by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
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suspension would be excessive and<br />
unreasonable. 73<br />
The disciplinary action cannot be mitigated <strong>by</strong><br />
the Grievant's performance and attendance<br />
because the offense itself has its own<br />
consequences. If the penalty were reduced<br />
because the Grievant did not knowingly bring<br />
the items onto the grounds, the unit's policy<br />
would be weakened and an unsafe work<br />
environment would be created. Therefore, due to<br />
the severity of the Grievant’s offense and the<br />
type of Institution involved. Removal was<br />
appropriate. 174<br />
When just cause is the issue, the ordinary<br />
presumption is that the employer must establish<br />
both the cause and the ethical justification for<br />
discipline. The parties to this dispute have taken<br />
the presumption a step further, turning it into a<br />
contractual mandate in Section 24.01. 183<br />
To establish just cause in the case the state must<br />
clearly and convincingly show:<br />
1. Acts <strong>by</strong> the grievant<br />
2. which constitute the violations<br />
charged<br />
3. and that the removal of the grievant<br />
was consistent with<br />
a.The Commission’s<br />
progressivedisciplinary Guidelines, and<br />
b. Labor agreement requirements,<br />
particularly sections 24.02 and<br />
24.04.<br />
Furthermore, removal cannot be arbitrary,<br />
unreasonable or discriminatory under the<br />
circumstances of this case. 190<br />
Under 24.01, all discipline of any nature<br />
whatsoever is to be measured against just cause.<br />
Under 24.02, most discipline must be<br />
progressive and follow four steps. The<br />
requirements are separate and distinct, but just<br />
cause is the overriding consideration.<br />
Progressive discipline cannot subsume just<br />
cause. The disciplinary priorities are the other<br />
way around. In other words, the fact that the<br />
employer strictly follows progressive-discipline<br />
steps does not automatically assure that any or<br />
all of the disciplinary impositions will be for just<br />
cause; and discipline is not for just cause unless<br />
it is corrective. Progressive penalties which are<br />
demonstrably punitive and noncorrective will be<br />
set aside <strong>by</strong> arbitrators. 213<br />
Section 24.01 provides that if there is found<br />
patient abuse, discharge is the only appropriate<br />
penalty. Neutrals are afforded no discretion to<br />
modify penalties. However, in order for the<br />
discharge penalty to be implemented, there must<br />
be a finding of patient abuse. 216<br />
The arbitrator found the removal order defective<br />
where it contained different particular violations<br />
that the pre-disciplinary hearing notice. The<br />
latter document referred to one insubordinate<br />
event but the removal order referred to several.<br />
This circumstance failed to provide the grievant<br />
with proper and timely notice as required <strong>by</strong><br />
24.01 and 24.04. This may have prevented a full<br />
and exact defense for the entire episode. 220<br />
The employer violated 24.01 <strong>by</strong> imposing<br />
discipline under a directive not clearly in force at<br />
the time of the incident and different from the<br />
directive specified on the notice of investigation.<br />
While the employer has the right to promulgate<br />
reasonable work rules, it cannot deprive<br />
employees or the union rights guaranteed to<br />
them under the contract. Nor can it initiate<br />
discipline under one set of work rules and<br />
complete it under another when the results is to<br />
the employee’s disadvantage. 227<br />
The word “abuse” in 24.01 is not defined, nor is<br />
it referenced to another contract section or the<br />
code. Abuse has varying definitions among<br />
agencies. However, abuse in 24.01 is a<br />
significant word because once abuse is found,<br />
the arbitrator loses power to modify the<br />
termination. Thus, in the context of the contract,<br />
the work “abuse is latently ambiguous – that is,<br />
the work has at least two plausible meanings.<br />
The duty of the arbitrator is to define the word as<br />
“intended” <strong>by</strong> the parties. The arbitrator is clear<br />
that abuse in the contract has to be a singular<br />
clear standard and cannot be defined each time<br />
<strong>by</strong> a different agency’s standard. The finding of<br />
abuse under 24.01 is an exceedingly powerful<br />
finding and must be a firmly fixed lodestar. The<br />
arbitrator is very persuaded <strong>by</strong> the cogent<br />
opinion of Arbitrator Pincus (G-87-00 (A) 10-<br />
31-87) and the persuasive elaboration <strong>by</strong><br />
arbitrator Michael: 238 − Section 24.01 requires<br />
that discipline be premised on just cause, and it<br />
charges the Employer with the burden of proving<br />
that the standard has been met. In most disputes<br />
involving removals, suspensions, or reprimands,<br />
this provision grants arbitrators a wide range of<br />
matters to consider. The term, “just cause” is<br />
expansive, amorphous, and often defined <strong>by</strong> an