. at 11-14 with C-23-26.<br />
What is undisputed is that Defendant Caviness issued<br />
Plaintiff a citation <strong>for</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> O.C.G.A § 40-1-4 (C-<br />
27). According to Defendant Caviness he did not see the<br />
word BUSH in BUSHIT but saw “bullshit” instead (C-27). He<br />
took a picture but still saw the word “bullshit”.<br />
What is also undisputed is that Defendant Caviness<br />
called <strong>for</strong> backup (C-28) and took Plaintiff’s license <strong>for</strong> 5<br />
minutes (C-12, 28), during which time Ms. Grier was not<br />
free to leave. Plaintiff was given a citation (C-13). The<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer had not stopped Plaintiff <strong>for</strong> any other reason (C-<br />
22).<br />
This was the first time Defendant Caviness had<br />
arrested someone <strong>for</strong> violating O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 (C-6). He<br />
knew about O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 because he had previously<br />
stumbled upon the Code section 3 or 4 years ago (C-7). The<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer testified it was an Official Code <strong>of</strong> <strong>Georgia</strong> law<br />
6
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book, id., which was both annotated and unannotated (C-8) 2 .<br />
This book had been issued by DeKalb County (C-21) 3 .<br />
There is also a s<strong>of</strong>tware program (C-13).<br />
A. The s<strong>of</strong>tware is issued by DeKalb<br />
County. I didn’t particularly get it<br />
from anywhere. It is updated on our<br />
laptops that we use in our police cars.<br />
Q. So, <strong>for</strong> example when you pull in<br />
behind somebody and you wonder what the<br />
elements <strong>of</strong> a particular <strong>of</strong>fense are,<br />
you can go to the s<strong>of</strong>tware, and the<br />
s<strong>of</strong>tware will tell you, <strong>for</strong> example,<br />
this is the right statute, this is what<br />
the statute says, so you get it right<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e you go arrest somebody <strong>for</strong> it;<br />
right?<br />
A. Yes.<br />
Q. Okay. And this is provided by<br />
DeKalb County; right?<br />
A. Yes, sir.<br />
Q. And updated by DeKalb County;<br />
right?<br />
A. Yes, sir.<br />
Q. And you have no hand in saying<br />
this is what should be on the s<strong>of</strong>tware,<br />
or this should not be on the s<strong>of</strong>tware;<br />
right?<br />
Q. Does this s<strong>of</strong>tware have a name?<br />
2<br />
Maybe just annotated (C-8, lines 20-24). It was unclear<br />
what he was reading because Title 16 and 40 were in the<br />
same book (C-10).<br />
3<br />
The only annotation to O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 in the Michie<br />
Code shows the statute to be unconstitutional.<br />
7
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A. I think it is pronounced Gould, G-<br />
O-U-L-D, Law. I think they’re the<br />
publishers, but I’m not 100 percent<br />
sure on that.<br />
Q. Okay. Now, I apologize. I’m just<br />
not computer literate, but let me try.<br />
This isn’t like a disk they give you?<br />
You actually have a way to tap into<br />
DeKalb County Police’s -- the general<br />
computer?<br />
A. Every police car is equipped – I<br />
say “every,” but most police cars are<br />
equipped with laptop computers that we<br />
run in<strong>for</strong>mation on: personal<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation, drivers’ license<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation, and so <strong>for</strong>th.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the programs they have on<br />
that computer is the Official Code <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Georgia</strong> Handbook. This is just on the<br />
computer as opposed to having a book in<br />
front <strong>of</strong> you. I have no hand in<br />
placing that s<strong>of</strong>tware on that computer.<br />
Q. Right.<br />
A. No, I do not. That is placed on<br />
the hard drive by our Advanced<br />
Technologies Unit. Police <strong>of</strong>ficers, we<br />
