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(formerly Article 43.02 of 1986 – 1989<br />

contract)<br />

Ohio Revised code 145.298 requires that under certain<br />

conditions of layoff, the Employer is required to establish a<br />

retirement incentive plan for employee of employing unit in<br />

which the layoffs are to take place: 458 (1992-94 contract)<br />

Prior to her employment with the Industrial Commission<br />

(IC) in 1986, the grievant was employed at FCPDO. She<br />

requested service credit for her tenure at FCPDO. The IC<br />

denied the request because the FCPDO did not make<br />

contributions to PERS for its employees. The arbitrator<br />

found that the FCPDO was established as a result of the<br />

Public Defender’s Act of 1976. The majority decision in<br />

Mallory v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 82 St. 3d 235<br />

(1998) noted that the FCPDO was created pursuant to the<br />

Public Defender Act and that its public duties were<br />

performed under the auspices of the sovereign rights of<br />

Franklin County. The arbitrator’s determination was based<br />

on the court’s analysis Mallory. The grievant, however, did<br />

not file a grievance in this matter until 2001; therefore,<br />

service credit awarded as of ten days prior to the grievance<br />

filing date, pursuant to the <strong>Contract</strong>. 784<br />

The grievant was charged with various alleged violations<br />

including unexcused tardiness, AWOL, and Failure of Good<br />

Behavior for not following the directions of a superior when<br />

he was told to take a midday lunch break before going to his<br />

next appointment. He chose not to take the break and to<br />

proceed to his next appointment. The arbitrator found that<br />

the initial determination <strong>by</strong> the employer that the AWOL<br />

and Failure of Good Behavior charges were “serious” was<br />

correct. However, these charges were ultimately found to<br />

have been improperly leveled against the grievant. The<br />

unexcused tardiness allegation was considered diminished<br />

in severity <strong>by</strong> the fact that some of the tardiness charges<br />

were simply in error, others were withdrawn and one was<br />

improper. The arbitrator found that the employer gave<br />

proper weight to the insubordination charge and that the<br />

remaining tardiness charge was recidivist in nature. He<br />

found that the charge of Exercising Poor Judgment was<br />

proper in this instance because the offense followed specific<br />

counseling regarding how to handle his lunch break. This<br />

charge was concededly less serious than insubordination,<br />

and the 10-day suspension was reduced to an 8-day<br />

suspension. 809<br />

The grievant was given a 10-day suspension for various<br />

alleged violations including Neglect of Duty,<br />

Insubordination, Exercising Poor Judgment; Failure of<br />

Good Behavior and Working Excess Hours Without<br />

Authorization. The Union argued that the same person<br />

conducted the third step proceeding, the pre-disciplinary<br />

meeting, another third step meeting and also prepared the<br />

notice of the pre-disciplinary meeting notice. In essence,<br />

the grievant’s “Accuser, Judge and Employer<br />

Representative.” The arbitrator determined that there was<br />

no conflict and that the contract does not require that<br />

different individuals preside over the various steps in the<br />

process. He noted that the pre-disciplinary meeting was not<br />

an adjudicatory hearing, stating that it is described in Article<br />

24.04 as a meeting. The arbitrator found that five<br />

examination reports were not submitted <strong>by</strong> the grievant.<br />

The supervisor was “extraordinarily patient with the<br />

grievant” and gave him several reminders to submit the<br />

examination reports. The grievant clearly understood he<br />

was to submit the reports. The grievant’s failure to submit<br />

the reports was a failure to perform a fundamental part of<br />

his job. The Employer failed to make its case with regards<br />

to the grievant’s time sheets. The employer did not show<br />

just cause to discipline the grievant for working excess<br />

hours without authorization. Though the time sheet was not<br />

clear, it was obvious that the grievant was not claiming<br />

hours beyond his scheduled hours. The arbitrator<br />

determined that there was no just cause for Working in<br />

Excess Poor Judgment, Failure of Good Behavior and<br />

Exercising Poor Judgment; however, he found just cause for<br />

Insubordination and Neglect of Duty. The arbitrator found<br />

the 10-day suspension reasonable. The decision <strong>by</strong> the<br />

employer to suspend the grievant for 10 days in this case<br />

was based in part on an act of insubordination that occurred<br />

approximately one month prior to the charges in this matter.<br />

854<br />

In January 1990, the <strong>OCSEA</strong> and the DRC entered into a<br />

Settlement Agreement containing several conditions<br />

intended to regulate future strip searches. This was a result<br />

of the Union suing DRC in federal court, challenging the<br />

constitutionality of the DRC’s strip search procedures. The<br />

instant case arose from DRC’s decision to strip search five<br />

black female correction officers after receiving an<br />

anonymous tip that described a correction officer who<br />

allegedly intended to bring drugs into the Allen Correctional<br />

Facility. The Arbitrator held that the Settlement Agreement<br />

was intended to be part of the Collective-Bargaining<br />

Agreement. Section 7(f) explicitly removes only “cause for<br />

search” from arbitration and grievances. “Cause for search”<br />

does not include the terms “suspicion” or “reasonable” and<br />

is not necessarily synonymous with the phrases “reasonable<br />

suspicion”, “cause for suspicion supporting the search”, or<br />

“cause for suspicion”. These are separate issues. In<br />

addition, Section 7(b) affords employees targeted for strip<br />

searches the right to review much of the information that<br />

went into the decision to strip search them. Affording<br />

employees access without the right to subject it to<br />

independent review does not protect them from arbitrary,<br />

discriminatory, or unreasonable searches or decisions. The<br />

Arbitrator held that issues involving how strip searches are<br />

conducted and the element of reasonable suspicion<br />

supporting decisions to strip search employees are<br />

substantively arbitrable under the Collective-Bargaining<br />

Agreement, which is referenced under Section 7(f) of the<br />

Settlement Agreement. The case was settled with the<br />

grievants receiving both wage and back leave accrual. 949<br />

Management of EPA violated the Collective Bargaining<br />

Agreement <strong>by</strong> failing to give the Grievant a pro-rated<br />

vacation dump. The State was directed to credit her with 36<br />

hours of vacation leave. Article 28 is clear in that

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