by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA

oppressive working environment. 461 (1992-94
contract)
The grievant admitted hitting the patient, but
failed in her assertion that it was in self-defense.
The Employer’s finding of patient abuse is well
founded, and as such, there was just cause for her
removal. 463 (1992-94 contract)
The Employer and grievant signed a last-chance
agreement, which included EAP completion,
after the Employer ordered the removal of the
grievant based on a charge of patient abuse, a
charge which was not grieved. The grievant
failed to meet the conditions of the last chance
agreement, and so the Employer had just cause to
activate the discipline held in abeyance,
regardless of any mitigating circumstances. 465
(1992-94 contract)
The grievant failed to inform a supervisor that he
had lost his driving privileges and he continued
to drive state vehicles. Because he lost his
license, he was unable to perform his job duties,
and it was additionally unlikely in light of his
suspension that he could obtain the newly
required commercial driver’s license by the
deadline. Therefore, the Employer had just cause
to remove the grievant. 466 (1992-94 contract)
A seven-day suspension is a very serious penalty
which must be warranted by a very serious
offense. That the grievant called in late, reported
to work well after his call-in, failed to obtain a
doctor’s verification is not enough to justify such
a penalty. With just one-day suspension on the
record, only a two-day suspension is warranted.
468 (1992-94 contract)
Although the grievant’s commission of inmate
abuse constitutes a first offense, Management
had just cause to remove him as a threat to the
institution’s security. 470 (1992-94 contract)
The grievant was improperly designated a
fiduciary, and therefore, maintained her
bargaining unit status. The Employer, therefore
violated Section 24.01 of the Contract when it
terminated the grievant without just cause. 472
(1992-94 contract)
Unless the individual situation is examined,
removal after three days’ unauthorized leave,
without more, is simply an unreasonable,
arbitrary cut-off time without evidence of the
employee’s intention. 477 (1992-94 contract)
The employer had just cause to remove the
grievant who had admitted to charges of gross
sexual imposition of an inmate and was
subsequently convicted. The Employer did not
abuse its discretion, considering the seriousness
of the misconduct and its direct relation to the
grievant’s responsibilities and job performance
as a Correction Officer. 479 (1992-94 contract)
The Employer had just cause to remove the
grievant for sleeping on duty, in light of his
disciplinary record. 480 (1992-94 contract)
The State did not establish just cause for
discipline. The allegations of inmate abuse were
not supported. The testimony of the State’s
witnesses, many of whom have criminal records,
was inconsistent, and in many cases, not
credible. No reports were filed on the incident
nor were medical exams conducted until days
later. Material evidence was not secured, and a
detailed investigation was apparently not
conducted by the Employer after the incident.
481 (1992-94 contract)
Giving the “role model” requirement its most
narrow reading, the prison employer can show a
rational relationship between the correction
officer’s off-duty criminal behavior, whether a
felony or misdemeanor, and his ability to
function as a Correction Officer, whose job
essentially consists of confining criminals, when
he is himself a criminal. Such a conflict of
interest can seriously undermine his ability to do
the job. While the grievant had only minor
discipline up to this point, the nature of the crime
was serious. The State had just cause to remove
the grievant. 482 (1992-94 contract)
ODOT policy prohibits any ODOT employee
from operating or driving any department
equipment unless or until their modification of a
driver’s license suspension is documented on the
employee’s driving record at the BMV. The
grievant failed to comply with the requirements
of the modifying order, and so was not able to
obtain limited driving privileges. Because 70
percent of the grievant’s job duties required him
to drive ODOT vehicles off-season, and 100
percent in snow season, he was unable to
perform his job. Therefore, the Employer had
just cause to remove the grievant. 486 (1992-94
contract)