can’t even access what is on that<br />
computer.<br />
What I mean by that, nothing can<br />
be changed. It’s password protected so<br />
nobody can go in there and just take<br />
stuff and put stuff on.<br />
Q. Right. But you can access it?<br />
You just can’t change what’s on there?<br />
A. Yes, sir.<br />
Id. at C-13-14. The Gould System, however, has no<br />
annotations (C-17). Defendant Caviness consulted the Gould<br />
system be<strong>for</strong>e issuing Plaintiff a traffic citation (C-23-<br />
8
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24). If he looked at the Gould system today, O.C.G.A.<br />
§ 40-1-4 would still be on the system (C-30).<br />
I. DEFENDANT CAVINESS VIOLATED PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH<br />
AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY SEIZING HER<br />
In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996),<br />
the Supreme Court held,<br />
Temporary detention <strong>of</strong> individuals<br />
during the stop <strong>of</strong> an automobile by the<br />
police, even if only <strong>for</strong> a brief period<br />
and <strong>for</strong> a limited purpose, constitutes<br />
a ‘seizure’ <strong>of</strong> ‘persons’ within the<br />
meaning <strong>of</strong> [the Fourth Amendment].<br />
Accord Brendlin v. Cali<strong>for</strong>nia, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2401 (2007).<br />
For Fourth Amendment purposes, the question then is whether<br />
the seizure was lawful. See United States v. Botero-<br />
Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10 th<br />
Cir. 1995)(en banc);<br />
Scheuerman v. City <strong>of</strong> Huntsville, 2007 WL 2298186 (N.D.Ala.<br />
2007).<br />
Slip at 8.<br />
A traffic stop ‘is valid under the<br />
Fourth Amendment if the stop is based<br />
on an observed traffic violation or if<br />
the police <strong>of</strong>ficer has reasonable<br />
articulable suspicion that a traffic or<br />
equipment violation has occurred or is<br />
occurring.’<br />
Q. And why did you stop her?<br />
A. I stopped her <strong>for</strong> what I believed<br />
was a valid law on a lewd and pr<strong>of</strong>ane<br />
decal that she had affixed to her<br />
bumper...<br />
9
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Q. It wasn’t <strong>for</strong> driving too fast or<br />
weaving or any <strong>of</strong> that other stuff?<br />
A. No, sir.<br />
(C-22). Defendant Caviness violated Plaintiff’s Fourth<br />
Amendment rights.<br />
II. DEFENDANT CAVINESS VIOLATED PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS UNDER<br />
ARTICLE I, SECTION I, PARAGRAPH I OF THE GEORGIA<br />
CONSTITUTION<br />
In Long v. Jones, 208 Ga.App. 798 (1993), the Court<br />
held that a citizen could sue directly under the <strong>Georgia</strong><br />
Constitution to en<strong>for</strong>ce her state constitutional rights.<br />
The arrest without probable cause violated Plaintiff’s<br />
rights under Article I, Section, I, Paragraph I. Goodwin<br />
v. Allen, 89 Ga.App. 187, 192-193 (1953); Cutsinger v. City<br />
<strong>of</strong> Atlanta, 142 Ga. 555 (1914) (protection against<br />
arbitrary power).<br />
III. DEFENDANT CAVINESS VIOLATED PLAINTIFF’S FIRST<br />
AMENDMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION<br />
In Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827 (1991) the Court<br />
held that O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 was unconstitutional under the<br />
First Amendment and <strong>Georgia</strong> Constitution. Id. at 827<br />
citing Erznoznik v. City <strong>of</strong> Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205<br />
(1975) and Cohen v. Cali<strong>for</strong>nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).<br />
10
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Defendant is liable <strong>for</strong> the arrest in violation <strong>of</strong><br />
First Amendment rights. See Walker v. Briley, 140<br />
F.Supp.2d 1249 (N.D.Ala. 2001); J.S. v. Campbell, 2006 WL<br />
2864254 (M.D.Ala. 2006). See also Johnson v. Bax, 63 F.3d<br />
154 (2 nd Cir. 1995); Cannon v. City and County <strong>of</strong> Denver,<br />
998 F.2d 867, 874 (10 th Cir. 1993) 4 . Cf. Perry v. Los<br />
