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sufficient in providing proper notice concerning<br />
the sexual harassment policy. Witness testimony<br />
demonstrated that the grievant’s lewd, harassing<br />
behavior created an oppressive working<br />
environment. 461 (1992-94 contract)<br />
The grievant was provided with proper notice<br />
concerning the sexual harassment policy<br />
articulated in the Work Rules and Procedures.<br />
The employer’s training efforts were sufficient<br />
in providing proper notice concerning the sexual<br />
harassment policy. 461 (1992-94 contract)<br />
The Union’s claim of disparate treatment is not<br />
persuasive. The employer investigated three<br />
cases and found differences which explained<br />
any disparity in discipline. Other employees, not<br />
all black, have been removed for substantiated<br />
patient abuse. 463 (1992-94 contract)<br />
The Department of Rehabilitation and<br />
Correction’s grooming policy does not violate<br />
Section 2.01 of the Agreement, which prohibits<br />
discrimination on the basis of sex. 474 (1992-<br />
94 contract)<br />
The department of Rehabilitation and<br />
Correction’s grooming policy does not violate<br />
section 2.01 of the Agreement, which prohibits<br />
discrimination on the basis of race, creed,<br />
religion, or national origin. 474 (1992-94<br />
contract)<br />
The Union did not establish that the beliefs of<br />
native Americans require long hair for men,<br />
which is prohibited <strong>by</strong> the Department of<br />
Rehabilitation and Correction’s grooming<br />
policy. 474 (1992-94 contract)<br />
The Arbitrator took seriously the allegations of<br />
racial hostility, but there was no evidence of<br />
personal animosity existing between the State’s<br />
principal witness and the grievant. There must<br />
be some evidence other than the allegations in<br />
order to support the claims of disparate<br />
treatment. 480 (1992-94 contract)<br />
The issue of disparate treatment was not properly<br />
raised <strong>by</strong> the Union, which had the burden of<br />
proof. 482 (1992-94 contract)<br />
The arbitrator disregarded the State’s claim that<br />
it would be unfairly prejudiced <strong>by</strong> the<br />
consideration of the Union’s discrimination<br />
claim. The State was neither unfairly surprised<br />
nor disadvantaged because it should have<br />
recognized that the Union was relying on Article<br />
36.05 as the basis for its pre-positioning charge.<br />
487 (1992-94 contract)<br />
The facts that the grievant had been previously<br />
discharged and reinstated with back pay and<br />
there was a substantial delay in paying the<br />
grievant does not establish that the State was<br />
biased against the grievant in violation Article<br />
2.01. This is true since the delay in payment<br />
seemed more attributable to a dispute over the<br />
amount than harassment. The presence of<br />
another employee, who was also in the<br />
department when the door was observed open<br />
but who received no discipline, did not establish<br />
disparate treatment because the grievant was<br />
disciplined on the basis of eyewitness testimony.<br />
The other employee was never observed in a<br />
position to see that the door was open; therefore,<br />
it would have been inappropriate to impose<br />
discipline upon him. 493 (1992-94 contract)<br />
Involvement in EAP is voluntary; therefore,<br />
ODOT’s refusal to enter into an EAP agreement<br />
with the grievant was not fatal to its case and<br />
was within its rights under Article 5. This is<br />
especially true since the grievant was previously<br />
convicted of theft, but never removed; there was<br />
no evidence that ODOT was predisposed to<br />
remove the grievant, and there was no evidence<br />
that the grievant was subject to disparate<br />
treatment. 500 (1992-94 contract)<br />
That the grievant is an African-American and<br />
was not given excused time to attend United<br />
Way meetings does not establish evidence of<br />
race discrimination. Also, that two employees<br />
who attended such meetings were Caucasian<br />
does not provide evidence of race<br />
discrimination. In order to support a claim of<br />
racial discrimination prohibited <strong>by</strong> the<br />
Agreement there must be some evidence, in<br />
some direction, beyond the coincidence pointed<br />
to <strong>by</strong> the Union. 552 (1994-97 contract)<br />
Under <strong>Contract</strong> Article 2, discrimination on the<br />
basis of race, sex, creed, color, religion, age,<br />
national origin, political affiliation, disability,<br />
sexual orientation, or veteran status on the part of<br />
employers is prohibited pursuant to the laws of<br />
the United States, or the State of Ohio or<br />
Executive Orders. In this case, the Arbitrator<br />
held that the employer did not discriminate on<br />
the basis of disability so that the employer would<br />
be able to accommodate her. 562 (1994-97<br />
contract)