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by Contract Number (PDF) - OCSEA

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State to prove that its decision was rationally based on<br />

greater efficiency, greater economy, greater programmatic<br />

benefits OR greater related factors. Then, the burden again<br />

shifts to the Union to prove that the State's decision was<br />

erroneous, based in bad faith OR not in the public interest<br />

<strong>by</strong> clear and convincing evidence. 514A<br />

Management argued that the grievance was<br />

considerably untimely, since the cause of action<br />

had occurred fifteen years earlier, when a resident<br />

worker started working as a short order cook. The<br />

grievance was filed on the same day the cooks<br />

were ordered to report to the new location. The<br />

Arbitrator held that the grievance was timely. The<br />

Arbitrator found there was insufficient evidence<br />

that the reason for giving the Veterans Hall<br />

Kitchen cooking duties to the Ohio Veterans Home<br />

Resident Workers and changing the work area of<br />

the union cooks to Secrest Kitchen was to erode the<br />

bargaining unit. Members of the bargaining unit<br />

were not displaced. There were no layoffs.<br />

Members were not deprived of jobs that were<br />

normally available to them. It appears that the only<br />

change was the work assignment. There was no<br />

evidence of any deprivation of any economic<br />

benefit to membership. The Arbitrator held that<br />

the 1994 grievance settlement had not been<br />

violated. No bad faith was established. Further,<br />

the short order grilling was de minis in nature when<br />

compared to production quantity work performed<br />

<strong>by</strong> the union cooks. The subcontracting in these<br />

circumstances had little or no effect on the<br />

bargaining unit, and was permissible under Article<br />

39.01.<br />

1009<br />

ARTICLE 43 – DURATION<br />

43.01 - Duration of Agreement<br />

Requires an arbitrator to find the contract controlling if a<br />

section of the Ohio Revised Code conflicts with a<br />

contractual provision. 22<br />

State statutes or regulations (in this case protection of<br />

patient confidentiality) do not provide state with a<br />

reasonable basis under 25.08 or 24.04 for refusing to<br />

provide information since section 43.01 of the contract<br />

determines that the contract supercedes any conflicting state<br />

law. 39<br />

Section 43.01 gives precedence to the agreement over any<br />

statutes other than ORC 4117 where such statutes conflict<br />

with the agreement. Thus, the requirement in 25.08 that the<br />

state produce evidence requested <strong>by</strong> the union supercedes<br />

the Ohio Highway Patrol’s statutory privilege in ORC<br />

149.43: 75 − The parties did not intend for the contract to<br />

supersede applicable federal laws and regulations. 116<br />

The parties agreed in 43.01 that the Agreement takes<br />

precedence and supercedes conflicting state laws except<br />

ORC Chapter 4117 and the rules, regulations, and directives<br />

in that statute. That 4117 in section 10(A) provides that the<br />

public employer and employees are bound to state and local<br />

laws pertaining to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of<br />

employment for public employees only in situations where<br />

there is no agreement or when an agreement exists but it<br />

makes no specifications about a matter. If an agreement<br />

exists and it specifies a matter, the contract takes<br />

precedence. Terminating an employee after his<br />

probationary period is a term and condition of employment<br />

subject to final and binding arbitration for grievances. The<br />

contract is specific about this term and condition of<br />

employment. An employee cannot be terminated for any<br />

reason except just cause. In the case of applying civil<br />

service laws concerning employees who have failed a civil<br />

service exam, the employer has the burden of taking actions<br />

to follow civil service laws within the constraints of the<br />

contract. 175<br />

Section 43.01 gives the Agreement precedence over<br />

conflicting laws. 297<br />

The State cited Ohio Revised code section 124.34 in the<br />

grievant’s removal for abuse. Arbitrator Rivera quoted<br />

Arbitrator Pincus in the Dunning** opinion, “Reliance on<br />

this section (the Ohio Revised Code section defining abuse),<br />

moreover, conflicts with a recent Ohio Supreme Court<br />

decision which found that the Code cannot be used to<br />

supplement and indirectly usurp provisions negotiated <strong>by</strong><br />

the parties.” The standard under the Agreement is just cause,<br />

not a lesser standard defined <strong>by</strong> the Ohio Revised Code.<br />

This violation was found to be de minimis. 308**<br />

Citation of the Ohio Revised Code section defining abuse is<br />

a technical violation and is insufficient for overturning the<br />

removal for allegedly abusing a youth. 326<br />

The grievant was a Correction Officer who was enrolled in<br />

an EAP and taking psychotropic drugs. He got into an<br />

argument with an inmate who had used a racial slur and<br />

struck the inmate. The grievant was removed for abuse of an<br />

inmate and use of excessive force. The arbitrator found that<br />

the grievant struck the inmate with no justifying<br />

circumstances such as self defense, or preventing a crime.<br />

The employer, however, failed to prove that the grievant<br />

knowingly caused physical harm as required <strong>by</strong> Ohio<br />

Revised Code section 2903.33(B)(2), because the grievant<br />

was taking prescription drugs. The grievant’s removal was<br />

reduced to a thirty day suspension because the employer<br />

failed to consider the grievant’s medication. The grievant<br />

was not faulted for not notifying the employer that he was<br />

taking the psychotropic drugs because he had no knowledge<br />

of their possible side effects. Thus, the use of excessive<br />

force was proven, but excessive use of force is not abuse,<br />

per se. 368<br />

The grievant had been on a disability separation and had<br />

been refused when he requested reinstatement. The

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