Angeles Police Dept., 121 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9 th Cir. 1997).<br />
IV. DEFENDANT CAVINESS VIOLATED PLAINTIFF’S RIGHTS UNDER<br />
ARTICLE I, SECTION I, PARAGRAPH V OF THE GEORGIA<br />
CONSTITUTION<br />
Speech that is not abusive is absolutely protected by<br />
the <strong>Georgia</strong> Constitution and cannot be abridged, curtailed<br />
or restrained in any degree <strong>for</strong> any period <strong>of</strong> time no<br />
matter how short. K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v.<br />
Floyd, 217 Ga. 784 (1962). Plaintiff’s speech was not<br />
abusive. Cunningham, supra. Under Long v. Allen, supra,<br />
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.<br />
V. DEFENDANT CAVINESS FALSELY IMPRISONED PLAINTIFF<br />
Under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 false imprisonment consists<br />
<strong>of</strong> the unlawful detention <strong>of</strong> the person <strong>of</strong> another, <strong>for</strong> any<br />
length <strong>of</strong> time, whereby that person is deprived <strong>of</strong> his<br />
4<br />
Defendant Caviness has no qualified immunity in light <strong>of</strong><br />
Cunningham, supra. See Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d<br />
1479, fn. 32 (11 th Cir. 1991); Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega<br />
City Bd. <strong>of</strong> Ed., 115 F.3d 821, fn. 4 (11 th Cir. 1997).<br />
11
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physical liberty. Given that Mr. Caviness stopped<br />
Plaintiff and then temporarily took her license, he falsely<br />
imprisoned her. Burrow v. K-Mart Corp., 166 Ga.App. 284,<br />
287 (1983).<br />
VI. DEFENDANT COUNTY IS LIABLE FOR CONSCIOUSLY ALLOWING<br />
ITS OFFICERS TO ARREST BASED ON AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUE<br />
As set out above at 6-9, the County consciously chose<br />
to provide codes and a Gould system which in<strong>for</strong>med <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />
they could arrest under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 despite the fact<br />
that the statute had been declared unconstitutional 5 . It<br />
was the County’s deliberate choice to use these systems<br />
rather than, <strong>for</strong> example, WESTLAW. Indeed, the County<br />
continues to use the same system (C-30) which still tells<br />
DeKalb <strong>of</strong>ficers they can arrest <strong>for</strong> violations <strong>of</strong> O.C.G.A.<br />
§ 40-1-4 (C-30). See United States v. Hurley, 755 F.2d<br />
788, 790 (11 th Cir. 1985); Land v. United Telephone<br />
Southeast, Inc., 1995 WL 128500 (D.Kans. 1995) at 4-5<br />
(corporate intent).<br />
It follows from Monell that where an unconstitutional<br />
policy causes a violation <strong>of</strong> Plaintiff’s rights, the County<br />
has liability. Monell v. New York Dept. <strong>of</strong> Social Serv.,<br />
436 U.S. 658 (1978). See e.g. Buffkins v. City <strong>of</strong> Omaha,<br />
5<br />
And Mr. Caviness in fact consulted the system be<strong>for</strong>e he<br />
arrested Plaintiff <strong>for</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4.<br />
12
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922 F.2d 465 (8 th Cir. 1990) (unconstitutional disorderly<br />
conduct ordinance); Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047 (5 th<br />
cir. 1990)(unconstitutional ordinance controlling<br />
disposition <strong>of</strong> private property in police custody).<br />
In Buffkins, a case closely analogous to the one<br />
herein, plaintiff was arrested under an unconstitutional<br />
ordinance that had been declared “unconstitutionally<br />
suspect” and later unconstitutional, but had never been<br />
repealed.<br />
In 1985, the Nebraska Supreme Court<br />
observed that subsection (c) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
disorderly conduct ordinance was<br />
“unconstitutionally suspect” but held<br />
that in the particular case the<br />
defendant lacked standing to challenge<br />
the subsection. State v. Groves, 219<br />
Neb. 382, 385, 363 N.W.2d 507, 510<br />
(1985). Four years later, the United<br />
