by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA
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(formerly Article 43.02 of 1986 – 1989<br />
contract)<br />
Ohio Revised code 145.298 requires that under certain<br />
conditions of layoff, the Employer is required to establish a<br />
retirement incentive plan for employee of employing unit in<br />
which the layoffs are to take place: 458 (1992-94 contract)<br />
Prior to her employment with the Industrial Commission<br />
(IC) in 1986, the grievant was employed at FCPDO. She<br />
requested service credit for her tenure at FCPDO. The IC<br />
denied the request because the FCPDO did not make<br />
contributions to PERS for its employees. The arbitrator<br />
found that the FCPDO was established as a result of the<br />
Public Defender’s Act of 1976. The majority decision in<br />
Mallory v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 82 St. 3d 235<br />
(1998) noted that the FCPDO was created pursuant to the<br />
Public Defender Act and that its public duties were<br />
performed under the auspices of the sovereign rights of<br />
Franklin County. The arbitrator’s determination was based<br />
on the court’s analysis Mallory. The grievant, however, did<br />
not file a grievance in this matter until 2001; therefore,<br />
service credit awarded as of ten days prior to the grievance<br />
filing date, pursuant to the <strong>Contract</strong>. 784<br />
The grievant was charged with various alleged violations<br />
including unexcused tardiness, AWOL, and Failure of Good<br />
Behavior for not following the directions of a superior when<br />
he was told to take a midday lunch break before going to his<br />
next appointment. He chose not to take the break and to<br />
proceed to his next appointment. The arbitrator found that<br />
the initial determination <strong>by</strong> the employer that the AWOL<br />
and Failure of Good Behavior charges were “serious” was<br />
correct. However, these charges were ultimately found to<br />
have been improperly leveled against the grievant. The<br />
unexcused tardiness allegation was considered diminished<br />
in severity <strong>by</strong> the fact that some of the tardiness charges<br />
were simply in error, others were withdrawn and one was<br />
improper. The arbitrator found that the employer gave<br />
proper weight to the insubordination charge and that the<br />
remaining tardiness charge was recidivist in nature. He<br />
found that the charge of Exercising Poor Judgment was<br />
proper in this instance because the offense followed specific<br />
counseling regarding how to handle his lunch break. This<br />
charge was concededly less serious than insubordination,<br />
and the 10-day suspension was reduced to an 8-day<br />
suspension. 809<br />
The grievant was given a 10-day suspension for various<br />
alleged violations including Neglect of Duty,<br />
Insubordination, Exercising Poor Judgment; Failure of<br />
Good Behavior and Working Excess Hours Without<br />
Authorization. The Union argued that the same person<br />
conducted the third step proceeding, the pre-disciplinary<br />
meeting, another third step meeting and also prepared the<br />
notice of the pre-disciplinary meeting notice. In essence,<br />
the grievant’s “Accuser, Judge and Employer<br />
Representative.” The arbitrator determined that there was<br />
no conflict and that the contract does not require that<br />
different individuals preside over the various steps in the<br />
process. He noted that the pre-disciplinary meeting was not<br />
an adjudicatory hearing, stating that it is described in Article<br />
24.04 as a meeting. The arbitrator found that five<br />
examination reports were not submitted <strong>by</strong> the grievant.<br />
The supervisor was “extraordinarily patient with the<br />
grievant” and gave him several reminders to submit the<br />
examination reports. The grievant clearly understood he<br />
was to submit the reports. The grievant’s failure to submit<br />
the reports was a failure to perform a fundamental part of<br />
his job. The Employer failed to make its case with regards<br />
to the grievant’s time sheets. The employer did not show<br />
just cause to discipline the grievant for working excess<br />
hours without authorization. Though the time sheet was not<br />
clear, it was obvious that the grievant was not claiming<br />
hours beyond his scheduled hours. The arbitrator<br />
determined that there was no just cause for Working in<br />
Excess Poor Judgment, Failure of Good Behavior and<br />
Exercising Poor Judgment; however, he found just cause for<br />
Insubordination and Neglect of Duty. The arbitrator found<br />
the 10-day suspension reasonable. The decision <strong>by</strong> the<br />
employer to suspend the grievant for 10 days in this case<br />
was based in part on an act of insubordination that occurred<br />
approximately one month prior to the charges in this matter.<br />
854<br />
In January 1990, the <strong>OCSEA</strong> and the DRC entered into a<br />
Settlement Agreement containing several conditions<br />
intended to regulate future strip searches. This was a result<br />
of the Union suing DRC in federal court, challenging the<br />
constitutionality of the DRC’s strip search procedures. The<br />
instant case arose from DRC’s decision to strip search five<br />
black female correction officers after receiving an<br />
anonymous tip that described a correction officer who<br />
allegedly intended to bring drugs into the Allen Correctional<br />
Facility. The Arbitrator held that the Settlement Agreement<br />
was intended to be part of the Collective-Bargaining<br />
Agreement. Section 7(f) explicitly removes only “cause for<br />
search” from arbitration and grievances. “Cause for search”<br />
does not include the terms “suspicion” or “reasonable” and<br />
is not necessarily synonymous with the phrases “reasonable<br />
suspicion”, “cause for suspicion supporting the search”, or<br />
“cause for suspicion”. These are separate issues. In<br />
addition, Section 7(b) affords employees targeted for strip<br />
searches the right to review much of the information that<br />
went into the decision to strip search them. Affording<br />
employees access without the right to subject it to<br />
independent review does not protect them from arbitrary,<br />
discriminatory, or unreasonable searches or decisions. The<br />
Arbitrator held that issues involving how strip searches are<br />
conducted and the element of reasonable suspicion<br />
supporting decisions to strip search employees are<br />
substantively arbitrable under the Collective-Bargaining<br />
Agreement, which is referenced under Section 7(f) of the<br />
Settlement Agreement. The case was settled with the<br />
grievants receiving both wage and back leave accrual. 949<br />
Management of EPA violated the Collective Bargaining<br />
Agreement <strong>by</strong> failing to give the Grievant a pro-rated<br />
vacation dump. The State was directed to credit her with 36<br />
hours of vacation leave. Article 28 is clear in that