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Nuclear Production of Hydrogen, Fourth Information Exchange ...

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USE OF PSA FOR DESIGN OF EMERGENCY MITIGATION SYSTEMS IN A HYDROGEN PRODUCTION PLANT<br />

Figure 2: PSA covered area<br />

Preliminary system design<br />

Once the information necessary to mitigate sulphuric acid leakage within the area indicated above<br />

was collected, a system was proposed which is composed <strong>of</strong> three protective barriers, which are<br />

described below.<br />

Primary system (isolation system)<br />

The primary system is intended to isolate the major equipment in order to prevent reverse flow and<br />

exhaust oxides in a gaseous state. It consists <strong>of</strong> a special “restraint type” valve (check) and two<br />

motorised shutdown valves, arranged in series. The system includes a low pressure detector on the<br />

main pipe that trips the sulphuric acid pumps, isolates the process and stops the helium flow into the<br />

reactor and heaters (emergency system EAS-200).<br />

One <strong>of</strong> the precursors <strong>of</strong> the critical event is the failure <strong>of</strong> isolation in any <strong>of</strong> the endpoints, either<br />

from the pumping system to the heating train, from the decomposition reactor to the previous train,<br />

or in the helium supply lines. This is because, in the former case, the flow <strong>of</strong> sulphuric acid to spill<br />

will be greater than that permissible, in the second case there is an emission <strong>of</strong> sulphur oxides in a<br />

gaseous state from the decomposition reactor and in the third the flow <strong>of</strong> helium through stagnant<br />

heat exchangers would increase emissions.<br />

The electrical support for this system is the emergency generator for the section <strong>of</strong> sulphuric acid<br />

decomposition. The pressure detectors PI201 and PI202 trip the system on low pressure. The diagram<br />

<strong>of</strong> the primary system is shown in Figure 3.<br />

Neutralisation system<br />

If for some reason the primary system failed, a leak <strong>of</strong> acidic compounds would occur that should be<br />

treated to prevent formation <strong>of</strong> toxic clouds. The second barrier against toxic clouds proposed here is<br />

a chemical mitigation system, which uses a calcium carbonate dilution as a neutralisation agent.<br />

In this second system, an automatic hopper delivers calcium carbonate to a dilution water tank,<br />

where an electric mixer stirs and homogenises the blend. To cover a possible mixer failure, a diesel<br />

pump, with enough capacity to homogenise the tank contents by turbulent backflow, is also placed.<br />

400 NUCLEAR PRODUCTION OF HYDROGEN – © OECD/NEA 2010

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