States District Court <strong>for</strong> the District<br />
<strong>of</strong> Nebraska declared the unreasonable<br />
noise subsection <strong>of</strong> the Omaha<br />
disorderly conduct ordinance<br />
(subsection (c)) unconstitutional.<br />
Lang<strong>for</strong>d v. City <strong>of</strong> Omaha, 755 F.Supp.<br />
1460 (1989). The court reached the<br />
“inescapable” conclusion:<br />
that the instant ordinance, using no<br />
more than the word ‘unreasonable’ to<br />
define what noise is prohibited and<br />
being void <strong>of</strong> indication as to whose<br />
sensitivity shall measure a violation<br />
lacks that definiteness, both in notice<br />
<strong>of</strong> what conduct is prescribed and in<br />
establishment <strong>of</strong> guidelines <strong>for</strong><br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement which precedent has firmly<br />
declared to be essential.<br />
Lang<strong>for</strong>d v. City <strong>of</strong> Omaha, CV. 86-0-331<br />
(quoting Magistrate's Findings and<br />
13
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Recommendations, slip op. at 13). Based<br />
on the holding in Lang<strong>for</strong>d v. City <strong>of</strong><br />
Omaha, the trial court in the present<br />
case declared section 20-42(c) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Omaha disorderly conduct ordinance<br />
unconstitutional and granted Buffkins'<br />
summary judgment motion with respect to<br />
her claim that section 20-42(c) is<br />
facially unconstitutional. At the time<br />
<strong>of</strong> Buffkins' arrest, the City <strong>of</strong> Omaha<br />
had not repealed subsection (c) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
disorderly conduct ordinance even<br />
though the Nebraska Supreme Court had<br />
questioned the constitutionality <strong>of</strong><br />
that subsection approximately two years<br />
be<strong>for</strong>e Buffkins was arrested. Moreover,<br />
when the Nebraska federal district<br />
court finally declared section 20-42(c)<br />
unconstitutional, it relied on caselaw<br />
that clearly predated the arrest <strong>of</strong><br />
Buffkins. In addition, at the time <strong>of</strong><br />
Buffkins' arrest, several other federal<br />
courts had held statutes or ordinances<br />
with provisions similar to subsection<br />
(c) <strong>of</strong> the Omaha disorderly conduct<br />
ordinance unconstitutional. See, e.g.,<br />
Pritikin v. Thurman, 311 F.Supp. 1400,<br />
1402 (S.D.Fla.1970); Original Fayette<br />
County Civic & Welfare League, Inc. v.<br />
Ellington, 309 F.Supp. 89, 92<br />
(W.D.Tenn.1970). As a result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
City's failure to repeal subsection<br />
(c), Officers Friend and Grigsby relied<br />
on the unconstitutional portion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
disorderly conduct ordinance to arrest<br />
Buffkins. We there<strong>for</strong>e hold the City <strong>of</strong><br />
Omaha was improperly dismissed as a<br />
party defendant in this lawsuit.<br />
In similar manner, the County continues to en<strong>for</strong>ce an<br />
unconstitutional statute herein. Compare Thompson v. City<br />
<strong>of</strong> Chicago, 2002 WL 31115578 (N.D.Ill. 2002). To continue<br />
to provide codes and computer programs with<br />
14
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unconstitutional code sections contained therein seems akin<br />
to incorporating unconstitutional state law into local<br />
ordinances, codes or written polices.<br />
In Smith v. City <strong>of</strong> Dayton, 68 F.Supp.2d 911, 918<br />
(S.D.Ohio 1999), the Court held that a Monell entity “may<br />
be liable under § 1983 <strong>for</strong> carrying out an unconstitutional<br />
state law, even though the law has not yet been held<br />
unconstitutional” citing Kallstrom v. City <strong>of</strong> Columbus, 136<br />
F.3d 1055 (6 th<br />
Cir. 1998). At fn. 5, the Smith Court noted,<br />
This is not a case where a city was<br />
carrying out a state law which had<br />
already been held unconstitutional,<br />
which would clearly come within § 1983.<br />
The Eleventh Circuit perhaps would not go as far as<br />
