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sufficient in providing proper notice concerning<br />

the sexual harassment policy. Witness testimony<br />

demonstrated that the grievant’s lewd, harassing<br />

behavior created an oppressive working<br />

environment. 461 (1992-94 contract)<br />

The grievant was provided with proper notice<br />

concerning the sexual harassment policy<br />

articulated in the Work Rules and Procedures.<br />

The employer’s training efforts were sufficient<br />

in providing proper notice concerning the sexual<br />

harassment policy. 461 (1992-94 contract)<br />

The Union’s claim of disparate treatment is not<br />

persuasive. The employer investigated three<br />

cases and found differences which explained<br />

any disparity in discipline. Other employees, not<br />

all black, have been removed for substantiated<br />

patient abuse. 463 (1992-94 contract)<br />

The Department of Rehabilitation and<br />

Correction’s grooming policy does not violate<br />

Section 2.01 of the Agreement, which prohibits<br />

discrimination on the basis of sex. 474 (1992-<br />

94 contract)<br />

The department of Rehabilitation and<br />

Correction’s grooming policy does not violate<br />

section 2.01 of the Agreement, which prohibits<br />

discrimination on the basis of race, creed,<br />

religion, or national origin. 474 (1992-94<br />

contract)<br />

The Union did not establish that the beliefs of<br />

native Americans require long hair for men,<br />

which is prohibited <strong>by</strong> the Department of<br />

Rehabilitation and Correction’s grooming<br />

policy. 474 (1992-94 contract)<br />

The Arbitrator took seriously the allegations of<br />

racial hostility, but there was no evidence of<br />

personal animosity existing between the State’s<br />

principal witness and the grievant. There must<br />

be some evidence other than the allegations in<br />

order to support the claims of disparate<br />

treatment. 480 (1992-94 contract)<br />

The issue of disparate treatment was not properly<br />

raised <strong>by</strong> the Union, which had the burden of<br />

proof. 482 (1992-94 contract)<br />

The arbitrator disregarded the State’s claim that<br />

it would be unfairly prejudiced <strong>by</strong> the<br />

consideration of the Union’s discrimination<br />

claim. The State was neither unfairly surprised<br />

nor disadvantaged because it should have<br />

recognized that the Union was relying on Article<br />

36.05 as the basis for its pre-positioning charge.<br />

487 (1992-94 contract)<br />

The facts that the grievant had been previously<br />

discharged and reinstated with back pay and<br />

there was a substantial delay in paying the<br />

grievant does not establish that the State was<br />

biased against the grievant in violation Article<br />

2.01. This is true since the delay in payment<br />

seemed more attributable to a dispute over the<br />

amount than harassment. The presence of<br />

another employee, who was also in the<br />

department when the door was observed open<br />

but who received no discipline, did not establish<br />

disparate treatment because the grievant was<br />

disciplined on the basis of eyewitness testimony.<br />

The other employee was never observed in a<br />

position to see that the door was open; therefore,<br />

it would have been inappropriate to impose<br />

discipline upon him. 493 (1992-94 contract)<br />

Involvement in EAP is voluntary; therefore,<br />

ODOT’s refusal to enter into an EAP agreement<br />

with the grievant was not fatal to its case and<br />

was within its rights under Article 5. This is<br />

especially true since the grievant was previously<br />

convicted of theft, but never removed; there was<br />

no evidence that ODOT was predisposed to<br />

remove the grievant, and there was no evidence<br />

that the grievant was subject to disparate<br />

treatment. 500 (1992-94 contract)<br />

That the grievant is an African-American and<br />

was not given excused time to attend United<br />

Way meetings does not establish evidence of<br />

race discrimination. Also, that two employees<br />

who attended such meetings were Caucasian<br />

does not provide evidence of race<br />

discrimination. In order to support a claim of<br />

racial discrimination prohibited <strong>by</strong> the<br />

Agreement there must be some evidence, in<br />

some direction, beyond the coincidence pointed<br />

to <strong>by</strong> the Union. 552 (1994-97 contract)<br />

Under <strong>Contract</strong> Article 2, discrimination on the<br />

basis of race, sex, creed, color, religion, age,<br />

national origin, political affiliation, disability,<br />

sexual orientation, or veteran status on the part of<br />

employers is prohibited pursuant to the laws of<br />

the United States, or the State of Ohio or<br />

Executive Orders. In this case, the Arbitrator<br />

held that the employer did not discriminate on<br />

the basis of disability so that the employer would<br />

be able to accommodate her. 562 (1994-97<br />

contract)

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