Smith’s holding. In Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1222-<br />
1227 (11 th Cir. 2005), the Court noted,<br />
we reject Dillon's argument that, based<br />
on the reasoning in Surplus Store &<br />
Exchange, Inc. v. City <strong>of</strong> Delphi, 928<br />
F.2d 788, 791 (7th Cir.1991), Key West<br />
cannot be liable <strong>for</strong> en<strong>for</strong>cing an<br />
unconstitutional state statute which<br />
the municipality did not promulgate or<br />
adopt. First, § 1983 liability is<br />
appropriate because Key West did adopt<br />
the unconstitutional proscriptions in<br />
FLA. STAT. ch. 112.533(4) as its own.<br />
See KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES<br />
§ 42-1 (“It shall be unlawful <strong>for</strong> any<br />
person to commit, within the city<br />
limits, any act which is or shall be<br />
recognized by the laws <strong>of</strong> the state as<br />
an <strong>of</strong>fense.”). Second, Surplus Store is<br />
inapposite because it involved the<br />
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en<strong>for</strong>cement <strong>of</strong> a state statute by a<br />
municipal police <strong>of</strong>ficer who was not in<br />
a policymaking position. See 928 F.2d<br />
at 788. In this case, by contrast,<br />
Dillon was clothed with final<br />
policymaking authority <strong>for</strong> law<br />
en<strong>for</strong>cement matters in Key West and in<br />
this capacity he chose to en<strong>for</strong>ce the<br />
statute against Cooper. While the<br />
unconstitutional statute authorized<br />
Dillon to act, it was his deliberate<br />
decision to en<strong>for</strong>ce the statute that<br />
ultimately deprived Cooper <strong>of</strong><br />
constitutional rights and there<strong>for</strong>e<br />
triggered municipal liability. See<br />
McKusick v. City <strong>of</strong> Melbourne, 96 F.3d<br />
478, 484 (11th Cir.1996) (finding §<br />
1983 liability could exist where the<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> how and when to en<strong>for</strong>ce an<br />
injunction resulted in deprivation <strong>of</strong><br />
constitutional rights). Thus, Dillon's<br />
decision to en<strong>for</strong>ce an unconstitutional<br />
statute against Cooper constituted a<br />
“deliberate choice to follow a course<br />
<strong>of</strong> action ... made from among various<br />
alternatives by the <strong>of</strong>ficial or<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials responsible <strong>for</strong> establishing<br />
final policy.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at<br />
483, 106 S.Ct. at 1300; see McKusick,<br />
96 F.3d at 484 (noting that “the City<br />
could elect not to arrest anyone at<br />
all”). Accordingly, we find that the<br />
City <strong>of</strong> Key West, through the actions<br />
<strong>of</strong> Dillon, adopted a policy that caused<br />
the deprivation <strong>of</strong> Cooper's<br />
constitutional rights which rendered<br />
the municipality liable under § 1983.<br />
In other words, the Court did not reach the issue <strong>of</strong><br />
the Monell entity’s liability <strong>for</strong> en<strong>for</strong>cing state law under<br />
Delphi.<br />
Cooper is not a case where the statute was already<br />
declared unconstitutional. In this case moreover, although<br />
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the policy maker is unidentified, it is clear that there<br />
has been “a deliberate choice to follow a course <strong>of</strong><br />
action... made from among various alternatives by the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial or <strong>of</strong>ficials responsible <strong>for</strong> establishing final<br />
policy.” That is why the codes given out to the <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />
still contain the unconstitutional statute. It is why<br />
DeKalb County purchased and used and continues to use the<br />
Gould system which contains the unconstitutional statute.<br />
In Davis v. City <strong>of</strong> Camden, 657 F.Supp. 396 (D.N.J.<br />
1987), the Court engaged in a lengthy discussion <strong>of</strong> why the<br />
Monell entity is liable <strong>for</strong> implementing unlawful, yet<br />
state mandated policies and Plaintiff respectfully refers<br />
the Court to the opinion at 402-403.<br />
Relying on Davis, the Court in Conroy v. City <strong>of</strong><br />
Philadelphia, 421 F.Supp.2d 879, 886 (E.D.Pa. 2006) held<br />
that a Monell entity “may be held liable where it has, in<br />
some way, affirmatively adopted the policy or custom -<br />
albeit one that is required by the state – which is the<br />
driving <strong>for</strong>ce behind the alleged violation.” As pointed<br />
out above, DeKalb did “in some way” adopt the state statute<br />
by continuing to provide it to the <strong>of</strong>ficers in the code and<br />
the Gould system. Accord Community Health Care Ass’n. v.<br />
DeParle, 69 F.Supp.2d 463, 475 (S.D.NY 1999), Thomas v.<br />
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City <strong>of</strong> Talent, 2006 WL 2252594 (D.Ore. 2006). Cf. EEOC v.<br />
State <strong>of</strong> Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 169 (7 th Cir. 1995).<br />
In Caminero v. Rand, 882 F.Supp. 1319, 1324-1325<br />
(S.D.NY 1995), the Court distilled these holdings as<br />
follows,<br />
The Court believes, however, that these<br />
four cases, along with Koster, suggest<br />
a reasoned distinction between (1)<br />
cases in which a plaintiff alleges that<br />
a municipality inflicted a<br />
constitutional deprivation by adopting<br />
an unconstitutional policy that was in<br />
some way authorized or mandated by<br />
state law and (2) cases in which a<br />
plaintiff alleges that a municipality,<br />
which adopted no specific policy in the<br />
area at issue, caused a constitutional<br />
deprivation by simply en<strong>for</strong>cing state<br />
law. While allegations <strong>of</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
type have been found to provide a basis<br />
<strong>for</strong> Section 1983 liability, see Garner,<br />
8 F.3d at 364-65; Evers, 745 F.2d at<br />
1203; Davis, 657 F.Supp. at 402-04,<br />
allegations <strong>of</strong> the latter variety may<br />
not FN10 provide a remedy against the<br />
municipality, see Surplus, 928 F.2d at<br />
790-92; Thompson, 1987 WL 33188 at *5-<br />
6.<br />
FN10. Because the Court finds<br />
Plaintiff's claim to be <strong>of</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mer<br />
variety, it makes no finding as to<br />
whether a claim <strong>of</strong> the latter type can<br />
support Section 1983 liability.<br />
See also Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Services, Inc. v.<br />
Leean, 154 F.3d 716, 718 (7 th Cir. 1998).<br />
The district court turned them down on<br />
the grounds that while a county does<br />
not have the shield <strong>of</strong> the Eleventh<br />
Amendment, it cannot be held liable<br />
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herein.<br />
under section 1983 <strong>for</strong> acts that it did<br />
under the command <strong>of</strong> state or federal<br />
law. That at least is the position <strong>of</strong><br />
this circuit, Quinones v. City <strong>of</strong><br />
Evanston, 58 F.3d 275, 278 (7th<br />
Cir.1995); Surplus Store & Exchange,<br />
Inc. v. City <strong>of</strong> Delphi, 928 F.2d 788,<br />
791-92 (7th Cir.1991), and also <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Sixth Circuit. Garner v. Memphis Police<br />
Dept., 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir.1993).<br />
The Ninth Circuit held the contrary in<br />
Evers v. County <strong>of</strong> Custer, 745 F.2d<br />
1196, 1203 (9th Cir.1984). The circuit<br />
split is discussed helpfully in<br />
Caminero v. Rand, 882 F.Supp. 1319,<br />
1324-25 (S.D.N.Y.1995), except that the<br />
opinion erroneously classifies Garner<br />
with Evers. Garner merely distinguishes<br />
between the state's command (which<br />
insulates the local government from<br />
liability) and the state's<br />
authorization (which does not). That is<br />
entirely consistent with Quinones and<br />
Surplus Store.<br />
And consistent with the argument Plaintiff makes<br />
As the <strong>Georgia</strong> Supreme Court noted in 105 Floyd Road,<br />
Inc. v. Crisp County, 279 Ga. 825 (2005),<br />
It is well established that ‘ an<br />
unconstitutional statute, though having<br />
the <strong>for</strong>m and name <strong>of</strong> law, is in reality<br />
no law, but is wholly void, and in<br />
legal contemplation is as inoperative<br />
as if it had never been passed.’<br />
Under those circumstances, it is hard to see how<br />
DeKalb County was en<strong>for</strong>cing state law at all. It is<br />
subject to Monell liability.<br />
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VII. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY RELIEF<br />
Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief against<br />
DeKalb County that the unconstitutional statute applied to<br />
her conduct deprived her <strong>of</strong> constitutional rights. Here<br />
Plaintiff has requested nominal damages. “A plaintiff’s<br />
pursuit <strong>of</strong> nominal damages provides a sufficiently concrete<br />
interest in the outcome <strong>of</strong> the litigation to confer<br />
standing to pursue declaratory relief.” Yniquez v. State,<br />
975 F.2d 646, 647 (9 th Cir. 1992) and cases cited; Murray v.<br />
Bd. <strong>of</strong> Trustees, 659 F.2d 77, 79 (6 th Cir. 1981); F.E.R. v.<br />
Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1533 (10 th<br />
Cir. 1995); Crue v. Aiken,<br />
370 F.3d 668, 678 (7 th Cir. 2004); Pucket v. Rounds, 2006 WL<br />
120233 at 6 (D.SD 2006).<br />
In the instant case Defendants do not concede they<br />
have done anything wrong. A live controversy remains.<br />
Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment as set<br />
<strong>for</strong>th above.<br />
Indeed, Plaintiff believes that she has standing to<br />
seek a declaratory judgment that future arrests on this<br />
statute will violate her constitutional rights. See Church<br />
v. City <strong>of</strong> Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11 th Cir. 1994).<br />
Two facts from the litigation are important. One is that<br />
Plaintiff still has the BUSHIT bumper sticker on her car<br />
and is not removing it. The other is that DeKalb County<br />
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continues to supply its <strong>of</strong>ficers with the Gould System<br />
which continues to list O.C.G.A. § 40-1-4 as a valid<br />
statute. As pointed out above, Plaintiff’s arrest in this<br />
case is a result <strong>of</strong> a County policy, see Church at 1339.<br />
Dunn v. Gleason Four, Inc., 2007 WL 2447020 (M.D.Fla.<br />
2007).<br />
VIII.<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on<br />
all issues, but the amount <strong>of</strong> damages. Whether the <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
has <strong>of</strong>ficial immunity also remains <strong>for</strong> jury consideration.<br />
Respectfully submitted,<br />
Goldberg & Cuvillier, P.C.<br />
755 Commerce Drive, Ste. 600<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
(404) 378-7700<br />
(404) 378-7708 FAX<br />
_/s/ Ralph Goldberg_______<br />
Ralph Goldberg<br />
Bar No. 299475<br />
_/s/ Frank Derrickson________<br />
Frank Derrickson<br />
Bar No. 219350<br />
755 Commerce Drive, Ste. 600<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
(404) 373-5551<br />
(404) 378-7708 FAX<br />
Attorneys <strong>for</strong> Plaintiff<br />
21
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE<br />
This is to certify that I have this day served counsel<br />
<strong>of</strong> record <strong>for</strong> the opposing party in the <strong>for</strong>egoing matter<br />
with a copy <strong>of</strong> this document by depositing in United States<br />
Mail copies <strong>of</strong> the same in properly addressed envelopes<br />
with adequate postage thereon or by notification <strong>of</strong><br />
electronic filing.<br />
Stephen E. Whitted<br />
Senior Assistant County Attorney<br />
1300 Commerce Dr., 5 th Floor<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
This _5 th _ _ day <strong>of</strong> _September____, 2007<br />
_/s/ Ralph Goldberg_________________<br />
Ralph Goldberg<br />
Attorney <strong>for</strong> Plaintiff<br />
Goldberg & Cuvillier, P.C.<br />
755 Commerce Drive, Ste. 600<br />
Decatur, GA 30030<br />
(404) 378-7700<br />
(404) 378-7708 FAX<br />
22